The year 1781 commenced under auspices more propitious than those of
the last year. The British had exercised so much oppression and rapacity
over all those who would not join them, and so much insolence over
those who did, and were in the least suspected, that the people of South
Carolina found there was no alternative but between a state of downright
vassalage and warfare. Most of the men of principle already had, or
were prepared to take up arms against the enemy, and in general the
unprincipled only remained with them in the expectation of plunder.
Their army too, being divided into different cantonments over the
country, while it extended their oppression, exposed their weakness.
The history of all ages shows that a country may be overrun with more
facility than kept in a state of subjection, and that a partisan warfare
is the best that can be carried on against an enemy of superior force
and discipline.
During the present winter Lord Cornwallis formed a design of conquering
the upper counties of North Carolina, and marched by the way of
Charlotte towards Salisbury, for that purpose. This part of the country
was thickly covered with underwood, and settled by a hardy race of
industrious yeomanry, all friends of their country. He was fired upon
from behind bushes and fences, trees and rocks, by companies in ambush,
and individuals on foot and on horseback, and was so much annoyed
that he was obliged to retreat back to Winnsborough. The news of this
expedition was industriously spread abroad, and encouraged the people of
South Carolina to follow the example. In the mean time, Gen. Gates had
been superceded in the command of the southern army by Gen. Greene.
With the character of this leader it is intended to make the reader
better acquainted than he has been heretofore. His command begun with a
good omen, which in all times has had its effect. In a few hours
after his arrival in camp at Charlotte, he received the news that Col.
Washington had taken Rugely and one hundred men, by the well known
stratagem of mounting a pine log over against his block house, which he
mistook for a field piece.* Gen. Greene had not only no more than one
thousand continentals and about as many militia, but was also bare of
ammunition and clothing, and had no money to pay them. With this force
he marched down to Pedee, in South Carolina, and took a position
near Hick's creek, on the east side of the river, not many miles from
Chatham. From this place his first despatch to Gen. Marion is dated,
the 19th Jan. 1781, in which he says, "by the last accounts, Lieut. Col.
Tarleton was in motion, with about one thousand troops, towards Gen.
Morgan." On the 23d Jan. Gen. Greene congratulates Marion on Morgan's
victory over Tarleton, and writes him the particulars. On the 25th he
says, "before this I hope you have received the agreeable news of
the defeat of Lieut. Col. Tarleton. After this nothing will appear
difficult."
* This was the same Rugely who behaved so generously to
Governor Rutledge. It seems Lord Cornwallis intended to have
promoted him, but after this affair he wrote to Tarleton,
"Rugely will not be made a brigadier."
As the defeat of Tarleton at the Cowpens has been related by many
American writers, whose works are generally read, the account of the
renowned chief himself, who was unexpectedly foiled, and which is now
out of print, will be extracted for the amusement of the historical
reader. "Near the end of the last year, (1780) information had been
received by Lord Cornwallis, that Gen. Greene had made a division of his
troops, which did not exceed fourteen hundred men, exclusive of militia,
and that he had committed the light infantry and Col. Washington's
cavalry to Gen. Morgan, with directions to pass the Catawba and Broad
rivers, to collect the militia, and threaten Ninety-Six. It is not to be
supposed Gen. Greene would have adopted the hazardous plan of dividing
his forces, if he had received information of Gen. Leslie's command
being withdrawn from Virginia, and united to the force in South
Carolina; because such an accession of strength would produce a movement
from Winnsborough (where Cornwallis then lay,) and might separate the
two divisions of the American army, and endanger their safety. To attain
this object, (the separation of the two divisions of the American army,)
Col. Tarleton was now detached from the main army of Lord Cornwallis,
and was to be supported by his lordship, and Gen. Leslie as soon as he
arrived; with orders to push Morgan to the utmost. Tarleton's force was
his corps of cavalry and infantry of five hundred and fifty men; the
first battalion of the 71st, of two hundred men; two hundred men of
the 7th regiment, new recruits; and fifty dragoons of the 17th
regiment--total one thousand men. Morgan retreated before Tarleton till
the commanding officer in front of the British reported the American
troops were halted and forming. (17th Jan.) Lieut. Col. Tarleton,
having obtained a position he certainly might deem advantageous, did not
hesitate to undertake the measures his commander and his own judgment
recommended. He ordered the legion dragoons to drive in the militia,
that Morgan's disposition might be inspected. The American commander had
formed a front line of about one thousand militia; his reserve of five
hundred continental infantry, one hundred and twenty of Washington's
cavalry, and three hundred back woodsmen. Tarleton ordered his infantry
to disencumber themselves of every thing except arms and ammunition, to
file to the right, till they became equal to the flank of the American
front line; the legion infantry were added to their left, and under the
fire of a three pounder they were to advance within three hundred
yards of the enemy. This situation being acquired, the 7th regiment
was commanded to form on the left of the legion infantry, and the other
three pounder was given to its right. A captain with fifty dragoons, was
placed on each flank. The first battalion of the 71st extended to the
left of the 7th, one hundred and fifty yards in the rear, and composed,
with two hundred cavalry, the reserve.
"The animation of the officers and soldiers promised assurances of
success. The troops moved in as good line as troops could move, at open
files. The militia, after a short contest, were dislodged. The British
approached the continentals, and the fire on both sides produced much
slaughter. The cavalry on the right were ordered to charge the enemy's
left, and executed the order with great gallantry, but were driven back
by the reserve and Col. Washington's cavalry. As the contest between the
British infantry and continentals was equally balanced, Tarleton brought
the 71st into line, and ordered a movement in reserve to threaten the
enemy's right flank. Upon the advance of the 71st all the infantry again
moved on; the continentals and back woodsmen gave ground; the British
rushed forwards; an order was despatched to the cavalry to charge;
an unexpected fire at this instant from the Americans who came about,
stopped the British and threw them into confusion. Exertions to make
them advance were useless. The part of the cavalry which had not
been engaged, fell likewise into disorder, and an unaccountable panic
extended along the whole line. The Americans advanced and augmented
their astonishment. A general flight ensued. Neither promises
nor threats could gain attention. All attempts to restore order,
recollection or courage proved fruitless. Two hundred dragoons forsook
their leader, fourteen officers and forty horsemen were, however, not
unmindful of their own reputation, or their commanding officer. Col.
Washington's cavalry were charged and driven back into the continental
infantry by this handful of brave men. Another party who had seized upon
the baggage were dispersed, and this detachment retired towards Broad
river unmolested. The number of the killed and wounded at the Cowpens,
amounted to near three hundred on both sides, officers and men
inclusive; this loss was almost equally shared. But the Americans took
two pieces of cannon, the colours of the 7th regiment, and near four
hundred prisoners." Thus far Col. Tarleton. Gen. Moultrie received his
account of this action of the Cowpens "from an officer of great veracity
and high rank, who was conspicuous on that day;" supposed to be Col.
