W. T. SHERMAN,

_Major General Commanding_.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }

IN THE FIELD NEAR KENNESAW, June 27, 1864, 11:45 A.M. }

_Gen. Thomas_: McPherson's column marched near the top of

the hill, through very tangled brush, but _was repulsed_. It

is found impossible to deploy, but they hold their ground.

I wish you to study well the positions, and if possible to

break through the lines to do it. It is easier now than it

will be hereafter. I hear Leggitt's guns well behind the

mountain.

W. T. SHERMAN, _Major General Commanding_.

As nothing decisive was obtained by Sherman's attack, the fire

slackened, except on the skirmish line. After dark the enemy withdrew

to their main trenches, the roar of guns died gradually away, and the

morning of the 28th dawned on both armies in their former positions.

The battle of Kennesaw, then, was a display of force and an attack on

the entire length of our line by artillery and infantry, under cover of

which two grand attacks were made by assaulting columns, the one on my

line and the other on Cheatham's.

28th. After the battle of yesterday there is less activity in

front, and the enemy move about in a subdued manner and less

lordly style, and yet they resent defeat by a cannonade this

afternoon.

29th. Everything is quiet this morning, and so continued till

5:30 P.M., when they opened on our guns on Kennesaw with a

new battery to aid the previous ones. Perhaps they design

attacking my line again. A great number of shells fell in

camp, or rather they were fragments of shells bursting high

over the mountain. At dusk cannonading burst out again.

30th. Rather quiet this morning. At 2:30 A.M. last night we

were all aroused by a severe rattle of musketry on the left.

We got up and saddled our horses, but after about twenty

minutes the firing ceased and all was quiet till morning. It

appears that this night attack was caused by a false alarm.

This morning I rode to Marietta, it being the first time I

have left my line. This afternoon I went to the batteries

on the mountain with Gen. Mackell, and then again with Gen.

Stevens. There has been but little firing to-day.

July 1. After lying down last night I was aroused by some

shells passing overhead, and then again by some sharp

musketry on my left. The awful lies found in the newspapers,

manufactured by correspondents, lauding certain generals and

magnifying their victories, should ruin them.

This afternoon the enemy turned fifty-two pieces of artillery

on the three guns I have on the west brow of Little

Kennesaw, and continued the fire until long after dark.

Seldom in war have there been instances where so many guns

have been trained on a single spot. But it was only in the

darkness of the night that the magnificence of the scene

was displayed--grand beyond imagination, beautiful beyond

description. Kennesaw, usually invisible from a distance

at night, now resembles Vesuvius in the beginning of an

eruption. The innumerable curling rings of smoke from the

incessant bursting of shells over the mountain top, added to

the volumes belching forth from our guns, wreathed Kennesaw

in a golden thunder-cloud in the still sky, from which came

incessant flashes of iridescent light from shells, like

bursting stars. The canopy of clouds rolling around the peak

looked softer than the downy cotton, but ever changing in

color. One moment they were as crimson as the evening clouds

painted by the rays of the summer setting sun, and the next,

brighter than if lit by the lightning's flash, or bursting

meteors. However brilliant and varied and beautiful to the

sight, it was not one of pure delight, because it was not a

grand display in the clouds for amusement, and when it died

away, when silence came, and night threw her dark mantle over

the scene, there was no feeling of joy, only one of relief

from the excitement of hope and fear ever incident to the

wager of battle.

The good people of Marietta, who often watched from house tops these

scenes of excitement, will never forget them.

It was during this battle that one of the noblest deeds of humanity

was performed the world has ever witnessed. We have the Bible account

of the man who, "going from Jerusalem to Jericho, fell among thieves,"

and the good Samaritan who "had compassion on him and bound up his

wounds;" we have Sir Philip Sidney, and the generous conduct of a

French cuirassier at Waterloo who, seeing Maj. Poten, of the King's

German Legion, had lost his right arm, when about to cut him down,

dropped the point of his sword to the salute and rode away. The French

soldier was happily discovered, and received the cross of the Legion

of Honor. But here _we_ have "Col. W. H. Martin, of the First Arkansas

Regiment, of Cleburne's Division, who, seeing the woods in front of him

on fire burning the wounded Federals, tied a handkerchief to a ramrod

and amidst the danger of battle mounted the parapet and shouted to

the enemy: 'Come and remove your wounded; they are burning to death;

we won't fire a gun till you get them away. Be quick!' And with his

own men he leaped over our works and helped to remove them. When this

work of humanity was ended a noble Federal major was so impressed by

such magnanimity that he pulled from his belt a brace of fine pistols

and presented them to Col. Martin with the remark: 'Accept them

with my appreciation of the nobility of this deed. It deserves to be

perpetuated to the deathless honor of every one of you concerned in it;

and should you fight a thousand other battles, and win a thousand other

victories, you will never win another so noble as this.' Alas! alas!

The noble Col. Martin lived to return to his home. His lovely wife

died, leaving an only child. Broken-hearted, he sailed to Honduras, as

he said, to make a fortune for his little girl, and there, one day when

sailing in a small boat on the ---- river, with only a boy to help him,

the boom struck him on the head, knocking him overboard, where he was

drowned. Such is the irony of fate."[27]

CHAPTER XV.

Our Army Falls Back from Kennesaw--Confederate "Rebel

Yell"--Occupy Works on the Chattahoochee River--A. P.

Stewart Appointed Lieutenant General--Assumes Command of

the Army of Mississippi--Texas Brigade Fight to Obtain

Tools--We Cross the Chattahoochee--Arrival of Gen. B.

Bragg--Gen. Johnston Relieved--President Davis's Remark

about Relieving Johnston from Command--Johnston's Policy

versus Hood's--Battle of Peachtree Creek--We Occupy

Atlanta--Battle of Atlanta--S. D. Lee Assigned to Command of

Hood's Corps--Gen. Ector Wounded--Capt. Ward Killed--Battle

of July 28, 1864--I Apply to Be Relieved from Serving with

Hood--Gen. M. Jeff Thompson--Condition of the Camps of

United States Troops--Evidence of the Terrible Fire of Small

Arms--Evacuation of Atlanta--Jonesboro and Lovejoy's Station.

I left Kennesaw with regret. From its slopes we repelled the assaults

of the enemy, and from its top, where I loved to sit and witness the

almost daily conflicts, and hear the "Rebel yell" from away down the

throat, and the Federal cheer from the lips. The "Rebel yell" was

born amidst the roar of cannon, the flash of the musket, the deadly

conflict, comrades falling, and death in front--then, when rushing

forward, that unearthly yell rose from a thousand Confederate throats,

loud, above "the thunder of the captains and the shoutings," and

with the force of a tornado they swept on over the field to death or

victory. O how the heart throbs and the eye glares! As that yell is the

offspring of the tempest of the battle and death, it cannot be heard

in peace, no, never, never! The Federal cheer lives on, and is heard

daily in the land. That Confederate yell was never, as far as I know,

made when standing still. It was really an inspiration arising from

facing danger and death which, as brave men, they resolved to meet. Ye

children of peace can never hear it; wherefore I write of a sound that

was produced by environment ye will never have. It died with the cause

that produced it. The yell produced _awe_; the cheer indicated _joy_.

July 2. Not content with the waste of ammunition last

evening, the enemy commenced again at 4:15 this morning--the

heathens--and kept it up until 6 A.M. from every battery,

and from some guns until 11 A.M. I went up the mountain early

in the morning. The fire was not confined to my guns on the

mountain, but extended some distance down the line. All this

was intended, no doubt, to hold Johnston's main force on his

own right while they moved to our left, flanking as usual.

At 1 P.M. I received orders to withdraw my division to-night,

and did so at 10 P.M.

3d. The regiments left in the trenches and the skirmishers

did not leave until 3 A.M. Owing to detention of the trains,

etc., we did not reach our new position until after daylight.

I went to work intrenching our line--and it is a bad one.

Soon in the morning the enemy drove in our cavalry, and by

noon had out his skirmishers and artillery to the front. It

is wonderful how well our soldiers understand this falling

back. Never before did an army constantly fight and fall

back for seven weeks without demoralization, and it plainly

establishes the intelligence and individuality of the men.

4th. The shelling this morning was very severe. This caused

the Mississippi Brigade to seek protection in this way: They

used the shingles from a house for spades, and bayonets for

picks, and thus in a few minutes the men were in a shallow

ditch. My men in rifle pits were shelled out and driven in.

We were ordered to fall back to-night, which was done with

much difficulty.

5th. At 3 A.M. we were on the retreat, and it was well

executed by the troops, and we came into Vining Station ahead

of the other divisions. Some sharpshooters with Whitworth

rifles and a lieutenant of Hoskin's Battery were left in

camp asleep, and they barely escaped capture. We were now on

the right bank of the Chattahoochee river. The right of my

line was a small redoubt east of the railroad (Western and

Atlantic), thence it crossed it, thence across the Marietta

dirt road, etc. At 10 A.M. the enemy swept the whole plain

with shells down to the river. I established headquarters

with Gen. Walthall in an old log house by the roadside.

6th. The enemy is quiet this morning. Yesterday the impolite

followers of Sherman came near spoiling our dinner as we sat

on the ground eating, by sending a twenty-pound Parrott shell

near enough to throw the sand about and over it.

7th. This morning I rode along the lines with Gens. Loring

and Shoup. Gen. A. P. Stewart, having been promoted to

a lieutenant general, assumed command of the Army of

Mississippi. After the death of Gen. Polk I unhesitatingly

said that Gen. Stewart would be promoted. I rode along the

whole of his command with him.

8th. The enemy keep up a sharp fire on our skirmish line at

night. They evidently are apprehensive that we will cross the

river at night, for during the day they are quiet.

As we have no tools for throwing up breastworks, Gen. Ector

came to me for permission to move a regiment to his front in

the woods, from where he had swung back, so as to attack the

enemy when they came out to establish a picket line. This

he did successfully, and returned with good picks, spades,

and steel axes (ours were cast iron) that will cut wood.

Shingleur, Robinson, and Yerger, aids, are all sick.

9th. About 9 A.M. the enemy attacked the line of skirmishers

in front of Sears's Brigade with force and drove them from

their pits. Col. Barry advanced the Thirty-Sixth Mississippi

Regiment, under command of Maj. Parton, and forced them back,

captured their line, and drove them nearly to their main

works, and reëstablished ours. Prisoners were captured from

five different regiments. Our loss was fifty-two men in all.

After this they shelled my line for hours. About 2 P.M. the

enemy commenced a slow cannonade on my front, and continued

it till dark. The twenty-pound Parrotts passed over our

quarters constantly and exploded in the road.

This P.M. I was sent for by Gen. Stewart, and received orders

to withdraw my command across the river by the railroad

bridge. After all were crossed both the railroad and dirt

road bridges were burned. We moved on toward Paces' Ferry,

and bivouacked by the wayside.

10th. The morning has been quiet, and the wearied troops

have rested. This retrograde movement was caused by the

enemy crossing the river above, near Roswell. The works

of Gen. Shoup, with its stockades, did not give Johnston

spare troops enough to prevent this movement of the enemy.

Thus we are constantly outflanked by a superior force not

disposed to attack us behind any kind of works. At 4 P.M.

it commenced raining, and then artillery firing began at the

railroad crossing and farther down the river. Now for nearly

two months we have had daily firing, save only one day when

on Lost Mountain. Gen. Ector was left to guard the railroad

crossing and the river, above and below. This was on the

11th.

