(b) Knowledge of hidden things is natura_Moral theology

certainty from the presence of their known causes, or effects, or

indications. Hence, a physician is not accused of superstition if he

reasons out the character or phase of an internal disease from the

symptoms that exhibit themselves. Moralists today generally agree that

the use of the magic wand (divining rod, dipping rod, dowser) for the

discovery of subterranean springs, mineral deposits, oil wells, etc.,

is not superstitious, although there is some difference of opinion and

uncertainty about the cause of the phenomenon. It is true that many

means of detection or discovery, supposedly scientific, are due to

misunderstanding of scientific principles or of logic; but their

authors, since they rely on natural causes, are guilty of ignorance or

quackery rather than superstition.

2289. Use of Lots.--Is it lawful to use lots in settlement of some

business, when there is no intention to seek preternatural oracle?

(a) It is lawful to do this, if there is some reason of necessity or

utility or amusement to justify the lots, and no injustice or

prohibition of law. Hence, if there is no other convenient method of

decision, one may use the drawing of straws or cards to decide how

lands or goods shall be divided between claimants, or which of several

competitors shall receive a reward or office.

(b) It is not lawful to do this, if there is a prohibition of law

(e.g., ecclesiastical elections may not be made by lot), or if there is

no necessity for the lots (e.g., it is at least foolish to use the

Gospels for deciding by lot matters that could be decided by

reflection), or if injury is done another person (e.g., to decide by

lot when the merits of two contestants are unequal, to practise

unfairness in the drawing).

2290. Vain Observance.--Vain observance is a superstition that ascribes

to certain things effects for which they have no natural or

communicated power.

(a) It ascribes the effects to natural things, but it supposes that in

some way supernatural forces, not of religion, are at work in or

through these things. Thus, just as in divination, there is in vain

observance either an express or an implied invocation of the spirits of

evil. The alchemists, who thought there was a philosopher’s stone able

to transmute base metals into gold or an elixir that could greatly

prolong life, looked to natural causes, and hence to that extent seem

to be guilty of false science, rather than of superstition. Scientific

materialism, though, is a crasser form of ignorance than any

superstition that trusts in super-material powers.

(b) The things which vain observance makes use of are persons, acts,

objects, circumstances, happenings, etc. Even sacred things may be

employed as the material for vain observance, as happens when some

accidental and unnecessary circumstance of a sacred rite (e.g., the

size or color of candles) is given the credit of the sacred results.

Here again vain observance and divination are alike, since the same

means are employed by both.

view, is some fact or event. It is this characteristic that

distinguishes vain observance from divination: the latter aims at

occult knowledge, the former at supranatural results. The expected fact

or event is something that surpasses the natural powers of physical or

human agencies (e.g., sensation without sense excitants, mind-reading

without external indications, scientific knowledge without study,

bodily feats without corresponding bodily powers, detection of secret

and hidden things without human means for detection), or even of the

invisible world of spirits (e.g., creation, generation of new

substances, evocation of the dead, internal motion of man’s will).

(d) There is no natural power in the things used for producing the

substance or mode of the desired effects, that is, no inherent and

sufficient force or activity. Hence, vain observance is not to be

confused with scientific marvels or natural wonders whose explanation

is unknown to the general public, or which cannot be fully explained by

scientists themselves. Thus, the baffling tricks of white magic are due

to legerdemain, ventriloquism, ocular delusions, and the like; the

physiological changes (e.g., convulsions, hysteria, somnambulism,

bodily cures) produced in mesmerism, hypnotism, thought healing, etc.,

are explained by suggestion and the motor power of images excited to

produce bodily motions, passions, or changes; the mental phenomena

(e.g., hyperaesthesia, wondrous visions, increased vigor of mind) of

certain drugs such as hashish, mescal and opium, are caused by

properties of these drugs.

(e) There is no communicated power in the things employed, that is, no

instrumental virtue bestowed by a higher cause. Hence, since

Sacraments, sacramentals, and miracle-working relics have from God in a

greater or less degree an efficacy for results above nature, there is

no superstition in their proper use, But, as was noted just above,

sacred things themselves may be used superstitiously, as happens when

they are regarded as principal agents, or when, contrary to fact, they

are deemed to act infallibly or independently of any human cooperation

or disposition.

2291. Forms of Vain Observance.--Among the forms of vain observance are

the following:

(a) those by which one puts into use vain ceremonies or objects in the

expectation that they will secure certain desired effects, or puts an

exaggerated confidence in lawful rites or sacred objects;

(b) those by which one directs one’s life through fortuitous and

impertinent happenings in the belief that they have the power to

influence one’s fortunes favorably or adversely. This form of

superstition is like divination by omens; the difference is that in

using omens one chiefly seeks for knowledge of the future, while in

observing chance events one chiefly intends the direction of one’s

conduct. Examples are found in persons who fear to make a journey on

Friday or to begin any important affair during the dark of the moon.

2292. Vain Observances from which Desired Effects Are Expected.--(a)

Useful results are sometimes expected, such as knowledge for the mind

(notorious art) or health for the body (healing observances). The

notorious art consisted in the repeating of certain formulas or the

gazing upon certain figures, prayers and fasts at times being added,

and it was supposed that these practices would obtain infused knowledge

without the necessity of labor or study. Healing observances are

remedies used for man or beast that manifestly have no natural curative

properties (e.g., a buckeye or rabbit’s foot carried in the pocket to

ward off rheumatism).

(b) Wondrous results are sometimes expected, such as the power to bring

on storms, telekinesis, materialization, and levitation, through the

use of incantations, theurgic sacraments, spiritistic rites, etc. This

is known as the black art or black magic.

another by a glance (evil eye or fascination), the power to cast a

spell over another person by certain spoken words, to bring disease or

misfortune on a person by piercing or striking his effigy, to excite

impure love for a determinate person by the administration of love

philtres or charms, etc. (sorcery, witchcraft).

2293. Distinction between the Fact and the Sin of Vain Observance.--(a)

The Fact.--The demons have naturally powers over our world that surpass

those of human or physical agents, and it is not impossible for them to

produce prodigies or seeming miracles. The magicians of Egypt by

enchantments and certain secrets changed rods into serpents, etc.

(Exod., vii. 12, viii. 7); the New Testament narrates that Simon the

Magician bewitched the Samaritans by his magic (Acts, viii. 11), and it

clearly foretells the lying wonders of Satan and Antichrist (Matt.,

xxiv. 24; II Thess., ii. 9). But there are limits to the power of the

fallen spirits; for example, they cannot infuse knowledge, and

occultism has contributed nothing to the advancement of science or

civilization. Moreover, many effects that have been attributed to

demonic intervention were due to natural causes or to fraud (e.g., a

large proportion of spiritistic phenomena), or they were supposed to

exist only because the popular mind was carried away by excitement or

was bent on persecution (e.g., most of the witchcraft accusations of a

few centuries ago).

(b) The Sin.--Vain observance in which there is no express invocation

of evil spirits is common enough; even religious, educated and

practical persons are found to act on superstitious hopes or fears or

to put confidence in charms or amulets. But vain observance that

includes an express invocation of demons is a comparatively rare sin.

It is not impossible, however, that a person should come to such a pass

of despair or malice as to wish to have dealings with Satan, or should

be so carried away by curiosity, desire of wealth, power, fame, or

honor as to be willing to barter his soul in exchange for them. That

there were professional wizards from ancient times is a matter of

history, and Scripture contains severe prohibitions against dealings

with them (Levit., xix. 31, xx. 27; Deut., xviii. 10).

2294. Superstition in Religious Observances.--Superstition is sometimes

found even in religious observances. (a) Thus, there is superstition in

the observance itself when vain additions are made to an approved usage

(e.g., the addition to a prayer against sickness of gestures,

breathings, gibberish, etc., that have no significance of reverence for

God). (b) There is superstition in the manner of the observance when

one attributes the virtue of a sacred rite or object to some

unimportant circumstance (e.g., the shape of the reliquary in which a

relic is carried, the “propitious” day on which a sacramental was

received), or expects from a sacred thing an effect which it has no

power to produce (e.g., infallible certainty of salvation from the

performance of a certain devotion or the presence of a holy picture or

blessed object). It is not superstition, however, to attach

significance to circumstances that have a sacred meaning (e.g.,

holydays, figures that have a religious symbolism), or to put a

confidence in sacred things that is based on their character or

approved usage (e.g., the hope and trust that blessings will be

impetrated and salvation itself through fidelity to an authorized

devotion).

2295. Sinfulness of Vain Observance.--The malice of vain observance is

essentially the same as that of divination, for in both superstitions

the same virtue of religion is offended by the sinful cult that is

performed.

(a) Thus, there is mortal sin from the nature of the act, when vain

observance is exercised with invocation of evil spirits or with false

religious rites (for a serious injury is done to the honor due to God),

or when a vain observance is meant to bring a curse or grave misfortune

on a neighbor (for a serious injustice is willed).

(b) There is regularly only a venial sin, when a vain observance is of

a non-religious kind, consisting in foolish heed given to chance

happenings (such as a rabbit running across the road, the mention of

death, the presence of a person regarded as a Jonah), or the use of

improportionate means (e.g., to change one’s place at a card table in

order to change the luck). For usually there is no irreverence in such

practices, and at the worst they are foolish and idle acts. Often there

is no sin at all, the vain observance being due to ignorance or the

wish to joke.

practices to which on account of simplicity or invincible ignorance too

much power is attributed, as when one who is faithful to the essential

duties of religion has greater confidence in some personal devotion of

his own than in them. But superstition of this kind, though in itself

it is the least reprehensible form of superstition, may be very harmful

and disedifying.

2296. Cooperation in Divination or Other Form of Superstition.--(a)

Formal cooperation is of course never lawful (e.g., to act as the

medium or one of the deceivers at a spiritistic meeting). (b) Material

cooperation is lawful only when there is a proportionately grave

reason, no danger of sin, and no scandal. Thus, it seems that no sin is

committed by a scientist who assists at a spiritistic seance in order

to discover the frauds that are resorted to, or who makes experiments

with table turning or planchette movements in order to examine into the

theory that the phenomena are due to the action of the persons present.

2297. Doubtful Cases of Vain Observance.--Cases in which it is a matter

of doubt or dispute whether divination or vain observance is present.

(a) There is sometimes uncertainty whether an extraordinary fact is due

to natural or supranatural causes, Thus, authorities commonly take the

position, it seems, that certain phenomena of Spiritism (e.g., the

apparently automatic movement of tables on which a group of persons

rest their finger tips, the answers to questions that are rapped out by

such tables), and of mental healing (e.g., the cure of bodily ailment

by sympathy or moral influence), are accomplished through natural

powers of matter or mind. But other authorities incline to a

supranaturalistic explanation.

(b) There is also at times uncertainty whether a fact or practice has a

religious or an irreligious character. As to facts, they sometimes

appear to be so marvellous as to pass the natural, and yet it is

difficult to determine whether their source is good or evil (e.g., when

an ignorant person not noted for piety seems to have a remarkable

ability for treating and curing all kinds of diseases). As to

practices, they are sometimes susceptible of a religious or a

superstitious interpretation. Thus, one who says, “God bless us,” at a

sneeze may intend a prayer against sickness; one who knocks on wood

after boasting may intend a prayer to Him who died on the wood of the

cross, lest he be punished for boasting.

2298. Licitness of Using Doubtfully Superstitious Means.--It is lawful

to use means that are only doubtfully superstitious if the following

conditions are present:

(a) internally or subjectively, there must be a good conscience about

the use of the means. The rule can be followed that what is not

certainly of a supranatural character may be regarded as natural, but

that what seems to be supranatural is not to be ascribed to God unless

it has the marks and fruits of a divine work. When lawfully using means

of a dubious character, it is advisable to make an inner protestation

that one acts from reasonable necessity, and has no wish to take part

in superstition;

(b) externally or objectively, there must be nothing in the object or

circumstances or results to make the use of the means illicit. Thus,

even though a practice be not superstitious, it may be unlawful because

of the immorality of its object or tendency (e.g., frauds used by

psychical researchers, obscene messages given by laboratory

telepathists), or of its purpose (e.g., table-rapping used as the

instrument of pretended religious revelations), or because of the evil

consequences for body or soul (e.g., devotees of the ouija board give

scandal to others and often end in insanity or suicide).

