PLOTTING WHICH OVERTHREW MADERO
We have seen in the foregoing chapter the mistakes which had been made
by Madero. Being surrounded by enemies, he was too lenient with them,
and it proved disastrous.
Orozco, one of his chiefs of guerrilla, should have been
court-martialled and shot in Juarez according to military rule. The
same drastic penalty could have been applied without injustice against
two other high officers in the Mexican army, who had rebelled against
the authority--Felix Diaz and General Reyes. But Madero, besides being
too humane for such methods, sincerely believed that leniency was a
sign of strength. Assuredly it was, but only in case the cabinet and
the government in general had been loyal to him. Some cabinet members
plotted quite openly against him--A. G. Granados, for instance. The
headquarters of the plotters were in Paris and Geneva, with a branch
office in the New York Consulate. In Mexico Rodolfo Reyes was the soul
of the movement. In Paris, Limantour and L. de la Barra worked together
with General Mondragon to unravel the threads of the conspiracy in
favor of Felix Diaz, who would represent the old Porfirista crowd, with
the assistance of the clericals and the great landowners, and bankers,
Americans as well as Mexican and French.
In New York the plotters supported General Reyes as representing the
army, especially the younger element. To all appearances the conspiracy
was essentially a military mutiny backed by the científicos, the
landed interest and the clericals. The most prominent army plotters
were General Mondragon, General Reyes, General Blanquet, Gen. Felix
Diaz, General Beltran, General Navarrete and General Huerta. Among the
civilians were: M. Calero, A. G. Granados, T. E. Obregon, Vera Estañol,
A. R. Gil, L. de la Barra, J. M. Lozano, Q. Moheno and Dr. Urrutia.
The political and military heads, exemplified in the above mentioned
names, represented the army, the científicos, the clericals, the landed
aristocracy,--in fact, all the reactionary powers and none of the
liberal or revolutionary tendencies of the people.
In utter blindness, innocence and optimism, call it what you please,
Madero scoffed at the idea of a plot which could overthrow him. He
firmly believed that the Mexican people were behind him and would
support him. He forgot that all the powers of reaction were well
organized and that the Mexican people who supported him were not
organized,--that they were at the mercy of a few political bandits
without principles and without country.
These unpatriotic politicians knew from experience that the foreign
bankers, the foreign corporations, the American government and
especially the American ambassador, were inimical to Madero, and
hostile to liberal ideas, and would help them to resist any attempts to
reform the land question or change the financial “status quo” as left
over by J. Y. Limantour.
When Gustavo Madero discovered the plot on February 4th, and learned
of the conspirators, he took it to his brother, who laughed at him.
The mutiny started on Sunday morning, the 9th of February. During five
days Madero continued playing with fate, and when the rebellion, which
was dated for the 16th of March, burst out on the 9th, he was taken by
surprise. The plotters were scared into action six weeks before the
date set, because they suspected treachery in their own ranks. On one
side there existed the ambition of General Reyes, who was under the
political management of his son Rodolfo, on the other side the ambition
of Felix Diaz, whose mentor was General Mondragon. General Huerta’s
ambitions were always latent, but were kindled and managed by his
political tutor, Dr. Urrutia, who represented the clerical interests,
as far back as the Diaz time.
In the year 1908 a young painter, Dr. Atl, had to undergo an operation
and went to the sanatorium of Dr. Urrutia. There he found General
Huerta, who was then unknown to anybody except his own officers and
soldiers. Dr. Atl was a “compadre” of Dr. Urrutia, and although a
radical of the extremest type, Dr. Urrutia and General Huerta only
laughed at him, humored him, but took him into their confidence.
One afternoon as they were discussing political events, Dr. Urrutia
exclaimed that ambitious and able men should prepare the way for the
presidency after the death of General Diaz. Finally Dr. Urrutia said to
General Huerta: “General, you look like presidential timber, you are
capable and fearless and you control half of the army. Why don’t you
begin to get ready?” General Huerta looked at Dr. Urrutia and Dr. Atl
through half closed eyes, expressionless as a graven image, and after a
long pause he said: “It is difficult, but it is not impossible.”
During the Reyes-Diaz mutiny in Mexico City, General Huerta was in
charge of the troops. He was making a great noise and killing off
as many volunteers of Madero and non-combatants as possible. His
ambition was to sap the strength of the Maderists and to terrorize the
population of the city into acquiescence to any future pact.
During these strenuous ten days Dr. Urrutia was seen going back and
forth constantly between the house of the Bishop of Mexico and General
Huerta. He was advising the soldiers and tying the strings which would
lift the less experienced Huerta into the presidential chair, backed
by the money and the prestige of the Church. During the ten days of
constant bombardment, the citadel where Felix Diaz was entrenched was
touched but twice by the Huerta guns, and the National Palace only
twice also. An American officer who happened to be in Mexico City,
backed the claim of General Angeles, that the citadel could have been
taken in a few hours if Huerta had really been sincere in his attack.
