(c) The Time for Gratitude.--Internal gr_Moral theology

and should be shown by the kindly manner in which a favor is received;

but external repayment should await a suitable time, as it seems forced

or unappreciative to give a favor in return as soon as one is received.

(d) The Degree of Gratitude Owed.--If the favor was bestowed by reason

of a friendship of utility, the gratitude should correspond with the

benefit received; but, if it was bestowed out of pure friendship or

liberality, the gratitude should be measured by the benevolence that

prompted the favor. Hence, as Seneca remarks, gratitude is sometimes

more due to one who bestows small favors, but with liberality and

willingness and disinterestedness.

[e] The Amount of Recompense for Favors.--It is suitable that one repay

benefactors by giving more than was received from them, if this is

possible; for otherwise one will seem only to give back all or part of

what was received. But in gratitude, as in benefits, the good will

counts for more than the favor; and hence if one cannot hope to surpass

the favor (e.g., the case of children in relation to parents), one can

at least surpass in desire and internal benevolence.

2377. The Sins against Gratitude.--(a) Since gratitude is a moral

virtue, the sins against it are either by excess (e.g., if one is

grateful for things one should not desire), or by defect (that is, by

ingratitude). Since gratitude inclines to surpass favors received, it

is more offended by lack of thanks or ingratitude than by excessive

thanks.

(b) As to its motive, ingratitude is twofold, material and formal.

Formal ingratitude consists in contempt for the benefit or the

benefactor, as when the person favored disdains what has been done for

him, and therefore omits to give thanks or commits some injury against

the benefactor. Material ingratitude is any injury done a benefactor

without contempt for him or his favor.

omission and that by commission. The former is the culpable neglect of

the grateful act of repaying a benefactor, or of the grateful word of

thanking him, or of the grateful thought of remembering him with

affection; the latter is the culpable return of evil for good (Jerem.,

xviii. 20; Exod., xviii. 3) by an injurious act, or by a word in

contempt of the favor, or by a thought that it is a disfavor.

2378. The Moral Species of Ingratitude.--(a) Material ingratitude is

not a special sin, since it may be found in all kinds of sins committed

against a benefactor; for example, every violation of a commandment is

an act of ingratitude to God, and every injury done a human benefactor

is an act of ingratitude to man. But material ingratitude is an

aggravating circumstance, since it is worse to harm those to whom we

owe thanks than to harm others.

(b) Formal ingratitude is a special sin, for it is the denial of a

special debt owed in decency, and which a special virtue requires one

to pay (see 2374). St. Paul lists ingratitude with other special

classes of sin (II Tim., iii. 2).

2379. The Theological Species of Ingratitude.--(a) Formal ingratitude

from its nature seems to be a mortal sin, since it is against charity,

which bids us love our benefactors. It may be venial, however, on

account of the imperfection of the act or the smallness of the matter.

Thus, to offend a benefactor in some trifling matter would not be

mortal, even though there be some slight contempt in the act.

(b) Material ingratitude is venial or mortal according to the nature of

the injury done the benefactor. Thus, a small injury is done when one

gives a cheap present to a benefactor from whom one had received a

valuable gift, for his right to more was not strict, and hence the sin

is venial; but a grave injury is done when one seriously calumniates a

benefactor, and the sin is then mortal.

2380. Is It Right to Confer Favors on the Ungrateful?--(a) If the

favors will be of benefit, one should not desist merely because of the

ingratitude with which they are received. It is not always certain that

the beneficiary is ungrateful, and there may be reason to hope for his

improvement (Luke, vi. 35).

(b) If the favors are not beneficial, because the recipient is made

worse (e.g., arrogant, lazy) through them, they should be discontinued.

2381. The Virtue of Vengeance.--Just as gratitude returns good for

evil, so does vengeance (_vindicatio_) return evil for evil, that is,

the evil of punishment for the evil of sin. Vengeance is defined as “a

moral virtue that inclines a private person to use lawful means for the

punishment of wrongdoing, with a view to the satisfaction of public or

private justice.”

(a) Vengeance is a virtue of private persons; that is, it belongs to

those who are not charged officially with the punishment of offenses.

The duty of public persons, such as judges, is a much stricter one and

pertains to the virtue of vindictive justice, which is a form of

commutative justice; whereas vengeance is only a virtue annexed to

justice (see above, 2141 sqq.). Vindictive justice attends to the

equality between fault and punishment, vengeance to the protection of

the person who has been injured.

(b) Vengeance is concerned with the punishment of wrongdoing, or the

infliction of some painful retribution upon one who has already

committed an injury. Thus, this virtue is not strictly identical with

lawful self-defense, which is directed against an evil that is not past

but present, though self-defense may be rated as a secondary act of the

virtue of vengeance.

reparation from the authorities who have the right to give it and

follows due process of law. This virtue differs, then, from private

revenge, vendetta, lynch law, exercise of the “unwritten law,” etc.,

which are acts of sinful violence, though sometimes subjectively

excusable on account of ignorance. The virtue of vengeance is also

exercised by those who desire that justice may be done against

malefactors, or who visit upon them with moderation such punishments as

are not forbidden to private persons (e.g., denial of friendship).

Parents also exercise this virtue whenever they properly correct and

chastise their children.

(d) Vengeance has for its ends public and private justice, that is, the

vindication of the right order of society or the compensation or

satisfaction of an injured person. If some other good motive causes one

to desire requital of evil deeds, the act will pertain to another

virtue: thus, if one aims at the amendment of the evil-doer, one’s act

pertains to charity; if one desires by the deterrent of punishment to

secure the peace and prosperity of the commonwealth, the act is one of

legal justice; if one seeks the honor of God, the act is one of

religion, etc. If an evil motive prompts the desire of punishment, the

wish is not virtuous at all, but sinful. Thus, he who labors to have a

criminal captured, sentenced and executed, and whose intention is not

the vindication of justice but the gratification of jealousy, hatred,

cruelty or other like passion, sins grievously and perhaps makes

himself worse than the criminal. To return evil for evil in this way is

to be overcome by evil (Rom., xii. 17-21).

2382. The Morality of Vengeance.--(a) Vengeance is lawful, since it

pertains to justice, and Our Lord declares that it is found in the just

and is approved by God (Luke, xviii. 7). It is, moreover, a special

virtue, for it regulates the special natural inclination which moves

man to attack what is harmful and injurious and has its own distinctive

ends (see 2381). It is closely related to fortitude and zeal, which

prepare the way for it; zeal, being a fervent love of God and man,

inspires indignation against injustice, while fortitude removes the

fear that might keep one back from attack on injustice. Accidentally,

however, on account of greater evils, vengeance is sometimes unlawful,

as when it would involve the innocent with the guilty, or fall more

heavily upon the less guilty (Matt., xiii. 29, 30).

(b) Vengeance is obligatory when an injury to oneself is also an injury

to a public or other necessary good (e.g., to the rights of God or of

the Church). Hence it was that Elias and Eliseus punished those who

maltreated them (IV Kings, i. 9 sqq., ii. 23, 24), that inspired

writers pray God to punish the wicked (Psalms xviii, xxxiv, lxviii,

cviii, lxxviii, cxxxvi; Jeremias, xi. 20, xvii, 18, xviii. 21, xx. 12),

and Pope Sylvester excommunicated those who sent him into exile. If an

injury to oneself is merely personal, one should be willing to forego

punishment of the guilty person, and should actually do so when this

course is expedient, as Our Lord teaches in Matthew, vi. 14, 15 (see

1198 sqq.). When no necessity requires one to vindicate a personal

wrong, the more perfect course is to pardon the wrong for the sake of

God; for in avenging injuries to self there is always the danger of

such evils as selfish motive, arrogance, hatred, scandal, and the loss

of such goods as peace of mind, conversion of the other party,

edification, and greater claim on God’s forgiveness of self. Hence,

vengeance is called “a little virtue,” since it is so often the less

perfect way.

2383. Excess and Defect.--Punitive justice is a moral virtue and hence

should be characterized by moderation as to all its circumstances. It

should avoid the extremes of excess and defect.

(a) The sin of excess here is cruelty, which in the quality or the

quantity of the punishment offends human rights or surpasses the

measure of the crime or the custom of the law. Thus, it is immoral to

associate young prisoners with hardened criminals, to deprive an

offender of religious opportunities; it is inhuman to treat a human

being as if he were a brute or less than a brute (e.g., by confinement

in a loathsome dungeon, by overwork with starvation, by torture); it is

unfair to use severe punishments unknown to law or custom, or whose

rigor far surpasses the degree of offense. There is excess even in

medicinal or reformatory penalties, if a higher good is sacrificed for

a lower (e.g., the spiritual for the temporal, a major for a minor good

quality), for then the remedy is worse than the disease.

(b) The sin of defect in punishments is laxity, which rewards crime, or

allows it to go unpunished, or imposes penalties which are agreeable to

offenders, or not a deterrent, or not at all equal to the offense.

Scripture condemns this lenity when it declares that the parent who

spares the rod spoils the child (Prov., xiii. 24). In weighing the

gravity of a delinquency account should be taken of the fault itself,

of the injury done and the scandal given. In the fault consideration

must be had of the objective element (i.e., the nature and importance

of the law violated), of the subjective element (i.e., the age,

instruction, education, sex, and state of mind of the offender), of the

circumstances (e.g., the time, the place, the persons involved, and the

frequency). See Canon 2218.

2384. Circumstances of Punitive Justice.--(a) Punishments that May Be

Used.--Punishment is virtuous only in so far as it restrains from evil

those who cannot be restrained by love of virtue, but only by fear of

penalty. Hence, penalties should consist in the deprivation of goods

that are more prized than the satisfactions obtained through

delinquencies. Both divine and human laws, therefore, have established

as punishments the loss of a bodily good (e.g., by death, flogging,

imprisonment) or of an external good (e.g., by exile, fine, infamy),

the chief inducements to crime being found in bodily or external

things. The extreme penalty of death should be reserved for extreme

cases, and the other penalties should be suited to the crime, so as to

remove the incentive or means (e.g., dishonesty should be punished by

loss of goods, calumny by infamy, lust by pain, etc.).

(b) Persons Who May Be Punished.--Punishment again is virtuous only

because it pertains to justice and rights the inequality caused by sin.

Accordingly, no one should be punished unless he has sinned or

voluntarily transgressed. It is unlawful to punish the innocent for the

guilty, or to punish an innocent person in order to keep him from

future sins. It should be noted, however, that God inflicts temporal

evils on the just for the sake of spiritual goods (e.g., that they may

not become attached to this world, may have opportunities of merit, and

may give good example); that one person may be punished for the sin of

another when he associates himself with or approves of that sin, as

when careless parents have bad children or careless subjects bad rulers

(Job, xxxiv. 30; Exod, xx. 5); that for a sufficient reason an innocent

person may be deprived of a good for which he is unfitted (e.g.,

ordination when one is irregular by defect) or to which he has no

personal or absolute claim (e.g., the family property when it is lost

to the children because the father is fined).

2385. The Virtue of Truthfulness.--Having treated the virtues of

gratitude and vengeance, which deal with moral obligations caused by an

act of the one owed, we now pass on to truthfulness, which is a moral

obligation arising from the acts of the one owing in which he

communicates with others. For he who speaks, writes, or otherwise

manifests his mind to others puts himself under a duty of not

deceiving. Truthfulness or veracity is defined as “a moral virtue that

inclines one duly and faithfully to express what is in one’s mind.”

(a) It is a virtue, that is, a good habit, and so it differs from

truth, which is the object of intellectual habits. Thus, the First

Truth or God is the object of faith. Truthfulness is not the object of

a virtue, but it is a virtue.

(b) It is a moral virtue. It deals with external things (viz., the

words or signs by which we express our thoughts), and so it is not a

theological virtue; moreover, though the knowledge of truth belongs to

the intellect, the right manifestation of truth depends on a good will,

and so truthfulness is not an intellectual virtue: the truthful man may

be unlearned, but he loves honesty.

writing, gestures, conduct, and other external signs, so as to make

them conformable to the mind which they stand for. Truthfulness deals

with internal things (e.g., when the speaker says that he has good

health or is well disposed towards another) and with external things as

they appear to the speaker (e.g., when he says that he is certain or

believes that a report is accurate).

