(a) Thus, a vow is invalidated by substa_Moral theology

Titus, thinking his gold watch is brass, vows to give it as an alms;

Balbus, thinking that a distant sanctuary is not very far off, vows to

make a pilgrimage to it; Claudius, being wrongly informed that his

father is sick, makes a vow to go on a pilgrimage for his father’s

recovery), but not by ignorance or error that is merely accidental

(e.g., Sempronius, thinking that a sanctuary which is four miles away

is only three miles distant, vows to go there on pilgrimage, but he

would have made the vow, even though he had known the true distance;

Caius, intending chiefly to perform an act of religion, and secondarily

to visit a friend, vows a pilgrimage to a neighboring town, not being

aware that the friend has moved elsewhere). The vows of religion,

according to the common opinion, are not invalidated on account of

ignorance or error about accidentals, even though the vows would not

have been taken had these accidentals been known; for the common good

demands that the religious state, like the married state, have

stability, and that those who enter it intend to accept all the

obligations that go with it.

(b) A vow is invalidated by the absence of full deliberation (e.g.,

vows made by children who have not the perfect use of reason, by

persons who are only half-conscious or who are delirious or laboring

under a hysterical delusion or fixed idea, by persons who act on the

impulse of the moment without full advertence to the import or force of

the vow), but not by the absence of long or studious deliberation

(e.g., a vow is valid if one has thought over its meaning and

obligation, even though one has done this hurriedly and without

reflection on the details and has regretted the vow soon after its

pronouncement).

2196. Freedom of Will Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the will of the

person who takes a vow there must be freedom of choice, and the absence

of such impediments as take away self-determination or consent.

(a) Thus, the natural law itself invalidates a vow made under force or

under such fear as takes away the power of giving due deliberation to

the vow.

(b) The natural law, according to many, invalidates a vow made under

fear that is grave (though not disturbing to the reason), and that is

produced unjustly and with a view to coerce one into making the vow.

The reason for this opinion is that God cannot accept a promise to

Himself caused by injustice, nor can one be held to a promise made

under unjust pressure.

under grave and unjust fear. Many canonists interpret this law as

meaning that even when the unjust fear is not employed as a means to

force one into taking the vow, but does in reality cause one to take

the vow, the promise is null in both forums in virtue of Canon Law.

2197. Cases in Which Fear Does Not Invalidate a Vow.--(a) All admit

that fear does not invalidate when it proceeds from a natural cause

(e.g., vows made during a storm at sea) or an internal cause (e.g.,

vows made under the influence of fear that one will fall into sin

without the protection of the vow); for in these cases one chooses a

lesser burden to avoid a greater one, and the thing chosen is

involuntary, not simply, but only in a certain respect (see 44).

(b) It is commonly admitted that fear does not invalidate when it

proceeds from an external and just cause (e.g., if a guilty person were

threatened with the penalties of law unless he vowed not to repeat the

offense), since the cause of the vow is then internal rather than

external, namely, the guilt of the person who takes the vow and his

wish to evade punishment.

2198. Vows of Doubtful Validity.--In the following cases it is disputed

whether fear invalidates a vow.

(a) It is disputed whether fear unjustly caused invalidates in the

forum of conscience when it is light (e.g., Titia constantly importuned

by her parents to enter religion makes a vow to follow their wishes).

Some answer in the negative, because a fear that is slight both in

itself and in its influence on the vower cannot be considered as the

real cause of the vow. Others answer in the affirmative, because light

reasons do move persons to take grave steps, and it is not reasonable

to think that God will accept a vow brought on by unjust, though light,

fear.

(b) It is also disputed whether grave fear unjustly caused invalidates,

when the person who causes the fear intends to force the vower, not to

the vow, but to something else (e.g., Balbus threatens to kill Caius

unless the latter pays a large sum of money, and Caius vows to give the

money to religion if he escapes the danger). Some hold for the

affirmative and refer to Canon 1307, mentioned above. Others hold for

the negative because the vow is taken, not to accommodate the

aggressor, but to honor God and benefit self. This is the

interpretation given the pre-Code legislation. Still others

distinguish, affirming invalidity for the case in which fear is the

cause of the vow and denying invalidity for the case when fear is only

the occasion of the vow.

2199. The Intention Necessary for a Valid Vow.--As was said in the

explanation of the definition, a vow must include a will to bind

oneself, that is, the intention to make a vow.

(a) The object of this intention is the obligation itself, not its

fulfillment. Hence, he who makes a vow, but intends not to oblige

himself, vows invalidly; for he has two contrary intentions and (unless

the intention to vow is stronger) the substance of the vow is excluded.

On the contrary, he who makes a vow, intending not to fulfill it, vows

validly but illicitly, since he really intends to oblige himself, but

he sins by his purpose not to keep his vow (see 1883).

(b) The quality of the intention must be such that the character of the

vow as a deliberate act and a sincere agreement to obligation will be

preserved. Hence, an habitual intention (e.g., Claudius intending to

take a vow on the morrow pronounces the words of promise while asleep)

does not suffice, because the act made with such an intention is not

deliberate or human. Likewise, an external intention (e.g., Balba

forced by her parents to enter a convent takes the vows, intending only

the external rite) and an indirect intention (e.g., Sempronius,

foreseeing that if he drinks certain liquors he will bind himself by

vow to a number of things, takes the drinks and makes the vows) are not

sufficient, because with them there is no real agreement to obligation.