Washington. The substance of his account shall now be given; that the
two may be compared. Gen. Morgan drew up his men in an open pine barren,
the militia of about four hundred men, under Col. Pickens, formed the
first line. The continentals of about five hundred men, two hundred of
whom were raw troops, formed the second line, under Col. Howard,
two hundred yards in the rear. Col. Washington, with seventy-five
continental cavalry, and forty-five militia under Capt. M'Call, in the
rear. Pickens ordered his men to reserve their fire till the enemy came
within fifty yards, which they did, and fired with great success; but
they were soon obliged to give way and retreat behind the second line,
which received them warmly; at length the second line began to give
way. Col. Washington, perceiving this, rode up to their rear with his
cavalry, and told Howard, "if he would rally his men and charge the
enemy's line, he would charge the cavalry who were cutting down the
militia." His riding so close to the rear stopped the British, and
Howard rallied his men in the mean time, and charged with fixed
bayonets. Col. Washington charged the cavalry and routed them; the
militia at the same time recovered themselves and began to fire, and the
whole threw the enemy into the utmost confusion. Howard called out
to them, "to lay down their arms and they should have good quarters."
Upwards of five hundred men threw down their arms and surrendered. Two
hundred were left dead on the field, and a great number wounded. Besides
the two field pieces mentioned by Tarleton, six hundred men, eight
hundred stand of arms, and thirty-five baggage waggons, fell into the
hands of the Americans. Col. Washington pursued the British cavalry
twenty-five miles."
By this last account the disparity in numbers was not great, and as one
half the Americans were either militia or new levies, the superiority
was on the side of Tarleton, whose men, except two hundred, were
veterans, and he had two field pieces. The ground too he acknowledges
was advantageous; so that every thing was in his favour, but _an agency_
which he could not control. But in the last account we can find no place
where he and his handful of brave men could encounter Col. Washington.
In his bewildered fancy perhaps it was some other object he encountered,
since for the space of five and twenty miles, not their faces, but only
their backs were to be seen. The fact is, that never was victory
more complete, never was vanity more humbled, nor cruelty more justly
requited than in the defeat of this tyrannical man. Its first effect
was to raise the spirits of the people; its ultimate consequence was the
downfall of Cornwallis and peace to the country. But most severe trials
are yet to be surmounted, and patriotism the most exemplary remains yet
to be recorded.
On the day the last letter of Greene, of the 23d Jan. was written, Gen.
Marion and Col. Lee projected a joint expedition to surprise Georgetown.
Capts. Carnes and Rudulph, with ninety men, dropped down the Pedee from
Snow's island in a boat, to fall in on the back of the town by Winyaw
bay, while Marion and Lee were to come down with the main body by
land.--Carnes with his party went ashore at Mitchell's landing, and
marched over his rice-field bank into the town at day light. The
surprise would have been complete, had they pushed up directly to the
redoubt, but they delayed too long on the Bay. They took the commandant,
Col. Campbell, out of his bed, and killed Major Irvine and some others;
but Marion and Lee could not arrive in time to cooperate. The redoubt
was alarmed and placed in a state of defence, and Carnes was obliged
to retreat. The great cause of delay was the inclination to take the
commandant, by which they lost the fort and the town. Lieut. Cryer
killed Irvine, by whose orders he had received five hundred lashes some
time before, for attempting to take away his horse from Georgetown.
On the 28th Jan. Gen. Huger transmitted an order from Greene to
Marion, to strike at the posts beyond Santee. But this Gen. Marion had
anticipated.--From Cordes' plantation, in advance, at the distance of
one hundred miles from Greene, and on the 29th Jan. he had detached Col.
Postell and Major Postell on this important service. The latter had but
thirty-eight men, and it is presumed from circumstances, the colonel had
about an equal number. The colonel burnt a great quantity of valuable
stores at Manigault's ferry, and the major a great many more in its
vicinity.--Thence the latter posted to Keithfield, near Monk's corner,
and burnt fourteen waggons loaded with soldiers' clothing, baggage and
other valuable stores, and took prisoners about forty British regulars,
without losing a man. To the Postells "nothing indeed appeared
difficult." They received the thanks of Gen. Greene.
About the beginning of this year, Gen. Marion appointed two aids, Thomas
Elliott and Lewis Ogier, the first of whom conducted the most of his
correspondence. He formed a mess of which Col. Hugh Horry and Col. James
Postell were inmates, and apparently his principal counsellors; Serjt.
Davis was his caterer, and supplied his dinners, _such as they were_:
heretofore he had seldom any thing but meat and sweet potatoes, and
often not both of these at a time, but now he had the luxury of rice.
He did what was of more consequence than this, he put in requisition all
the saws in the country, and all the blacksmiths, and made swords
for four troops of militia cavalry.--He had so little ammunition this
expedient was necessary. He gave the command of this corps to Col. Peter
Horry, who had been a captain with him in the second regiment and had
been an excellent infantry officer.--His major was Benson, and his
captains John Baxter, John Postell, Daniel Conyers and James M'Cauley;
John T. Greene soon after succeeded Baxter, who was appointed colonel
on the resignation of Ervine. Hugh Horry had command of M'Donald's
regiment, who was a prisoner on parole, and _his_ officers have been
mentioned. Capt. Wm. M'Cottry commanded a company of riflemen who were
the dread of the enemy. As the brigade was not strong enough for this
corps of horse to act in conjunction, single troops were commonly
detached by the general. At the head of a party of this cavalry Col.
Peter Horry had soon an opportunity to make a trial of his skill in
cavalry evolutions. He met and charged a troop of British horse on
Waccamaw neck, but by his own account he appears to have been rather
worsted, for he was unhorsed himself and his life saved by Serjt.
M'Donald; however he brought off some prisoners. Major John Postell, who
was mentioned before, was stationed to guard the lower part of Pedee,
had better fortune. On the 18th Jan. Capt. James Depeyster, with
twenty-nine grenadiers of the British army, had posted himself in
the dwelling house of the major's father, and Postell commanded but
twenty-eight militia men. Towards day on the morning after, the major,
by knowing well the ground and avoiding the sentinels, got possession
of the kitchen, and summoned Depeyster to surrender; this was at first
refused, and the major set fire to the kitchen. He then summoned him a
second time, with the positive declaration if he did not surrender he
would burn the house; the British being intimidated, laid down their
arms and surrendered unconditionally.
