XXXIX. These reflexions answer no other purpose, than that of confronting
here and there a superficial and bastard schoolman, for all capable
people know and confess, that we are unable to give a definition of any
one substantial entity, except man. To what straight limits then is our
philosophy confined!
XL. But the misfortune is, that we have no certainty, that the general
received definition of a man, to wit, that he is a _rational animal_, is
a good and unexceptionable one; for we are clear it would not be a good
one, if this faculty appertains to other animals as well as him, and it
is matter of doubt whether it does or not; but I will not, nor cannot, in
support of this doubt, avail myself of the authority of Porphyrus, who in
his Treatise on Predicables, supposes God to be a rational animal; and
in order to distinguish between God and man, defines man to be a mortal
rational animal, because he thought that without the addition of the
word mortal, the definition would be applicable to God as well as man.
Neither will I avail myself of the authority of Aristotle, from whose
second book, De Sect. Pythagora, Jamblicus cites these words: _Animalis
rationalis aliud quidem est Deus, aliud autem homo._ But I may for this
purpose, avail myself of the authority of some Fathers, among whom is
St. Austin, who all affirm, that the angels are corporeal, or at least
have doubted of their incorporeality; to which doubt, appertains that,
of whether angels are rational animals, for in order to suppose them so,
there wants nothing but their being corporeal, and consequently it is
doubtful, whether the definition of rational animal, appertains solely to
man.
XLI. I may be told, that the corporeality of Angels has been condemned,
and their incorporeality defined, in the second Council of Nice, and the
fourth Lateran one. But in the first place, is it certain, that these
Councils declared the incorporeality of angels to be undeniable, and that
they declared affirming the contrary is erroneous; for it is somewhat
doubtful, whether the incorporeality was defined in them or not; because,
although mention was made in these Councils of this matter, it was not
done with an express design to discuss the point, but was only touched
upon, as we may say by _incidence_; which is an exception that all
eminent theologians admit, to our being bound to observe things that are
canvassed in that way even in Councils; as we are not obliged to suppose
any matters defined in them, that are not debated and settled with an
express intention. For which reason, the most learned Cano (_lib. 5. de
Considerat._) took the liberty of saying, that the opinion that angels
were corporeal, although it might be false, was not heretical; and long
before him, St. Thomas in his book _de Malo_, (_quæst. 16. art. 1._) had
said, that this question was no part of the Catholic Dogmas. My father
Saint Bernard (_lib. 5. de Considerat._) goes further; for he seems to
think, the opinion which denies the corporeality of angels, to be void
of probability; and it will not be improper to remark here, that he was
much posterior to the second Council of Nice, and Saint Thomas, not only
to the second Council of Nice, but to the fourth Lateran one also. This
may likewise be alledged as an answer, to the objections that are made in
consequence of some texts of Scripture, which give the epithet of spirits
to the angels; for it is certain, that the fathers who considered it as
defensible to maintain the corporeality of angels, were not ignorant of
those texts; the exposition of which, in truth is not difficult, for we
may fairly conclude, the Scripture calls them by this name, on account of
their being airy or light bodies, and we may also suppose, that it is for
this reason, that in various places it gives the name of spirit to the
air. _Spiritus procellarum. Advenientis spiritus vehementis, &c._
XLII. The second reply I shall make, is, that supposing it to be
determined that the angels are incorporeal, this truth is not established
by philosophy, but by faith; and as upon the knowledge of this truth,
depends the certainty, that the definition of a rational animal does not
belong to an angel; it follows, that by the help of philosophy alone, we
should never have hit upon giving a definition of a man; and with respect
to defining other things besides a man, its insufficiency is admitted.
What sort of philosophy is this? It ought rather to be called a total
want of philosophy.
XLIII. Not only with regard to the angels, but on the part of brutes
also, we find motives for doubting, whether the definition of _rational
animal_, may not be applied to them as well as to man. If _rational
animal_ signifies an animal capable of reflexion, the brutes are rational
animals in the opinion of all those, who suppose them to be endowed
with reason and reflexion: and as this sentiment may be supported by
strong arguments, it remains somewhat doubtful, whether rationality
is not diffused in different proportions to other animals as well as
men, or whether it is confined to them only. It is true, that if this
opinion should be admitted, we should grant, that the reason of man is
distinct from, and of a superior nature to that of brutes; but if in the
definition, we do not point out the character which distinguishes them,
we are reduced to assign as the difference, a generical idea.