About 3 P.M. the last of Sears's men arrived on the ridge near the

fort where we rested awaiting them, and we then left the ridge and

moved to the Cartersville road, where the wagons were left. Cockrell

was now ordered to proceed with the infantry force to the Allatoona

Creek bridge, and join the Mississippi regiment and artillery already

there on the Dallas road. I rode down to the battery still in position

on Moore's Hill to give instructions, and remained there sometime, not

a little astonished at the scene presented to my view. The declining

sun, seen through the calm, hazy atmosphere, shone red, like the

rising of the full-orbed moon, on the fortifications before us. All

was silent now where the battle raged so long, and the mellow light

gleamed so gently down on the wounded and the dead that I remarked

to the officers and men around me: "Silence, like the pall of death,

rests over Allatoona; it is as lifeless as a graveyard at midnight." I

even went up an inclined tree and used my glasses in vain to discover

a human being. And so Corse's statement that we "were driven from

every position, and finally fled in great confusion," leaps over the

bombastic and loses its force in ridiculous excess of inaccuracy.

Corse, in his report, says that he brought with him 165,000 rounds

of ammunition, and Ludlow states that "it was all expended except two

hundred and fifty rounds." All the artillery ammunition Corse had in

fort "C" was expended, and he got a man to go after some from fort "T,"

and he returned safely with an armful. See his report.

I will pause here awhile, that you may make a survey of the field of

battle at 1:30 P.M.

For over two hours there had been pent up in fort "C," inside and in

the ditch outside, the Thirty-Ninth Iowa, the Seventh Illinois, the

Fiftieth Illinois, the Ninety-Third Illinois, the Twelfth Illinois, two

companies of the Fifty-Seventh Illinois, and their artillery, 1,453 in

number, less the killed, badly wounded, and prisoners resulting from

their defense of the redoubt "R."

The fort, built for artillery mainly, had but seventy-seven yards of

parapet, which made it so dangerous for any one to expose his head

above the parapet that their men would not fire voluntarily, "and

most of their officers were killed or wounded in setting the men an

example;" and they passed the word to "cease firing." They cried

"surrender." Some "played dead," and the combatants stood on the

"living corpses." Others sat down on them. Even Corse himself used

one for a seat after he was wounded (Ludlow). They were out of water.

Their ammunition was nearly all expended. Their firing had slackened to

a musket shot at intervals. They let us withdraw without molestation,

and we sat in the shade of the trees in full view of the fort, within

musket range, from 1:30 P.M. until 3 P.M. awaiting Sears. They saw

us all leave the ridge at the last named hour. At 4 P.M. Corse sent

dispatch No. 23: "We still hold out." So they were in the fort then,

and did not come out until the Confederates were all out of sight. The

officers tried to keep up the spirits of their men by assuring them

that "Sherman will soon come" (Corse's report). The hope of speedy

relief prevented utter despondency, and they waited and waited, hoped

and hoped for the fulfillment of the encouraging promises implied in

the dispatches sent them by Sherman, as: "Hold fast, we are coming;"

"Sherman moving in force, hold out;" "Sherman working hard for you;"

"Near you." With his troops in this condition, and in the face of all

these facts, Corse officially publishes to his commander and to the

world, in a vainglorious manner, that the Confederates "were driven

from every position, and finally fled in great confusion, leaving

their dead and wounded, and our little garrison in possession of

the field!!!" It is a beautiful description of an event that never

happened.

It must have been pretty soon after we left Allatoona that Gen. Green

B. Raum, commanding a division of cavalry that was hovering around

_between_ the Etowah bridge and the Allatoona, arrived and made a

social call on Corse, and sympathized with him in his afflictions; but

he must have left at an early hour, for he went to Cartersville that

evening and sent a dispatch, which will be found, No. 25, dated October

5.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF ALLATOONA--CAPTURE OF REDOUBT "R."]

Soon Sherman was informed that the Confederates had retreated, and had

taken the road to Dallas. So _he checked his troops that were marching

on Allatoona_. However, Corse's train, expected _every hour during

the battle_, returned to Allatoona at 8 P.M. with the remainder of

_Rowett's Brigade_. Some cavalry also arrived, and the next morning

came _Martin's Brigade_. With him the condition of affairs was very

much changed now.

During this time the weary Confederates, after capturing the blockhouse

with a garrison of one hundred and ten men at Allatoona Creek bridge,

marched on till midnight of the 5th, and the next morning were at

New Hope Church, far away from Allatoona. Corse was now resting in

the bosom of his friends, who no doubt congratulated him on his happy

deliverance from the distress of the day previous; and as there were

no Confederates near to distress him any more, he wrote Sherman, AT 2

P.M. ON THE 6TH, his (so-called) famous dispatch, which for CHEEK is

unequaled:

I am short a cheek bone and an ear, but can whip all h-ll

yet!!

Now the adverb "yet" in this case implies conditions unchanged. But, as

they were then entirely changed, he was not justified in sending such

a dispatch. It is a vainglorious, self-laudatory dispatch, no doubt

sent to divert attention from the real condition in which his command

had been placed; or it may be that the joy he felt the day after the

battle, on being reënforced and rescued from the "slaughter pen" (in

which he was pent up), by Sherman's movements to save him, caused him

to write it; if so, it is not excusable. If, however, intoxicated

at the mess table by the congratulations of friends and the usual

accompaniments required for his condition, he was inspired to send that

dispatch (as a postprandial speech is made), to mean nothing, then he

may be forgiven.

But the unbought grace of life, the trained veracity, the chivalrous

respect for foemen his equal in valor, whose daring he had witnessed,

whose prowess he had felt, and from whose presence he so longed to

be delivered, should have restrained him, at a much later date, from

writing in his official report the fabricated story of how he "drove

the Confederates from every position until finally they fled in great

confusion," because he well knew this statement was not true.

In connection with Gen. Corse's visit with Joseph M. Brown to the

battle ground at Allatoona, I have a letter from Mr. Brown giving me

other information of what was said during his visit to Atlanta. As a

guest of Senator Brown this conversation grew frank and friendly.

ATLANTA, GA., August 31, 1900.

Gen. S. G. French, Pensacola, Fla.

_My Dear General_: Answering your inquiry as to Mr. De

Thulstrup's picture of the battle of Allatoona, I will

state that in 1886 Gen. John M. Corse came to Georgia with

the above well-known battle artist. I went with them to

Allatoona, where we spent almost a day going over the various

points of the ridge on both sides of the railroad, where

there were fortifications.

Returning to Atlanta, these two gentlemen were my guests at

my father's home. That night, after some social conversation,

Gen. Corse and Mr. De Thulstrup went upstairs to their

sleeping apartments. Within probably an hour afterwards I

also went up to my sleeping room. The hall door leading from

my room to Gen. Corse's being open, I was unintentionally

made a hearer of conversation going on. Gen. Corse was

quite animated in giving instructions to the artist as to

how to draw the picture. I very distinctly heard him use

the following expression: "_Be sure_ you have the Rebels

running." He repeated this in very positive tones.

Any one looking at the picture will see that the artist

faithfully complied with the General's instructions.

Very truly yours.

JOSEPH M. BROWN.

When J. M. Brown told Corse that French never received his reply to

his summons to surrender, he answered: "This is the first information

I have to that effect, that my answer never reached him." Then Corse

told him he was in great haste in examining the lines and disposing

of his troops. "When one of his staff officers hailed me with advice

that he had a note from the enemy's commander, which he supposed was

a summons to surrender, ... I took the note and read it; it made me

mad, because, from what I could _see_ of his forces, and what I knew

of mine, I believed that I had about as big a force as he had, hence

considered the summons a superfluous piece of bravado. I sat down on a

log, and, pulling my notebook out of my pocket, wrote the reply across

the face of one of its pages, which I tore out and handed to my staff

officer with instructions to take it to the bearer of the summons....

I never knew whether my answer reached French or not."

There is something in this statement which must be regarded as very

remarkable, for in the ordinary affairs of life, if even a servant be

sent to deliver a letter, and does not find the person to whom he was

to deliver it, would he throw it away and never mention it, or would

he return with it and report that he did not find the man to whom

he was to hand it? And does not common sense tell us that on such a

momentous matter as this, involving the lives of hundreds of men, his

staff officer would have reported that the flag of truce could not be

found, and have returned the dispatch given him? And, furthermore, can

any person of intelligence believe that Gen. Corse and the said staff

officer did not speak about this pretentious answer to the summons at

any time, which is published to the world in facsimile, of which Julius

E. Brown, of Atlanta, has one copy. If he published the "facsimile" of

the dispatch sent me, where did he get it? It seems to me the General

"doth protest too much." And further he says: "Being in great pain from

my wound, I took the train the night of the 5th for Rome." If this be

true, how could he have issued his "famous" dispatch from Allatoona on

the afternoon of the 6th, for it gives the place, date, and the hour?

I am inclined to the belief that he did not leave Allatoona until after

the 6th, or on the second day after the fight.

I would not detract anything from the well-earned reputation of Gen.

Corse--and more especially so, as he is not living--yet it is a duty

incumbent on me, a duty I owe to my children, and particularly to the

noble Confederate soldiers who were with me, to protect them against

the statement of being "driven away" by the garrison. The demands of

impartial history require of me--an actor therein, a living witness--to

transcribe from my diary the facts as there recorded at the time, so

that the world may know to what extent the many reported incidents of

the battle have truth for their foundation as we now find them related

in nursery tales to children, taught in schools, narrated in story, and

sung in the gospel hymn of "Hold the Fort" wherever the cross is seen

and Christianity prevails.

But in the current literature of the North derived from the exaggerated

bulletins daily sent from the seat of war there is a wonderful

admixture of truth and error, and I am trying to separate them so

far as they are found in the ordinary versions of this battle, and

emphatically to declare that the Confederate troops were _not_ repulsed

as stated in the light publications of the day, or as written in

Corse's report.

If any further testimony be desired, I would refer you to the following

letter from a publication made by Joseph M. Brown, son of the late

Senator Joseph E. Brown, of Georgia.

ALLATOONA, GA., November 10, 1890.

Mr. Joseph M. Brown.

_Dear Sir_: In reply to the inquiries contained in your

letter of October 31, I will state that, with my brother, I

was in Allatoona on the night of October 4, 1864, when the

place was surrounded by Confederates under Gen. French.

Early the next morning, for safety, we went into the fort

on the west side of the railroad, and were there during the

battle that day. Gen. Corse commanded on the west side of

the railroad, and was in the fort all the latter part of the

fight. The Federals fought desperately, and after they lost

fort "R"[30] across the Cartersville road they were very

much disheartened. They could get no water without exposing

themselves to a deadly fire; and it was very much needed,

especially for the wounded.

During the latter part of the engagement I frequently heard

it said they were nearly out of ammunition. They were on

the point of giving up the fight several times. The command

"Cease firing" was given by somebody and passed around the

fort, but then some of the officers rallied the men a little.

If the attack had been kept up a little while longer, the

fort would have certainly been taken; but to the surprise

of the Federals, their enemy's fire slackened and the

Confederates retired from the front of the fort. The Federals

at this time were at a loss to understand this movement, when

they themselves were nearly ready to surrender. They seemed

momentarily to expect a renewal of the attack from some

other quarter. They remained quietly in the fort for nearly

or quite three-quarters of an hour after the Confederates

retired. But when they found that the Confederates would not

renew the fighting there was a great rally in the fort. Then

there was some desultory firing at the Confederates on the

south of the fort near the depot and station. The Federals

did not sally out of the fort until the Confederates were

gone entirely out of sight.

W. M. DENTON.

As regards the arms captured by Corse, I will simple remark they were

inferior muskets exchanged on the field for Springfield rifles, and

Henry repeating rifles (16 shooters), one of which I turned over, by

my Aid Yerger, to the United States Ordnance officer at the close of

the war. Had Corse gone to the blockhouse at Allatoona creek, he would

have captured there eighty-five muskets (thrown away) in the road, in

exchange for those we captured there, which would have augmented his

list of arms captured.