2299. Irreligiousness.--We now proceed to the four sins that offend

religion by defect, namely, temptation of God and perjury, which show

disrespect to God Himself, and sacrilege and simony, which show

disrespect to holy things (see 2273). Perjury has been treated above

(see 2249), and hence we shall consider now only the other three forms

of irreligiousness.

2300. Temptation of God.--Temptation of God is a word or deed that puts

God to the test to discover whether He possesses or will exercise some

perfection.

(a) It is a word or deed, such as a prayer whose purpose is to discover

whether God is possessed of knowledge, power or goodness, or an act of

defiance performed in order to prove that there is no God.

(b) It puts God to the test, that is, the temptation is not seductive

(since it is impossible to influence God to sin), but experimental. He

who tempts God desires that God give some proof of His attributes.

one legitimately tests out the character of a human being. God Himself

tempted by trial holy men like Abraham, Job, and Tobias in order that

their virtue might be manifested and an example given to others. And of

spirits St. John says: “Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits

if they be of God, because many false prophets are gone out into the

world” (I John, iv. 1).

(d) The purpose is to discover, without regard to the ordinary means of

instruction and guidance appointed by God, whether God possesses or

will exercise an attribute; that is, temptation of God is due to

unbelief or to presumption.

2301. Cases Wherein There Is no Temptation of God.--(a) To seek a proof

of divine perfections is not temptation of God, if the purpose is only

to find new reasons for what one already accepts, or to experience in

an affective way what one already admits speculatively. Hence, a

theologian may study the attributes of God with a view to further

illumination; hence also, one may prove the sweetness of God or the

goodness of His will from the spiritual taste or relish for divine

things (Psalm xxxiii. 9; Rom., xii. 2).

(b) To seek a sign of God’s will or a manifestation of His perfections

is not temptation of God, if this is done, not from curiosity,

ostentation or other vain motive, but from some reason of necessity or

great utility, as when Gedeon prayed for a sign that the Lord had

spoken to him or was with him (Judges, vi. 17, 37), or when Elias

called on Jehovah to show His power before the worshippers of Baal (III

Kings, xviii. 37). Hence, he does not tempt God who, when ordinary

means of direction fail him in some critical affair, asks humbly for a

sign of God’s will; or who in a matter of great moment asks for

miraculous help if it be pleasing to God to grant it; or who exposes

himself to serious danger for some priceless good that cannot otherwise

be had, in the trust that God will be with him.

2302. Kinds of Temptation of God.--(a) In relation to its source,

temptation of God arises either from unbelief or from presumption. The

former, which is temptation of God in the strict sense, exists when one

disbelieves or doubts some attribute of God and seeks to put it to the

proof, as when the Israelites in the desert called into question the

providence and power of Jehovah (Exod., xvii. 7, Psalm lxxvii. 18, 19),

or when a person doubting the Real Presence asks for a miraculous sight

of Christ in the Eucharist. The latter sin, which is temptation of God

in the wide sense, is committed when a believing person asks without a

just cause for a miraculous manifestation of God’s will, or powers, or

of some other thing, as when a lazy man asks that his work be done in

some miraculous way, or a rash man neglects the ordinary care of his

health, asking that God supply for his carelessness. But temptation of

God is not to be identified with the theological sin of presumption

(see 1081).

(b) In relation to its manner, temptation of God is either express or

interpretative. It is express when one intends by one’s word or act to

put God to the proof in respect to knowledge, power, reliability, or

other perfection (as when the Jews demanded that Christ come down from

the Cross, if He were the Son of God) or to satisfy a vain curiosity or

boldness (as when Herod asked Christ to work some miracles for his

amusement). Temptation of God is interpretative when one does not

intend to discover God’s perfections or make presumptuous requests, but

nevertheless so acts or omits to act that one’s conduct is useful for

nothing except temptation of God, as when a believer rashly promises a

miracle to convince an unbeliever, a sick man refuses to use any

medical care (Ecclus., xxxviii. 4), a lecturer goes entirely unprepared

to his lecture, etc. Prayer made without the proper dispositions is a

quasi-temptation of God (Ecclus., xviii. 23), because it is

disrespectful and presumptuous; but it is not real temptation of God,

nor of its nature mortally sinful, the direct end of the act being

laziness or some other state of soul unsuitable to prayer.

2303. Causes that Exclude the Interpretative Temptation of God.--There

is no interpretative temptation of God strictly speaking if one acts

rashly or encounters danger, but does not at all expect miraculous or

special intervention from God. This happens as follows:

(a) when one is unconcerned whether evil results or not, or desires

that it may result (e.g., when a person who is tired of life seeks a

dangerous occupation for the diversion and excitement it affords, or

when a person practises abstinence from certain remedies as an act of

moderate mortification);

(b) when one does not wish the evil result, but is so stupid or rash as

to believe that an imprudent risk can be taken and evil escaped through

chance or good luck, as when a student goes up for a difficult

examination with slight preparation, trusting that only the things he

knows will be asked.

2304. Refusal of Medicine or Hygienic Care.--(a) If there is a

sufficient reason for this conduct, no sin is committed. There may be

sufficient reasons of a natural kind (e.g., that the remedies are

harmful or useless or too expensive), or of a supernatural kind (e.g.,

St. Agatha refused all medicines because God Himself was her physician,

certain Saints were divinely inspired to make no effort to remove

bodily maladies on account of the spiritual profit derived from them).

(b) If there is no sufficient reason for this conduct, it is sinful.

Thus, one sins against faith, if the reason for the conduct is

disbelief in the existence of evil (e.g., Christian Science or Eddyism

attributes sickness and pain to imagination, and says that the only

cure is “faith”); one sins by temptation of God, if the reason for the

conduct is vain expectation of miracles; one is guilty of suicide or

homicide, if the purpose is to end life, etc.

2305. The Sinfulness of Temptation of God.--(a) To doubt the

perfections of God, or to call upon the extraordinary Providence of God

in disregard of the ordinary Providence He has established is the

essence of temptation of God. It is sinful, because it includes either

unjustifiable doubt or vincible ignorance in the intellect or

presumption in the will. Hence the command given in Deuteronomy (vi.

16): “Thou shalt not tempt the Lord thy God.” But invincible ignorance

excuses from sin, and hence many of those who in times past resorted to

ordeals by painful or dangerous tests (e.g., walking on burning coals,

risking death in deep waters), in order that God might settle a

doubtful matter, were, on account of their good faith, guiltless of

temptation of God. The practice was condemned by the Church in the

ninth century.

(b) To doubt about the positive and unknown will of God, or to call

upon the extraordinary Providence of God (i.e., the direct intervention

of the First Cause), without disregard of the ordinary Providence

(i.e., of second causes appointed by God), is not sinful, if it is

justified by necessity. Thus, being unable to resist the nations

leagued against him, Josaphat prayed: “As we know not what to do, we

can only turn our eyes to Thee” (II Paral., xx. 12). And Our Lord

promised the disciples that, when they should be unable to prepare

their defense on account of the persecutions to which they were

subjected, the Spirit Himself would speak through them (Matt., X. 19),

and that He would enable them to do things as difficult as moving

mountains when real necessity called for it (Matt., xvii. 19). It is

not unbelief to doubt about matters pertaining to God that are really

doubtful (i.e., not His perfections, but His positive and unknown

will), and hence one does not tempt God who asks for divine guarantees

of a religion proposed as divinely revealed (see 795); it is not

presumption to ask God for a sign or proof, if God directs one to do

this (e.g., Abraham in Gen., xv. 8, was inspired to seek a sign that

the promised land would be given his posterity; Achaz in Isaias, vii.

11, was bidden for the sake of others to ask for a sign), or if, when a

sign from God seems necessary or very useful, one prays for it

prudently and on condition that the request is pleasing to God (e.g.,

the Apostles in Acts, iv. 30, prayed for signs and wonders in

confirmation of their preaching).

2306. The Malice of Temptation of God.--(a) It is a sin directly

against religion, for one shows contempt to God when one demands that

He prove His perfections, or when one takes the liberty to disregard

the ordinary means He has established and to call for others. The sin

is less, however, than that of superstition, since temptation of God

professes doubt, while superstition professes positive error.

Temptation of God offends also against other virtues, such as faith

(e.g., when one doubts the perfections of God), hope (e.g., when one

presumes that God will do all without one’s cooperation), charity

(e.g., when a person exposes his own life to risk or his neighbor to

scandal in a vain confidence that the danger will be miraculously

averted).

(b) It is a mortal sin from its nature, since it offends religion. But

it may be venial on account of the imperfection of the act, as when

from weakness of faith or without reflection one asks unnecessarily for

a sign (Luke, i. 11-20). It may be venial also from the lightness of

the matter, if the temptation is interpretative, as when one presumes

on the divine aid in a slight sickness, an unimportant talk, or other

small affair.

2307. As a rule temptation of God is only a venial sin, and in an

individual case it is rarely mortal, except in the following instances:

(a) when one intends a grave offense against God, as by doubting His

goodness, demanding or attempting a miracle to satisfy curiosity;

(b) when one exposes oneself to grave peril, as by leaping from the

roof of a high building, refusing all remedies or means of preserving

health, neglecting to provide for one’s sustenance, etc., in the

expectation that God will miraculously provide;

asking for signs exposes faith to the derision of unbelievers or

scandalizes believers.

2308. Sacrilege.--Sacrilege in the wide sense is any sin against the

virtue of religion. But in the strict sense, in which it is now taken,

it is defined as “the violation of a sacred thing.”

(a) Sacrilege is against a thing, that is, against some person, place

or object dedicated to divine worship as a possession of God. Sacrilege

differs from the two previous sins of irreligiosity (namely, temptation

of God and perjury); for they are against the reverence due to God

Himself, while sacrilege is against the reverence due to things on

account of their use in the worship of God.

(b) It is against a sacred thing, that is, against the sanctity which a

thing acquires from its dedication to God (e.g., when a church or a

chalice is consecrated to divine worship, when a virgin is dedicated to

God by vow), or from the immunity or privilege conferred on it by the

Church on account of its dedication to God (e.g., the clerical

privileges of forum and of canon in Church Law). But sacrilege is

present only when a sacred thing is attacked in that special quality or

relation in which it is sacred. Hence, he who violates the chastity of

a virgin consecrated to God is guilty of sacrilege, since it is her

chastity that was vowed to God; he who strikes her is also guilty of

sacrilege, since he attacks the sacred immunity which the law confers

on her; he who calumniates her or steals from her is not guilty of

sacrilege, since her name and goods are not consecrated to divine

worship nor protected by its special sacredness in law.

or morally injurious to the sacred character of a person, place or

thing. The difference between the injury done in sacrilege and that

done in simony is that the former injustice belongs to the class of

wrongs inflicted in involuntary commutations, such as theft or robbery

(see 1748, 1815), whereas the latter injustice pertains to the category

of wrongs perpetrated in voluntary commutations, such as buying,

selling, or lending. In both cases there is an injury to the property

or possession of God, but the difference is that in sacrilege the

parties involved are the sacrilegious person acting as aggressor

against God, in simony the parties are two men bargaining together to

buy and sell the sacred things of God.

2309. What Kind of Consecration Must Be Violated to Constitute

Sacrilege?--There are various opinions about the kind of assignment to

worship necessary for the sacredness which is injured by sacrilege.

(a) The opinion that seems to be common today holds that the assignment

must be made through some public rite or consecration on the part of

the Church. Hence, according to this view, the violation of a private

vow or resolution is not sacrilegious, but rather perfidious or

disloyal. The argument for this opinion is that the public acceptance

of the Church, which has control over divine worship, is a necessary

factor in making anything sacred to that worship; and that many

absurdities would follow from the principle that each individual has

the power to give the sacredness in question to his own person, acts or

possessions.

