THE MADERO REVOLUTION, ITS AIMS AND FAILURES
In the summer of 1908, when the writer was in Mexico he had heard that
a man called F. I. Madero was writing a book, in which he discussed the
advisability of contesting the seventh presidential election of General
Diaz. The book was supposed to have been written in collaboration with
a journalist who later was rewarded with the Governorship of Chiapas.
“The Presidential Question of 1910,” the title of the book, had about
ninety thousand words of written matter, and began with the War of
Independence down to General Diaz’s régime when he tried to analyze the
future political conduct of Diaz.
Of the interview of General Diaz in _Pearson’s Magazine_ of 1908, he
said: “We judge a study of his declarations to Creelman useless, as we
do not believe they are sincere, for they are in manifest contradiction
with his past acts, as General Diaz has always made promises which were
never kept, from the Plan of la Noria down to the last one.”
Although few intelligent Mexicans took General Diaz at his word, they
nevertheless caught him for the first time in a flagrant political
“faux pas” for not having denied the interview. They saw a chance to
take him at his own words and start the work of organizing an agitation
of the political conscience of Mexico.
Madero’s book was a powerful factor in this propaganda, which was
followed by a national organization of political clubs and speechmaking
by a few daring young men of the middle class. This fearless, open
propaganda copied the campaigning methods of the United States and
Madero was the head of the movement.
At first, Diaz, his political supporters and even the foreigners
laughed at their rash, foolish crusade which they thought would soon be
crushed and destroyed.
The Diaz clique, the cientificos and the old supporters of the czar,
men like General Reyes, General Naranjo, General Trevino, General
Izabal, General Torres, General Terrazas, Gen. Mucio Martinez, T.
Dehesa, R. Corral, J. Y. Limantour, E. Creel, Gen. G. Cosio, O. Molina
would all have liked to be president, but they were too much in awe
of the power of the old man in Chapultepec. Their political work was
all done underground, they were all getting ready for the moment when
General Diaz should step down gripped by the hand of death. None of
them imagined that any Mexican, no matter how daring, could shake the
foundation of the Diaz throne without the help of the middle class
of Mexico. When the old guard observed the impunity of the Madero
propaganda they guessed that it was going to be a repetition of the
events in the presidential elections of 1903-04 when Diaz allowed
his foolish enemies to come out in the open and then destroyed them
wholesale and in detail.
The great strength of Madero consisted in his peaceful methods of
propaganda and his constant advice to Mexicans to be patient under the
persecutions of the government agents. He advised them to suffer even
imprisonment and death so as to awaken the interest of the majority who
would soon follow their example.
Madero was assisted in his campaign by his brother Gustavo and a young
lawyer Roque Estrada, and was accompanied everywhere by his wife,
even in jail. Roque Estrada wrote about the evolution of the Madero
revolution and divided it into four parts:
1. The Awakening of the Mexican political soul.
2. The Concentration of the revolutionary propaganda.
3. The Destruction of the Diaz régime.
4. The Reconstruction of the new government.[5]
The campaign continued under difficulties, when the supporters of Diaz
awakened to the fact that Madero was growing popular. Then on the 6th
of June, 1910, came the news of his arrest.
It must be added that one of the reasons for the indifference of the
authorities to the Madero propaganda was the firm conviction that F. I.
Madero was a fool, an idiot, who was being used by powerful enemies to
initiate a counter campaign against Diaz. A second reason was the fact
that Madero belonged to a wealthy and politically influential family
of which the head, Don Evaristo, had been Governor of Coahuila during
General Gonzalez’ term (1880-84). Moreover, the Maderos had financial
connections in New York, Paris and London.
Besides the head of the family, every member of the Madero clan had
disowned Francisco I. Madero’s political activities with the exception
of his wife and Don Gustavo. It was a repetition of the story of Joseph
in the Old Testament: F. I. Madero like Joseph was sold out by this
brother’s family. There was a radical wing in the Madero movement
headed by Gustavo Madero which believed that all the peaceful methods
of agitation were useless and that the only successful method of
overthrowing the dictator was to be effected in the same way by which
he had come into power--by revolution.
F. I. Madero insisted on peaceful methods, so Gustavo without informing
his brother went to Paris ostensibly to organize a Mexican Railway of
the Centre. As soon as he cashed the first instalment of the moneys for
the construction ($375,000)[6] he used it to buy arms and ammunition
for the revolution which was certain to burst out in a few months.
In San Luis Potosí, October 5th, 1910, Don F. I. Madero, who by this
time had become convinced of the futility of peaceful propaganda,
wrote the famous Plan. A few days later he was advised that there was
an order for his arrest which would be followed by the application of
the “Ley Fuga.” Disguised as a common laborer he fled into the United
States on October 7th, and went to San Antonio. Some New York papers
had long accounts of his flight and plans, sent by their correspondents
but the news was not published.
The Plan of San Luis Potosí was a direct challenge to Porfirio Diaz,
and it used almost the same slogan which General Diaz had written on
the Plan de la Noria against Juarez and later his Plan de Tuxtepec and
Palo Blanco which was: “Effective suffrage and no re-election.”
A great deal has been published about the great promises of land reform
and distribution of great estates by F. I. Madero and which he could or
would not fulfil.
