XLIV. As we ascend the predicamental tree, and advance from the species,
to the genuses or kinds; we perceive, that philosophy does not discern
these more clearly, than it did the others; for we find in both cases,
equal ignorance, and equal uncertainty. If we ought to have scientific
certainty of any one genus in preference to another, it should be of that
under which we ourselves are comprehended, which is the animal kind, for
that is the thing which most immediately relates to us, and because also,
we employ more consideration and attention upon that, than we do upon
the others. We call the order animal, which comprehends man, and every
other species of terrestrial and aquatic brutes, as likewise every kind
of fish or fowl. And what do we know of animals according to this general
description? Why that they are _sensitive living beings_; for that is
the definition we give of them. But do we know this with any degree of
certainty? By no means; for it has been doubted whether every animal is
sensitive; and it has also been doubted, whether the sense of feeling
does not belong to other entities as well as to animals.
XV. The first doubt is built upon the opposition and arguments of the
Cartesians, who pretend, that all brutes are inanimate machines, and that
there is no other sensible animal but man; for which reason, in their
opinion, a sensible being is not a generical entity, but a specific one,
and proper to the human species in a quarter proportion. I am thoroughly
persuaded, that this opinion of the Cartesians is a false one; but I
have not yet seen any evident argument or demonstration to confront
it; nor has any person hitherto, hit upon one that evinces the falsity
of it; for their principal foundation is not so weak, but that it has
puzzled the most able Aristotelites to give an answer to it. But I do
not find, that this is any obstacle to our giving our firm assent to the
sensibility of brutes; although we have no reason to glory in our proofs
of this matter, when the contrary opinion, besides the arguments that are
produced to support it, finds so many partizans; and among them some of
excellent ingenuity. Nor have we any reason to suppose, what I have known
many people maintain, that all the Cartesians, think differently from
what they speak in this matter; for some of them, are as full of the
caprice that brutes are insensible, as we are of the persuasion that the
contrary is the fact. A few years ago, certain ladies who were present
at a bull-feast, seemed to express great concern for the sufferings of
one of the bulls, which the people employed for that purpose, worried
excessively. A French lady, who was a Cartesian philosopher, that sat
near them, begged they would not grieve, for says the good Cartesian
with great gravity, _I believe as firmly as I do in God and this cross,
that the bull feels no more pain than the bench I sit on_. I do not know
whether the other ladies believed her, but I am persuaded, that many are
stedfastly of the same opinion with the French lady.
XLVI. The second doubt, whether other entities besides animals are
not sensible, is patronized by Campanela, who labours by a variety of
arguments, to prove in divers parts of his Works, that all elemental
things are sensible. This doubt is also supported, and with more colour
of reason, by those philosophers, who allow feeling to plants. And that
this opinion may not appear extravagant; for the information of those
who adopt the common sentiment, it will not be amiss to let them know,
that Aristotle did not look upon this thing in that light, for he rather
inclines to patronize the doubt; for in his first book _de Plantis_,
he says, there is no certainty whether plants are, or are not, endued
with feeling, appetite, and knowledge: _Nec enim constat, habeant ne
plantæ animam, appetendique facultatem, doloris item, & voluptatis, &
rerum discretionis._ In the third place, the naturalists, who build upon
experimental observations, attribute feeling to some determined species
of plants, which on that account, they call sensitive plants.