PROVISIONS.

There were about one million rations of bread at Allatoona, and two

million seven hundred thousand in Atlanta, and _not_ two million seven

hundred thousand in Allatoona as stated by Col. Ludlow. (Sherman's

letter to Corse, page 134, Vol. 39.) The rations in Allatoona in no way

affected the "march to the sea." They were ordered to Rome on the 11th,

for use above. (See page 207.)

"I propose breaking up the railroad from Chattanooga and striking out

with wagons.... Until we can _depopulate_ Georgia it is useless to

occupy it.... The utter destruction of the _roads, houses, and people_

cripple their resources.... I can make Georgia _howl_.... I have eight

thousand cattle and three million rations of bread." (Page 162, Vol.

39.)

The destruction of the stores at Allatoona, had it been done, would not

have interfered with the "march to the sea."

The stores in Allatoona were in our possession, and they were not set

on fire by our men because they wanted some themselves, and much was

appropriated. But I had no knowledge of there being a large depot there

until I withdrew Cockrell and Young; and while waiting for Sears I

heard the men speak about them. On obtaining this information a party

of men were sent there to burn them. It is a singular fact that only

three matches could be found, and Gen. Cockrell had them, and when the

party reached the stores the matches failed to ignite.

Gen. Sherman left Atlanta November 15, 1864, and arrived at Savannah

on the 10th of December. He writes that he had sixty-five thousand men.

To supply these men the twenty-seven days they were on the march would

require one million seven hundred and fifty-five thousand rations. They

averaged eight miles per day--for the distance is about two hundred and

twenty miles. I have related to you how I made a march (with a large

wagon train, through a desolate country, heavily laden) of ninety-six

miles in fifty-two hours; and this without water.

This much vaunted "march to the sea" was a pleasure excursion, through

a well-cultivated country, and is a mere bagatelle compared with that

made by the Mormons from Illinois to Utah, or the many expeditions

made overland to California during the gold excitement. The distance

to California is ten times greater than the distance from Atlanta to

Savannah.

Sherman boastfully writes that he "destroyed two hundred and sixty-five

miles of railroad, carried off ten thousand mules, and countless

slaves; that he did damage to the amount of $100,000,000. Of this,

his army got $20,000,000, and the $80,000,000 was waste," as they went

"looting" through Georgia.

But not content with this, when "this cruel war was over," he presented

the delectable spectacle of "how we went thieving through Georgia"

at the grand review of _his_ army in Washington, by mounting his

bummers on mules laden with chickens, ducks, geese, lambs, pigs,

and other farm productions, unblushingly displayed, to cover up the

concealed money, jewelry, and plate taken from the helpless women--to

delight the President, to edify the loyal people, to gratify the

hatred of the populace to the South, to popularize the thirst for

plundering made by his troops, to be an object lesson to the present

generation, to instill a broader view of moral right, to heighten

modest sensibilities, to refine the delicate tastes of young ladies, to

humiliate a conquered people; or wherefore was this unwise "Punch and

Judy" show given?

During the revolutionary war, when the British fleet ascended the

Potomac river, one ship sailed up to Mount Vernon--the residence of the

arch rebel, Washington--and made a requisition for provisions which his

agent filled. The English commander must have been a gentleman because

he did not burn the dwelling, insult the family, nor commit robbery!!!

Gen. Bradley T. Johnston, in his life of Gen. J. E. Johnston, quotes

that, "Abubekr in the year 634 gave his chiefs of the army of Syria

orders as follows: 'Remember that you are always in the presence of

God, on the verge of death, in the assurance of judgment and the hope

of paradise. Avoid injustice and oppression.... When you fight the

battles of the Lord acquit yourselves like men, without turning your

backs; but let not your victory be stained with the blood of women or

children. _Destroy_ no _palm tree_, nor burn any _fields_ of _corn_.

Cut down no _fruit trees_, nor do any _mischief to cattle_, only

such as you _kill to eat_. When you make any covenant or article,

stand to it and be as good as your word. As you go on, you will find

some religious persons who live retired in monasteries, and purpose

themselves to serve God in that way. Let them alone, and neither kill

them nor destroy their _monasteries_.'

"Judged by the laws given Moses on Sinai, or the teachings of Him

who stilled the waves on Galilee, or the Koran, the principles of

morality, or feelings of humanity; were not the gates of Paradise open

to Abubekr?

"Owing to the barbarities that were practiced by the English soldiers

and sailors, and the refusal to exchange prisoners, Capt. John Paul

Jones, when in command of the Continental ship, Ranger, on April 23,

1778, landed on the Isle of St. Mary, Scotland, with a small force

and surrounded the house of the Earl of Shetland, to carry the earl

away, and have him detained until through his means a general and

fair exchange of prisoners, in Europe as well as in America, could be

effected.

"The earl was not at home, and Jones permitted his men to take

silverware from the castle as fair plunder and a just revenge for the

acts of British sailors in America, who had not only looted the homes

of the rich, but had driven off _one_ cow and _one_ pig of the laborer.

"The silver taken was of the real value of £500 pounds, but when sold

for the benefit of the crew, Jones bought it and returned it (at his

own expense) at a cost of £1,000 pounds, all told, to the noble lord."

(Spear's "History of Our Navy," pages 142-148, Vol. I.)

Was not England fighting the colonies then in rebellion?

It is not I who charge Sherman with destroying cornfields, cutting

down fruit trees, or "driving off _one_ cow and _one_ pig;" he himself

boasts of having done it. If he did take the "_one_ cow and the _one_

pig," he kindly left the poor women their tears and their memory.

SHERMAN.

The dispatches numbered 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 17, 18, 19,

20, 23, and 26, which I have given, will show Gen. Sherman's untiring

efforts to save Allatoona, and to prevent my division from joining

Hood. No. 26 shows that on the 4th his force went into camp at the

foot of Little Kennesaw. Nos. 15 and 16 show that Stanley, with a

part of the army of the Cumberland, was on Pine Mountain at 2:10

P.M. on the 5th. At that hour we were sitting under the shade of the

trees at Allatoona, waiting for Sears's men, and on the ridge by the

fortifications.

My diary, written on the spot, says we left with the wagons at 4:30

P.M. Next, we were detained an hour in capturing the blockhouse at the

creek. If Stanley had moved promptly, he could have occupied the Dallas

road, moving northwest, at some point many hours in advance of me.

No. 17 informs Stanley: "I want to control the Sandtown road back to

Allatoona." That is the road I marched over from the blockhouse to New

Hope Church _on the 5th, and morning of the 6th_.

Sherman's cavalry was ordered several times to hold that road. They

were two miles in advance of Kemp's Mill at 3:10 P.M. on the 5th (see

No. 16), and not four miles from the road. We were then at Allatoona.

In Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II., page 147, you will find these words:

"From Kennesaw I ordered the Twenty-Third Corps to march due west on

the Burnt Hickory road, and to burn houses or piles of brush as it

progressed to indicate the head of column, hoping to interpose this

corps between Hood's main army at Dallas and the detachment _then_

assailing Allatoona."

The _rest_ of the army was directed straight to Allatoona, eighteen

miles distant.

By the map, Allatoona (in a direct line) is thirteen miles from

Kennesaw, ten miles from Pine Mountain, twelve miles from New Hope

Church, eight miles from Big Shanty, eleven miles from Lost Mountain;

and from Pine Mountain, where Gen. Stanley was on the 5th with part

of the army of the Cumberland, to the road over which I passed on the

6th, _it is only five miles_. Also the cavalry that was at Kemp's Mill

at 3:10 P.M. on the 5th was within five miles of the residence of _Dr.

Smith, where I encamped on the night of the 5th_.

For these facts, read again the Federal dispatches that I have given.

It is therefore manifest that only by tardy and cautious movements,

or no movements, as Sherman ordered, arising from Hood's fighting

qualities, they failed to place a powerful force across our road before

I left the bridge across Allatoona creek or at any time on the 6th, the

day following.

Sherman at first, or "for a time, attributed this result" (my

withdrawing my troops) "to the effect of Gen. Cox's march" (see page

147, Vol. II., of his "Memoirs"), which, in truth, was mainly the

cause; but he generously gave--however erroneously--all the credit

to his lieutenant, with whom he was well pleased for "holding on" and

"holding out" through faith in "his promises to come to his relief,"

and then complimented him in a general order that Corse must have felt

as being a little ironical, save only as relates to "holding out" with

a _faith_ in Sherman which can be found in St. Paul's Epistle to the

Hebrews, where he writes that "faith is the substance of things hoped

for, the evidence of things not seen."

Sherman's signal dispatches to Corse before and during the battle to

"hold the fort," intended only for their encouragement, has now become

a world-wide inspiration in the form of a gospel song written by the

evangelist P. P. Bliss.

Mr. Joseph M. Brown writes that "the circumstances of the messages and

the battle being narrated to the evangelist, he caught from them the

idea for the stirring words:

Ho! my comrades, see the signal

Waving in the sky!

Reënforcements now appearing,

Victory is nigh.

_Chorus._--Hold the fort, for I am coming!

Jesus signals still;

Wave the answer back to heaven:

"By thy grace we will!"

"He wrote this song on the night that he first heard the story, and

sung it in the Tabernacle in Chicago next day. It was caught up by

the voices of thousands, and from that day to this has been a standard

gospel lyric."

_HOOD._

On the afternoon of October 4, 1864, when I was at Big Shanty, on the

railroad near Kennesaw, Gen. A. P. Stewart, my corps commander, handed

to me two orders from Gen. Hood. The first one is dated October 4, 7:30

A.M., and the second at 11:30 A.M. These two orders may be found in my

official report of the battle of Allatoona on a preceding page.

The purport of these two orders is: that I will take my division to

Allatoona and fill up the deep cut there (a photograph of a _part_ of

this cut is here given), and then go on to the Etowah river bridge and

burn it, if possible; and thence march to New Hope Church by taking

roads running south to New Hope Church, and join my corps there; the

destruction of the bridge being the more important duty; and I was

expected to join the army on the 6th.

[Illustration: RAILROAD CUT, ALLATOONA. FORT "C" ON THE LEFT, FORT "T"

ON THE RIGHT.]

If this cut be critically examined, it will be perceived that the

order to "fill it up" in an hour or so, and then go on to the bridge,

does not evince a profound knowledge of engineering. A little boy

builds sand forts and castles on the seashore with wooden paddles, and

believes he is a Vauban or an Inigo Jones.[31] He knew we had but a

few spades, and directed Gen. Stewart to borrow for me tools from Gen.

Armstrong; and he had none.

In 1880, sixteen years after he wrote those orders, Gen. Hood published

a work called "Advance and Retreat," in which the following words are

written (page 257):

"I had received information--and Gen. Shoupe records the same in his

diary--that the enemy had in store, at Allatoona, large supplies which

were _guarded_ by two or three regiments. As one of the main objects

of _the campaign_ was to deprive the enemy of provisions, Maj. Gen.

French was ordered to move with his division, to capture the garrison,

if practicable, and _gain possession_ of the _supplies_. Accordingly

on the 5th, at 10 A.M., after a refusal to surrender, he attacked the

Federal forces at Allatoona, and succeeded in capturing a portion

of the works; at that juncture he received intelligence that large

reënforcements were advancing in support of the enemy, and, fearing

he would be cut off from the main body of the army, he retired and

abandoned the attempt. Maj. L. Perot, adjutant of Ector's Brigade,

had informed me by letter that our troops were in possession of these

stores during several hours, and could easily have destroyed them. If

this assertion be correct, I presume Maj. Gen. French forbade their

destruction, in the conviction of his ability to successfully remove

them for the use of the Confederate army."

Now, if any intelligent person will carefully scrutinize the orders

given me, and then ponder over what Hood published, he can arrive at

no other conclusion than that the account published is erroneous. They

cannot both be true!

And further, when I made my official report I copied my orders that

he gave me, and I stated in my report: "It would appear, however, from

these orders, that the general in chief was not aware that the pass was

fortified and garrisoned that I was sent to have filled up."