From a part of the correspondence of Gen. Marion with Capt. Saunders,
now commandant of Georgetown, it appears that he had either soon after
the 17th Jan. or before that, imprisoned Mr. John Postell, the father of
the major; Gen. Marion offers "to exchange him, and hopes humanity will
induce Capt. Saunders to treat him like a gentleman."* Mr. John Postell
was at least seventy years of age, and much afflicted with disease, but
possessed the spirit of a Cato.
* Marion's letter, 22d February.
Soon after this, Col. Peter Horry had a conflict with Major Ganey at
White's bridge, near Georgetown, which had a more decisive effect than
could have been expected at the time. Early in the morning he made a
charge upon a party who were killing beeves at the camp near that
place. They fled and were pursued through the woods on the left towards
Georgetown, with some disorder on the side of Horry. In the mean time
the firing was heard in the town, and their tory friends came out to
their assistance. A kind of savage warfare now took place in the woods,
between the Sampit and Black river roads, during the whole morning.
A party of Horry's was at one time seen advancing, and the tories
retreating; then again the tories were advancing, and a party of Horry's
retreating. At one time the commander was left as he thought alone, and
Capt. Lewis at the head of a party was rushing on to shoot him down,
when suddenly from behind a tree off went the gun of a boy by the name
of Gwyn, and shot Lewis, whose party thinking more guns were behind
trees ran away. As Lewis fell his gun went off and killed Horry's horse.
Finally the tories were routed. In this affair Serjt. M'Donald performed
essential service; he had singled out Ganey as his object of attack, and
the latter fled from him.--In going at full speed down the Black river
road, at the corner of Richmond fence, M'Donald shot one of Ganey's men,
and overtaking him soon after thrust a bayonet up to the hilt in his
back; the bayonet separated from the gun, and Ganey carried it into
Georgetown; he recovered, but tired of a garrison life, after a few
months he and his men deserted the British.
As the navigation of the Wateree river was at that time imperfect,
the British were obliged to have most of their stores of rum, salt,
ammunition and clothing sent over land, across Nelson's ferry, to
Camden, and as the Americans were destitute of these articles, constant
conflicts took place upon that road to obtain them from the enemy.
To secure these, they had established a line of posts, at Biggen, at
Nelson's, and at Scott's lake. Besides this protection, their supplies
were always attended by escorts, which, since the enterprizes of the two
Postells, seldom consisted of less than three or four hundred men. About
the middle of February, Major M'Ilraith was marching from Nelson's ferry
at the head of one of these escorts, and Marion with about an equal
force assailed him near Halfway swamp, on the road; he first cut off two
pickets in his rear in succession, then wheeling round his main body,
attacked him in flank and in front. As M'Ilraith had no cavalry,
his situation became perilous in the extreme. By a forced march, and
constant skirmishing, he at length gained a field upon the road, now
belonging to Mr. Matthew James; and as it was open and enclosed, he
posted himself on the west of the road, within the enclosure. On the
east, skirting the road, there is a large cypress pond stretching
towards Halfway swamp, and on the verge of this Marion pitched his
camp. Here M'Ilraith sent him a flag, reproaching him with shooting his
pickets, contrary, as he alleged, to all the laws of civilized warfare,
and defying him to a combat in the open field. Marion replied, that
the practice of the British in burning the houses of all who would
not submit and join them, was more indefensible than that of shooting
pickets, and that as long as they persisted in the one he would
persevere in the other. That as to his defiance, he considered it that
of a man in desperate circumstances; but if he wished to witness a
combat between twenty picked men on each side, he was ready to gratify
him. The offer was accepted, and a place pitched upon to the south of
an oak tree, which still stands in the field. Accordingly, Gen. Marion
appointed Maj. John Vanderhorst, then a supernumerary officer, to take
command of this band, and Capt. Samuel Price, of All Saints, to be
second in command. The names of the men were written on slips of paper,
and presented to them individually, and the first slip was handed to
Gavin Witherspoon. Not one refused. Vanderhorst formed in Indian file,
and they proceeded to the fence, where Gen. Marion met and harangued
them to the following effect: "My brave soldiers! you are twenty men
picked this day out of my whole brigade. I know you all, and have often
witnessed your bravery. In the name of your country, I call upon you
once more to show it. My confidence in you is great, and I am sure it
will not be disappointed. Fight like men, fight as you have always done,
and you are sure of the victory." This short speech was received with
applause by the combatants. Vanderhorst now asked Witherspoon, "What
distance would you choose as the surest to strike with buck shot?"
"Fifty yards for the first fire," was the reply. Then, said the
commander, "when we get within fifty yards, my boys, as I am not a good
judge of distances, Mr. Witherspoon will tap me on the shoulder. I will
then give the word, and you will form on my left opposite those fellows.
As you form, each man will fire at the one directly opposite him, and
my word for it, few will be left for a second shot." The British had now
formed in a single line in front of the oak, and Vanderhorst advanced
boldly on within one hundred yards. At this juncture, an officer was
seen to pass swiftly on toward the oak, and the enemy shouldered
their muskets and retreated with a quick step towards the main body.
Vanderhorst and his men gave them three huzzas! but did not at that
distance fire a shot. Thus a British officer was met on his own boasted
ground and proved recreant. The next morning Major M'Ilraith abandoned
his heavy baggage, left his fires burning, and retired silently from
the ground, along the river road towards Singelton's mill, distant ten
miles. Near day Marion discovered his movement, and detached Col. Hugh
Horry with one hundred men to get ahead of him, before he should reach
the mill. The colonel made all possible speed, but finding he could not
overtake him, detached Major James at the head of a party mounted on the
swiftest horses, to cross the mill pond above, and take possession of
Singelton's houses, which stood on a high hill, commanding a narrow
defile on the road, between the hill and Wateree swamp. Major James
reached the houses as the British advanced to the foot of the hill; but
found Singelton's family down with the small pox. This was more dreaded
than the enemy. He gave them one fire, by which a captain was killed,
and retired. As M'Ilraith was now in a strong hold, Marion pursued him
no further.
The character of Major M'Ilraith has been constantly represented by the
inhabitants of this state, among whom he passed as the most humane
of all the officers of the British army. To those in their power even
forbearance was at that time a virtue, but his virtues were active. It
has been currently reported that he carried his dislike to house
burning so far, that he neglected to carry into effect the orders of his
commander in chief on that point to such an extent, as to gain his ill
will and that of many other British officers.--How much it is to be
regretted that the rigid rules of warfare should have arrayed such a man
in opposition to Marion, when both professed the same humane principles.
We come now to the most interesting part of the warfare of Gen. Marion,
which, bringing into action all the energies of his officers and men, at
the same time developed all the skill and patience of their commander.
