(c) Excessive desire of praise or celebrity is vanity (see 2028, 2269).

The great of soul desire the good opinion of their fellow-men (see 1575

sqq.), but they also desire that their good reputation be well founded,

and their motive is the glory of God or the spiritual profit of man.

The vain, on the contrary, are eager for admiration and praise for

which there is no justification (e.g., those who wish to be praised for

virtues they do not possess) or which are valueless (e.g., those who

fish for compliments over things of no great importance, such as good

looks or dress, or who wish to appear learned among the uneducated, or

who crave notoriety), or seek admiration without a proper motive (e.g.,

those who advertise themselves for self-glorification alone). Vanity,

like ambition, is _per se_ only a venial sin, but it becomes mortal on

account of its cause (e.g., when the motive is to conceal crimes that

are planned), or its results (e.g., when the desire to be famous makes

one boast of one’s crimes, or refuse to repair injuries done to others,

or neglect the honor of God), or its matter (e.g., when one is vain

about a reputation for skillful injustice). Vanity is one of the

capital sins (see 268 sqq.), since it is one of the motives that

chiefly lead men into sin; for all desire excellence, and in

consequence the love of renown is one of the chief incentives to

action. Even the ambitious crave honors because of the glory honors

bring. The offspring of vanity includes the sins by which a man seeks

unlawfully to show off his good points, or to prove that he is not

inferior and thus capture popularity or glory. In the first class are

the publication by word or deed of one’s own true or pretended exploits

(boasting hypocrisy), the cultivation of novelties and eccentricities

designed to attract attention (such as singularity in opinion, in

pronunciation, in dress, etc.). In the latter class are sins of

intellect which make one hold obstinately to one’s views

(stubbornness), sins of will which make one resist desires of others

(discord), sins of word which make one loudly dispute (contention),

sins of deed which make one refuse to yield to authority (disobedience).

2451. Vice Opposed to Greatness of Soul by Defect.--The sin opposed to

greatness of soul by defect is pusillanimity (littleness of soul),

which does not desire great things when one should desire them.

(a) Pusillanimity is sinful, because it excludes nobility of soul,

springs from a lazy ignorance of one’s own ability and worth and from a

false fear of failure, and leads to the loss of great things that could

be done for God and humanity. The Scriptures reprove Jonas, who fled

from the great task set for him by God (Jonas, i. 1 sqq.), and the

fearful servant who hid his talent in a napkin (Matt, xxv. 24 sqq.).

Pusillanimity is not to be confused, therefore, with humility; for

humility excludes the unreasonable or immoderate desire of excellence,

whereas pusillanimity represses even that desire of greatness which is

reasonable and moderate. Indeed, meanness of spirit may be associated

with pride on account of obstinate refusal to take upon oneself what is

commanded (Prov., xxvi. 16). Thus, Moses and Jeremias showed humility

by their fears of unworthiness (Exod, iii. 11; Jerem., i. 6), but they

would have sinned by pusillanimity, and also by pride, had they held

out against God’s charge to them.

(b) Pusillanimity is _per se_ a venial sin (see 2450), but it may

become mortal on account of its matter or consequences, as when one is

so self-depreciative as to neglect grave obligations of correcting

abuses. It is essentially more evil than presumption, for it turns one

away from things and pursuits that are noble, and is thus more opposed

to greatness of soul; but radically presumption is more evil, as it

springs from pride (Ecclus., xxxvii. 3). The dread of attempting great

deeds or pursuits is sometimes no sin at all, as when it is due to

inculpable ignorance of what one can do or what one deserves, or from a

fear that overpowers judgment, or from bodily disease, or from a sense

of inferiority caused by education, excessive repression and habit

(Col., iii. 21).

2452. Greatness of Deed.--Greatness of deed is the execution of the

great things to which one is inclined by greatness of soul.

(a) The virtue is a general one, if it includes every kind of noble

performance; it is a special one, if restricted to princely generosity

in the expenditure of large sums for great works (virtue of

magnificence or munificence). The munificent person spends large sums

from his purse in behalf of the worship of God (e.g., in building

churches, monasteries, etc.), and for the common good (e.g., in

founding schools, in endowing educational institutions, hospitals,

etc.). This virtue resembles fortitude by the grandeur of its

accomplishment; it falls short of fortitude, since it deals not with

sacrifice of self but with sacrifice of goods. The Maecenases and the

generous patrons of religion are among the greatest benefactors of

humanity, for without them the best things would often languish for

want of support.

(b) The vices opposed to this virtue are meanness by deficiency and

vulgarity by excess. The mean man is unable to do things on a great

scale, and prefers to ruin a noble work rather than make the proper

outlay (e.g., after planning a beautiful church, he will spoil it by

using cheap materials). The vulgar man, on the contrary, is avid for

ostentation, or heavy expenditure when there is no call for it. He is

liberal to works of less importance (e.g., his own usual personal needs

or comforts), but penurious with works of great importance (e.g.,

charitable causes); or he lavishes money needlessly on great works, as

when his residence is over-ornamented and offensive to good taste, or

when his wedding breakfast is served with profuse extravagance and

waste in order to make a display of wealth. _Per se_, these sins are

venial, but they may be mortal on account of circumstances. Munificence

is the virtue of the rich, but even the poor may have the merit of this

virtue, by a good intention, especially when they show liberality to

great enterprises according to their means.

2453. Patience.--Patience is a virtue which from the love of moderation

so controls the sadness caused by present afflictions that this passion

neither excessively disturbs the internal powers of the soul nor

produces anything inordinate in the external conduct. Hence it differs

from the following:

(a) from temperance, for, although temperance also regulates sadness,

the sadness with which it deals is caused by lack of pleasures, while

that with which patience deals is caused by the presence of evils,

especially of those brought on by annoyances from others;

(b) from the endurance of fortitude, for fortitude regulates fear of

death, while patience regulates sadness caused by evils of whatever

nature, such as sickness, bereavements, loss of money, persecution;

(c) from longsuffering and constancy, for the matter of these virtues

is a good which cannot be obtained except by long waiting or a good

which must be continually exercised, whereas the matter of patience is

an evil that has to be endured in the present. But since the delay of a

desired good causes sadness (Prov., xiii. 12), and since continuance in

good is irksome to the flesh, both longsuffering and constancy are

included under patience.

2454. The Greatness of Patience.--(a) Its Rank.--Patience is less than

the theological virtues, and also is inferior to prudence and justice,

which perfect one in goodness; it is also less than fortitude and

temperance, which preserve from the greatest impediments to goodness;

for the office of patience is only to preserve one from lesser

impediments, namely, the common adversities of life. But, on the other

hand, patience is a part of fortitude--a potential part, because it

does not connote the supreme heroism of fortitude, and an integral

part, because courage in the face of death is bettered by the serenity

which patience imparts.

(b) Its Necessity.--Patience is a most useful virtue. Without it one

cannot long continue in the way of virtue on account of the many trials

man encounters (Heb., x. 36), whereas with it the enemies of other

virtues are destroyed; and hence it is called the root and guardian of

virtue (cfr. Rom., v. 3, 4; James, i. 2-4; Luke, xxi. 19). But there

are degrees of patience: the lowest is equanimity, which offends God

neither in thought, word nor deed even though sorely tried (Job, ii.

7-10); a higher degree is submission, which prefers adversity to

prosperity (Ps. cxviii. 71); the highest degree is joyful resignation,

which smiles at grief and rejoices in tribulation (II Cor., xii. 10,

vii. 4).

2455. The Vices Opposed to Patience.--(a) The sin of deficiency in

sorrow is stolidity, which is a brutal insensibility that is moved

neither by one’s own nor by others’ misfortunes. This is not a virtue,

but an inhuman and unnatural way of life, which takes no account of man

as a feeling as well as a reasoning being.

(b) The sin of excess in sorrow is impatience, which mourns excessively

under afflictions, or in looks, words or deeds expresses a complaining

and rebellious spirit (Prov. xiv. 17; Judith, viii. 24, 25). Stolidity

and impatience are _per se_ venial sins, but they become mortal _per

accidens_ on account of some circumstance, as when the unfeeling man

gives great scandal by his hardhearted acts, or the impatient man

blasphemes (see 2450, 2451).

2456. Steadfastness.--Steadfastness is a virtue which is so devoted to

the goodness of continuing in the right that it is not fatigued by the

length of time or the repeated effort required for a good work (virtue

of persistence or perseverance), nor disheartened by the opposition

which a good work encounters (virtue of manliness or constancy), but

goes on unmoved until the conclusion which right reason calls for has

been arrived at.

(a) The Virtue.--Steadfastness belongs to fortitude, since the essence

of both is a struggle against difficulty; but steadfastness is the

inferior, since it is nobler and more heroic to be undismayed by the

peril of death than to be unconquered by strain of monotony or

opposition. Steadfastness is a most important virtue, for it avails one

little to begin a work well if it is not carried to a successful

conclusion. Without it one puts hand to the plow but looks back (Luke,

ix. 62), or begins to build but does not finish (Like, xiv. 30); with

it the work begun is crowned, the harvest will be reaped (Gal., vi. 9,

10), and salvation secured (Matt., x. 22). Scripture abounds with

exhortations to steadfastness (I Cor., xv. 58; Phil., iv. i; II Tim.,

iii. 13; Ecclus., xi. 21, 22, v. 12; John, viii. 31; Heb., xii. 7); but

final perseverance is a special gift of God (I Peter, v. 10).

(b) The Opposite Vices.--Opposed to steadfastness by deficiency is the

vice of effeminacy or weakness, by excess the vice of pertinacity. The

effeminate person, lacking stamina to go on in a necessary good,

surrenders to weariness or opposition by abandoning the undertaking or

by taking up with evil (Matt., xi. 7, 8). The pertinacious person

continues in the course he has begun when right reason bids him to

discontinue, as when one has taken a vow and does not wish to accept

the dispensation which a change of circumstances necessitates. These

sins are venial unless they go counter to a grave duty, as when an

effeminate person gives up the resolution to avoid a very dangerous

occasion of sin, or the headstrong person determines to fast during the

remainder of Lent when this will seriously injure his health.

2457. The Complements of Fortitude.--We shall now speak of the Gift,

the Beatitude, and the Fruits that correspond to fortitude (see 159 and

2433).

(a) The Gift of Fortitude is an infused habit which makes the

appetitive powers readily responsive to the encouragement of the Holy

Spirit and filled with a courage that is more than human. Thus, the

Gift of Fortitude supplies for what is wanting in the virtue of

fortitude. The virtue is regulated by the rules and measure of human

prudence, but the Gift is inspired by the presence and command of the

Holy Spirit Himself (Ps. xliii. 4, xvii. 2, 3); the virtue strengthens

the soul, but the Gift supports even the weakness of the flesh, for the

Spirit helpeth our infirmity (Rom., viii. 26; cfr. Luke, xxii. 43); the

virtue aids one against the perils of death, but the Gift strengthens

in difficulties both of life and death, reinforcing not only courage

but also the allied virtues, greatness of soul, munificence, patience

and perseverance, for we can do all things in Him that strengthens us

(Phil., iv. 13); the virtue gives firm resolution to adhere to the

right in spite of death itself, but the Gift adds the unshaken

confidence that one shall surmount every difficulty and win the crown

of victory (Rom., viii. 31 sqq.).

(b) The Beatitude which is the special exercise of the Gift of

Fortitude is the eighth: “Blessed are they that suffer persecution for

justice’s sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven” (Matt, v 10). The

Gift of Fortitude makes the persecuted feel a great confidence and

security in the midst of the struggle, and this is a foretaste of the

copious, exceeding and eternal reward that follows this Gift (Gen., xv.

1; Rom., viii. 18; II Cor., iv. 17; Ps. xciii. 19; II Cor., i, 1).

Others assign to this Gift the Beatitudes of the meek and of those who

hunger and thirst for holiness.

(c) The Fruits that are most appropriate here are patience in bearing

evil and longsuffering in awaiting or performing good; for these are

acts that add a finish of maturity to fortitude (see 2447, 2454, 2456),

and in their most excellent state (see 2454) the performance of them is

no longer bitter but sweet.

2458. The Commandments of Fortitude.--(a) Fortitude itself is commanded

both in the Old and the New Testament. In the Old Testament are found

precepts of bravery in bodily warfare, as in Deut. xx. 3: “Hear, O

Israel, you join battle this day against your enemies. Let not your

heart be dismayed, be not afraid, do not give back, fear ye them not.”

The New Law commands courage before spiritual foes; “Your adversary the

devil goeth about like a roaring lion, seeking whom he may devour, whom

resist ye strong in faith” (I Peter, v. 8); “Resist the devil and he

will fly from you” (James, iv. 7); “Fight the good fight” (I Tim., vi.

12). It also commands fortitude in the presence of corporal dangers:

“Fear not them that kill the body, but cannot kill the soul” (Matt., x.

28).