This report was, by Gen. Stewart, delivered to Gen. Hood, and by him

forwarded to the War Department in Richmond; thence it went to the War

Department in Washington. And although I therein state that Hood had

no knowledge of the place being garrisoned, or fortified, he forwarded

it without comment. He could not do otherwise. There were the originals

copied in his own order book.

"Gain possession of the supplies!" under all the environments, is only

a vague expression of a glittering generality and signifies nothing

particular, and is a mere platitude and nothing more. What was I to do

with them? Bring them away? remove them without a wagon, when about six

hundred were required!

But let us suppose that Hood actually did know that Allatoona was

fortified, garrisoned, and a depot for army rations. If so, then he

should have imparted to either Gen. Stewart or me that information.

Again: Gen. Hood having declared that the main object of the campaign

was "to deprive the enemy of provisions," here was the desired

opportunity; nay, more--to appropriate them to his own use. He wrote

the first order to me at 7:30 A.M. on the 4th. At that time I was at

Big Shanty, Walthall at Moon's, and Loring at Acworth, only two hours'

(daylight) march from Allatoona!

Now I ask in the name of common sense, Can it be possible that, with

Gen. Stewart's army corps so near those much needed army supplies, he

should order Gen. Stewart's Corps to remain there close by them "till

late in the evening," and then march him away and order me, the most

distant, to go there and "take possession of them?"

Had he known what he says he did, undoubtedly he would have ordered,

at daylight on the 4th, every available wagon to Acworth, and (instead

of the utterly impractical one of putting a mountain in a deep cut)

ordered Gen. Stewart with his three divisions to Allatoona in all

haste. Loring could have reached Allatoona by _11 a.m. on the 4th_,

and the others soon after. The battle would have been fought on the

4th, and before the arrival of Corse at midnight. No! for the want of

information, this was not to be.

And so I went all alone into the land occupied by the enemy, and Gen.

Hood moved farther and farther away, leaving me isolated beyond all

support or assistance.

Gen. Hood could not have had a good knowledge of the topography of the

country, because when my dispatch to Stewart--that I would withdraw

from Allatoona to avoid being shut up in a _cul de sac_--was received

Hood tells Stewart that he does not understand "how Gen. French could

be cut off, as he should have moved directly away from the railroad

to the west." (Page 791, War Records, Vol. 39.) I am quite sure Gen.

Armstrong, when (at 9 A.M.) he sent me his dispatch, also sent a

copy of it to Gen. Stewart or Hood, because Hood at 1:15 P.M. tells

Armstrong he "must prevent my being surprised, and enable me to get out

safely."

I will state here again that it was about noon on the 4th, when some

citizens, living on the line of the railroad above, remarked that

we "could not tear up the track to Allatoona, because that place

was fortified and garrisoned, and that it was a depot for supplies."

Therefore it was that Gen. Stewart and myself, in discussing the order,

were convinced that Hood did not know the condition of affairs at

Allatoona, and at my request he gave me some additional artillery; and

so there is ample evidence that Hood had no knowledge that the enemy

occupied the Allatoona Pass.

Gen. Hood was indeed a brave man, if not a courageous one, and he

couched his lance at the enemy wherever he met him, whether in the

guise of a windmill or the helmet of Mambrino; but at last, in after

days, he went over to the enemy, for on page 257 of his volume he

writes: "Gen. Corse won my admiration by his gallant resistance, and

not without reason the Federal commander complimented this officer,

through a general order, for his handsome conduct in the defense of

Allatoona!"

It is a pertinent question to ask from what source Gen. Hood derived

his information. If he had read Gen. Corse's report, he would have

discovered that his men would not expose themselves enough to fire

over the parapet, and that they merely "held out" for the hourly

promised assistance, etc., as I have narrated. Is it pleasing to learn

from his pen his rapturous love for the Federals and contempt for the

Confederates and his standard of admiration? Mine is different; and I

am free to state that it was the Confederates with whom I was present,

who by their death,

"by their painful service,

The extreme danger, and the drops of blood

Shed,"

by their gallantry and perseverance won my admiration. And this is no

reflection on the enemy they met. Hood's want of admiration for the

soldiers he commanded in 1864 and 1865 is the highest meed to their

intelligence.

Perhaps it was natural, in after years, that Gen. Hood should select

some Federal officer on whom to bestow his admiration, and when they

passed in review before him Gen. Corse was awarded this honor. I trow

he must have forgotten Col. Clark R. Weaver, U. S. A.

Seven days after Allatoona, Gen. Hood with his entire army was at

Resaca. It was garrisoned by about five hundred men commanded by Col.

Weaver. Hood summoned Weaver to surrender in unmistakable terms, ending

as follows:

If the place is carried by assault, no prisoners will be

taken.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, _General_.

To this Col. Weaver replied:

In my opinion I can hold this post. If you want it, come and

take it.

CLARK R. WEAVER, _Com'd'g Officer_.

(See Sherman's "Memoirs," Vol. II., page 155.)

Nevertheless, on page 257, "Advance and Retreat," Hood writes, "Gen.

Corse won my admiration by his gallant resistance," etc., and further

on--page 326 of his book--he writes, "The information I received

that the enemy was moving to cut me off proved to be false," which

is refuted by the arrival of reënforcements as I have stated, and

Sherman's dispatches that I have given.

It is singular that so many laudatory statements should have been made

by Gen. J. M. Corse and admirers about the battle of Allatoona, which

were not necessary to sustain his character as a soldier.

I have before me a book of nearly five hundred pages, written by F.

Y. Hedley, adjutant of the Thirty-Second Illinois Regiment, which

is entitled "Pen Pictures of Everyday Life in Gen. Sherman's Army,

from Atlanta to the Close of the War." This includes the battle of

Allatoona, and as he makes the story to be palatable to the tastes

of those who enjoy the marvelous, at the expense of the Confederate

soldiers and myself, I feel obliged to expose more of the legerdemain

used to deceive the public by juggling tricks.

I will state that on page 219 there is a facsimile of my summons to

the commanding officer of the garrison to surrender. It was sent, as I

have stated, because it was then supposed that the garrison was small

in numbers. It reads:

AROUND ALLATOONA, October 5, 8:15 A.M., 1864.

Commanding Officer U. S. Forces, Allatoona:

_Sir_: I have placed the forces under my command in such

positions that you are surrounded; and to avoid a needless

effusion of blood, I call on you to surrender your forces at

once, and unconditionally. Five minutes will be allowed you

to decide. Should you accede to this, you will be treated in

the most honorable manner as prisoners of war.

I have the honor to be very respectfully yours,

S. G. FRENCH,

_Major General Commanding Forces C. S._

On the same leaf is a facsimile of Gen. Corse's reply to my note, and

it reads:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION, }

FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, 8:30 A.M., October 5, 1864. }

Maj. Gen. G. S. French, C. S. A.:

Your communication demanding surrender of my command I

acknowledge receipt of, and respectfully reply that we are

prepared for the "needless effusion of blood" whenever it is

agreeable to you.

I am very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. CORSE,

_Major General Commanding Forces U. S._

Let us investigate this matter.

The facsimile of my letter is true, no doubt about that; but we have

also the facsimile of the reply made by Corse which was sent me, and

by me never received; and in the face of that Corse "declared he never

knew that I did not receive it, or that it was not delivered to Maj.

Sanders, the bearer of the flag of truce," until so informed by Joseph

M. Brown, whose guest he was when he came to Atlanta with the artist De

Thulstrup to have the battle painted; and he further told him: "I took

the note (French's) and read it. It made me mad, because from what I

could see of his forces, and what I knew of mine, I believed that I had

about as big a force as he; hence considered the summons a superfluous

piece of bravado. I sat down on a log, and pulling my notebook out of

my pocket, wrote the reply across the face of one of the pages, which

I tore out and handed to my staff officer with instructions to take it

back to the bearer of the summons."

Not finding Maj. Sanders, of course he returned in a few minutes and

gave Corse the note.

Next William Ludlow (now a general in the United States army), in his

address to the Michigan Commandery, Loyal Legion, at Detroit, on April

2, 1891 (page 20), says: "Corse did reply; he wrote his answer on the

top of a neighboring stump."

Then Hedley (page 223) says of Corse: "His every pound of flesh

and blood was that of a hero: his eye flashed as if lighted with a

Promethean spark; and his chest swelled with angry defiance to the

hideous threat implied in the summons to surrender! 'Capt. Flint,' said

he, 'answer this!' so Capt. Flint seated himself upon a tree stump and

wrote the reply."

I care not who wrote the reply to my note; I only desire to know who

kept it concealed for over twenty years, and then produced it, and,

together with mine, authoritatively gave them to Hedley to photograph

and publish side by side.

If Corse had it hid away, or knew where it was, then he must have been

mistaken when he declared to Joseph M. Brown that he never knew that

I had not received it. Besides, that I received no reply was reported

officially and well known.

As regards the "hideous threat implied" in my note, it has been left to

the hero of Allatoona to discover it for the first time, although the

like and similar expressions have been used by many commanders in the

years long past, and escaped the critical acumen of those to whom they

were sent to find an implied threat therein.

No one except Ludlow, so far as I am aware, has ever published that

Maj. Sanders was fired on by Corse's soldiers when approaching under a

flag of truce. I made it known on an inclosure in my official report.

Adjutant Hedley says "the heroic _defense_ of Allatoona is almost as

famous as the 'charge of the Light Brigade,' and far more momentous in

its results."

There was nothing momentous pending on it. It was Hood's ignorance of

the enemy's position that caused the battle; it should never have been

made. We had nothing to gain; we would not remain there, nor had I any

means to carry stores away with me. It is well known what Hood ordered

us to do: "fill up the Allatoona cut, and burn the bridge over the

Etowah river," and join him on the 6th.

I here repeat that the one million rations of bread in Allatoona were

not a factor in Sherman's march to Savannah. He refused to repair the

railroad we had destroyed, and sent the rations north of the Etowah.

Subsequently, however, he did put the road in condition so as to send

the sick and wounded, etc., north from Atlanta. The war records show he

had in Atlanta 3,000,000 rations and eight thousand beeves. For 65,000

men eighteen days were required 1,170,000 rations. On the march the

most difficult problem Sherman had to solve was _what to do with his

superabundant rations_.

Let us examine Hedley on this question. He writes, first: The regular

commissaries and quartermasters foraged for the regular commands off

the country; but "under the color of the _license_ given by Sherman's

orders _every_ regiment in the army sent out an independent foraging

party, whose duty it was to see that its particular command was

furnished with all the DELICACIES the country afforded. These men

were the most venturesome in the army;" they "took great risks and

experienced startling adventures.... If the negroes told the bummers

stories of cruelty they had suffered, or hostility to the Union, etc.,

the injury was avenged by the torch." So on the twaddle of negroes

these bummers, acting as judges, without appeal, executed their own

sentences.

The rehearsal of these scenes afforded amusement in Washington,

and "Marching through Georgia" is still a favorite hymn to the

sanctimonious people who delight in cruelty to innocent women and

little children.

"The bummer was a wily diplomat and learned all that was to be known

of the neighbor farther down the road whom he expected to raid the next

day.... The bummer drew a line between the rich and the poor."

Speaking of one bummer, as an example of others, he writes: "About

midnight his voice was heard arousing the camp; he had six animals,

horses and mules, strung together with a motley improvised harness

made of odds and ends.... He bestrode one of the wheelers, and swayed

in the saddle from the effects of apple-jack; his wagon was an immense

box of the Tennessee pattern, high at each end, low in the middle,

similar to an old Dutch galiot, loaded to the guards with the choicest

of wines and liquors; and by chance there was in the cargo a box of

glass goblets.... Samples of the wines were sent to corps headquarters,

pronounced excellent, with the intimation that a further supply would

be acceptable, etc.," and so on the chapter reads to the end.