(d) It is a faithful expression of what is in the mind or belief.

Hence, one may be truthful while making statements contrary to fact, or

untruthful while making statements agreeable to facts, for truthfulness

is sincerity, not correctness.

(e) It is a due expression of one’s mind or belief; that is, it is

given when and where and as it should be given. A person who speaks out

his mind on all occasions, with no regard for results, is not a liar,

but he is at least imprudent, and he cannot be said to possess the

virtue of truthfulness, for every virtue is prudent. Examples of this

are persons who unnecessarily indulge self-praise by telling their true

virtues or perfections (Prov., xxvii. 2), or who vaingloriously or

otherwise foolishly publish their true sins or imperfections (Is. iii.

9).

2386. The Excellence of Truthfulness.--(a) Truthfulness is a virtue,

since it makes right use of language and other signs by employing them

for the truth, and also serves society, which rests on the trust that

men have in the words and promises of their fellow-men. St. Paul

admonishes the Ephesians (iv. 25) that each one speak the truth to his

neighbor, since all are members of the other.

(b) It is a moral virtue, preserving moderation in conversations and

other interchanges of thought. This virtue sees that facts are neither

exaggerated nor understated, that truth is not manifested when it

should be concealed, nor concealed when it should be spoken.

actions and external things, none of them except truthfulness regulates

those objects precisely in their character of media or instruments for

signifying and conveying thoughts, opinions, and decisions. And since a

great part of human life is occupied in conference or correspondence

with others, truthfulness is one of the most useful of the virtues and

one whose exercise is most frequently called for.

(d) It is a virtue annexed to justice. On the one hand, it is like

justice, since it pays a debt which one social being owes another of

speaking the truth; on the other hand, it falls short of justice, since

the debt is moral, not legal. This is said of truthfulness in ordinary

intercourse, for in judicial process and in contracts there is also a

legal obligation of justice to tell the truth.

2387. Sincerity and Fidelity.--Two virtues that pertain to truthfulness

are sincerity and fidelity.

(a) Sincerity (simplicity) is the virtue of one who is consistent with

himself, avoiding duplicity and double dealing of every kind, such as

lies, equivocations, sophistries, specious excuses, quibbles, dishonest

shifts, distractions, concealments, and the like.

(b) Fidelity (loyalty) is the virtue of one who fulfills promises that

are obligatory only in virtue of his word freely given. It differs from

constancy, which is concerned not with promises but resolutions, and

from virtues concerned with promises that are obligatory in virtue of

legal debt, such as contracts, promissory oaths (see 1692, 1749, 1753,

1888). Fidelity makes an honest man’s word as good as his bond, and it

is therefore one of the most appreciated of virtues (Matt., xxv. 21;

Psalm xiv). Horace calls it the sister of justice.

2388. Vices Opposed to Truthfulness.--(a) By defect one sins against

truth through lying and breach of promise; (b) by excess one sins

against truthfulness in violation of secret or other unjustifiable

disclosures.

2389. Lying.--A lie is a word spoken with the purpose of stating what

is not true.

(a) It is said to be a word, by which is meant any external sign

consisting in speech or its equivalent. A lie may be expressed by

language, oral or written, by signs, by gestures, by insinuation, by

expressive silence, by actions or conduct (see 2012, 2028).

(b) A lie is spoken, that is, expressed externally. But the guilt is

found in the will, and hence those who plan lies are guilty of

mendacity, even though they do not carry out their plans.

intellect of the sign with the thing signified and a voluntary choice

of the insufficient sign to be used. An infant or an unconscious

person, therefore, may tell an untruth, but he cannot tell a lie.

Moreover, a person who has no good command of language or no clear

understanding of a subject is not guilty of lying when in spite of his

efforts to the contrary he gives misleading impressions. But those who

do not think before they speak, or who use language carelessly or

inaccurately, may be guilty of injustice and deception, or even of

indirect lying.

(d) The purpose of a lie is the statement of what is not true, or the

pretense that what is not in one’s mind is in one’s mind. Just as

truth is the agreement of the word with the thought, so a lie is the

disagreement of word with thought. But a lie need not be entirely

false, and indeed one of the most dangerous of lies is what is known as

a half-truth, in which some real facts are told in order to give

support to pretended facts, or in which valid arguments are adduced to

throw dust in the eyes as regards other arguments that are sophistical.

2390. Statements Liable to Misunderstanding or Misinterpretation.--A

word that sufficiently expresses one’s idea is not a lie or a

deception, even though another idea will be taken from it by a listener

or is conveyed by its mere letter.

(a) Thus, misunderstanding due to defect, not of the speaker, but of

the listener, does not make one’s words untruthful, any more than it

makes them scandalous (see 1462), as when the listener has not given

attention to what was said (John, xxi. 23). Even a speech worded

obscurely because the matter is obscure, or because the listener would

be harmed by plainer speech (see 1001), is not mendacious but prudent.

(b) Misinterpretation to which a statement is open on account of its

wording does not make the statement untruthful, if the context or

circumstances sufficiently disclose the true meaning of the words.

Examples: hyperbolical, ironical or other metaphorical speech; words

spoken in jest or in terms of customary politeness, such as “your most

obedient servant”, statements made inquiringly or hypothetically (e.g.,

when a judge or prosecutor accuses a defendant of crime in order to

discover the truth; cfr. Gen., xiii. 9), or by way of mere quotation or

of fictitious narrative (e.g., fairy tales, stories, reveries), or of

disputation as in school debates exercised for the sake of practice in

argumentation. It is not a lie to write under a pen-name, to speak

according to the personality one represents (Gen., xxxi. 13; Tob., v.

18), to answer according to the mind of a questioner, as when A says to

B: “Have you seen your father?” meaning, “Do you know where he is?” and

B replies: “I have not seen him,” meaning “I do not know where he is.”

Lying contests, in which fishermen, sportsmen, etc., vie with one

another to see who can tell the most incredible yarn or tall tale, are

not in themselves sinful, but there may be circumstances (for example,

scandal, deception, danger) that make them reprehensible.

2391. Divisions of Lies.--(a) Intrinsically, or in respect to its

nature as a departure from the speaker’s mind, every lie is either an

exaggeration, which tells more than the truth, or a suppression, which

tells less than the whole truth. He who affirms what he does not

believe, or who states as certain what he thinks is uncertain,

exaggerates; he who denies what he believes, or who states as doubtful

what he holds as certain, is guilty of suppression.

(b) Extrinsically, or in respect to purpose, mode, and result, lies are

of many kinds. As to mode, a lie is either spoken or acted, the former

being a falsehood and the latter a simulation or hypocrisy. As to its

immediate purpose, a lie is meant either to express falsehood only or

to deceive, the former being misrepresentation and the latter deceit

(e.g., if Claudius knows that he calumniated and that Sempronius heard

the calumny, and yet brazenly denies the calumny to Sempronius, there

is misrepresentation); if Claudius tries to mislead others who only

suspect him and gives false alibis, there is deceit. As to its ulterior

purpose, a lie is meant for good (an officious or jocose lie) or for

evil (a pernicious lie), or is directed to both good and evil. As to

its result, a lie sometimes produces and sometimes does not produce a

statement at variance with fact; it sometimes deceives and sometimes

does not deceive the auditors.

2392. Classification of Lies.--Every lie is harmful from its nature,

since it tends to deceive others and so to disturb the good order of

society. But the reason that moves persons to lie is not always evil,

and hence we have the following classes of lies.

(a) Some lies are told for a good purpose, as when one lies in order to

please (jocose lie) or to serve another (officious lie). Jocose lies

include all kinds of humorous and interesting narrations and

descriptions meant only to afford pleasure, but given out as facts by

one who does not believe them to be facts. Untruths told in such a way

(e.g., with a laugh or in a playful tone, especially if the auditors

have a sense of humor) that it is clear they are not meant to be taken

seriously, are not jocose lies or lies of any kind. Officious lies are

told with a view to assisting or accommodating a neighbor, that he may

receive some good (e.g., to hold out false promises as an inducement to

good conduct) or escape some evil (e.g., to fill the ears of a

despondent man with false reports of good news in order to revive his

spirits). It seems that we should regard as officious lies various

statements made by Jacob (Gen., xxvii. 35), David (I Kings, xx. 6, xxi.

2, xxvii. 10), and Judith (X. xi. xii).

(b) Some lies are told for an evil purpose, as when one lies merely to

indulge a propensity for falsehood or for the sheer pleasure of lying

(lies of inclination), or when one lies to injure another person

(pernicious lies).

2393. Motives for Lying.--The motives for lying are not always simple,

and it may happen that in one and the same lie there are several

motives of different character.

(a) Thus, an officious lie is not always dictated by pure benevolence.

It may be selfish (e.g., when one lies to conceal the delinquency of

another in which one was involved), as well as altruistic (e.g., when

the liar derives no benefit from the lie), or self-sacrificing (e.g.,

when the liar is put to expense, trouble or loss through his lie).

(b) An officious lie may also be pernicious and jocose, for it may

affect different persons in different ways. Thus, if Claudius

calumniates Julius in order to shield Balbus from the bad opinion of

Caius, who does not know Balbus, and to amuse Sempronius who knows the

truth, the lie is pernicious as regards Julius, officious as regards

Balbus, and jocose as regards Sempronius.

2394. Comparison of the Gravity of Various Lies.--(a) Lies of

exaggeration are not worse as lies than lies of suppression, for in

both cases the truth is departed from. But it is more imprudent to

overstate than to understate, and in this sense the lie of exaggeration

is worse.

(b) Lies are aggravated by the purpose to harm, and the greater the

harm, the greater the sin. Thus, the worst of all pernicious lies is

that which is directed against God, as in false religious doctrine; and

the lie that harms a man in spiritual goods is worse than a lie that

harms in temporal things only.

intended the less the sin. In other words, lies that are not pernicious

are not so bad as pernicious lies, officious lies are less sinful than

jocose lies, officious lies told for the sake of some great good are

not so grave as those told for the sake of a lesser good. Thus, it is a

less evil to lie in order to save a man’s life than to lie in order to

take his life; it is less sinful to lie in order to spare another the

shock of bad news than to lie for the sake of embellishing a tale; it

is a less offense to lie in order to ward off a bodily harm than to lie

in order to prevent a financial loss.

2395. Sinfulness of All Lies.--But though lies are unequal in

sinfulness, it remains that no lie, even the smallest (such as are

called fibs or white lies), is ever justified, even by the greatest

good (Job, xiii. 7), for a lie is intrinsically evil, and the end does

not justify the means.

(a) A lie is a sin, because it is an abuse of speech and other signs

given by God for the manifestation of truth; because it is an

unfriendly and unsocial act, tending to the disruption of kindly

relations between men; because it is directly opposed to truth, the

proper and distinctive good of the human mind. Even the pagans have

regarded liars with contempt and considered lies as disgraceful, and

even those who lay no claim to virtue feel gravely insulted if called

liars. In many places the Scriptures forbid lying (Exod., xxiii. 7;

Levit., Xix. 11; Prov., xii. 22; Ecclus., xx. 26; Col., iii. 9), and

St. Paul especially (Eph., iv. 25) is very clear on this point:

“Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor,

for we are members one of another.” The Fathers and the theologians are

generally agreed that no necessity, not even the danger of death,

excuses a lie, any more than it excuses theft or adultery. If God could

approve of even one lie, would not that approval undermine our faith

in His own veracity? Surely we have no implicit confidence in one who

helps to deceive us even in a small matter.

(b) A lie, considered precisely as a lie, seems from its nature to be

only a venial sin, for the disorder of using signs against one’s mind

is not serious, and the harm done society by mere denial of truth is

not necessarily grave (the case would be otherwise if truth could be

denied on principle as a lawful thing). Even pious persons do not

regard harmless lies as very sinful (see 2143, 2386). Hence, as jocose

and officious lies have no other malice than that of untruthfulness and

as the malice is lessened by the intention, they are generally venial;

but some extrinsic circumstance (such as scandal, the fact that one

lies habitually and without scruple, or disastrous results) may render

them mortal. Pernicious lies have another malice besides that of

untruthfulness, and accordingly the case with them is different.

