XXXII. The thing then being understood, in the sense we have explained
it, the conclusion I draw from the premises is, that science, or
scientific certainty is not to be found in physics. Doctor Martinez, in
the second volume of his _Medicina Sceptica_, (Convers. 27.) proves this
conclusion abundantly, both by the authority of scripture, and by the
sentences of many fathers; though as the works of this author are easily
to be met with, I shall not here insert the authorities he quotes, but
shall content myself with adding to them two very remarkable ones that
he has omitted. The first is, that of my father St. Bernard (in Cant.
Cantic. Serm. XXXIII.), who when he is speaking of philosophers, says,
_Vagi sunt, nulla stabiles certitudine veritatis, semper discentes,
et nunquam ad scientiam veritatis pervenientes._ And it is somewhat
remarkable, that the Saint says further, philosophers never arrive at
attaining a certain knowledge of the very truths they themselves are
in search of, and are desirous of teaching to other people: _semper
discentes_; and lest some should conclude he spoke of supernatural
truths, I thought it necessary to hint here, that these are not the
objects of philosophical inquiries. Neither should we suppose, that he
spoke of the moral philosophers, because many of these, even including
the Gentiles, investigated many truths, that came within the compass of
their plan, with intire certainty; and it is evident, that if Aristotle,
had written with as much precision upon physics, as he did upon ethics,
we needed not to have wished for any thing better.
XXXIII. The second authority, is that of Lactantius Firmianus, an
illustrious person, and a venerable member of the church; this great
man (Lib. III. Divin. Instit. Cap. iv. v. and vi.) treats largely of
the scepticism of Archesilaus, of whom we have spoken before, and after
combating and confronting this philosopher effectually on the subject of
universal doubt, admits without reserve, that he would have been right,
if he had limited his scepticism to matters of physics, because there is
not, nor ever can be any science, which will teach mankind, the causes
and reasons of natural things: _Quanto faceret sapientius, ac verius, si
exceptione facta diceret causas, rationesque duntaxat rerum cælestium,
seu naturalium, quia sunt abditæ, nec sciri posse, quia nullus doceat,
nec quæri opportere, quia inveniri quærendo non possunt_.
XXXIV. Some of the sceptics themselves prove our conclusion, for they
say, that the things appertaining to physics are singular, and that
from singular things you cannot derive a science. But this reason does
not satisfy me. In the first place, notwithstanding physical things
are for the most part singular, they in some instances may cease to
be singular. Thus, although every real entity is singular, it may,
contemplated metaphysically, depart from its singularity. In fact, the
schoolmen together with St. Thomas say, that physics may depart or be
separated from their singular, but not from their sensible nature;
and that mathematical things, may depart or be separated from their
singular and sensible, but not from their intelligible nature; also,
that metaphysical ones, may depart or be separated from their singular,
sensible, and intelligible. In the next place, the axiom that from
singular things you can derive no science, should be understood with some
grains of allowance; that is, of such singular things as are particularly
necessary to the individual, and are accidental to the species; but
from those which appertain or belong to the species, science may be
deduced, even when they are connected with the individual. For example.
If I know scientifically; that man according to the general received
opinion respecting him, is risible, I also know scientifically that
Peter is risible, for in the following syllogism; _every man is risible;
Peter is a man; and therefore Peter is risible_, is implied the truth
of the premises, and the consequence deducible from it is, that it is
scientifically evident. Further, if ever a philosopher should arise,
who should know with certainty, the specific nature of all material
entities, and from that knowledge, should be able to demonstrate all
their properties, and the respective operations appertaining to each
species, and in virtue of this extraordinary penetration, should be
capable of giving reasons _à priori_ for all the phenomena of nature, we
should not be able to deny, that such a philosopher possessed physical
science, notwithstanding the object of his science, related only to the
species, unconnected with individuals. What then remains to be proved,
is, that in physics there is to be found no sort of science, or evident
knowledge of the matters appertaining merely to physics, abstracted from
all other considerations; and truly the dogmatic naturalists, would be
very happy, could they be permitted to possess a knowledge that amounts
to as much as this; nor would it disturb them, to have it dinned in their
ears, that the knowledge of common conceptions is metaphysical, and not
physical; for they would tell you, that both physics, and metaphysics,
may depart or be separated from their singularity, and that the principal
distinction between them is, that the last regards its object with a
greater degree of abstraction; that is, as exempt from all matter, and
considers only those reasons, which may subsist abstracted from matter,
such for example as spiritual entities; on the contrary, physics only
contemplate material and corporeal entities; the most sublime of which
conceptions, is that which regards the reason of the body, and the
lowest, that which is attached to the corporeal part of it. But call this
knowledge by what sort of name you will, either physical or metaphysical,
the way to bring the matter to a short issue is, to shew that there is
not in reality, any such knowledge.