The bummers generally obliged the negroes to improvise teams, and in

wagons brought their stealings into camp. "They ranged over a section

between sixty to eighty miles in breadth." (Page 272.) The writer

pursues a middle line: he tells us nothing about the distress of the

thousands of women and children left homeless by these cruel wretches,

nor does he see any of watches, plate, and jewelry stolen; and now

here we are, in the last years of the century, told by the "Grand Army

of the Republic" that we must not tell any of these matters to our

children in our school histories.

I am now about to close my account of this battle and the false

statements regarding it. I have written it because of Gen. Corse's

willfully making an erroneous statement toward the close of his report

about driving the division away, and because of his (so-called) famous

dispatch, the gospel hymn, and the shouts of victory, congratulatory

orders and admiration parties; because of Hood's statement about orders

given me--all of which have thrown a glamour over the conflict, making

things seem to be what they were not.

I have endeavored to dispel the illusion, remove the glamour, uncover

the hidden truth to him who will seek it.

The "holding on" power of the Federal soldier in this battle was

remarkable, and his faith commendable. From 11 A.M. to near the close

of day they were pent up inside and around in the ditch of a small fort

in such numbers that they lay on one another, sat on each other, stood

on others dead or alive, praying for relief. There they stayed till, in

the silence of the gloaming, they ventured out and "had the advantage

of the enemy and maintained it"--without opposition, for the enemy had

long been gone away!

In what I have written respecting this battle I have made no charge

against the Union soldier of the want of courage or the desire to

surrender.

It is they who furnish the evidence of their distress, refusal

to man the parapets, and desire to surrender under the long delay

and disappointments of the so-often-promised aid. Amidst all their

environments, let none condemn them without cause.

[Illustration: JOSEPH M. BROWN.]

THE SOLDIERS' GRAVE.

BY JOSEPH M. BROWN.

[In Allatoona Pass, by the Western and Atlantic railroad, is the

grave of an unknown soldier who fell in the battle there October

5, 1864.]

In the railroad cut there's a lonely grave

Which the trackmen hold sacred to care;

They have piled round it stones, and for it they save

Every flower, when their task calls them there.

Away from the home of his love,

Away from his sweetheart or wife,

Away from his mother, whose prayers went above,

He gave for his country his life.

We know not if, wearing the blue, he came

'Neath the "bright, starry banner" arrayed,

And, dying, that it o'er the mountains of fame

Might forever in triumph wave prayed;

Or we know not if, 'neath the "bonnie blue flag,"

He rushed forth, his country's defender,

Valiant, smote those who her cause down would drag.

And only to death did surrender.

That God only knows; and so in his hand

Let the secret unfathomed e'er rest;

But this we know, that he died for his land,

And the banner he thought was the best.

Heav'n pity the dear ones who prayed his return,

Heav'n bless them, and shield them from woes,

Heav'n grant o'er his grave to melt anger stern,

And make brothers of those who were foes!

THE LONE GRAVE.

BY PAUL DRESSER.

["The Lone Grave" is situated on the Western and Atlantic

railroad between Chattanooga, Tenn., and Atlanta, Ga. A plain

board marked the resting place of a soldier. Name "unknown."

None could tell whether he had been a Federal or Confederate.

The section hands, when laying the track, discovered the

grave, sodded it over beautifully, and placed a headstone

over it bearing the above inscription. The traveler's

attention is always called to this spot, and the trains

"slow up" in order to give all an opportunity to see it. Let

this be an olive branch to the North and South to be again a

united people.--AUTHOR.]

A story I am going to tell of a grave

In the South where a brave soldier fell.

For his cause he now sleeps by the side of a

track--

What his colors none able to tell.

A plain, simple board, rudely carved, that was all

That was left to remind one of that sacred spot.

The words, as we traced them, were simple enough;

"A soldier sleeps here; O! forget me not."

_Chorus._--The lone grave is there by the side of the track;

It contains a wanderer who never came back;

And when he appears on the great judgment day,

Our Father'll not ask: "Was your suit blue or

gray?"

There's a mother that sits by a fireside to-night.

She is thinking of days long gone by;

And she pictures "a loved one who went to the war,

But returned not," she says with a sigh.

If the mother could know that her boy calmly

sleeps,

Undisturbed by the march or the progress of

time,

What feelings would haunt her, what thoughts would

she have,

Sobs, tears, and heartaches, what sadness

sublime!

Joseph M. Brown, who was for many years engaged in collecting facts

relating to this battle, and which he privately published some years

ago, states that the remains of Col. W. H. Clark, of Mississippi, rest

in this grave. He fell, with the colors of his regiment in his hands,

leading his men in the attack. That is an error.

[Illustration: THE LONE GRAVE.]

These now deserved tributes to a brave soldier were made "To an Unknown

Hero." For it is not known whether he was in the United States or

Confederate service. As the last resting place of a man who gave his

life for his country, it was regarded a sacred spot, and it is hoped it

will always be reverently cared for out of respect to the dead. It is

an honored grave. Millions of travelers pass by and do it reverence.

And now, in conclusion, I have shown:

1. That the remarkable orders I received from Gen. Hood were given

before he had any knowledge of there being a garrison at Allatoona; and

that his later statements may be erroneous.

2. That I was not aware that the garrison in the fortress had been

reënforced (two hours before my arrival) by Gen. Corse and troops, when

I summoned the commander to surrender; and that I never received any

reply to my summons.

3. That when the outer line of the fortress was gained, and Gen.

Corse with all his troops west of the railroad were driven into the

"slaughter pen," the battle was lost to him; his troops would not face

their assailants; would have surrendered, only their officers implored

them to "hold out" longer, as relief was momentarily expected to end

"the prolonged strain of that mortal day."

4. That when I received the dispatch from Gen. Armstrong informing me

that the advance infantry of Sherman's army from Atlanta had passed

Gen. Hood at Lost Mountain, and were at Big Shanty, I deemed it best to

forego the gratification of a complete victory for myself and troops,

which, if won, must still result in further fight (by my exhausted

troops) with the reënforcements hourly expected. And so I would not

yield to the importunity of both officers and men, who were mad, and

wanted, also, to "hold on" until they captured the entire works. I

weighed their promises to capture the last work when ammunition was

obtained with the after probable consequences, and pointed them out,

and adhered to my decision; deeming it best for the "Confederate cause"

not to lose more men for the mere eclat of a victory of doubtful

compensating utility. We could not remain an hour if the place were

taken.

5. Considering the number of urgent dispatches that Sherman sent to

his general officers to take possession of the road over which I passed

(on the 5th and 6th) on my way to New Hope Church, it is left for them

to account for permitting the Confederates to pass by them without any

serious skirmishing, because dispatch No. 15, received by Gen. Stanley

at 2:30 P.M. on the 5th (when I was at Allatoona), gave him seventeen

hours to occupy and hold the Sand Town road, as ordered, before I moved

over it to join Hood at New Hope Church.

Lastly. Gen Corse's "famous" dispatch, originally, "I can lick all

h--l yet," has not the merit of the excitement or inspiration of

the battlefield. It loses its significance entirely for the want of

applicability. He had "whipped" no one; his command was now doubled

in numbers; no enemy was within twenty miles of him; an entire day

(lacking an hour) had passed since the last shot was fired, when he

deliberately and thoughtfully prepared that dispatch, perhaps to divert

attention from the real, actual occurrences of the battle the day

previous and tickle the public ear.

The testimony of hundreds of witnesses now living has been _recorded_

to substantiate what I have written. For the Union soldier in this

battle I have tried to

nothing extenuate.

Nor set down aught in malice,

and in after years, I trust, to the noble Confederates who fought this

battle the impartial historian will

Give them the honors they won in the strife,

Give them the laurels they lost with their life.

CHICKAMAUGA, GA., April 12, 1897.

Gen. S. G. French, Pensacola, Fla.

_My Dear General_: The manuscript history of the battle

of Allatoona which you recently sent me has been read over

twice, very carefully. It was exceedingly interesting to me,

and must be correct in every particular. Those facts and

circumstances which fell within my personal knowledge are

stated correctly, according to my recollections; and your

unswerving fidelity to the truth and careful attention to

details are well remembered. Moreover, the account given of

the conduct of your troops is just what every one who knew

them, as I did, would expect of Cockrell's Missourians, of

Young's (Ector's) Texans, of Sears's Mississippians, and of

Coleman's North Carolinians. Do you not owe it to these men

as well as to yourself and the truth of history to publish

this account of that battle? I hope you will do so, and would

suggest, in the event you do, that the route taken by Sears

to reach the north side and rear of the Federal position,

and the positions of your three brigades, be indicated on the

topographical map (page 339).

Very sincerely yours,

ALEX P. STEWART.

CHAPTER XVII.

Return from Allatoona--Hood's Deportment--Cross the Coosa

River--Devastation around Rome--Rome Burned--Garrison of

Resaca Refuses to Surrender--Capture of the Seventeenth

Iowa Regiment at Tilton--Dalton Taken--Dug Gap--Dinner

of Roasting Ears--Supper--Captured Officers are Jolly

Good Fellows--Gadsden--Encampment at Mrs. Sansom's--Her

Daughter a Guide for Gen. Forrest when He Captured

Gen. Streight--Cross the Black Warrior River and Sand

Mountains--Decatur--Some Fighting at Decatur--Gen.

Beauregard with Hood--Beautiful Valley of the Tennessee

made Desolate by War--Tuscumbia--Dreary March to Columbia,

Rain and Snow--Stewart's and Cheatham's Corps Cross Duck

River _en Route_ to Spring Hill--Hood Slept--Schofield

Passed By--Pursue Schofield to Franklin--Battle of

Franklin--Incidents--Remarkable Order for a Second Assault

at Night--Losses in My Two Brigades--Exchange of Prisoners

Stopped.

The battle of Allatoona having been fought as I have described it, the

blockhouse at Allatoona creek with a garrison of 110 men captured, we

marched on toward New Hope Church, and near midnight encamped at the

residence of Dr. Smith, in the midst of an awful rainstorm, and within

three miles of Federal forces.

October 6, 1864. The rain is still falling in torrents, and

it continued until we reached New Hope Church and joined

the other two divisions. When I called at headquarters, Hood

reminded me of a disheartened man. His countenance was sad

and his voice doleful. He received me with a melancholy air,

and asked no questions; did _not refer to the battle_, "told

me where my corps was, and said he would leave next day." He

seemed much depressed in spirits. Perhaps he experienced a

feeling of remorse that his want of information had induced

him to send me to burn the Etowah bridge, stopping an hour or

two _en route_ at the Allatoona cut, "fill it up and obtain

information." Encamped on Pumpkinvine creek.

7th. Marched early this morning to Van Wirt, by a road

leading along a high ridge. Was invited to the house of Dr.

Pearce for the night.

8th. Started at dawn and marched to Cedartown, and encamped

near there.

9th. Remained in camp till 12 P.M. Left the sick and

lame-footed men with the baggage wagons to move on to J,

and took up the line of march from ... toward Rome. Struck

the road over which we marched May 17, last. Encamped at

Cunningham's, on the road from Cave Springs to Rome. Gen.

Beauregard arrived at Cave Springs; he was heartily cheered

by Cheatham's Corps.

10th. Moved by a wood road to near a ferry over the Coosa

river. Arrived there at noon, but could not cross on the

pontoon until the corps of Hardee had passed over. When

my division was across we marched about three miles to

Robinson's, at the gorge of the Texas Valley road. All over

the country within a radius of ten or twelve miles of Rome

the citizens have been robbed by the enemy of everything.

Bureaus broken, women's clothing torn to pieces, children

left in rags, mirrors broken, books torn, feather beds

emptied in the road, stock driven off; and no effort left

untried to distress the families.

On the 8th of this month Gen. John M. Corse, from

Cartersville, near here, wrote Gen. Sherman that he could not

_now burn_ or abandon Rome because there were one thousand

four hundred sick there. (War Records, page 150, Vol. 39,

Part III.) I mention this to show that it was saved for a

while but afterwards destroyed.

11th. This morning we crossed into Texas Valley, and marched

to Amuch post office, where we encamped.