At the juncture of the retreat of Gen. Greene before Cornwallis, Sumter
and Marion were left alone in South Carolina; Sumter on the Catawba,
in York district, and Marion on the Pedee, at Snow's island, about two
hundred miles apart, and Lord Rawdon directly between them, with a much
superior force. Thus situated his lordship laid a well digested plan
to crush Marion. Col. Watson with a British regiment, and Harrison's
regiment of tories, amounting in the whole to more than five hundred
men, was ordered to march down the Santee, towards Snow's island; and he
commenced his expedition from Fort Watson about the first of March.
Shortly after Col. Doyle with another British regiment, was directed
to proceed by the way of M'Callum's ferry on Lynch's creek, and down
Jeffer's creek, to the Pedee road to the same point, where they were to
form a junction. Doyle had to open a road from M'Callum's to Pedee, and
his approach, though slow, was unexpected; but Marion's scouts placed
from Camden down, with relays of horses, soon informed him of Watson's
movement. By one of his rapid marches he met him at Wiboo, about midway
between Nelson's and Murray's ferry, and at this swamp commenced his
arduous contest with Watson. Col. Peter Horry was placed in advance
at the swamp, while the general with the cavalry, and remainder of the
brigade, amounting to about four hundred men, lay in reserve. Horry made
considerable impression upon the tories in advance; but Watson with two
field pieces, and at the head of his column of regulars, dislodged him
from the swamp, and the tory cavalry under Harrison pursued. As they
advanced, Gavin James, a private of gigantic size and spirit, mounted on
a strong grey horse, and armed with a musket and bayonet, threw himself
in their way. He first deliberately fired upon the column and one man
fell. The causeway was narrow and this occasioned a pause, in which a
volley was fired at him without effect. One dragoon advanced and was
struck off his horse by the bayonet. A second came to his aid and shared
a like fate; in falling he laid hold of the musket near the muzzle to
jerk it away, and James dragged him forty or fifty paces. This bold
action produced a considerable effect, and was soon followed by
many others, not so well recollected, and too numerous to be
inserted.--Harrison had not pursued far, when Marion ordered the cavalry
to charge; Capts. M'Cauley and Conyers, met him, and soon dispersed
his force; whilst Conyers killed one of his officers, said to be Major
Harrison, with his own hands. Thus were the tories intimidated at the
outset.
On the 9th of March, Col. Watson encamped at Cantey's plantation, and
wrote a letter to Gen. Marion, in which he justifies (what the other had
complained of by a previous communication,*) the burning of houses and
the hanging of those citizens who had taken paroles, and afterwards
joined the Americans, upon the principles of the laws of war and
nations.--It seems the colonel had reference to the code of barbarous
nations. Marion made him no reply, but gave orders to his nightly
patroles, to shoot his sentinels and cut off his pickets. Such a
retaliation was to be expected; and thus raged the civil warfare.
* Letter of Marion, 7th March.
Watson marched down the river, and at Mount Hope had to build up the
bridges, and to sustain a second conflict with Col. Hugh Horry, at the
head of Marion's advance. By dint of his field pieces, and the strength
of his column, he at length made good his way. Near Murray's ferry he
passed the Kingstree road to his left, and when he came to the Black
river road, which crosses at the lower bridge, he made a feint of still
continuing down the Santee; but soon after wheeling took that road on
which the lower bridge was, distant twelve miles. His manoeuvre did not
long deceive Marion. He detached Major James at the head of seventy men,
thirty of whom were riflemen under M'Cottry, to destroy the remnant of
the bridge, which had been partially broken, and to take post there,
while the general kept an eye on Watson.
The pass of the lower bridge was now to decide the fate of
Williamsburgh, and seventy of her sons, under her most approved
leaders, were gone forth to defend it. Maj. James proceeded with great
expedition, and crossing the river by a shorter route than the road,
arrived at the bridge in time to throw down two of the middle arches,
and to fire the string pieces at the eastern end. At this place the west
bank of the river is considerably elevated, the east low and somewhat
swampy, and on the west the road passes to the bridge through a ravine;
the river is forty or fifty yards wide, and though deep, was fordable
below the bridge. As soon as the breach in it was effected, Maj. James
drew up M'Cottry's riflemen on each side of the ford and end of the
bridge, so as to have a fair view of the ravine, and disposed the rest
of his little band on the flanks. Not long after, Marion arriving, took
post in the rear, and sent Capt. Thomas Potts, with his Pedee company,
to reinforce Maj. James; and this had scarcely been effected, when
Watson's field pieces opened their fire, from the opposite bank to clear
his way, for a passage at the ford. These field pieces could not be
brought to bear on the low grounds to the east without exposing his
artillerists on the hill to the fire of the riflemen. His balls hit
the pines across the river, about midway their trunks, or passed over
disregarded. This attempt not succeeding, Watson drew up his columns in
the old field over the river, and his advance was now seen approaching
the ford with an officer at its head, waving his sword. M'Cottry fired
the signal gun, and the officer clapped his hand to his breast and
fell to the ground. The riflemen and musketeers next poured in a well
directed and deadly fire, and the British advance fled in disorder; nor
did the reserve move forward to its support. Four men returned to bear
off their officer, but all four shared his fate. In the evening,
Watson succeeded in removing his dead and wounded, and took up his head
quarters at John Witherspoon's, a mile above the bridge. Here he was
overheard to say, "that he never saw such shooting in his life." To men
fighting for their homes, wives, families, and their very existence,
"nothing appeared difficult;" and good shooting, if not a virtue in
them, was highly commendable. Gen. Marion took a position on a ridge
below the ford of the river, which is still called the general's island.
Next day he pushed M'Cottry and Conyers over the river, and recommenced
shooting Watson's pickets and sentinels. Watson posted himself a little
farther up the river, at Blakely's plantation, where he pitched his camp
in the most open place he could find, but still Marion kept him in a bad
humour, (as his letters from that place indicate,) and his regulars in a
constant panic. Here he remained for more than a week* in inactivity
and irresolution; perhaps he waited for Doyle to make an impression
at Snow's island; but if Marion heard of Doyle, he kept it a profound
secret. While Blakely's and Witherspoon's provisions lasted, his present
plan answered pretty well; but when they failed, it became necessary to
have more at a greater distance, and these could not be obtained, but by
daily skirmishes. In these Capt. Conyers was greatly distinguished. He
was most daring, and sat and managed his horse so remarkably well, that
as was the case with the centaur of old, they might have been taken for
one animal. Conyers was at this time fighting under the auspicious eye
of a young lady,** to whom his faith had been plighted, and beneath her
alternate smiles and fears, he presented himself daily before the lines
of the enemy, either as a single champion, or at the head of his troop.