XXXV. And what is more easy to be proved than this? I reason thus;
physics contemplate the nature of an entity that has motion, or
circulation; this may be considered, either according to the specific, or
generative nature of the thing; and I assert, that nothing is known with
certainty of the nature of any entity that has motion or circulation,
either in one or the other of the before named senses.
XXXVI. And to begin with the specific, who can deny that in this sense,
we know nothing of any one entity? I defy all the philosophers to tell me
what is the constituent or component physical substance, of any one of
the material entities that is to be found in the universe, and will give
them leave to chuse that which they have most examined. St. Basil has
some words (Epist. 168. _ad Eunomium_) that are admirably applicable to
this purpose, and which I shall here insert: _Itaque qui se existentium
scientiam assequutum esse gloriatur, exponat nobis quomodo, quod minimum
esse eorum, quæ in lucem prodierunt, natura habeat._ Let the presumptuous
philosopher, who boasts of his physical knowledge, explain to us the
nature of the least entity which God has created. Let him, adds the same
Father, who is ostentatiously vain of having penetrated into the secrets
of nature, tell us what is the nature of an ant: _Dicat formicarum nobis
naturam, qui eorum, quæ in natura sunt scientiam cum fastu se prædicat
assequutum._ But why should we waste time? There is not, nor ever was to
this day, any one, who by means of acquired science, could penetrate the
constituent or component physical substance of any living or inanimate
entity; the reach of our capacities not permitting us to go further, than
to distinguish by some very extrinsic accidents, one thing from another;
and this mode of distinguishing, is confined principally to those we call
naturalists, and rarely extends to those in the schools, who acquire the
appellation of philosophers, and who generally content themselves with
distinguishing some few, which they commonly do in the unhappy manner we
shall proceed to point out; but when school philosophers descend to treat
of specific conceptions, their philosophy is so miserable and confined,
that they only attempt to give the colour of a definition to a few
species of brutes, whose voice they describe by some particular name,
and then explain their conception of them, by some term derived from
that name; thus they call the lion a roaring animal; the dog a barking
one, and the horse a neighing one; but the fish, because they are very
numerous, and are for the most part mute, cannot well be comprehended
within this rule, and therefore are obliged to go without a definition.
XXXVII. The school philosophers cannot be ignorant, that these are not
definitions, but should rather be termed mere shadows of definitions,
which they make use of for want of true ones, to express logically,
what definition is, what species, what gender, what difference, and
other things appertaining to logical dialect; but is it not clear, that
defining a horse by calling him a neighing animal, can give us no better
conception of the creature, than may be conveyed to us by the most stupid
clown, who would explain the thing more simply, and without school
jargon, by telling us that a horse _is an animal that neighs, or is
capable of neighing_? Oh! what a penetrating philosophical description is
this of the nature of a horse!
XXXVIII. If any one, notwithstanding what has been said, should chuse to
reply, that nature, as the root of all operations, should be explained
according to the order, or habit of those operations; and thus, that a
horse is well and physically defined, by the radical order of the act of
neighing; if any one, I say, should reply to me in this manner; I apprise
him in the first place, that all substantial nature has its absolute
being, which is understood to be antecedent to the order of operations,
for the first, is supposed to be the cause or reason of the other;
that is to say, because such a thing has such a being in nature, from
thence is derived the habit or aptness for such operations. I apprise
him secondly, that if we should permit nature to be well defined by the
precise or characteristic order of operation, this should not be extended
to every sort of operation, but should be confined to the primary
operation, which marks the foundation of the species; but alas, we are
ignorant of what that is. For example, if a man, as is generally thought,
is well defined by his rational faculty, or radical power of reasoning;
because the being able to reason or reflect, is the principal, or primary
operation of man; a horse then should be defined by his radical habit
to that act of perception, instinct, or knowledge, which is proper to
his species, and distinct from that of all other animals. But who has
penetrated what this is? Or who has ever known the innate difference,
that there is between the instinct of a horse and a dog? And thus, as it
would be ridiculous and absurd to define a man by the radical order of
elocution, by saying, that he is an animal who can talk and discourse;
because this absurdity would be incurred, on account of the act of
elocution being posterior, or secondary to that of reason or reflexion;
and it would be much more ridiculous, to define him by the order of his
voice, which you describe by some particular name, and to define him in
the manner you define a horse, which you call a neighing animal; nor is
it less absurd to define a horse by the radical order of his neighing.
I apprise him thirdly, that if such definitions are admitted as good
and legitimate, it is the most easy thing in the world, to define every
substantial entity whatever, because in order to do it, you have only to
observe its operations, give the most remarkable one a name, and define
it by that name. By the help of this instruction only, you may make every
peasant a consummate philosopher, and enable him to define the nature of
all the entities in the universe.