12th. Started this morning at 4 A.M., and after a tedious

march all day struck the railroad one mile above Resaca.

Gen. S. D. Lee took a position in front of the works at

Resaca. It was garrisoned by five hundred men. Hood summoned

the garrison to surrender. It refused to do so. Here Hood

showed his good sense not to make the attack even with twenty

thousand men. We did not want the place nor the garrison,

and had no men to spare or lose in a useless fight. Allatoona

was a warning to him. Stewart's Corps moved up the railroad

about three and a half miles, and captured a blockhouse and

a construction camp, and burned an immense amount of lumber.

There was one company captured in the blockhouse, which,

however, was a temporary structure of hewn timber. Worked all

night destroying railroad.

13th. Moved my division up the railroad, and surrounded a

very large and strong blockhouse at Tilton. It was garrisoned

by the Seventeenth Iowa Regiment, commanded by Col. Archer.

He refused to surrender. As it was, from its oaken walls,

impregnable to field artillery, it resisted a long time.

Gen. Stewart, hearing the firing, came on the field and also

called on the commander to surrender. Again he declined.

I had placed a field battery in position, and directing

shells to be fired at the narrow loopholes, we succeeded

in driving shells through them, which, exploding inside,

filled the structure with a dense, suffocating smoke, and

soon the white flag was waved. Seventy shells were fired.

The garrison consisted of three hundred and fifty men.

Col. Archer, not being well, was paroled. The plundering of

the stores, especially the sutler's, was the work of a few

minutes, and our hungry men obtained some articles not found

in the Confederate commissary department. The sutler came

to me with his books and begged me to keep them for him,

as he had no other evidence of what was due him from the

regiment. I introduced him to my quartermaster, and asked him

to keep them for the sutler. To add to the quick confusion,

Loring's division was passing by at the time and tried to

obtain some of the sutler's stores. Burned everything but

the transportation, arms, stores, etc., and then moved on to

Dalton. I had now four hundred and fifty prisoners. Dalton

was captured by Cheatham. It was garrisoned by negro troops.

14th. My division became the rear guard. We crossed the

mountain at Dug Gap and encamped near Villanow. When I

crossed the mountain ridge I found a large field of corn

by the roadside. The roasting ears were fine. I halted the

division; called the brigade commanders, and gave them half

an hour to get dinner out of the cornfield. Wonderfully quick

were the fires made, and the corn roasted and fried. The

prisoners and men dined indiscriminately. The Yankees made

themselves useful, and knew how to rob a cornfield. Encamped

in an orchard, and had some cows driven up and shot for

supper and breakfast in the morning.

15th. Cheatham in advance. Loring, Walthall, and I were

in the rear. During the march most of the field and staff

officers of the Seventeenth Iowa walked along with me. They

were jolly, good fellows, and laughed heartily at their

dinner of green corn, and warm cow beef for supper and

breakfast, and one of them presented me with a silk sash. He

insisted on my accepting it. He told me "that much stress was

placed on starving us out, but from the experience they had

in the past two days they did not think we could be starved

out at all, and that they would write home and tell their

friends that the starvation game was played out." They made

no complaint, for they messed with our men.

16th. Left Treadway's Gap this morning. Gen. Sears's Brigade

and Kolb's battery remained to defend the Gap. I moved on

through Summerville and encamped at Rhinehart's. Ordered

to move to Lafayette at 2 A.M. Pigeon Mountain looms up in

sight, and the scenery is beautiful.

17th. Started to Lafayette, as ordered, but returned and went

to the junction of the road from Lafayette and Rome with

the Alpine road. Here Sears's Brigade joined the division.

Encamped at Mr. Mosteller's.

18th. Took the road at 5:30 P.M., passing through

Gaylesville, and encamped four miles beyond the town. There

are some good farms on the Chattooga river, which is here

about twenty-five yards wide, with rocky bottom.

19th. Started at 6 A.M., intending to go to Blue Pond, but

left the road and marched across to the Rome and Gadsden

road, thence to Gadsden. Crossed Little River. Encamped near

the Jacksonville and Gadsden roads. Cheatham's Corps near by.

I hear various rumors in regard to Sherman's movements. The

main question is, has he transportation with him to enable

his command to move far away from the railroad? I am sure

he will find all he wants in the country as he proceeds. I

_think_ we do not leave much in the way of rations behind us.

Received letters from home to-night.

20th. Marched about two miles beyond Gadsden and encamped at

Mrs. Sansom's. Her daughter, Miss Emma, was at home. When

Federal Gen. Streight with two thousand men from Rome was

captured by Gen. Forrest, he was under many obligations to

Miss Sansom, who during the fight mounted Forrest's horse,

sat behind him, and piloted him across Black Creek, which

contributed much to enable him to capture the enemy. Out of

compliment to Miss Sansom, I got Gen. Cockrell's band to play

for her and her mother. While we were honoring Miss Sansom,

a hungry soldier was skinning one of the Madam's hogs, and,

_apropos_, I had the skin secured to the soldier's back,

and thus he was marched about camp, a warning to others not

to plunder. There is a waterfall on Black Creek, near here,

reported to be one hundred feet high.

The Legislature of Alabama has granted to Miss Sansom a section

of land. If she had betrayed Forrest, she might perhaps now be in

receipt of a pension from the United States treasury, because the

pension roll is a Roll of Honor, and so comprehensive that it embraces

deserters from our army who enlisted in theirs. I have not inquired

if substitutes receive pensions, but it is fair to presume they do.

Were they not patriots? What is a patriot? What is patriotism? Dr. Sam

Johnson, the great lexicographer, declared it to be "the last refuge of

a consummate scoundrel."

21st. Remained in camp. Next day marched nineteen miles.

Crossed the Black Warrior river, and crossed over Sand

Mountain. On the 25th we passed the dividing ridge between

the waters of the Tennessee and Coosa rivers. Heard artillery

firing all the morning, apparently at Decatur. This sounds

natural, as I have heard big guns almost daily for three

years. It must have been inspiriting, for we marched

twenty miles to-day. I am to-night within seven miles of

Summerville, and six miles in advance of Walthall.

25th. I had to wait until noon for Walthall to pass on in

advance, consequently I marched only four miles. Rain is

falling fast. It rained all day on the 26th. In the afternoon

reached Decatur. Loring's division took position near the

defensive works and commenced firing with his batteries on

a fort in front. Went into bivouac in columns of brigades

within easy cannon range of the guns of the enemy. At dusk

sent Ector's Brigade to the Danville road to guard it until

Cheatham's Corps arrived by that road. And still it rains.

27th. Here we all are in front of Decatur. Will Hood attack

the defensive works of the town? I can see nothing to be

gained by it to compensate for the loss of men. We do not

want the position. This afternoon I received orders to move

over west of the Danville road. Reached the position at

sunset. Relieved Gen. Guist, and went into line not far in

front of Mr. Garth's residence. Rode down to the skirmish

line; found Gen. Brown there. I relieved his men on the

line with three of my regiments, and drove in the Federal

skirmishers. There was firing all round, but most on Loring's

line. I believe some negro troops made an attack on him. Gen.

Beauregard is at the residence of Mr. Garth.

28th. Remained in camp. Cheatham's pickets formed a line in

front of my division pickets and Gen. Brown's also during

the night. Had to send Cockrell's Brigade to report to Gen.

Loring, who generally magnifies the forces of the enemy.

Received orders to move my command to Courtland in the

morning. The nights are cold and the frosts very heavy.

29th. Started this morning by the railroad, but _not_ in the

cars. The line of the railroad crosses from the right to

the left bank of the Tennessee river at Decatur, and I am

marching down the left bank. The country is beautiful, and

the soil rich; but what a desolation everywhere! The dreamy

silence, the absence of life, the smoky atmosphere, the

abandoned dwellings, the uncultivated fields, the destruction

of fences--everything, everywhere mark the ravages of war

that has changed this once beautiful valley of the Tennessee

into a desert in all save the rich soil. Here the tide of

war has ebbed and flowed; and far and wide have the raiding

parties roamed until almost every means of subsistence has

been consumed or destroyed. The only signs of life are here

and there a rabbit startled from ambush, and now and then

a solitary crow perched on a dead limb of a tree. Made my

camp on a farm belonging to Mr. Swoope, but now occupied by

Mr. Watkins. Cheatham's Corps and some cavalry were left at

Decatur.

The Federal forces in Decatur were commanded by Gen. R. S. Granger,

an old friend of mine, and he was brevetted for his gallant defense

of the town. Dear me! I did not think there was a skirmish there, and

no effort was made to take the place, although the forces were, in

strength, less than those at Allatoona. Gen. Granger told me, when I

met him after the war, what his numbers were.

30th. Left Courtland this morning, moving along the track

of the railroad toward Tuscumbia. Stopped at Col. Saunders's

for dinner. They have a beautiful and costly residence. There

were present for dinner Mrs. and Miss Saunders, Miss Sherod,

Gen. Cheatham, Col. Shotwell, Col. Brown. Mr. Foster, and

others. Encamped at Leighton, near the house of Dr. Kompy.

Took tea with the family.

31st. Arrived at Tuscumbia. Encamped on the creek. Stopped at

Mrs. Chadwick's. Gen. S. D. Lee had crossed the two divisions

of his corps over the Tennessee river. I was surprised at

this because of the width of the river, and the apprehension

of the pontoons giving way or being broken. The day is bright

and beautiful. Rode up to see the spring. The volume of water

gushing out of rocks, from far below, is sufficient to form

a large creek. The town is old, and now dilapidated. Most of

the dwellings from Leighton to this place have been burned by

the enemy.

The houses of absentees were always destroyed in that way, it being a

crime to leave home.

November 1. Busy arranging transportation. I am told that

the pontoons do not reach to the other shore. From to-day to

the 13th we remained in Tuscumbia because of the heavy rains

that delayed the arrival of supplies. During this period the

Yankees made two attempts to cut the ropes of the pontoons;

once they went down the wrong channel; next day they cut

the rope, but their boat upset and they were captured.

Rumor reports that Sherman, with a large force, is between

Chattanooga and Atlanta. I remained at or near Tuscumbia

until the 20th, when I prepared to cross the river. For three

weeks it has rained almost continuously, making the roads

very bad. I remonstrated with Gen. Hood, at a meeting of his

officers, against taking so many pieces of artillery with the

army unless we had a _full_ supply of horses for the guns.

But he insisted that, once in Tennessee, men would join us,

horses could be obtained, and the men be supplied with shoes

and clothing.

20th. I passed over the Tennessee river by the pontoon bridge

_en route_ to Nashville. To-day we learned that Sherman's

advance had reached Griffin on the 16th. Here are two armies

that have been fighting each other from about the first of

May to the first of November, six months--parted--the one

heading for the Atlantic ocean, two hundred and ten miles

from Atlanta, and the other marching from Tuscumbia, Ala.,

for Nashville, Tenn., one hundred and fifteen miles distant.

The one is a strategic move against the army of R. E. Lee, in

Virginia, and the other appears a military error, because it

must meet accumulative forces as it advances into the enemy's

zone. Winter is near and the army not clothed.

21st. Having crossed the river yesterday, and moved out on

the Lawrenceburg road five miles, we started this morning

through mud from four to twenty inches deep, and through

snow that the keen wind blew in our faces. In the afternoon

we encamped by the roadside, near a deserted habitation. The

weather is bitterly cold, and the snow falling. Sleeping on

the ground covered with snow.

22d. Resumed the march. Roads miserable. Encamped seven

miles beyond Priwit's Mills. Lee's Corps is on our left and

Cheatham's on the right. Stewart's is the central column.

Snowed some to-day, and the ground was frozen so hard that it

bore the wagons. Artillery delayed everything, and some of it

did not reach camp until daylight, just as I told Gen. Hood

it would be; in fact, men had to haul their guns over bad

places. In the conference, I told Hood he would take the guns

to Nashville only to turn some of them over to the enemy for

want of horses. This is my birthday. What a delightful time

I have had!