(b) According to a stricter opinion, no public assignment is necessary

if the consecration is a personal one; and hence the violation of even

a private vow of chastity would be sacrilegious. The argument is that

even a private vow affecting the person sets it apart as a sacred thing.

is necessary, whether the consecration be personal or non-personal, and

hence even the violation of a vow to fast would be sacrilegious. The

argument is that anything set apart for God’s honor, either publicly or

privately, becomes sacred to Him.

2310. Is Sacrilege a Special Sin?--(a) As regards its matter or subject

sacrilege may be called, though improperly, a general sin, in the sense

that many different classes of sins may be sacrilegious (e.g., murder

is sacrilegious when a sacred person is killed, lust is sacrilegious

when a person vowed to God is violated; theft is sacrilegious when

objects consecrated to divine worship are stolen, etc.).

(b) As regards its form or essence, and hence properly speaking,

sacrilege is a special sin, because there is a peculiar deformity

contained in the very nature of sacrilege that is not in other sins,

namely, the disrespect shown to God through contempt for things that

are sacred to Him. Moreover, there may be a sin of sacrilege that is

separate from other sins, such as murder, lust, and theft, for example,

when the right of asylum is violated.

2311. The Species of Sacrilege.--(a) Personal sacrilege is committed

when the sacredness of a person is violated. This happens in the first

place when bodily or real harm (e.g., gravely sinful striking, citing

before a secular tribunal, subjecting to civil duties or burdens, such

as military service) is done to a cleric; and in the second place when

a grave sin of unchastity is committed by or with a person dedicated to

God by a vow (at least by a public vow) of chastity. Sacrilege

committed through bodily or real harm is treated by canonists under the

questions of the privileges of canon (Canon 119), forum (Canon 120),

immunity (Canon 121). Sacrilegious impurity committed with a person

vowed to chastity and sacrilegious impurity committed by a person vowed

to chastity are grave sins of lust, even though they be only of thought

or desire.

(b) Local sacrilege is committed when the sacredness of a place is

injured. A place is considered sacred or religious when it possesses

sanctity as being consecrated or blessed for divine worship or for

burial of the faithful, namely, churches, public or semi-public

oratories, and consecrated cemeteries. Injury is done to the holiness

of the place by desecration or profanation. Desecration is the

performance in a sacred place of a notorious act of irreverence which

so spiritually contaminates it that the divine offices may not be

lawfully celebrated therein until the rite of reconciliation has been

performed. Canon 1172 enumerates four causes of desecration: the crime

of homicide; the injurious and serious shedding of human blood; impious

or sordid uses (e.g., if a church were turned into a brothel or

gambling den, a dump, or cattle stable), and burial of an infidel or

person excommunicated by condemnatory or declaratory sentence.

Profanation of a sacred place is a disregard for the religious respect

or immunity due to it which in some way materially contaminates it

(e.g., if a church is not kept nice and clean; if markets and fairs are

held in its precincts; if it is used for shows, plays, moving pictures,

banquets, court proceedings; if the right of asylum is violated; if the

church is broken into, seriously defaced, burned). These matters are

treated more fully in commentaries on Canons 1172 sqq.

violated. An object is sacred when it contains the Author of holiness

or confers holiness (viz., the Eucharist and the other Sacraments),

when it is naturally related to the Sacraments or sacred persons (e.g.,

the sacred vessels, images and relics of the Saints), when it is set

aside for the uses of worship (e.g., holy water and other sacramentals,

candles for the altar) or the maintenance of the Church or its

ministers (viz., movables and immovables of a parish, money left for

the support of the clergy, seminarians, etc.). Injury is done to the

holiness of an object by unworthy treatment or by unjust damage or

conversion. Examples of unworthy treatment are the following: the

invalid or sinful administration or reception of a Sacrament, parodies

of Sacred Scripture, scandalous manner of enacting sacred rites or

saying prayers, use of sacred chalices or other sacred vessels or of

blessed articles for profane purposes, use of unblessed holy articles

for sordid or ignoble purposes, handling of chalices, etc., by those

who have no right to touch sacred vessels (Canon 1306). Examples of

unjust damage or conversion are: contemptuous breaking or burning of

relics, oils, pictures used for worship; theft of moneys or goods

belonging to the Church.

2312. Special Cases Regarding Local Sacrilege.--Local sacrilege is not

committed by every sin, even though grave, that is done in a holy

place, for the character of this sacrilege is that it be such an injury

to the sacredness of the place as to make what should be hallowed seem

horrible, or contemptible, or common. Hence, there is no sacrilege in

detractions, lies, perjuries, blasphemies, or in most internal sins,

when committed in a church or cemetery. But there are two kinds of sins

which are sacrilegious profanations of holy places, namely, theft and

impurity.

(a) Theft in a holy place is certainly sacrilegious when the thing

taken is sacred (e.g., a chalice, money in the votive stands). It is

probably not sacrilegious when the thing taken is not sacred (e.g., the

pocketbook of a person kneeling in the church), and if the thing taken

was not left in the custody of the place. This matter, however, is

disputed.

(b) Impurity, if external and perfect (_voluntaria effusio seminis_),

is sacrilegious, though under the Code it does not seem to be a

desecration. The same is probably true of external but imperfect sins

(such as touches, looks, words, gestures). Internal acts of impurity

are not sacrilegious, unless they include a desire to sin externally in

a holy place.

2313. Cases Wherein There Is No Sacrilege.--In the following cases no

sacrilege is committed:

(a) when the thing violated is not sacred. There is no personal

sacrilege in an act of unchastity committed by a person privately vowed

to chastity (common opinon). While some authors teach that personal

sacrilege is committed by the violation of poverty and obedience (see

Merkelbach, _Summa Theologiae Moralis_ II, n.804, 4), it seems better

to hold the opposite opinion and restrict personal sacrilege to

violations of chastity by persons with religious vows or admitted to

the religious state. There is no local sacrilege in the profane use of

a place devoted to works of piety but not specially set apart for them

by Church authority (such as a private oratory, or a hospital conducted

by the laity), nor in the burial of infidels in an unblessed graveyard.

There is no real sacrilege in profane use of things which are not set

apart exclusively for sacred use (e.g., to use the candelabra and

candles of the altar to read by in one’s room), or which have not been

made sacred (e.g., to steal money promised but not delivered to the

Church or the personal belongings of a cleric);

(b) when the thing injured is sacred, but the action or omission is not

opposed to the attribute in which it is holy, or to a law made to

ensure respect for it. Thus, a person who has the vow of chastity does

not commit sacrilege if he becomes intoxicated or uses profane

language, for he was not consecrated against those sins; a sacred place

is not sacrilegiously violated by an act not opposed to its holiness or

the respect demanded for it by the law (e.g., organ recitals or awards

for Christian Doctrine in church, sale of candles in the vestibule,

physical violence against a disturber of divine service). Sacrilege is

not done in reverently destroying an old and tattered vestment, in

respectfully handling agnus deis, relics, unused palls, and other

objects that may be touched by all.

2314. Sacredness as Aggravating Circumstance of Sin.--But a sin that is

not sacrilegious is often made worse by reason of the sacredness of

some thing with which the sin is connected. (a) Thus, the sin is

aggravated by such circumstances as person and place. In this way it is

worse for a person vowed to God to blaspheme or lie than for one who

has no vow; it is worse to carry on frivolous or calumnious

conversations in church than on the street. (b) The sin receives the

additional malice of sacrilege if the sinner expressly intends the

circumstance of time, place, etc., in order to show contempt. Thus, it

is not sacrilege to get drunk on a Sunday or holyday, unless one wishes

by the sin to show dishonor to the sacred time; it is not sacrilege to

conduct oneself with levity in church, unless one wishes by the levity

to show contempt for the place.

2315. The Malice of Sacrilege.--(a) The moral malice of sacrilege is

that of irreligiousness (see 2299). The three kinds of sacrilege

(personal, local and real) are commonly regarded as three distinct

species of sin; for, just as injuries done to a man’s person, to his

immovable property, and to his movable goods are looked upon in law as

different kinds of offenses, so are injuries offered to the ministers

of God, the house of God, and the objects used in the service of God

unequal in the dishonor which they give to God before the public. More

probably there are no sub-species of these three classes of sacrilege.

Hence, in so far as the disrespect to God is concerned, there seems no

essential difference between the sin of violating and that of striking

a consecrated virgin.

(b) The theological malice of sacrilege is mortal from the nature of

the sin. Just as it is gravely insulting to a man to treat his

representatives or his home or chattels with contempt, likewise

disrespect for the things of God is disrespect for God Himself. The

seriousness of sacrilege is seen from the punishments visited on Core,

Dathan and Abiron (Num., xvi), on the sons of Heli (I Kings, ii. 17,

iv. 11), on King Balthasar (Dan., v. 2 sqq.), and on the sellers in the

temple (John, ii. 14). Sacrilege may be venial, however, on account of

the imperfection of the act (e.g., when one strikes a priest without

reflecting that he is a clergyman) or the smallness of the matter

(e.g., to quote Scripture in a decent joke, to use altar linen that is

only slightly soiled or torn, to touch the chalice without permission,

to steal a few pennies from a church).

2316. Conditions that Govern Gravity of Sacrilege.--To decide in a

concrete case whether a sacrilege is gravely or lightly sinful, one

should consider the internal state of mind of the offender and the

external character of the offense. (a) Thus, if the purpose is directly

and formally to dishonor God, the sin is grave, but, if there is some

other purpose, it may be light. (b) If the thing dishonored is more

closely related to God, or if the act of dishonor is in public

estimation more insulting, the sin is more serious. Unworthy treatment

of the Eucharist is the worst of sacrileges; ill-usage of a sacred

person is worse than disrespect for a sacred place; treading the Sacred

Species under foot is more contemptuous than an unworthy Communion, etc.

2317. Simony.--Simony derives its name from Simon Magus, the first

person in New Testament times, as far as we know, who committed this

crime. For it is written of Simon (Acts, viii. 18 sqq.) that he

attempted to buy from St. Peter the power of imposition of hands. But

the sin was not unknown in the Old Testament, as we see from the

examples of Baalam (Numb., xxii. 7), Giezi (IV Kings, v. 20 sqq.), and

Jason (II Mach., iv. 7 sqq.).

2318. Definition of Simony.--Simony is defined as “the studied will to

buy or sell for a temporal price or consideration something that is

spiritual either intrinsically or extrinsically.”

(a) Simony is in the will, for it is an act of injustice pretending to

have or to receive the right of dominion over spiritual things that

belong to God alone, and injustice is a vice of the will. Hence, simony

is not an internal sin of the intellect; for, though one who practises

simony externally makes to some extent a profession of belief in the

heresy that man is the owner of spirituals and gives grounds for the

suspicion that he holds that the sale of spirituals is lawful, yet he

may know well that the things of God are priceless and still wish to

give or receive a price for them. Again, simony is not to be identified

with the external act of bargaining for spirituals; for, though the law

punishes only external or completed simony, the guilt and malice of the

sin is present even when one has the desire to traffic in spiritual

things, but makes no overtures or compact.

(b) Simony is a studied will; that is, it is an act of free and

deliberate choice selecting some form of internal or external simony as

a desirable means. Hence, it is not sufficient for the sin of simony

that there be an internal wish not fully voluntary on account of

inculpable ignorance or imperfect consent; nor, on the other hand, is

it necessary for incurring the guilt of simony that there be a mutual

pact, but it suffices that one party alone have the will to make the

pact or to obligate another party to simony.

thing in exchange for a spiritual thing. There is question here, then,

not only of the contract of sale, but of any other form of onerous

contract, such as hire, rent, loan, exchange, _do ut des_, _facio ut

facias_, etc. To be simoniacal, however, a contract need not be

fulfilled or explicitly manifested; it suffices that it be unfulfilled

or tacitly made, if the sinful intent can be gathered from the

circumstances of the case. Hence, from the present part of the

definition it follows that there is no simony in a gratuitous contract

(e.g., when one gives a gift to another hoping and expecting that the

later from gratitude will give in return something spiritual which it

is lawful to bestow from gratitude; when a poor person offers to make a

novena for benefactors who give him an alms). It is simony, however, to

make an onerous contract under the guise of a gratuitous contract, for

example: “I give you this money as a pure gift on condition that you

will not be ungrateful but will give me this spiritual favor as a pure

gift.”