(b) The annexed virtues are counselled when (as is the case with

greatness of soul and munificence) they incline to the excellent and

superabundant; they are commanded when (as in the case of patience and

perseverance) they are necessitated by normal conditions of earthly

existence. Greatness of soul is recommended in the invitations to be

perfect (Matt., v. 48), to love God more ardently (see 1560) and to

follow the counsels (see 364 sqq.), and in the praise bestowed on the

excellent virtue of Noe (Gen., vi. 9), of John the Baptist (Matt., xi.

11), and of Mary Magdalene (Luke x. 42). Munificence is recommended in

the eulogies of Solomon (Ecclus., xlvii. 20), of Magdalene (Mark, xiv.

9) and of Joseph of Arimathea (Luke, xxiii. 50 ff.). Patience is

commanded in Luke, xxi. 19 (In patience possess your souls), and in

Rom., xxii. 12 (Be patient in tribulation); perseverance in Ecclus.,

ii. 4 (In sorrow endure), in Matt., x. 22 (He that perseveres to the

end shall be saved), in I Cor., xv. 58 (Be steadfast and unmovable) and

in Heb. xxi. 7 (Persevere under discipline).

2459. Obligation of the Precepts of Fortitude and Annexed Virtues.--(a)

The precepts of fortitude are negative or prohibitory, and therefore it

is obligatory at all times to omit what they forbid (see 371). It is

never lawful to be timorous, insensible, cowardly, or foolhardy--to do

anything intrinsically wrong, even to escape death (see 317, 318). But

it is not necessary to sacrifice life for the fulfillment of an

affirmative precept, unless injury to God or the common safety, or an

extreme spiritual loss to self will otherwise result (see 317, 818,

361).

(b) The precepts of patience and perseverance are also negative, and

hence it is never lawful to be guilty of stolidity, impatience,

effeminacy or stubbornness. But since patience and perseverance are not

so difficult as fortitude, they have also affirmative precepts. These

latter laws oblige always, but not for every occasion (see 371). Thus,

one must be always willing to exercise patience, but one who is spared

trials has not the occasion to exercise the virtue. Patience itself

never ceases to be a virtue, but there is a pseudo-patience which

consists in toleration of evils that should not be tolerated, and which

is not a virtue but a kind of supineness or spinelessness that pertains

to effeminacy rather than to patience.

2460. Subjects of Fortitude.--(a) Laws have universal extension, and

hence it would not be true to say that active fortitude is a masculine,

passive fortitude or patience a feminine virtue. But greater courage is

expected in some than in others on account of greater strength (e.g.,

the adult, the physically well) or greater necessity (as in soldiers,

policemen, firemen, pastors, physicians, rulers).

(b) The counsel of munificence, however, is only for the rich as

regards exercise, since others have not the means wherewith to exercise

this virtue.

Art. 8: THE VIRTUE OF TEMPERANCE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 141-170.)

2461. Definition of Temperance.--Temperance is a moral virtue which

regulates according to reason the gratification of the lower pleasures

and desires of sense.

(a) It moderates pleasure and desire, and in consequence also the

sadness caused by the absence of pleasure. Just as a special virtue

(fortitude) is needed to check the strongest of the repelled emotions

(fear of death), so likewise a special virtue (temperance) is necessary

to bridle the most vehement of the attracted emotions (pleasure and

desire).

(b) It moderates sensible pleasure, that is, satisfactions derived from

the use of the external senses--sight, hearing, smell, taste, and

touch. Spiritual pleasures, which are derived from the loftier powers

of intellect, will and imagination (e.g., from the study of theology,

the reading of classical literature, the meeting of mother and child or

of friend and friend), have no opposition to reason, except

accidentally when a still higher activity which should be exercised is

impeded by them. Some of these (such as the pleasures of the intellect)

may be called purely spiritual, since they make little or no impression

on the sensible appetite; others, on the contrary (such as the

pleasures of the will), may be called mixed pleasures, since at times

they vehemently excite the sensitive appetite and powerfully affect the

body (e.g., mothers have been known to die of joy at the return of a

child who was thought to be dead).

(c) Temperance moderates the lower sensible pleasures, that is, the

satisfactions caused primarily by touch and taste, and secondarily by

other senses, in the activities necessary for preservation of the

individual (eating and drinking) and of the race (sexual intercourse).

These passions are called the lower, animal, or carnal pleasures, since

they are common to man and beast, and are strongly rebellious against

reason. The special virtue of temperance is necessary, then, to make

man follow reason, not Bacchus or Venus. The higher sensible pleasures,

on the other hand, are produced by a sensible object, not on account of

any relation to venereal or gustatory delight, but on account of a

perfection in the object that makes it suitable to the sense (e.g., the

enjoyment derived from beautiful scenery, classical music, fragrant

roses, or downy or velvety cloth). The esthete or the connoisseur

obtains from these agreeable sensations a pleasure unknown to the

animals, and one that is not from its nature refractory to reason nor

seductive to carnal excess. Hence, these higher sensual pleasures are

not gross, but refined; they should be moderated by prudence, but they

are not so dangerous as to demand a special virtue, like temperance,

for their regulation. Neither should we class with carnal pleasures the

joys of physical well-being, such as the refreshment of sleep, the

exhilaration of a sea bath or of a massage, the comfort of a balmy

breeze, the ease of strength, or the relaxation of exercise.

2462. The Rule of Moderation.--The rule of moderation which temperance

imposes on the carnal appetites is this: “Indulge only as necessity

requires and duty allows.” For pleasure is a means whose end is some

reasonable need of life, and it is therefore a perversion to make

pleasure an end by indulging it apart from need and duty (see 85). But

necessity is to be understood broadly, so as to include not only the

essentials, but also the conveniences of life (e.g., seasonings and

desserts with food).

(a) As to venereal pleasures, then, the rule means that they should not

be used outside matrimony, nor in matrimony except for the procreation

of children and the other lawful ends of marriage.

(b) As to the pleasures of the table, they should not be indulged

except for the benefit of mind and body, and in such manner, quantity,

quality, etc., as this purpose requires. But one may regulate one’s

food or drink by the higher purpose of mortification, and partake of

less than the body demands here and now.

2463. The Excellence of Temperance.--(a) Temperance is among the four

principal or cardinal virtues. It keeps in order one of the passions

that is most natural and most necessary for the present life, and among

the virtues it excels in the quality of moderation, since it chastens

the inclination that is hardest to hold within bounds, and guards the

senses, the gateways of the soul (see 2441). “Wisdom teaches

temperance, prudence, justice and fortitude, than which there is

nothing more useful in life” (Wis., viii. 7).

(b) In its nature temperance is not the chief but the least of the

moral virtues. For justice and bravery are of greater service to the

common welfare, and the good of the multitude, as Aristotle remarks, is

more divine than the good of the individual. But in accidental respects

temperance has a superiority; for it is more tender and graceful than

fortitude, more arduous than justice, and there is perhaps no other

virtue whose exercise is so constantly called for.

2464. The Vices Opposed to Temperance.--(a) The vice of deficiency has

been called insensibility, and consists in an unreasonable dislike of

the inferior sensible pleasures, which makes one unwilling to use them

when and as reason commands. Thus, the Stoics and Manichees believed

that material joys are intrinsically evil, and there have been

fanatical advocates of teetotalism (e.g., the Aquarians) and of purity

(e.g., the Puritans who would not permit a man to kiss his wife on

Sunday, the prudish and censorious who fear or suspect evil without

reason, the Pharisees who think they are defiled if a sinner speaks to

them, the misogynists who disapprove of marriage). The sin is venial

_per se_, since it does not submit to passion; but it may be mortal on

account of some circumstance, as when the marriage debt is unjustly

refused or necessary nourishment is not taken. This vice is rarer than

its opposite, and it must not be confused with austerity, which for the

sake of a spiritual good foregoes some lawful but unnecessary sensible

enjoyment.

(b) The vice of excess is immoderation, which includes gluttony and

impurity. This is the most disgraceful of sins, because the most

unworthy of a rational being; it enslaves man to pleasures of which the

lower animals are capable; unlike other vices, it contains in itself

nothing of intelligence, industry, generosity, and nothing that would

at all liken it to virtue. The lowest depths of degradation are reached

when immoderation is brutish even in its manner, as when one is

gluttonous of human flesh or desirous of sodomitic pleasure.

Immoderation is called by Aristotle a “childish sin,” because, as a

child is eager for pleasures and will follow them unduly unless

instructed and trained, so also an immoderate person thinks only of his

appetite, and will go from bad to worse unless he accepts the

discipline of reason. But the child is excusable, while the immoderate

man should know better. Immoderation is worse than timidity; for, while

the former seeks selfish delight and acts with willing unrestraint, the

latter seeks self-preservation and is under some external menace.

2465. The Parts of Temperance.--(a) The subjective parts or species of

temperance are two, since there are two distinct objects of the virtue.

These objects are the two delights of touch that are ruled by the

virtue, namely, those associated with the nutritive and those

associated with the generative function. The first subjective part of

temperance includes abstemiousness as to food and sobriety as to drink;

the second part includes chastity, as regards the principal sexual act

(copulation), and decency or pudicity, as regards the secondary acts

(kisses, touches, embraces, etc).

(b) The integral parts are also two, since there are two conditions for

the perfect exercise of temperance. These conditions are the fear and

avoidance of what is disgraceful (shamefacedness, reserve, or delicacy)

and the love of what is honorable (virtue of propriety or refinement).

Shamefacedness is a passion, but, as physical fearlessness is a

disposition for moral courage, so is the fear of incurring reproach a

preparation for virtue. Hence, this delicacy is a laudable passion, and

is ascribed chiefly to temperance, whose opposite is chief among things

disgraceful. Propriety is also assigned to temperance, because it is an

attraction towards that which is spiritually good and beautiful, a

habit most useful for temperance, which must subordinate the delightful

to the good, the carnal to the spiritual.

(c) The potential parts of temperance are its minor or servant virtues.

They resemble temperance inasmuch as their chief praise is in

moderation, but they are inferior to it inasmuch as that which is

moderated by them is less recalcitrant than the sexual or gustatory

appetites. First among these potential parts are those whose task of

moderating, while not of the greatest difficulty, is yet more than

ordinarily difficult; and here we have continence, which calms a will

agitated by immoderate passion, and meekness, which governs the passion

of anger. Next among the potential parts are those whose task of

moderating offers less or ordinary difficulty, because they keep in

order matters less removed from reason. All the virtues of this second

group are given the common name of modesty. They are reduced to four:

humility and studiosity, which moderate the internal appetites of

excellence and of learning respectively; modesty of bearing and modesty

of living, which regulate respectively the external acts of the body

and the external goods of food, drink, clothing, furnishings, etc.

2466. Abstemiousness.--Abstemiousness is a virtue that moderates

according to reason the desire and enjoyment of the pleasures of the

table.

(a) It is a special virtue, because the appetite it curbs is very

powerful, and on account of the body’s need of nourishment is often

tempted.

(b) It moderates by avoiding both defect and excess in meals as to

time, place, quantity, quality, etc. There is not, then, one standard

amount of food for all, since the needs and duties of all are not the

same, and hence he who takes more or less than is normal or usual

cannot from that alone be accused of being unabstemious. Neither is the

mean for an individual so rigidly fixed as not to permit some latitude

within certain limits. It should be noted here too that abstemiousness

is not the same thing as abstinence. Thus, a person who is immoderately

abstinent, denying himself the food necessary for life or for duty or

for optional works better than his abstinence, is not abstemious, since

he is not guided by prudence or obligation.

(c) It moderates according to reason; that is, it decides what is

proper for an individual, not merely from the viewpoint of bodily

health, vigor, and longevity, as is done by the arts of medicine and

hygiene, but also and chiefly from the viewpoints of higher goods, such

as mental power, control of passion, austerity.

(d) It moderates the pleasures of the table, that is, the desire for

and actual enjoyment of food and non-intoxicating beverages. Moderation

in intoxicants is the special virtue of sobriety, which will be

discussed later. Hence, a person who drinks too much ginger ale or

water, tea or coffee, sins against abstemiousness; he who drinks too

much whisky, beer, or wine sins against sobriety.

2467. Degrees of Abstemiousness.--(a) The lower degree practises

temperance, taking sufficient food and drink for the preservation, not

only of life and health, but also of the very pink of physical

condition, yet so as to avoid all excess.

(b) The higher degree practises austerity, taking less than is

necessary for the best condition, or strength or comfort of the body,

but sufficient for life and health. The austere person eats less than

he could reasonably take, but not less than his health and work demand.

The subtraction he makes in his food will more likely benefit his

health in the long run and promote longevity, for, in the wise words of

old Galen, “abstemiousness is the best medicine.” But even though this

austerity be slightly detrimental to health, or may slightly abbreviate

life, it is still lawful, since the higher goods of the mind and of

virtue may always be secured at such reasonable sacrifice of corporal

goods (see 1164 sqq., 1561 sqq.).