23d. This morning I was ordered to remain in camp and await

the arrival of the supply train. Artillery went on under

charge of Col. Williams. Bushwhackers reported on the road.

Continued the march to Mt. Pleasant. Remained all night

with Mr. Granbury. The roads still in very bad condition.

Started on the morrow amidst the rain and mud. Passed through

a beautiful country. Passed the home of Gen. G. J. Pillow.

Reached Columbia. Encircled the town with troops, and some

skirmishing ensued. The enemy left the place last night, and

early this morning we entered the town. Gen. Schofield with

his army is now on the north side of Duck river, offering a

strong resistance to our crossing. I was invited to the house

of Mr. Mathews. In the afternoon I moved my division up the

river to cross it: but as the bridge was not ready, I turned

back.

29th. This morning Cheatham's Corps, Johnston's Division, and

Stewart's Corps, and one battery of artillery (the cavalry in

advance) moved up the river to near Hewey's ferry and crossed

it on a pontoon bridge; Gen. S. D. Lee, with the remainder of

the army, remained in Columbia, making a strong demonstration

to hold the enemy there.

This was a strategic movement of Hood's to gain the Franklin pike in

rear of the enemy. We marched rapidly for Spring Hill by a country

road. Hearing the cannonading all the time at Columbia, we were

encouraged and hopeful of reaching Spring Hill before the enemy did.

Schofield, no doubt, was informed that we were crossing, and, having

a shorter and better road to travel, got Gen. Stanley with a division

and much artillery at Spring Hill and in position before Hood arrived

there at the head of Cheatham's Corps. Perhaps, apprehensive that the

enemy might move on the Murfreesboro road, he halted Stewart's Corps

and Johnston's Division at Rutherford creek, some four miles from the

pike. Our corps was kept here until dark, when it was ordered to move

on toward the pike.

When Hood arrived in view of the pike and saw the road filled with

United States wagons in hasty retreat to Franklin, what orders he gave

Cheatham I know not, for _his_ version differs from what Hood says

were given _him_. But Hood was on the ground present, and that settles

the question. The sun went down, darkness came, and later we went into

bivouac. The head of our army reached the pike about 3 P.M. and we were

halted. As but little musketry was heard, officers naturally asked:

"What did we come here for?" There was a house near by my headquarters,

and about 9 P.M. I walked over to it. In the drawing room I found

Gen. James R. Chalmers and other cavalry officers. Chalmers said they

were short or out of ammunition. On inquiry as to the cartridges they

used, Maj. Storrs, my ordnance officer, said he could supply them

with ammunition, and I ordered him to issue them cartridges at once.

Occasionally we heard some picket firing toward the north. It was Gen.

Ross's men on the road to Franklin. Cheatham's Corps went into bivouac

near the pike, and so in comparative silence the long night wore away.

Hood slept. The head and the eyes and ears of the army, all dead from

sleeping. Ye gods! will no geese give them warning as they did in

ancient Rome?

30th. We were up before the morning star. My division was

ordered to take the advance to Franklin in _pursuit_ of

Schofield, for now every one knew he passed by us while we

were dreaming. Artillery and wagons, infantry and horse, all

gone on to Franklin! When I reached the pike I met Gen. Hood,

and he exclaimed; "Well, Gen. French, we have missed the

great opportunity of the war!" "Yes," I replied, "I am told

the Yankees passed along all night and lit their pipes at our

camp fires." Of course my answer was a _little_ figurative,

but some soldiers heard it, and, taking it literally, it soon

spread through the ranks.

The idea of a commanding general reaching his objective point, that

required prompt and immediate action and skillful tactics, to turn

away and go to bed surpasses the understanding. The truth is, Hood had

been outgeneraled, and Stanley with the Federal troops got to Spring

Hill before Hood did. What information Hood received of the enemy,

when he reached the pike, if any, no one will ever know. Why did he

not in person form his line of battle and attack the enemy at Spring

Hill? Although we yielded the right of way, the enemy must have been

a little nervous, because the slight firing done by Ross's men caused

the enemy to abandon about thirty wagons, and I could not but observe

what a number of _desks_ containing official vouchers had been _thrown_

from the wagons by the roadside. Had there been a cavalry force with

artillery north of Spring Hill and near the pike to have shelled the

road, there would no doubt have been a stampede and a wreck of wagons.

My division overtook the enemy near Franklin, drawn up on a range of

hills about two miles from the town, and when I began to deploy my

troops, to advance a line on their flank and rear, they fell back to

the town.

[Illustration: BATTLE OF FRANKLIN.]

I rode with some members of my staff to the top of a high wooded hill,

from which I could look down on the surrounding country. Before me were

the town, the green plains around it; the line of defensive works,

the forts and parks of artillery on the heights across the river,

long lines of blue-clad infantry strengthening their lines, and trains

moving over the river. While I sat at the root of a giant tree a long

time surveying the scene before me, I called to mind that _never_

yet had any one seen the Confederates assigned to me driven from any

position, much less from defensive works, by assault, and I inferred

that it would require a great sacrifice of life to drive the veteran

Federals from their lines, and thought if Hood could only ride up here

and look calmly down on the battle array before him he would not try

to take the town by assault. But the offspring of Hood's conception

at Columbia came stillborn at Spring Hill, caused by an oversleep.

Chagrin at this mishap and awakened at the consequences, without duly

considering the whole field of war and deducing therefrom what was best

for the _cause_, he impatiently formed line with the two corps with him

and prepared to assault the town. Perhaps he forgot to call to mind

the well-acknowledged fact that _one_ man behind an intrenched line

is equal to _five_ in front. Now Schofield had at Franklin, by report

in the War Records, 25,420 men, exclusive of cavalry; and Hood had

21,874 men, exclusive of a part of Lee's Corps, the cavalry and Ector's

Brigade detached. So any one can compute what Hood's strength, or

numbers, should be to make a fair fight. Therefore, it is probable that

Hood, by disappointment at Spring Hill, inconsiderately, and without

careful reconnoissance, determined immediately to attack the fortified

city with 21,874 men, without any artillery, except two guns brought

with him.

The sketch of the field of Franklin will show that the Harpeth river in

its meandering covers three of the four sides of the town. The line of

intrenchments extended from the Nashville and Decatur railroad around

the southern and western parts of the town to the Harpeth river, with

an advanced line extending to some distance on either side of the

Columbia pike. Also I saw rifle pits inside the works from which a fire

was opened on our troops after they scaled the main line.

THE BATTLE.

My division, as I have told you, was the van of the army, and as we

neared Franklin it left the pike, turning to the right or east, and

halted near the river. Here Gen. Stewart formed his corps in order

of battle by placing Loring on the right, Walthall in the center, and

French on the left. This brought me nearest to the Columbia pike, as

will be shown. Cheatham's Corps was formed with his right resting on

or near the pike, which brought Cleburne's right a half mile distant on

my left. We were thus formed, as it were, in a circle like the fellies

of a wheel; and each division marching to one common center caused them

to overlap before reaching the enemy, because the circle became smaller

and smaller. My division consisted of only two brigades, Cockrell's and

Sears's. Ector's Brigade was on detached duty. Stewart's Corps, being

in advance, was first formed, and we rested. The sun was sinking in

the west, the day was drawing to its close, the tumult and excitement

had ceased. The winds were in their caves, the silence that precedes

the storm was _felt_; the calm before the earthquake which by some

_law_ of nature forewarns fowls to seek the fields, birds to fly away,

and cattle to run to the hills, although withheld from man, seemed to

presage an impending calamity, as painful in suspense as the disclosure

of any reality. From this feeling of anxiety, sometimes incident to men

when held in readiness to engage in a great battle, there came relief

by a signal. And what a change! Twenty thousand gallant Confederates at

the word of command moved proudly over the open plain to the attack.

It was a glorious and imposing sight, and one so seldom witnessed, as

all were in full view. Soon my division came under the artillery fire

of both the guns in front and those in position in the forts across the

river, undaunted by the crash of shells, all moved gallantly on and

met the fire of the enemy in the outer line of defense. It was only

the work of a few minutes to crush the outer line, and when it broke

and tried to gain the main works they were so closely followed by our

men that friends and foe, pursuer and pursued, in one mass, rushed over

the parapet into the town. During this time the fire from the enemy on

this part of the line ceased so as to admit their own troops. But the

Confederates now inside were confronted with a reserve force and either

killed or captured.

As our division overlapped, immediately another line made the assault,

and again the smoke cloud of battle so obscured the plain that I could

see only beneath the cloud an incessant sheet of flame rolling on the

ground, in which the combatants flitted about like the pictures of

demons in Tophet. The shock was too violent to last. Its force was soon

spent. The fire slackened, and as the smoke was wafted away in broken

clouds, the sight was appalling! What a ghastly scene was in front of

the ginhouse! The dead and wounded were visible for a moment, only to

be again enveloped in the cloud of battle beneath which the Angel of

Death garnered his harvest. "On! on! forward! forward!" was the cry.

It was death to stop, and safety was in a measure found in the ditch

beneath the fire from the parapet. There thousands remained all night;

others were repulsed and driven back. My division was re-formed beyond

the range of musketry, but exposed to artillery in front and from the

fort across the river.

Gen. Sears's men, those that were repulsed, fell back with some order,

but Cockrell's Brigade had nearly all disappeared. Now and then a few

came out. Cockrell was wounded. Col. E. Gates came out riding with his

bridle reins in his mouth, being wounded in both hands. I was on foot.

My horse, during the continued shelling at Kennesaw Mountain, took a

dislike to shells, and manifested it on this occasion by using only his

hind feet when walking. I had to give him to the orderly to lead.

Gen. Walthall came out at the time we did. He rode up to me, and as I

put my hand on his horse's shoulder to talk with him, the animal reared

up, plunged violently forward, and fell dead, throwing the General far

over his head. The horse had been shot and that was the death struggle.

We fell back, and bivouacked just out of range of fire. It was now

growing dark; but still the battle raged furiously at intervals till

near midnight, especially on the west side of the pike, mainly between

our troops in the ditch, and on the captured parapet, with the enemy

on inside lines; and the bright glare of musketry with the flashes of

artillery lit up the surroundings with seemingly fitful volcanic fires,

presenting a night scene frightfully wild and weird.

Gen. S. D. Lee's Corps and the artillery had arrived, and after dark

orders were given by Gen. Hood that after midnight or near dawn one

hundred rounds would be fired by every piece of artillery, and then

the troops _would assault the works again_ over the same ground. Festus

assigned a reason for St. Paul's madness, but no one attributed Hood's

madness to that cause when _this_ order was given.[32] However, when no

reply was made to our guns it was discovered that Schofield had, with

the main body of his army, abandoned Franklin and was on his way to

Nashville.

It was a terrible battle. One of my brigades, Cockrell's, made the

assault with 696 officers and men, and when it was over he had 277 men

in his brigade. His loss was, killed, 19 officers and 79 men; wounded,

31 officers and 198 men; missing, 13 officers and 79 men; total, 419,

which was over sixty per cent. The missing were captured inside the

works, as stated by some who escaped. Sears's Brigade met with less

loss, because it stopped a few minutes in the exterior line before

moving to the main line. There were twelve general officers killed and

wounded and one taken prisoner.[33]

Hood's official report puts our loss at 4,500. I believe that this

grand charge of 21,800 men, for a mile or more over an open plain, all

in full view, was grander than any charge at Gettysburg.

After the fall of Vicksburg, and the battle of Gettysburg had been

fought, and enlistments in the Confederate service had practically

ceased, and the exchange of prisoners stopped, as I have stated, it

certainly behooved the government and the generals in command of

the armies in the East and in the West to husband their _men_ and

resources. I know this was the opinion of Gen. J. E. Johnston, and

it was perhaps, in a measure, attributable to this that Gen. Hood

superseded him in command of the army then at Atlanta, for he had

the reputation of being a "fighter," and when put in command had to

sustain that reputation. Gen. Grant was intrusted with the exchange of

prisoners and (to take the ignominy off the government) discontinued

the exchange,[34] and thus all increase of our fighting force ceased.