On the other hand, it suffices to have an actual but implicit or tacit

intention (e.g., Titus receives subdeaconship intending the obligations

annexed to the office, but not knowing that celibacy is a duty vowed by

subdeacons), or a virtual intention (e.g., Caius intended to make

religious profession, but at the moment of pronouncing the vows he is

distracted and gives no attention to the words), for in either case

there is a human act and real agreement to obligation (see 2164, 2165).

2200. The Matter of a Vow.--(a) A vow is a free promise, and hence its

matter must not be something necessary. (b) A vow is made to God, and

hence its matter must not be something that is not pleasing to Him.

2201. Vows that Promise Something Necessary.--(a) If the necessity is

absolute, because a certain thing must be or cannot be, a vow is

invalid. A vow to die is null, because death is a necessity; a vow to

avoid venial sin, deliberate and indeliberate, is null, because it is

impossible without a special privilege from God to keep such a vow; a

vow that one’s child shall enter religion is also null, because one has

no power over that which depends on the will of another. The vows made

by communities do not oblige their successors or posterity as vows, but

only as laws or customs having the force of law, or as contracts to

which agreement is given, etc.

(b) If the necessity is hypothetical, because a certain thing must be

done or omitted if one is to observe the natural or positive law, the

vow is valid. For though it is necessary to observe a commandment

(e.g., to avoid intoxication), it is not necessary to add to the

existent obligation the new obligation of religion. The most suitable

matter for a vow, however, is something that is of counsel, but not of

precept, for example, to practise celibacy.

2202. When Fulfillment of Vow Is Only Partly Possible.--(a) If the

vower intended that his promise should be an entire one obliging him to

fulfillment of all the items, the vow is invalid, since its fulfillment

as intended is impossible. Thus, if one vowed to go on foot to a place

of pilgrimage but was unable to accomplish the journey on foot, or

vowed to go to Rome and became unable to go the full distance, there

would be no obligation.

(b) If the vower intended that his promise should be severable, the

difficulty can be settled as follows: he is held to nothing if the

matter is severable but the principal part impossible (e.g., if he

vowed to go on a pilgrimage and also to go barefooted, he is not bound

to go barefooted an equal distance if the pilgrimage becomes

impossible). He is held to the part that is possible, if it is really

severable and was intended as the principal part of the vow (e.g., if

he vowed to go on a pilgrimage and to go barefooted, but is unable to

go barefooted).

to perform what is possible (e.g., if one has vowed to pay for the

erection of a church but becomes unable to pay for more than a part of

the expense); but if there is a good reason to presume that he intended

an entire vow, or a severable vow whose chief part has become

impossible, one may decide the doubt in the sense of that presumption

(cfr. 465).

2203. Vows that Promise Something Displeasing to God.--(a) Vows that

promise what is always evil (e.g., to steal) are invalid and, on

account of the irreverence, gravely sinful, at least if the sin

promised is mortal. (b) Vows that promise something that may turn out

either evil or good (e.g., Jepthe’s vow to immolate the first living

being that came before him) are imprudent, and should not be kept as to

the part that is sinful.

2204. What should be said of vows that promise something good, but that

have an evil end or other evil circumstances?

(a) The vow is invalid and illicit if the evil circumstance affects the

thing promised itself, so that the fulfillment of the vow must be

sinful, for example, when one promises to give an alms in order to

seduce the recipient into sin or to build a church in order to gratify

pride or spite. Similarly, invalid and illicit are vows made to obtain

something evil (e.g., the vow of an alms in order to obtain success in

a robbery) or to render thanksgiving for success in evil already done

(e.g., the vow to give God half the booty taken in robbery); for such

vows can not be fulfilled without the implicit protestation that God is

the author of sin.

(b) The vow is valid but illicit if the evil circumstance affects only

the act of vowing; for the thing promised is good and is to be

performed properly, but the disposition of the vower is not free from

sin as he makes his promise. It should be noted, however, that the evil

circumstance does not always deprive the act of vowing of substantial

goodness (see 78). Thus, if one vows to build a church and the sole

motive for making the vow is the applause one will receive, the vow is

substantially illicit; but if vainglory is only a secondary motive, the

vow is substantially licit.

the act promised nor the act of vowing, both of these being good. Thus,

it is lawful to vow an alms for every time one yields to a sinful

habit. It is also lawful to vow an offering to God if one escapes

unhurt from a duel, for such a vow does not ask God to bless the duel

but to protect one’s life.

2205. Vows that Promise Something Indifferent.--(a) These vows are

invalid if there is no circumstance to make the promise honorable to

God (e.g., if one promises to save up a certain percentage of one’s

earnings each month). The sin committed by those who vow necessary,

impossible or indifferent things, does not seem to exceed venial fault

_per se_, for the vow is illicit, not because its matter is evil and

displeasing to God, but because it is not good and pleasing to Him. The

sin seems to be one of levity rather than of irreverence.

(b) These vows are valid and lawful if there is a circumstance that

makes the indifferent subject-matter honorable to God (e.g., if one

vows to save up so much each month in order to practise frugality, or

to set aside means for some charitable or pious cause).

2206. Meaning of a Better Good.--It is also necessary for validity of a

vow that the thing promised be a better good; for this is the will of

God, our sanctification (I Thess., iv. 3), and the vow is made to God.

(a) By the better good is not meant that which has no good superior to

it, for then one could vow only the most excellent good, which is not

true.