2468. Austerity.--The two chief forms of austerity in food and drink

are fasting and abstinence.

(a) Nature.--The natural fast is the omission of all eating and

drinking, or the omission to receive into the stomach anything whatever

that has the nature of food, drink or medicine. The moral fast is the

omission to take a certain quantity of food that could be taken without

intemperance. Abstinence is the omission to take a certain quality of

food, such as meat or eggs.

(b) Kinds.--Fast and abstinence are in respect to duration either

perpetual (e.g., the abstinence from meat of the Carthusians) or

temporary (e.g., the abstinence for Fridays and other appointed days of

the faithful generally); either voluntary (e.g., a fast which one

assumes under private vow) or obligatory (e.g., the fasts and

abstinences prescribed in the general or particular laws of the

Church). The ecclesiastical fast and abstinence will be spoken of later

when we treat of the precepts of the Church and Holy Communion.

2469. The Excellence of Fasting and Abstinence.--(a)

Lawfulness.--Fasting and abstinence are acts of virtue, for they subdue

the unruly flesh, fit the mind for divine contemplation (Dan, x. 3

sqq.), satisfy for sins (Joel, ii. 12), and add weight to prayers

(Tob., xii. 8; Judith, iv. 11; Matt., xvii. 20). The greatest men of

the Old and New Testaments practised fasting--Moses, Samson, Elias,

John the Baptist, and St. Paul. Our Lord Himself fasted forty days and

forty nights (Matt, iv. 2). St. Paul, therefore, numbers fasting with

other virtues: “In fastings, in knowledge, in chastity” (II Cor., vi.

5). Examples of abstinence are Daniel avoiding meat (Dan, i. 8 sqq.)

and Eleazar who died rather than eat forbidden swine flesh (II Mach.,

vi. 18 sqq.). Abstention from solid or liquid nourishment is not a

virtue, however, if practised from purely indifferent or evil motives,

for example, merely in order to recover health through diet, or to

train for an athletic contest, or to preserve shape and beauty, or to

commit suicide, or to simulate virtue, or to profess false doctrines or

if carried to extremes. The forty-day fasts of Moses, Elias and of Our

Lord are for our admiration, but very few are able to imitate these

examples.

(b) Obligation.--Fasting and abstinence in general are obligatory under

natural law, because without them certain necessary ends cannot be

obtained. They are remedies for past sins and preservatives against

future sins; and, as sin is the common state of man (James, iii. 2;

Gal., v. 17), it would be presumptuous to neglect these antidotes.

Under the positive law fasting and abstinence have been prescribed in

detail, and this was necessary since it is the duty of the Church to

determine the time, manner and other circumstances of natural duties of

religion which the natural law itself has not determined.

2470. The Sins Opposed to Abstemiousness.--(a) The sin of deficiency in

the matter of food is self-starvation. This is the sin of those who are

martyrs to fashion, who in order to have a frail figure follow a diet

(e.g., denying oneself all substantial food to reduce obesity) that

undermines their constitutions and leaves them a prey to disease. It is

also the sin of those who from unwise zeal for rigorous fasting deprive

themselves of the necessaries of life, or eat what their stomachs rebel

against. This sin does not differ from suicide or bodily injury treated

above (see 1566 sqq., 1857 sqq.). “It is the same thing to kill

yourself by slow degrees as to kill yourself in a moment. And he who

kills himself by fasting is like one who offers God a sacrifice from

stolen property” (St. Jerome).

(b) The sin of excess in food is gluttony. There is no sin in desiring

food or in taking food with satisfaction, for the Author of nature has

willed that such an essential act as eating should be pleasurable, and

it is a fact that digestion and health suffer when food is taken

without appetite or a peaceful frame of mind. But the glutton goes to

excess by the inordinate and unreasonable enjoyment he takes in feeding

himself.

2471. Ways of Committing Gluttony.--There are many ways of committing

gluttony, but they can all be reduced to two heads.

(a) Gluttony in food is excess in the substance, quantity, or quality

of the things eaten. The gourmet is extremely fastidious about the

substance of his food; he must have the most dainty or costly or rare

viands, and nothing else will satisfy him. Cannibalism seems to be

lawful in extreme necessity, but it is not lawful to kill human beings

in order to eat them. The gorger or gourmand may not be particular

about the kind of food that is given him, but he desires a large

quantity, more than is good for him. The epicure is too hard to please

as to quality; even when there is no festal occasion, he must have a

great variety of foods and they must be most carefully prepared, so

that he may get the utmost joy of the palate. We should not class among

gluttons, however, those who require special foods or special cooking

for a good reason, as when health or hard work forces one to observe a

strict diet.

(b) Gluttony in eating is excess as to the time or manner of taking

food. There is excess about the time when a person is over-eager about

the dinner bell, eats before or oftener than he should, or lingers too

long at table. There is excess about the manner when a person eats

greedily, hurriedly, or selfishly, rushing at his food like a tiger,

bolting it like a dog, or depriving others like a pig.

2472. The Sinfulness of Gluttony.--(a) Gluttony is a mortal sin when it

is so serious as to turn man away from his end itself, making him

prefer his appetite to God. Thus, those sin gravely who are such high

livers that they are unable to pay their debts, to the serious

detriment of creditors; or who gormandize so much that they can do

little work and have to spend most of their time in exercising or

taking cures; or whose heavy eating is the occasion of serious sins of

anger, impurity, or neglect of religious or other duties. To all these

apply the words of St. Paul (Phil., iii. 19): “Whose god is their

belly.” To eat until one vomits seems to be a mortal sin, if the vomit

is caused by the enormous quantity of food consumed, for such an act

seems to be gravely opposed to reason; but there is no grave sin if the

vomit is due to the quality of the food or the weakness of the stomach.

(b) Gluttony in itself is a venial sin since it is a disorder about the

means, and not a turning away from the end. This happens when one is

inordinately fond of gastronomic joys, but is not prepared to sacrifice

grave duties for their sakes. Thus, a person who gives too much

indulgence to a sweet tooth, or who likes to stuff himself now and

then, but who doesn’t disable himself or give scandal by his weakness,

sins venially.

2473. Gluttony as a Capital Sin.--(a) The first condition of a capital

sin is that it be one of the main sources of evil attraction. This

condition is verified of gluttony, for all seek happiness, and gluttony

contains one of the ingredients of happiness, namely, pleasure in an

unusual degree. Among all sensual delights those of the palate and

stomach are admitted to be, along with those of sexual love, the most

intense. The first of the three temptations with which Satan assailed

Christ was that of gluttony (Matt., iv. 1-4).

(b) The second condition of a capital vice is that it be the final or

motive cause of a large crop of sins. This condition is also verified

in gluttony, since the greedy man is so in love with his pet vice that

in order to pamper it he is ready to suffer various kinds of evils

which he should not permit. Evils of soul that are caused by gluttony

are: heaviness in the mind, for an overloaded stomach unfits the mind

to reflect on higher things or to consider the duty of moderation in

rejoicing, in words or in acts (Ecclus., ii. 3); absurd mirth in the

will, a feeling of security and gladness and unrestraint, for the

glutton thinks only of his present contentment and does not consider

the evils of his sin; loquacity in word, for his mental faculties being

dulled and his will hilarious the glutton gives free rein to his

tongue, often sinning by detraction, betrayal of secrets, contumely,

and blasphemy (Prov., X. 19); levity in act, for the glutton wishes to

give vent to his animal spirits, and he does so by unbecoming jokes and

clownishness. Evils of body due to gluttony are dirtiness and disease:

the glutton is often filthy in his manner of eating, his breath is

fetid, he is much occupied with natural necessities, excretion and

exgurgitation, and he suffers from gout or indigestion or one of the

numerous other maladies that are the price of overindulgence.

2474. Sobriety.--Sobriety in its strictest sense is a virtue that keeps

one to the moderation of temperance in the liking for intoxicating

liquors and in their use.

(a) Thus, sobriety is concerned with intoxicants, that is, with

substances that produce a poisonous effect upon the nerves and brain.

It is, therefore, a different virtue from abstemiousness, since it has

to subdue a vice far more alluring and deleterious than gluttony.

Alcohol has the same effect as a narcotic drug, for it benumbs both

mind and body, sometimes to the point of insensibility, so that those

who are under its influence are unable to think, speak or regulate

their movements properly; but it gives a feeling of exhilaration and

elevation and leaves behind it an insatiable craving, so that those who

have once taken too much are very likely to repeat the act. Habitual

intoxication breaks down both morals and health, and the toper goes to

a disgraceful and early grave.

(b) Sobriety is concerned with liquors, that is, with beverages and

medicines. But secondarily it also controls the appetite for narcotics,

such as opium, chloroform, tobacco, and the desire to inhale strong

liquors or vapors or gases which may produce intoxication.

2475. Obligation to Practise Sobriety.--Sobriety should be cultivated

by all, but certain ones are more bound to it than others.

(a) Thus, on account of the greater physical evils of insobriety in

their regard, the virtue should be especially cultivated by the young,

the old, women, and persons of sedentary life. Young people are greatly

harmed by too much alcohol, because it stunts their growth and affects

them more seriously in mind and body than adults. The old have not the

strength to throw off the poison of too much stimulation and are

accordingly more injured. Women, being more excitable than men, are

more easily affected by strong drink, and hence among the ancient

Romans females abstained from wine. Finally, those who lead a sedentary

or indoor life do not so easily get the poison out of their systems,

and they feel the evil effects more than those who live out of doors or

who engage in manual work. But there is no constitution, however iron

it may be, that is not conquered in the end by alcoholism.

(b) On account of the greater spiritual ills that result from their

insobriety, the virtue of soberness is more imperative in certain

individuals. Thus, there are some who do greater spiritual harm to

themselves by intoxication, for example, the young, whose passions are

more easily inflamed, and females, who are more readily taken advantage

of; and hence St. Paul recommends sobriety to women and young men

particularly (I Tim., iii. 11; Tit., ii. 6). There are also some who do

greater harm to others by intoxication, such as those who should

instruct others (Tit., ii. 2), or who should give good example (I

Tim., iii. 2), or who are rulers over the people (Prov., xxxi. 4).

2476. The Sins against Sobriety.--(a) The sin of excess may be called,

for want of a special name, over-sobriety. It is committed by those who

condemn all liking for or enjoyment of intoxicants as intrinsically

evil (e.g., the Manichees, who said that wine was the gall of the

devil); also by those who deny to themselves or others intoxicants when

the use of them is necessary (e.g., the Encratites, who would allow

only water for the Eucharist, or a fanatical teetotaler who would see a

man die rather than give him a necessary dose of whisky).

(b) The sin of deficiency against sobriety is drunkenness, which is a

voluntary and unjustified loss of the use of reason brought on by the

consumption of too much intoxicating liquor. Drunkenness as a sin

(active drunkenness), therefore, is to be distinguished from

drunkenness as a condition (passive drunkenness). There is active

drunkenness or the sin of drunkenness when intoxication is both

voluntary and inexcusable; there is passive drunkenness or the mere

state of drunkenness when one or the other of these two conditions is

lacking. Usually those who sin by drunkenness seek the pleasure or

forgetfulness which potations bring, but this is not essential, it

seems, to the sin of inebriety; the malice of drunkenness is found not

merely in the excessive pleasure, but especially in the subordination

of spirit to the flesh and in the damage done to mind and body. Hence,

a person who yields to the insistence of a banquet companion that he

drink wine which is disgusting to him, is guilty of drunkenness if he

takes too much.

2477. Cases of Mere Passive Drunkenness.--(a) Involuntary

Drunkenness.--This occurs when there is invincible ignorance of fact

(e.g., when an adult becomes intoxicated in good faith, because he had

no reason to suspect that a cocktail or eggnog was very strong, or that

his stomach was very weak), or of law (e.g., when a child gets drunk

because he does not know that it is wrong to do so), or when there is

lack of intention (e.g., when drink is forced on a person who does not

want it).

(b) Excusable Drunkenness.--This occurs according to most theologians

when there is a proportionately grave reason which justifies the evil

of intoxication (see 103 sqq.). Such grave reasons are the saving of

life (e.g., to escape death from snake bite), the cure of serious

disease (e.g., cholera or influenza), the avoidance or mitigation of

severe suffering (e.g., before a surgical operation, or after a very

painful accident, or when there is no other means of helping a grave

case of insomnia). In all these cases it is generally admitted that one

may bring on unconsciousness by the use of anesthetics and sedatives

(such as chloroform, ether, morphine, opium); and there is no reason

why we should not view intoxicants also in the light of remedies which

may be taken on the advice of physicians or other competent persons if

other remedies cannot be had. Some theologians, however, refuse to

excuse intoxication for any reason, since they regard drunkenness as

intrinsically evil. In addition to the excuses just mentioned some also

give that of escape from violent death, as when a burglar threatens to

kill unless those present make themselves helpless by intoxication. But

all agree that intoxication is not excused by ordinary advantages, such

as escape from slight physical pain (e.g., toothache, seasickness), nor

by the desire to avoid what can be avoided by other and more suitable

means (e.g., worry about one’s troubles, an unpleasant meeting or

conversation).