12th and 13th. The camp is filled with rumors. The enemy

is reported to have crossed the river and then gone back.

I rode to Stewart's headquarters, and thence to Atlanta. I

saw Capt. Maupin in the hospital. Poor fellow; he was shot,

at the Latimar House, through the breast. I went to see Gen.

Johnston, and found Gen. Braxton Bragg there. He comes from

Richmond. What is his mission? Who knows? Is Sherman on this

side of the river? Has Grant's failures in Virginia, and

Early's invasion of Pennsylvania, affected movements down

here? A few days will determine. O for brighter days for the

Confederacy! I have been obliged to order the guards to fire

on the cavalry when they go in the river to bathe with the

Federal cavalry. Federals never venture in unless our men

are bathing. Our men are not seeking fords; they are. This is

what they are looking for.

14th, 15th, 16th. We remained in bivouac, and nothing unusual

occurred. We are still anxious to learn more about Early in

Maryland. There is the usual amount of firing on our front.

Sunday, 17th. The enemy commenced a more rapid and continued

fire from their batteries near the railroad bridge, where

I have pickets. This, as usual, presages some movement. And

here it is: "Hold your command ready for a movement." It does

seem strange that we cannot have one quiet Sabbath. Sherman

has no regard for the Fourth Commandment. I wish a Bible

society would send him a prayer book, instead of shipping

them all to the more remote heathen; but it would be the

same in either case. The one is wicked by nature; the other,

I fear, is becoming so from habit. Perhaps "Tecumseh" has

something to do with it. There is much in a name.

18th. I moved into a position where my left rested on the

Marietta road, and commenced intrenching at night. Gen.

Johnston was relieved on yesterday from the command of this

army, and Gen. J. B. Hood assumed command by orders from

Richmond. Early this morning I rode down to army headquarters

and bade Johnston good-by.

And here I will state the conversation that occurred between Hood

and me. I told him that I was sorry Johnston had been relieved; that

I had often, when in Mississippi, talked with him concerning the

manner of conducting the war; but "now that you are in command, I

assure you I will serve under you as faithfully and cheerfully as with

him." Although he took my hand and thanked me, I was ever afterwards

impressed with the belief that he never forgave me for what I said.

[Illustration: A. P. STEWART.]

Now, since I have alluded to it, I will state that in our conversation

I agreed with Johnston that our success mainly depended on breaking the

enemy down financially, by procrastinating the war; that to do this the

strength of the army in the East and in the West should be maintained;

that the armies upheld the government, and a great defeat would be

disastrous.

It was because we could obtain no more recruits that Grant refused to

exchange prisoners and receive the Andersonville prisoners and return a

like number to increase the ranks of Lee's army. Here is Grant's letter

on exchange of prisoners:

CITY POINT, August 18, 1864.

To Gen. Butler.

On the subject of exchange, however, I differ from Gen.

Hitchcock. It is hard on our men held in Southern prisons

not to exchange them, but it is humanity to those left in

the ranks to fight our battles. Every man released, on parole

or otherwise, becomes an active soldier against us at once,

either directly or indirectly.

If we commence a system of exchange, which liberates all

prisoners taken, we will have to fight on until the whole

South is exterminated. If we hold those caught, they amount

to no more than dead men. At this particular time to release

Rebel prisoners North would insure Sherman's defeat, and

would compromise our safety here.

As Gen. Grant discusses the humanity of his acts, I will compare

it with what other distinguished men have written on the subject of

exchange of prisoners.

Carthage, dispirited by her losses, wished for peace. For this purpose

ambassadors were dispatched to Rome. Regulus (a prisoner in Carthage)

was sent with the ambassadors to further the exchange, bound by an oath

to return to Carthage in case of a failure to make peace or exchange

of prisoners. He dissuaded his countrymen from agreeing to either

proposition, and, bound by his oath, returned to Carthage, where he

well knew torture and death awaited him.

Cicero applauds Regulus in both particulars in returning to Carthage.

Sir Walter Raleigh commends Regulus in maintaining the obligation of

his oath, but in dissuading the Senate not to agree to exchange of

prisoners he condemns his inhumanity, which no good reasons of state

could justify.

However, be this as it may, one thing is certain, and that is that the

inhumanity, if there were any, was assumed by the act of the United

States (the North) in refusing to mitigate their sufferings on both

sides by not exchanging prisoners, and it releases the South from the

charge of all suffering incident, always, to prison life.[28]

O! had the gifted Senator from Georgia, Benjamin H. Hill, known of

the existence of this letter defining the policy of the North in the

treatment of prisoners of war, he would have vanquished his antagonist,

Hon. J. G. Blaine, and silenced the jingoes and stopped the waving of

the bloody shirt to fire the Northern heart against the South.

In a private conversation with President Davis he told me that so great

was the pressure made on him by deputations, committees, individuals,

officials, and the press demanding to know if Atlanta and the State

of Georgia were to be given up without a battle for its preservation,

that he was reluctantly obliged to relieve Gen. Johnston to satisfy the

clamorous demands made for a halt and a battle in defense of the State

while the army was in the mountainous region, and so he yielded to the

cry of the people.

20th. This morning it was resolved to attack the three corps

of the enemy that were on the Peachtree creek and separated

from the corps that were near Decatur. Sears's Brigade being

on duty on the river and creek, I moved with the brigades

of Cockrell and Ector to the right and formed line of battle

in front of the Ragdale House. This position was the extreme

left of the army.

The plan of battle was a good one. Hardee was to gain the

enemy's rear, swing to the left, taking their line in flank,

while we attacked the line in front in echelon of brigades

as the battle swept down the creek. Walthall was on my

right, and I was to keep within about three hundred yards of

him. In advancing I came to an open field in front of the

enemy. Their line was fortified, with two field batteries

in position that kept up a continuous fire on my line. Gen.

Loring's troops broke through the enemy's line of works.

Reynolds and Featherston had to abandon the captured line

by reason of the flank fire on them. The failure of Hardee

deranged the plan of battle. After dark we withdrew.

22d. I had a slight skirmish with the enemy yesterday. We got

twenty-four of them. Last night the army occupied Atlanta. My

division formed the extreme left of the army. My headquarters

are at Mr. Jennings's house, and the line crosses the road

to Turner's Ferry and runs toward the Western and Atlantic

railroad. Preparations are being made to attack the enemy's

left wing over toward Decatur. Noon has passed, and there has

been no infantry-firing yet, only the booming of artillery;

but about 4 P.M. the volleys of musketry fell on the ear,

died away, and then burst out anew, and did not cease until

dark, when they receded in the distance, indicating the

advance of our troops. The fruits of the victory are reported

to be twenty-four pieces of artillery and three thousand one

hundred prisoners. With it comes sad regrets for the death of

Gen. W. A. T. Walker on our side, and Gen. McPherson, United

States army, on their side.

27th. Nothing has occurred, save the usual siege firing,

since the 22d. This morning when I was at Ward's Battery

there was some artillery-firing, and a shell exploded

overhead, striking Gen. Ector above the knee, requiring

amputation, and Capt. Ward, mortally wounding him. I sent

them to my quarters and thence to our hospital. Ward was an

accomplished gentleman and a brave soldier. I wrote to Mrs.

Ward, trying to console her in her bereavement. Gen. Ector in

due time was walking by the aid of crutches. Gen. S. D. Lee

to-day was assigned to the command of Hood's Corps.

28th. I rode to Gen. Stewart's and heard that the enemy was

moving to our left. I then went to Hood's. Knowing that four

divisions had been moved to my left, I felt assured that a

battle was pending. S. D. Lee was in command. About 1 P.M.

it began, and continued four hours. By request of Walthall

I sent them Guibor's guns and Ector's Brigade. The attack

was a failure because it was fought by weak detailed attacks

instead of a consolidated force. Gen. Stewart was struck by

a partly spent ball in the forehead, and Loring was wounded.

As soon as I learned the position of the enemy I opened fire

on them from my rifled thirty-two pounders and continued the

fire slowly all night.

29th. All is quiet this morning. I rode to corps

headquarters, and found that both Stewart and Loring had

left, which made me commander of the corps, but to my

surprise I found that Hood had placed Cheatham in command.

I wrote to Hood in regard to the matter. Hood's act was in

keeping with the intriguing so ruinous to this army, and I

asked to be relieved from serving in it any longer.

31st. Nothing unusual happened yesterday. To-day is Sunday,

and it dawned as though peace had spread her white wings

over the land, for not a gun has yet been heard, and so it

continued most of the day. Divine service was held in the

brigades, and in the pond in front of my quarters a baptism

took place.

August 1. My command was extended to cover Walthall's

original front. I made a call on Gens. G. W. Smith and R.

Toombs, and wrote to Richmond. This P.M. the enemy commenced

artillery fire on the redoubt in front of my house. One shell

killed a mule in the yard, another broke my wagon tongue,

while a third knocked the pipe from Hedrick's (my orderly)

mouth, etc. My application to be relieved from duty was

returned disapproved, and I was informed that I would not be

relieved. So on August 2 I wrote to the Adjutant General to

be relieved from command in or serving with this army.

2d, 3d, 4th, 5th. [To transcribe my diary for these days

would only be a reiteration of daily siege attacks.]

6th. I made a demonstration on the enemy this morning in

his works in my front to aid Lee on our left. I moved my

left over a mile to the front and attacked the enemy on his

skirmish line and then their main line, but it was done

at the expense of Lieut. Motherhead killed, Maj. Redwine

wounded, and forty-three men killed and wounded. I was

directed to make this demonstration; ordinarily they do but

little good against old soldiers, because they know so well

that they would not be attacked behind their works seriously

unless by massed troops. Neither will they attack ours. In

the afternoon they shelled my line complimentary to my attack

in the morning. How polite they are in returning attentions!

Bad news received from Mobile. It is reported that the United

States fleet has passed Fort Morgan and is now in the bay.

8th, 9th. I gave my large map of the Yazoo Valley to Gen. M.

L. Smith, who sent it to Macon to be copied, one copy for the

commander of the Department of Mississippi, and the other for

the War Department. I rode along the lines with Gen. Sears,

who has returned. Cockrell also got back yesterday. While I

was at Col. Young's the enemy commenced shelling, and it has

continued ever since, full seven hours. So far it has done

but little damage. Very many shells have fallen close by,

and exploded over the house, and it has become anything but

a pleasant residence, and at night disturbs pleasant dreams.

I sent a letter to the President on the matter of Gen. Hood's

conduct in the assignment of Cheatham to Stewart's Corps

during his absence.

10th and 11th. I rode out to our hospital this morning. The

enemy seems disposed to get possession of my vidette line,

which I have maintained up to this time. When the siege began

I sent for my principal officers and told them all that I did

not intend my camp should be rendered unpleasant from rifle

balls, that the vidette line away in front must be held; that

the picket line five hundred yards in front should be strong,

and on it the fighting should be to the last extremity. The

result of this course has been that my men are entirely free

from annoyance, except from some artillery fire, and that is

foolishly directed at our redoubts. I use artillery on their

infantry camps and lines so as to destroy their rest both

day and night. See the difference! While we sleep in safety,

in some parts of the lines around the city no one can move

without drawing the fire of the Yankees on themselves, so

near are the lines together.