(b) By the better good, then, is understood that which is preferable to

its contrary good (e.g., virginity is better than marriage), that which

is absolutely or objectively preferable to its contradictory (e.g., it

is better to give an alms than not to give one, it is better to keep

the law of fasting than not to keep it), that which is relatively or

subjectively better than its contradictory (e.g., it is better to marry

than to commit fornication, or live in concubinage, or give scandal, or

leave children illegitimate). Generally, however, it is not advisable

to vow matrimony, for, even if the vow is not invalid, it seems to have

little advantage. If a person thinks marriage is better for him, let

him take the marriage vows or engage to marry the woman of his choice.

2207. Vows Invalidated by Promise of Lesser Good.--(a) The vow to do

what is less pleasing to God (e.g., never to make a vow, never to

embrace a counsel) is invalid _per se_. There may be cases, however, in

which a vow of this kind would be better and therefore valid (e.g.,

when a person who is prone to making vows is bidden by the confessor to

make no other vows without advice).

(b) The vow to do what may easily become less pleasing to God also

seems to be invalid. Thus, if one were to make a vow to play no more

games in order to give more time to prayer or to avoid temptations, the

vow might later be a cause of spiritual harm, for at times it is more

pleasing to God to take recreation than to abstain from it.

2208. Case in Which One Has Taken Two Opposite Vows.--(a) If the vows

are equally good, or if it is doubtful which is better, the first

prevails; the second being impossible does not oblige. (b) If the

second is certainly better, it prevails, and the first does not oblige,

being impossible. Thus, if one has first vowed to go on a pilgrimage

and next to stay at home and attend the sick during an epidemic, the

pilgrimage should not stand in the way of the more urgent good of

caring for those in distress.

2209. The Obligation of a Vow.--Every valid vow obliges to fulfillment,

for it is a promise, and loyalty to promises is a moral duty. Scripture

declares that one must pay one’s vows, and that it is better not to vow

than to vow and not fulfill (Eccles., v. 4), that God will hold as sin

the neglect of a vow (Deut., xxiii. 21), that a faithless promise

displeases Him (Eccles., V. 3).

(a) The Quality of the Obligation.--A vow is an act of religion, since

it promises to God a tribute of honor, even though the thing promised

(e.g., a fast, virginity) does not belong to worship but to some other

virtue. Hence, the violation of a vow is a sin against fidelity and

also against religion. But it seems that sacrilege is committed only by

sins against certain vows, namely, those whose matter is a sacred thing

dedicated to God; for example, the violation of the vow to fast would

not be sacrilegious, while the violation of a public vow of chastity is

a sacrilege. All transgressions of vows, as such, are sins of the same

species, namely, sins against religion.

(b) The Quantity of the Obligation.--A vow, as being a duty of religion

(see 2146, 2148), obliges under grave sin. But in an individual case

the sin committed may be only venial on account of lightness of matter

or imperfection of the act.

2210. Gravity of the Obligation of a Vow.--A vow has the nature of a

private law, since it is an obligation which the vow-maker voluntarily

imposes on himself. But a law obliges under grave sin when the

subject-matter itself and the intention of the lawgiver require strict

obligation (see 381 sqq.). Hence, gravity of matter in a vow depends on

the great importance of the thing vowed and on the will of the vower to

assume a grave obligation.

(a) Thus, the thing vowed must be of great importance, either in itself

(e.g., chastity) or from its relation to divine worship (e.g., a fast,

a communion). One cannot oblige oneself to a grave obligation under a

vow whose matter is absolutely and relatively of minor importance

(e.g., a daily Hail Mary, an alms of twenty-five cents; see 382).

(b) The intention of the vower must be to bind himself under grave sin.

He is free not to oblige himself by vow at all, and hence, should he

elect to vow, he may bind himself, even though the matter of the vow is

of great importance, either under grave or under light sin (or only to

penalty), as he wishes. Exception must be made, however, for public

vows taken in religious institutes and for the vow of chastity and

celibacy taken in the reception of subdeaconship, for the law of the

Church on account of the public good decrees that these vows oblige

under grave sin.

2211. Rules for Determining What Is Important Matter in a Vow.--(a) In

personal vows, an act of omission may be made the subject of grave

obligation, if it may be made the subject of grave precept by the

Church (e.g., the hearing of Mass, Confession, Communion, a fast or

abstinence, a Rosary).

(b) In real vows, some fix grave matter according to the standards for

commutative justice (see 1896 sqq.). But such a rule seems unsuitable.

The amounts absolutely and relatively grave in theft are determined by

the wealth of the person stolen from, but, since God is owner of all

things, we do not see how those amounts could be fixed in reference to

Him. On the other hand, the duty of religion obliges more strictly than

that of commutative justice, and hence it does not seem that grave

matter should be the same for both. In practice, the matter is not

grave when it is quite inconsiderable (say less than a dollar), or when

the vower intends only a light obligation. If the matter is not

inconsiderable and the intent of the vower is uncertain, one may decide

as to the obligation of the vow from presumptions based on custom, the

circumstances of the vow, or the rule that grave obligation is not to

be taken for granted (see 709, 714, 659).

