HUERTA IN POWER--THE LANDING OF AMERICAN MARINES IN VERA CRUZ
When we speak of revolutions we must consider three facts. First,
that in Mexico’s history there have been only three real revolutions:
the revolution which overthrew Spanish rule, the three years’ war
(1857-60), and the Madero revolution, which began with the overturning
of the Diaz régime and was continued by the Carranza revolution and
the flight of Huerta. Secondly, it must be remembered that all other
political and military upheavals, of long or short duration, cannot be
called revolutions but are in fact either mutinies or revolts or coups
d’état or as the Mexicans call them “cuartelazos.” And lastly, that
no revolution can hope of success unless it is backed by the majority
of the middle class, and no successful revolution can be organized
with foreign and especially American money with concessionary strings
attached to it.
General Huerta with a soldier’s training and temperament, and an
unsympathetic knowledge of his country’s history, thought that for the
sake of getting and staying in power the control of the army was the
only possible road. Not only Huerta, but his most prominent supporters
made the mistake of confusing cruelty, brutality and treachery with
power.
Huerta’s cunning was believed to be statesmanship, but very soon his
Machiavellian “double crossing” of Felix Diaz, Rodolfo Reyes and
General Mondragon, pointed to his methods of procedure. The elimination
of his more powerful enemies and the mysterious disappearance of the
less known enemies, showed that wholesale assassinations were as
frequent as under Diaz’s rule. Nevertheless, if Diaz was ruthless he
was at least more careful of public opinion. The foolish excuse that a
rescuing party had been responsible for the accidental death of Madero
and Suarez, laid bare to the world the inner circumvolution of Huerta’s
political brain.
A simpleton could have advised him that Madero murdered was much more
to be feared than Madero alive. Madero the martyr was remembered
through his virtues and ideals, and all his faults, weaknesses and
blunders were forgotten. What Madero alive could not achieve, Madero
dead, united under one idea, one effort, one banner.
Huerta’s supporters lacked what is essential in politics, psychological
perception of public opinion. Huerta, the double-edged sword of the
clericals, destroyed by his blunders the last vestige of clerical
power which supported the militarists and reactionaries. Terrible
sacrifices were enacted to strike terror into the hearts of political
opponents. Secret agents lured the political victims into automobiles
to a solitary spot near Mexico City, close to Guadalupe; then they were
stabbed to death and hastily buried on the spot.
The Huerta executioners were themselves in danger of being murdered for
knowing too much, but their suspicion enabled them to escape death, and
during Carbajal’s short rule they were caught and lived to tell the
details of their gruesome work.
Dr. Urrutia, once minister of the interior in Huerta’s cabinet was
the chief executioner of the dictator. Senator Dominguez because he
had attacked Huerta in the Senate and accused him of the murder of
Madero and Suarez, and Mr. Rendon were driven gagged to Dr. Urrutia’s
sanatorium in the suburbs. They were put to sleep under the influence
of ether, their bodies were atrociously mutilated and when awakened
to consciousness, they died of the loss of blood and the tremendous
nervous shock.
Such savage methods accelerated the disruption of the reign of terror
and drove all elements into active co-operation under the leadership
of Carranza. Secret agents were also sent to murder Carranza, Villa,
Obregon, Gonzalez, but the game was too risky. The federal General
Rabago succeeded in catching Abraham Gonzalez, governor of Chihuahua
under Madero, and he was murdered by being pushed under the wheels of
a moving train.
A supporter of General Huerta when he foresaw the end of his friend
went into exile. He claimed that he had escaped two dangers by leaving
Mexico, one was a term in jail and the other a portfolio in Huerta’s
cabinet.
There was never a period in the history of Mexico when such a
congregation of incompetents, of grafters, and murderous fools held
sway; even in the world’s history there is difficulty in finding a
parallel. We have to go back to Nero and Caracalla to find such a depth
of infamy, cowardice and Sadism.
Victoriano Huerta appeared as a demoniacal clown let loose on the
political circus of Mexico City, in an infernal saturnalia of gore,
drunkenness and prostitution. Huerta was the Avatar of greed, lust and
alcoholism, a moral hyena laughing diabolically at the amazed world,
a white-livered soldier pickled in cognac, a mental baboon grinning
inanely at his own political antics.
His own cabinet was chosen from among the best saloons, in the houses
of prostitution and from the prisons. A meeting of the Cabinet was like
a confab between maniacs, idiots and drunkards. A prominent Mexican who
asked to be heard by the members of the Cabinet reported that he was
interrupted by a minister before he could finish: “This is no time for
reforms,” said he; “we must drown the whole country in blood.” Another
suggested American intervention as the best method of uniting the
warring revolutionary elements. “Then,” he added, smiling, “the fool
gringos will do the dirty work for us and our lives and property will
be respected.” A third member advised a repetition of the system of
reconcentration as was inaugurated in Cuba by General Weyler.