12th to 17th. [The diary is too full of detail to record

here, so I will merely remark that the everlasting fire

continues on my picket line, and their guns shell my

redoubts.]

17th. Gen. Stewart came to my quarters early this morning,

at 6 A.M., and we went along the line. We returned and had

breakfast. Then the artillery, as usual, began at the redoubt

in front of the house. As the shells crossed the road on

both sides of the house, it was dangerous to leave, and he

remained an hour or more.

In the evening I was sitting on the fence enjoying my pipe

while watching the explosion of the shells, when who should

ride up but Gen. M. Jeff. Thompson, and he was invited to

our quarters. I could not keep from laughing. I have an

illustrated copy of the illustrious Don Quixote, and here was

a duplicate picture, or rather here before me was the Don

himself, in form and features, and if Sancho had seen Jeff

he would have called him "Master." He passed the night with

us, entertaining us with his adventures in the West. In the

morning he went to see his Missouri friends.

18th. The Yankees must be angry. Because my batteries dared

to wake them up with a few shells they raised--well--(I

begin it with a "w") and never ceased until 2 P.M., and they

threw not less than two thousand shot at us, and accomplished

nothing, only one shell went by accident through our house.

19th, 20th, 21st, 22d. These days witnessed the usual

expenditure of ammunition. On the 21st Lieut. Col. McDowell

was killed in the rear of our second skirmish line. What

an excellent man and gallant officer gave his life for the

Confederacy! Peace to him and his friends!

23d. Firing as usual.

24th. The enemy fired hot shot on the city all last night,

and to-day they set on fire some cotton, and burned a few

houses.

25th. I wrote to Judge Ould. Firing as usual.

26th. This morning at daylight I was informed that the enemy

had abandoned their works on my right and front nearly to

my left. I found everything in their works horribly filthy,

and alive with "dog" flies to such an extent that our horses

could not be managed. The clothing, new and old, was covered

with vermin. My servant boys carried some jackets home that

had to be buried. Their line of works was very strong. I

found the brick furnace where they made "shot red hot" to

fire day and night at intervals to burn the city. At first

little "niggers" got their fingers burned picking them up to

sell to the ordnance department. Again on my skirmish line

this evening was another good officer killed. Lieut. Col.

Samuels fell from a rifle ball. From Decatur all the way

around to the Turner's Ferry road the enemy has moved to our

left.... There are no flies or vermin in our camp--strange

but true.

27th. I made a reconnoissance with two brigades and artillery

to Turner's Ferry over the Chattahoochee river. We had a

fight there and captured some prisoners. They told me that

the place, as I could see, was strongly fortified; that the

Twentieth Corps (Hooker's) occupied the work; that Hooker had

gone and Slocum was in command. I think they told me this,

although not named in my diary. We slept in peace.

28th. I rode through the city. To give you an idea of the

terrible musketry fire, in an open field between their picket

line and mine one brigade picked up about five thousand

pounds of lead balls that had been fired on the lines. The

ground was literally covered with them--oxidized white like

hailstones. Trees three and four inches in diameter in front

of my line were cut down by balls. The lead was sold to the

ordnance officers, and the weight was thus known.

29th. 30th. Our troops are moving to the left. Six of our men

crossed the river and captured nine men and two wagons.

31st. Featherston and Walthall have been withdrawn from the

city. My division and some State troops under the charge of

Gen. G. W. Smith alone are in the city to-day. Some cavalry

scouts followed my scouts nearly into the city. Firing is

heard on our left. The railroad to Macon was cut to-day. This

is unpleasant news.

September 1. This morning the news is that Hardee had failed

to dislodge Sherman from his position. Everything indicates

that Atlanta is to be abandoned, and before noon the order

came. I became the rear guard. There is confusion in the

city, and some of the soldiers in the town are drunk. Common

sense is wanted. The five heavy guns that I had ordered to be

spiked by the rear guard at 11 P.M. were burned by order of

the chief of ordnance at 5 P.M., a proclamation to the enemy

in my front that we were evacuating the place. As soon as

I started to leave the works some of Hood's officers fired

the ordnance trains. This should have been done the last of

all, when the rear guard or pickets were withdrawn. Who would

extinguish an ordnance train of bursting shells? So lighted

by the glare of fires, flashes of powder, and bursting

shells, I slowly left Atlanta, and at daylight on the morning

of the 2d we were not five miles out of the city. I started

soon after for Lovejoy's Station.

3d. Featherston took the advance. Last evening artillery

was heard at Lovejoy's Station. Hardee was holding in check

all of Sherman's army except the Twentieth Corps, and we are

marching to his assistance. I passed S. D. Lee's Corps on the

road. It was yesterday at Rough and Ready. This is attacking

_in detail_ as usual. On arrival my division was ordered to

relieve Gen. Brown's. After dark I was ordered to move to my

left and Gen. Guist to his right to exchange positions. This

was a deliberately planned _trick_ of Hardee's to put me in

one side of a salient angle that was subject to a reverse

fire of artillery from the enemy.

4th. This morning cannonading was not so rapid.

5th. Last night I made a change of position. Firing as usual.

While I was on the line Capt. Kennedy (Mrs. Bowen's brother)

and four others were killed and five wounded. During the day

I lost forty men.

6th. It was now discovered that the enemy were falling back

to take possession of Atlanta, now abandoned. Gave Cockrell

permission to pursue them, and he skirmished with their rear

guard and killed many of them and returned with over twenty

prisoners.

7th, 8th, and 9th. [Diary records no important events.]

10th. A communication from Sherman to Hood was received

stating that the citizens of Atlanta must leave. Those who so

elect will be sent to the North. The remainder will be sent

South. The work is to commence on Monday. There are about

eighteen thousand people in the city. I am told that he also

offers to exchange prisoners, provided he should receive only

men who have yet two years to serve in the United States

army. Prisoners who have served out the period of their

enlistment, or have only a short time to serve, will not be

received. Gen. Loring returned to-day.

CHAPTER XVI.

_THE BATTLE OF ALLATOONA._

From Lovejoy's to Lost Mountain--Big

Shanty--Acworth--Destroying Railroad--In the Rear of

Sherman--Situation of the Two Armies--Orders to Destroy

the Etowah River Bridge--To Fill Up the Railroad

Cut at Allatoona--Hood Not Aware that Allatoona Was

Fortified and Garrisoned--March to Allatoona--Summons to

Surrender--No Answer--Gen. Corse's Report Erroneous--The

Fortifications--Strength of Forces--Equalization of

Forces--Some Federal Dispatches--The Battle--Corse's

Account--Col. Ludlow's Description--Desperate Fighting--The

Main Line Captured--Enemy Driven into an Interior

Fort--Dispatches from Gen. Armstrong Respecting Movements

of the Enemy at Big Shanty--Withdraw to Avoid Being

Surrounded by Converging Forces--Corse's Dispatch to

Sherman--Provisions--Confederates Three Days and Nights

without Rest or Sleep--Pass by the Enemy--Evangelist P. P.

Bliss Writes the (Gospel) Hymn, "Hold the Fort"--Hood and

His Erroneous Publications in His Book--His Admiration for

Corse--My Admiration for the Confederates--The Soldier's

Grave--The Lone Grave--Lieut. Gen. A. P. Stewart's Note in

Regard to This Account of the Battle.

September 29. This morning Loring's, Walthall's, and my

divisions moved on the Pumpkinton road and _crossed the

Chattahoochee river_ and encamped beyond Villa Rica. The

following day we marched to near Brownsville Post Office.

Saturday, October 1. I remained in camp. At 10 A.M. all the

division commanders were invited to Gen. Hood's headquarters,

and the object of the move was discussed. I found in the room

on my arrival Gens. Stewart, S. D. Lee, Loring, Walthall,

Stevenson, and Clayton. As soon as I entered the room Hood

said to me: "Gen. French, what do you think Gen. Sherman

will do now?" I replied: "I suppose he will turn southwest

and move on to Mobile; or he may go to Augusta to destroy

our powder mills, and then make for Charleston or Savannah."

"In that event do you believe he can sustain his troops on

the march if our cavalry lay waste the country before him?"

I answered: "He will find all he wants as he moves on." To

this Hood replied: "Well, I have nothing to do with that,

as the President has promised to attend to that matter."

Every officer present disagreed with me save Gen. S. D. Lee.

He thought all would have difficulty to subsist except the

cavalry.

[Illustration: ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

FROM ETOWAH RIVER TO ATLANTA.]

On the subject of destroying Sherman's communications my diary says:

I was in favor of an immediate move on the railroad above

Kennesaw with the _whole army_, and expressed my regrets at

the delay.

I received orders to move to-morrow. We were requested to

inform the brigade commanders of the object of moving in

the rear of Sherman's army, and they were to inform the

regimental and company officers.

2d. I left camp and marched to Moon's, and this brought us to

the same ground we occupied on the 24th of May.

3d. When Sherman discovered that Hood had crossed the

Chattahoochee and was marching to obtain possession of his

line of communication, he immediately adopted measures to

defeat Hood's plans and give him battle.

The general situation of the two armies to-day is: Sherman's

main body of troops is at Atlanta, with garrisons at the

Chattahoochee, Vining's, Marietta, Kennesaw, Big Shanty,

Moon's, Acworth, Allatoona Creek, Allatoona fortifications

garrisoned by just about one thousand men, Gen. Elliott,

chief of cavalry, with his command at Kennesaw, Gen. J. E.

Smith, with his division, at Cartersville, Gen. J. M. Corse

at Rome with a division, and the garrisons at important

places on up to Chattanooga, as disclosed by the movements

of troops, dispatches sent directing their movements, and

subsequent information.

Hood's army marched to Lost Mountain, where he remained with

two corps, while Stewart's Corps went thence in the rear

of the enemy's line of fortifications to Big Shanty. Gen.

Featherston captured some forty prisoners at Big Shanty, and

commenced destroying the railroad. Loring, sent to Acworth

(near Allatoona), captured about two hundred prisoners, and

Walthall took seventy prisoners at Moon Station. All night

every one was hard at work destroying the railroad, and the

next day by noon we had about eight miles of the track taken

up and the rails twisted.

4th. At noon, when filling up the railroad cuts at Big

Shanty, I received orders to fill up the deep cut of the

railroad at Allatoona, and then, if possible, destroy the

railroad bridge over the Etowah river. About this time some

one living near by told us that the enemy had fortifications

at Allatoona, well garrisoned and commissary stores there.

Under these peculiar orders (which will be given in full

hereafter in my report) I left Big Shanty with my division at

3 P.M. for Acworth and thence to Allatoona, while Loring and

Walthall were ordered in the direction of New Hope Church.

I was now entering the zone of active movements of the

Federals, and away from all support, and all support from me,

and the enemy converging on Allatoona from all directions. I

reached Acworth about dark, and was detained there till 11

P.M., awaiting rations and getting some one for a guide. I

saw camp fires of the enemy east of the railroad and north

of Kennesaw, and night signals from Allatoona to Kennesaw.

From two young ladies, who to-day had visited Allatoona, I

obtained the name of the commander there, and the probable

strength of the enemy in the several works. I also succeeded,

through some of the citizens, in getting a boy for a guide.

I moved from Acworth about 11 P.M., and on arriving at

Allatoona Creek I left there the Fourth Mississippi Regiment

and one piece of artillery, with instructions to burn the

bridge and capture the garrison of one hundred men in the

blockhouse. When at Acworth I sent fifteen men from a Capt.