2396. When Lying Entails No Formal Sin.--Lies are sometimes free from

all formal sin on account of ignorance (as in the case of children or

uninstructed persons, who think they may use lies in case of great

difficulty) or on account of irresponsibility (as in the case of

certain defectives who seem to be born liars).

2397. Pernicious Lies.--Pernicious lies are mortal sins from their

nature, but may become venial from the imperfection of the act or the

lightness of the matter. For a pernicious lie sins not against truth

only, but also against justice or charity. Hence, it is said that the

liar destroys his own soul (Wis., i. 11), that a lie is abominated and

hated by the Lord (Prov., vi. 17, xii. 22), that it has the devil for

its father (John, viii. 44), that it brings down divine vengeance (Ps.

v. 7) and will receive its portion in the pool of fire and brimstone

(Apoc., xxi. 8). This sin is committed in two ways, as follows:

(a) a lie is pernicious when its matter is harmful, as being contrary

to sound doctrine, good morals or true science. Hence, a preacher sins

gravely if the substance of his pulpit teaching is mendacious (e.g., if

in a sermon he enunciates or defends erroneous principles of conduct),

venially if he lies about accidentals (e.g., if he gives the wrong

chapter or verse for a text); a scientist, a physician, a jurist, or

the like is similarly guilty of a pernicious lie when he misleads the

public by unreliable information. A penitent in the confessional and a

witness in court lie perniciously if their statements about relevant

matters are untrue, for the one injures the Sacrament and the other

injures public justice; but if the lie is about some matter of slight

importance, the sin is venial, unless there is no other matter in the

confession, or the testimony is under oath;

(b) a lie is also pernicious when the intention of the liar is to

injure God or his neighbor, even though the matter itself is not

opposed to true doctrine or is not official testimony. Examples are

found in those who lie in a humorous way in order to injure or sadden

others.

2398. Concealment of the Truth.--Truthfulness is offended not only by

the declaration of falsity (i.e., of what is not in the mind), but also

by the unlawful concealment of the truth (i.e., of what is in the

mind). The truth is concealed either negatively or positively.

(a) There is negative concealment of the truth, when one has recourse

to silence or evasion. Everyone admits that this kind of concealment is

lawful when there is no obligation to give information, or when there

is an obligation not to give it. Thus, a person who is besieged by

newspaper reporters does not feel obligated to answer all their

questions; a person who is interrogated by curious individuals about

his business or financial affairs, does not feel guilty if he evades

their questions by changing the subject, or by asking them similar

questions, or by putting them off till a more convenient time, etc.

(b) There is positive concealment of the truth, when one gives a reply

in language that is obscure to the listener or obscure in itself. If

the listener has no right to the truth, it is not wrong to speak to him

in words which he will not understand (e.g., in technical or scientific

terms); for if he is deceived, he can blame only his own impertinence

or dullness. The case is more difficult, however, if the reply is

obscure in itself, that is, if use is made of ambiguity or mental

reservation.

2399. Mental Reservation.--Mental reservation is an act of the mind by

which a speaker restricts or limits his words to a meaning which they

do not naturally or clearly convey; or it is an internal modification

of an external speech delivered without any or without clear external

modification. There are two kinds of mental reservation.

(a) Strict mental reservation is that in which the internal

modification is manifested by nothing external, neither by the natural

sense of the words (i.e., the meaning that ordinarily attaches to them)

nor by their accidental sense (i.e., the meaning they receive from

their context, such as the circumstances of time, place, usage, person

who questions, person who is questioned, etc.). Example: Titus, who

struck Balbus with a club, denies that he hit him, meaning that it was

the club which hit Balbus directly.

(b) Broad mental reservation is that in which the internal modification

can be perceived, at least by a prudent person, either from the natural

sense of the words (because they are known to be capable of different

meanings), or from the context (because circumstances indicate that the

words are not to be taken in their obvious sense). Example: Claudius

accidentally ran against and wounded Sempronius and the latter thinks

that someone struck him a blow. Claudius denies that he struck

Sempronius, or declares to those who have no right to ask that he knows

nothing about the matter.

2400. Lawfulness of Mental Reservation.--(a) Strict mental reservation

is unlawful and has been condemned by the Church (see Denzinger, nn.

1174-1178). The reasons are, first, that it is a lie, since it employs

words that do not at all express what the speaker has in mind, and his

mental reservation cannot give them a significance they do not possess;

secondly, that, if it were lawful, every dishonest person could easily

escape the guilt of lying and yet deceive at will. According to

Scripture the sophistical speaker is hateful (Ecclus., xxxvii. 23), but

the just man speaks and swears without guile (Ps. xxxiii. 14, xxiii. 4).

(b) Broad mental reservation is unlawful when there is a reason that

forbids its use, or when there is no sufficient reason to justify its

use. Reservation is forbidden when a questioner has the right to an

answer free from all ambiguity, for example, when a pastor questions

parties preparing for marriage, when a person who is about to be

inducted into office is asked about his freedom from disqualifications,

when a witness in court is interrogated about matters on which he can

testify, when one party to a contract seeks from the other necessary

knowledge about the contract; for in all these cases injury is done by

concealment of the truth. Reservation is not justified, unless it is

necessary in order to secure some good or avoid some evil, whether

spiritual or temporal, whether for self or for another, and the end

compensates by its importance for the deception that may be caused.

Apart from such necessity mental reservation is, to say the least, a

departure from the virtue of Christian sincerity or simplicity, which

pertains to truthfulness and which forbids one to conceal the truth

from others when there is no good reason for concealment (Matt, v. 37).

Moreover, the friendly relations of mankind would be impaired if it

were lawful to speak equivocally even when trifling things are

discussed or when there is no reason to be secretive.

reason for it, such as the public welfare (e. g., the preservation of

state secrets or of military plans), spiritual welfare (e.g., the

prevention of blasphemy or intoxication), bodily welfare (e.g., the

prevention of death or murder), or financial welfare (e.g., the

prevention of robbery). But the reservation must be necessary, as being

the only lawful means that will secure the end (e.g., one should not

use reservation when evasion or silence will suffice); and it should

not be injurious to the rights of another (e.g., it should not be

employed against the common good, in favor of a private good). The

reason for the present conclusion is found in the principle of double

result (see 103 sqq.) and in the fact that a broad mental reservation

is not intrinsically evil, since it contains no lie or insincerity and

causes no injury to individuals or society. There is no lie, because

the words correspond with the thought, either from their natural

signification (in case of double-meaning words), or from their

accidental signification (in case of words whose meaning is varied by

the context); there is no insincerity, for the aim is only to conceal a

truth that should not be made known; there is no injury to the listener

or questioner, since, if he is deceived, this is due to his own

heedlessness or dullness or unjustified curiosity; there is no injury

to society, since the general welfare demands that there be some honest

means of eluding unjust inquiries and of protecting important secrets.

Our Lord Himself, who is infinitely above all suspicion of duplicity or

insincerity, may have used broad mental reservations when He declared

(John, vii. 8-10) that He would not go up to Jerusalem, that the

daughter of Jairus was not dead but sleeping (Matt., ix. 24). Other

cases of mental reservation in Scripture are found in Eliseus (IV

Kings, vi. 19).

2401. When Is Broad Mental Reservation Lawful?--There is general

agreement that broad mental reservation is lawful in the following

cases:

(a) it is lawful and obligatory when one is bound to keep the truth

from the person who asks it. Hence, those who are questioned about

secrets which sacramental or professional confidence forbids them to

disclose (e.g., confessors, doctors, lawyers, statesmen, and

secretaries) should deny knowledge, or, if hard-pressed, even the

facts. The answer, “I do not know” or “No,” in these cases simply

means: “I have no personal or communicable knowledge.” In war time a

government has the right to censor the news in order to keep

information from the enemy. A reason of charity might also make it

obligatory to disguise the truth by mental reservation (e.g., when a

clear reply given to the question of a sick person would only weaken a

slender hope of saving his life, or when exact information given to a

gunman would enable him to overtake an intended victim);

(b) it is lawful when a reasonable local custom permits one to withhold

the truth. Thus, an accused person, even though guilty, has the right

to plead not guilty, which means that he does not confess guilt; a

person who has a visitor at an unseasonable hour may send word that he

is not at home, which means that she is not at home to visitors, a

person who is asked for an alms or a loan which he cannot conveniently

grant may answer, according to many, that he has not the money, which

means that he has no money to spare for those purposes (see 2251).

2402. Ambiguous Answers.--Are ambiguous answers which are not given

according to the questioner’s mind, and for which there are no

reasonable justifications, to be classed as lies?

(a) If the answer, even in the setting of its context, retains its

ambiguity or can be interpreted in two ways, there is not strictly

speaking a lie, for the words signify, though obscurely, what is in the

speaker’s mind. But this is a form of insincerity known as equivocation

or quibbling, which many regard almost as disreputable as plain lying.

The pagan oracles that made predictions that would suit any turn of

events and politicians who so word themselves as to be on opposite

sides at the same time are examples of equivocation.

(b) If the answer, though verbally susceptible of two senses, is

contextually limited to one sense, it is a lie; for it does not express

the speaker’s mind. Thus, if Titus knows that Balbus is good physically

or mentally but not morally, he equivocates by answering that Balbus is

good, if from the circumstances this indicates only that in some way or

other Balbus is good; but Titus lies by answering that Balbus is good

and restricting his meaning to physical goodness or industry, if the

question propounded referred to moral goodness.

2403. Simulation or Pretence.--A special form of untruthfulness is

simulation or pretence, which uses external deeds or things to signify

the contrary of what one thinks or intends internally.

(a) Simulation uses external deeds or things, and thus there is an

accidental difference between lying and simulation, the one being

untruthfulness in word and the other untruthfulness in deed (see 1678

sqq.).

(b) It employs deeds or things to signify. Unlike words, deeds and

things were not meant principally to signify, and hence not all conduct

at variance with one’s ideas is simulation. One may act without any

thought of the impression the act makes on others (e.g., when one keeps

sober, not from wish, but from necessity). And even when an act is done

with the intention to influence others by it, the purpose may be, not

to signify, but to conceal something (e.g., Josue fled from the troops

of Hai to keep them from a knowledge of his plans, Jos., viii. 1 sqq.;

David feigned insanity to conceal his identity, I Kings, xxi. 11.

sqq.). Thus, simulation teaches error, and dissimulation hides truth

from those who have no right to it. That dissimulation is generally

recognized as lawful is seen from such examples as stratagems,

ambushes, camouflage in war, disguises in detective work, and

concealment of marriage by couples not ready for housekeeping.

is sad laughs and jokes to make others think he is happy, or one who is

well apes the actions of a sick man so as to appear unwell, or when one

who hates his neighbor treats him as a friend in public. A special form

of simulation is hypocrisy, which makes a show of virtue that one does

not possess at all or in the degree pretended. There is no simulation

if the exterior corresponds with what one has is mind, for example, at

Emmaus Christ made as though He would go farther (Luke, xxiv. 28), but

He meant not to stop without an invitation.

2404. The Sinfulness of Simulation.--(a) In general, simulation is a

sin, since it is nothing else than an acted lie. But deeds, with the

few exceptions of bows, nods, gestures and the like, are not from their

nature signs of thoughts, and those employed to serve as signs are more

indeterminate and equivocal than words; hence, it is not always as easy

to decide that an act is simulatory as to decide that a word is a lie.

Thus, it is not simulation to make use of false hair, false teeth, or

false jewelry as means of protection or of adornment, there being no

intention to mislead; neither is it simulation for a wicked cleric to

wear the clerical garb, for the dress signifies primarily his state,

and not necessarily his personal moral character.

(b) In particular, simulation by hypocrisy and treachery is detestable;

for hypocrisy prostitutes works of virtue to the ignoble ends of

applause or lucre or worse, while treachery uses the intimacy or marks

of friendship as means for betrayal. The most stinging rebukes of Our

Lord were given the hypocritical Pharisees (“Blind guides, whited

sepulchres, serpents, generation of vipers,” Matt., xxiii. 23 sqq.),

and among the saddest words of Christ are those addressed to Judas

(“Dost thou betray the Son of man with a kiss?” Luke, xxii. 48).

