Whether Those Things That Are of Faith Can Be an Object of Science
[*Science is certain knowledge of a demonstrated conclusion through
its demonstration]?
Objection 1: It would seem that those things that are of faith can be
an object of science. For where science is lacking there is
ignorance, since ignorance is the opposite of science. Now we are not
in ignorance of those things we have to believe, since ignorance of
such things savors of unbelief, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: "I did it
ignorantly in unbelief." Therefore things that are of faith can be an
object of science.
Obj. 2: Further, science is acquired by reasons. Now sacred writers
employ reasons to inculcate things that are of faith. Therefore such
things can be an object of science.
Obj. 3: Further, things which are demonstrated are an object of
science, since a "demonstration is a syllogism that produces
science." Now certain matters of faith have been demonstrated by the
philosophers, such as the Existence and Unity of God, and so forth.
Therefore things that are of faith can be an object of science.
Obj. 4: Further, opinion is further from science than faith is, since
faith is said to stand between opinion and science. Now opinion and
science can, in a way, be about the same object, as stated in Poster.
i. Therefore faith and science can be about the same object also.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxvi in Evang.) that "when a
thing is manifest, it is the object, not of faith, but of
perception." Therefore things that are of faith are not the object of
perception, whereas what is an object of science is the object of
perception. Therefore there can be no faith about things which are an
object of science.
_I answer that,_ All science is derived from self-evident and
therefore "seen" principles; wherefore all objects of science must
needs be, in a fashion, seen.
Now as stated above (A. 4), it is impossible that one and the same
thing should be believed and seen by the same person. Hence it is
equally impossible for one and the same thing to be an object of
science and of belief for the same person. It may happen, however,
that a thing which is an object of vision or science for one, is
believed by another: since we hope to see some day what we now
believe about the Trinity, according to 1 Cor. 13:12: "We see now
through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face": which
vision the angels possess already; so that what we believe, they see.
In like manner it may happen that what is an object of vision or
scientific knowledge for one man, even in the state of a wayfarer,
is, for another man, an object of faith, because he does not know it
by demonstration.
Nevertheless that which is proposed to be believed equally by all, is
equally unknown by all as an object of science: such are the things
which are of faith simply. Consequently faith and science are not
about the same things.
Reply Obj. 1: Unbelievers are in ignorance of things that are of
faith, for neither do they see or know them in themselves, nor do
they know them to be credible. The faithful, on the other hand, know
them, not as by demonstration, but by the light of faith which makes
them see that they ought to believe them, as stated above (A. 4, ad
2, 3).
Reply Obj. 2: The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that
are of faith, are not demonstrations; they are either persuasive
arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not
impossible, or else they are proofs drawn from the principles of
faith, i.e. from the authority of Holy Writ, as Dionysius declares
(Div. Nom. ii). Whatever is based on these principles is as well
proved in the eyes of the faithful, as a conclusion drawn from
self-evident principles is in the eyes of all. Hence again, theology
is a science, as we stated at the outset of this work (P. I, Q. 1, A. 2).
Reply Obj. 3: Things which can be proved by demonstration are
reckoned among the articles of faith, not because they are believed
simply by all, but because they are a necessary presupposition to
matters of faith, so that those who do not known them by
demonstration must know them first of all by faith.
Reply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Poster. i), "science and
opinion about the same object can certainly be in different men," as
we have stated above about science and faith; yet it is possible for
one and the same man to have science and faith about the same thing
relatively, i.e. in relation to the object, but not in the same
respect. For it is possible for the same person, about one and the
same object, to know one thing and to think another: and, in like
manner, one may know by demonstration the unity of the Godhead, and,
by faith, the Trinity. On the other hand, in one and the same man,
about the same object, and in the same respect, science is
incompatible with either opinion or faith, yet for different reasons.
Because science is incompatible with opinion about the same object
simply, for the reason that science demands that its object should be
deemed impossible to be otherwise, whereas it is essential to
opinion, that its object should be deemed possible to be otherwise.
Yet that which is the object of faith, on account of the certainty of
faith, is also deemed impossible to be otherwise; and the reason why
science and faith cannot be about the same object and in the same
respect is because the object of science is something seen whereas
the object of faith is the unseen, as stated above.
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