(d) The price or consideration in simony is some thing, action or

forbearance which in some way is of advantage to the recipient. Simony

in the strictest sense is committed when a temporal thing is offered

for a spiritual thing (e.g., money paid for a Sacrament); simony in the

wide sense is committed when, contrary to the law on simony, things

like in character are exchanged (2323 a). Thus, if the Church forbids

Mass to be exchanged for Mass, or benefice for benefice, or the office

of sacristan for that of sexton, transgressors are guilty of the second

form of simony.

(e) The matter of simony is something intrinsically or extrinsically

spiritual. In general, the spiritual is that which proceeds from God or

tends to Him as the Author or End of eternal salvation (viz., the

destiny, law, means, works, etc., proposed to us in Christian

revelation and religion). Among these things those are intrinsically

spiritual that pertain to the supernatural order on account of some

inherent character of their own (e.g., grace, Sacraments, Mass,

miracles) or some intimate union with things spiritual (e.g., benefices

attached to spiritual offices, consecration to be given a chalice);

those are extrinsically spiritual that are in themselves temporal, but

in church law are treated as spiritual for the sake of reverence to the

intrinsically spiritual (e.g., chrism in regard to the material itself

of the oil and other ingredients). If the matter of a contract is

neither intrinsically nor extrinsically spiritual, there is no simony

in buying or selling it (e.g., devotional books, household furnishings

of a rectory, personal effects of a cleric).

2319. Temporal Price in Simony.--The temporal price in simony is some

temporal good or advantage. St. Gregory the Great distinguishes three

kinds of simoniacal prices as follows:

(a) the price from the hand (_munus a manu_) is either money or things

that have a money value, such as movable or immovable property,

corporeal or incorporeal rights. It would be simony to give a benefice

in exchange for a sum of money, for a loan, for real estate;

(b) the price from the tongue (_munus a lingua_) is any kind of

patronage, such as praise, recommendation, protection, defense,

opposition to competitors, etc. It would be simony to confer a benefice

in exchange for the influence in one’s favor which the recipient of the

benefice would exercise with some powerful person, for his vote in an

election, etc.;

labor or assistance given for another’s benefit, such as the management

of his business or the instruction of his children. It would be simony

to grant a benefice in exchange for work done as secretary, treasurer,

or advisor.

2320. The Spiritual Thing in Simony.--The thing inherently spiritual in

simony is also of three kinds. (a) That which is spiritual from its

nature is a thing that is supernatural in itself, such as sanctifying

grace, the Gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the power of orders or of

jurisdiction. (b) That which is supernatural from its cause is a thing

produced by a supernatural agency or power, such as health obtained

through miracle. (c) That which is supernatural from its effect is a

thing having the virtue of producing supernatural results, _ex opere

operato_, or _ex opere operantis_, or as an occasion (e.g., Sacraments,

prayers, sermons).

2321. Temporal Thing United with Spiritual.--In the two following ways

things are made spiritual in reference to simony through intimate union

with spirituals: (a) by necessary connection, when a temporal thing is

so annexed with a spiritual thing that it cannot exist without it. This

includes the things annexed consequently, and perhaps also those

annexed concomitantly and intrinsically (see 2322); (b) by contractual

connection, when a spiritual and a temporal are the partial objects of

a contract, as when in the sale of a consecrated chalice the price is

raised on account of the consecration.

2322. Temporal Thing Annexed to Spiritual.--In three ways a temporal

thing is annexed to a spiritual thing.

(a) The temporal thing is annexed antecedently if it precedes the

spiritual thing as its prepared or appointed or presupposed matter or

subject. Thus, all things that receive a consecration or blessing

(e.g., chalices, rosaries) or a property to which a right of patronage

is attached are of this kind. Relics are properly of this category,

but, since they have usually no material value, it is customary to

include them amongst spirituals.

(b) The temporal thing is annexed concomitantly if it is simultaneous

with the spiritual thing as being the action or labor that produces it.

If the union is essential and inseparable, the temporal thing is said

to be annexed intrinsically (e.g., the work performed in saying Mass,

preaching, making a sick call); if the union is not essential, the

temporal thing is said to be annexed extrinsically (e.g., the special

work performed in saying Mass, if it has to be sung, or said in a

distant church, or at a determined hour).

spiritual thing as the cause on which it depends. Thus, the revenues of

a parish are a temporal thing, but they follow on the pastoral office

which is a spiritual thing.

2323. The Various Kinds of Simony.--(a) In reference to its matter or

the law violated, simony is either against natural and divine law or

against positive ecclesiastical law. Simony against divine law consists

in the exchange for temporalities of things that are spiritual or

intimately annexed to the spiritual (see 2321), such as Sacraments,

indulgences, or jurisdiction. Simony against church law consists in an

exchange that has the appearance of simony against divine law, or that

easily leads to simony against the divine law, and is consequently

forbidden by the Church in order to safeguard religious respect for

sacred things, as when one violates the law by taking money for holy

oils. In the former kind of simony, things of different orders

(spirituals and temporals) are exchanged one for the other; in the

latter kind of simony, things of the same sort (spirituals for

spirituals, temporals for temporals, etc.) are exchanged where the law

forbids (Canon 727).

(b) In reference to its manner, or the way in which it is committed,

simony is internal or external. Internal simony is the will, without

the external agreement, to exchange spirituals for temporals; it is

purely mental if nothing external is done by reason of the internal

will; it is not purely mental if something external is done by reason

of the internal will (e.g., if the person who desires to commit simony

makes a money present to another in the hope that the latter will feel

morally bound to give something spiritual in return, or if one gives

something spiritual looking for a substantial gift of money as

compensation). External simony is an outward pact freely entered into

between two parties to exchange spirituals for temporals. It is called

purely conventional, if neither party has as yet performed his part of

the agreement; it is semi-real or mixed, if one of the parties has

executed his part; it is real if both parties have performed, at least

in part, what they agreed to. A simoniacal compact is explicit, if

expressed by clear words or signs (e.g., “I will pay $100 for your

vote”); it is tacit, if circumstances indicate the evil intention

(e.g., very unusual presents given before an election).

2324. Confidential Simony.--Simony committed in reference to benefices

is called confidential because the contract is illegal, giving no

judicial protection, and there is only the confidence or reliance on

another’s word to give assurance that the agreement will be kept.

Canonists discuss at length the following contracts in which it is

committed:

(a) the contract _per accessum_ grants a benefice with the agreement

that the grantee will later resign, so that access to it may be had by

the grantor or a third party at present incapable;

(b) the contract _per ingressum_ resigns a benefice not yet taken

possession of with the understanding that the person who now enters

into possession will leave the place open for his predecessor if he

himself resigns or is promoted;

(e) the contract _per regressum_ resigns a benefice already possessed

with the understanding that it may be recovered by the person now

resigning or by a third party;

(d) the contract _per reservationem partis_ obtains a benefice for

another with the stipulation that he will pay a certain percentage of

its revenues to the person who obtains it for him or to a third party

(see Canon 1441).

2325. Simony Against Divine Law.--Simony against divine law is

committed in reference to spiritual things when a temporal price is

formally or virtually given or received for them.

(a) Thus, the temporal thing is formally set up as the price, when it

is regarded or treated as the end of the spiritual thing or action

itself (_finis operis_), one of the things exchanged being used as the

measure of value of the other. This happens when a person wills to buy

or sell a spiritual thing, either because he thinks that its value may

be expressed in terms of money or other temporal thing, or because he

judges that he should treat it as though money were its equivalent, as

when one fulfills a spiritual office and excludes every other motive

than that of lucre (Denzinger, n. 1196).

(b) The temporal thing is virtually set up as the price, when it is

intended as the sole proximate end of the agent himself (_finis

operantis_), though there is no explicit thought about values or prices

or comparisons. This happens when one gives a temporal thing and has no

other immediate personal purpose in this act than the acquisition of a

spiritual thing, or performs a pretendedly gratuitous service,

intending thereby to obligate the beneficiary to the grant of some

spiritual benefit, or bestows a “gratuitous” temporal favor as

compensation for a spiritual benefit or vice versa (Denzinger, n.

1195). This is simony, for he who explicitly intends only an exchange,

implicitly intends a price; and if it were not simony, then simony

would be almost entirely an entity of the mind, since it is a very

simple matter to will that the temporal thing exchanged shall be not

the price, but only the motive of the contract or gratuitous

compensation.

2326. The temporal thing is not made the virtual price of the spiritual

thing, if there is a lawful proximate motive (i.e., one recognized by

the Canons or legitimate custom) for giving the temporal thing and the

desire of receiving the spiritual thing is only the remote reason or

occasion of the act. For in such a case the temporal thing is given for

a lawful purpose and is not the price of a spiritual thing.

Examples: (a) If the recipient of the temporal thing has a right to it,

there is no simony. Thus, the ministers of the altar have a right to

their support (see 2186), and it is not simoniacal, when asking

spiritual things from them (e.g., the application of Mass to one’s

intention, the performance of Sacraments and sacred functions), to

offer a stipend or fee; (b) if the bestower of the temporal thing gives

it freely out of pure friendship, liberality, charity, gratitude or

good will, so that it is an absolute gift, there is no simony, even

though he hopes or expects that he will receive something spiritual as

a mark of appreciation. But “a charitable or friendly gift” may easily

be palliated simony; that is, there may be a pretense of liberality to

conceal the real purpose of purchasing spirituals with temporals.

2327. Rules of Alexander III for Determining Simony.--Alexander III

gave several rules for determining whether a gift is made from

liberality or with simoniacal intent.

(a) The following are marks of simoniacal intent: the quality of the

giver (e.g., that he is poor, or in great need, or not customarily

generous), the quantity of the gift (e.g., that it corresponds with the

value of a vacant benefice, that it is surprisingly large), the time of

the gift (e.g., that it is made when the donee is not in any special

need, or when he is about to confer an office, or after hints have been

made). If a gift is bestowed in connection with a spiritual thing

received, the presumption is for simoniacal intent, unless there was a

sincere and reasonable motive for the gift.

(b) The following, on the contrary, are marks of a liberal intent: the

quality of the giver (e.g., that he is wealthy, noted for kindness and

compassion, or liberal to all, or is a relative of the donee); the

quantity of the gift (e.g., that it is small or normal in size), the

time of the gift (e.g., if it is made when necessity, festal occasion,

or the like calls for it).

2328. Simony against Divine Law in Reference to Things Annexed to

Spirituals.--(a) It is simony against divine law to buy or sell things

annexed to spirituals consequently (e.g., the revenues of a benefice)

or concomitantly and intrinsically (e.g., the ordinary labor and

fatigue connected with preaching, saying Mass); for in the former case

the temporal grows out of a spiritual and is morally one with it, while

in the latter case the temporal has no value except in so far as it is

joined with the spiritual.

(b) It is not simony against divine law to buy or sell things annexed

to spirituals antecedently (e.g., blessed candles, sacred vestments),

if the price is not raised on account of the spiritual thing, or things

annexed concomitantly and extrinsically (e.g., the extraordinary labor

and fatigue caused by saying Mass in a distant place or at a late

hour); for in both cases the temporal has its own proper value and is

not considered as inseparable from the spiritual. There is simony

against divine law, however, if the price is raised on account of the

spiritual part (e.g., if something is added for the blessing given a

candle), and simony against church law if the transaction is forbidden

as simoniacal (e.g., deductions and payments made in the act of

preferment to a benefice are contrary to Canon 1441).

2329. Conditions Necessary for Simony against Ecclesiastical Law.--(a)

There must be an exchange through some kind of onerous contract, but it

suffices that the understanding be tacit and non-executed, as was

explained above (see 2323).