2478. The Morality of Total Abstinence.--(a) Obligation.--_Per se_,

there is no obligation of abstaining from every or any kind of

intoxicating beverage, either perpetually or temporarily, for food and

drink were intended by God for the use of man and the moderate use of

intoxicants, especially when the percentage of alcohol is light, is

found by many to be a help to digestion, a refreshing stimulant, an

excellent tonic and remedy. The example of Our Lord, who changed water

into wine, who partook of wine at banquets, and who made wine one of

the elements of the most sacred of rites, is proof that it is not

sinful to drink strong liquors. This is also clearly taught in the

Bible, which praises moderate drinking of wine (Ecclus., xxxi 36),

recommends that a little be taken for a weak stomach (I Tim., v. 23),

and declares that it is not what enters the mouth that defiles (Matt.,

xv. 2).

But, _per accidens_, there is an obligation of total abstinence when a

greater good requires that one sacrifice intoxicants, whether the good

be of self (e.g., when intoxicants are a serious danger to one’s health

or morals, or when one is bound by vow or pledge to abstain from them)

or of another (e.g., when the use of intoxicants gives serious scandal,

Rom., xiv. 21). If the common safety is seriously imperilled through

drunkenness, and obligatory abstinence can be enforced and will be the

most reasonable method of correcting the evil, we can see no objection

to prohibition laws. But whether these conditions exist in this or that

particular place or case is a question of fact and has to be decided by

impartial study.

(b) Lawfulness.--_Per se_, it is also permissible to abstain freely

from all intoxicants, for the sake of some higher good (e.g., in order

the better to apply the mind to studies, Ecclus., ii. 3), to silence

calumnious tongues, to practise mortification, or to give good example.

But, _per accidens_, it is not lawful to abstain when law (e.g., in the

celebration of Mass) or necessity (e.g., a man dying from influenza who

cannot be saved without whiskey) requires one to drink spirits.

Examples of total abstinence are the Nazarites (Num., vi. 3), Samson

(Judges, xiii. 7), Judith (Jud., xii. 2, 19), and John the Baptist

(Luke, i. 15).

2479. Degrees of the Sin of Drunkenness.--(a) The sin of perfect or

complete drunkenness is a voluntary excess in intoxicants carried so

far that one loses temporarily the use of reason. This does not mean

that one must become insensible or fall in a stupor or be unable to

walk or have delirium tremens (dead drunk), but only that one loses the

mental power to direct oneself morally, even though one still retains

enough judgment to direct oneself physically (e.g., to cross the street

or ascend the stairs safely, or to find one’s own quarters without

help). The indications of perfect drunkenness are that the intoxicated

person no longer distinguishes between right and wrong, perpetrates

evils he would abhor in his right senses (e.g., beats his wife, runs

down a pedestrian, blasphemes, or provokes quarrels), and cannot

remember on sobering up the chief things he said or did while drunk.

(b) The sin of imperfect or incomplete drunkenness is a voluntary

excess in intoxicants carried so far that one is somewhat confused in

mind, but does not lose the use of reason. Hence, a person who is

physically impeded though not mentally incapable on account of drink,

who staggers, speaks incoherently, or sees uncertainly, but who knows

that he should not beat his wife, or kill, or blaspheme, or quarrel,

etc., is imperfectly drunk. There are also circumstances that aggravate

the evil of perfect or imperfect drunkenness. Thus, it is worse to be a

toper or habitual drunkard than to be an occasional drunkard, and worse

to go on a long spree than to be drunk only for an evening.

2480. Malice of the Sin of Drunkenness.--(a) Perfect drunkenness is a

mortal sin, because it is a grave disorder to deprive oneself of moral

judgment and thus expose oneself to the danger of perpetrating serious

crimes and injuries. Moreover, it is a monstrous thing to despoil

oneself unnecessarily of reason, the greatest natural good of man, and

to make oneself for the time being a maniac, more like a beast than a

human being. St. Paul declares that those who would put on Christ must

put away drunkenness with other works of darkness (Rom., xiii. 13), and

that drunkards shall not inherit the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 21). The

opinion that perfect drunkenness is only venial if not habitual is now

obsolete, and the opinion that perfect drunkenness is not mortal unless

it lasts a considerable time (say, more than an hour) is commonly

rejected; for the essential malice of drunkenness depends on its

nature, not on its frequency or duration. A person who takes enough to

make himself completely drunk and then escapes the consequences by

artificial means (e.g., by using a drug or bringing on a vomit), does

not sin mortally by drunkenness; but it seems that such a swinish

person must sin mortally by reason of gluttony, injury to health, or

scandal.

(b) Imperfect drunkenness is a venial sin, because the harm done is not

considerable, for a tipsy man usually suffers nothing more than a

slightly fuddled brain and some unsteadiness of body. Indeed, if wine

or beer produces nothing more than a spirit of moderate hilarity and

talkativeness, there is no sin.

Accidentally, imperfect drunkenness may be a mortal sin by reason of

circumstances, as when the person who is intoxicated gives great

scandal on account of his position or office, or when the motive is to

inflame passion or to commit other serious sin, or when the drunkenness

is constantly repeated, or when the drunkard seriously neglects his

business, family, or religious duties, or does other grave harm in

consequence of his love of the bottle. In fact, there may be grave sin

when one is not intoxicated at all, but is only a tippler. For the

habit of drinking alcoholic beverages frequently (e.g., a nip or dram

of whisky several times a day) is, according to medical authority, more

harmful to the system (alcoholism) than intoxication at long intervals,

especially if the portion is generous and the drinker is young.

2481. Drunkenness Compared with Other Sins.--(a) It is not the worst of

sins. Sins against the theological virtues are more wicked, since they

offend against divine good, whereas drunkenness is against human good.

Many sins against the moral virtues are worse, since they injure a

greater human good; for example, it is more harmful to take away life

than to suspend the use of reason.

(b) It is one of the most ruinous of sins in its consequences (see

2472, 2473): first, for society, since a large percentage of crime,

insanity, destitution, and misery is due to intemperance; secondly, to

religion, since indulgence in one sensual pleasure sharpens the

appetite for others, while creating a distaste for spiritual things,

for effort and self-sacrifice; thirdly, to the intellect, for strong

drink steals away the mind and memory; fourthly, to the body, for

drunkenness not only prostrates the nervous system at the moment and

has most painful after-effects in bursting headaches and disabled

stomach, but it also causes permanent disasters (to brain, heart,

nerves, kidneys, and liver), weakens the resistance to disease and

brings on an early death; fifthly, to goods of fortune, since drunkards

squander their all for drink; sixthly, to posterity, since intemperate

parents transmit constitutional weakness to their children.

2482. Responsibility of Drunkard for Sins Committed While

Intoxicated.--(a) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable,

he is responsible for all the sins he foresaw or should have foreseen;

for then these sins are willed in their cause (see 94 sqq.). Hence one

who is accustomed while under the influence of liquor to blaspheme,

betray secrets, quarrel, etc., should confess that he committed them

while drunk, or that he was prepared to commit them in getting drunk.

Under similar conditions one who misses Mass because he was drunk is

responsible for the omission; one who is too drunk to attend to a

business appointment and thereby causes loss to another is held to

restitution. But, if grave sins are foreseen only in a very confused

way, generally they will be imputable only as venial in themselves.

(b) If the drunkenness is fully voluntary and culpable, but the sins

that ensued were not foreseen and could not humanly have been foreseen,

the drunkard is excused at least in part from the guilt of these sins.

Hence, a person who gets drunk for the first time or who usually sleeps

after getting drunk is not responsible for the bad language he uses, if

the thought of profanity was farthest from his mind when he became

drunk. But if this person was not completely drunk and had some

realization of the malice and scandal of bad language, he is at least

venially guilty of profanity and scandal.

(c) If the drunkenness was involuntary, the drunken person is excused

entirely in case of complete drunkenness; he is excused partially in

case of incomplete drunkenness that did not exclude some realization

of the sinfulness of what he said or did while intoxicated (see Canon

2201, Sec.3). In the civil law drunkenness is not held to be an excuse

for a criminal act, but it may negative a specific intent (Robinson,

_Elements of Law_, Sec.Sec.471, 525, 531).

2483. Material Cooperation in the Sin of Drunkenness--(a) If there is

no grave reason for the cooperation, it is illicit. Mere hospitality is

not a sufficient reason for furnishing a table with a great supply of

strong drinks when some of the guests are dipsomaniacs, and mere good

fellowship does not justify one who has been treated to order another

round of treats if some of the drinkers are already inebriated. Parents

or others in authority who get drunk before their subjects are guilty

of scandal; those who encourage drunkenness are guilty of seduction;

those who supply others with drink in order that these may become

drunkards are guilty of formal cooperation.

(b) If there is a grave reason for cooperation, it is not illicit (1515

sqq., 1538 sqq.). Whether it is lawful to persuade another to get

sinfully drunk in order to keep him from the commission of a greater

evil (e.g., homicide or sacrilege), is a disputed question (see 1502).

2484. Is it lawful to make another person drunk when he will be

guiltless of sin, and there is a grave reason?

(a) According to one opinion this is not lawful, because drunkenness,

like impurity, is intrinsically evil and never permissible, since the

end does not justify the means. Hence, just as it would be wrong to

induce a drunken person to impurity, so it would also be wrong to

intoxicate a child or an insane person (see 306).

(b) According to the common opinion, it is lawful to intoxicate oneself

for a grave reason (see 2477 b), and hence also it is lawful to

intoxicate another for a similar reason. Thus, if a criminal were about

to blow up a building and destroy many lives, it would be permissible

or even obligatory to put powerful intoxicants into his drink so as to

make him helpless. If one were about to be roasted by cannibals and

could escape by making the cannibals drunk, it would not be sinful to

make them drunk.

2485. Licit Use of Narcotics.--There are a great many substances that

produce the same effects on mind and body as intoxicating liquors,

namely, the narcotic poisons, such as morphine, opium, chloroform,

ether, or laughing gas. To them then will apply the principles given

above in reference to strong drink. Thus, it would be a serious sin to

make oneself insensible by using morphine, if there were no just

reason; but it is lawful to take ether for an operation, gas when

having a tooth pulled, morphine when it is ordered by a physician to

relieve pain, etc. In his address of Feb. 24, 1957 to a symposium of

the Italian Society of Anaesthesiology (_The Pope Speaks_, Summer,

1957, pp. 33 ff.) Pope Pius XII considered some special aspects of the

use of drugs in the practice of analgesis. Among the questions

submitted to him for consideration were the following:

1) Is there a general moral obligation to refuse analgesis and to

accept physical pain in a spirit of faith? After indicating that in

certain cases the acceptance of physical suffering is a matter of

serious obligation, the Pope responded that there was no conflict with

the spirit of faith to avoid pain by the use of narcotics. Pain can and

does prevent the achievement of higher goods and interests and may

licitly be avoided; obviously, too, the pain may be willingly accepted

in fulfillment of the Christian duty of renunciation and of interior

purification.

2) Is it lawful for the dying or the sick who are in danger of death to

make use of narcotics when there are medical reasons for their use? The

Pope responded; “Yes--provided that no other means exist, and if, in

the given circumstances, that action does not prevent the carrying out

of other moral and religious duties.” The duties referred to include

settling important business, making a will, or going to confession.

(Should a dying man refuse first to attend to these duties and persist

in asking for narcotics, the doctor can administer the drugs without

rendering himself guilty of formal co-operation in the fault committed,

which results, not from the narcotics but from the immoral will of the

patient.) Among the conditions and circumstances laid down for the

licit use of narcotics in the case in question are the following: “if

the dying person has received the last Sacraments, if medical reasons

clearly suggest the use of anaesthesia, if in delivering the dose the

permitted amount is not exceeded, if the intensity and duration of the

treatment is carefully reckoned, and finally, if the patient consents

to it, then there is no objection, the use of anaesthesia is morally

permissible.”

3) Can narcotics be used even if the lessening of pain probably be

accompanied by a shortening of life? The Pope responded that “every

form of direct euthanasia, that is, the administration of a narcotic in

order to produce or hasten death, is unlawful because in that case one

presumes to dispose directly of life ... If between the narcotics and

the shortening of life there exists no direct causal link, imposed

either by the intention of the interested parties or by the nature of

things (as would be the case if the suppression of the pain could be

attained only by the shortening of life), and if, on the contrary, the

administration of narcotics produces two distinct effects, one, the

relief of pain and the other the shortening of life, then the action is

lawful. However it must be determined whether there is a reasonable

proportion between these two effects and whether the advantages of the

one effect compensate for the disadvantages of the other. It is

important also to ask oneself whether the present state of science does

not make it possible for the same result to be obtained by other means.