Often did she hear them repeat, "Take care! there is Capt. Conyers!" It
was a ray of chivalry athwart the gloom of unrelenting warfare.
* About ten days, as it appears from the dates of his
letters.
** This young lady was Mary, the second daughter of John
Witherspoon, who after the war, was married to Conyers. One
day when her lover made his appearance as usual, a British
officer made use of language disrespectful to him, which she
bore for some time with patience; at last he said something
indelicate to herself. She immediately drew off a walking
shoe from her foot, and flung it in his face, saying,
"coward! go meet him." In those days kid slippers were not
fashionable.
To increase the panic of the British, Serjt. M'Donald, with a rifle,
shot Lieut. Torriano through the knee, at the distance of three hundred
yards. This appears to have softened even the proud spirit of Watson;
for, on the 15th of March, he wrote a letter to Marion, stating, "we
have an officer and some men wounded, whom I should be glad to send
where they could be better taken care of. I wish, therefore, to know if
they will be permitted to pass to Charleston." Gen. Marion wrote for a
list of them, and next day sent the following pass: "Gen. Marion's pass,
granted to Lieut. Torriano and twelve privates.--One officer and six
wounded men, with six attendants, of the British troops, are permitted
to pass to Nelson's ferry, thence to Charleston, unmolested," &c. Col.
Watson was now literally besieged; his supplies were cut off on all
sides, and so many of his men killed, that, he is said by tradition, to
have sunk them in Black river to hide their number. There is a quarry of
rock in the neighbourhood of the place, and the only one in that part
of the country, where, it is said, he sunk his men. At length Watson,
decamping, made a forced march down the Georgetown road; but paused at
Ox swamp, six miles below the lower bridge. On each side of the road
there was then a thick, boggy swamp--trees were felled across the
causeway--three bridges were destroyed, and Marion was watching him with
the eye of an eagle. Thus situated, and having to force a more difficult
pass at Johnson's swamp, ten miles ahead, Watson most prudently wheeled
to the right, and passed on, through open piney woods, to the Santee
road, distant about fifteen miles. When overtaken by Marion upon this
road, his infantry were passing like horses at a full trot. Here he
had not so many obstacles to encounter as on the other road, and, by
wheeling covertly and marching so briskly, had gained considerable
ground. However, Col. Peter Horry now advanced ahead with the cavalry
and riflemen, and annoyed him in flank and in front, while Marion
attacked in the rear, until they reached Sampit bridge, where the last
skirmish took place. News from Doyle appears to have arrested Marion's
progress, and summoned him to new perils.
Watson reached Georgetown, with two waggon loads of wounded men.* It is
evident from an intercepted letter of his of the 20th of March, that he
had been hemmed in so closely that he was in want of every thing, and
had taken this route to Georgetown, fifty miles out of his way, to
obtain supplies. From Fort Watson to the lower bridge, he had not
advanced more than forty miles on his premeditated route to join Doyle.
* Horry's Narrative.
In the mean time, Col. Doyle, an active, enterprising officer, had
driven Col. Ervin, who commanded only a weak guard, from Snow's island.
But before retreating he had Marion's arms, stores and ammunition thrown
into Lynch's creek. This, at the crisis, was a most serious loss.
From Sampit, Gen. Marion marched back towards Snow's island; on the way
he received intelligence that Doyle lay at Witherspoon's ferry, and he
proceeded forthwith to attack him. Doyle had taken a position on the
north side of the ferry, and when M'Cottry, in advance, with his mounted
riflemen, arrived at the creek, the British were scuttling a ferry boat
on the opposite side. He took a position behind trees, and gave them
a well directed and deadly fire; they ran to their arms and returned a
prodigious volley, which did no more harm than that of knocking off
the limbs of trees among the riflemen. Doyle had received news, which
occasioned him to retreat for Camden. The ferry boat being now scuttled
and sunk on the opposite side, and Lynch's creek being swollen, and at
this place wide and deep, Gen. Marion proceeded up the creek, and swam
over it at the first place he reached, five miles above Witherspoon's.
This was the shortest route to come at Doyle. He pursued all that day,
and the next morning till nine or ten o'clock, when he came to a house
where Doyle had destroyed all his heavy baggage, and had proceeded on
with great celerity towards Camden. This seemed mysterious at the time;
but here Marion halted.
It appears from what follows, shortly, as well as from Horry's account,
that this pursuit was undertaken by Gen. Marion with the desperate
resolution of either selling his own life and that of his followers, as
dearly as possible, or of cutting his way through the enemy to make good
a retreat into North Carolina. Happily for his country, Doyle evaded
him, and thus prevented the dangerous attempt. The general now received
the melancholy account of the extent of his loss in ammunition and other
stores on Snow's island, which under present circumstances appeared
irretrievable. However he was but little disposed to brood over
misfortunes, and if he had, his enemies were not inclined to allow him
leisure. In the mean time Col. Watson, having refreshed and reinforced
his party, and received a fresh supply of military stores and provisions
at Georgetown, proceeded again towards the Pedee. On his march he had
nothing to impede him but a few bridges broken down. He took the nearest
route across Black river at Wragg's ferry, and crossing the Pedee at
Euhany, and the little Pedee at Potato bed ferry, he halted at Catfish
creek, a mile from where Marion court house now stands.--Here Ganey's
party flocked in to him in such numbers that he was soon nine hundred
strong. Gen. Marion returning from the pursuit of Doyle, and hearing of
the approach of Watson, crossed the Pedee and encamped at the Warhees,
five miles from him. At this place he consulted with his field officers
then in camp, and informed them that although his force was now
recruited to five hundred men, that yet he had no more ammunition than
about two rounds to each man, and asked them "if he should retreat into
the upper parts of North Carolina, or if necessary to the mountains,
whether they would follow him." With a firm and unanimous voice the
resolution to follow him was adopted. These field officers, whose names
should be engraved on tablets of brass, were Cols. Peter Horry, Hugh
Horry, James Postell and John Ervin, and Majors John James, John Baxter
and Alexander Swinton.
Not long after this resolution was taken, Gen. Marion met Capt. Gavin
Witherspoon, who said to him, "General had we not better fight Col.