2212. Coalescence of Light into Grave Matter.--(a) If the vower has

determined the relation of the items of the vow one to another,

coalescence can be judged from his intention. Thus, if the vower

intends that the items shall be parts of one whole, there is

coalescence (e.g., if he vows to give fifty cents in alms daily and

neglects this for a year, there is grave sin); but if he intends the

items as separate promises, there is no coalescence (e.g., if he vows

to say a Hail Mary every day and neglects this for a year, there are

many venial sins). If some of the items have been performed, others

omitted, and the omissions coalesce, there is grave sin according to

some as soon as a notable quantity is reached, but others believe that

there is grave sin only when a notable percentage (say one-third or

one-fourth) of the matter vowed has been neglected.

(b) If the vower has not determined the relation between the items of

the vow, the presumption as a rule favors coalescence in real vows,

non-coalescence in personal vows (as in the examples of a vow to give

fifty cents daily and of a vow to say a Hail Mary every day). But there

are exceptions, as when one vows to give a small alms every Saturday in

honor of the Blessed Virgin, for the chief intention in this case may

be to show respect to the Mother of God and not to give a certain

amount to the poor.

2213. The Time When a Vow Obliges.--(a) A negative vow (e.g., not to

drink certain intoxicants) obliges at once and always (see 371).

(b) An affirmative vow to which the vower has annexed a time for

fulfillment obliges at the time determined. If the time was intended as

a principal circumstance (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary on the Feast of

the Assumption), the vow ceases with that time, even though performance

was culpably neglected; but if the time was intended only as a

secondary circumstance (e.g., a vow to go to confession next week made

by one who needs it badly), the vow continues in force even after the

time set has elapsed without fulfillment (see 468 sqq.). Anticipation

of fulfillment on account of inability to fulfill at the time appointed

in the vow, is not necessary, unless the vow was attached to a certain

space and cannot be fulfilled in the latter part of this space; for

example, if one has vowed to say the Rosary today and foresees that the

whole afternoon will be occupied, one should say the Rosary in the

forenoon (see 470, 471).

should be accomplished as soon as this can be conveniently done, for

such is the rule in every absolute promise, and, moreover, no better

time for fulfillment can be assigned; “When thou hast made a vow to the

Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy God

will require it. And if thou delay it shall be imputed to thee for a

sin” (Deut., xxiii. 21).

2214. Delay in Fulfilling Vow.--Sin may be committed by delaying to

keep a gravely obligatory vow for which no date was set.

(a) There is no sin if the delay is reasonable in view of the

subject-matter of the vow (e.g., to put off a Rosary or fast for two or

three days, a pilgrimage of 50 miles for a week, a pilgrimage of 1000

miles for several months, etc.) or of the circumstances (e.g., if one

has to delay entrance into religion until one has better health or has

closed up a business).

(b) There is venial sin if the delay is unreasonable but does not

notably diminish what is promised or endanger its fulfillment. Thus, a

Rosary, a fast, or a pilgrimage is as good next year as this year, and,

apart from danger of forgetting or omitting, no lapse of time seems to

constitute a notable delay in respect to such obligations.

(e) There is mortal sin if the delay is unreasonable and notably

depreciates what is promised or notably endangers performance of the

vow. Thus, to put off the fulfillment of a vow to enter religion

lessens the value of the thing promised, if one waits until old age; it

imperils the promise, if one remains in the world for several years

exposed to the danger of losing vocation. Moralists hold that three or

four years would be a considerable delay in reference to a vow to enter

religion.

2215. The Person Obliged to Fulfill a Vow.--(a) A personal vow obliges

only the vower, because by its nature a vow is a law which one imposes

on oneself (see 463, 1696, 188). But vows taken by a city or community

may be obligatory on the subjects in virtue of law, and vows taken by

ancestors may oblige posterity in virtue of lawful and obligatory

custom. (b) A real vow (and a mixed vow as to the part that is real)

obliges also the heirs, for this kind of vow is a debt of the vower’s

estate (see Canon 1310). The obligation of the heirs is one, not of

religion, but of justice, and they are not held beyond the resources of

the estate.

2216. The Manner of Fulfilling a Vow.--(a) As to Internal

Disposition.--It is not necessary that one have at the time of

fulfillment the purpose of fulfillment, provided there is no intention

exclusive of that purpose, for the vow binds one only to do what was

promised (cfr. 477). Hence, if one has vowed to hear Mass and then

hears a Mass out of devotion, not thinking of the vow, one may take

this assistance at Mass as a satisfaction of the vow.

(b) As to External Performance.--If a vow is personal, one must perform

it personally, for one’s own act was promised, and hence, if personal

performance becomes impossible, it is not necessary or valid to use a

proxy; if a vow is real, one may use goods given by others, but one is

not obliged in case of poverty to seek the goods of another, since

one’s own goods were promised.

2217. The Obligation of Certain Kinds of Vows.--(a) Conditional

Vow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow unless the condition is

fulfilled, and this is probably true even when the condition is

equivalently, but not formally, fulfilled (e.g., Titus, who has to

support his mother, vows to enter religion as soon as she contracts

marriage, but the mother unexpectedly dies and Titus is thus freed of

her support). The vower is not guilty of sin against the vow if he

prevents the fulfillment of the condition, unless he uses unlawful

means. Such means are not employed if one is not obliged to fulfill the

condition (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $10 if one gets drunk), or if

non-fulfillment is due to weakness, not to the purpose to defeat the

vow (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $100, if one remains sober for a

year, when the vower becomes intoxicated accidentally or through

frailty before the year is up), or if non-fulfillment is due to the

exercise of one’s right (e.g., a vow to enter religion if one’s parents

consent, when the vower in lawful ways persuades his parents not to

consent). The vower is guilty of sin against the vow, if he uses

unlawful means to prevent the condition’s fulfillment (e.g., if he gets

drunk purposely in order to evade the alms promised for sobriety, or if

he uses fraud or force to keep his parents from consenting to a vow

which he has made dependent on their consent).