(b) There must be a law of the Church which, from a motive of respect

for sacred things, forbids the exchange.

spiritual is given for another temporal annexed to a spiritual (e.g.,

benefice for benefice), or a spiritual for a spiritual, or a temporal

for a temporal. Canonists enumerate the following as examples of simony

of ecclesiastical law: gifts made in connection with a competitive

examination for a parochial benefice, with ordination or grant of

certain testimonial letters (Canon 545), with erection of

confraternities; sale of blessed oil or chrism, or of the right of

patronage (Canon 1470); remuneration for collection of stipends or for

expenses of Mass (Canons 840, 1303).

2330. Certain and Uncertain Simony.--(a) Cases in which simony is

certain are the administration of Sacraments or sacramentals to the

unworthy for the sake of the fee or favors, the sale of indulgences,

taxes or charges made contrary to law (e.g., for a Mass of bination).

Other examples are given in 2323 sqq. The Church demands that certain

ministrations (e.g., Confirmation, Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction,

Orders) be gratis, but there may be local customs or conditions that

justify exceptions. Some moralists teach that there is no simony when a

stipend is exacted for an obligatory ministry, if the simoniacal motive

is absent.

(b) Cases in which simony is controverted are those in which a tax or

stipend in excess of what is just or lawful is exacted (e.g., a Mass

stipend higher than custom permits). Some claim there is simony,

because the excess must be for the spiritual thing; others hold that

there is no simony, but only an unjust increase in the stipend allowed

for support; others say that there is no simony in the internal forum

if the intent is not simoniacal, but that there is simony in the

external forum on account of the presumption of simoniacal intent.

2331. Doubtful Cases of Simony.--In some gifts and payments the

presence or absence of simony depends on the object for which they are

given.

(a) Thus, when they are given for omission of a spiritual act, there is

simony if the omission includes the exercise of spiritual power (e.g.,

to omit absolution is to retain sins or censures); there is no simony

if the omission is the mere exercise of free will (e.g., to omit Mass,

confession).

(b) When they are given for omission of opposition or annoyance, so

that one may be able to obtain some office or benefice, there is simony

if the temporal thing is thereby given for the benefice itself or for

the way to it (i.e., if one has no strict right to the spiritual thing,

or if the opposition is just), as when the candidate for a benefice

pays a competitor to withdraw, or pays an accuser to keep silence;

there is no simony if the temporal thing is given for freedom from

unjust vexation (i.e., if one has a strict right to the spiritual thing

and the opposition is clearly unjust, as when one who has acquired a

right to an office pays an enemy to desist from placing impediments).

The payment made by Jacob to Esau for the birthright, to which Jacob

was entitled by divine disposition, may be regarded as having had for

its end, not the paternal blessing and other spiritual rights of the

first-born, but immunity from persecution by Esau.

(e) When they are given for instruction, there is simony if the

instruction has for its direct purpose the spiritual benefit of the

disciple (e.g., catechetical instructions, sermons, spiritual

direction); there is no simony if the instruction has for its direct

purpose the improvement of the mind or the utility or advantage which

the disciple will derive from it (e.g., instruction in theology,

preparation for examinations).

(d) When they are given for admission to religious life, there is

simony if the money is paid for the religious state itself, the vows,

or other spirituals; there is no simony if the money is paid for the

temporal support of the religious institute, that it may be able to

meet its expenses.

2332. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Lawful.--(a)

There is no simony when a temporal is given on the occasion of but not

for a spiritual. This happens when there is a just title for bestowal

of the temporal, such as right of support (e.g., pastors’ salaries,

Mass stipends, fees), extrinsic values in a work or object (e.g., the

special labor in saying Mass under certain conditions, and, according

to some, the special affection one has for a relic, the _lucrum

cessans_ on account of some function performed).

(b) There is no simony when something of value is given in exchange,

but not for a spiritual, nor in contravention of an anti-simony law.

This happens whether like be exchanged for like (e.g., Mass for Mass),

or a temporal for a thing associated with a spiritual as the latter’s

subject (e.g., money for a rosary or cemetery plot which has been

blessed). In the former case there is no prohibition; in the latter,

the temporalities have their own distinct values which may be paid for,

if the price is not raised on account of the spiritual (see Canons 730,

1539).

2333. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but Is

Sinful.--(a) Sins against God.--One who performs functions of religion

primarily and principally, as far as his personal motive (_finis

operantis_) is concerned, for the salary, stipend or fee, is not guilty

of simony, since he does not regard the temporal even virtually as the

price of the spiritual. But he does sin by indevotion, and the sin may

even be mortal (e.g., a canon goes to choir chiefly because this yields

him a living). Offenses committed in the matter of Mass stipends are

not called simony in the Code, but the penal law classes them with

offenses against religion, as may be seen from Canon 2324. Nepotism,

favoritism in giving offices, and political and dishonest maneuvers to

obtain church dignities are not in themselves simoniacal; but they are

an unworthy and scandalous treatment of sacred things.

(b) Sins against Others.--It is not simony but injustice to deny the

Sacraments to parishioners who do not contribute, to overcharge in

lawful fees, and also, according to some, to take money for the

omission of a spiritual act owed in justice (e.g., for refusal to hear

the confession of a parishioner), or to demand money as the stipend for

the performance of such a spiritual act (e.g., for hearing a

confession). It is disobedience to take money in ways forbidden (e.g.,

to take Mass stipends in the confessional, to earn money by gambling or

trading forbidden in the Canons). Again, it is not strictly simony to

put up as the stakes in a game a spiritual thing (e.g., the recitation

of the Rosary) against a temporal thing (e.g., ten dollars), for there

is no intention to value the spiritual thing by the temporal; but such

a practice is scandalous. Greed about getting or keeping money pertains

to avarice, not necessarily to simony.

2334. Cases in Which a Transaction Is Not Simoniacal, but

Virtuous.--(a) Some acts done in God’s honor (e.g., to purchase a

spiritual object, such as a sacred vessel or relic, from a person who

would misuse it), when the purchaser intends the prevention of

profanation. It is certainly not irreverence to a sacred thing to use

means necessary to rescue it from such irreverence.

(b) Some acts done for the good of others (e.g., to give prizes to

children who frequent the Sacraments or Sunday school, dowries to young

girls that they may be able to enter religion, free education to worthy

young men as an inducement to embrace the ecclesiastical state). In all

these cases there is no purchase of a spiritual thing, because the

temporal is a pure gift, and the spiritual is received, not by the

giver of the temporal, but by another. There is no simony in the fees

imposed for dispensations or in the alms sometimes prescribed for

indulgences; for the temporal is not a price paid for the spiritual,

but in the one case either a penance or a charge for expenses, and in

the other a spiritual good work and duty prescribed as a condition for

a spiritual benefit.

(e) Some acts done for the spiritual good of self (e.g., if one were in

danger of death and could be baptized only by a person Who demanded

money for the service, it would not be simony to pay the money, since

the price would be offered, not for the Sacrament, but for the removal

of an unjust annoyance).

2335. Theological Malice of the Sin of Simony.--(a) Simony against the

divine law is a mortal sin from its nature and in every instance. No

matter how small the spiritual thing that is sold, it is priceless, and

a grave injury is done by putting a price on it. Simony is a serious

injury to God, since it usurps His place as the only Lord of spiritual

things (I Cor., iv, 1), to the spiritual things themselves, since it

estimates their worth by vile material gain (Prov., iii. 15; Acts,

viii. 20), and to the recipients, who should receive the gifts of God

freely (Matt, x, 8). Hence, St. Peter denounced Simon Magus as

deserving of perdition (Acts, viii. 20), and in law simony is spoken of

as the worst of pests, a cancer, leprosy, a scourge.

(b) Simony against ecclesiastical law is a mortal sin from its nature,

since it is forbidden as a protection to religion and under grave sin;

but in particular cases it may be only a venial sin, since the church

laws do not bind under grave sin, when the matter or the danger is not

serious, as was said in 382.

2336. Moral Malice of the Sin of Simony.--(a) Simony is reducible to

real sacrilege (see 2311 c). It is treated separately for the sake of

convenience, on account of the large number of questions that pertain

to it, and also because there is reason to consider it as a distinct

species of sin (2308 c). Hence, the moral malice of simony is that of

irreligiousness.

(b) Simony of divine law and simony of ecclesiastical law, according to

the more common and likely opinion, are alike in moral malice. For

although the mere prohibition of the Church does not make a non-sacred

thing sacred, it does make the non-sacred thing unsaleable precisely

because related to things that are sacred. In other words, the motive

of the law is the protection of sacred things against the appearance or

danger of simony, and the motive of the law is the factor that

determines the moral character of precepts and prohibitions of human

law. Thus, to miss Mass on Sunday is a sin against religion, because

the Church commands in virtue of religion that Mass be heard on Sunday;

to eat meat on Friday is a sin against temperance, because the Church

forbids the use of meat on Friday in virtue of temperance. Hence, it is

not merely disobedience, but simony, to violate a law which forbids a

certain contract because of its nearness to the sale of spirituals for

temporals. Moreover, he who willfully exposes himself to the immediate

danger of some sin wills the malice of that sin.

2337. Invalidity and Penalties of Simoniacal Contracts.--(a) Every

simoniacal contract is invalid and of no force either in the external

or in the internal forum, because it sells what is unsaleable under

divine or ecclesiastical law. If the contract has to do with benefices,

offices or dignities (e.g., “You vote as I wish and I will give you

such and such favors,” “You obtain for me such a dignity and I will pay

you well”), the appointment to them is rendered null and void, even

though the simoniacal act be done by a third party without the

knowledge of the beneficiary, unless it be done by that third party to

injure the beneficiary or against his protest (Canon 729). Invalidity

is also produced in case of simoniacal resignations (Canon 185),

commissions (Canon 1441), presentations (Canon 1465, Sec. 2), and

prescription does not operate for one who holds a benefice obtained

through simony (Canon 1446).

(b) Certain simoniacal contracts subject the guilty parties to special

punishments. Thus, the penalty for simony in appointments, elections or

promotions to office and dignities is excommunication _latae

sententiae_ reserved simply to the Holy See, and deprivation forever of

all right of nominating, voting, presenting, and suspension (Canon

2392); the penalty for simony in elevation to Orders or in use of other

sacraments is suspicion of heresy and suspension reserved to the Holy

See (Canon 2371).

2338. When the Canonical Penalties for Simony Do Not Apply.--(a) Purely

mental simony is not subject to ecclesiastical penalties, since the

Church does not pronounce on internal acts. But this does not take away

the serious guilt in the sight of God. (b) External simony is subject

to ecclesiastical penalties, but canonists dispute about the meaning of

certain Canons, for example, whether only real simony falls under the

punishments _latae sententiae_, whether the penalties of Canons 729 and

2392 apply only to simony of divine law, or to simony of ecclesiastical

law as well.

2339. Influence of Simony on Spiritual Effects.--(a) On Effects of the

Power of Orders.--Sacraments administered simoniacally are valid, for

the law nullifies only the contract made about the Sacrament, not the

Sacrament itself. It seems also that in the case of sacramentals (such

as simple blessings imposed on articles) the blessing is not lost by

sale of the article, provided the price is asked only for the object

and not for the blessing. A blessed or consecrated object loses its

blessing or consecration when it is put up for public sale (Canon 1305).

(b) On Effects of the Power of Jurisdiction.--Acts of jurisdiction are

valid in spite of simony, unless there is special provision to the

contrary. Indulgences are lost _ipso facto_, if anything temporal is

taken for the indulgenced object (Canon 924). Religious profession, it

seems, is valid, even though simoniacal.

2340. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for a Spiritual

Thing.--(a) If the simoniacal contract is semi-real (that is, if the

spiritual consideration has not been received), the price must be

restored; for we have then the case of an immoral and unexecuted

contract (see 1878 d). (b) If the simoniacal contract is real (that is,

if the spiritual consideration has been received), the price should be

given back; for the case then is one of commutative justice, a temporal

price being taken for a thing (e.g., a blessing) that has no temporal

price, or for a service that one was bound to give gratis (e.g.,

parochial sermon by the pastor). But if a service was not obligatory,

it is held by some that there is no certain duty of restitution, if the

spiritual thing cannot be restored (e.g., when one received a stipend

for a Mass of bination or demanded an excessive fee for a sacred

function).