Finally, in the use of the narcotics, one should not go beyond the

limits which are actually necessary.”

2486. The Virtue of Purity.--As abstemiousness and sobriety preside

over the pleasures of the self-preservative instinct, so purity governs

those that pertain to the species-preservative instinct. Purity is an

inclusive name for the virtues of chastity and decency or pudicity, and

its office is to regulate proximately the internal movements of the

soul (thoughts and desires) and remotely the external words and acts

that have to do with sexual delights.

(a) Chastity in its strictest sense is a virtue that moderates or

chastens through reason venereal pleasure, chiefly as to its principal

or consummated act (i.e., intercourse, semination) or as to its

principal bodily centers (i.e., the genital organs). Hence, there is a

twofold chastity, conjugal and celibate: conjugal chastity abstains

from unnatural pleasure, and uses the natural reasonably in marriage;

celibate chastity abstains from all venereal pleasure, as being

unlawful in the single state.

(b) Decency (_pudicitia_) in its strictest sense is a virtue that

moderates by the sense of shame venereal pleasure chiefly in its

secondary or non-consummated external acts (e.g., looks, conversations,

touches, embraces, kisses), which are related to the principal act as

being an enticement to it, its preparation, or its external sign and

accompaniment. The conjugal act, though lawful, occasions a feeling of

shame, and the same is true of the non-consummated acts; but decency is

especially concerned with these latter, because they are usually more

openly performed than the consummated act. Decency means, then, that

manifestations of carnal desire should be conducted with a sense that

this desire arises from a lower and rebellious passion, removed in

itself farthest from reason, and not more suited for unrestrained

expression or public exhibition than other lower animal acts. The sense

of shame and decency is a protection to the virtue of the unmarried and

the married, restraining the former from the unlawful and holding the

latter to moderation in the use of the lawful.

2487. Chastity and decency are not separate virtues; rather decency is

a circumstance of chastity. (a) Thus, chastity moderates also the

secondary acts, for reason must chastise the pleasure that is taken in

these acts, if this passion is to be kept in due bounds, (b) Decency

moderates also the primary act, for in the use of marriage there should

be nothing unworthy, nothing to bring a blush of confusion.

2488. Virginity.--The highest form of chastity is virginity, which is a

purity unblemished that retains the bloom of its original innocence.

Conjugal chastity uses venereal pleasures moderately and virtuously;

virginity abstains from them entirely and virtuously. Virginity is

threefold.

(a) Virginity of body is freedom from corruption in the genitals, which

means that a male has never had sexual intercourse, that the hymen of a

female is inviolate. This physical purity belongs to the virtue of

virginity accidentally, seeing that it is the result or indication of

the virtue; but it does not belong to the virtue essentially, since

virtue is in the soul, not in the body. Hence, one may be virginal in

body without the virtue of virginity (e.g., a new-born infant), or vice

versa (e.g., a woman vowed to virginity who has been raped).

(b) Virginity of the lower part of the soul (the passions) is freedom

from venereal pleasure voluntarily experienced. Primarily, this refers

to pleasure in consummated acts, secondarily to pleasure in

non-consummated acts and internal acts of thought and desire. This kind

of purity belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, since sexual

pleasures are the material element or subject-matter of virginity,

whose office it is to exclude all indulgence of them. Hence, a person

who has had even one voluntary experience of these satisfactions,

lawful or gravely unlawful, has lost virginity permanently, though the

virtue of chastity may remain or may be recovered. For virginity cannot

continue when its subject-matter has been removed. It should be noted

that involuntary pleasures, as in nocturnal pollution or in rape or in

passive spermic discharges, are not detrimental to the virtue of

virginity.

(c) Virginity of the higher part of the soul (the mind) is the

intention to abstain from every venereal act in the future. This purity

of soul also belongs to the virtue of virginity essentially, being its

formal element, since acts of the sensitive appetites are made moral

and virtuous only from the direction and influence of reason and will.

Hence, one who has had no experience of voluntary carnal pleasure, but

who intends to marry and use its rights or to act unchastely, has not

in the first case the virtue of virginity, or in the second case the

virtue of chastity.

2489. Loss of Virginity.--Physical or bodily virginity once lost can

never be recovered, for this virginity means that a certain bodily

action or passion has not occurred, whereas the loss means that such

action or passion has occurred. Of course, a miracle could restore

bodily integrity. But a more important question is this: is moral

virginity, or the virtue of virginity, also irrecoverable?

(a) If the virtue has been lost as to its chief material element, it

cannot be recovered. This material element (i.e., the absence of all

voluntary seminal experience) cannot be restored, for even God cannot

make what has been experienced a non-actuality. However, it should be

noted once for all that loss of virginity does not necessarily imply

loss of conjugal chastity, and that lost chastity may be recovered by

repentance.

(b) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element, and the

intention not to abstain was unlawful and naturally, though not

actually, productive of semination (e.g., copulation of a completely

aspermatic adult, or internal and intense libidinous sin from which

accidentally pollution does not result), it seems that the virtue

cannot be recovered. For in these cases the sinner wills, at least

indirectly, the loss of the chief material element of virginity, and it

seems repugnant to reason to ascribe the glory of virginity to one who

has sinned in this way. Non expedit regulariter monere poenitentes de

eorum virginitate irreparabiliter amissa, sed praestat quaerentibus

respondere omnia peccata remitti de quibus contritio habeatur.

(c) If virginity has been lost as to its formal element and the

intention not to abstain was lawful (e.g., a maid not under vow decided

to marry and have children, but changed her mind and decided to remain

single), or was unlawful but neither naturally nor actually productive

of semination (e.g., external unchastity of a child incapable through

impuberty of emissions, or internal and only mildly exciting

unchastity of an adult), the virtue may be recovered, certainly in the

first case and probably also in the second case. For the matter of

virginity is certainly not taken away by the mere intention to have

lawful venereal pleasure, nor probably even by pleasures that do not

tend to semination. Recovery of virginity is made in the one case by

the retractation of contrary intention and in the other case by

repentance and renewal of good purpose.

2490. Conditions Necessary for the Virtue of Virginity.--(a) As to its

manner, it seems more probable that this purpose must be expressed as a

vow. The reason for this according to some is that virginity is a

special virtue only because of the sacred character which religion

gives it, and according to others also because of the unshakable

renunciation which is conferred by a vow. But it is also held as

probable that unvowed virginity may be called a lesser degree of the

special virtue of virginity, At least, it is a higher degree of the

virtue of chastity.

(b) As to its motive, virginity must be justified by an extrinsic

reason. Chastity is justified by its own end, which is reasonable

moderation. Virginity, on the contrary, is not self-justificatory,

since in itself it is unfruitful and without advantage. Hence, it is

not praiseworthy unless it serves some higher good than that of

propagation, such as a good of the mind (e.g., Plato remained single

for the sake of philosophy) or of the will (e.g., the New Testament

recommends virginity for the sake of greater devotion to the things of

God). Virginity that results from mere contempt for sensible pleasure

would be an excess, and continence embraced merely to escape the

burdens of marriage and to lead an easy, self-indulgent, irresponsible

life would be selfishness; but virginity followed from an ideal of

self-sacrifice which reason approves observes the golden mean (see Pius

XII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954).

2491. The Excellence of Virginity.-(a) Virginity has the highest rank

among the various forms of chastity. Every kind of chastity

(pre-nuptial, conjugal, vidual) is of great importance, because to this

virtue is entrusted the right propagation of the entire race and the

moral and physical health of the individual in the most insistent of

passions. The material reproduction of the race is indeed a more urgent

need than virginity, since without it the human species would die out;

and if there were danger of race extinction, it would be more

imperative to marry than to remain continent. But if we confine our

attention to the ordinary course of things and compare virginity and

non-virginal chastity from the viewpoint of nobility, it must be said

virginity is more valuable both to the community and to the individual

than the other kinds of chastity. It is more valuable to the community,

since the example of its excellence is a protection to public morals,

and its permanence gives the opportunity for a more general and ready

service of society. It is more valuable to the individual, since to be

occupied with the things of God is better than to be engrossed in the

things of the world, and the unmarried have the opportunity to devote

more time with less distraction to higher things. Scripture affirms the

superiority of virginity to marriage by its teaching (e.g., Our Lord in

Matt., xix. 12, counsels virginity; St. Paul in I Cor., vii. 7 sqq.,

says that it is the better and more blessed state), by its examples

(Our Lord, the Blessed Virgin, St. John the Baptist, St. John the

Evangelist, and in the Old Dispensation Josue, Elias, Eliseus,

Jeremias), and by its promised rewards (Apoc., xiv. 4). A popular

philosophy of materialism today makes repressed sex-urges responsible

for hysteria and other emotional disturbances, but experience proves

that continence benefits both psychical and physical health.

(b) Virginity does not rank first among all the virtues. The

theological virtues surpass it, being its goal; martyrdom and religious

obedience are greater, because they sacrifice the superior goods of

life and of the will. It may happen, then, that a person in the married

state or a penitent (Luke, vii. 36 sqq.) is personally more holy than

one dedicated to continence; a married person or penitent may surpass a

virgin in faith, hope and charity, and may be therefore, simply

speaking, more perfect.

2492. The Sin of Impurity.--This sin, which is also known as lust, is

an inordinate desire of sexual pleasure.

(a) Its object is sexual pleasure, that is, the sense of physical

enjoyment in the bodily organs or of psychical satisfaction in the

lower appetites of the soul derived from acts related to generation.

Hence, we should distinguish impurity from sensuality (which is an

inordinate attachment to esthetic pleasure or other higher

sense-pleasure), from luxury (which is an excessive desire of health

and comfort), and from the vice called curiosity (which is an

over-fondness for intellectual delights, see 2461). But it should be

noted that sensual pleasure easily leads to venereal delight, and that

intellectual curiosity about sex matters is dangerous, and hence this

sensuality and curiosity may be, and frequently are, a temptation to

impurity (see below on Temptations to Impurity).

(b) Impurity is in desire, for the passions in themselves are

indifferent (see 121), and they become sinful only when their abuse is

consented to by the will.

(c) Impurity is inordinate; that is, it takes pleasure against lhe

dictate of reason. This happens when sexual gratifications are indulged

by the unmarried, or by the married in unnatural ways. It is a

perversion and a sin to cheat the stomach in order to gratify the

palate, because God willed that the pleasure of eating should serve the

nourishment of the body, or, as the proverb has it, because man does

not live to eat, but eats to live. Now, sex pleasure has been ordained

by God as an inducement to perform an act which has for its purpose the

propagation and education of children, duties that cannot be rightly

attended to except in the married state. Hence, those who seek venereal

pleasure outside of matrimony, or outside the way intended by nature,

act unreasonably, for they sacrifice the end for the means. Instinct

guides the animal aright in these matters, but man is a nobler creature

and must guide himself by religion and reason.

2493. Kinds of Impurity.--(a) Impurity is consummated when the act is

continued to its natural conclusion and complete venereal satisfaction

is had. This occurs in semination, which is the termination of the

process set up by the impure thought and desire and the realization of

its full pleasure. Semination occurs either in the process of coition,

or in extracoitional issues known as “pollution.” Equivalent to

semination, morally speaking, are other emissions or secretions that

accompany complete or almost complete gratification, but in which the

fluid is not prolific (e.g., the urethral emissions in boys who have

not attained puberty or in eunuchs, the vaginal flow in women, urethral

distillations). Consummated impurity is either natural (that is,

suitable for reproduction, the end intended by nature), as in

fornication or adultery, or unnatural (that is, not suited for

reproduction), as in sodomy or pollution.

(b) Impurity is non-consummated when not carried to its natural

conclusion of complete satisfaction and semination. There are two

classes of the non-consummated sins, namely, the internal (as in

thoughts and desires) and the external or lewdness (as in words, looks,

kisses). This happens without carnal commotion (e.g., when a frigid old

man thinks with mental pleasure only on the wild deeds of his youth),

or with carnal commotion, that is, with an excitement and stimulation

in the genital organs that prepares the way for semination.

2494. Gravity of the Sin of Impurity.--(a) Impurity is a mortal sin,

because it is a disorder that affects a good of the highest importance

(viz, the propagation of the race), and brings in its train public and

private, moral and physical, evils of the most serious kind. Man has no

more right to degrade his body by lust than he has to kill it by

suicide, for God is the absolute Lord over the body and He severely

forbids impurity of every kind. Those who do the works of the flesh,

whether according to nature (e.g., fornicators and adulterers) or

against nature (e.g., sodomites) or by unconsummated sin (e.g., the

unclean, the impure), shall not obtain the kingdom of God (Gal., v. 19;

I Cor., vi. 9 sqq.), nor have any inheritance with Christ (Eph., v. 5).

(b) Impurity is not the worst of sins, because sins against God (e.g.,

hatred of God, sacrilege) are more heinous than sins against created

goods, and sins of malice are more inexcusable than sins of passion or

frailty. But carnal sins are peculiarly disgraceful on account of their

animality (see 2464 b, 224), and in a Christian they are a kind of

profanation, since his body has been given to Christ in Baptism and the

other Sacraments (I Cor., vi. 11-19).