Taylor's company of cavalry, Pinson's Regiment, to strike

the railroad near the Etowah river and tear up the track

to prevent reënforcements from reaching Allatoona. I moved

on then from the creek, and arrived before Allatoona about

3 A.M. All was darkness; nothing could be seen except

occasional lights flitting about the place. I put the

artillery, eleven guns, in position, or rather left them

in what the guide said was a good place, and also left two

regiments of Ector's Brigade under Col. Andrews as a support

to them. With the guide directing, I moved the division to

gain the flank and rear of the line of works. There were

five detached works on the high ridge through which the

Western and Atlantic railroad runs. No road leads to this

ridge except the Cartersville road, that ascends the ridge

by a winding ascent, and enters the works, passing within a

few feet of the main redoubt, under its guns, and then runs

on the crest of the ridge for two hundred and fifty yards

to where it passes out through the fortifications. So the

guide directed us through the dark _woods_ and up the steep,

rugged, rocky _hills_, and down into deep _valleys_ until we

were lost, and the guide acknowledged that he could not find

the way. This determined me to stop and rest till daylight.

The pickets had been driven in, and now and then shots were

exchanged. Starting again at dawn, I reached the high ridge

on which the redoubts were at 7:30 A.M. with the leading

brigade. I halted Cockrell's and Ector's Brigades on the

ridge, and sent Gen. Sears to gain the rear of the works. The

artillery opened fire on the forts (one on either side of the

railroad) about 7 A.M., and when we gained the ridge appeared

to keep the enemy quiet.

These dispositions being made, about 8 A.M. I summoned

the commander to surrender the place. I then supposed

the garrison consisted of only about nine hundred men, as

reported to me at Acworth. Maj. D. W. Sanders was instructed

to allow about twenty minutes for the officer to whom he

delivered the message to go and return with the reply. After

waiting longer than the specified time, he returned without

an answer. Believing Sears was now well around on the north

side, and having waited to hear his attack so long, I put

Cockrell's Brigade in motion, supported by Ector's Brigade

(of four regiments), to make the attack, as it was now 10:20

A.M.

The three companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois that were

in the two extreme west redoubts abandoned them without

making much resistance, and fell back to a very strong line

of defense protected by all the entanglements of modern

warfare. Through the center of this work ran the Cartersville

road. This part of the defensive work was occupied by the

Thirty-Ninth Iowa, Seventh Illinois, and seven companies

of the Ninety-Third Illinois, making, in officers and men,

a total of just about nine hundred. Against this force,

placed in carefully constructed works, I could send only the

Missouri brigade and four regiments of the Texas brigade, in

all one thousand three hundred and fifty. I had been informed

by Gen. Armstrong that the enemy's cavalry was moving up

east of the railroad. Then again I received from him a second

dispatch informing me that the Federal infantry was passing

through Big Shanty and moving up the railroad. This dispatch

was dated 9 A.M. Knowing that this column could reach the

junction of the Sandtown and Dallas roads before I could, I

determined to withdraw, trusting to arrive there first.

[Illustration: F. M. COCKRELL.]

But as all these matters are more fully referred to in my report, I

will here quit, for the present, further extracts from my diary, and

give the report.

[Illustration: CAPTURE OF BLOCKHOUSE, ALLATOONA CREEK,

OCTOBER 5, 1864.]

In Volume 39, Series 1, page 814, will be found in the "War Records"

the following report:

HEADQUARTERS FRENCH'S DIVISION, }

TUSCUMBIA, ALA., November 5, 1864.}

_General_: Sometime since I had the honor to submit to you a

brief preliminary report of the battle of Allatoona. As the

report of the brigade commanders are now in, I have the honor

to forward one embracing some of the details of the battle.

About noon on the 4th of October, when at Big Shanty, the

following order was handed me by Lieut. Gen. Stewart, it

being a copy of one to him:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, October 4, 1864, 7:30 A.M.

Lieut. Gen. A. P. Stewart, Commanding Corps.

_General_: Gen. Hood directs that later in the evening you

move Stevenson back to Davis's Cross Roads, and that you

bring two of your divisions back to Adams's and between

Adams's and Davis's Cross Roads, placing them in such a

way as to cover the position at Adams's now occupied by

Stevenson, and that your third division (say French) shall

move up the railroad and fill up the deep cut at Allatoona

with logs, brush, rails, dirt, etc. To-morrow morning at

daylight he desires Stevenson to be moved to Lieut. Gen.

Lee's actual left, that two of your divisions at that time at

Adams's shall draw back, with your left in the neighborhood

of Davis's Cross Roads, and your right in the neighborhood

of Lost Mountain, and the division that will have gone to

Allatoona to march thence to New Hope Church and on the

position occupied by your other troops--that is, that the

division shall rejoin your command by making this march out

from the railroad and via New Hope. Gen. Hood thinks that

it is probable that the guard at the railroad bridge on

Etowah is small, and when French goes to Allatoona, if he

can get such information as would justify him, if possible

move to that bridge and destroy it. Gen. Hood considers its

destruction would be a great advantage to the army and the

country. Should he be able to destroy the bridge, in coming

out he could move, as has been heretofore indicated, via New

Hope.

Yours respectfully,

A. P. MASON,

_Assistant Adjutant General_.

Soon after an order, of which the following is a copy, was

sent me:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, }

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, October 4, 1864, 11:30 A.M. }

Lieut. Gen. Stewart, Commanding.

_General_: Gen. Hood directs me to say that it is of the

greatest importance to destroy the Etowah railroad bridge, if

such a thing is possible. From the best information we have

now he thinks the enemy cannot disturb us before _to-morrow_,

and by _that time_ your main body will be near the remainder

of our army. He suggests that if it be considered practicable

to destroy the bridge when the division goes there and the

artillery is placed in position the commanding officer shall

call for volunteers to go to the bridge with lightwood and

other combustible material that can be obtained, and set fire

to it.

Yours respectfully,

A. P. MASON,

_Major and Assistant Adjutant General_.

Gen. Stewart's Corps had struck the railroad at Big Shanty

on the evening of the 3d, and all three of his divisions

had worked all night destroying the railroad from near

Kennesaw up to Acworth Station. As we had been informed at

Big Shanty that the Allatoona pass or cut was fortified, and

that the enemy had a garrison there of three regiments, and

had accumulated a considerable amount of provisions, it was

considered a matter of importance that the place should be

captured, and after the orders were handed me, at my request,

Gen. Stewart sent me (with Maj. Myrick) four additional

pieces of artillery. _It would appear, however, from these

orders that the general in chief was not aware that the pass

was fortified and garrisoned that I was sent to have filled

up._ Under these orders I left Big Shanty about 3:30 P.M.,

and marched to Acworth, a distance of six miles, arriving

there before sunset. There I was detained, awaiting the

arrival of rations and cooking them, until 11 P.M.

As I knew nothing of the roads, the enemy's works or

position, it was important to procure a guide, and at last a

young man, or rather boy, was found who knew the roads, and

had seen the position of the fortifications at Allatoona,

he being a member of a cavalry company. At Acworth Capt.

Taylor, of Pinson's Regiment of cavalry, with twenty-five

men, reported to me for duty. He was immediately directed

to send fifteen men under a trusty officer to strike the

railroad as near the Etowah railroad bridge as possible, and

take up the rails and hide or destroy them, to prevent trains

from reaching Allatoona with reënforcements, as well as to

prevent any trains that might be there from escaping. From an

eminence near Acworth the enemy could be seen communicating

messages by their night signals from Allatoona with the

station on Kennesaw; and to the east of us were the fires of

a large encampment of the Federals and apparently opposite

Moon's Station. Citizens residing here informed me that

there was a blockhouse with a garrison of about one hundred

men at the Allatoona bridge; that at Allatoona there were

two small redoubts with outworks, defended with four pieces

of artillery and garrisoned with three and a half regiments

of infantry. About 11 P.M. the march was resumed. The night

was very dark, and the roads bad. After crossing Allatoona

creek, Col. Adaire, with his Fourth Regiment, Mississippi

Volunteers, and one piece of artillery, was left near the

blockhouse with instructions to surround it, capture the

garrison, and destroy the bridge over the creek. Continuing

the march, the division arrived before Allatoona about 3

A.M. Nothing could be seen but one or two twinkling lights

on the opposite heights, and nothing was heard except the

occasional interchange of shots between our advanced guards

and the pickets of the garrison in the valley below. All

was darkness. I had no knowledge of the place, and it was

important to attack at the break of day. Taking the guide

and lights, I placed the artillery in position on the hills

south and east of the railroad, and the Thirty-Ninth North

Carolina Regiment, under Col. Coleman, and the Thirty-Second

Texas were left as a supporting force, both under command

of Col. J. A. Andrews, commanding the latter regiment. This

being done, I proceeded with the guide to gain the heights,

or ridge, crowned by the works of the enemy. Without roads

or paths the head of the line reached the railroad, crossed

it, and began ascending and descending the high, steep, and

densely timbered spurs of the mountains, and after about an

hour's march it was found that we were directly in front of

the works, and not on the main ridge. The guide made a second

effort to gain the ridge, and failed, so dark was it in the

woods. I therefore determined to rest where we were and await

daylight. With the dawn the march was resumed, and finally,

by 7:30 A.M., the head of the column was on the ridge about

six hundred yards west of the main fortifications, and

between those he occupied an abandoned redoubt on our left.

Here the fortifications, for the first time, were seen, and

instead of two redoubts there were disclosed to us three

redoubts on the west of the railroad cut, and a star fort on

the east with outer works and approaches defended to a great

distance by abatis, and nearer the works by stockades and

other obstructions. The railroad emerges from the Allatoona

Mountain by crossing this ridge through a cut sixty-five feet

deep. Dispositions for the assault were now made by sending

Gen. Sears's Brigade to the north side or rear of the works,

Gen. F. M. Cockrell's (Missouri) Brigade to rest with its

center on the ridge, while Gen. W. H. Young, with the four

Texas regiments, was found in the rear of Gen. Cockrell.

Maj. Myrick had opened on the works with his artillery, and

was ordered to continue his fire until the attacking force

should interfere, or until he heard the volleys of musketry.

Gen. Sears was to commence the assault on the rear, and when

musketry was heard Gen. Cockrell was to move down the ridge,

supported by Gen. Young, and carry the works by (as it were)

a flank attack. So rugged and abrupt were the hills that the

troops could not be gotten into position until about 9 A.M.,

when I sent a summons to surrender. The flag was met by a

Federal staff officer, and he was allowed seventeen minutes

to return an answer. The time expired without any answer

being received, whereupon Maj. D. W. Sanders, impatient

at the delay, broke off the interview and returned. No

reply being sent me, the order was given for the assault

by directing the advance of Cockrell's Brigade. Emerging

from the woods and passing over a long distance of abatis

formed of felled timber, and under a severe fire of musketry

and artillery, nobly did it press forward, followed by the

gallant Texans. The enemy's outer line and one redoubt soon

fell. Resting to gather strength and survey the work before

them, again they rushed forward in column, and in a murderous

hand-to-hand conflict that left the ditches filled with the

dead they became masters of the second redoubt.

The third and main redoubt, now filled by those driven from

the captured works on the west side of the railroad, was

further crowded by those that were coming out of the fort

on the east side of the road, from the attack of Gen. Sears.