Against the former he pronounced woes, and He declared that it were

better if the latter had never been born (Matt., xxvi. 24).

2405. Sinfulness of Hypocrisy.--(a) Hypocrisy in its strictest sense is

the simulation of one who wishes to seem but not to be virtuous. This

sin is mortal, since it cares nothing for virtue, and its external

pretense is but a mockery. It is this hypocrisy that is so scathingly

denounced in Scripture.

(b) Hypocrisy in a less strict sense is the simulation of one who is in

mortal sin, but wishes for some reason to appear virtuous or to lead a

double life. The sin is mortal or venial according to the motive; for

example, to act the hypocrite in order to seduce another is a mortal

sin, though, if the motive is only vanity, the sin is venial. It should

be noted that it is not hypocrisy for a just cause to conceal one’s sin

by dissimulation; indeed, Isaias severely blames those who scandalize

others by flaunting their wickedness before the public (Is, iii. 9).

degree of sanctity above that requisite for salvation, as when a person

of ordinary goodness tries to gain the reputation of miracle-worker, or

to pass as one better than others in faith, zeal, humility, etc. This

sin is not mortal in itself, but it may become mortal on account of

some motive, some means, or some other circumstance. There is no

hypocrisy at all, however, in showing oneself for the virtue one really

has; on the contrary, he lies, who being good pretends that he is not

good, or who being free of a vice pretends that he is guilty of it.

2406. Self-Glorification and Self-Depreciation.--Two forms of lying

about self are self-glorification and self-depreciation.

(a) Braggadocio is untruthful self-glorification, as when one pretends

to be of royal descent, or makes a display of wealth beyond one’s

means, or poses as an authority on matters of which one is ignorant, or

tries by bluff to make one’s defects seem perfections. This sin is

mortal when the lie is seriously injurious to God or others (Ezech.,

xxviii. 2, Luke, xviii. 11), or when the motive is gravely sinful, such

as grave arrogance, ambition, or avarice.

(b) Feigning of defects (irony) is untruthful self-depreciation, as

when one falsely denies a good quality which one possesses (e.g., an

excessively humble man denies the good deeds that others ascribe to

him, though he knows they are real), or when one falsely admits a bad

quality which one lacks (e.g., a person who wishes to curry favor

accuses himself of misdeeds which he knows never happened). This sin is

usually less than braggadocio, since as a rule its purpose is to avoid

offense to others; but it may be serious sin on account of some

circumstance, as when one speaks ill of self in order to scandalize or

seduce another. At times the feigning of defects is a concealed

braggadocio, as when one dresses in rags, hoping by this expedient to

acquire repute as a person of great spirituality (Prov., xxvi, 25;

Matt., vi. 16; Ecclus., xix. 23).

2407. Infidelity and Violation of a Secret.--It remains to speak of the

vices of infidelity and violation of secret (see 2388 a). As to the

former, since it has been discussed elsewhere (1877 sqq., 1888, 1889;

see also the matter on Promissory Oaths), it will suffice here to ask

the question: Is the breach of a promise freely given a sin?

(a) If observance of the promise is due from fidelity only, there is no

legal fault, but there is moral fault, and hence the breach of the

promise is a sin. The malice is essentially the same as that of

untruthfulness (see 2395), for both the liar and the promise-breaker

show themselves unreliable, the former because his words do not square

with his mind and the latter because his deeds do not live up to his

plighted word. Breach of promise, then, seems _per se_ to be a venial

sin, though there are often circumstances (such as damage done) that

make it mortal.

(b) If observance of the promise is not due even from fidelity, on

account of the presence of some defect, there is no moral obligation to

keep the promise and no sin is committed by not keeping it. The defects

referred to are such as make the promise lack force from the beginning

(e.g., if it was immoral or extorted by force), or deprive it of the

force it had (i.e., inability on the part of the promisor or loss of

right on the part of the promisee). The promisor is unable to keep the

promise, if the thing promised has become physically impossible (e.g.,

he no longer has the strength or the means to perform what he

promised), or morally impossible (e.g., the thing promised has become

unlawful, or a notable change has taken place which, could it have been

foreseen, would have prevented the promise). The promisee loses his

right if the sole or principal reason that dictated the promise has

ceased, or if the promise has become useless to the promisee, or if the

promisor has been released, or if the promisee forfeits his claim by

his own perfidy towards the promisor (see 2256 sqq., 1889).

2408. Definition of a Secret.--A secret is a matter (e.g., an

invention, valuable information, concealed virtues, the fact that a

crime has been committed) known privately by only one person or by so

few that it is neither public property nor notorious. Moralists

distinguish the following kinds of secrets:

(a) a natural secret, which is one that cannot be revealed without

causing injury or annoyance to another, as when the revelation will

harm a person in his reputation, honor, influence property. It is

called natural for it arises from the very nature of the matter of the

secret and not from any promise or contract.

(b) a promised secret, which is one that a person has promised, but

only after he had already learned it, to guard inviolate. It makes no

difference whether the promisor learned the secret from the promisee or

from some other source;

promised (and before he learned it) to keep from others. The promise

here is either implicit or explicit. An implicit promise of secrecy is

one that is demanded by the confidential nature of communications

between two parties (professional secret), as when physicians, lawyers,

priests, parents, or friends are told of private matters on account of

their position or relationship. An explicit promise is one that is

given in express terms, as when A says to B: “I have a matter of great

importance to tell you, but you must first promise that you will keep

it secret”; and on B promising, A confides to him the secret.

2409. Sinfulness of Violating a. Secret.--A secret is the property of

its owner, and to it he has a strict right; for if it is a good secret

(such as an original idea or discovery), it is the product of his labor

or at least a possession which he has lawfully come by; if it is an

evil secret (such as a crime of which he has been guilty), it may not

be made known without infringing on his right of reputation. It is no

more lawful to violate the right to a secret than to violate the right

to property, and, as there are three kinds of injuries to property, so

there are three kinds of injuries to a secret.

(a) Thus, the right of possession is injured by those who by fraud or

force or other illegal means deprive another of his secret (e.g., by

secretly intercepting private letters, by making a person drunk in

order to learn a secret).

(b) The right of use is injured by those who on acquiring knowledge of

a secret guide themselves or others by it to the detriment of the

owner’s rights.

which they were obliged not to reveal.

2410. Prying Into Others’ Secrets.--To seek to discover the secrets of

others is not lawful unless the following conditions are present:

(a) one must have a right to the knowledge. Hence, if there is question

about a crime that has been committed or that is about to be committed,

one has a right to investigate in order to prevent harm to public or

private good; in war one may try to discover the plans of the enemy.

But it is not lawful to pry into purely personal matters, to fish from

others natural or confidential secrets which they are bound to keep, to

steal from another the thoughts, plans, inventions, etc, which are his

own;

(b) one must use only honest means to discover secrets to which one has

a right (1504). Thus, it does not seem lawful generally to inebriate

another in order to learn his secret, and it is certainly sinful to

resort to lies or simulation or immorality.

2411. Reading Another’s Letters or Papers.--When is it lawful to read

the letters or other papers of another person?

(a) This is lawful when the writings are not intended to be secret to

anyone, as when a circular is meant for public use, when greetings are

written on a postcard which all may read, and when a letter is left

open and thrown away or otherwise abandoned. But a sealed letter, or

one left open in a private room, or one lost in a public place, is

secret. If a letter or manuscript has been torn up by its owner and

thrown away on the street or other public place, it does not seem

lawful to piece the fragments together and read the writing, for,

though the paper has been abandoned, the owner by destroying it has

indicated his will to keep the contents secret.

(b) It is also lawful to read the writing of others that are not secret

as regards oneself, as when one has received a just permission from the

writer to peruse a letter written by him, or when one may presume such

permission on account of friendship with the writer, or when rule or

lawful custom gives the superior of an institution the right to inspect

the correspondence of his subjects. Exception must be made for exempted

matter for which there is no permission, such as letters containing

conscience matters and letters directed to higher religious superiors

(see Canon 611).

be secret, if one has a right to know what is in them: for in such a

case the owner would be unreasonable if he wished to exclude one from

the knowledge. Thus, the public authority (e.g., in time of war) has

the right to open and read letters and private papers, when this is

necessary for the common good; parents and heads of boarding schools

may examine the correspondence of their subjects, though parents should

respect conscience matter and others should not read family secrets;

private individuals have the natural right, as a measure of

self-defense, to read another’s letter, when there is a prudent reason

for thinking that it contains something gravely and unjustly harmful to

themselves (such as conspiracy, a trap, calumny).

2412. Lawfulness of Utilizing Knowledge of Secret.--One is said to use

the knowledge obtained from a secret when one guides one’s conduct by

the knowledge, doing or omitting what one would not otherwise do or

omit. Is this use of a secret lawful?

(a) If there was a promise not to use the secret, such use is unlawful

(see 2414). Breach of promise is then, in case of a merely promised

secret, an act of infidelity at least, and in case of an entrusted

secret an act of injustice. Thus, when one consults a professional

person, there is a tacit understanding that the knowledge communicated

will not be used against one’s interests or without one’s consent, and

hence a lawyer would be unjust if, on learning in the course of work

for a client that the latter’s business was not prosperous, he gave

word of this to one of the client’s creditors.

(b) If there was no promise not to use the secret, the use of it is

nevertheless unjust, if it infringes a strict right (e.g., to make

money from a secret process on which another has a patent, to get

knowledge of another’s information and plans through reading his

letters and thereby to prevent him from securing a vacant position), or

if it is equivalent to unjust revelation of a secret. The use is

uneharitable if it harms another person without necessity (e.g., to

take away one’s trade from a deserving merchant solely because one has

learned that on one occasion he was accidentally intoxicated).

use, it is lawful to use a secret for a non-necessary good (e.g., to

raise the price on one’s property when one accidentally learns through

overhearing a secret conversation that the property is worth the higher

price), and it is obligatory to use it for a necessary good (e.g., to

assist a neighbor when one is told under secret that he is in dire need

of one’s charitable help). Even though harm will result to another by

use of the secret, use is not sinful if it infringes no right and could

be sacrificed only at great inconvenience to oneself, as when one has

discovered by one’s own industry some important truth in an art or

science which another had previously discovered but had neglected to

make his own by exclusive right, or when one learns under secret that

another person is one’s enemy and has to be watched and avoided.

2413. The Sin Committed by Stealing or Unduly Using the Secret of

Another.--(a) From its nature (cases of mere fidelity excepted) the sin

is mortal, as being a violation of commutative justice or of charity.

Injury to property rights, whether in goods or in knowledge, is

violation of a strict right (see 1890, 1894). The sin is aggravated by

the greater import of the secret or by the greater damages or

displeasure caused.

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter the

sin may become venial, as when one thoughtlessly reads another person’s

letters, or opens correspondence without authority, feeling morally

sure that there is nothing confidential in it, or makes use of an

unimportant secret without permission.

2414. The Obligation of Keeping a Secret.--(a) The natural secret

obliges _per se_ under grave sin; for violation of it offends charity

and justice by saddening and harming a neighbor. The sin may become

venial on account of lightness of matter, as when little sadness or

harm is caused.

(b) The promised secret obliges ordinarily under light sin only; for as

a rule the promisor intends to obligate himself in virtue of fidelity

alone (1888), and the obligation of fidelity, as said above (see 2407),

is not grave. But exceptionally the obligation may be grave, as when

the promisor intended to bind himself in virtue of justice and under

grave sin, or when the secret is natural as well as promised.

a duty of commutative and of legal justice to keep it, on account of

the rights of contract and of the common good that are involved. The

violator of an entrusted secret injures private good by disregard for

contract, and he injures public good by weakening confidence in

officials or professional persons to whom others must go for advice or

assistance. Violation of a committed secret may be only a venial sin on

account of the lightness of the matter. Thus, some think it is not a

serious injustice to reveal a secret to one very discreet person, if

the person whose secret is made known is not very much opposed to this

and no other damage will result (see 2065).