(c) Impurity is one of the seven capital vices. The capital sins have a

preeminence in evil, as the cardinal virtues have a superiority in

good. The preeminence in evil is due, first, to some special

attractiveness of a vice that makes it an end for the commission of

other sins, which are used as means to it or are incurred for its sake;

or, secondly, to a power and influence that is so strong as to hurry

those under its sway into various kinds of sin. Now, impurity is a

moral disease that ravages every part of the soul, its deadly effects

appearing in the reason, the will and external speech; for the more one

subjects oneself to the dominion of passion, the less fitted does one

become for the higher and nobler things of life; and the more ignoble

the inner life, the more vulgar, cheap and degrading will be the

conversation.

Hence, the Fathers trace back to impurity the following sins of

imprudence in the mind: wrong apprehension, about the end or purpose of

life, and precipitancy in deliberation, thoughtlessness in decision,

inconstancy in direction, in reference to the means to the end (see

1693 sqq.). They also trace to impurity the following sins in the will:

as to the end, voluptuarism (which subordinates all to fleshly

pleasure) and hatred of God (which abhors the Supreme Lawgiver who

forbids and punishes lust); as to the means, love of the present and

horror of the future life (since the carnal man revels in bodily

pleasures and dreads the thought of death and judgment). Finally, they

trace the following sins of the tongue to the vice of impurity: the

subject of the lewd man’s talk is filthy, for out of the heart the

mouth speaketh (Matt., xii. 34), the expression itself is foolish,

since passion clouds his mind, the origin of his talk is emptiness of

mind which shows itself in frivolous words, and his purpose is

unsuitable amusement, which leads to farcical or vulgar jokes.

2495. Evil Fruits of Impurity.--In addition to these moral

consequences, impurity is also prolific of many other evil fruits.

(a) Thus, for the sinner himself it is like a cruel goad that

constantly annoys him and takes away his peace (St. Ambrose), like a

sword that kills the nobler instincts (St. Gregory the Great), like a

descent from human dignity to a condition below the beasts (St.

Eusebius of Caesarea).

(b) For society it is disastrous in many ways, since it propagates

dread mental and physical diseases, disrupts the peace of families,

brings disgrace and destitution on innocent children, eats away

fortunes and leads up to innumerable crimes of injustice and violence.

2496. Is Impurity Ever a Venial Sin?--(a) By reason of the imperfection

of the act, impurity is venial when there is no sufficient deliberation

or consent. Invincible ignorance in reference to the sixth commandment

itself sometimes happens, especially in reference to internal sins of

thought, to external sins of pollution if the person is young, and to

other external sins when there is some complication of circumstances

(e.g., kissing and other intimacy by engaged persons, onanism when

married persons are poor or the woman sickly); and more frequently

there is invincible ignorance about details of the sixth commandment

(e.g., about the precise theological or moral malice of what is known

to be sinful).

(b) By reason of the matter, impurity according to the common teaching

is always mortal if directly willed, but sometimes venial if only

indirectly willed. Impurity is directly willed when one posits an act

intending to obtain from it unlawful venereal delectation, or perceives

that such delectation is already present and consents to it. No matter

how brief this voluntary assent, no matter how slight the commotion of

the animal nature, no matter how far from the consummated is the impure

act in question, there is always a serious injury done to a great good

or at least (exception is made for the case of married persons) the

proximate danger of such injury, and hence mortal sin (see 260). That

even slight yielding to impurity is a serious peril is the teaching of

Scripture (which declares that lust has killed even the strongest,

Prov., vii. 26), of the Church (which condemns the opinion that

libidinous kisses are not dangerous, see Denzinger, Enchiridion, n.

1140), of theology (which reminds us that by original sin reason has

been darkened, the will enfeebled and the passions strengthened), and

of experience (which shows that those who expose themselves to

passion’s flame will be burnt). A small spark of fire is not trivial in

the vicinity of a powder magazine, a minute flaw in a machine is not

unimportant if it may bring on disaster, a first step is not safe if it

is made on a slippery downward declivity.

(c) Impurity is indirectly willed when deliberately and without

sufficient reason one posits an act which is not venereal pleasure

(whether the act be good, such as a prayer made with great sensible

fervor, or bad, such as gluttony, or indifferent, such as reading a

book, looking at a picture, taking a bath), but which produces foreseen

venereal pleasure (consummated or non-consummated) that one neither

intends nor directly consents to. Impurity thus indirectly willed is

sinful, because the pleasure is foreseen and permitted without

sufficient reason (see 102), or in other words because one exposes

oneself to danger of internal defilement (consent), or external

pollution without justification (see 260). Indirect impurity is mortal

when there is proximate danger of grave sin in the act done, that is,

when the posited act _per se_ or from its nature strongly incites the

agent to sexual passion, as when one gazes long and fixedly at obscene

pictures, knowing that always or nearly always this arouses impure

emotions. The sin is venial when there is only remote danger of grave

sin. This happens when the posited act is not of a venereal kind (an

unnecessary conversation on indifferent topics) or is only mildly

exciting (e.g., a passing glance at an obscene object), or when the

agent himself is not greatly affected by it (e.g., when an old man, or

one who is of very cold disposition, or an artist whose only thought is

the esthetic excellence, carefully studies a picture of the nude).

2497. Temptations to Impurity.--Before treating the various kinds of

impurity, we shall speak briefly of temptations that occasion this sin

and of the duties of the person tempted.

(a) External temptation comes from the devil or the world, and the duty

of struggling against it has been treated elsewhere (see 252, 1455

sqq., 1495 sqq.). Thus, he who finds that certain persons, places or

things are for him a temptation to impurity must be guided by the

principles given for occasions of sin (263 sqq.); he who finds that

another wishes to seduce him into impurity must refuse all internal

consent (see 254 sqq.), and must also resist violence when there is

hope of success, or when this is necessary to avoid giving scandal or

yielding consent (see on self-defense, 1841).

(b) Internal temptation comes from the flesh. It consists in inchoative

disturbances or excitements of the organs or fluids that serve

generation (e.g., erections, clitoral movements). Sometimes it is

produced involuntarily, without any intention or consent of the will,

by physiological states (e.g., conditions of the blood, nerves, etc.,

due solely to the weather, to disease, to aphrodisiac properties of

ailment, to clothing, or position) or by psychical states (e.g.,

spontaneous images or appetites of the soul mentioned in 129), and in

these cases the temptation is manifestly free from all sin. St. Pius V

condemned the teaching of Baius that those who suffer motions of

concupiscence against their will are transgressors of the command:

“Thou shalt not covet” (see Denziger, Enchiridion, nn. 1050, 1051,

1075). Sometimes the temptation is directly voluntary, as when the

passion is deliberately awakened for the purpose of sin, and then there

is grave guilt (see 2496 b). Sometimes the temptation is indirectly

voluntary, as when with the foresight of the passion but without desire

of it an action is performed that arouses it. In this last case, if

there is a just reason for the excitatory action (e.g., a physician

sees and hears things that are calculated to be a temptation, but his

reason is the exercise of his profession), no sin is committed; but if

there is no just reason for the action (e.g., a person reads an erotic

book, and curiosity is his only motive), sin is committed, and its

gravity depends on the amount of danger to which one exposes oneself

(see 2496 c).

2498. Resistance to Internal Temptations.--The fight against internal

temptations is of various kinds.

(a) By reason of its subject, the conflict is chiefly in the will, to

which it belongs to give or withhold consent; secondarily, in the other

powers of the soul and the body, which under command from the will

perform acts designed to overcome temptation.

(b) By reason of its manner, the conflict is either removal of the

temptation (i.e., cessation from an act which produces the temptation)

or resistance, passive or active. Passive resistance is the suspension

of activity relative to the temptation till it ends of itself, as when

internally the will neither consents nor dissents, or externally

nothing is done for or against the temptation. Active resistance is

positive opposition offered to temptation. It is made in two ways:

first, by way of flight, as when internally the mind turns away to

other thoughts (e.g., absorbing studies, meditation on the passion of

Christ), or the will devotes itself to other subjects of resolve (e.g.,

acts of love of God or of purity), or externally the body is removed or

freed from conditions that excite temptation; secondly, by way of

attack, as when internally the mind turns against the temptation (e.g.,

thinking of its dangers, calling on God to drive it away), or the will

rejects the temptation (e.g., by despising it, by expressing dislike,

disapproval and unwillingness, by firmly resolving not to yield, by

deciding on measures against the passion), or when externally the body

is subjected to pain or mortification.

(c) By reason of its circumstances, resistance to temptation is either

prolonged, as when the act by which the will resists is of considerable

duration or is renewed at frequent intervals, or is brief, as when the

act of rejection is momentary and is not repeated.

2499. What Opposition to Temptation Is Sufficient?--Opposition to

temptations of the flesh must be sufficient to remove the temptation,

when the temptation is due to the continuance of one’s own sinful or

unjustified act; for one is obliged to cease from sin or the

unreasonable. This happens (a) when the temptation is directly

voluntary--for example, one who wished to experience temptation and

therefore reads a very seductive book must give over this reading; or

(b) when the temptation is not directly voluntary and is without

sufficient reason--for example, one who experiences carnal temptation

due to a book which he reads from idle curiosity must desist from the

book. But one is not bound to omit or interrupt necessary or useful

acts, such as rest and sleep, prayer and charity; consent should be

denied the evil, but the good should be continued.

2500. Insufficient, Harmful and Unnecessary Opposition.--In other cases

opposition to temptations of the flesh must be such as is sufficient to

keep one from consent, that is, to protect one against the proximate

danger of sin.

(a) Hence, that resistance is insufficient which does not strengthen

the will. It seems that passive will-resistance is of this kind, since

it is most difficult for the will to remain inactive in the presence of

carnal stimulation or motions of the sensible appetites without being

moved by the evil suggestion. In external resistance, however, passive

opposition suffices when it alone is feasible, as when temptation grows

out of necessary work, or rest that cannot be discontinued or

interrupted by active resistance, provided the will registers

internally its displeasure or disapproval; but external passivity is

not permissible when the will needs the help of external resistance, as

in the case of vehement and prolonged temptations.

(b) That resistance is harmful which strengthens the temptation. Hence,

resistance by direct attack or by formal rejection is oftentimes to be

omitted in favor of resistance by flight or by contempt; for it is a

common teaching of the Fathers and Doctors confirmed by experience that

dwelling on reasons and means of repelling passion often adds to its

strength, and that resolving mightily and expressly to crush a weak and

passing temptation often serves only to give it a longer life. It is

better to brush a mosquito away than to risk one’s neck by chasing it

up and down stairs.

(c) That resistance is unnecessary which demands a physical or moral

impossibility. Thus, a prolonged act of resistance or one repeated at

intervals of a few minutes, or a resistance that includes extreme

corporal austerities, is not required in ordinary cases at least. When

a temptation is unusually vehement or is due to one’s own fault, there

should be proportionately greater resistance to offset the greater

danger; but when a temptation is only moderately dangerous, it suffices

to reject it firmly but briefly and to repeat this when there arises a

new crisis or danger and the renewal of resistance is useful.

2501. Weapons against Carnal Temptations.--The most powerful weapons

against carnal temptations are spiritual ones, and of these the most

necessary is grace, which should be asked in prayer (Wis., viii. 21),

especially through the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary (see

Pius XII, _Sacra Virginitas_, March 25, 1954). But corporal means,

chiefly of a preventive kind, should not be neglected.

(a) Physical measures are the observance of what are now often spoken

of as sex hygiene for normal and sex therapeutics for abnormal cases.

Special health rules whose observance conduces to good morals are

especially the cultivation of habits of bodily cleanliness, of hard

mental and physical work, of vigorous exercise and the avoidance of

unhealthful habits (such as constipation, drug or spirit stimulation),

unsuitable clothing or sleeping conditions. Surgical or medical

treatment for structural abnormalities or for mental or bodily diseases

that react unfavorably on sex life requires the service of a

conscientious and competent physician.

(b) Religious measures are various forms of corporal mortification,

such as custody of the eyes and other senses, deprivation in food

(fasting and abstinence) and sleep (vigils, night watches), afflictive

penances through the use of hairshirts, painful girdles, scourges or

disciplines. But austerities must be suited to the health, age,

condition, duties and other circumstances of the person who practises

them, and should not be used without the consent of one’s confessor or

spiritual director.

2502. Sinfulness of Negligence in Resisting Temptations.--It is sinful

not to struggle against temptation, since he who in no way resists, not

even passively, surrenders or yields to sin. Hence, the Church

condemned the quietistic indifference to temptation of Molinos

(Denzinger, nn. 1237, 1257, 1267). It is also sinful to resist, but

only insufficiently, as regards promptness, vigor, manner, etc.