Therefore the men in the army had become _the Confederacy_, and to them

the power was virtually transmitted, and the commanders of armies held

the destiny of the nation in their hands. No dictator appeared! Wisdom

called for the Fabian policy; heedless of her voice, the _third_ day

after being in command he fought the battle of Peach Tree Creek. Two

days after this (on the 22d) he fought the battle of Atlanta; and on

the 28th, a third battle, without a victory, and all the time the siege

of the city continued. The men he lost diminished his power. The loss

to the enemy was nothing. Men cost nothing, and they could get all

they wanted. Next came Jonesboro, and then Allatoona, both reducing

his strength. And now came the battle of Franklin, where he lost about

5,000 more men. Why were the lines of the enemy assaulted at Franklin?

Was it a strategical point? No. Were there in the town magazines or

army stores? No. Was there anything of such value as to justify 21,874

men assaulting a town defended by 25,420 veteran troops? No! Schofield

was crossing his teams as rapidly as possible to join Gen. Thomas at

Nashville.

I was asked by Gen. T. J. Wood, U. S. A. (in 1865), who was at

Franklin: "Why did you fight us at Franklin, when we were getting away

from there as fast as we could?" He said: "The order directing the

operation of withdrawing the troops had been issued, and the officers

were assembled in Schofield's office, when, to our astonishment, a

cannon shot was heard, and, looking out, we saw your troops advancing.

That order for evacuating the place was not changed. Our apprehension

was that you would cross the river and outflank us, as you did at

Spring Hill."

I thought when we arrived at Franklin that Hood, who had declined to

attack a garrison of 500 men at Resaca with his whole army present,

and did not risk an attack on the works at Decatur when garrisoned by

2,000 men, would surely not assault the town garrisoned by an army of

25,000 men, with the two army corps and one division he had with him

numbering only 21,800 men. Why he gave battle when so little could be

gained, except some eclat, I cannot tell. I only know that he said to

Gen. A. P. Stewart that "captured dispatches told him the time had come

to fight."

An army belongs to the nation that made it, and not to the general

commanding it. Therefore he has no right to sacrifice it.[35]

Mrs. S. P. Lee states (on page 493) that "orders were given to carry

the inner fortifications at daylight."

The Rev. Thomas B. Markham, chaplain to Featherstone's Brigade, writes:

"Our artillery was moved to within point-blank range of the enemy's

works, ... to open fire on them at earliest daybreak, after which

a general assault was to be made by the infantry," etc. (Page 272,

_Confederate Veteran_, June Number, 1899.)

NOTE.

It has been a source of much regret to me that I was unable

to write an official report of the battle of Franklin

immediately after it occurred; but on account of the

condition of my eyes it was put off from time to time, and

now I wonder why I did not have my adjutant general do it

for me. But so it was, under the sorrow for lost friends

and comrades, and the immediate pursuit of the enemy to

Nashville, it was neglected. Besides, as is usual, no report

was called for by the commander of the army; and so with

many it has become only a memory of a great and uncalled-for

disaster to the Confederate cause--a battle fought against

great odds, without any compensating value if successful.

CHAPTER XVIII.

March to Nashville--Cold Weather--Partial Investment of

the City--Leave of Absence--Turn the Command Over to

Brig. Gen. C. W. Sears--Battle of Nashville--Hood Not

Physically Able for the Duties of a Commander in Want

of All Supplies--Marshal Saxe--Mulai Malek--Going to

Nashville a Failure; Could Not Be Otherwise--Leave for

Columbus, Ga.--Marriage to Mary Fontaine Abercrombie--Go

to Meriwether County to Avoid Wilson's Raid--Robbing in

Columbus--Adventures of My Orderly--Yankees Raid the

Houses--Gen. A. Had No Pies--Gens. Lee and Johnston

Surrender--Terms Thereof--War with the Musket Ends.

December 2, 1864, Hood in his impetuosity rushed in pursuit of

Schofield's army, that was securely at rest behind the fortifications

at Nashville, where he formed a junction with the troops there under

Gen. G. H. Thomas. Hood formed his line close as he could in front of

their works. My division was on the left of the Granny White turnpike,

and ran north of the dwelling of E. Montgomery, who was a cotton

planter and neighbor of mine in Mississippi. Owing to the condition of

my eyes, I could write no more in my diary. The weather was cold, the

ground frozen, and covered with snow.

I remained there suffering with my eyes until the 13th, when I was

granted a leave of absence, and I turned the command over to Gen. C. W.

Sears. I remained there the 14th, intending to leave the next day, but,

observing a movement of the enemy's troops on the 15th, remained there

to ascertain his intentions. Instead of a demonstration, it proved to

be a real attack. I remained on the field all day, and by night our

left was forced back parallel to the Granny White pike. By noon on the

16th it was plain that the battle was lost, and in the afternoon I was

advised to leave to avoid confusion of the retreat. So, with my two

aids, we started for the Tennessee river, and crossed it at Tuscumbia.

The horses were given the servants to ride to Columbus, Ga., and we

left by train for the same city.

The history of the Army of Tennessee from this time to its surrender on

April 25, 1865, by Gen. J. E. Johnston in North Carolina may be found

in the War Records. Johnston was placed in command of this army again

at the request of the Confederate Congress by a joint resolution that

was passed.

As I shall here probably take my leave of Gen. Hood, I desire to say

that, had he not made erroneous statements in his reports and in his

book, and perverted facts, and cast reflections on me and the men I

had the honor to command at Allatoona, I would have kept silent, and

this biography would never have been written; but he and Gen. Corse

have obliged me to vindicate the truth of history for my children and

myself, and the Confederate soldiers that I had the honor to command.

Gen. Hood was a noble commander of a division, for he was indeed

a brave man; but as the commander of an army, circumstanced as the

Confederate States were, he was too impulsive. As well try to catch

all the fish in the ocean as to kill all the men that the United States

could obtain, or recruit, from the nations of the earth, including our

slaves, for the bounty offered. Constant conflicts entailed losses on

both sides, and we had no men to sacrifice. The misfortune in part was

that he had condemned Johnston's policy, and obeyed him reluctantly,

and felt bound when he superseded him to carry on an aggressive war,

and in doing so wrecked the Army of Tennessee.

The influence of personal valor in an officer on his men is generally

limited to a small body of troops that witness it; whereas, victory for

an army depends on the _skill_ and the _art_ with which the impulsive

force of the masses is united on the field of battle, quickly to

accomplish an object and destroy the plans of the enemy. By the art

of skillful maneuvering an army may be obliged to abandon an advanced

position without being driven out at the expense of life. Hood was a

fighter; but he was not able by reason of his wounds to undergo the

labor devolving on a commander constantly marching and fighting, often

without supplies.

It is true that Marshal Saxe, carried on a litter, won the battle of

Fontenoy; that Mulai Malek, Emperor of Morocco, in a dying condition,

planned his last battle, and was carried on a litter through the ranks

to animate the men. With anguish of mind he saw some of his troops

giving way. In his last agonies he collected strength of life enough

to throw himself from the litter, and rallied them, and led them to

the charge. Exhausted, he fell on the field. When placed again on

the litter, he laid his finger on his mouth to enjoin secrecy on his

officers, and in a moment expired; but he won the victory. These,

and others I remember, are exceptions, but it is not safe to make

exceptions the rule.[36]

Hood's physical condition should have been considered by the

authorities before he was placed in command, and the question asked:

"Has he ever been thrown on his own resources to _provide for_ and

_direct_ an independent command?" To command a corps is a small matter

compared with directing a campaign (against a superior force) often

without supplies. I have no desire to criticise Hood's movements, and

will only remark that I am not able to see why he interrupted Gen.

Schofield from leaving Franklin when he was getting away as fast as

he could. That interference cost us the loss of nearly 5,000 men, the

flower of the army, without any compensating object in view or result

likely to be obtained under the environments.

Then came Nashville. We went there for recruits and army supplies.

The presence of our poor, worn-out, and badly clothed troops that had

survived the late battles of Peach Tree Creek of July 22 and 28 outside

of Atlanta, and the siege of that city, Jonesboro, Allatoona, Franklin

and many smaller conflicts consolidated the stream of reënforcements

sent to Thomas at Nashville until it became a formidable army.

As a river on its course when stopped by a dam must overflow the

obstruction or sweep it away, so Thomas's army was gathering force

to overwhelm ours, which received no additional strength, but on the

contrary lost some at Murfreesboro. On the walls of Hood's tent were

now written: "_An army that can obtain no recruits must eventually

surrender._" And that he could not interpret. Then the tempest came!

And the best reason I can give that the remnant of the grand Army of

Tennessee so successfully crossed the Tennessee river is that Gen.

Thomas always rode his horse at a walk. This is no reflection on the

defense of our rear guard.

I remained in Columbus, Ga., and on the 12th of January, 1865, married

Miss Mary F. Abercrombie, daughter of Gen. Anderson Abercrombie, a

planter in Russell County, Ala.[37]

Sherman had now captured Savannah, and was marching to join Grant.

Then came the surrender of Gen. Lee. And now Gen. J. H. Wilson was

nearing Columbus. To escape his thieving crowd, I started on Saturday,

April 15, in a carriage with my wife to take her to Mrs. Campbell's,

in Meriwether County, Ga., some twenty-five miles above Columbus. We

remained that night in town with Judge G. E. Thomas, and started next

morning. Gen. Howell Cobb was in command of the troops in Columbus,

and he asked me to remain and take the command of the forces. This I

declined, but I promised to return Monday morning and aid him. About

10 A.M. we heard cannon at Columbus, and knew that Wilson had attacked

the town. The next morning at the dawn of day fugitives from Columbus

were passing by, and told us that the town was in possession of the

Federals. So I did not go to join Gen. Cobb. However, being anxious to

know the condition of affairs, I asked my orderly, Hedrick, if he would

next morning ride down in the direction of the city, and ascertain the

condition of affairs, and he said: "Yes, General."

Now it chanced, soon after he started, that Hedrick met a Confederate

soldier who told him that the Yankees had taken the fort at West

Point, Ga., and gave him the name of the Federal officer who commanded

the expedition, and Hedrick's sagacity applied the information to

the accomplishment of his purposes. Riding on, just below the town

of Hamilton, he suddenly encountered a regiment of Federal cavalry.

Without hesitation he rode up to the leading officer, and inquired

for Gen. Wilson, saying he was a messenger from the Federal commanding

officer at West Point, sent to meet Gen. Wilson.[38] He was directed to

go on to Columbus. About a mile farther on two cavalrymen in a skirt

of wood cried out "Halt," and said: "You are a prisoner." He told

them the story of his having been sent to find Gen. Wilson. They were

doubtful, and one said: "If you please, none of your blarney to us,

for we are from Ould Ireland itself, and you are a Johnnie Rebel, and

are after daceiven' us, you are. Look at the stripe on your jacket."

Hedrick explained that he could not ride through the country with

his United States uniform on, and that his clothing was taken from a

prisoner, etc. "Mike," said one of them, "of course he could not wear

his own coat, and I am sure he is a gentleman; and did not the colonel

himself let him pass?" So Pat agreed with Mike, and Hedrick rode on.

Next, after crossing a stream, he came to a dwelling by the roadside:

the owner was sitting on the fence by the front gate, watching for more

Yankees to pass by, when Hedrick rode up to him and asked if he could

have dinner. The farmer inquired who he was; and he varied the story of

being a messenger to suit the occasion, by saying he was a Yankee, and

as so many Yankees had just passed, he invited him into his house. His

daughters hastily prepared a dinner. Hedrick was gracious, told them to

come down to Columbus--send down chickens and butter, and get coffee,

sugar, and nice dresses--and with thanks departed. About a mile farther

on he was stopped by a number of men armed with shotguns (in quest

of stragglers), farmers in the neighborhood, who also inquired who he

was and where he was going. He said that he was my orderly, "sent to

Columbus in quest of information." They did not believe him until one

of the party, who was a lieutenant in the Confederate army, asked him,

"How long have you been with Gen. French? were you with him at Suffolk?

where did he have his headquarters?" etc., to all of which he gave true

answers. The lieutenant, who had been at Suffolk, said, "Gentlemen,

he is all right, I know, for I was there;" and so Hedrick journeyed

on. Near Columbus he encountered the videttes, rode up, and asked that

one of them should be sent with him to Gen. Wilson's headquarters.