They had to cross the deep cut, through which our artillery

poured a steady and deadly fire. The Federal forces were now

confined to one redoubt, and we occupied the ditch and almost

entirely silenced their fire, and were preparing for the

final attack.

Pending the progress of these events I had received a note

from Gen. F. C. Armstrong, dated 7 A.M., asking me at what

time I would move toward New Hope, and informing me also that

the enemy had moved up east of the railroad above Kennesaw

and encamped there last night. I had observed this movement

when at Acworth, but at 12 M. I received another dispatch

from him, written at 9 A.M., saying: "My scouts report the

enemy's infantry advancing up the railroad. They are now

entering Big Shanty. They have a cavalry force east of the

railroad."

On the receipt of this second note from Gen. Armstrong I

took my guide aside and particularly asked him if, after the

capture of the place, I could move to New Hope Church by any

other route than the one by the blockhouse at Allatoona creek

and thence by the Sandtown road to the Acworth and Dallas

road, and he said I could not. Here, then, was Gen. Sherman's

whole army close behind me, and the advance of his infantry

moving on Acworth, which changed the whole condition of

affairs. Ammunition had to be carried from the wagons, a mile

distant at the base of the hills, by men, and I was satisfied

that it would take two hours to get it up and distribute

it under fire before the final assault. I had learned from

prisoners that before daylight the place had been reënforced

by a brigade under Gen. Corse. I knew the enemy was at

Big Shanty at 9 A.M. By noon he could reach Acworth and be

within two miles of the road on which I was to reach New Hope

Church. I knew Gen. Stewart had been ordered to near Lost

Mountain. My men had marched all day on the 3d; worked all

the night of the 3d destroying the railroad; that they had

worked and marched all day on the 4th; marched to Allatoona

on the night of the 4th; had fought up to the afternoon of

the 5th; and could they pass the entire third day and night

without rest or sleep if we remained to assault the remaining

works? I did not doubt that the enemy would endeavor to get

in my rear to intercept my return.

He was, in the morning, but three hours distant, and had

been signaled to repeatedly during the battle. Under these

circumstances I determined to withdraw, however depressing

the idea of not capturing the place after so many had fallen,

and when in all probability we could force a surrender before

night. Yet, however desirous I was of remaining before the

last work and forcing a capitulation, or of carrying this

interior work by assault, I deemed it of more importance

not to permit the enemy to cut my division off from the

army. After deliberately surveying matters as they presented

themselves to me, I sent to Gen. Sears to withdraw his men

at once, moving by the route he went in, and directed Gen.

Cockrell to commence withdrawing at 1:30 P.M.

Before the action commenced it was foreseen that it would

be impossible to carry any wounded, on litters, to the road

where the ambulances were placed, owing to the steepness

of the hills, the ravines, and the dense woods. Accordingly

the wounded were brought to the springs near the ridge. All

who could be moved without the use of litters were taken to

the ambulances. The others were left in charge of surgeons

detailed to remain with them.

The troops re-formed on the original ground, west of the

works, and marched to the south side near the artillery,

and at 3:30 P.M. commenced the move toward New Hope. After

the troops left I rode on down to Col. Andrews's position in

front of the works and directed him to remain until 5 P.M.,

and then withdraw and move on in our rear.

Before I commenced to withdraw the infantry from the captured

works (but after the guide said I would have to return by

the way I came) I sent orders to Maj. Myrick to send two

batteries and caissons to a point beyond the blockhouse

on the Sandtown road, to act in concert with the troops

left there. Having been informed by Col. Andrews that the

blockhouse at the Allatoona bridge had not been captured, I

directed Capt. Kolb, with his battery that had remained with

Col. Andrews, to move on and report to Gen. Cockrell for the

purpose of taking the blockhouse.

Shortly after 4 P.M., and when not a person could be seen in

or around the forts, I left the command of Col. Andrews and

overtook the division near the blockhouse. Col. Adaire had

burned the railroad bridge over Allatoona creek (over two

hundred feet long), and also the duplicate of the bridge,

which had been already framed to replace the old structure.

Under the increased artillery fire the garrison of the

blockhouse surrendered.

We captured two hundred and five prisoners, one United

States flag, and the colors of the Ninety-Third Regiment

of Illinois, a number of horses, arms, etc., and killed and

wounded seven hundred and fifty of the enemy, being, with the

garrison of the blockhouse, over one thousand.

History will record the battle of Allatoona one of the most

sanguinary of the war; and when it is remembered that the

enemy fought from within their strong redoubts the desperate

deeds of daring performed by our troops in overcoming so many

of the foe will win a meed of praise for their heroic valor.

The artillery opened about 7 A.M., and, except when the flag

of truce was sent in, continued until 2 P.M.

The attack, commencing about 10 A.M., continued unremittingly

until 1:30 P.M., and the rattle of musketry did not cease

entirely until 3 P.M., when it died away, and a silence

like the pall of death rested over the scene, contrasting

strangely with the previous din of battle.

I cannot do justice to the gallantry of the troops. No one

faltered in his duty, and all withdrew from the place with

the regret that Gen. Sherman's movements--closing up behind

us--forbade our remaining longer to force a surrender of the

last work.

After leaving out the three regiments that formed no part of

the assaulting force, I had but little over two thousand men.

My entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 799,

as follows: Cockrell's Brigade: Killed, 42; wounded, 182;

missing, 22. Sears's Brigade: Killed, 37; wounded, 114;

missing, 200. Ector's Brigade: Killed, 43; wounded, 147;

missing, 11. Staff: Captured, 1. Total: Killed, 122; wounded,

443; missing, 233; captured, 1. Grand total, 799.

Among the killed from Sears's Brigade is Col. W. H. Clark,

Forty-Sixth Mississippi. He fell in the advance, near the

enemy's works, with the battle flag in his hands. He was an

excellent and a gallant officer. Also, were killed Capt. B.

Davidson and Lieuts. G. C. Edwards, J. R. Henry, and J. D.

Davis. Col. W. S. Barry, Thirty-Fifth Mississippi, and Maj.

Partin, Thirty-Sixth Mississippi, were wounded, together with

Capts. R. G. Yates and A. J. Farmer and Lieuts. J. N. McCoy,

G. H. Bannerman, J. M. Chadwick, J. Copewood, R. E. Jones,

E. W. Brown, G. H. Moore, and Ensigns G. W. Cannon and A.

Scarborough.

Texas will mourn for the death of some of her bravest and

best men. Capt. Somerville, Thirty-Second Texas, was killed

after vainly endeavoring to enter the last work, where his

conspicuous gallantry had carried him and his little band.

Capts. Gibson, Tenth Texas, Bates, Ninth Texas, Lieuts.

Alexander, Twenty-Ninth North Carolina, and Dixon E. Wetzel,

Ninth Texas, were killed while gallantly leading their men.

Brig. Gen. W. H. Young, commanding the Texas Brigade, was

wounded. Most gallantly he bore his part in the action.

Col. Camp, Fourteenth Texas, one of the best officers in the

service, was seriously wounded. Also Majs. McReynolds, Ninth

Texas, and Purdy, Fourteenth Texas. Of the captains wounded

were Wright, Lyles, Russell, Vannoy, and Ridley, and Lieuts.

Tunnell, Haynes, Gibbons, Agee, Morris, O'Brien, Irwin,

Reeves, and Robertson.

In the Missouri Brigade were killed or mortally wounded Majs.

W. F. Carter and O. A. Waddell, Capts. A. J. Byrne, A. C.

Patton, John S. Holland, Lieuts. Thomas S. Shelly, Joel F.

Yancey, G. R. Elliott. R. J. Lamb, G. T. Duvall, and W. H.

Dunnica, and Ensign H. W. De Jarnette--men who had behaved

well and nobly during the whole campaign.

Among the wounded are Maj. R. J. Williams, Capts. Thompson

Alvord, G. McChristian, G. W. Covell, and A. F. Burns,

Lieuts. Joseph Boyce, Silas H. F. Hornback, J. L. Mitchell,

A. H. Todd, and H. Y. Anderson, and Ensign William A. Byrd.

I have named the killed and wounded officers in this report.

The names of the private soldiers who fell or were wounded

will also be filed with this as soon as they are received.

It is due to the dead, it is just to the living, that they

who have no hopes of being heralded by fame, and who have

but little incentive except the love of country and the

consciousness of a just cause to impel them to deeds of

daring, and who have shed their blood for a just cause,

should have this little tribute paid them by me, whose joy it

was to be with them.

For the noble dead the army mourns, a nation mourns. For

the living, honor and respect will await them wherever they

shall be known, as faithful soldiers, who, for their dearest

rights, have so often gone through the fires of battle

and the baptism of blood. It would perhaps be an invidious

distinction to name individual officers or men for marked or

special services or distinguished gallantry where all behaved

so well, for earth never yielded to the tread of nobler

soldiers.

I am indebted to Gens. Cockrell, Sears, and Young for

bravery, skill, and unflinching firmness.

To Col. Earp, on whom the command of the gallant Texans

devolved, and to Col. Andrews, who commanded on the south

side, and Maj. Myrick, commanding the artillery, I return

thanks for services. Maj. D. W. Sanders, assistant adjutant

general, Lieut. Wiley Abercrombie, aid, Capt. W. H. Cain,

volunteer aid, Capt. Porter and Lieut. Mosby, engineers,

were zealous in the performance of their duties, and E. T.

Freeman, assistant inspector general, was conspicuous for his

gallant conduct. I commend the last-named to the government

for promotion.

Col. E. Gates, First and Third Missouri, Maj. E. H. Hampton,

Twenty-Ninth North Carolina, and W. J. Sparks, Tenth Texas,

and Lieut. Cahal, of Gen. Stewart's staff, are named for

gallant services.

Lieut. M. W. Armstrong, Tenth Texas, seized the United States

standard from the Federals, and after a struggle brought it

and the bearer of it off in triumph.

In the inclosed reports of brigade commanders will be found

the names of many officers and soldiers that I know are

entitled to commendation and all marks of distinction that

the government can award.

The cavalry officer who was sent to cut the railroad (early

in the afternoon of the 4th) and failed to perform that duty

is, in my opinion, much to blame. Had he taken up the rails

(and there was nothing to prevent it), reënforcements could

not have been thrown in the works, and the result would have

been different. After events showed that a cavalry force and

_Corse's other brigade arrived just three hours after we left

Allatoona_, and reënforced the garrison in the fort.

Very respectfully submitted.

S. G. FRENCH,

_Major General Commanding_.

[Illustration: MAJ. D. W. SANDERS.]

You have now my official report of the battle of Allatoona as it was

written soon after the event, and I will say here that, had I known

it would have been so incorrectly reported by Gen. Corse, it would

have embraced much matter of detail elucidating what occurred. I shall

now proceed to copy some part of Gen. Corse's report, after which its

errors will be pointed out as substantiated by facts not then known,

and some that were not regarded. So, with my report, unintentional

errors have been made known, as shown by subsequent information.

GEN. CORSE'S REPORT.

... I directed Col. Rowett to hold the spur on which the

Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois were formed, ...

and taking two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois down

a spur parallel with the railroad and along the bank of the

cut, so disposed them as to hold the north side as long as

possible. Three companies of the Ninety-Third, which had been

driven from the west end of the ridge, were distributed in

the ditch south of the redoubt, with instructions to keep

the town well covered by their fire, and to watch the depot

where the rations were stored. The remaining battalion of the

Ninety-Third, under Maj. Fisher, lay between the redoubt and

Rowett's line, ready to reënforce wherever most needed.