(b) Penal Vow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow if the act against

which the vow is made is committed by him but is not sinful (e.g.,

Claudius vowed not to play cards, but on a certain occasion did play

after having received a dispensation), or is only materially sinful

(e.g., Balbus vowed not to use profane language, but on a certain

occasion did use such language inadvertently), or is not sinful against

the vow, at least if the penalty is for violation of the vow (e.g.,

Caius vowed not to quarrel under penalty of an alms for breaking the

promise, but on a certain occasion did quarrel, adverting to the sin

against charity, but not to the vow), or is venially sinful on account

of the imperfection of the act, at least if the penalty is grave. If

the vower has not determined the number of times the penalty is to be

paid, it seems that it should be paid only after the first fault, if

the penalty is grave and one that is not customarily repeated (e.g., a

distant pilgrimage, a large alms), but should be repeated after every

fault if the penalty is slight and one that is customarily repeated

(e.g., a decade of the Rosary, a small alms).

chosen from is evil, vain or impossible (e.g., a vow either to earn or

to steal the money for an alms). The vower is held to nothing if before

his choice one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible

(e.g., Claudius vows to give one or the other of two chalices he owns,

but before he makes his choice one of the chalices is stolen), or if

after his choice the thing chosen becomes impossible (e.g., Claudius

decided to give the larger of two chalices, but before he could give

it, it was stolen). The vower is held, however, if one of the things to

be chosen from has become impossible before choice through the vower’s

own fault (e.g., Claudius’ chalice was stolen before his choice because

he had culpably delayed to make a choice), or if the thing not chosen

has become impossible after the choice (e.g., Claudius decided to give

the large chalice and the small one was stolen afterwards).

(d) Doubtful Vow.--Doubts about the essentials, that is, whether a vow

was really made (e.g., whether it was a vow or only a resolution,

whether there was the requisite intention or deliberation, whether the

vow was invalid on account of fear, etc.), or whether a vow certainly

made was fulfilled, must be settled according to the principles for

directing a doubtful conscience (see 672 sqq.). Thus, if it is more

probable that a vow was made or that a vow was not fulfilled, the

decision must be for obligation according to the Probabiliorists; but

if there remains a positive doubt whether only a resolution was made,

or whether a vow was fulfilled, there is no obligation according to the

Probabilists. Doubts about accidentals, that is, whether a vow was of

this kind or that (e.g., the circumstances of quality, quantity,

number, etc.), must be settled according to reasonable rules of

interpretation of the mind of the vower.

2218. General Rules of Interpretation of Doubtful Vows.--(a) Private

vows must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumptive

intention of the vower, for a vow is a private law, and the vower the

lawmaker. (b) Public vows must be interpreted according to the sound

doctrine of approved authorities on theology and Canon Law.

2219. Special Rules for Interpreting the Mind of the Vower.--(a) A

doubtful vow should be interpreted from internal evidence, that is,

from the language of the vow itself and the significance usually

attached to the terms used, for the presumption is that the vower meant

to express himself in the ordinary speech used for vows. Thus, a vow of

“virginity” usually means the same as a vow of “chastity,” and should

be so understood unless there is reason for a stricter interpretation.

The language of a vow is to be understood in the light of the purpose

of the vower (e.g., a vow to give a chalice to a church does not mean a

glass chalice, since the Church employs only chalices of precious

metal); a vow to hear Mass daily does not mean that one must hear two

Masses on Sunday, since the purpose of the vow is to let no day pass

without assistance at Mass.

(b) A doubtful vow that cannot be sufficiently construed from internal

evidence should be judged from general presumptions, that is, from the

custom as regards the vow taken (e.g., one who vows an alms is

understood to promise the amount that others in his condition promise),

from the custom or law as regards the matter of the vow (e.g., one who

vows a perpetual fast is understood to promise a fast on days other

than Sundays and holydays, for the church law distinguishes between

fast days and feast days), from the rules governing the interpretation

of laws (e.g., since things odious are to be of strict interpretation,

he who vows to give something may himself determine what he wishes to

give, provided it is not ridiculously small), from the conditions that

are implied in every vow as to possibility, the rights of others,

change in circumstances, etc. (e.g., he who promises to become a

religious means that he will do so, if a Religious Order will accept

and keep him; he who promises a gift means that he will give without

prejudice to the claims of third parties, etc.).

2220. The Advantages of Vows to the Vowers.--(a) A first advantage is

that a vow strengthens the will of the vower to do good and avoid evil.

This is an important advantage, since human nature is so weak and

inconstant and so much in need of helps that will add resolution and

perseverance to its efforts. The vow is a promise binding not only in

honor but also as a religious duty, and an act that has a special claim

on divine assistance and a favorable answer, and hence it is a powerful

ally to a virtuous life. True, he who takes a vow is subject to greater

sin if he is unfaithful. But there is no good that has not some risk

attached to it, and the risk here is due, not to the vow itself, but to

the weakness of the will which may use it improperly. The person who

thinks only of the dangers of storms will neither sow nor reap

(Eccles., xi. 4).