2341. Restitution of the Temporal Price Received for Temporal Things

Annexed to Spirituals.--Restitution is obligatory as follows: (a) when

commutative justice is violated, as when one charges for a blessed

candle or rosary in excess of its market value or just price, or when

by fear or force one compels another to exchange a chalice for a

ciborium; (b) when law or judicial sentence imposes restitution as a

penalty for an offense, as when for money one has resigned one’s

benefice in favor of another person.

2342. Circumstances of Restitution for Simony.--(a) The Time for

Restitution.--If simony is against natural law, restitution is due

before sentence; if against ecclesiastical law only, restitution is due

only after sentence.

(b) The Person to Whom Restitution Is to Be Made.--Satisfaction should

be given to the owner, or injured party (e.g., to the person who was

charged for a blessing), or, if this is impossible, to the poor or

pious causes. The revenues derived from a benefice simoniacally

obtained should be restored to the church to which the benefice

belongs, unless this is advantageous to the guilty parties, or probably

to charity, or religion, or the successor in the benefice.

permission of the Church, express or presumed, excuses from the duty of

restitution.

2343. Restitution of Spiritual Thing Simoniacally Received.--The

spiritual thing simoniacally received must be restored even before the

sentence of the judge (Canon 729, Sec.1). (a) Thus, if it is a benefice,

office or dignity that was obtained or conferred through simony, it

must be resigned; nor may the guilty party keep the fruits, unless he

was in good faith and permission is given. (b) If the spiritual thing

is something other than a benefice, it should likewise be given up,

provided it is of a kind that can be restored (e.g., it is impossible

to restore a Sacrament received or a consecration given to a church)

and restitution will not cause irreverence (e.g., it would be

irreverent to restore blessed objects or relics to the seller if he

meant to profane them).

Art. 6: THE REMAINING POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE OF PIETY;

THE COMMANDMENTS

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 101-122.)

2344. Having treated of religion, the chief potential part of justice,

we shall new consider the remaining subsidiary virtues of the present

group, namely, piety, reverence, truthfulness, gratitude, vindication,

friendship, liberality, equity (see 2141-2143).

2345. The Virtue of Piety.--In general, piety is the virtue that

inclines one to show due recognition of indebtedness to those from whom

one has received life and existence. There are three senses of the word:

(a) in its strictest meaning, it refers to the dutifulness owed to the

immediate or secondary causes of our being, namely, parents and country;

(b) in a derived meaning, it is applied to the religious duties owed to

God, who is our Heavenly Father and the First Author of our being.

Hence, those who are faithful to the worship of God are called pious

and the divine services are known as works of piety;

they are most pleasing to God as a tribute of filial devotion. The

merciful man has pity (piety), because his kindness to the unfortunate

honors God more than victims or sacrifices. Hence, since God is

merciful, He Himself is sometimes called pious: “The Lord is

compassionate (_pius_) and merciful” (Ecclus., ii. 13).

2346. Definition of Piety.--Piety in the strictest sense is defined as

“a moral virtue that inclines one to pay to father and fatherland the

duty of respect and assistance that is owed them as the authors and

sustainers of our being.”

(a) It is a moral virtue, one pertaining to justice, and hence it

differs from the special duty of charity owed to parents and country

(see 1158, 1171 sqq.). Charity loves parents and country out of love

for God whose creatures they are; piety honors them in recognition of

the benefits received from them and the authority vested in them.

(b) Piety is shown to father and fatherland; that is, just as religion

gives worship to God in acknowledgment of His excellence and our

dependence upon Him, so does piety show due respect to those who hold

the place of God in our respect on earth. Filial piety is owed to the

mother as well as to the father, and in a less degree to other

relatives, inasmuch as they share or continue the blood of one’s

parents and may be regarded as representing them (e.g., brothers and

sisters, husband or wife). Patriotism belongs to one’s native land or

the country, nation, state, city, etc., of which one is a citizen; and

it should include, not only fellow-citizens, but also the friends and

allies of one’s country. He who is the adopted citizen of a country

should love the place of his birth, but loyalty and obedience are owed

to the nation to which he has transferred his allegiance.

parents on account of their position of progenitors and superiors; the

second is owed to their condition when they are infirm or destitute or

otherwise in need. It is more probable that filial piety is violated

only when the personal goods (e.g., life, health, body, fame, honor) of

parents are injured, and that injury to their real goods pertains to

fraud, theft or damage, rather than to impiety. Moreover, on account of

the community of goods that exists between parents and children, real

injuries between them are not rigorously acts of injustice and require

more than the ordinary grave matter for serious sin (see 1902).

(d) Piety is owed to parents and country as the authors and sustainers

of our being. Thus, it differs from legal justice, which is the duty

owed the State or community, precisely as it is the whole of which one

is a part. It differs likewise from commutative justice, which is

obligatory in agreements with parents or other superiors, for the duty

is then owed them as partners to a free contract. On account of this

nobility of the formal object, filial piety and patriotism are very

like to religion and rank next after it in the catalogue of virtues.

2347. The Reverence Required by Piety.--(a) Parents should be honored

internally by the esteem in which their parental dignity and merits

(not their personal failings) are held; externally, by the marks of

respect customarily shown to parents.

(b) Relatives should receive a lower degree of respect commensurate

with the nearness and quality of the kinship. Thus, parents should

treat their children with the consideration owed to members of the

family, and not as servants or strangers, brothers and sisters and

relatives of remoter degree should give one another that courtesy and

regard which respect for common parents or ancestors calls for. Lineal

relatives are nearer than collaterals, and elder relatives (such as

grandparents, uncles and aunts) are more entitled to respect than

younger relatives (such as grandchildren, nephews and nieces).

(e) Country should be honored, not merely by the admiration one feels

for its greatness in the past or present, but also and primarily by the

tender feeling of veneration one has for the land that has given one

birth, nurture and education. Even though a country be poor and humble,

it should be patriotically revered (Ps. cxxxvi). External

manifestations of piety towards country are the honors given its flag

and symbols, marks of appreciation of its citizenship (Acts, xxi. 39),

and efforts to promote its true glory at home and abroad.

2348. The Assistance Required by Piety.--(a) Parents should be helped

in their needs, spiritual or temporal. If they are sick, they should be

visited; if they are poor, they should be assisted; if they are in need

of the Sacraments or prayers or suffrages, these spiritual means should

be provided. But a son is not bound to pay the debts of his deceased

father who left him nothing, since the debt was a personal one.

(b) Relatives should also be assisted in their needs, especially if the

necessity is urgent and the relationship close (as in the case of

brothers and sisters). But this duty is not as strict as that owed to

parents, and, if the relationship is distant, there is no special

obligation of piety.

moral, mental or corporal need. The noblest patriots are those who

devote their lives, labors or substance to the promotion of religion,

education and contentment among their people, to the correction of real

evils that threaten decay or disaster to the national life, and to the

preservation of those special ideals and institutions that constitute

what is characteristic and best in the nation.

2349. Sins against Piety.--(a) By Excess.--Exaggerated respect for

relatives or country is a sin, since it is not according to order or

reason. Thus, while children should not dishonor their parents under

the pretext of religion (Matt., xv. 3-9), neither should they be more

devoted to their parents than to God (Luke, xiv. 26; Matt., viii. 22),

nor neglect God’s call when their parents do not need them (Matt., iv.

22). Thus also, patriotism should not degenerate into patriolatry, in

which country is enshrined as a god, all-perfect and all-powerful, nor

into jingoism or chauvinism, with their boastfulness or contempt for

other nations and their disregard for international justice or charity.

(b) By Defect.--Disrespect for parents is felt when they are despised

on account of their poverty, ignorance, or feebleness; it is shown by

word (e.g., when they are addressed in bitter, reproachful, or

contemptuous speech; or when they are ill spoken of to others), by

signs (e.g., when mocking gestures or mimicry are used to ridicule

them), by deeds (e.g., when they are threatened or struck), and by

omissions (e.g., when their children are too proud to recognize them or

to give them tokens of honor). Disrespect for one’s country is felt

when one is imbued with anti-nationalistic doctrines (e.g., the

principles of Internationalism which hold that loyalty is due to a

class, namely, the workers of the world or a capitalistic group, and

that country should be sacrificed to selfish interests; the principle

of Humanitarianism, which holds that patriotism is incompatible with

love of the race; the principle of Egoism which holds that the

individual has no obligations to society); it is practised when one

speaks contemptuously about country, disregards its good name or

prestige, subordinates its rightful pre-eminence to a class, section,

party, personal ambition, or greed, etc.

2350. Malice of Sins against Piety.--(a) The moral malice is distinct

from that of other sins, since injustice committed against the debt

owed to the human principle of existence has a special character of

wrong, as being opposed to a special kind of right. Parricide and

matricide have always been looked on as having a peculiar enormity

among sins of homicide; and similarly, disrespect to father and mother

are greater evils than disrespect to persons who have no like claim to

honor. Hence, he who has struck his father must mention the

circumstance of relationship in confession, since it is a circumstance

that changes the species of the sin. But he who has struck his fourth

cousin need not confess the relationship, for distant kinship, though

an aggravating circumstance, does not give the injury the character of

impiety.

(b) The theological malice of the sin is grave from the sin’s nature,

since piety ranks next to religion and is the object of a special

commandment and promise from God. But the sin may be venial on account

of lightness of the offense (e.g., when young children answer back or

speak saucily to their parents, but without contempt) or on account of

the lesser importance of the person offended (e.g., when a brother

slaps his brother, the sin is not as serious as when a child strikes

his parent). Children who have been seriously disrespectful to their

parents are obliged to beg pardon; but to impose the obligation

regularly in confession is deemed unwise, since insistence may only

lead the penitent to new sins, and moreover the forgiveness of parents

may generally be presumed when there is amendment.

2351. The Virtue of Reverence.--This virtue is known in Latin as

_observantia_, because its object is persons of authority, whom it

carefully observes in order to revere their dignity and to learn their

commands. It is defined as “a moral virtue which inclines one to render

to persons of higher position the tribute of honor and obedience that

is due their authority.”

(a) It is a moral virtue, that is, one concerned immediately with the

direction of human acts. Reverence belongs to justice because it

renders to others what is due them.

(b) The persons to whom it does justice are those of higher position,

that is, superiors who rule over us or over others, and men

distinguished for virtue, knowledge or other excellent qualities that

make them fit to govern. Superior here does not mean that the person

who receives reverence must be in every way better than the person who

shows reverence (e.g., he who is superior in jurisdiction owes some

reverence to a subject who is more learned or virtuous than himself),

or that there must be inequality between the one who gives and the one

who receives reverence (e.g., two distinguished persons of equal rank

and merit owe mutual reverence to each other on account of the

superiority which each has to many others).

that is, the excellence of their state, which gives them a higher

dignity than others, and their office of ruling, which empowers them to

direct a subject to his proper end. Here we see that reverence is a

distinct virtue, for, while piety and reverence are both forms of

veneration, the motive of each is different. Thus, a child owes to his

father piety, because from the father was received the beginning of his

life, and reverence, because from the father is received direction to

his end. Again, a subject owes the rulers of his country both piety and

reverence: piety, as regards their relation to the common good and the

nation (e.g., when the ruler is given his special salute), reverence,

as regards their personal rank and glory (e.g., when assistance is

given the ruler to lessen the burden of his office).

(d) The first tribute paid by reverence is honor, which is a testimony

given to worth, and is offered to the dignity or rank of the superior.

Honor differs from reverence as the effect differs from the cause, or

the means from the end; for it is reverence that prompts one to show

honor, and honor is meant to excite in others reverence for the person

honored. The debt of honor is due those who are superior in

jurisdiction, from legal justice; it is due to those who are superiors,

but not in jurisdiction, not from legal justice, since the law does not

enforce it, but from moral obligation, since it is decent and becoming.

(e) The second tribute of reverence is obedience, which is submission

to law, and is offered to the ruling power of the superior. This

tribute of reverence is paid only to one’s own ruling superior, since

others have no power to impose upon one their will or precept.