2415. Comparison of Secrets as Regards Binding Force.--(a) The promised

secret obliges less than the natural or the entrusted, as was said in

the previous paragraph. (b) The natural secret obliges less _per se_

than the entrusted secret, for the safeguarding of the latter is agreed

to in an onerous contract, while no engagement is made to keep the

former. (c) Some entrusted secrets are more sacred than others. Thus, a

secret confided from necessity is more binding than one confided

without necessity; a secret one has sworn to keep is more obligatory

than a secret one has given one’s word of honor to keep; a professional

secret is more imperious than a private secret; a state secret is far

more important than any secret of private individuals. The most

inviolable of all secrets is that of the confessional, because its

violation is always a sacrilege.

2416. Cases Wherein It Is Not Necessary to Keep a Secret.--(a) If there

has been no obligation from the time the secret was learned, it is not

necessary to keep it. Thus, if a merely promised secret was accepted

under compulsion and revelation will be advantageous and not harmful,

it does not seem necessary to keep the secret.

(b) If the obligation of the secret has ceased, it is not necessary to

be silent. Examples are cases in which secrecy was promised only for a

certain space of time, or in which a matter formerly secret has become

public, or in which the owner of the secret wishes it to be divulged,

or in which he has not kept faith with the possessor of the secret,

provided of course that in these cases no injury or unnecessary harm is

done by making known the secret. Similarly, if the recipient of the

secret cannot keep it without grave harm (e.g., death) to himself, he

is not bound by it, unless charity (see 1165, 1236) or justice calls

for the contrary. Commutative justice would demand silence (though many

make exception for a most grave reason, regarding a promise to the

contrary as prodigal) if there had been an express contract to guard

the secret at all risks; legal justice would demand it, if the safety

of the republic were involved.

2417. Cases Wherein It Is Not Lawful to Keep a Secret.--(a) If a secret

cannot be kept without greater harm to the common good, it may not be

kept, for legal justice requires that private good be subordinated to

public safety. The violation of secrets is a harm to the public good

and a greater harm than ordinary evils against the community (such as

the escape of a guilty person); but it is a less harm than serious

evils against the people (such as menace to public health, sedition, or

treason). The possessor of a natural or promised secret must make it

known at the command of lawful authority, as in court; but the superior

has no right to question about entrusted secrets of a necessary kind,

and this is usually recognized by positive law in the protection

extended to professional communications.

(b) If a secret cannot be kept without greater harm to the private good

of the owner of the secret, distinction is made between a non-entrusted

and an entrusted secret. In the former case the secret may not be kept,

for charity bids one to help a neighbor escape a greater evil, and the

owner of the secret would be unreasonable if he were opposed to its

revelation (see 501 sqq.). In the latter case, some are of the opinion

that the secret should be kept, if it is professional (since the public

good then takes precedence over the private good of the owner of the

secret), but this is denied by others. Example: Titus knows that Balbus

is about to marry with a secret impediment that will nullify the

marriage, but he cannot persuade Balbus to disclose this impediment to

the pastor.

of a third party (i.e., one other than the owner of the secret),

distinction is made between cases, according as injury is or is not

done by the owner of the secret to the third party. If no injury is

done the third party, the secret should be kept (e.g., if one knows in

confidence that Sempronius has made an invention which will supersede

an invention made by Claudius, one is not at liberty to make this known

to the latter, for Sempronius has done no injury to Claudius). If,

however, injury is done the third party by the owner of the secret when

the secret is kept, one should not keep the secret; for charity

requires that one help an innocent person to escape from harm, even if

this has to be done at the expense of harm to the guilty cause of the

harm. Examples: If one knows as a secret that A, B and C have conspired

to murder D tomorrow night, and one cannot otherwise prevent the

murder, one should if possible break the secret, at least by sending

warning to D that his life is in danger tomorrow night. If a doctor

knows that a man who is about to contract marriage is syphilitic and

pretends that he is sound, and if the doctor cannot persuade this man

to make the facts known to the intended wife, the doctor himself should

give notice to the woman, according to some authorities, unless the

laws of the country forbid such use of professional knowledge.

2418. What should the possessor of an entrusted secret do, if from the

secret he knows that the one who entrusted it is guilty of a crime for

which an innocent third person is about to be convicted and sentenced?

(a) If the guilty party is responsible for the plight of the innocent

party (e.g., because he falsely accused him or threw suspicion on him),

natural law would require the possessor of the secret to make known the

true state of affairs; for the guilty party is then the unjust cause of

damage and is bound to accuse himself (see 1763). Revelation of the

true culprit would not be necessary, however, if there was some other

way of saving the innocent person.

(b) If the guilty person is not responsible for the difficulty in which

the innocent person finds himself, not having used any means to bring

the latter into suspicion, some believe that the secret should be kept,

since the guilty person has then the right to keep his secret and

therefore has also the right that his confidants keep it (see 1968).

But others, while granting that the guilty person is not obliged to

accuse himself, deny that the confidant is not obliged to accuse him;

for the right of the guilty that his secret be kept and the right of

the innocent that he be not deprived of life or liberty are in conflict

and unequal, and he who prefers the former right does an injury to the

innocent person (see 288).

2419. The previous question was concerned with an innocent third party.

If the holder of the secret is also the accused, it seems he is not

obliged, unless perhaps when he agreed to it, to prefer the

inviolability of the secret to his own justification; for the

acceptance of a secret does not mean that one binds oneself to grave

hardship for its preservation (see 2418). The thing to do would be to

warn the guilty person to escape in time, and then to exculpate oneself

by making known the truth.

2420. Lawfulness of Revealing a Secret Learned by Stealth or Force.--Is

it lawful, in order to avert some great evil, to use or reveal against

the interests or wishes of its owner a secret which one has learned by

stealth (e.g., by spying, eavesdropping, wiretapping, unauthorized

inspection of papers) or by force? Various answers are given to this

question, but to us the following seems the best:

(a) if the stealth or force would not be unjust here and now, because

the owner of the secret has a duty to disclose it (e.g., on account of

the public good, on account of the extreme need of a private person),

or the other party has a right to seek after it (e.g., because he

cannot otherwise defend himself against the unjust vexation of the

owner of the secret), the answer is in the affirmative; for in such a

case there is only applied the principle of lawful occupation or of

lawful self-defense (see 1920 sqq., 1819). But if the stealth or force

is excessive in its manner or productive of unnecessary harm, it is

sinful and induces the duty of restitution, nor is there any right to

make such use or such revelation of a secret as is sinful in itself

(e.g., on account of calumnies, scandals, disorders);

(b) if the stealth or force would be unjust here and now, the answer is

in the negative; for in such a case there is real theft of a secret, a

person’s most intimate possession, and a continuation of the original

injury by the use of the stolen property against its owner, or at least

an unlawful conversion of property. Hence, if there is no grave or

proportionate reason for the use of the secret, or if other and simpler

methods can be employed, the secret may not be used. Those who play the

detective ostensibly for other reasons but really for purposes of

blackmail or other personal advantage, are therefore in the same class

as thieves and are bound to restitution; their sin is _per se_ mortal,

for secrets are usually esteemed more highly than money, and it would

be seriously detrimental to the public weal if the practice of using

secrets unlawfully obtained (e.g., by secretly taking down privileged

communications or state secrets) were permissible.

2421. The Virtues of Affability and Liberality.--These two virtues,

though they are not so important as those that preceded, are still most

useful to human life (see 2143). Affability (friendliness, politeness)

is a virtue which inclines a person to show himself in serious matters

properly agreeable to others in order thus to fulfill a duty to society.

(a) Affability has for its object to be agreeable to others, that is,

in looks, manner, words and deeds to treat them with kindness and

consideration, and so to give them pleasure. Affability is more than

mere civility, which avoids rudeness and observes necessary

proprieties, but does not manifest a gracious spirit. The gentleman,

according to Cardinal Newman (“Idea of a University,” Discourse viii,

10), is one who does not inflict pain and whose great concern is to

make others at their ease and at home. The true gentleman is

considerate for all his company, guards against unseasonable allusions

or topics, is seldom prominent in conversation and never wearisome,

makes light of his own favors, never speaks of himself except when

compelled, avoids personalities and insinuations of evil, and is

indulgent towards opponents.

(b) Affability is as agreeable as is becoming, or proper; that is, it

observes the golden mean, attending to moderation and circumstances,

suiting its deportment to the time, place, occasion, and persons and

observing the recognized laws of etiquette for social, official,

business, religious, domestic and other relations. Indeed, there are

times when affability should not be shown, as when it is necessary to

display severity and displeasure, or even to sadden others, for the

sake of some higher good (II Cor., vii. 8, 9).

ways of life are made rougher and more difficult for all, and

therefore, since man is a social being, it becomes obligatory that each

one should so conduct himself towards others as to avoid the

displeasing and to cultivate the pleasing. Thus, affability is less

than friendship (see 1110), since it does not include special

benevolence and is shown to friend and foe alike; but it is more than

polish, for it consists not merely in external good manners but chiefly

in an internal sense of responsibility to society and of deference to

its requirements. Affability is at its best, however, when prompted by

friendship and Christian charity. A modicum of courtesy, if accompanied

by sincerity and goodness of heart, is more appreciated than profuse

compliment and ceremony behind which there is little genuineness or

little affection.

(d) Affability regulates conduct in serious matters, for the regulation

of amusements or recreations pertain chiefly to modesty and falls under

temperance rather than justice. Aristotle calls the virtue directive of

games _eutrapelia_, which may also be called reasonable relaxation,

urbanity, or pleasantness.

2422. Offices of Affability.--All, and especially the clergy, should

practise courtesy, imitating St. Paul, who became all things to all

men, in order to gain all to Christ (I Cor., ix. 22), and following his

advice to be without offense to Jew or Gentile or to the Church of God

(I Cor., x. 32). The offices of affability can be reduced to the

negative and the positive, as follows: (a) the negative offices are the

avoidance of excess (adulation) and defect (surliness); (b) the

positive offices are the observance on special occasions of the

appropriate forms and usages and on all occasions the exercise of a

gentle and thoughtful regard for the feelings of others.

2423. The Sins against Affability.--(a) Adulation is the vice of those

who in the effort to please others go beyond what is proper, of the

complaisant man who aims to gratify by merely conventional or

extravagant compliments, and of the flatterer who seeks to win favors

for himself by expressions of fulsome admiration. Adulation is shown by

exaggerated debasement of self (servility, obsequiousness), as well as

by exaggerated exaltation of others (toadyism). The sin of adulation is

not grave from its nature, being only an excessive will to please; but

circumstances sometimes make it grave, such as its matter (e.g., when

one compliments another’s sins, Is., v. 20), its effect (e.g., when the

person flattered will be made proud), or its purpose (e.g., when the

flatterer means to seduce the other person, Prov., xxvii. 6). Like to

adulation in its exaggeration, but unlike it in manner, is the display

of friendliness by offensive familiarity or boisterous conduct.

(b) Surliness is the sin of those who are ungracious in their manners,

not because of hate or anger, but because of a desire to be unpleasant

and to make others yield to themselves. The surly man is always ready

to contradict or argue, he is hard to please, sensitive, sour in

visage, gruff in words, and much given to complaint or sullen silence.

Surliness is _per se_ worse than adulation but not a mortal sin; for it

is farther removed from affability than adulation, but does not

necessarily inflict a severe wound on charity. But the smooth palaverer

is usually a more dangerous character than the morose man (Ps. cxl. 5).

Like to surliness is the boorishness of those who from cynicism or

laziness despise refinement, or from greed neglect proper manners at

table. But entirely different from surliness is that dignity which can

be reserved without being distant or hard of approach, and that

seriousness which can be grave or silent without being ungracious.

2424. Liberality.--Liberality is a virtue that moderates the love of

riches and inclines one in ordinary affairs to bestow one’s own goods

upon others willingly, when and as right reason may dictate.

(a) It moderates the love of riches; that is, it makes one value and

esteem money at its true worth. In this respect it pertains at least

improperly to temperance inasmuch as the love of money is a passion.