(b) A second advantage is that a vow makes the good done more

meritorious and praiseworthy. It adds to the virtue practised (e.g.,

abstinence) the virtue that directs (viz, divine worship or religion,

the most excellent among the moral virtues); it offers God a more

perfect subjection, since it presents to Him, not only a single act

here and now, but the power itself of the will to do the opposite; it

acts from a greater resolution and firmness, a circumstance that gives

perfection to virtue. All this should be understood _per se_, or with

the qualification “other things being equal”; for if we suppose that a

person who has no vow serves God with great charity and fervor, there

is no doubt that he is better before God than one who has vows and

performs them carelessly and reluctantly.

2221. When a Good Vow May Be Sinful.--A vow good in itself may be

sinful or the occasion of sin on account of the dispositions of the

vower.

(a) Thus, in taking vows one commits sin if one acts imprudently in not

taking into consideration the circumstances. Hence, before making a vow

one should consider carefully and consult one’s confessor or director

or some other prudent man.

(b) After taking vows one commits sin by regrets, if these regrets

include the desire not to comply with obligations (e.g., when one

regrets having lived up to a vow in the past or intends not to live up

to it in the future, or when one keeps the vow only from human motives

and wishes one could violate it), or if they manifest ingratitude

towards God (e.g., when one regrets without good reason that one ever

took the vow). The sin committed by desire not to comply with

obligation is mortal or venial according to the nature of the

obligation; the sin of ingratitude is venial. There is no sin at all,

it seems, if for a reasonable cause one regrets having made a vow or

wishes there were no obligation to perform something of supererogation

that one vowed, unless by such wishes one is exposed to temptations and

the danger of sinning against the vow.

2222. Merit of Fulfilling a Vow that One Regrets.--If one regrets

having made a vow but intends to keep it, is the good work performed

better by reason of the vow?

(a) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a religious motive

(e.g., the desire to please God or the fear to offend Him), the good

work is more meritorious than if there were no vow, for it has the

double value of an act of religion and of an act of some other virtue,

of a good work done and of a vow to do it.

(b) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a human motive

(e.g., the desire to please some human person or to secure some

temporal benefit), the good work is not made more meritorious, but

indeed is not meritorious at all, since not done for God’s sake.

2223. Who Can Make a Vow?--Every person living in the state of mortal

existence, whether Catholic or non-Catholic, is able to take a vow,

unless there is an impediment of natural or positive law.

(a) Natural law excludes vows made by those who are not masters of

their own acts or who have not the use of reason; for, since a vow is a

law which one knowingly places on oneself, it cannot be made by those

who have not the right of disposition over their acts or who do not

understand the meaning of the obligation. Hence, religious and other

subject persons are restricted as to the right of making vows, while

infants and insane persons are utterly incapable of making a vow.

(b) Positive law of the Church has laid down certain conditions for the

validity of public vows (e.g., age, performance of the novitiate,

etc.), and hence those persons in whom the conditions are not found are

incapable of taking these vows. The power of binding and loosing has

been given the Church, and the regulations on public vows exercise this

power for the benefit of the Church as a whole and of the persons who

take vows, As to private vows, it is a matter of dispute whether the

Church has the power to appoint conditions for them, since they are

internal acts (see 426), but it seems that no such conditions have ever

been made.

2224. Twofold Dependence on the Will of Another.--Those who are not

masters of their own acts are unable to vow on account of their

subjection to or dependence on the will of another. There is a twofold

dependence of this kind.

(a) There is a dependence of the will of the subject, as in the case of

religious who have vowed obedience to their rule and superiors, and in

the case of those who have not attained the age of puberty and who must

be guided and ruled by their father or guardian. This dependence means,

not that the subject must have the positive consent of the superior for

every act, but that he must not will or do anything contrary to the

just will of the superior.

(b) There is a dependence of the matter of the vow, when it is subject

to the wishes of another person, as happens in the case of those who

have obligations to others. Thus, a wife cannot make a vow of chastity

without the consent of her husband, otherwise she infringes upon

conjugal rights; a servant cannot make a vow to spend in visiting

churches time for which he is paid; a son who lives with his parents

and is not emancipated cannot vow to give his earnings in alms, for he

owes them to his family.

2225. The Validity of Vows Made by Subjects.--(a) If the vow is against

the rights of another person, it is invalid without his consent. Thus,

if a wife makes a vow of chastity without her husband’s consent, the

vow obliges her to ask his consent, but it has no force if he refuses

his consent.

(b) If the vow is against the subjection due another, it is invalid if

he denies his consent. Thus, if a religious vows an act for which

according to his rule permission must be sought, the vow has no actual

force until the permission is obtained; if he vows an act that is good

in itself, but absolutely forbidden in his rule (e.g., if a novice

bound to remain in the cloister vowed to go on a pilgrimage), the vow

is null, since it is better to keep the rule.

subjection due, it seems that the vow is valid without the knowledge

and consent of the superior. Thus, if a religious privately vows to do

what is commanded in a particular law or rule, or what is counselled by

his superiors, or what is good and not forbidden, the vow is valid

until annulled by the superior; for, as was said in the previous

paragraph, the subject is not bound to have the positive consent of his

superior for all acts, and it is supposed now that the thing vowed is

not detrimental to the rights of the superior or others.