I had barely issued the orders when the storm broke in all

its fury on the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh Illinois.

Young's Brigade of Texans had gained the west end of the

ridge, and moved with great impetuosity along its crest

till they struck Rowett's command, when they received a

severe check, but, undaunted, came again and again. Rowett,

reënforced by the gallant Redfield, encouraged me to hope

that we were safe here, when I observed Gen. Sears's Brigade

moving from the north, its left extending across the railroad

(opposite Tourtellotte). I rushed to the two companies of the

Ninety-Third Illinois, which were on the brink of the crest

running north from the redoubt, they having been reënforced

by the retreating pickets, and urged them to hold on to the

spur; but it was of no avail; the enemy's line of battle

swept us back like so much chaff, and struck the Thirty-Ninth

Iowa in flank, threatening to ingulf our little band without

further ado. Fortunately for us, Col. Tourtellotte's fire

caught Sears in flank, and broke him so badly as to enable me

to get a staff officer over the cut with orders to bring the

Fiftieth Illinois over to reënforce Rowett, who had lost very

heavily. However, before the regiment sent for could arrive,

Sears and Young both rallied, and made their assaults in

front and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force

as to break Rowett's line, and had not the Thirty-Ninth Iowa

fought with the desperation it did, I never should have been

able to get a man back inside the redoubt; as it was, their

hand-to-hand conflict broke the enemy to that extent that

he must stop and re-form before undertaking the assault on

the _fort_. Under cover of the blows they gave the enemy the

Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois, and what remained of the

Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell back into the _fort_.

The fighting up to this time, about 11 A.M., was of the

most extraordinary character. Attacked from the north, from

the west, and from the south, these three regiments (the

Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois)

held Young's and a portion of Sears's and Cockrell's Brigades

at bay for nearly two hours and a half. The gallant Col.

Redfield, of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, fell shot in four places,

and the extraordinary valor of the men and officers of this

regiment and the Seventh Illinois saved to us Allatoona.

So completely disorganized were the enemy that no regular

assault could be made on the fort till I had the trenches

all filled and the parapets lined with men. The Twelfth and

Fiftieth Illinois, arriving from the east hill, enabled us to

occupy every foot of trench, and keep up a line of fire that,

as long as our ammunition lasted, would render our little

fort impregnable. The broken pieces of the enemy enabled them

to fill every hollow, and take every advantage of the rough

ground surrounding the fort, filling every hole and trench,

seeking shelter behind every stump and log that lay within

musket range of the fort. We received their fire from the

north, south, and west of the redoubt, completely enfilading

our ditches and rendering it almost impracticable for a man

to expose his person above the parapet. An effort was made

to carry our works by assault; but the battery (Twelfth

Missouri) was so ably manned, and so gallantly fought, as to

render it impossible for a column to live within a hundred

yards of the work. Officers labored constantly to stimulate

the men to expose themselves above the parapet, and nobly set

them the example.

The enemy kept a constant and intense fire, gradually closing

around us, and rapidly filling our little fort with the dead

and dying. About 1 P.M. I was wounded by a rifle ball that

rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty minutes, but

managed to rally on hearing some persons cry "Cease firing!"

which conveyed to me the impression that they were trying to

surrender the fort.

Again I urged my staff, the few officers unhurt, and the men

around me to renewed exertions, _assuring them that Sherman

would soon be here with reënforcements_. The gallant fellows

struggled to keep their heads above the ditch and parapets in

the face of the murderous fire of the enemy now concentrated

upon us. The artillery was silent, and a brave fellow, whose

name I regret having forgotten, volunteered to cross the

railway cut, which was under fire of the enemy, and go to

the _fort_ on the east hill to procure ammunition. Having

executed his mission successfully, he returned in a short

time with an arm load of canister and case shot. About 2:30

P.M. the enemy were observed massing a force behind a small

house and the ridge on which the house was located, distant

northwest from the fort about one hundred and fifty yards.

The dead and wounded were moved aside so as to enable us

to move a piece of artillery to an embrasure commanding the

house and ridge. A few shots from the gun threw the enemy's

column into great confusion, which, being observed by our

men, caused them to rush to the parapet and open such a fire

that it was impossible for the enemy to rally. From this time

until near 4 P.M. we had the advantage of the enemy, and

maintained it with such success that they were driven from

every position, and finally fled in great confusion, leaving

their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession

of the field. [See War Records.]

The above extracts _from Gen. Corse's report_ are taken from an address

made by Col. William Ludlow, United States army, to the Michigan

Commandery, at Detroit, April 2, 1891, and I desire it to be borne in

mind that he is a graduate of the Military Academy and was with Gen.

Corse at Allatoona during the battle, for I shall have cause to refer

to his address after a while.

There have been so many erroneous accounts given to the public of this

battle, impugning of motives, _guessing_ at the controlling objects

that influence action, falsifying of numbers, glorifying dispatches,

and complimentary orders, that won the admiration even of a Confederate

lieutenant general, that I purpose, as well as I am able, to give an

impartial account of it.

To do justice to the troops engaged on either side in the conflict, it

will be necessary: 1. To have a knowledge of the ground or topography

of the field of action. 2. The strength of the fortifications, and

the time and labor bestowed on them. 3. The strength of the respective

forces. 4. The ratio of inequality between men in strong fortifications

and men attacking from without, immediately on arrival. 5. The

inspiring inducement to the garrison _not to surrender_ when relief is

at hand; and the advantage to be gained, if successful, compared with

the risk of remaining after ascertaining that the enemy was converging

on the place from every point.

1. If an examination of this topographical map be made in connection

with the photographic views of the railroad cut, the star fort, and

the view from the sally port, it will give you an idea of the rough

mountain spurs over which we had to pass.

2. These forts and redoubts were built by a distinguished engineer

in the United States army, and, with their mutual defensive relation

the one to the other, form a remarkably strong line of fortifications

on every side. Sherman wrote to Gen. Blair, June 1, 1864, "Order the

brigade left at Allatoona to be provided with tools, and to intrench

both ends of the pass very strong," and frequently he speaks of

Allatoona as a "natural fortress," etc.

Beginning at the east, we have a fort about fifty feet in diameter in

the interior (marked "T" on the map), near three hundred yards east of

the railroad, with a deep ditch around it. Walls twelve feet thick, and

having embrasures for artillery, for which it was mainly designed. This

fort was connected with a line of heavy intrenchments extending to the

railroad cut, and along the cut to defend the star fort "C" by a flank

fire, and also the redoubt "R." Again, there are intrenchments on the

east side of the railroad near the depot that sweep with a flank fire

the south front of the star fort "C," the Cartersville road, depot,

etc. There was also protection given by inundating the country north by

a dam across the creek.

Crossing the railroad to the west, on the summit of the ridge and on

the verge of the deep cut, you will find the star fort "C" surrounded

by a wide ditch six feet deep. The interior is seventy-five feet in

diameter, and has eight embrasures for large guns. It dominates,

from its elevation, all the surrounding country, and commands the

approach in every direction, completely sweeping the ridge both east

and west, protecting the redoubt "R" from any force attacking it. The

Cartersville _road_ passes under the muzzle of its guns, and then runs

west on the ridge, through redoubt "R."

[Illustration: FORTIFICATIONS--ALLATOONA, GA.]

The two forts, "T" and "C," are interior isolated _works for

artillery_, and the fire from each swept all the other works both

inside and externally. Both were surrounded by ditches six feet deep,

making their parapets about _twelve feet_ high. Consequently they

could not be taken by assault without _scaling ladders_, or otherwise,

usual in sieges, unless by the sally port. In fact these two inside

forts could be used as citadels, or a place of _refuge_ when the

long exterior lines of defense were captured. And this was the case

with fort "C" in the battle of Allatoona. The whole formed a mountain

fortress.

The Federals call the intrenchments at "R" "rifle pits," to which they

bear about as much relation, in regard to strength, as a battleship

does to a dispatch boat. Commencing about one hundred and twenty-five

yards west of the fort "C," and on the south side of the Cartersville

road, are two lines of intrenchments running nearly parallel with that

road. These two, or double, lines of defense converge and meet below

the crest of the ridge, then, turning north, cross the road (with

angles for flanking fire) and continue north down the slope. From this

north line an intrenchment runs due east toward the main fort. The

parapet is revetted with timber, and the interior ditch is very wide.

On the parapet are large chestnut _head logs_ to protect the persons of

the soldiers. In front were immense entanglements of abatis, stockades,

stakes, etc., to check any assault on the works. So well was the work

done that in 1890, when I was there, time had not defaced them, and the

revetments and "head logs" are today as round as when placed there.

I am the more particular about this redoubt because here happened,

perhaps, the bloodiest tragedy in the history of the war.

3. _The strength of the respective forces._

Col. Tourtellotte's command was composed of the Ninety-Third Illinois,

officers and men, 294; the Eighteenth Wisconsin, guns, 150; Fourth

Minnesota, guns, 450; the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, men, 16; giving an

apparent total of 910. To this must yet be added the force for the six

pieces of artillery, not less than 60. If we add the company officers

not enumerated, it will be found that Tourtellotte had about 1,000

officers and men. The above numbers are official.

Corse's official statement is that he brought with him to Allatoona

the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, 280 men; Seventh Illinois, 267 men; Fiftieth

Illinois, 267 men; Fifty-Seventh Illinois, 61 men; Twelfth Illinois,

155 men; or 1,030 _men_. To this must be added (say) 107 regimental

and company officers, making the force that he brought with him 1,137

officers and men. So with Tourtellotte's troops the aggregate is

2,137 instead of 1,944 as reported by him, which excluded himself and

officers.

As regards the strength of my division at Allatoona, the War Records

show that on September 20, at inspection, I had present for duty 331

officers and 2,945 men. Total, 3,276.

Cockrell's Brigade was composed of eight small regiments consolidated

into four, Ector's Brigade of six regiments, and Sears's Brigade of six

regiments, and two batteries, 8 guns.

To this force add one four-gun battery sent with me, and deduct one gun

and one regiment left at Allatoona creek bridge, and my entire force

present was _3,197_.

And thus officially we have Federals, 2,132; Confederates, as above.

4. _Equalization of forces._

The ratio of inequality between a force _within ordinary_ intrenchments

in line of battle and the attacking force _without_ is well known.

Gen. Cox in his "Atlanta Campaign," page 129, says: "One man in the

trench is equal to five in front." Gen. O. O. Howard, in reference to

the battle of Kennesaw Mountain, says: "My experience is that a line of

works thoroughly constructed, with the front well covered with abatis

and other entanglements, well manned with infantry, whether with our

own or that of the enemy, _cannot be carried by direct assault_."

Gen. R. S. Granger informs Gen. G. H. Thomas that the fort at Athens,

manned by 700 men, can hold out an enemy 10,000 strong. (War Records,

V. 39, Part 3, page 519.) Vicksburg, Jackson, Cold Harbor, Kennesaw,

Petersburg, Atlanta, Knoxville, and other lines repelled the assaults.

Now Allatoona was, without doubt, thrice as strong as these, and the

attacking force was only _one and a half to one inside_. Then, too, we

should consider that the works on the _hills_ were almost inaccessible.