Watson before any more tories join him." "My friend," replied he, "I
know that would be best, but we have not ammunition." "Why, general,"
said Witherspoon, "here is my powder horn full," holding it up. "Ah!
my friend," said Marion, "you are an extraordinary soldier, but as for
others, there are not two rounds to a man." Witherspoon passed off in
silent sorrow; but as soon as he reached his camp, met Baker Johnson, an
old tried whig, who begged him for God's sake to give him something to
eat, and he set before him some cold rice in a pot. While Johnson was
eating, Witherspoon sat pondering over what he had heard for some time;
but at last inquired, "What news, Johnson?" "Fine news," said he, "I saw
a great number of continental troops, horse and foot, crossing at Long
bluff." "Come and tell the general," said Witherspoon. "No," replied the
other, "I am starving with hunger, and if the general wants the news he
must come to me." Witherspoon immediately posted off to the general, who
lost no time in going to Johnson; around whom some hundreds were soon
collected. The bearer of the good tidings was to be depended on. The
news was sudden and unexpected, and to men now in a state of desperation
nothing could be more transporting. Scarce was there an eye but what was
suffused with tears of joy. All sufferings appeared now to be at an end,
and that balm of the soul hope began to revive. But while Johnson was
still communicating his intelligence, it was confirmed by the sound of
a drum in the rear; and soon after by the arrival of Major Conyers
and Capt. Irby, with Lieut. Col. Lee's legionary infantry. By Conyers,
Marion received orders from Gen. Greene to join Lee, and cooperate with
him in striking at the posts below Camden, and in furnishing provisions
for the main army;* and Lee had moved on towards the Santee for that
purpose. Commencing his march immediately, Gen. Marion crossed the Pedee
in his rear, and left Witherspoon with a small party to watch Watson.
The line of march was directed through Williamsburgh; and Marion joined
Lee near Fort Watson, on Scott's lake.
* Greene's letters, 4th and 17th April.
About the same time, Capt. John Brockington, of the tories, had been
up to his plantation at Cashway, and hearing the same news with Baker
Johnson, pushed over the river, and gave Watson the like information. He
lost no time, but immediately rolled his two field pieces into Catfish
creek, destroyed all his heavy baggage, re-crossed the little Pedee, and
not venturing by Euhany, he passed the Waccamaw at Greene's ferry, and
retreating through the neck, between that river and the sea, crossed
Winyaw bay, three miles wide, and thus arrived in Georgetown. To those
unacquainted with this route, a bare inspection of the map of the
country will at once give information, how much Marion was dreaded by
Watson.
Upon forming a junction with Col. Lee, it was decidedly the opinion
of Gen. Marion, that they should pursue Watson, and either take him or
prevent his junction with Lord Rawdon. But Lee was of opinion it would
lead them too far from Gen. Greene. Gen. Marion must have given up his
point with much reluctance, for he was afterwards heard repeatedly to
regret that his orders did not permit him to pursue Col. Watson. But,
perhaps the true reason was that Marion and Lee were both bare of
ammunition, and could get it only by taking Fort Watson. It was left
without the presence of its commander, and as in that day there was
no road from Kingstree up Black river to Camden, and the swamps were
impassable except to hunters, by taking a position at Scott's lake, they
would be on the only road there was from Georgetown, on a direct line,
to intercept Watson, as he marched up to Camden.--But while Gen. Marion
passed through Williamsburgh, his men having now performed a tour of
duty of more than a month against Watson, which with all its watchings
and privations was unusually severe, and being suddenly relieved from
that pressure, many of them took the liberty of going home to recruit
themselves; and he was left to his great mortification with only eighty
men. However, they soon dropped in, one or two at a time.*
* Gen. Greene's elegant letter to Marion, 9th May.
On the 15th of April, Gen. Marion invested Fort Watson, at Scott's lake,
without any other means of annoyance than musketry. The fort stood on
an Indian mound, about forty feet high, and was stockaded, and had three
rows of abbatis round it.* The besiegers took post between the fort
and the lake, to cut off the water; but the besieged sunk a well in the
fort. As there were no trees or other covering near the fort, Marion's
riflemen were too much exposed at first to fire with effect; but Col.
Maham contrived to raise a tower of logs in one night, so high that it
overtopped the fort, and the marksmen began to fire into it. Gen. Marion
had no entrenching tools to make a regular approach, but on the day
after the investment, a party of militia under Ensign Baker Johnson, and
of continentals under Mr. Lee, a volunteer in the legion, with a sudden
movement, and much intrepidity, made a lodgment near the stockade, and
began to pull away the abbatis and fling them down the mound. Lieut.
M'Kay, who commanded, then hoisted a white flag, and the garrison,
consisting of one hundred and fourteen men and officers, capitulated.
Major Eaton had been detached by Gen. Greene, with one field piece, to
join Marion, but arrived too late to participate in this siege. The loss
of the Americans was only two militia men killed, and three continentals
and three militia wounded.--As this fort lay on the great line of
communication between Camden and Charleston, its fall was a great
loss to the enemy; and by taking it Gen. Marion obtained supplies of
ammunition, which he soon turned to great advantage.
* Marion's letter, 23d April.
During the siege, Col. Watson evaded Marion and Lee. Having arrived in
Georgetown, and not yet recovered from his panic, he crossed the north
and south Santee, at the lower ferries, and having surmounted this
difficulty, he marched up the west side of the river and arrived in
Camden by the way of the ferry near the town, with forces much impaired
by the incessant attacks of Marion, and long marches, combined with much
desertion; but his loss is not confessed by the enemy, nor could it be
discovered by the Americans.--Had he been able to have cooperated with
Doyle in sufficient time, with their overwhelming force, assisted by
Harrison and Ganey, with an equal, if not greater number of tories;
there can be little doubt, but Gen. Marion with his scanty means of
defence, must either have fallen in the conflict or been driven out of
the country. When he first marched from Scott's lake, Col. Watson had
only seventy miles to traverse, and only Black river to pass, before
he reached Snow's island; yet such was the consummate skill and
indefatigable exertions of Gen. Marion, that from the 9th of March until
the 10th of April, he had not reached his place of destination, and then
made a hasty retreat through roads unfrequented, and over wide swamps
and rivers, unpursued. To effect this he took a circuitous route, nearly
one hundred miles out of his way, which detained him until about the
9th of May, more than two months from his first setting out on this
expedition.