Liberality is thus distinguished from mercy and beneficence. These

virtues are open-handed from charity, and give because another is in

need or is loved; liberality, on the contrary, may be without charity

and its bounty may be shown even to those who are not in need or who

are not liked, for it is free in using money precisely because it does

not prize external things excessively.

(b) It inclines one to bestow one’s own possessions, or freely to

communicate them. In this respect liberality is assigned to justice,

since its object is external things as owed by a certain moral debt to

others. Since liberality consists primarily in a generous inclination,

even the poor may have this virtue; in fact, the poor oftentimes, being

less wedded to money, are far more disposed to liberality than the rich.

magnificence that makes wealthy men spend money lavishly in enterprise

of the greatest moment.

(d) The beneficiary of liberality is another, for no special virtue is

needed to make one use money freely for one’s own needs or comfort.

(e) Liberality bestows gladly, but according to right reason, for there

is no merit in unwilling gifts, and no virtue in gifts bestowed

unsuitably as to time, place, purpose, person, quantity, quality, etc.

Liberality, then, is not inconsistent with prudence about temporal

affairs, that is, with economy which adapts expenditures to income,

with thrift which puts something by for the future, and with frugality

which spares unnecessary expenses on self, especially in the matter of

luxuries (see 1681 sqq.).

2425. The Importance of Liberality.--(a) Liberality is not the greatest

virtue. It is less than temperance, for temperance regulates the

passions in reference to the body, while liberality regulates them in

reference to externals; it is less than fortitude and justice, which

serve the common good, whereas liberality regards individuals; it is

less than the virtues that are concerned with divine things, for

liberality has to do directly with temporals.

(b) Liberality is one of the most useful of virtues since it disposes

one to use money well in the service of God and humanity, and gives one

an influence that can be employed for good (Ecclus., xxxi. 28).

According to Aristotle, the virtues that chiefly attract fame are first

bravery, next justice, and then liberality. Moreover, this virtue of

generosity is one of the surest indexes of internal religion and

charity, as being the natural expression of devotion and benevolence

(see 2185, 1211), while miserliness is a sign of coldness towards God

and man.

2426. Vice of Avarice.--The vice which is opposed to liberality by

defect in giving is avarice, which, properly speaking or as

distinguished from theft and robbery, is an immoderate desire, love or

delight entertained in respect to external corporal goods, such as

lands or money.

(a) The Absolute Malice of Avarice.--This sin is _per se_ venial, since

it is only an excess in the love of a thing that is in itself

indifferent and lawful; but it becomes mortal if the affection for

money is so great that one is prepared to sacrifice grave obligations

for its sake (e.g., to stay away from church rather than contribute to

religion or the suffering poor). It is not merely carnal, since not

concerned with bodily pleasure; nor merely spiritual, since riches are

not a spiritual object; hence, it stands midway between spiritual and

carnal vices.

(b) The Comparative Malice of Avarice.--In regard to deformity, avarice

is not worse than other sins, but rather the contrary. The less the

good to which a vice is opposed, the less the deprivation caused by the

vice; and hence since external goods, to whose proper esteem avarice is

opposed, are less important than divine or human goods, it follows that

avarice is not so sinful as irreligion, homicide, theft, etc. In regard

to shamefulness, however, avarice is worse than other sins. The less

valuable the created good that a vice pursues, the more disgraceful the

vice; and hence since the miser sets his heart on external things,

which are the lowest of all goods, preferring them to goods of body and

of soul (e.g., to health, education) and even to divine goods, he is

rightly regarded as more contemptible than other sinners. Some forms of

avarice, too, are more despicable than others. Thus, in some persons

avarice shows itself in their fear to consume or expend for their own

necessary uses (parsimony, penuriousness); in others it shows itself by

an unwillingness to give to others (stinginess, niggardliness), or a

willingness to live at the expense of others (sponging); finally, the

most disgusting form of avarice is seen in those who cannot bear to

part with their possessions either for their own sake or for the sake

of others, and find their happiness in mere possession (miserliness).

In regard to influence, avarice has a pre-eminence among sins that

causes it to be numbered among the seven capital vices. A capital vice

is one of the chief sources of evil attraction that produces other

sins, and it is clear that immoderate love of riches is one of the most

prolific of sins. All are drawn to happiness, and money seems to secure

the requisites for happiness (Ecclus., x. 16); hence we see that for

the sake of holding to money men become hard of heart (Matt., xxiii.

14; Luke, xvi. 21), for the sake of acquiring it they become carnal and

restless in mind (Ecclus., xiv. 9; Matt., xiii. 22) and have recourse

to deeds of violence (III Kings, xxi. 2), of deception (Acts, xxiv.

26), of perjury (Matt., xxviii. 12 sqq.), of fraud (Luke, xvi. 4 sqq.),

and of treachery (Matt., xxvi. 15). Avarice is at the same time one of

the most dangerous of sins, for it will lead a man to sell even his own

soul (Ecclus., X. 10) and to commit any enormity (I Tim., vi. 9), and

one of the most incurable, for the miser never has enough (Prov., xxx.

15, 16) and is always able to make believe that his avarice is prudence

or some other virtue (Wis., xv. 12).

2427. Vice of Prodigality.--The vice opposed to liberality by excess in

giving is prodigality, which is an insufficient regard for temporal

things and an extravagant bestowal of them on others.

(a) It is an insufficient care for temporal things: that is, as the

miser loves money too much, so the prodigal esteems it too little; as

the miser is over-anxious to get and keep money, so the prodigal is

careless about earning or saving.

(b) It is an extravagant bestowal of temporal things; that is, the

prodigal gives more than he should, or else the circumstances do not

call for his gift, as when he gives when or where or to whom he should

not give.

2428. The Sinfulness of Prodigality.--(a) From its nature it is venial.

The prodigal is not the absolute owner of his goods, but a steward who

is held to administer them according to reason. But his sin is not

grave, since it does not injure others and the goods of which he

deprives himself are of the lowest kind.

(b) From its circumstances it may be mortal. Thus, it is made mortal on

account of the purpose (e.g., extravagant presents made with a view to

seduction or bribery), or the consequences (e.g., wastefulness which

makes one unable to pay debts or assist a relative who is in grave

need), or the special obligation of devoting superfluities to charity,

as when one squanders the excess revenues of a benefice (see 1252).

2429. Comparison of Avarice and Prodigality.--(a) They are associable,

for the same person may be both avaricious and prodigal, though in

different respects (e.g., some persons are spendthrifts in giving money

away, and are thus forced to be grasping to get money and ready to

obtain it by any means, foul or fair). (b) They are unequal in malice.

Prodigality is less sinful than avarice, because it is less removed

from liberality, less harmful to self and others, and less difficult to

cure. It is said that prodigality is the vice of youth, avarice the

vice of old age.

2430. The Virtue of Equity.--The virtues that have been so far treated

in the present Article are forms of particular justice, and they have

the status of adjuncts or potential parts. We shall conclude the list

of virtues grouped with justice by discussing equity, which belongs to

general (legal) justice and has the rank of a subjective part (see

above, 1635, 1636, 1745, 1701, 1704).

2431. Definition of Equity.--In law, equity is any court system of

extraordinary justice in which the standard is natural honesty as

declared by the conscience of the judge or by a body of rules and

procedures that supplement or override the usual rules and procedures

where these are too narrow or limited. Thus, in England and in the

United States courts of equity are those that take care of defined

special cases for which there is no remedy in the usual or common

law courts (Robinson, _Elementary Law_, Sec.348). But as here taken

equity is a moral virtue, and is of two kinds, particular equity which

pertains to particular justice (natural equity) and general equity

which belongs to legal justice (legal equity).

(a) Natural equity is a moral virtue that inclines one not to insist

unnecessarily on one’s strict or legal rights when to do so will be

unpleasant or burdensome to others. It is exemplified in the acts of an

employer who freely grants a bonus to deserving employees in addition

to the wage promised, and of a creditor who grants an extension of

time to a hard-pressed debtor. This virtue partakes of both charity

and justice; of charity, since it tempers justice with mercy; of

justice, since it is really identical with the virtue of affability

or friendliness mentioned above (2421). Its obligation as an act of

justice is not grave, since the debt is not of a rigorous kind.

(b) Legal equity is a moral virtue that inclines one to justice beyond

the common laws, or it is a correction of the law in that wherein the

law by reason of its universality is manifestly deficient. The law is

said to be deficient here when its application in a particular case

would be prejudicial to the supreme purpose of law (i.e., to the common

good or to equal justice). Some precepts of the natural law (e.g., the

prohibitions against lying and adultery) cannot be deficient in this

way and need no supervising equity. But other precepts of natural law,

according to some (e.g., the command that a deposit be returned to the

depositor), and also precepts of positive law are found to be

unsuitable in exceptional cases. The reason for this defect in a good

law lies in the nature of the case; for these laws must be made in view

of what happens in the majority of cases, and accordingly they are

couched in general terms and permit of exceptions which the lawgiver

himself would allow (see on Epieikeia, 411 sqq).

2432. The Greatness of Legal Equity.--(a) It is a distinct virtue,

since it inclines the will to do good and avoid iniquity in a matter of

special difficulty. It is not a transgression of law, since it upholds

the spirit when the letter departs from the spirit, and prizes the

lawgiver’s intention to do what is just and right above the lawgiver’s

words.

(b) It is a subjective part of common justice, since all that is

contained in the concept of justice belongs to equity. Thus, it differs

from the potential and integral parts of justice so far treated in

Articles 5 and 6.

legal justice; for equity extends to all the virtues and is concerned

with the debt owed to the common good. Thus, _per se_ its obligation is

grave (see 1721).

(d) It is the higher part of legal justice. Just as prudence has two

parts--good judgment (_synesis_), which settles ordinary cases of

morals according to the usual rules of conduct, and acute judgment

(_gnome_), which passes on moral problems that are out of the ordinary

run--so legal justice has two acts, a lower which applies the law to

usual cases, and a higher (equity) which applies more remote principles

(viz., that the common good be not injured, nor injustice done) where

the immediate principles of the law are clearly inadequate. Thus, if a

madman demands from a depositary the return of his revolver in order to

commit murder, the letter of the law would uphold the madman, but

equity would decide against him; if the enemy are attacking a city and

one cannot repel them except by disregarding an ordinance of the city,

the law would forbid one to transgress the ordinance, while equity

would command one to transgress it.

(e) Equity is, therefore, the noblest act of strict justice. For legal

justice is preferred to particular justice (1703, 1715), and equity is

the superior act of legal justice. In will and intention the common

good and justice must take precedence over laws and statutes at all

times; but in act the supreme ends of law are served, except in

extraordinary cases, by obedience to law.

2433. The Complements of Justice.--To each of the various virtues

correspond certain complements, namely, Gifts of the Holy Ghost, Fruits

of the Holy Ghost, and Beatitudes (see 159).

(a) The Gift that corresponds to justice is piety, for, like justice,

piety is exercised towards another, and moreover piety is the

completion of the virtue of religion, the highest development of

justice. This Gift is defined as “an infused habit that renders the

soul well disposed towards God as its kind Father, and makes it quickly

responsive to the Holy Spirit when He moves it to acts of filial

affection towards God.” As the virtue of piety is shown to earthly

fathers, so the Gift of Piety is shown to the Father in heaven: “You

have received the spirit of adoption of sons, in which we cry: Abba,

Father” (Rom., viii. 15). Religion honors God as Lord, piety as Father;

filial fear reveres His majesty, piety His lovingkindness. And as a

child tenderly loves all that belongs to a good father, so piety makes

the soul rejoice and be glad in the things of God, in the Saints, the

Scriptures, the practices of religion, and the like.