(a) The Theological Malice.--It is mortally or venially sinful to be

negligent against temptation, according to the greatness or smallness

of the danger to which the negligence exposes one (see 256-262). Thus,

it is not a serious sin to omit all resistance to a weak and dying

temptation, or to neglect from indolence or other venial fault all

external resistance when the danger is made remote by the internal

displeasure or resolution; but it is a serious sin to trifle with any

very attractive temptation or to put off resistance until a progressing

temptation has grown formidable and made self-control difficult, and

this is true even though consent is not finally given to the impure

suggestion.

(b) The Moral Malice.--Negligences in reference to carnal temptations

do not differ specifically but only in degree, according to the

approach the stimuli make towards complete lust. Even when there is an

object (e.g., fornication, adultery) before the mind, the difference in

species of the object, it seems, does not induce a difference in

species of the sin, since the sin is the general one of carelessness in

presence of temptation. Hence, it suffices to confess that one has been

remiss in banishing impure emotions or thoughts.

2503. Applications.--(a) The principles here given in reference to

emotions of the sensible appetite and rebellions of the flesh should be

applied to other involuntary acts in the imagination, reason and will

(see 129). Thus, thoughts or images of impure scenes that pass through

the mind should be treated in the same way as temptations of the flesh.

(b) The principles here given about the person who suffers temptation

should also be applied to the person who causes temptation. Since it is

a mortal sin to commit impurity, it is also a mortal sin to solicit

impurity; since it is a mortal sin of lust to make oneself drunk in

order to experience carnal emotions, it is also a mortal sin of lust to

make another person drunk that he may become likewise inflamed; since

it is a mortal sin to expose oneself to extreme danger by reading a

pornographic work, it is also a mortal sin to wish to expose another to

a like danger. And this is true even though the temptation is

unsuccessful. Physicians who minimize the wrong of masturbation, or who

counsel fornication to young men on the absurd plea that continence is

unhealthy or productive of impotency, share in the guilt of pollution

or fornication which they counsel; and young persons who seek to win

the sinful love of others by nourishing their hair, painting their

faces, exposing their bodies, etc., have the guilt, if not the gain, of

seduction.

2504. Non-Consummated Sins of Impurity.--These include all those

preparatory sins in which unlawful sex pleasure is not carried to

completion by coition or pollution. We shall speak first of the

internal sins of thought, delight, and desire (see 232 sqq.), and next

of the external sins of unlawful looks, words, kisses, and embraces.

2505. Impure Thoughts.--Impure thoughts (_delectatio morosa_) are

representations in the mind or imagination of impure venereal objects

in which deliberate pleasure is taken.

(a) They are representations, that is, mental pictures or images of

things absent from the senses, but thought of or imagined as present.

Thus, impure thoughts differ from desires, which consist in attraction

with will to accomplish, and also from sense contact of various kinds

with objects present to the eyes, ears, or touch.

(b) They are joined with deliberate pleasure of the will, that is, one

intends them or consents even momentarily to them after perceiving

their presence and malice, even though carnal pleasure is not felt or

does not threaten. Thus, impure thoughts differ from tempting thoughts,

which are transient and unwished forms that appear in the mind, and are

thought on before their true character is adverted to, or which gain a

lodging in spite of efforts to eject them. A tempting thought is not

sinful, but an occasion of merit when resisted, no matter how long it

endures (see 2497 b).

(c) The pleasure is taken in a venereal object, that is, in the thought

of fornication, adultery or other carnal sin, committed by oneself or

by another. Hence, impure thoughts are not to be confused with the

pleasure taken in knowledge about impurity (e.g., a professor of

medicine or morality is not impure when he rejoices at the sexual

knowledge he possesses and which is necessary for his duties, or

willingly thinks about sex matters when it is necessary or useful for

him to do so), or with pleasure taken in the morally indifferent manner

of the venereal sin. For example, amusement over a ridiculous feature

of a sin which one detests is not an impure thought (see 233-236).

2506. The Malice of Impure Thoughts.--(a) The Theological

Malice.--Impure thoughts are mortal sins: for he who deliberately

rejoices at the thought of sin, loves sin and is therefore guilty of

it. They are venial sins when there is imperfect advertence, and also

when there is lightness of matter on account of the remoteness of the

danger of a thought only indirectly voluntary. They are mortal when

there is full deliberation and the impure thought is directly voluntary

or gravely dangerous (see 2496).

(b) The Moral Malice.--Impure thoughts have the same specific malice as

the representation of the object which is entertained as a welcome

guest in the mind; for not only is impurity given the hospitality of

the mind, but a particular kind of impurity (see 90, 235). Hence it

follows, first, that a specifically different object (as is the case

with different consummated sins) makes a specifically different sin

(e.g., to think pleasurably of unlawful intercourse is mental

fornication if the persons in mind are unmarried, and is mental

adultery if the person in mind is married); secondly, that objects not

specifically different--as is the case with different non-consummated

sins of lewdness--do not make specifically different sins (e.g., to

think pleasurably of a sinful kiss and to think sinfully of a sinful

touch are both mental lewdness or impure thoughts); thirdly, that

special malices of the object from which the mind can prescind--viz.,

those which in the external act do not change the species or do not

explain the venereal pleasure--and from which it does prescind, are not

incurred (e.g., to think pleasurably of sin with a woman who is married

and a relative, if the thought that she is married or one’s relative is

not pleasing or is displeasing, is mental fornication, not mental

adultery or mental incest). In praxi vero consulitur confessariis ut

regulariter abstineant a quaestionibus de specie morali delectationis

morosae; nam fideles plerumque nesciunt faciliter distinguere inter

species morales cogitationum, et sic interrogatio evaderet vel

inutilis, vel etiam ratione materiae perieulosa. Ad haec quum casus

crebriores sint, maximo esset incommodo, tum confessariis, tum

poenitentibus, si sacerdos exquireret quae vix cognosci possunt.

Sufficit igitur ordinarie sciscitari de specie theologica (utrum

voluntas complacuerit), vel de specie morali generali (utrum actus

internus delectatio morosa vel potius desiderium fuerit). See Canon

888, Sec.2; Norms for Confessors in Dealing with the Sixth Commandment,

Holy Office, May 16, 1943.

2507. Impure Rejoicing.--Impure rejoicing is a deliberate pleasure of

the mind yielded to the recollection of a past sin of impurity. Hence,

this sin of rejoicing is committed when one thinks with approval of a

fornication of former days, but the sin of rejoicing is not committed

when one confines one’s pleasure to some good consequence of a

fornication (e.g., the excellent child that was born), or to a lawful

pleasure of the past, as when a widower thinks without present carnal

commotion or danger of his former married life. The circumstances are

more readily willed here than in impure thoughts, for here the mind is

picturing an actual, not an imaginary case of sin, and the mental

representation will therefore be more distinct; nevertheless, in the

case of impure rejoicing the moral sub-species--at times even the

distinction between impure rejoicing and impure thoughts--is usually

not perceived. The principles of the previous paragraph apply to impure

rejoicing.

2508. Impure Desires.--Impure desire is a deliberate intention to

commit impurity in the future.

(a) It is a deliberate intention, that is, a purpose or will to which

consent is given internally. Hence, an impure desire is not the same

thing as a statement of fact, as when a passionate person declares that

he would sin, were it not for fear of the consequences, meaning only

that he is frail, not that he wishes to sin. Neither is it the same as

a mere velleity, which desires venereal pleasure under circumstances

that would make it lawful, as when a married man wishes that he were

lawfully married to a woman other than his present wife, or that both

he and the other woman were free to marry each other. But these

velleities are foolish and venially sinful, and often on account of

danger they are mortally sinful. An impure desire exists when the will

consents unconditionally (as when a person decides or wishes to

fornicate tomorrow) or conditionally under a proviso that does not take

away the malice (as when a person decides that he would fornicate were

it not for fear of punishment, or Wishes that it were lawful for him to

practise fornication).

(b) It is an intention to commit impurity, and hence there is no impure

desire in wishing what is not venereal pleasure (e.g., the spiritual,

mental or bodily relief that follows on an involuntary pollution), or

what is lawful venereal pleasure (e.g., when engaged persons think, but

without carnal commotion or danger, of the benefits of their future

married relationship).

2509. Malice of Impure Desires.--Impure desires are mortal sins and

have the malice of the object and of the circumstances that one has in

mind; that is, one commits the same kind of sin in desiring as in

performing impurity. Hence, Our Lord declares that he who looks upon a

woman to desire her unlawfully has already committed adultery in his

heart (Matt., v. 28), and hence also the ninth commandment forbids sins

of impure desire. The principles given in 2506, 2507, apply also to

impure desires with this difference that the mind when it wills

external performance considers the object as it is in itself, not as it

is mentally represented, and hence is less likely to prescind from

actual circumstances known to it, But even here confessional

investigation is sometimes not necessary on account of its moral

impossibility.

2510. Lewdness.--After the internal sins follow the external sins of

lewdness or indecency (_impudicitia_). These may be defined as

“external acts which are performed from or with deliberate venereal

pleasure that is not consummated, and which are not directed to the

conjugal act.”

(a) They are external acts of the body, such as the looks of the eye,

the speech of the tongue, kisses of the lips, touches, fondling,

embraces, pressure of the hand, etc. Those also are guilty of lewdness

who permit themselves to be petted, kissed or otherwise impurely

handled, unless it is morally impossible to resist, as when a woman who

gives no internal consent cannot defend herself against a forced kiss

without being killed, or cannot without great scandal refuse to shake

hands with one whose motive is impure love. Lewdness (e.g., an impure

look) may also be directed to one’s own person, or to an animal, or to

an artificial object, such as a statue or book.

(b) They are performed from or with pleasure; that is, passion either

causes or accompanies the impure look or other act. These

non-consummated acts are indifferent in themselves and may be licitly

performed for a just cause; they become sinful by reason of the evil

passion that animates them. The carnal motive appears either from the

end of the act (e.g., an indecent kiss naturally tends to impurity or

grave danger thereof, no matter what good purpose the kisser may have),

or from the end of the one acting (e.g., a decent kiss becomes an

impure act if the one who kisses is moved by carnal desire). Hence,

there is no sin of lewdness when one of the acts now considered is

performed becomingly as to externals and innocently as to the internal

motive and quality (e.g., from a sense of duty, not from pleasure).

(c) The pleasure intended or consented to is venereal; that is, such as

is consummated in copulation or pollution. Hence, there is no sin of

lewdness when the acts in question are performed becomingly and with

and for pleasure of a spiritual kind (as when members of a family give

one another the customary kiss or embrace of affection), or of a merely

sensual kind (e.g., when a nurse kisses the tender skin of an infant).

On the distinction of intellectual, sensual and venereal pleasures see

above (2461).

(d) The external act is not consummated by copulation or pollution.

These are often its result but they are a different degree of sin, and

lewdness is committed even without them (see 2486).

(e) Lewdness is an action not directed to the conjugal act. Coition

itself is lawful in the married state, and this legitimatizes all the

preparatory or accessory endearments. Hence, the rule as to married

persons is that venereal kisses and other such acts are lawful when

given with a view to the exercise of the lawful marriage act and kept

within the bounds of decency and moderation; that they are sinful,

gravely or lightly according to the case, when unbecoming or

immoderate; that they are venially sinful, on account of the inordinate

use of a thing lawful in itself (85 a), when only pleasure is intended;

that they are mortally sinful, when they tend to pollution, whether

solitary or not solitary, for then they are acts of lewdness. The

rights and duties during courtship and engagement will be treated below

in Question III.

2511. Cases Wherein No Sin Is Committed.--Since lewdness proceeds from

or is accompanied by culpable venereal pleasure, it does not exist in

the following cases:

(a) in children who have not attained puberty and the capacity for sex

pleasure, and hence there is no sin by reason of proximate danger in

looks or touches exercised by them, which would be gravely sinful in

those who have reached the age of puberty. These children may, however,

sin against modesty or obedience, at least venially. They should be

trained from their earliest years to reserve and decency, and it is a

most serious sin to scandalize their innocence. The question of sex

instruction for the young will be dealt with in the Question on the

Duties of Particular States. If an adult person were as unmoved as a

child by the stimulus of passion, such a one would incur no personal

guilt of lewdness by kissing and the like acts, but such an adult

person is very rare;

(b) in adult persons when a dangerous act is exercised by them, without

consent or proximate danger, and with a sufficient reason for the

exercise. Thus, a student of literature may read an erotic story from

the classics, if he is proof against the danger and intends only

improvement in style, though for the young such books should be

expurgated; a professor of medicine or moral theology may discourse

prudently to his students on venereal diseases or sins; an artist may

use naked models in painting, if and as far as this is necessary; farm

hands may attend to the service of female by male animals; looks and

touches that would otherwise be immodest are lawful for proportionate

reasons of utility, as in bathing oneself, in performing the services

of nurse or physician for others, etc. (see 2497 sqq.).