The exact wording of that famous Article 3d of the Plan has either been
forgotten or misinterpreted. We reproduce the Article:
_Article 3d_: “As a result of the abuses of the lands, numerous small
proprietors, mostly Indians, have been despoiled of their lands by
common consent of the ministry of Fomento or by the decisions of the
Mexican courts. In justice to the old proprietors, they should be given
back lands which have been taken away from them in such an arbitrary
manner. The decisions of the Ministry of Fomento and of the courts
will be subject to revision and it will be demanded of those who acted
in such immoral fashion, to return the land to their original owners,
besides paying them an indemnity. Only in case that the lands should
have passed to a third party before the publication of this plan, will
the original owners receive an indemnity from those whose spoliation
benefitted them.”[7]
Thus it will be seen that the Plan of San Luis Potosí aimed first of
all to destroy the régime which had made the land robbery possible.
After the capture of Juarez the whole Diaz Government was practically
destroyed as a political force and the Reconstruction would have been
easy with a new government. But the reactionary forces were at work to
arrest the impetus of the revolution. Limantour came back from Paris
and prepared the way to an entrance of the reactionaries by threatening
to arrest Gustavo Madero for the misappropriation of money to the use
of the revolution.
Madero’s father and brother had to accept his conditions and went
post haste to confer with F. I. Madero at the border. Limantour’s
conditions were the cessation of hostilities and a constitutional
transfer of the presidential power on the shoulder of the clerical
L. de la Barra. Limantour’s clever, strategic movement arrested the
radical impulse, put a few Maderistas in the Cabinet, and others in the
Governorship, but the inexperience of the new men and the conscious
inertia of ministers, like Ernesto Madero, Secretary of Finance
and Rafael Hernandez, Secretary of Fomento, checked all effective
attempts at reforms. The two radical brothers, the Vasquez Gomez, were
eliminated. Limantour went back to Paris to watch from a distance and
to direct the tactics of the policy of inertia.
Meanwhile plots were hatched against the life of Madero. One almost
succeeded at this time. While L. de la Barra was provisional President
they sent F. I. Madero to confer with Zapata who agreed to meet him on
condition that no federal troops should accompany Madero in Cuautla.
General Huerta, who was in charge of the federal troops in Morelos
broke the promise, and attacked Cuautla in hopes that Zapata would kill
Madero for his supposed treachery. The common sense of Zapata saved
Madero’s life.
The first conspiracy against Madero happened when he was in Juarez and
the cientificos had plotted his destruction by inciting the suspicious
anger of men like Orozco and Villa against him. But Madero’s bravery
saved him again. The cientifico plotters were said to be T. E.
Obregon, F. Carbajal and Oscar Braniff. T. E. Obregon later became
a member of Huerta’s cabinet and Carbajal the provisional president
following the flight of General Huerta. As soon as Madero was elected
the cientificos captured Orozco with money and started him as the head
of a counter revolution before the President had been seated a month.
Then they pushed General Reyes and later Felix Diaz and Vasquez Gomez
to revolt against Madero.
These movements although they failed, were kept up so as to show the
world the incompetence and lack of popularity of the Madero régime.
Zapata started on the war path incited by the cruelties of the federal
generals and all over the country rich haciendados (ranchers) gave
money to guerrilla leaders to keep up the anarchy and by attacks on
American property and American citizens to invite American intervention.
Twice the Taft régime attempted or threatened an invasion of Mexico
and once they almost succeeded. The failure was due to the exposé of
the little plot which resulted in the resignation of Dickinson, then
Secretary of War.[8]
It must be remembered that the Attorney General under Taft was a lawyer
who had been a personal representative of Diaz in the United States,
and among some of the lawyers who had been his partners was a brother
of the President of the United States. All were interested in Mexico
financially and politically.
The threats of invasion by the Taft régime had a disastrous effect
on the reorganization of the new government. Madero was surrounded
by enemies at home and abroad. The army, the cientificos and the
clericals were plotting at home. The Mexican Ambassador Calero had
formed an alliance with the American Ambassador, hoping to step into
the presidency as L. de la Barra had done. Calero went so far as to
telegraph to some French bankers who were negotiating a loan to Madero,
to stop until further orders; the further orders were supposed to come
from the new government which Calero hoped to head.
But meanwhile there should not come any financial assistance to Madero.
In Congress men like F. Bulnes, Q. Moheno, J. M. Lozano headed the
opposition which interfered with any plans of reform, by cutting off
all financial help. Madero was just beginning to reap the fruit of his
policy of conciliation.
With few exceptions all the old Diaz appointments in the courts, in
the States, in the consular and diplomatic service were kept in their
places, and as a result the old methods were kept in vogue. All the
army officers who had ruthlessly fought the revolutionists were left in
their positions and the rebel chiefs were dismissed with thanks.
With the new interests created by the Madero ascension to power there
sprang up a hungry crowd of office seekers and a neo-cientifico
régime headed by Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez. It would not be
supposed even as a fantastic flight of a poetical imagination that the
neo-cientificos would sincerely attempt a reform of the government. E.
Madero is reported as having said that the financial system left by
Limantour worked like a Swiss watch. The only reform to men of great
interests can be achieved in their favor, not against them.
Zapata could only be induced to stop his rebellious activity by a
solution of the agrarian problem in Morelos. The Cabinet Minister under
Madero only incited the exasperation by sending men of Huerta’s stamp
in their midst.
It can be safely asserted that all the government officials in Mexico
were inimical to reforms beginning with the Madero clan (excepting
F. I. and Gustavo Madero), down to the lowest officials. The men
who had fought for the revolution watched in disgust and dismay the
disintegration of the revolutionary ideals.