Col. Watson was considered by the British one of their best partisans;
yet we have seen how he was foiled. Had his regiment attempted, as was
no doubt intended, to ford the river at the lower bridge, they would
have found the passage narrow, and the river at that time deep; or had
he undertaken to repair the bridge, in either case he must have lost
a great portion of his men. He was, however, a better officer than
historian or civilian, otherwise he would not have justified the
practice of burning houses, in the face of the universal censure cast
upon Lewis XIV. for adopting the same measure in the Palatinate. But
when Watson, Balfour, and other British officers, professing to know the
laws of war and nations, burnt houses and hanged those citizens who
had taken deceptive paroles upon their authority, certainly it may be
affirmed that Marion, who was self-taught, and had no book of the law
of nations, or perhaps any other book in his camp, was justifiable as
a matter of retaliation, to shoot down their pickets and cut off their
sentinels wherever he could find them; and always to fight such invaders
in their own barbarian manner. Nothing ever showed, in such a strong
light, the plain good sense of Marion. Col. Watson had orders to burn
houses, but did not however appear to wish to carry them rigourously
into effect. It is believed he burnt but two; one was the house of
Lieut. Dickson, who was with Marion; the other belonged to Nathaniel
Dwight, of Waccamaw neck. Upon a retrospection, Col. Watson's character
appears in a favourable point of view; and, as far as was consistent
with orders, his humanity is undoubted.
On the 18th of April, Col. William Harden, acting under the orders of
Marion, took the British fort at Pocotaligo, with one militia colonel,
one major, three captains, three lieutenants, sixty privates and
twenty-two dragoons, prisoners. He writes, "I wish you would send some
commissions, with your orders. It seems they wait for Col. Hayne, and he
says he cannot act without a commission, and I am sure, if he turns out,
at least two hundred will join him. If so, I am very certain that this
part of the country may be held." Every one has either read or heard of
the subsequent melancholy fate of Col. Hayne; but more of that in the
sequel.
Major John Postell had been pitched upon as the first victim. After
distinguishing himself, as related, he obtained leave from his general
to go with a flag to Georgetown, to obtain the release of his father,
(who was still a prisoner) and of some others. Capt. Saunders, now the
commandant, detained him, and threw him also into gaol, on the plea of
his having broken his parole;* and, in a long correspondence with Gen.
Marion, he and Col. Balfour, the commandant of Charleston, vindicated
the measure, as consistent with the laws of war and nations. It appears
Balfour was the civilian of the British while here in power. He was just
such a minion as would have suited the purposes of Tiberius Caesar. He
had several hundreds of Americans pining in want and misery in loathsome
prison-ships, and in dungeons under the Exchange, damp and noisome,
which he called _his provost_.
* By a copy of Major Postell's parole, preserved in Horry's
correspondence, it appears he was paroled in Charleston;
but, soon after, the British or tories stripped him of all
his property, which was a breach of it on their part. In a
letter to Gen. Marion, 14th Jan. he says, "My honour is all
I have left--my family has been reduced to beg their
bread."
He writes thus to Saunders, concerning Major Postell, "send him by
water," (by land was not safe) "by a fast sailer--under a guard--_be
so good_ as to let him have no chance of escaping." _Be so good_ here,
meant to clap him in irons. This royal tiger, secure in his jungle, was
now crouching to spring upon what he deemed defenceless prey; but, while
reasoning about the law of nations, Saunders had the folly to send out
Capt. Merrett with a flag. Marion immediately detained him, and swore a
bitter oath, that if they touched a hair of Postell's head he would hang
Merrett. Major Postell lost all further opportunity of distinguishing
himself, and underwent a long and rigourous imprisonment; but this had
become a common case, and the British knew Marion too well to carry
matters further. On the 25th of April,* Gen. Greene lay at Hobkirk hill,
at that time a mile out of Camden, but now partly in the town. His army
consisted of only about seven hundred continentals, and as many militia;
his left rested on Pinetree creek, and his right extended across the
road leading to Lancaster, uncovered by any obstructions. Having just
received a comfortable supply of provisions, which they much wanted,
his men were employed in cooking and washing. At this juncture, Rawdon
sallied out of Camden, at the head of nine hundred men, his whole
disposable force. Between him and Greene, along Pinetree creek, were
thick woods and shrubbery, and he preferred this route for concealment.
His advance was not suspected, until he was fired upon by the American
pickets; but these received him bravely, and during the contest with
them, Greene formed his army. The Virginia brigade, under Gen. Huger,
took the right; the Maryland brigade, under Col. Williams, the left. The
continentals were thus disposed in one line, and the artillery, under
Col. Harrison, were in the centre. The reserve were the cavalry, under
Col. Washington, and two hundred and fifty North Carolina militia, under
Col. Reade. Rawdon advanced with the King's American regiment on the
right, the New York volunteers in the centre, and the 63d on the left;
his right supported by Robertson's corps, and his left by the volunteers
of Ireland. Greene discovering his narrow front, ordered Col. Campbell,
of the Virginia, and Col. Ford, of the Maryland line, to turn his
flanks; the centre regiments to advance with fixed bayonets, and
Washington to gain his rear. Rawdon perceiving his danger, brought up
the volunteers of Ireland into line. The battle opened with vigour, and
Huger evidently gained ground. Washington in the rear, was carrying all
before him, and Col. Hawes in the centre, was descending the hill with
fixed bayonets. At this flattering moment, the veteran regiment
of Gunby, the 1st Maryland, fired contrary to orders; while Capt.
Armstrong, with two sections, was moving ahead upon the enemy. Gunby,
being anxious to lead his regiment into battle thoroughly compacted,
ordered Armstrong back, instead of making him the point of view in
forming. Retrograde being the consequence of this order, the British
shouted and pressed forward, and the regiment of Gunby, considered the
bulwark of the army, never recovered from its panic. Williams, Gunby,
and Howard, all strove in vain to bring it to order. The Virginia
brigade and second Maryland regiment maintained the contest bravely; but
the 2d Maryland, feeling the effect of the retreat of the 1st, became
somewhat deranged, and its commander, Lieut. Col. Ford, being wounded
in repressing it, this corps also fell back. Rawdon's right having now
gained the summit, and flanking Hawes, Gen. Greene ordered a retreat,
which was covered by Hawes. Col. Washington having gained his point of
attack, and taken two hundred prisoners, was confident of victory;
but seeing the retreat, he paroled the officers on the field, and
relinquished all the prisoners but fifty. These he brought off, and made
good his retreat, with the loss of only three men. Greene's field pieces
were now likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, and seeing Capt.
John Smith,** with his company of picked light infantry, marching off
the field in good order, he rode up and called to him, "Smith, my brave
fellow, save the field pieces." He immediately fell in the rear, and
executed his orders, with the loss of his whole company. All were killed
but one man and Smith, and they were made prisoners. Gen. Greene rallied
his army at the pass of Sanders' creek, six miles from Camden, and soon
after occupied the position Gates had intended to take, at Gum swamp.
The British lost between sixty and seventy, and Greene two hundred men.
This affair shows upon how small an incident the fate of war generally
depends.
* This is partly extracted from Lee's Memoirs.
