Whether Fear Is Fittingly Divided into Filial, Initial, Servile and
Worldly Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that fear is unfittingly divided into
filial, initial, servile and worldly fear. For Damascene says (De
Fide Orth. ii, 15) that there are six kinds of fear, viz. "laziness,
shamefacedness," etc. of which we have treated above (I-II, Q. 41, A.
4), and which are not mentioned in the division in question.
Therefore this division of fear seems unfitting.
Obj. 2: Further, each of these fears is either good or evil. But
there is a fear, viz. natural fear, which is neither morally good,
since it is in the demons, according to James 2:19, "The devils . . .
believe and tremble," nor evil, since it is in Christ, according to
Mk. 14:33, Jesus "began to fear and be heavy." Therefore the
aforesaid division of fear is insufficient.
Obj. 3: Further, the relation of son to father differs from that of
wife to husband, and this again from that of servant to master. Now
filial fear, which is that of the son in comparison with his father,
is distinct from servile fear, which is that of the servant in
comparison with his master. Therefore chaste fear, which seems to be
that of the wife in comparison with her husband, ought to be
distinguished from all these other fears.
Obj. 4: Further, even as servile fear fears punishment, so do initial
and worldly fear. Therefore no distinction should be made between
them.
Obj. 5: Further, even as concupiscence is about some good, so is fear
about some evil. Now "concupiscence of the eyes," which is the desire
for things of this world, is distinct from "concupiscence of the
flesh," which is the desire for one's own pleasure. Therefore
"worldly fear," whereby one fears to lose external goods, is distinct
from "human fear," whereby one fears harm to one's own person.
On the contrary stands the authority of the Master (Sent. iii, D, 34).
_I answer that,_ We are speaking of fear now, in so far as it makes
us turn, so to speak, to God or away from Him. For, since the object
of fear is an evil, sometimes, on account of the evils he fears, man
withdraws from God, and this is called human fear; while sometimes,
on account of the evils he fears, he turns to God and adheres to Him.
This latter evil is twofold, viz. evil of punishment, and evil of
fault.
Accordingly if a man turn to God and adhere to Him, through fear of
punishment, it will be servile fear; but if it be on account of fear
of committing a fault, it will be filial fear, for it becomes a child
to fear offending its father. If, however, it be on account of both,
it will be initial fear, which is between both these fears. As to
whether it is possible to fear the evil of fault, the question has
been treated above (I-II, Q. 42, A. 3) when we were considering the
passion of fear.
Reply Obj. 1: Damascene divides fear as a passion of the soul:
whereas this division of fear is taken from its relation to God, as
explained above.
Reply Obj. 2: Moral good consists chiefly in turning to God, while
moral evil consists chiefly in turning away from Him: wherefore all
the fears mentioned above imply either moral evil or moral good. Now
natural fear is presupposed to moral good and evil, and so it is not
numbered among these kinds of fear.
Reply Obj. 3: The relation of servant to master is based on the power
which the master exercises over the servant; whereas, on the
contrary, the relation of a son to his father or of a wife to her
husband is based on the son's affection towards his father to whom he
submits himself, or on the wife's affection towards her husband to
whom she binds herself in the union of love. Hence filial and chaste
fear amount to the same, because by the love of charity God becomes
our Father, according to Rom. 8:15, "You have received the spirit of
adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)"; and by this same
charity He is called our spouse, according to 2 Cor. 11:2, "I have
espoused you to one husband, that I may present you as a chaste
virgin to Christ": whereas servile fear has no connection with these,
since it does not include charity in its definition.
Reply Obj. 4: These three fears regard punishment but in different
ways. For worldly or human fear regards a punishment which turns man
away from God, and which God's enemies sometimes inflict or threaten:
whereas servile and initial fear regard a punishment whereby men are
drawn to God, and which is inflicted or threatened by God. Servile
fear regards this punishment chiefly, while initial fear regards it
secondarily.
Reply Obj. 5: It amounts to the same whether man turns away from God
through fear of losing his worldly goods, or through fear of
forfeiting the well-being of his body, since external goods belong to
the body. Hence both these fears are reckoned as one here, although
they fear different evils, even as they correspond to the desire of
different goods. This diversity causes a specific diversity of sins,
all of which alike however lead man away from God.
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