2352. Species of Honor.--(a) As to kinds, there is common honor which

is shown to all and by all (e.g., God honors the Saints, and Tobias and

Mardochaeus were honored by their sovereigns), and the special honor of

homage which includes submission and is shown only by inferiors or

servants to their superiors or masters.

(b) As to modes, there is honor in general and praise, which is a

special form of honor; Praise is given in speech or writing; honor is

shown not only by words, but also by deeds (e.g., by salutations,

prostrations) and things (e.g., by monuments, presents, banquets,

titles).

temporal authority of rulers, teachers, employers, etc.), religious

honor (i.e., the respect shown to the spiritual authority of the Pope,

bishops, priests, etc.), and supernatural honor (i.e., the respect

given to the virtue of holy men). This last honor is known as _dulia_

(service) when offered to the Saints who reign with Christ in heaven,

as _hyperdulia_ (superior service) when offered to the Mother of God.

2353. Obligation of Showing Honor to Deserving Excellence.--(a) Common

honor should be given to all who are not irrevocably evil and

malignant, that is, it should be shown to all creatures, the damned

excepted. For, as was said above, there is no one who is not possessed

of superiority in some respect, and it is even reasonable to believe

that the most unpromising person is better than oneself in some quality

or other. Hence, the Scriptures admonish us to honor all (I Peter, ii.

17), to be beforehand in giving honor to one another (Rom., xii. 10),

and humbly to believe that others are superior (Phil., ii. 3). But in

bestowing honor, while one should have at least in general an honorable

opinion of others, the duty of external honor does not oblige at all

times or in all circumstances; and the same kind of honor is not to be

given by or to all persons. Those who show the ordinary signs of

charity (as they should) in greetings, salutations, courtesies, and the

like, comply sufficiently with the duty of common honor.

(b) Special honor should be given all those who have a right to it:

“Tribute to whom tribute is due, honor to whom honor is due” (Rom.,

xiii. 7). Thus, rulers and prelates should be given the respect due

their station, even though personally they are wicked, for in the honor

given their rank reverence is shown to God, whose ministers they are,

and to the community which they represent. There is a moral, though not

a legal, obligation to honor men distinguished for holiness for their

own sakes since, while honor is not a sufficient reward of virtue, it

is a distinguished mark of recognition, and for the sake of others,

since virtue in honor is like a lamp placed upon a stand and shining

for many (Matt., v. 15).

2354. Obligation of the Religious Cult of Dulia.--(a) There is no

strict duty of giving veneration to the Blessed Virgin, the Angels,

Saints, images, or relics, for absolutely speaking it suffices for

salvation to adore God. But it is of faith that the cult of these holy

persons and things is lawful and useful; hence he who should neglect it

would not merely disregard the earnest advice of the Church, but he

would also deny to God’s friends and heroes the honors they deserve

(Ecclus., xliv. 1; Heb., xi), and would deprive himself of precious

helps of intercession and inspiration. Some believe it is at least

venially sinful never to invoke the Blessed Virgin, and surely there

would be sin--and perhaps even grave sin, _per accidens_--if the

neglect was scandalous or perilous to salvation.

(b) There is an obligation in performing acts of cult to make the

veneration suitable to the dignity of the object (e.g., to the Mother

of God belongs _hyperdulia_, to the Saints of God _dulia_; to holy

persons is given absolute cult, to holy objects relative cult) and

conformable to the laws of the Church (e.g., the titles of Venerable,

Blessed, Saint are conferred only by the Church; public cult may be

performed only by those authorized to act in the name of the Church and

only by such rites as have been approved). It is lawful privately to

pray to infants who died after Baptism, and, according to many, to the

souls in Purgatory; but it would be superstitious to give to the damned

or false saints the cult that belongs only to the canonized Saints.

2355. Obedience.--Obedience is a moral virtue annexed to justice which

inclines one to comply promptly and willingly with the command of one’s

superior, because it is a command and obligatory.

(a) Obedience is prompt and willing, and so it differs from forced or

unwilling or tardy submission and from servile and politic obedience

(which would not obey were it not for fear or self-interest), for these

lack either the good will or the good motive required by virtue. Note

also that the virtue of obedience differs from the vow of obedience in

this, that the vow obliges to the external performance of a command,

while the virtue includes also internal submission.

(b) It is shown to a superior. Between equals there is not obedience in

the strict sense, though one of them may out of charity or friendship

yield to what the other desires.

imposed by authority. Some authorities hold that it is an act of

obedience to fulfill the known will of a superior, even though it has

not been imposed as obligatory; but others see in such a fulfillment,

not obedience, but the perfection or spirit of obedience. Thus, if a

son knows that his father wishes him to perform a certain work, but has

received no orders to do it and leaves it undone, this omission

according to the first opinion is disobedience, while according to the

second it is a want of the spirit of obedience.

(d) It obeys precisely because the superior’s will has been expressed

as a command. It is this intention that sets off obedience from other

acts of virtue about commanded matters. There is a material obedience

which is a circumstance of other virtues and may be called a general

virtue (e.g., when one keeps the first commandment out of love for God,

there is charity; when one keeps the seventh commandment out of love of

honesty, there is justice). The formal obedience of which we now speak

is a peculiar and distinct virtue, because it keeps the law simply

because it is law and as such should be kept.

2356. Power of Jurisdiction and Dominative Power.--There are two kinds

of power that confer moral authority to impose a command--the power of

jurisdiction and dominative power.

(a) The power of jurisdiction is had by one who rules in a perfect

society (Church or State), which has supreme authority and the right to

impose laws.

(b) Dominative power is had by one who rules in an imperfect society,

which has dependent authority and the right to impose precepts only.

This power arises either from the very nature of society as a body

composed of superior and subjects (e.g., in the family the children are

necessarily subject to the father), or from agreement between the

parties concerned (e.g., the wife by marrying becomes subject to her

husband, the servant by taking employment becomes subject to the

employer, the religious by entering a community or by vowing obedience

becomes subject to the superior).

2357. Degrees of Obedience.--Ascetical authors distinguish three

degrees of obedience: (a) external obedience, which performs with

exactness the thing commanded though there is no heart or willingness

in its act; (b) internal obedience, which joins willingness to external

submission though the judgment doubts the wisdom or value or good faith

of the command; (c) blind obedience, which submits the judgment itself

to the superior’s judgment, provided of course the thing ordered is not

clearly sinful (Matt, ix. 9; Gen., xxii. 3 sqq.; Matt., ii. 13 sqq.).

2358. Comparison of Obedience with the Other Virtues.--(a) Obedience,

as was explained above (2355), is distinct from the other virtues on

account of its different formal object. Its act is found sometimes

joined with other virtues (e.g., to fast during Lent in order to keep

the law is an act of obedience, but it is also an act of temperance if

actuated by love of moderation, or an act of religion if offered as

homage to God); but obedience may be separate from other virtues, as

when a superior commands or forbids something indifferent in order to

try a subject’s obedience (e.g., to take a walk solely because it has

been commanded is an act of obedience only).

(b) Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues, since it

belongs to the moral virtues, which are not directly concerned with God

Himself but with the means to union with Him (I Tim., i. 5). Among

those moral virtues that consist in contempt of temporal things,

obedience which serves God in all things has a certain preeminence,

inasmuch as it contemns for God’s sake the noblest human good, one’s

own will, whereas the other virtues contemn lower goods (those of the

body and external things); on the other hand, obedience is inferior to

religion, since, while obedience consists in veneration of the law,

religion consists in veneration of God Himself. But acts of worship

performed without devotion or without regard for God’s will are not to

be compared with respectful obedience, since the former are sins and

the latter is both religious and obedient; hence, it is said that

obedience is better than sacrifice (I Kings, xv. 22), which means that

internal devotion is to be preferred to mere external worship.

Spiritual writers praise obedience as the guardian of all the virtues

and the safe road in which they walk (Prov., xxi. 28).

2359. Comparison of Acts of Obedience.--(a) All acts of obedience are

of the same species, since in spite of diversity of superiors or of

laws there is always in obedience the same essential character on

account of the motive. Whoever may be the superior or whatever may be

the law, the reason for obedience is always the authority that commands

and the obligation that it imposes. Thus, whether one obeys God, or the

Church, or the State, or parents, the virtue is always one and the same.

(b) All acts of obedience are not of the same perfection, for

circumstances (e.g., the willingness, the duration, the difficulty) add

to the merit of obedience. It should be noted, however, that to obey by

performing what one likes is not necessarily less virtuous than to obey

by performing what one dislikes; for the thing liked may be something

hard that appeals to few and may be performed from a spirit of willing

obedience, whereas the thing that is disliked may be something easy and

may be performed with less willingness.

2360. The Duty of Obedience.--Since obedience is obligatory because a

superior has the right to command, the extent of the duty depends on

the extent of the superior’s authority.

(a) Thus, God must be obeyed in all things that He commands, for He is

Lord of all and cannot command what is unlawful: “Let us do all that

the Lord has spoken and we shall be obedient” (Exod., xxiv. 7). Man is

not bound, however, to wish all that God wishes in particular, since

God wishes things from the viewpoint of the universal good, and the

creature from the viewpoint of the limited good known to him (e.g., it

is not lawful for man to wish the damnation or the misfortune of those

whom God will permit to suffer these evils); but man is bound to wish

that which God desires him to wish (e.g., that his neighbor will not be

lost, that his father will not now die). Neither is man bound to

perform what God proposed to him as a counsel. In certain instances

(Gen., xxii. 2; Exod., xii. 36; Osee, i. 2) it appears that God

commanded sin, but only a foolish or blasphemous person would interpret

the facts in that impossible sense. In the physical order, a miracle

wrought by God is not contrary to the law of nature established by Him,

but to the usual course of nature; and similarly the commands referred

to were not contrary to the laws of virtue, but to the usual manner of

virtue, as was explained in 308 sqq.

(b) Man must be obeyed in all those things in which he has lawful

authority to command, first, because God Himself requires this and he

who resists resists God (Rom, xii. 2); next, because without obedience

the peaceful order of society cannot be maintained. Even though the

superior be wicked or an infidel, obedience is due him, for it is given

him, not in his personal, but in his official capacity (Matt, xxiii. 2,

3). The Scriptures command obedience to all classes of lawful

superiors, whether ecclesiastical (Heb, xiii. 17), civil (Titus, iii.

1; I Peter, ii. 13), or domestic (Eph, vi. 1, v. 22-24, vi. 5-8).

2361. When Obedience Is Not Lawful or Obligatory.--Obedience to a human

superior is not lawful or not obligatory in those matters in which the

superior has no authority to command.

(a) It is not lawful to obey a human superior when his command is

clearly contrary to the command of a higher superior, and therefore

unlawful. Thus, one may not obey any human superior when he orders sin,

even a venial sin, for we must obey God rather than man (Acts, v. 29;

Rom., iii. 8); neither may one obey a subordinate official who commands

something clearly opposed to the law or to the regulations of his own

superior. It does not belong to the subject, however, to sit in

judgment on his superior, and hence, unless the unlawfulness of a

command is manifest, the subject must presume that it is lawful.

(b) It is not necessary to obey a human superior when his command

exceeds his competency, or when he orders things over which he has no

control. Thus, God alone has authority over the internal action of the

soul and over the natural state of the body; and as regards these

things all men are equal, one indeed being less perfect mentally or

bodily than another, but none being subject to another in these

matters. Divine law regulates the interior (e.g., the command to

believe, the prohibition to covet), but human law is confined to

external acts; divine law can regulate things pertaining to the nature

of the body (e.g., God could command an individual to marry, or to

observe virginity, or to abstain from all food), but human law is

concerned with external things, in which men are unequal, and it cannot

take away natural rights to life or the means thereto (see 292 on

Inalienable Rights). Moreover, even as regards external acts and

things, the authority of a superior is limited by the bounds which its

nature gives it; for example, temporal authority cannot command

spiritual acts, a ruler placed over one territory or group cannot

command for others, a constitutional body cannot make laws beyond the

powers conferred by its constitution, ecclesiastical laws or customs

rejected by the Code cannot be enforced, etc. It is clear, too, that no

superior may command the execution of what is physically or morally

impossible, and generally a subject should not be required to practise

heroic virtue (e.g., to expose his life to danger; see 374). If a

command is plainly ridiculous (that is, if it lacks a reasonable

motive), it would be more perfect to obey, but it seems it would not be

a sin to disregard it.