2226. Cessation of Vows.--Since a vow is a private law, it may cease,

just as a law ceases in certain cases (see 500 sqq.). There are,

therefore, two ways in which a vow ceases or ceases to oblige.

(a) The vow ceases from within, or from internal causes, when the

matter of the vow has so changed as to be detrimental or useless, or

the purpose of the vow is no longer served by the vow. For the nature

of a vow is that it promotes a better good to the greater glory of God.

It is clear also that a temporary vow ceases when the time limit fixed

to it has expired, and that a conditional vow ceases if the condition

is not fulfilled (e.g., one vows an alms of thanksgiving if one’s

mother recovers from sickness, but she dies).

(b) The vow ceases from without, or from external causes, when it is

removed or suspended by the authority of God to whom it was made

(dispensation) or by the authority of one who has power over the will

of the vower or over the matter of the vow (annulment), or even by the

authority of the vower himself in so far as belongs to him the right to

substitute some equal or better work for the work vowed (commutation).

2227. Public vows do not cease from intrinsic causes, for this would be

productive of many disadvantages to religious communities and to those

who take vows in them. The chief cases in which private vows cease for

internal reasons are as follows:

(a) They cease on a substantial change in the thing promised, for then

the subject-matter has become morally different. There is a substantial

change if the matter of the vow has become illicit (e.g., Titus vowed

an alms to a beggar, but he learns that the beggar will use the alms to

become drunk), or if it has become useless (e.g., Claudius vowed not to

visit a certain house on account of the bad language used there, but

the guilty parties have now moved away), or if it has become an

obstacle to a greater good (e.g., Balbus vowed to go on a pilgrimage,

but an epidemic has broken out and it is better for him to remain home

and care for the sick), or if it has become impossible (e.g.,

Sempronius vowed to give an alms, but lost his money and cannot afford

to keep the promise). Some also think there is a substantial change

when circumstances are so different that, had the vower been able to

foresee them, he would not have taken the vow.

(b) They cease on the disappearance of the principal reason that

induced the vower to make his promise. Thus, if Caius vows a sum of

money to an institution solely because it is poor and it becomes

wealthy before he has fulfilled his vow, his obligation is at an end

(see Canon 1311).

2228. Annulment of Vows.--The annulment of a vow is made in two ways,

directly and indirectly. A full treatment of this subject will be found

in commentaries on Canons 1312, 499, 88, 89, 675, 501.

(a) Direct annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the

vower which, by affecting immediately the vower’s act, recalls the vow

and makes it of no force. Hence, this kind of annulment may be

exercised by all those who have such private authority over the will of

the vower as to be able either to confirm or to cancel his acts.

Private authority over the will of another is contained in the paternal

power of the father over his children, in the domestic power of the

husband over his wife, and in the governing power of a religious

superior over his subjects. The paternal power may be exercised to

annul the vows of children (at least, of those who have not reached

puberty), since these children are incompetent to decide for

themselves. The governing power also may annul directly the private

vows of professed subjects made after profession, since these subjects

have made a quasi-contract of submission in this matter. The domestic

power of the husband, according to some, cannot directly annul the

post-matrimonial vows of the wife, since the wife is competent to

direct herself in these affairs, and has made no engagement of

subjection in their regard; but others argue that at least positive law

(Num., xxx. 2-17; Eph., v. 24) gives the husband this authority. The

paternal power in this matter is had, not only by the father, but also

by those who take his place (such as the guardian or the mother); the

governing power is had by religious superioresses, by immediate and

other regular superiors, by bishops in reference to their non-exempt

communities, and by the Pope in reference to all communities.

(b) Indirect annulment is the operation of a person distinct from the

vower which, by affecting the matter or object of the vow, suspends the

obligation produced by the vow. Hence, this kind of annulment may be

exercised by all those who have a right over the matter of the vow,

when and as long as the vow is prejudicial to their right. Thus, the

Pope may annul a vow of any of the faithful that is detrimental to his

rights or the rights of the Church; parents may annul the vows even of

their children who have attained puberty, when these vows interfere

with family order; religious superiors may annul the vows of novices

that are harmful to religious discipline; husbands and wives may annul

each other’s vows that trespass on conjugal rights; a master may annul

a vow of his servant that keeps the servant from performing work due

the master.

2229. Reason Necessary for Annulment of a Vow.--Is a just reason

necessary for annulment of a vow? (a) For validity it is not necessary

that there be a just reason, since there is always the implicit

condition in a vow: “unless the superior or other person whose consent

is necessary refuses.” (b) For lawfulness it is necessary that there be

a just reason, for it is not lawful to deprive God of honor promised

Him, unless one has a good reason to do so (see Canon 1312). But the

sin committed by one who annuls or who asks for annulment without

sufficient reason does not regularly exceed a venial sin.

2230. Differences between Direct and Indirect Annulment.--(a) Direct

annulment extinguishes a vow, since it affects the act of vowing

itself, and hence, if a father annuls the vow of his son who has not

reached the age of fourteen, the vow ceases entirely. Indirect

annulment, on the contrary, only suspends a vow, since it affects only

the matter of the vow and this matter may be withdrawn from the power

of him who annuls. Thus, if a master annulled the vow of his cook to

hear Mass daily, the vow would revive when the cook took service

elsewhere.