(b) The Beatitudes assigned here are the fourth (Blessed are they that

hunger and thirst after justice, for they shall have their fill), which

agrees with justice, and the fifth (Blessed are the merciful, for they

shall obtain mercy), which is suitable for piety inasmuch as one who

finds his love and joy in God as Father will be compassionate to the

suffering creatures of God. Like justice, both of these Beatitudes are

exercised in reference to the neighbor (see 164).

kindness, which find a sweet joy in purposing and performing services

for others. Like justice, these acts have reference to others (163);

like piety, they see in their neighbors the children of the same

heavenly Father. Thus, justice when alone is guided by prudence; it

pays what is due to God as Lord, to man as neighbor; it acts perhaps

with pain, but from a sense of duty. But when justice is supernaturally

perfected, it is the Spirit of Piety which guides, and which makes one

to see in God one’s Father and in man the child of God; even that which

is not owed is given from mercy, and there is a hunger and thirst for

justice; and in the payment of duty to others there is at last a joy

found in the very difficulty itself.

2434. The Commandments of Justice.--The various precepts regarding

justice are contained in the Decalogue. For justice consists in the

fulfillment of duties towards others whether they be superiors, equals

or inferiors. The Ten Commandments sum up these duties of justice; the

first three prescribe the duties owed to God, the fourth the duties

owed to human superiors, and the other six the obligations which man

has to his equals or to all fellowmen.

2435. The order of the Commandments is most appropriate, for their

purpose is to form man to virtue and to lead him to perfection, which

consists in the love of God and neighbor (see 1118, 1553 sqq.), and

they therefore outline first the service that is owed to God

(Commandments of the First Table) and next the service that is owed to

man (Commandments of the Second Table).

(a) The Commandments of the First Table lay the foundation of the

edifice of justice, for they teach us that our first duty is to render

to God the things that are God’s. We must avoid, therefore, the excess

of superstition (Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me) and the

defect of irreligiousness (Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord Thy

God in vain); we must practise the virtue of religion (Remember thou

keep holy the Sabbath Day).

(b) The Commandments of the Second Table begin with the duties owed to

those to whom we are most bound after God, namely, parents, country,

superiors (Honor thy father and thy mother). Next follow prohibitions

against injuries done to any neighbor by deeds or words, whether the

harm be to his person (Thou shalt not kill), or to those who are as one

person with him (Thou shalt not commit adultery), or to a neighbor’s

external corporal goods (Thou shalt not steal), or to his external

incorporeal goods of fame and honor (Thou shalt not bear false witness

against thy neighbor). Finally, there are prohibitions against thoughts

or desires injurious to the neighbor, mention being made specially of

those internal sins that are most common on account of the utility

(Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s goods) or the pleasure (Thou shalt

not covet thy neighbor’s wife) they afford.

2436. We shall not give here any special treatment of the Decalogue.

Rather we refer the reader to the excellent explanations that are

contained in Part III of The Catechism of the Council of Trent.

Moreover, each of the Commandments has been treated in the present

work, chiefly in the Articles on justice, and supplementary matter can

be drawn from some others of its articles. For the sake of convenience,

however, we give here a list of references, showing the passages of

this Moral Theology in which the Commandments of the Decalogue are

explained.

(a) Thus, for the First Commandment read on superstition (2274 sqq.)

for the prohibitory part, on faith, hope and charity (746 sqq.) for the

perceptive part.

(b) For the Second Commandment read on irreligiousness (2299) for the

prohibitory part; on oaths, adjuration and praise (2245 sqq.) for the

preceptive part.

virtue of religion (2145 sqq.); as to its positive precept, read on

positive laws (340 sqq., 352, 425) and on the first Commandment of the

Church (see 2575 sqq.).

(d) For the Fourth Commandment read on the virtues of piety, reverence,

obedience and gratitude (2344 sqq.). Other matter will be found under

charity (1158 sqq., 1211 sqq.) and under the duties of particular

states.

(e) For the Fifth Commandment read on homicide, suicide, and bodily

injury (1816-1871). Other matter will be found in the Articles on

charity (1579 sqq., 1193 sqq.) and on affability (2421 sqq.).

(f) For the Sixth Commandment read on injustice (1719 sqq.), on

restitution (1803), and on the virtue of temperance (2461 sqq.).

(g) For the Seventh Commandment read on commutative and distributive

justice (1745 sqq.), on restitution (1751 sqq.), on injuries to

property (1872-1938), on fraud (2121 sqq.), on liberality (2424 sqq.).

(h) For the Eighth Commandment read on judicial injustice (1939 sqq.),

on unjust words (2009 Sqq.), and on truthfulness (2385 sqq.).

(i) For the Ninth and Tenth Commandments read on internal sins (230

sqq.), and on the malice of the internal act of sin (89-93).

Art. 7: THE VIRTUE OF FORTITUDE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 123-140.)

2437. The Virtue of Fortitude.--This virtue ranks next after justice

and before temperance. Prudence has the greatest amount of goodness

since it deals directly with reason, the essential good of man; justice

is next because it realizes the dictates of reason in human affairs;

the other virtues uphold the reign of reason against the rebellion of

passion, fortitude repressing fear, the most powerful foe of reason,

and temperance subduing pleasure, which is after fear the strongest of

reason’s enemies (cfr. 157, 1627, 1688). Fortitude is nobler than

temperance because more closely related to reason; it is the more

difficult virtue, because it is harder to bear pain than to abstain

from pleasure.

2438. Fortitude in General.--Fortitude (etymologically, strength,

vigor, firmness) in general is a moral quality which makes a person

unshaken from the right by danger or difficulty. It has various senses.

(a) It is used for a seeming virtue, which has the act but not the

requisites (i.e., the knowledge and the free choice) of a moral virtue.

Thus, some are brave from ignorance or want of reflection, because they

do not realize the danger (e.g., intoxicated persons) or because habit

makes them act without thought, or because many successes have rendered

them over-sanguine; others are brave from compulsion, because cowardice

is severely punished, or from passion, because they are beside

themselves with pain, anger, desire, etc.

(b) It is used for an inchoate virtue or a natural fitness to withstand

attack or encounter danger. Thus, some persons are so constituted

physically that the thought of risk, pain, or death does not affect

them strongly (fearlessness, intrepidity), or even attracts them

(adventurousness). This kind of bodily bravery is a preparation or

predisposition for moral courage.

general condition which must be found in every virtue. For there is no

virtue without firmness and persistence in good, as the name virtue

(i.e., strength) indicates. Thus, a person who is weakly inclined to

temperance and opposes no strong resistance to temptation cannot be

said to possess the virtue of temperance.

(d) Finally, fortitude is the name of a special virtue which confers

vigor and steadfastness in a special kind of trial, such as perils and

pains which threaten or inflict severe evils. It is of this fortitude

that we now speak.

2439. Definition of Fortitude.--Fortitude is defined as “a virtue which

in the face of the greatest evils moderates the passions of fear and

confidence within the bounds dictated by right reason.”

(a) The primary object of fortitude is the passions, or motions of the

sensuous appetite through which the appetite is attracted or repelled

by an object brought before it as good or evil, agreeable or

disagreeable. Justice is concerned with operations, fortitude and

temperance with passions (see 1709).

(b) The passions that chiefly fall within the scope of fortitude are

fear and confidence; and thus it is set apart from temperance, which

deals with the passions of pleasure. Fortitude has to do with that

which is disagreeable to sense, temperance with that which is

agreeable. Fear is a disturbance of soul produced by the imminence of

an external evil that cannot be easily escaped; confidence is a feeling

of self-reliance impelling one to face or attack a threatening evil.

keep them to the happy mean between excess and defect. The passions in

themselves are not evil, but they need regulation (see 121, 122); and

hence without fortitude one falls either into cowardice or rashness.

(d) Fortitude acts in the face of the greatest evils, that is, even

when death itself, the greatest of corporal evils and the king of

terrors, is at hand. Virtue is the act of a perfect man, and hence we

do not ascribe fortitude to a man who is not brave except in reference

to things that are fearful only slightly or not at all (such as having

a tooth pulled or a finger lanced). The right regulation of fear

springs, therefore, from different good qualities, according to the

kinds of objects that inspire alarm: to fortitude in the strictest

sense, if there is question of supreme natural evil (that is, death or

its equivalent in deadly disease, mortal wound or torture); to

fortitude in a wider sense, if there is question of lesser corporal

evils (e.g., blows, wounds or mutilation that do not cause death); to

some other virtue, if there is question of other kinds of evils (e.g.,

liberality regulates the fear of losing money).

(e) The motive of fortitude is conformity with right reason. The

courageous person despises dangers because he wishes to hold fast to

virtue and has for his last aim God and true beatitude. Fortitude is

exercised, then, only when one is courageous in a good cause; the end

of the work (_finis operis_), or at least the end of the agent (_finis

operantis_), must be virtuous. The aim of bravery itself is virtuous

when it is the common good (e.g., soldiers fighting in defense of

country) or the good of a particular virtue (e.g., a judge contending

for justice, a virgin for purity, a martyr for religion); the aim of

the brave man is good when he performs an indifferent act for virtue’s

sake (e.g., waits on another during pestilence because of friendship,

goes on a perilous journey because of a pilgrimage). On the contrary,

fortitude is not exercised if bravery has nothing to do with virtue

(e.g., the imperturbability during sickness or shipwreck of a person

who had resolved on suicide), or if it is opposed to virtue (e.g., the

daring and coolness of a pirate, bandit, gunman or dueller); to risk

ignoble death with bravado is not a virtue.

2440. The Two Acts of Fortitude.--(a) The moderation of fear is

followed by endurance or firmness in the midst of danger, as in the

case of the martyrs. This act in common speech is more especially

designated “fortitude.” It is not accurate to speak of it as passive

resistance or passive courage. By it, indeed, no external act is

performed, but this is due to a most firm internal resolution and

self-control, such as a refusal to accept defeat, surrender principles

or make peace with wrong. Endurance to undergo is not the same thing,

then, as stoical indifference or apathy.

(b) The moderation of confidence is followed, where circumstances call

for it, by prudent attack or even, when discretion is the better part

of valor, by retreat as in warriors. A truly brave man does not fear to

be called a coward, and hence he will not advance when reason forbids

nor hesitate to retire when reason commands. Brave endurance is a

nobler act of fortitude than brave attack; for endurance struggles

against superior strength, it feels the evil already present, and its

fight is long and continuous, whereas attack is borne on by a sense of

power, the object of dread is still in the distance, and its rush is

quick and passing (Prov., xvi. 32). Hence, not all who are courageous

in attack are courageous under attack. But both acts are noble, and

each is necessary at its proper time.

2441. The Excellence of Fortitude.--(a) Its Rank.--Fortitude is one of

the four principal or cardinal virtues. A principal virtue is one that

exercises in the most difficult circumstances one of the four qualities

that every moral virtue must have. These qualities are firmness (for

every virtue is a habit or strongly rooted quality), rectitude (since a

virtue inclines to the good as the right or obligatory), moderation

(since a virtue is moral, or measured according to reason), and

discretion (since good inclinations must be guided by true direction).

Now, just as rectitude is most difficult, on account of self-love, in

dealing with others, and moderation in governing the appetites, and

discretion in ruling one’s own actions, so firmness is most difficult

in the presence of the greatest dangers; and therefore with justice,

temperance, and prudence must also be associated fortitude as one of

the chief of all virtues. These four principal virtues are also called

cardinal virtues (from _cardo_, a hinge), because the whole moral life

of man hinges on them. Thus, though perils of death are comparatively

rare, the occasions of such perils are common and one is constantly

called on to exercise fortitude (e.g., to be prepared to incur mortal

enmities rather than forsake justice, or purity, or religion).

(b) Its Utility.--Fortitude has a certain general utility, for it is

found to be of advantage everywhere. Thus, brave men and just men are

admired in peace as well as in war, whereas liberal men are serviceable

only in certain matters (Aristotle). Fortitude is like a strong tower,

or like an army that protects the other virtues, and there are

continual demands for its exercise. The life of man is a warfare (Job,

vii. 1), and a manly spirit is needed to struggle against the

temptations, injuries, infirmities, and trials that threaten virtue.

Without fortitude, then, no one can be saved, for the kingdom of heaven

is captured only by the aggressive (Matt., xi. 12), and only those who

fight shall receive the crown (II Tim., ii. 5).