Battery Wagner, a sand fort on a level plain on Morris Island,

Charleston, S. C., was garrisoned by only 740 men, who successfully

defended it _fifty-eight days and nights_ against the assaults and

continuous fire of 11,500 men, with forty-seven cannon, aided by

ships--the Ironsides, eight monitors, and five gunboats. And Fort

Sumter never was taken by assault. It was quietly abandoned February

18, 1865.

On Sunday, April 16, 1865, seven days after the surrender at

Appomattox, a small redoubt or fort, of weak construction, garrisoned

by an unorganized force hastily collected, at West Point, Ga., near

Atlanta, consisting of 64 men under Gen. Tyler and Col. J. H. Fannan,

held the fort all day against 3,750 men of Gen. J. M. Wilson's command,

and surrendered only for want of ammunition and loss of men. Col. O. H.

LaGrange, of Wisconsin, commanded the Federals. Ratio, 1 to 62.

5. The _inspiring hopes_ given the garrison will be discovered in the

following dispatches informing them aid was at hand, begging them to

hold out until reënforcements arrived. In these dispatches bear in

mind that Gen. Stanley was in temporary command of the Army of the

Cumberland, and Gen. Elliott was the commander in chief of Sherman's

cavalry. I give only a few of the many dispatches in the War Records.

NO. 1. VOLUME 39, PART 3, PAGE 53.

_SHERMAN TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA._

October 3, 1864.

Hood might slip up to Acworth and Allatoona. I want the

utmost vigilance there. If he goes to Allatoona, I want him

only delayed long enough for me to reach his rear.... If he

moves up to Allatoona, I will surely come in force.

NO. 2. VOLUME 39, PAGE 65.

_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

IN THE FIELD, October 4, 1864.

I heard from Gen. Elliott to-night. He was on the Sandtown

and Allatoona road.... I will be up to-day and move to

Kennesaw.

NO. 3. VOLUME 39, PAGE 66.

_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

October 4, 1864. Received 10 A.M.

Yes, move to Little Kennesaw and west of it. Tell Elliott

in my name to interpose with his whole force between Dallas

and Allatoona, and strike for any force in the direction of

Acworth.

NO. 4. VOLUME 39, PAGE 71.

_SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT._

October 4, 1864, 11 P.M.

Don't risk the safety of your cavalry until I get up with my

whole force, but make bold reconnoissances in connection with

Gen. Stanley. My chief object is to prevent the enemy from

making an attack on Allatoona to-morrow.

NO. 5. VOLUME 39, PAGE 71.

_SHERMAN TO COMMANDING OFFICERS AT ALLATOONA, KINGSTON, AND ROME._

October 4, 1864.

The enemy is moving on Allatoona, thence to Rome.

NO. 6. VOLUME 39, PAGE 52.

_SHERMAN TO GEN. VANDEVER._

October 3, 1864.

Sherman wants the force at Big Shanty cleaned out, and wants

it done to-night if possible.

NO. 7. VOLUME 39, PAGE 75.

_CORSE TO GEN. J. E. SMITH._

ROME, October 4, 1864.

I will move my entire command to Cartersville and unite with

Gen. Raum in attacking the enemy from Allatoona direct.

NO. 8. VOLUME 39, PAGE 75.

_CORSE TO RAUM._

ROME, October 4, 1864.

I am expecting a train every moment; as soon as I can get

ready I will move 3,000 to 4,000 men.

NO. 9. VOLUME 39, PAGE 77.

_VANDEVER TO SHERMAN._

NEAR KENNESAW, October 4, 1864.

Elliott is between Big Shanty and Kennesaw on our left. I am

skirmishing with the enemy now.

NO. 10. VOLUME 39, PAGE 77.

_VANDEVER TO SHERMAN._

NEAR KENNESAW, October 4, 1864.

Gen. Elliott has all his force near the west base of the

mountain. Gens. Kilpatrick and Garrard are both with him, so

couriers report.

NO. 11. VOLUME 39, PAGE 78.

_VANDEVER TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA._

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 4, 1864, 2 P.M.

Sherman is moving in force. Hold out.

NO. 12. VOLUME 39, PAGE 78.

_VANDEVER TO COMMANDING OFFICER AT ALLATOONA._

NEAR KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 4, 6:39 P.M.

Gen. Sherman says hold fast, we are coming.

NO. 13. VOLUME 39, PAGE 88.

_SIGNAL OFFICER AT ALLATOONA TO SIGNAL OFFICER AT KENNESAW._

ALLATOONA, October 5, 1864.

Gen. Corse is here with one brigade. Where is Sherman?

NO. 14. VOLUME 39, PAGE 89.

_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 5, 1864, 11:15 A.M.

No news by signal from Allatoona. Heavy firing, indicating an

assault and repulse. Occasional shots now, but too smoky to

see signals. Can see the field about Lost Mountain. No large

force of Rebels there. Can see Kilpatrick's cavalry massed in

a big field this side, but no skirmishing.

NO. 15. VOLUME 39, PAGE 89.

_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 5, 1864. Received 2:30 P.M.

Throw forward pickets on the Sandtown road. Take strong

position and hold it.

NO. 16. VOLUME 39, PAGE 90.

_STANLEY TO SHERMAN._

PINE TOP, October 5, 1864, 3:10 P.M.

I am on Pine Top.... I saw our cavalry about two miles in

advance of Kemp's Mills.

NO. 17. VOLUME 39, PAGE 90.

_SHERMAN TO STANLEY._

IN THE FIELD, October 5, 1864.

I want to control the Sandtown road back to Allatoona.[29]

NO. 18. VOLUME 39, PAGE 91.

_SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT._

IN THE FIELD, October 5, 1864.

Dispatch Garrard to-night to Allatoona, making a circuit to

the right, and to learn if possible the state of affairs

there.... The day was so hazy that we could get but _few_

messages. Corse is there with his division.

NO. 19. VOLUME 39, PAGE 92.

_SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT._

IN THE FIELD, October 5, 1864.

I have heard from Allatoona. All right. Corse is there, but

wounded. You need not send Garrard's cavalry, but send a

squadron.

NO. 20. VOLUME 39, PAGE 92.

_SHERMAN TO ELLIOTT._

IN THE FIELD, October 5, 1864.

I have been up on Kennesaw all day watching the attack. Since

it ceased I have a signal, O. K. Corse wounded.... I want to

establish communication with Allatoona.

NO. 21. VOLUME 39, PAGE 96.

_TOURTELLOTTE TO SHERMAN._

ALLATOONA, GA., October 5, 1864.

_Gen. Sherman_: Corse is here.

NO. 22. VOLUME 39. PAGE 96.

_TO COMMANDING OFFICER, ALLATOONA._

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 5, 1864.

Near you.

NO. 23. VOLUME 39, PAGE 96.

_SIGNAL DISPATCHES FROM AND TO KENNESAW MOUNTAIN._

At 8 A.M. I called Allatoona for two hours and a half. I

asked for news, and at 10:30 A.M. received the following

message: "We hold out. Gen. Corse here."

Adams, _Signal Officer_.

At 4 P.M. I again called Allatoona, and at 4:15 got the

following: "We still hold out. Gen. Corse is wounded."

NO. 24. VOLUME 39, PAGE 97.

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN, October 5, 1864.

Tell Allatoona to hold on. Gen. Sherman says he is working

hard for you.

NO. 25. VOLUME 39, PAGE 97.

_GEN. G. B. RAUM TO GEN. J. E. SMITH._

CARTERSVILLE, GA., October 5, 1864.

We have won a great victory at Allatoona to-day. _I am just

from there._ Gen. Corse is slightly wounded in the cheek;

Col. Tourtellotte slightly in the left thigh.

NO. 26. VOLUME 39, PAGES 111, 112.

_LIEUT. W. H. SHERFY, CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, KENNESAW, REPORTS._

October 4, 1864.

I called Allatoona and sent the messages received last night.

I saw the enemy hard at work destroying the railroad on both

sides of Big Shanty.... At 5 P.M. the enemy began to move off

on the Acworth road, and at _6 P.M. our army moved into camp

at the foot of Little Kennesaw Mountain_.

October 5.

To-day the battle of Allatoona was fought. I could see the

smoke of guns and shells. Gen. Sherman was with me all day

sending and receiving messages.

Having now given you some knowledge of the ground, the strength of

the fortifications, the numbers engaged on either side, the ratio of

inequality between troops inside and those outside ordinary works,

and the many inspiring hopes sent to the garrison to hold out, you can

better comprehend.

THE BATTLE.

The day dawned beautiful and bright, and as the sun rose higher and

higher in the mellow autumnal sky, and lit up the forest-clad heights,

it turned into a quiet Indian summer day of hazy, drowsy appearance

inducive of rest. All nature seemed at variance with the active

preparations being made for the impending conflict of arms.

Gen. Corse had placed in redoubt "R" the Seventh Illinois, the

Thirty-Ninth Iowa, and the Ninety-Third Illinois. He had some companies

in advance of "R," and the remainder in reserve in the rear of "R."

These three regiments for the defense of this redoubt (called rifle

pits) numbered nine hundred and four officers and men.

Tourtellotte, in fort "T" and the intrenchments, had for the defense

east of the railroad the Fourth Minnesota, Eighteenth Wisconsin,

and the Fiftieth and Twelfth Illinois Regiments. Soon, however, the

Fiftieth and Twelfth Illinois were ordered over by Corse to the west

side of the railroad.

I made the following disposition of my division of infantry present on

the ridge. Sears's Brigade was ordered to the north side of the ridge

and _east_ of the railroad. Cockrell's Brigade and the four regiments

of Ector's Brigade were on the ridge west of the enemy's works.

About 9 A.M. the artillery ceased firing, and, under a flag of truce, I

sent a summons to the commander of the garrison to surrender, supposing

the forces were small or to be the same as reported to me when I was

in Acworth. The summons was carried by Maj. D. W. Sanders, Adjutant

General. He waited about twenty minutes for a reply; receiving none,

he returned. I had no idea that the garrison had been reënforced by the

arrival of Gen. Corse with one of his brigades.

It was now near 10 A.M. when, impatient at the delay of Sears not

getting in position, I ordered Cockrell to make the attack on the

redoubt "R" with his brigade of nine hundred and fifty strong,

supported by four regiments of Ector's Texas Brigade of about four

hundred men. The ridge was so narrow that when deployed the wings were

in the woods on the steep sides of a rocky ridge. As Cockrell neared

the line he was subjected to the fire of the artillery from the two

forts "T" and "C," and the musketry from "R," and the troops in the

intrenchments on the east side of the railroad, near the deep cut,

that swept his approach on every side. Arriving near the redoubt, the

troops were stopped by the formidable abatis and other entanglements.

There for an hour, under this searching fire, they worked to make a

way through the abatis. When passages had been made they rushed to the

assault, and, after a terrible hand-to-hand conflict, the redoubt was

carried, and the survivors fled to fort "C," followed by our men, and

in a few minutes every Union soldier west of the railroad, including

the Fiftieth and Twelfth Illinois, sought refuge in fort "C" and the

ditch surrounding it, crowding them beyond measure.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF ALLATOONA.

In this picture the timber is omitted in order to show the ridge on

which the fortress was constructed. All the troops visible are

supposed to be Confederates.]