General Angeles proposed to carry the citadel if F. I. Madero would
only place him at the head of the government troops. Madero refused for
fear of hurting Huerta’s vanity, and hoped thus to prove that he had
faith in his loyalty.
We publish the account of events which followed the arrest of Madero
and Suarez, by Mr. Marquez Sterling, who tried his best to save
Madero’s life.
DECLARATION made by the Minister of the Republic of Cuba in Mexico,
Mr. Manuel Marquez Sterling, to the _Herald_.
It was exactly twenty-nine days after I presented my credentials to
President Madero, when the revolt in the City of Mexico started. I
shall not refer to the tragic scenes which took place during the
struggle in the city, from the 9th of February to the ruin of the
government, as the same are now well known to all the world; I shall
only refer to the fall of Mr. Madero, after ten days of terrible
disorder, during which, automobiles of diverse legations constantly
crossed the streets of the city.
On the morning of February 18th, in a conference which I had with the
Secretary of Foreign Relations, Pedro Lascurain, he assured me that
in the afternoon the revolt would receive a decisive blow, and that
the city would return to the hands of the government. Precisely at
two o’clock in the afternoon, I received notice that General Blanquet
had made the President and his cabinet prisoners. A short time later
we were called to the American Embassy by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson and
informed of this extraordinary event.
General Blanquet verified the arrest by order of General Huerta, and
as a consequence, the sharpshooting in the streets ceased. In the
evening, the Ministers of Chile, Brazil and I visited the American
Embassy, looking for further news. We there met General Huerta and
Gen. Felix Diaz, who for several days had fought in the streets of
Mexico. They were accompanied by other persons, such as the actual
Minister of Justice, Lic. Rodolfo Reyes. Reyes then read in a loud
voice, in our presence, a document in which both Generals agreed
upon the ceasing of hostilities. Huerta and Diaz later signed this
document, embracing immediately afterwards, while their companions
applauded; the diplomats did not applaud, remaining as mute witnesses
of a scene which was unexplainable to us.
On the 19th, in the morning, I left the Cuban Legation and went
through several streets, in order to get an idea of the popular
sentiment. I heard the death of Gustavo Madero discussed, of whose
capture I had already heard, they saying that he had been assassinated
in the arsenal, and that in the afternoon Huerta would execute
the president himself. They also stated that the Vice-President,
Pino Suarez, had tried to escape. While I listened to all this,
a distinguished Mexican gentleman, whose name I shall not state,
detained me and said: “You and the members of the Diplomatic Corps are
the only ones who can save Madero.”
On returning to the Legation, this idea had taken possession of my
mind, and for that purpose I immediately sent a note to the American
Ambassador, communicating the matter to him and proposing to him that
the Diplomatic Corps should take charge of the same. In the name of
my government, I offered the services of the Cruiser _Cuba_ (which
some days previous I had requested from my government, and which was
anchored in Vera Cruz) to save them from danger, taking them away from
the country, in case they should obtain their liberty. I immediately
went to the Japanese Legation to see the parents of the President,
who had heard of the death of their son, Gustavo, and which they did
not credit. They begged me therefore, to go to Mr. Wilson and beg him
to aid us with General Huerta, to save the lives of their two sons.
The Chargé d’Affaires of the Japanese Legation accompanied me to the
American Embassy and we made our proposition known to the Ambassador.
We there met the Spanish Minister, and he and I agreed that the
situation was more serious than we had thought, and therefore
determined to personally see General Huerta, asking him for the lives
of the prisoners. We went in my automobile, flying the Cuban flag, but
we were not able to see Huerta. Instead, we were received by General
Blanquet, who treated us with great courtesy, assuring us that they
would respect the lives of the prisoners, and while this was passing
the Minister of Chile arrived, telling us that Madero had consented to
resign as President of the Republic, and that the Secretaries of State
and other persons who had been made prisoners with Madero and Pino
Suarez, had been set at liberty.
On the morning of the 19th nevertheless, a representative of Huerta
urged Madero to resign. Madero replied to this messenger that he
was now resolved to resign, provided that he who had usurped his
place should govern according to the Constitution. While they were
explaining this, Mr. Lascurain went to see Madero, as a mediator, to
whom Madero expressed the conditions under which he would resign.
Lascurain, in Huerta’s name, accepted. These conditions were: that the
resignation should be delivered to the Minister of Chile, who would
retain it in his possession until Madero and Pino Suarez should be
safely aboard the _Cuba_ in Vera Cruz. Madero stipulated also that
in the trip to Vera Cruz, they should be accompanied by the Chargé
d’Affaires of Japan and myself, Madero insisting principally in that,
before delivering the resignation to Congress, Huerta should sign a
letter, in which he would promise to comply with the terms of same.