2442. Martyrdom.--As judgment is the chief act of justice (see 1727),

so martyrdom is the chief act of fortitude, and in a sense the most

perfect of all acts. For martyrdom is defined as “the voluntary

acceptance for the sake of God of a violent death inflicted out of

hatred of virtue.” Martyrdom belongs to fortitude which produces it, to

love of God which commands it (I Cor., xiii. 13), and to faith which

attracts it. Merely as an act of courage, it is inferior to some other

acts, since fortitude is not the highest virtue, and the goods for

which martyrdom is undergone must be preferable to martyrdom itself.

But in two ways martyrdom is the greatest act of virtue.

(a) Thus, internally it has charity for its end, and “greater love than

this no man hath, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (John,

xv. 13); it is the greatest sign of love of God.

(b) Externally it is a profession of faith in the superiority of the

invisible and future to the visible and present goods, and no more

efficacious proof of this faith can be given than martyrdom (Job, ii.

4; II Cor., iv. 11).

2443. Kinds of Martyrdom.--The word martyrdom is sometimes used loosely

or less accurately, and hence we distinguish the following kinds of

martyrdom:

(a) false martyrdom is death suffered in an evil cause, as when one

dies for erroneous principles or doctrines (e.g., for anarchy),

Martyrdom is testimony of blood given to the truth, not to error, and

hence it is not the suffering but the cause that makes the martyr.

Improper martyrdom is death suffered for some purely natural good, as

when a person dies for the cause of science or of a political party, or

in defense of natural truths about God but without a religious motive;

(b) true and proper martyrdom, which is not the virtue but the crown of

martyrdom, is death inflicted on an infant out of hatred for Christ, as

in the case of the Holy Innocents. This is baptism of blood for

infants, as the virtue is for adults, supplying the place of baptism of

water (Matt., x. 39);

is either in desire or in act. Martyrdom of desire, which is the wish

to die for God, may have the same essential glory as martyrdom in act,

but it lacks the accidental glory, since it does not really suffer the

trial (see 89-93). Martyrdom in act, which is external suffering for

justice’s sake, has three degrees: the lowest degree is suffering that

lacks one or other of the essential conditions (see 2444) for supreme

self-sacrifice (imperfect martyrdom), the higher degree has all the

essential conditions (perfect martyrdom), while the highest degree has

also the accidentals that are most suitable for martyrdom (complete

martyrdom);

(d) the virtue of martyrdom in the sight of the Church (canonical

martyrdom) is that which, in addition to the conditions for perfect

martyrdom, possesses also external indications sufficient to prove

their existence and character.

2444. Conditions for Martyrdom.--Since martyrdom is a virtue and the

supreme testimony, it must have the following conditions:

(a) the cause of the martyrdom must be faith (e.g., persecution because

the martyr is a Catholic), or some virtue containing a profession of

faith, inasmuch as a divine good (e.g., chastity) or a human good

(e.g., the truth of a science, the safety of one’s country) is defended

for the sake of God;

(b) the persecutor must act from hatred of virtue, but it is not

necessary that he be an unbeliever, or that he avow his hatred of

virtue as the motive of persecution, or that he pronounce or execute

the sentence of death himself;

intention suffices, and perhaps also habitual); he must be free from

guilt that provoked the sentence, and must be in the state of grace or

at least repentant; he must die from a virtuous motive, not from

vainglory, despair, or other sinful reason. Some make non-resistance a

condition for what we called perfect martyrdom, while others make it a

condition for what we called complete martyrdom; according to the

former opinion the crusaders or other soldiers dying in a just war

cannot be called martyrs of religion, but according to the second

opinion they may be ranked with the martyrs;

(d) the punishment inflicted on the martyr must be death, either

instant (as in decapitation) or delayed (as in gradual starvation,

death by slow poisoning, mortal wounds, imprisonment or other

hardship), Hence, those who are not put to death, but who are tortured,

mutilated or imprisoned (e.g., St. John the Evangelist), are confessors

of the faith, but only in an imperfect sense are they martyrs. Some

believe that suffering is necessary for perfect martyrdom, and hence

that those who are put to death painlessly are not, strictly speaking,

martyrs; but others--and with better reason, it seems--deny this. Those

who are not killed (e.g., persons who die from disease contracted while

attending the sick or from austerities), or who are killed by

themselves (e.g., the Circumcellions who thought to win martyrdom by

suicide), are not martyrs (on the cases of Sts. Apollonia and Pelagia,

see 1856).

2445. Practical Questions about Martyrdom.--(a) The Desire of

Martyrdom.--A general desire for or the willingness to suffer martyrdom

if the necessity should arise is required for salvation (I John, iii.

16; Rom., x. 10). Apart from necessity, a special desire of martyrdom

is not of precept, since martyrdom is an act of perfection; but such a

desire is of counsel, since it is encouraged by Christ (I Peter, ii.

21), and many Saints have prayed for martyrdom.

(b) The Choice of Martyrdom.--Regularly it is not lawful to offer

oneself freely for martyrdom, for to do so gives the tyrant an occasion

of committing injustice, and as a rule there are not sufficient reasons

of public or private good for permitting his sin (see 103 sqq.).

Exceptionally it is lawful, when there is no danger that one will be

overcome and there are urgent reasons for the act, such as the glory of

God or the peace of the faithful.

persecution by aggression (e.g., by destroying idols), since generally

this will make one guilty of complicity and presumption. But there are

exceptional cases, when the good of souls demands attack on evils

(Dan., xiv. 26; Matt., xiv. 3, 4). It is not provocation of

persecution, however, to live virtuously (Tob., ii. 8, 9), or to

reprove a persecutor after one has been apprehended (II Mach., viii.

15-17; Acts, vii. 51-54).

(d) Flight from Martyrdom.--Flight is sometimes sinful, sometimes

obligatory, sometimes optional, according to circumstances, as was

explained in 1005, 1006.

2446. Sins Opposed to Fortitude.--(a) Number.--The vices opposed to

fortitude are four, two of excess and two of defect, according as fear

and confidence are not regulated as to time, place, manner and other

circumstances in the way of moderation. He who fears when or as he

should not, is timorous (e.g., one who kills himself because he fears

the hardships of life, one who neglects religion out of human respect);

he who does not fear when or as he should, is insensible (e.g., one who

exposes himself to peril of death for the sake of excitement). He who

does not dare when or as he should, is cowardly (e.g., a superior who

does not correct as he should); he who dares when or as he should not,

is foolhardy (e.g., a superior who corrects when there is no chance of

a good result).

(b) Malice.--These sins _per se_ are venial, since excess or defect in

emotions, which in themselves are indifferent, is not a serious

disorder. But they become mortal if they lead to grave evil (e.g., if

from fear of persecution one becomes a pagan), or to grave danger

(e.g., if from foolhardiness one exposes oneself to death or

mutilation). Insensibility and foolhardiness are caused by pride or

vainglory, by contempt for life or for the strength of others. Timidity

and cowardice diminish culpability, though they do not remove it.

2447. The Parts of Fortitude.--As has been said above, the parts of a

virtue are subjective, integral and potential (see 1635, 1636).

(a) Fortitude has no subjective parts, for it is concerned with a very

specialized matter, namely, the danger of death; and hence there is no

room for differences of kind, although there are differences of degree

(e.g., greater courage is needed to face an ignominious or cruel death

than to face death amid applause or with little suffering).

(b) The integral parts of fortitude are those that are necessary for

the perfect functioning of its offices in reference to major dangers

(i.e., of death). Now, the first act of fortitude, namely, attack,

requires greatness of soul (which makes one love the best things and

despise all that is opposed to them) and greatness of deed (which makes

one perform generously what was nobly willed). The second act of

fortitude, namely, endurance, requires patience (that the soul be not

thrown into dejection by difficulties) and steadfastness (that the soul

be not turned aside from its purpose or wearied by long-continued

opposition).

exercised in reference to minor dangers.

2448. Greatness of Soul.--Greatness of soul or nobility (Latin,

_magnanimitas_) is a virtue that inclines one to aspire after

excellence in things most honorable, but to esteem and use honors

themselves with moderation.

(a) The first act of this virtue is aspiration. It desires the higher

manifestations of every virtue--the things that are more difficult and

that befit a generous and elevated spirit, such as great austerity,

great labor, great sacrifice, etc. Thus, it resembles fortitude, for

both virtues are exercised in difficult circumstances.

(b) The second act of this virtue is moderation. It esteems honors at

their true worth, for it is greatly concerned to possess the higher

honors (i.e., good repute before God and godly men), knowing that these

are solid and lasting, but it is less concerned about lower honors

(i.e., the esteem and applause of the world), knowing that these are

frail, fleeting, and common to good and bad alike. Hence, the great of

soul are not elated in prosperity or dejected in adversity. This virtue

here differs from fortitude, since fortitude is concerned with dangers,

which are unpleasant, while greatness of soul is occupied with honors

which are pleasant.

2449. Comparison between Greatness of Soul and Humility.--Greatness of

soul and humility are different, but not contrary.

(a) Thus, greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as worthy of great

things, when one is indeed worthy of them on account of gifts bestowed

by God (Luke, i. 46). Hence, the great of soul put the good above the

profitable, they do not busy themselves unduly about lesser things,

they are slow to ask and quick to grant favors, they are not outdone in

generosity, they are not subservient before the mighty, and they are

familiar only with friends. But if they are truly great of soul, they

are also humble, knowing that the good is from God, and that of

themselves they are weak and sinful.

(b) Greatness of soul makes one regard oneself as superior to lower

things, for it makes one loathe anything that would be unbecoming the

gifts one has received from God. Hence, as St. Thomas says, the noble

character does not flaunt his ideals, nor obtrude himself into places

or offices of honor; he does not complain or remember injuries; he is

not haughty with inferiors but gentle and considerate with all; in

manner he is quiet and unhurried, speaks sincerely, and is not much

given either to praise or to blame others. But though the noble person

despises all that is petty, he is not proud; and hence he can see the

good that is in others, and he reveres those who are superior to

himself.

2450. Vices Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Excess.--The vices opposed

to greatness of soul by excess are such as desire great deeds, or

honors, or fame, when or where or how they should not be desired.

(a) Excessive desire of great deeds is presumption, which attempts to

do greater things than one is able to perform (cfr. 1075 sqq.), This

happens in conceited persons who overestimate their own abilities,

taking on themselves offices for which they are incompetent or

exercising powers for which they have no authority; also in vulgar

persons who mistake their fortuitous advantages, such as wealth or

influence or birth, for character and ability. Presumption is a mortal

sin when its cause is a grave sin (e.g., lack of faith) or when its

effects are very harmful (e.g., when one who is ignorant presumes to

teach or practise medicine, when one who is morally frail presumes to

enter occasions of sin). There is no sin if one attempts too much in

good faith and from inculpable ignorance.

(b) Excessive desire of honors (see 2010, 2011, 2351) is ambition, or

an inordinate hankering after distinctions and deference. The great of

soul desire honors when these are due to their station or when there is

a just reason, such as the glory of God or the advantage of the

neighbor (Matt., v. 15, 16; Heb., v. 4). The ambitious, on the contrary,

seek to be honored beyond their deserts (e.g., when an ignorant man

longs for academic degrees, a tyrant wishes to be respected on account

of his tyranny, an inferior man seeks to perpetuate himself in

temporary elective offices, a rich man or athletic hero expects that he

will be revered above those who are eminent for virtue or learning), or

they seek honor for its own or their own sake, like the Pharisees who

loved the first places at feasts and the first chairs in the

synagogues, and salutations in the market place, and to be called by

men Rabbi (Matt., xxiii. 7; cfr. I Tim., iii. 1 sqq.; Matt., xx. 25).

This sin, being excessive desire of something indifferent, is not _per

se_ mortal; but it is made mortal either by a cause that is seriously

sinful (e.g., if one’s whole life is but a mad chase for preferments)

or by a result that is seriously harmful (e.g., if one commits or is

ready to commit serious injustice or uncharitableness to win a coveted

dignity). Ambition is cured chiefly by charity, for charity is not

ambitious (I Cor., xiii. 5; cfr. Gal., v. 13).

(c) The Time for Gratitude.--Internal gratitude should be immediate,