2362. Obedience in Cases Where There Is Normally No Obligation.--If a

superior oversteps his authority, the subject may obey when the matter

is lawful and the motive of submission is good. In certain cases it is

even obligatory to obey a superior in matters over which normally he

would not have authority. Such cases are the following:

(a) on account of a vow or other free and moral agreement, a subject is

held to obedience in matters pertaining to the nature of the body

(e.g., when he has made a vow of virginity). The Church cannot impose

virginity, but he who has vowed to observe it, must fulfill the

conditions and precautions necessary for its observance, and can be

ordered so to do;

(b) on account of circumstances, such as scandal or danger of great

evils, it is sometimes necessary to yield submission to a command that

is not of itself obligatory (see 376, 377).

2363. Internal Actions and Human Superiors.--Internal actions in

themselves do not fall under human authority, and hence the Apostle

says: “Judge not before the time until the Lord come, who will make

manifest the counsels of the heart” (I Cor., iv. 5). But in two ways

these actions may be dealt with authoritatively by human superiors.

(a) Thus, in the internal forum and there alone, internal acts

themselves are subject to a human superior; for the confessor knows and

acts there, not as man, but as the representative of God, and hence he

may pass on and prescribe internal thoughts and desires just as God may

pass on them and prescribe them.

(b) In the external forum, the Church deals with internal acts in so

far as they enter into an external act as a necessary ingredient of its

goodness or malice, as when she commands a devout communion or

pronounces censure against judges who are swayed by fear or favor. This

question was treated above in 426.

2364. Obligation of the Vow of Obedience.--(a) The vow obliges a

religious to observe the commands of superiors that are given according

to the rule which the religious professed. Hence, there would be no

obligation in virtue of the vow of performing commands that are not

authorized explicitly or implicitly in the rule (e.g., if a cloistered

religious were bidden to engage in hospital work), nor, unless

otherwise vowed, of keeping each prescription of the rule or

constitutions. A command to accept a relaxation from the rule is

obligatory, unless the dispensation is clearly invalid (cfr. 2225,

2237).

(b) The obligation is grave only when superiors command in a grave

matter and with the intention of imposing a grave precept. The

intention of a superior is indicated by a form of words and other

circumstances which the rule or constitutions prescribe for the

imposition of a grave precept.

2365. Sins against Obedience.--Since obedience is a moral virtue and

therefore observes a mean, there is both an excess and a defect that it

avoids.

(a) Thus, the sin of excess is not found in the quantity of obedience,

for the more obedient a subject is, the more is he worthy of praise. It

is found, therefore, in other circumstances of the act of submission,

as when one obeys a person or a command which one should not obey.

Sinful submission is just as foreign to obedience as superstition is to

religion; cringing submission or servility in matters where one should

think and judge for oneself is only a simulacrum of obedience.

(b) The sin of defect is found in disobedience to a lawful command.

This sin may also be said to include both excess and defect--the former

because the subject follows his own desires more than he should, and

the latter because the superior does not receive what he is entitled to

(see 1711 sqq.).

2366. Definition of Disobedience.--Disobedience is the transgression of

the lawful command of a superior.

(a) It is a transgression, that is, a voluntary neglect or refusal to

perform what is ordered or to omit what is forbidden, or to perform or

omit at the time or in the manner ordered. Thus, there is no

disobedience if fulfillment is impossible--for example, if a subject

who is summoned to present himself at a certain place does not receive

the notice or becomes too ill to make the journey, or if he is asked to

give what he cannot give, or if he is burdened with so many laws or

regulations that he cannot even know what they are, much less attempt

to observe them.

(b) Disobedience transgresses a lawful command, that is, one which is

morally good and issues from competent authority. It is not

disobedience to refuse to do what is evidently illicit (e.g., to lie or

steal), or what is illegally ordered (e.g., to submit to arrest

blindly, to perform what the law forbids the superior to order).

it is not disobedience to neglect advice or exhortations or requests

made by superiors, if the subject-matter is not otherwise obligatory

(e.g., a daughter is not disobedient if she does not choose the husband

picked out for her by her parents).

(d) It is against the command of a superior, and hence, if there is

opposition between laws or precepts, the higher law and the higher

superior prevails (288 sqq.).

2367. The Kinds of Disobedience.--(a) By reason of the subject,

disobedience is either material or formal, according as the

transgressor intends only the satisfaction of his sinful desire against

some other virtue, or intends the violation of obedience itself.

Material disobedience is found in every sin, since every sin is a

transgression, and in this sense the pride of the original sin is

called disobedience (Rom., v. 19); but formal disobedience is a special

sin, and it is committed only when the sinner transgresses purposely in

order not to submit.

(b) By reason of the object, formal disobedience is contempt either for

the law or for the superior. In the former case the transgressor

despises the commandment given him and vents his dislike in

disobedience; in the latter case the transgressor belittles the

authority of the lawmaker or superior who made the law or who gave the

precept; or scorns his sinfulness, ignorance, or low birth; or hates or

envies him, and therefore proceeds to break his laws or precepts. If

contempt moves one to rebel against every command, it is perfect; if it

extends to only one or another matter, it is imperfect.

2368. It is not sinful contempt of a person in authority, however, if

the subject does not admire his character, or agree with his opinions,

or approve of his courses, when the subject has good reason for his

view and does not forget the respect and obedience due to authority and

law.

2369. Theological Sinfulness of Formal Disobedience.--(a) From its

nature formal disobedience is a grave sin, since it is contrary to

charity, which is the life of the soul and the end of the law. Love of

God demands that we keep His commandments and be submissive to His

representatives (Rom., xiii. 2; John, xiv, 21; Rom., ii. 23, xiii. 2;

Luke, X. 16). Disobedience is classed by St. Paul with the worst sins

of the ancient pagans (Rom., i. 30) and of the sinners of the last days

(II Tim, iii. 1), with witchcraft and idolatry (I Kings, xv. 23).

(b) From the imperfection of the act formal disobedience is sometimes

only a venial sin, as when in a sudden fit of anger against his

superiors a child refuses to obey his teachers or parents.

venial sin, if the contempt is imperfect and not directed against God,

and the matter of the command or transgression is not serious (e.g., if

one gets up a few minutes late in the morning once or twice as a

protest against a regulation). But, even though the matter is not

serious in itself, formal disobedience is a grave sin, when the

contempt is perfect (e.g., if in a spirit of defiance and of

anarchistic contempt for all his laws one pays no heed to some minor

regulation of a superior), and perhaps also when contempt is directed

against a divine precept (e.g., if with the feeling that the eighth

commandment is foolish or useless, one tells small lies); for in the

former case there is grave contempt, in the latter case blasphemy.

2370. Moral Species of Disobedience.--(a) In formal disobedience, if

the command belongs to some special virtue, there are two sins, namely,

that against obedience and that against the virtue intended by the

lawgiver (e.g., when out of contempt one violates the third

commandment); but, if the command was given for the sake of obedience

only, there is but the one sin of formal disobedience (e.g., when out

of stubbornness a child refuses to do the study or other work imposed

by parents or teachers).

(b) In material disobedience, if the command was given for the sake of

some special virtue, there is but the one sin against that virtue, as

when one breaks the fifth or sixth commandment to satisfy passion; but

if the command was given for the exercise of submission only, there is

but the one general sin of disobedience, as when a child eats between

meals against the command given by his mother.

2371. Circumstances that Aggravate Formal Disobedience.--One act of

formal disobedience can be worse than another such act in two ways:

(a) by reason of the rank of the person who gave the command. Thus, it

is more serious to disobey God than to disobey man, and more serious to

disobey a higher than a lower superior;

(b) by reason of the rank which the thing commanded has in the

intention of the superior. Thus, when disobeying God it is more serious

to transgress against the higher than against the lower good, for God

always prefers the better good; but in disobeying man alone it is more

serious to transgress against the good, higher or lower, which the

lawgiver has more at heart.

2372. Comparison of Formal Disobedience with Other Sins.--(a)

Disobedience against God (e.g., contempt for His law) is worse than

sins against the neighbor (e.g., murder, theft, adultery). This is true

when these latter sins do not include formal disobedience against God,

for, _per se_ and other things being equal, a sin against God is more

serious than a sin against a creature; it is also true when sins

against creatures include formal disobedience against God but offend a

less important commandment, as when the one sin is perjury and the

other theft.

(b) Contempt for the lawgiver, even without disobedience, is worse than

contempt for the law with disobedience, since the lawgiver is of

greater importance than his precept. Thus, it is worse to blaspheme God

than to despise His commandment; it is worse to hold a superior in

contempt than to disregard his precept.

2373. The Virtue of Gratitude.--Religion, piety, reverence and

obedience are annexed to justice on account of a legal debt; the

virtues that remain, beginning with gratitude, are assigned to justice

on account of a moral debt only (see 2143). Gratitude is defined as “a

moral virtue that inclines one to acknowledge with appreciation and to

repay with gladness the favors one has received.”

(a) The object of gratitude is favors received, that is, some good

useful and acceptable to the recipient and gratuitously bestowed. Thus,

gratitude is not owed for a thing that is harmful (e.g., for aid in the

commission of sin, for gifts offered with purpose of bribery or simony)

or useless (e.g., for old articles which the giver only wished to get

rid of and forced one to take). Neither is gratitude owed for presents

made with the purpose of ridicule or offense. Finally, no thanks are

due for what was owed in justice (e.g., wages for work performed),

though courtesy demands a pleasant response to every good one receives,

even when it is not a favor.

(b) The offices of gratitude are acknowledgment and repayment. The

former consists in thoughts or words, such as remembrance of

benefactors, praise of their good deeds, words of thanks; the latter

consists in acts or things, such as honor, service, assistance, and

gifts (Tob., xii. 2, 4).

2374. Two Kinds of Gratitude.--(a) In a wide sense, gratitude is the

recognition of favors received from superiors, and does not differ from

religion, piety and reverence, by which one gives due acknowledgment to

God as the first cause of all benefits, to parents as the second cause

of life and training, and to rulers as the second cause of direction or

guidance or of public and common benefits. (b) In its strict sense,

gratitude refers only to special and private benefits distinct from

those mentioned above. Gratitude, then, is a distinct virtue and

follows in order after reverence.

2375. Is greater gratitude due to God for the gift of innocence or for

the gift of repentance?

(a) If we consider only the greatness of the favor, the one who has

been preserved from sin owes more gratitude to God; for, _per se_ and

other things being equal, it is a greater favor to be kept from sin

than to be rescued from it.

(b) If we consider the liberality of the favor, the one who has

received the gift of repentance should be more thankful, for God is

more generous when He bestows His grace on one who deserved punishment.

2376. Circumstances of Gratitude.--(a) To Whom Gratitude Should Be

Shown.--Every benefactor should be repaid internally (e.g., by kind

remembrance and prayers) and also externally, unless this is impossible

(e.g., when he has become so depraved that one can have no dealings

with him). The internal debt is lessened if the benefactor was less

benevolent (e.g., if he gave grudgingly, or in an unkind manner, or

only with a view to self-advertisement), for the gift is esteemed

chiefly from the good will of the giver; the external debt is lessened

if the benefactor stands less in need of external help (e.g., if he is

wealthy or famous).

(b) By Whom Gratitude Should Be Shown.--Every person who is favored

should be thankful. There is no one so high that another cannot be his

benefactor, and the greatest or wealthiest person should not feel it

beneath his dignity to repay even small favors sincerely given. Neither

is there anyone so low, whether child or pauper, that he cannot to some

extent, by his respect, affection, prayers, etc., recompense his

benefactors.

(b) Knowledge of hidden things is naturally deducible with more or less