The corporal refused, telling him, however, where he would find the

commanding officer. It was dark when he entered the city. He rode to

Judge Thomas's, remained there all night, and saw Gen. Wilson leave

the town next morning riding in the carriage taken from J. C. Cook.

After the troops left the city for Macon, Hedrick rode back to Mrs.

Campbell's and related to me his adventures.

Two days after we started for Columbus, and below Hamilton, we found

that lieutenant and a squad of men still guarding the road. He asked

me if I had sent my orderly to Columbus. On my answering that I did

send him, the maddest man in the crowd was the one who, when he sat

on the fence, had bidden his daughters to give the Yankee a dinner.

He swore he "would shoot Hedrick for deceiving him;" and while I was

remonstrating with him Hedrick, who was behind, rode over the hill and

was recognized by the irate man, who exclaimed: "Yonder the rascal

comes." He was warned by his party to be quiet. Hedrick passed us,

raising his cap to the crowd, bowed smilingly, and passed on. Poor

Hedrick, without occasion, and for mere adventure, ran the risk of

being captured as a spy in Columbus.

When we were at Mrs. Campbell's the Federal cavalry several times

was near by and kept the ladies alarmed, and as for myself I was not

inclined to be captured and carried off, if it could be avoided. Our

horses were kept saddled to leave, and several times word was sent us

that raiding parties were on the road. Tired of these alarms, we were

at dinner, when some one rode by and said: "The Yankees are coming."

One of the ladies went to the front door, and came back screaming.

I went to the gate, and like a whirlwind came a cloud of dust, and

beneath it I thought I saw the feet of cavalry horses; but in half a

minute, at full run, passed by about forty loose mules driven by negro

men at their heels wildly shouting. For three days Hedrick and the

servants were camped out in the woods lest our horses should be stolen

at night. It was so demoralizing that I returned to Columbus, where

there was a Federal garrison, passed through the town, and returned to

Gen. Abercrombie's.

While we were gone--as I anticipated--nine of Wilson's bummers quietly

surrounded the dwelling of Gen. Abercrombie (near Columbus), and

entered the grounds from different directions. The General was sitting

in a chair on the front gallery by the door, and the first intimation

he had that the thieves were at work was a hand from behind him

passed, snakelike, over his shoulder and down to his vest pocket to

get his watch; fortunately, he had placed it where it was safe. In a

few minutes those in the house went _through_ every wardrobe, bureau,

closet, etc. They took all the silverware and jewelry. While this was

being done the two guards in the rear entered the large out kitchen,

where "old Aunty Minty," the negro cook, had presided for fifty years,

and screamed out: "Get us something for dinner, quick." The good old

soul was scared half out of her wits, and raised her hands, pleading

for mercy. "Get some ham and eggs for us quick, quick, you old dunce."

The stove was hot, and she cooked some with the turn of a hand. In a

minute the platter was empty, and they demanded of her to "bring on

the _pies_." She called on all the saints to witness that she had no

_pies_; the rascals swore they "never saw a house as big as that was

that did not have _pies_ in it." However, the pie question was settled

by the captain of the band shouting "Come on," and they mounted their

horses with their plunder, and left for other fields. Then "Aunty" came

into the house and told her mistress: "Them is the meanest people I

ever did see."

When my overseer left the plantation with the negroes for Columbus, he

packed up my Brussels linen and best China, and took them with him, and

left them at Judge Thomas's house. The evening Columbus was taken, Mrs.

Thomas was sitting by a parlor window, and seeing some men in the yard,

she asked, "Who are you there?" and the reply was, "Yanks; you did

not expect us so soon, did you?" They _went through_ everything in the

house in a jiffy. Judge Thomas with them. By his engaging manners he

got them by the baggage room, and saved things there. But they carried

my chest of crockery out of the basement, thinking they had a prize;

but when they found only China they commenced breaking it, but desisted

at Mrs. Thomas's request. These men became experts from long practice,

and generally knew where to look for hidden treasures. "As the hart

panteth after the water brooks," so the hearts of these hirelings

panted for plunder.

When the Yankees first went to my plantation, in five minutes a

company of about thirty men marched into the garden, formed line, fixed

bayonets, and, marching abreast, probed the ground until they struck

a box that was buried there containing silver tableware. But in this

case I am sure "old Aaron," a house servant who buried it for mother,

betrayed her confidence in him and told the Yanks where it was. These

are small matters, but I mention them to show how the men, by the

connivance of officers, if not by participation, became an army of

thieves generally.

In a day or two authenticated information was received that both Lee's

and Johnston's armies had been surrendered on terms of agreement, and

as I was included in the latter army, I went to Columbus and obtained

my parole. The terms of the surrender were that we were not to be

molested by the _United States authorities_ so long as we obeyed the

laws which were in force previous to January, 1861, where we resided.

On my part, I was sworn "not to bear arms against the United States

of America, or give any information, or do any military duty or act

in hostility to the United States, or inimical to a permanent peace,"

etc., and thus the war _with the musket_ ended.

On reading my parole I discovered what seemed to me a _petty trick_,

for it read "not to be disturbed by the _United States military

authorities_," leaving me at the mercy of the civil authorities to be

indicted. I was informed those were the paroles sent them to be used in

Columbus. It must have been a misprint.

CHAPTER XIX.

Aspect of the Country at Termination of the War--The Returned

Confederate Soldier--Carpetbaggers--Lincoln's Vow--His

Proclamation Concerning Confiscation of Slaves--How the

Slaves Were Legally Liberated--Lincoln Murdered--Johnson

President--His Thirst for Vengeance--"Treason" to Be

Made Odious--Grant Declared That the Paroles Must Not Be

Violated--Cost of a Bill of Dry Goods in Confederate Money

in 1864--Leave Columbus for Greenville, Miss.--Desolate

Home--The Good Israelite--Return to Columbus--I Go with Mrs.

French to Mississippi--Traveling Incognito a Failure--Journey

to New York in 1865--Incidents of My Mother and Child When

They Went North--Home Confiscated--Edward Cooper's Kind

Act--No One Would Touch Mother's Trunks--Copy of a Contract

in 1865, Whereby I Obtained Funds--People under Espionage

at the North--Return to the Plantation--Northern Plan to

Terminate the War.

If a man had ascended one of the lofty peaks of the Southern

Appalachian chain of mountains at the termination of the war, and

been endowed with telescopic powers of vision extending for hundreds

of miles in every direction, he would have beheld the wreck of "the

storm-cradled nation" that fell in defense of the rights that they

possessed under the constitution of 1787-88, which was shaped, and

established, and agreed to, by the States forming the convention. As

far as such vision could extend, that once beautiful country was almost

desolate and silent; the busy hum of industry had ceased, the daily

smoke of burning buildings, the marching of armies, and the dull sound

of distant cannon terminated; railroads had been destroyed, bridges

were burned, many wagon roads were impassable; agriculture had nearly

ceased, draft animals had been taken for war purposes; the flower

of the South, with its pride of ancestors, had "fallen foremost in

the light;" the noble women were almost paralyzed in mind, ready to

doubt the existence of a just God who seemingly had been deaf to their

prayers, and made fatherless their little children; four million slaves

sat idle around their decaying cabins, impressed with the prevailing

idea that freedom meant to do as they pleased, and not work any more;

provisions were scarce, and the whole scene was a picture of war's

desolation and misery.

I can call to mind the delight I experienced when reading that

wonderful description by Burke of the desolation of the Carnatic,

in India, by the butcher Hyder Ali, in years long passed; or with

sorrowful heart the desolation of the Palatinate by the French troops

by order of Louvois, but I am not aware of any Northern pen having

told the story of the destruction of the beautiful Valley of the

Shenandoah[39] in Virginia by Gen. P. H. Sheridan, though it be a theme

as sad as the one immortalized by the genius of Burke.

Hyder Ali left nothing in the Carnatic that drew the breath of life;

Sheridan left nothing in the Valley for a crow to feed on--as stated in

his official report, wherein he writes that "a crow could not cross the

Valley without carrying his provisions with him."

It is true, however, that you can find in some of the Northern

schoolbooks a beautiful poem entitled "Sheridan's Ride," as mythical as

Barbara Frietchie; still there are in the true story some incidents not

unlike those in Burns's "Tam O'Shanter" that kept "Sheridan far away."

And now the surviving Confederate soldier returned to what was once

his happy home. He had faith in the terms of his _parole_, that he

was "not to be molested by the United States authorities as long as he

obeyed the laws of 1861." Inured to hardships incident to a soldier's

life, he was well equipped to become an industrious, peaceful citizen;

he had stormed fortifications, captured batteries, marched up to the

cannon's deadly mouth without tremor, passed days without rest and

nights without sleep, subsisted on parched corn, been frost-bitten by

cold, and burned by the torrid sun. His bare feet had left their prints

in blood on the rocks, and crimsoned the snow on many a wintry march;

he had stopped the marauder in his path, and turned the enemy from

his course; he had tempted the ocean in its wrath, and driven off its

waters the enemy's commercial sails. All that man dares he had done.

And now in adversity, almost naked, with unending toil before him, he

commenced life anew, and went manfully to work with hope for the joy

of peace, little thinking of the degradation, insults, humiliations,

oppressions, robbery, extortions he and his family would be subjected

to during the coming years, caused by revengeful legislation. And now

behold him even greater in peace than in war!

The plunder obtained by the soldiers of the Union army had so whetted

the avaricious spirit of those who had furnished substitutes for

themselves, that they were bent on having their share of the spoils;

and the politicians, anxious to ride into place and power, to that end

resorted to more machinations than Machiavelli ever dreamed of in his

advice to the prince.

By the daily trains came men, generally from the Eastern States, in

every garb, and they walked along the streets in single file in quest

of cheap hotels and boarding houses, and the _insignia_ of their

_order_ was a carpetbag, and their interests and tastes--not their

sympathy--prompted them to associate with the freedmen, considering

themselves just as good and honorable as the "Wards of the Nation."

You must not deem it out of place if I here make mention of some

incidents that occurred pretty early in the war.

In the Bible we read how Jephthah vowed a vow unto the Lord that if he

would deliver the children of Ammon into his hands he would do certain

things. So Lincoln made a solemn vow before God that if Gen. Lee

were driven back from Maryland he would set the _slaves free_. After

"Antietam" he announced his _intention_ of issuing, and on September

22, 1862, he did issue, a proclamation setting free, by _his military

authority_, all the slaves in the rebel States. He still founded his

action on "policy and the Constitution."[40] As the Confederate States

did not return to the Union as required in his September proclamation,

on January 1, 1863, he issued his emancipation proclamation, the slaves

having been confiscated by Act of Congress in 1862.

The act of confiscation and the President's proclamation emancipating

the slaves in the Confederacy could not abolish slavery, because it

existed under the _laws of the States_. It could alter no State law,

still it did affect slavery in this way: it caused slaves to leave

their owners, and to this extent diminished their property and their

wealth, but under the laws they could purchase others.

The great undefined latent power of the Constitution is embodied in

Article I., Section 8: "To provide for the common defense and general

welfare." Under this section almost all the outrages of the war were

committed, restrained only by international rules of war; but these

were ignored under the plea that the war was only a rebellion--quite

a family affair, and would soon be settled. Under this article also is

found the power to tax to any amount "for the common defense and public

welfare."

The confiscation act of Congress was unconstitutional. Ed Burke, in

the Warren Hastings trial, said: "I do not know the method of drawing

up the indictment against a whole people." The Constitution _declares_

that the "trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be

by jury." But this confiscation act punished a "whole people" without

indictment, trial by jury, or conviction.