Thus did 1,350 Confederates carry the redoubt defended by 904 brave

Union veterans, although subjected all this time to the fire of forts

"T" and "C," and other flanking works. But I will let Gen. Corse tell

the story himself, as found on pages 761-766, Volume 39, War Records,

only I will correct the errors in names and figures in some instances:

I had hardly issued these incipient orders when the storm

broke in all its fury on the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and Seventh

Illinois. Young's [Cockrell's] Brigade of Texans, 1,900

strong, had gained the west end of the ridge, and moved with

great impetuosity along its crest till they struck Rowett's

command, where they received a severe check, but, undaunted,

they came again and again. Rowett, _reënforced by the

Ninety-Third Illinois_, and aided by the gallant Redfield,

encouraged me to hope we were all safe here, when I observed

a brigade of the enemy under command of Gen. Sears moving

from the north, its left extending across the railroad. I

rushed to the two companies of the Ninety-Third Illinois,

which were on the brink of the cut running north from the

redoubt [fort "C"] and parallel with the railroad, they

having been reënforced by the retreating pickets, and urged

them to hold on to the spur, but it was of no avail. The

enemy's line of battle swept us back like so much chaff, and

struck the Thirty-Ninth Iowa in flank, threatening to ingulf

our little band without further ado. Fortunately for us,

Col. Tourtellotte's fire caught Sears in the flank and broke

him so badly as to enable me to get a staff officer over

the cut with orders to bring the Fiftieth Illinois over to

reënforce Rowett, who had lost very heavily. However, before

the regiment sent for could arrive, Sears and Young [Cockrell

and Young] both rallied and made their assaults in front

and on the flank with so much vigor and in such force as to

break Rowett's line, and had not the Thirty-Ninth Iowa fought

with the desperation it did I never would have been able to

have brought a man back into the redoubt [fort "C"]. As it

was, their hand-to-hand struggle and stubborn stand broke

the enemy to that extent that he must stop to re-form before

undertaking the assault on the fort. Under cover of the blow

they gave the enemy the Seventh and Ninety-Third Illinois

and what remained of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa fell back into

the fort. The fighting up to this time--about 11 A.M.--was

of a most extraordinary character. Attacked from the north,

from the west, and from the south, these three regiments,

Thirty-Ninth Iowa, Seventh Illinois, and Ninety-Third

Illinois infantry, held Young's and a portion of Sears's and

Cockrell's [should be Cockrell's and Young's] Brigades at bay

for nearly two hours and a half. [We were delayed about an

hour, and that by the entanglements that prevented us from

reaching the parapet; besides, we were under fire from guns

everywhere.] The gallant Col. Redfield, of the Thirty-Ninth

Iowa, fell, shot in four places, and the extraordinary valor

of the men and officers of this regiment and the Seventh

Illinois saved to us Allatoona.

The capture of the redoubt by Cockrell and Young under the fire of six

pieces of artillery, two in fort "C" and one in a battery in advance

of the fort, three in fort "T," and musketry fire from every place,

besides the 904 men in the redoubt, ends the first act of the tragedy.

It is proper here to give a description of this scene by quoting from

an address made by Col. William Ludlow, Corps of Engineers, United

States Army, who was with Gen. Corse during the battle, to the Michigan

Commandery, Loyal Legion, at Detroit, April 2, 1891. In referring to

the capture of redoubt "R," he said:

But the appalling center of the tragedy was the pit in which

lay the heroes of the Thirty-Ninth Iowa and the Seventh

Illinois. Such a sight probably was never presented to the

eye of heaven. There is no language to describe it. With

all the glad reaction of feeling after the prolonged strain

of that mortal day, and the exultant surge of victory that

swelled our hearts, it was difficult to stand on the verge

of that open grave without a rush of tears to the eye and a

spasm of pity clutching at the throat. The trench was crowded

with the dead, blue and homespun. "Yank" and "Johnny,"

inextricably mingled in the last ditch. Our heroes, ordered

to hold the place to the last, with supreme fidelity, had

died at their posts. As the Rebel line ran over them they

struck up with their bayonets as the foe struck down, and,

rolling together in the embrace of death, we found them, in

some cases, mutually transfixed. The theme cannot be dwelt

upon.

I will now go on with Corse's report, and let him tell his story of the

battle in his own way.

So completely disorganized were the enemy that no regular

assault could be made on the fort until I had the trenches

all filled and the parapets lined with men. The Twelfth

Illinois and the Fiftieth Illinois, arriving from the east

hill, enabled us to occupy every foot of trench, and keep

up a line of fire that as long as our ammunition lasted

would render our little fort impregnable. The broken forces

of the enemy enabled them to fill every hollow and take

every advantage of the rough ground surrounding the fort,

filling every hole and trench, seeking shelter behind every

stump and log that lay within musket range of the fort. We

received fire from the north, south, and west face of the

fort, completely enfilading our ditches, and rendering it

almost impracticable for a man to expose his person above the

parapet. An effort was made to carry our works by assault

[This is an error. We had no scaling ladders, besides the

ditch was _solid full_ of Corse's men who found shelter

there], but the battery, Twelfth Wisconsin, was so ably

managed and so gallantly fought as to render it impossible

for a column to live within one hundred yards of the works.

Officers labored constantly to stimulate the men to exertion,

and almost all that were killed or wounded in the fort met

this fate while trying to get the men to expose themselves

above the parapet, and nobly setting them the example.

The enemy kept up a constant and intense fire, gradually

closing around us, and rapidly filling our little fort with

the dead and the dying. About 1 P.M. I was wounded by a rifle

ball, which rendered me insensible for some thirty or forty

minutes, but managed to rally on hearing some persons cry,

"_Cease firing_," which conveyed to me the impression that

they were trying to surrender the fort. Again I urged my

staff, the few officers left unhurt, and the men around me to

renewed exertions, assuring them that _Sherman would soon be

here with reënforcements_. The gallant fellows struggled hard

to keep their heads above the ditch and parapet in the face

of the murderous fire of the enemy now concentrated upon us.

Here we have the astonishing official statement that his men would

not expose themselves enough to fire over the parapet or out of the

ditch, and that most of the officers lost their lives in "nobly setting

them the example;" and this is also established by Col. Ludlow in his

address, where he says:

Rowett's order to "_cease firing_" had, of course, nothing

to do with the cry of "_surrender_." It is true that there

were men in the fort ready to surrender or to do anything

else in order to get out of it alive. Happily these were

few, and most of them lay prone, close under the parapet,

_playing dead_, with the combatants and wounded standing

and sitting upon them. If I mistake not, _Corse himself_,

at least for a time, _was holding down one of these living

corpses_, who preferred to endure all the pain and discomfort

of his position rather than get up and face the deadly music

that filled the air with leaden notes.... It was absolutely

necessary to keep room for the fighting force along the

parapet, so the wounded were drawn back, and in some cases

shot over and over again. The dead were disposed of in the

same way, except that as the ground became covered with them

they were let lie as they fell, and were stood or sat upon by

the fighters.... The slaughter had been frightful.

One of our guns was disabled from the jamming of a shot, and

we were out of ammunition for the other two.... I recall

distinctly the fact that a regimental flagstaff on the

parapet, which had been _several times_ shot away, fell again

at a critical moment toward the end of the action. There

was a mad yell from our friends outside, and a few cries of

"surrender" among our own people, but a brave fellow leaped

to the summit of the parapet, where it did not seem possible

to live for a single second, grasped the flagstaff, waved

it, drove the stump into the parapet, and dropped back again

unhurt. His action restored confidence; a great Yankee cheer

drowned the tumult, and no cry of "surrender" was afterwards

heard.

[Illustration: SIGNAL TREE, ALLATOONA, OCT. 5, 1864.]

Here now is presented the testimony of Corse himself, and of Col.

Ludlow, that the men would not expose themselves, and that they cried

"cease firing," and "surrender." I know, as do hundreds of others

now living, that the fire of the fort was silenced, because our men

were close up; and if any one inside the fort or in the ditch exposed

his head, instantly it became the target for several Confederates.

Confederates moved about with impunity, and I called the attention of

my staff to Johnson (Cockrell's flag bearer) riding up to the north

side of the fort, sitting quietly on his horse, and listening to what

was going on in the fort. In a recent letter from him he writes to J.

M. Brown, of Atlanta: "I remember riding up very close to the fort.

The distance was short, as I was close enough to tell what the Federals

were doing in there." After 12 M. the Confederates merely watched for

any person exposing his head above the parapet, and so I am sure that

the fire described was not so severe as related by Gen. Corse, but it

was very fatal.

Gen. Corse goes on with his report, and writes that about 2:30 P.M.

the enemy massed a force (behind a small house) which he threw into

great confusion, and that "from this time on until 4 P.M. we had the

advantage of the enemy, and maintained it with such success that they

were driven from every position, and finally fled in great confusion,

leaving their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession

of the field."

It is hardly possible to crowd into a short paragraph more errors than

are found in the four lines above, and most of them he well knew to be

false. It is true, no doubt, that he was not aware of the information

sent me that induced me to withdraw my troops. That dispatch was

received at 12:15 P.M. The Cartersville road, running north, passes

within a few yards of fort "C," and then continues some two hundred and

fifty yards on through the captured works. It was open to my infantry,

but was there not life enough in the two forts, "C" and "T," to shoot

down some of the horses and mules passing by within short pistol shot

if I attempted to move the artillery, baggage wagons, and ambulances

and block the road if I decided to move _north_ to avoid Sherman's

troops marching from the south to the relief of Allatoona?

So I resolved to obtain possession of the Acworth and Dallas road

before it was occupied in force by the Federals, trusting to their slow

and cautious movements. To this end, I first ordered all the artillery

except one battery to start at once to the Allatoona Creek bridge to

join the Mississippi regiment left there, and hold that position. Next,

Sears was directed to withdraw immediately from the north side in front

of fort "T," and Cockrell to commence at 1:30 P.M.; and, owing to the

rough hillsides, _to come out in squads, or individually_. Although

Sears began the movement over an hour before Cockrell and Young did,

the latter were all collected on the ridge first, and sat there under

the shade of the trees, within sight and easy rifle range of fort "C,"

until about 3 P.M., waiting for Sears, who had to go around the pond

made by the Yankees damming up Allatoona Creek. During all this time

but few shots were fired by the enemy. One, however, was fired at us,

and it killed a man who had appropriated a fine pair of cavalry boots

from the stores, and he fell dead at my feet where we were sitting. In

the meantime I went among the wounded men who could not walk over the

rocky hills to our ambulances, and explained to them why they would

have to be left, and that surgeons had been detailed to remain with

them. They gave me thanks without complaint.

After I showed Gens. Cockrell and Young the dispatches I had received,

and informed them of my intention not to remain and make an assault on

fort "C," lest reënforcements for the garrison should arrive before we

could leave the place, they demurred, and said their men were mad, and

wanted to remain and capture the place. Col. Gates, of the Missouri

Brigade, declared that he would capture fort "C" in twenty minutes

after the arrival and distribution of our ammunition, by way of the

sally port. He asserted that they were so crowded inside that but few

men could fire.

I adhered to my decision to withdraw, because the men had already

been three days and two nights without rest or sleep, and that they

could not pass a third night without sleep, and risk having to fight

reënforcements momentarily expected; and the subsequent arrival

of troops from Cartersville at 8 P.M. proved the correctness of my

judgment; also Martin's Brigade reached Allatoona next morning.