That same afternoon Madero signed his resignation, and further, as
Lascurain was present, he granted, at his indication, that the affair
should be ventilated among Mexicans, handing the resignation to
Lascurain, instead of delivering it to the Minister of Chili. It was
then stipulated that at ten o’clock that night Madero and Pino Suarez
would leave for Vera Cruz in a special train, together with their
families, and accompanied by myself and an official of the Japanese
legation, and escorted by a powerful guard.
Having communicated this arrangement to the office of General
Blanquet, I ascended to General Huerta’s department to see him, but
I was informed that he was sleeping. I immediately returned to the
office of General Blanquet, where the Ministers of Chile and Spain
awaited me. We then asked for permission to see Madero and same was
immediately conceded to us, going to the four first rooms, in which he
was confined.
Madero warmly expressed his gratitude to me, begging me to accompany
him to Vera Cruz, which request I was pleased to accede to.
“When you are ready,” he told us, “come to the palace in order to go
to the station. It would be well if you could come at eight, but at
any rate I shall wait for you until ten o’clock.”
I then left, and immediately went to telegraph to the Commander of the
_Cuba_ that he should expect us, being ready to sail from Vera Cruz,
and that he should do what was necessary in order to receive aboard
the Heads of the Government and their families.
At eight o’clock I was punctually at the Palace, making my proposition
known to General Blanquet. He ordered one of his aides to accompany
me; the four rooms occupied by Madero and Pino Suarez were connecting.
The door of one of the rooms faced the yard, and there were many
soldiers and officials in the entrance; there were also sentinels in
the interior of the sparsely furnished rooms, sentinels who, according
to what I knew were replaced each moment. General Angeles, one of the
official favorites of Madero, was also a prisoner in these rooms.
Ernesto Madero was there visiting his nephew.
Receiving us affectionately, Madero asked me if I knew anything about
his brother Gustavo, and it could be seen that he did not know of his
death. I evaded the question to the best of my ability. Suddenly,
Madero asked about the letter that he had to give to Huerta. None
of us had it, and then Ernesto Madero said that he would go and get
it from Huerta. Almost immediately he returned without it, but with
the news that Lascurain had gone to present Madero’s resignation to
Congress.
On knowing this, Madero became very excited, and from that moment
lost all hope of salvation. “I have fallen into a trap for the second
time,” he said, indicating to his uncle that he should go and tell
Lascurain that he wished him to come immediately. Then Ernesto Madero
confessed the truth to him, telling him that the resignation had
already been presented and accepted by Congress. “This is a felony
of Lascurain,” said Madero. “The agreement was that the resignation
should not be presented until I was aboard the _Cuba_.”
In those moments, we knew by the conduct of an official that Huerta
had just been designated as Provisional President by Congress.
“This has been the second trap into which I have fallen,” Madero
finally said to me. “I am now convinced that I shall not leave Mexico
alive. They will conduct me to prison this same night, and on the
trip, they will shoot me, or else they will assassinate me right here,
as soon as we are alone.”
Ernesto Madero begged me to remain with him, telling me that if they
succeeded in surviving that night, that probably the Diplomatic Corps
would be capable of saving them. I decided to accompany them, for how
could I have the heart to take my hat and leave them, being persuaded
that these men would be dead as soon as I was in the street? Ernesto
finally left us, Madero, Pino Suarez and I remaining in these gloomy
rooms.
At one o’clock in the morning he invited me to rest, indicating to me
that he was very sleepy, and without the least agitation, this man who
had just been deposed from the Presidency, commenced to prepare two
beds with chairs, one for himself and the other for me.
He had finished his labor, when an official sent by General Huerta
arrived, he having ordered him to tell us that the train arranged to
conduct the prisoners out of the country was conveniently ready, but
on account of circumstances which he would explain later, it had been
impossible to despatch it. The same official invited me to retire and
wait. And as, previously, something had been said in regard to the
train being ready to leave at five o’clock in the morning, I asked the
official if this was in the programme, but he replied that he did not
know anything. As soon as I saw Madero sleep, I went to keep company
with Pino Suarez, first giving a glance at Madero, who slept like a
child. At this moment, the guards entered and turned out the lights.
From the upper crevices of the windows some rays of light penetrated,
but they did not molest us. We were so closely guarded, that any
phrase which passed between Pino Suarez and myself had to be spoken
in a very low voice.