** Capt. Smith, afterwards well known in this state as Col.
John Smith, of Darlington, surrendered himself prisoner to a
lieutenant of the British; and after he had delivered his
sword, was struck by the lieutenant with the broad side of
it. At the battle of Guilford, Smith had killed Col.
Stewart, of the British guards, in a single rencounter; and
his bravery was otherwise so well known that the British
officers invited him to a dinner in Camden. Before dinner,
he mentioned how he had been treated by the lieutenant, and
it was agreed among them, that, as that officer was to be
present at the dinner, Smith should be at liberty to treat
him as he thought fit. Accordingly Smith kicked him down
stairs; and as he did not resent it, he was soon after
cashiered.
Upon Watson's arrival in Camden, Lord Rawdon being now reinforced,
marched out to attack Gen. Greene, at Sawney's creek, on the west
side of the Wateree. Greene did not like his position for a general
engagement, and took a new one at Cornal's creek, leaving the horse,
light infantry and pickets, at his old encampment. The enemy approached
and drew up on the opposite side of the creek, but did not attempt to
cross; and retired into Camden before night. Early in the morning of the
next day (10th of May, 1781,) Lord Rawdon burnt the mill at Camden, the
gaol, his stores, and many private houses, and evacuating it, retreated
towards Nelson's ferry. Thus was Camden evacuated in less than a year
after the British obtained possession of it; but during that short
period it had become the scene of innumerable spoliations, and other
atrocities. While they held it, the loss of property, and being reduced
to poverty, were the least considerable incidents, which happened to the
inhabitants. To form an accurate idea, as well of the wretched situation
of the people of that town and its vicinity, during this period, as to
elucidate a part of history not yet explained, let the reader take the
following narrative, partly in and partly out of its due order. Gen.
Greene, having traversed that part of North Carolina from Guilford to
Pedee, and passed through nearly one half the breadth of South Carolina,
by the way of Cheraw hill, and Lynch's creek, arrived at Town creek,
four miles below Camden, about the middle of April. Except at the Pedee,
the country through which he had marched was destitute of provisions,
and no where, unless he had impressed salt provisions, could he find any
thing better than beef driven out of the woods; which in April is well
known to be lean and nauseating. For the last fifty miles, his route
had been across the sand hills, between Pedee and the Wateree; here his
guide deserted him, and when he arrived at Town creek, he and his men
were at a loss which way to proceed, and were literally starving. The
fine low grounds of the Wateree now lay before him, where he expected
an abundance of provisions, but he was most grievously disappointed. The
British had swept away every thing of the kind that could be found,
and what little subsistence was left to the planters was hid in small
parcels, and in different places in the swamps. Scarcely any thing fit
to eat, was visible, where prior to this period, and subsequently,
every kind of provisions had been so abundant. But Gen. Greene, in his
distress, happily* met with a young man, whom, while he had been at
Hick's creek in January last, he had appointed assistant commissary
general; and who had served him with zeal and ability in that
department. This young man, (the present Gen. Cantey, of Camden,) had
but just returned from Dan river, where he had supplied Gen. Greene,
with fifteen waggon loads of flour, and nearly one thousand head of
hogs, which he had driven from the Pedee, by private ways, with so much
skill and address, as to avoid Lord Cornwallis, and the numerous tories
by whom he was surrounded; and Cantey was still zealous to serve his
country. After gaining some intelligence of the enemy, Gen. Greene
requested his commissary to endeavour to get them some provisions, for
they were famishing. Cantey's father lived not far off, and recollecting
he had some bacon and corn meal hid in a swamp, he immediately went and
brought enough for the general's mess, and in a short time after, drove
in beeves, such as they were, sufficient for a supper for the men; but
so destitute was the neighbourhood, that Cantey recommended it to Gen.
Greene to move above Camden, where provisions might be collected from
the upper country, and it was more probable he would receive aid from
the militia. But for this explanation, the good judgment of Gen. Greene,
in taking post above Camden, might well be questioned; since his wisest,
and hitherto favoured plan, had been to strike at the posts below. It is
thought, if he could have taken a position at Town creek, or Swift creek
below, all surprise might have been prevented. At this time, Gen. Greene
sent Cantey to Gen. Sumter, distant more than one hundred miles, to
request him to join him; but Sumter, who was meditating an attack on
fort Granby, declined any further cooperation except in that way.
When this answer was communicated to Gen. Greene, by Cantey, he was
exceedingly angry, and said he had a great mind to leave _them_ to
defend the country as well as they could, without his assistance. Could
he have concentrated his force, and _had not regarded Ninety-Six_, he
might have driven the British into Charleston, before the sickly season
commenced. But the system of leaving fortresses behind an invading
army, so strongly recommended by Machiavelli, and so much followed by
Bonaparte, had not yet been adopted in tactics. But we are anticipating
our narrative.
* As all the accounts of the movements of Greene and Col.
Lee, into South Carolina, are confused, from a want of
information of the local situation of the country, and the
clashing of the names of places; the present note has been
subjoined to rectify misconceptions. From Ensign Johnson
Baker's account we have seen Lee at the Long bluff, since
called Greenville, now Society-hill. At that time, the
marshes of Black creek, and the bogs of Black river, were
impassable (except to Marion,) on any direct route to
Camden, or Scott's lake, or Santee; but there was an Indian
path, by the way of the present Darlington court house and
Day's ferry, on Lynch's creek, to Kingstree; and from the
latter place there was a road to Murray's ferry on Santee.
From the necessity of the case, therefore, this must have
been Lee's route, for he cannot explain it himself. Lee had
been the principal adviser of Greene to return to South
Carolina, for which the country can never be too grateful to
him; and being now about to invest fort Watson, he sent Dr.
Matthew Irvine, for whom both leaders had a great
friendship, and who, from his persuasive powers was highly
fitted for the mission, to inspire Greene with hope and
confidence. Irvine obtained a guide and an escort from Col.
Richardson, and proceeded by the route of the Piny lands,
back of the Santee hills, then a pathless wilderness, now a
thickly settled country, and _on the first broad road_ he
fell in with in this tract, he unexpectedly met with Greene,
about fifteen miles from Camden. Irvine continued with him,
until descending a range of Sand hills between little and
great Pinetree creeks, about a mile from Camden, he crossed
great Pinetree creek at the place now called M'Crae's mill.
From the latter place, Greene proceeded about three miles to
an old mill on Town creek, called English's; and here Irvine
left him, and Cantey met with him as a general and his army
emerging from the wilderness. This _first broad road_ must
again from the necessity of the case, for there was no other
at that time, have been the road from Cheraw hill to Camden.
Thus have the accounts of two respectable witnesses, Dr.
Irvine and Gen. Cantey, been reconciled, which appeared at
first sight impossible.