Cabinet meetings took place in a house several miles from Mexico
City and later in the red light district and the famous Café Colon,
whose proprietor was made a general. All the ministers were also made
generals and had to appear in their uniforms. Everybody in the employ
of the government was created an officer in uniform, even the teachers
and clerks. Bartenders were made sergeants and it was reported that
Doña Lupe of the Salto del Agua was appointed honorary Rear-Admiral of
a squadron of cruisers. The sons of the ministers, especially those of
General Blanquet and the sons and relatives of General Huerta received
concessions for running gambling houses, for the sale of human beings
into the army at so much per head, and contracts for the sale of arms,
ammunition, uniforms and victuals to the War Department.
A naturalized American named Ratner was indirectly responsible for the
landing of the marines in Vera Cruz. Ratner was the president of the
Tampico News Co.; during Madero’s time he was caught selling arms to
Zapata and was deported under Article 33 of the Constitution.
When General Huerta became dictator Ratner came back. Being fertile and
unscrupulous in expedients, he became a favorite of the general. One
day he advised the dictator to buy all the arms and ammunition for sale
then in the United States, and for six months ahead so as to prevent
the Constitutionalists from getting any at any price. It was discovered
that the sum required for the purpose was too great so the order was
limited to machine and field guns and ammunition. Twenty-five million
dollars in gold was the price for this corner in war engines. Ratner
engineered the whole scheme and shipped the material to Odessa in
Russia. From Odessa they were sent to Hamburg and there reshipped for
Vera Cruz.
The United States secret service agents, who had been watching closely
the sales of American manufacturers, did not at first understand the
meaning of the elaborate and expensive shipping and reshipping.
When the _Ypiranga_ headed for Vera Cruz the whole matter became
clear. Huerta’s idea was to get first all the field guns in the
United States so as to prevent the revolutionists from getting them;
thereupon to force the United States to intervene in Mexico, counting
on the patriotism of the Mexicans to fight the invaders. His idea was
to concentrate all the revolutionary chiefs in the battles against
the Americans and to eliminate them one by one when they could be
reached more easily and without arousing suspicion. If that plot did
not succeed, he had decided to permit the Americans to occupy Mexico
City, knowing that they would respect the lives and properties of all
factions.
The Huerta conspiracy fell through because the Constitutionalists
believed in the word and friendship of President Wilson and they
mistrusted the word and patriotism of Huerta. It was soon afterwards
that the dictator made up his mind to resign. By the acceptance of
the A.B.C. mediation, the game was ended and he had decided to retire
before it was too late. Ratner had succeeded in his undertaking and his
commission was a million and a half in gold.
Señor Don Fernando Iglesias Calderón related that while he was a
prisoner in the castle of San Juan de Ulloa he heard that an order had
been telephoned from the Commander of Vera Cruz to the Commander of the
fort, to release, arm and dress about 300 convicts in civilian clothes.
They were landed in Vera Cruz the night before the landing of American
marines. In the morning General Maas, his officers and soldiers hastily
retreated to the hills near Soledad.
The blue jackets found no Federals, but the Mexican snipers who made
such a desperate resistance were mostly ex-convicts who were promised
their liberty if they fought the Americans. The shooting which emanated
from the Naval Academy was directed by ex-prisoners and a few cadets
who fought very bravely.
Two days after the landing of the marines General Navarrete of the
staff of General Maas passed through the American lines into the fort
of Ulloa, where he tried to induce F. Iglesias Calderón to join Huerta
in Mexico City and publish a manifesto uniting all factions against the
hated Americans.
Don Fernando Iglesias answered that he could not believe any
promises made by Huerta and that he was quite certain that the
Constitutionalists would not join the dictator even if they were
forced to resist an American invasion in the north. A few days later
the Commander of the fort under the advice of Don Fernando Iglesias
released all the political prisoners.
The Vera Cruz incident showed up the Federals as a despicable, cowardly
lot,--they had to arm a few hundred ex-convicts and civilians to do the
fighting for them.
The retirement of the Federals to Soledad likewise proved that there
was no serious intention to resist an advance of American soldiers to
Mexico City, as the general line of march could never have been taken
by way of Soledad, but only through the Cerro Gordo on the road to
Jalapa by the Interoceanic Railroad, the same itinerary used by Scott
in 1847. By advancing through the Cerro Gordo, Jalapa, Perote and
Puebla, the American troops could have ignored or driven the Federals
at Soledad into the mountains and by the capture of Esperanza cut off
their communications in the rear. That would automatically have forced
them to evacuate Soledad, Cordoba, and Orizaba. The whole campaign
would have been a repetition of the treachery of Santa Anna in 1847.
Fortunately for the Americans and Mexicans, President Wilson was too
wise to fall into such a trap, and the Constitutionalists were too
patriotic to play into the hands of Huerta.
NOTE.--The details about the arming of prisoners in Ulloa and the
landing of American marines in Vera Cruz were given to the writer by
Don Fernando Iglesias Calderón.