At 9:30 in the morning breakfast was served to us. Pino Suarez did not
wish to take the coffee, fearing that it might be poisoned, but Madero
and I took it. Then Madero gave the boy who had served us a dollar,
and told him to bring us the morning papers. We did not permit this,
fearing that he might find out about Gustavo’s death. Madero became
resigned, lying down on his bed of chairs, where he slept for twenty
minutes.
When he awakened, he said he was prepared for everything that might
happen, but he indicated to me that I should approach the diplomats in
order to save him, which I promised to do with pleasure. He also asked
me if his wife had also made any petition personally to Huerta.
About ten o’clock in the morning, the wife of Pino Suarez arrived,
accompanied by a gentleman, and I then took leave of them.
The balance of that day, February 20th, and the two following days,
we worked to save Madero. I asked Huerta why he had not given his
consent in this respect, to which he replied that he did not dare send
Madero to Vera Cruz, until he could have confidence in the military
authorities of that place. I, in turn, indicated to him that he might
be sent to Tampico, where I could have the _Cuba_ sent. He further
showed himself irresolute. Almost all the foreign ministers saw
Huerta personally that day, and interceded for the life of Madero.
On the morning of the 22d, the ministers thought the lives of Madero
and Pino Suarez to be out of danger, although we had heard the rumor
that they schemed to place Madero in an insane asylum. At night
all the ministers approached the American Embassy to celebrate the
anniversary of the birth of Washington. Huerta and all the Ministers
in his Cabinet were present and they all appeared very calm.
On the morning of the following day, Sunday, I was very urgently
called to the telephone. It was Mrs. Madero, who was very excited
on account of the news she had received that her husband had been
wounded. I answered that this could not be true, but a little later I
read in the morning papers the event of the death of Madero and Pino
Suarez at 11:15 the previous night, on being taken to the penitentiary.
Ambassador Wilson finally tried to obtain permission for Mrs. Madero
to see the body of her husband. We then believed that the balance
of the family were in danger, and I hastily proposed to take them
from the country. I personally sent in a secret manner to Vera Cruz,
Francisco Madero, father of the assassinated president, and his
brother Ernesto, and they embarked on the _Cuba_.
I later conducted the mother, widow and sister of the President to
the _Cuba_, leaving Vera Cruz on February 25th.
Mr. Marquez Sterling has belonged to the Diplomatic Corps of the
Republic of Cuba several years, and has occupied the post of Minister
in Argentine, Peru and Brazil. During the administration of President
Palma, he was counsellor of the Department of State. He presented his
resignation as Minister of Mexico after the murder of Madero and Suarez.
In the account of the events leading to the murder of Madero
and Suarez, Mr. Marquez Sterling mentions the excitement of the
prisoner-president when he discovered that Don Pedro Lascurain had
turned over the written resignation of Madero into Huerta’s hands.
What happened was told by Lascurain himself. As soon as General Huerta
heard that Pedro Lascurain had Madero’s resignation in his possession,
he asked to see him and begged him with great insistence to give him
the valuable paper. Don Pedro Lascurain was obdurate, so the cunning
old Indian, knowing that Lascurain was a devout Catholic, fished
out the holy medallion hanging by a chain to his neck. “See this
medallion,” said Huerta. “It is the most precious thing I possess; it
was given to me by my mother when I was a little boy. I promise you
on all that is holy and sacred to me, I swear on the white head of my
sainted mother, the memory of this holy image, that if you give me
the President’s resignation, I shall guarantee his life,” and as he
finished the sentence he kissed the holy medallion.
Don Pedro Lascurain, convinced, handed him the paper with the
resignation of Madero and Suarez. The next day General Huerta was
visited by the Belgian, Spanish and Japanese Ministers who asked him
to guarantee the life of the ex-President and Vice-president. Huerta
answered:
“Gentlemen, will you guarantee to me that if I permit Madero and Suarez
to go out of Mexico, that they will not start another revolution
against my government in the United States?” The three diplomats
declared that they could not give such promises.
“Then,” he exclaimed, “gentlemen, how can I be made responsible for
their lives?” The diplomats left the general without answering.
As the price of blood, the generals and the civilians demanded the
heads of Madero and Suarez; the most insistent of all was Don Rodolfo
Reyes, who called for victims to avenge the death of his father in
front of the National Palace. Adolfo Basso’s life was also sacrificed
with that of Gustavo Madero’s. The Huerta Cabinet went into power like
a Black Hand Cabinet, after the assassination of its enemies. This
infamous list should be remembered by all who are interested in the
reconstruction of Mexico, and who speak of amnesty.
General Huerta, Provisional President.
L. de la Barra, Foreign Affairs.
A. García Granados, Interior.
Rodolfo Reyes, Justice.
T. Esquivel Obregon, Finance.
General Mondragon, War.
J. Vera Estañol, Instruction.
A. Robles Gil, Fomento.