2512. Conditions Governing Propriety of External Acts.--The

becomingness of the external acts spoken of in 2510 b includes two

conditions.

(a) On the side of its object, the act must not be directed

unnecessarily to the parts of the body that are shameful and private

(i.e., the genitals and immediately adjacent parts). It is customary to

distinguish the remaining or non-shameful parts of the body into

becoming, which are uncovered (e.g., face, hands, feet), and less

becoming, which are covered (e.g., legs, breast, back). But as to less

decent parts much depends on local usage. For example, at a bathing

beach it is not unbecoming to appear in a mixed crowd with uncovered

legs or arms, and in very warm countries it is not improper to go about

in public with less clothing than is worn in colder climates.

(b) On the side of its subject, the act must be performed with

moderation and respect for reasonable custom. Thus, columbine

(popularly called “French”) kissing and the ardent or prolonged

embraces known as “necking” or “petting” are admittedly indecent, even

when not accompanied by sexual excitement. Oral abuse committed by or

with either sex is indecent both as to the object, i.e., the part of

the body involved, and as to the subject, i.e., the mode of action. It

is the filthiest form of lewdness and is usually joined with pollution

(irrumation).

2513. Morality of Kissing and Similar Acts.--(a) _Per se_, or from

their nature, these acts are indifferent, since they can be employed,

not only for evil (Job, xxxi. 27; Luke, xxii. 48), but also for good,

as we see from the examples of the kiss of peace (I Thess., v. 26), the

kiss of fraternal greeting (Gen., xxvii. 26, 27), and the kiss of

respectful homage (Luke, vii. 38, 45).

(b) _Per accidens_, or from their circumstances, these acts are often

venially or mortally sinful against purity or against some other

virtue, or against both. Thus, justice is offended by injuries or

violence (e.g., stolen kisses, unhygienic kisses that transmit venereal

or other disease); charity is offended by scandal given the object of

affection or the onlookers (e.g., kisses given by way of greeting to a

member of the opposite sex by an ecclesiastic or religious, kisses

forced upon children by grown-ups and which are harmful to the youthful

sense of modest reserve); purity itself is offended by familiarities

which, though not impure in themselves, constitute a peril for the

virtue of one or both parties, as is true especially in demonstrations

of sensual affection or pleasure. But even though there be some carnal

commotion, it is not unlawful to give with a pure intention the decent

salutation customary in one’s country (e.g., to shake hands with a

lady, to kiss one’s stepmother or sister-in-law).

2514. Morality of Sensual Gratification.--Sensual gratification, or the

pleasure experienced from the perfection in the sensible order of some

object, is indifferent and lawful in itself (see 2461, 2492). When it

is aroused by objects not venereally exciting (e.g., the beauty of the

heavens or scenery, the harmony of music, the tender softness of the

rose), it does not tempt to impurity; but when it is aroused by objects

that are venereally exciting (e.g., the beautiful face or eyes or sweet

voice or soft skin of a person much admired), it approaches so closely

to the confines of venereal gratification as to seem almost the same

thing. Hence arises the question; is deliberate sensual gratification

about objects sexually exciting always a mortal sin?

(a) Many theologians answer in the affirmative, and give as their

reason that in the state of fallen nature there is no one who can be

assured that such gratification is not for him or her a proximate

occasion of pollution, or of what is morally the same thing, of

inchoate pollution. This opinion does not include gratifications not

deliberately sought or yielded to, nor those in which experience has

shown that the venereal attraction of the object, at least for the

subject concerned, is nil or practically nil (e.g., sensual kisses of

an infant by a nurse.)

(b) Other theologians dissent from the rigorous view, and argue that,

since sensual and venereal attraction are really distinct, there is

always the possibility of intending the former and excluding consent to

the latter.

(c) To the present authors it seems that there is room for a middle way

between these two extreme views. As was said above (2497), it is

sometimes sinful and sometimes not sinful to encounter temptation,

according to the intention and reason one has, and a temptation willed

unjustifiably but only indirectly is a grave or a light sin according

to the great or small danger that is risked. Now, it seems that certain

forms of sensual gratification (e.g., those derived from beautiful but

modest music or paintings) have only a very slight sexual allurement

for even the passionate; whereas other forms (e.g., those derived from

the warm kiss or caress of a handsome adult person of the opposite sex)

are vehemently alluring. Hence, if sensual pleasure of the first kind

is sought inordinately, or if it is dangerous to purity, there is a

venial sin; if sensual pleasure of the second kind is sought, there is

very likely mortal sin.

2515. The Theological Species of the Sin of Lewdness.--(a) _Per se_, or

from its nature, this sin is mortal, even though the external act

(kiss, etc.) be decent (see 2512) and of the briefest duration; for

lewdness is consent to unlawful venereal pleasure, which from the

nature of the case is a serious matter, tending either to illicit

copulation or to pollution (see 2496). Hence, even a shake of the hand

made with lustful intent is a mortal sin. If the guilt of adultery is

found even in libidinous thoughts (Deut., v. 21) and glances (Matt., v.

28), much more is it found in lewd kisses, embraces, and conversations.

Scripture strongly condemns every form of lewdness: impure speech

(“Uncleanness let it not so much as be named among you, or obscenity,

or foolish talking,” Eph., v. 3, 4), impure reading (“Evil

communications corrupt good morals,” I Cor., xv. 33), impure looks

(“Whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already

committed adultery with her in his heart,” Matt., v, 28), impure kisses

and other touches (“It is good for a man not to touch a woman, but for

fear of fornication let every man have his own wife,” I Cor., vii. 1).

(b) _Per accidens_, this sin may be venial as follows: first, on

account of the imperfection of deliberation, as when a person under the

influence of liquor, drugs or sleep acts with only a partial

realization of what he is doing, especially if the lewd offense has not

occurred before; secondly, on account of the lightness of the matter,

when the lewd act is indirectly voluntary and the danger remote (see

2496), as when slight danger is risked in gratifying the sensual desire

to gaze at a famous painting, or in yielding to an impulse of

curiosity, levity, or playfulness, to indulge in suitable recreations

or even unnecessary conversations in which occur glances or touches

that arouse some small degree of sexual emotion. Were mortal guilt of

impurity incurred in these instances, very few could remain free from

it unless there was a general retirement into isolation. But even in

the _per accidens_ cases there may be other mortal sins (e.g., that of

drunkenness or of scandal).

2516. A large proportion of the sins of lewdness are only indirectly

voluntary, and hence they are mortal or venial according to the amount

of danger to which one exposes oneself. No ironclad rules, however, can

be given to determine universally what things are gravely and what

slightly dangerous, since the force and direction of concupiscence are

not the same in all persons. Some persons are oversexed or passionate,

others are undersexed or cold; some have normal, others abnormal

inclinations (e.g., homosexuality, sadism, masochism, sexual fetishism)

in matters venereal. Hypersexuality and abnormal sexuality are not in

themselves sinful, but are manifestations of that inordinate

concupiscence that is the effect of original sin and, if yielded to,

becomes the cause of actual sin. Proximately they may be due to

disease. But since these subjective differences do exist, what we shall

set down in the following paragraphs about gravity and lightness of

danger is to be understood of the average or normal person and in the

abstract, for it is impossible to consider every individual case.

2517. Circumstances That Increase or Lessen the Danger of Sin.--(a) The

Person Acting.--There is less danger before and after than during

puberty, less for an invalid than for a person full of health, less for

an inhabitant of a cold region than for a dweller in the tropics, less

for one habituated to suppress venereal passion (e.g., a bachelor) than

for one who has been accustomed to indulge it (e.g., a widower), less

in some cases for the married who can lawfully enjoy sexual intercourse

than for the single who cannot. Familiarity also can give a certain

amount of immunity (e.g., where naked bathing or naked statuary in

public places is according to custom, the natives are less disturbed by

these things than outsiders). Those who know (without self-deception)

from their experience that certain things excite them very little do

not run grave danger in encountering such things.

(b) The Person or Being Who Is the Object of the Act.--There is less

allurement in an animal than in a human, less in a small than in a

large animal, less in a representation than in the original, less in

young children than in adults, less in one’s own person or sex than in

another person or the opposite sex, less in an elderly or homely person

than in one who is young and attractive.

(c) The Sense Used.--Hearing (and, for a similar reason, reading) is

less dangerous than sight, for hearing is nearer to the immanent

activities of thought and desire, while sight has more of an emanant

character (e.g., to hear or read about an obscene act is farther

removed from it, and hence less seductive, than to see it in picture or

reality). Sight in turn is less dangerous than touch, for sight is a

more elevated and less material kind of perception, being exercised by

a cognitional, not by a physical contact with its object, as is the

case with touch (e.g., to behold others embrace is not so moving as to

give or receive an embrace). Thus, impure touches (kisses, embraces,

handling) are the most dangerous form of lewdness.

(d) The Sense-Object Acted Upon.--The degree of danger corresponds with

the approach made to the act of generation (e.g., smutty stories are

worse when they deal with consummated than with non-consummated acts)

or to the genitals (e.g., impure touches are worse when directed to the

organs of reproduction than to the non-shameful regions).

(e) The Manner.--There is greater danger when the act is prolonged than

when it is momentary, when it is ardent than when it is calm (e.g., a

passing glance or peep at an obscene picture is not as dangerous as a

leisurely inspection, a loose linking of arms not as dangerous as a

hug). The more exposed the object of attraction and the more secluded

the parties themselves, the greater the danger (e.g., love-making

between parties who are not fully clothed or who are alone in the dark

or in a closed and curtained room is more dangerous than love-making

between those who are properly dressed and seated among a crowd of

people).

2518. Cases Wherein the Danger of Sin Is Grave or Slight.--A physician

must know the difference between mortal and non-mortal diseases, and

likewise a priest must know the distinction between various kinds of

spiritual leprosies. But when certain cases are listed as less

dangerous, this does not mean that they are not dangerous at all and

that no account should be taken of them. Especially in the matter of

impurity should the warning of Scripture be remembered: “He that

contemneth small things shall fall by little and little” (Ecclus., xix.

1). With this in mind, we now subjoin some examples of grave and slight

danger for cases in which a lewd act is indirectly voluntary, but is

prompted only by curiosity, joke, levity or other such insufficient

reason.

(a) Speech.--Dirty or suggestive stories, conversations, songs, music,

or radio entertainments are a grave danger when the persons present are

very impressionable (e.g., on account of age or character), or if the

topic is utterly vile (e.g., descriptions of filthy or unnatural sex

acts), or if the manner is very seductive (e.g., the terms used are

unfit for polite society, or the story is very detailed, or sin is

boasted about, or the conversation is prolonged). On the other hand,

the danger is light when the persons present are of mature age and not

strongly inclined to impurity, especially if the topic and the language

are not very disgusting; but there may be serious sin on account of

circumstances, as when the speaker or approving listener is a person

from whom good example is expected. Obscene talk is generally not a

serious sin when the persons are husband and wife, or a group of

married men or of married women; on the contrary, it is generally a

serious matter when the persons are a group of young people of the same

sex, more serious when they are a mixed group, and still more serious

when they are a boy and a girl or a young man and a young woman. The

fact that those of the younger generation often do not admit this, does

not change its abiding truth.

(b) Reading.--The remarks made on speech apply also to reading, which

is a kind of silent speech. A noteworthy difference between the two in

the present matter, however, is that reading is often more dangerous

than conversation, since it is usually more protracted. Love letters

and romances were once the chief temptation in this line, but today

they seem mild in comparison with the supply of pornography that is

easily accessible to all (e.,g., the magazines and papers that pander to

depraved tastes, the stories and pseudo-scientific books that corrupt

the youth of every land). Even without grave danger to self, one may

still be guilty of grave sin in reading obscene books on account of the

cooperation with the vendors of immorality, or the scandal, or the

disobedience thereby shown to the Church (see 1455 sqq., 1529, 1530).

(c) Looks.--There is generally no danger in a look at the full nudity

of a small infant, or at the less becoming parts of a person of the

same sex; there is generally only slight danger when the object is the

privates of self or of another of the same sex, or the coition of

animals, unless the gaze be fixed, prolonged and the object near; there

is grave danger in beholding a completely non-infant naked person of

the opposite sex, or the coition or other grave external sex acts of

human beings (unless the glance be brief or not attentive), or even at

times the less becoming parts of the opposite sex, if the look is very

intent and continuous. Representations of the bodily parts or acts just

mentioned (pictures, drawings, diagrams, etc.) have generally the same

dangers as the originals, though the allurement in itself is less

vivid; circumstances may even make the representations equally or more

dangerous (e.g., on account of a thin veil of concealment in paintings

or sculpture that only increases the attraction; or on account of the

suggestive music, the voluptuous dance, the crowd atmosphere that

accompanies an immoral scene on the stage or screen). The saying of

Oscar Wilde that esthetics are above ethics is opposed both to morality

(since all conduct should be guided by reason) and to art (for the

highest beauty is that of virtue and the spirit and purity).

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