(b) He who has power to annul directly may exercise the power even

though he granted permission for the vow, or promised not to annul it,

or gave his approval to it; for he retains his power over his subject

and may change his own decision. But he who has only indirect power of

annulment more probably may not annul once he has given his permission

or ratification to a vow; for his power is only over the matter of the

vow, and this, after he has consented to its dedication to God, is no

longer under his control.

2231. Dispensation.--A dispensation is the relaxation of a vow granted

in the name of God by one who has competent jurisdiction.

(a) It is a relaxation, that is, it removes the obligation (see 401).

Thus, a dispensation differs from a mere declaration or interpretation

that a law is not binding.

(b) It is a relaxation of the vow, that is, the dispensation, at least

in modern practice, takes away not only the obligation but also the vow

itself. It is not merely a suspension or a commutation, but a total

removal of the vow.

God remits the promise that was made to God. Thus, a dispensation

differs from an annulment, for the latter is made by the annuller in

his own name on account of the authority he has over the will of the

vower or over the matter of the vow.

(d) It is given by one who has competent jurisdiction, that is, public

spiritual authority in the Church over the external forum. For, as a

vow is an obligation to God, it cannot be removed without the act of

those whom God has appointed as His representatives in spiritual

matters. Here again a dispensation differs from an annulment, for the

latter requires, not the power of jurisdiction, but only dominative or

domestic power.

2232. Reasons Sufficient for a Dispensation.--A dispensation is granted

in the name of God, and therefore, unlike an annulment, it requires a

just reason for its validity; for the remission of a religious promise

cannot be satisfactory to God, unless there exists a justifying reason.

A dispensation conceded for insufficient reasons is invalid, even

though all the parties concerned were in good faith; but, in doubt, the

presumption is that the reasons were sufficient. The reasons sufficient

for a dispensation can be reduced to two classes: (a) the public good

of the community or of the Church (e.g., if a person bound by vow leads

a dissolute life to the scandal of the public); (b) the private good of

the vower (e.g., if he finds the observance of the vow too difficult,

if he took the vow without much deliberation or with such fear as is

insufficient to nullify, see 2195, 2196).

2233. Sinfulness of an Unnecessary Dispensation from Vows.--(a) The

superior who grants the dispensation is guilty if he is certain that

there is no sufficient reason for it, or if he doubts whether there is

any reason for it. But he dispenses validly and lawfully, if he is

certain that there is a reason for the dispensation, but doubts whether

the reason is sufficient (see 407), Usually, a superior who has been

asked for a dispensation should not be anxious about his right to give

it, for the very insistence of the subject indicates that the vow has

become harmful or useless.

(b) The subject is guilty if he asks for a dispensation while knowing

that he has no right to ask for it, or if he uses it while knowing that

there was manifestly no sufficient reason for it. But in case of doubt

whether the reason was sufficient, the subject should be guided by the

judgment of the superior, not by his own, for the decision belongs to

the superior.

2234. Persons Who Have the Power of Dispensation.--The Church has the

power to dispense both public and private vows, for Our Lord gave this

power when He said: “Whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, shall be

loosed in heaven” (Matt., xvi. 19), and the power thus given has been

exercised from the beginning (see 314). Those who have the power of

dispensation are the following:

(a) the Pope, since he is the Vicar of Christ, has the fullness of

dispensing power. He may dispense from every dispensable vow, solemn

vows included, and there are certain vows from which he alone may

dispense. The vows reserved to the Pope or his delegate are almost all

public vows and the two private vows of perfect and perpetual chastity

and of entrance into a Religious Order of solemn vows. The two latter

vows are reserved, however, only when made absolutely and with perfect

freedom by one who has completed his or her eighteenth year;

(b) local Ordinaries (and superiors with quasi-episcopal jurisdiction,

such as regular prelates) can dispense from the non-reserved vows. In

certain cases, such as urgent necessity or a doubtful vow, they can

also dispense from the two private vows reserved to the Pope. These

matters are treated more fully by canonists, especially in connection

with Canons 258 and 1045. It is the common opinion that regular

confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants can dispense, either

in confession or outside of confession, from all non-reserved vows not

made principally for the advantage of a third party and accepted by

him. Parish-priests and other confessors may dispense from a vow of

chastity discovered at the last moment when all preparations have been

made for marriage (see Canon 1045).

2235. Dispensation from Religious Vow of Chastity.--Does the Church

dispense from the vow of chastity taken in religious profession or in

the reception of Sacred Orders?

(a) There are no known examples of public dispensation of priestly

celibacy for the sake of contracting marriage, but dispensations are

granted from the religious vow of chastity.

(b) There have been cases in which subdeacons and deacons were

permitted to marry for the sake of some common good of the Church or of

a nation, and in which the marriages of priests were validated, as at

the time of the Anglican Schism and of the French Revolution. But the

clerics thus dispensed were forbidden the exercise of their clerical

powers.

2236. Dispensation from a Vow Made for the Benefit of a Third

Party.--(a) If the promise is gratuitous and not yet accepted by the

third party, the dispensation can be given; for in such a case the only

obligation is one arising from the vow, and the Church can dispense

from vows. Hence, if one vowed to have Masses said for the soul of a

deceased person or to give alms to the poor without determining any

particular persons, the vows can be dispensed.

(b) If the promise is gratuitous and accepted by the third party, but

is made chiefly in honor of God and only secondarily for the benefit of

the third party, it is probable that the dispensation can be given. For

that which is secondary in the promise should follow that which is

primary, and here the vow, which is the primary intention, is

dispensable.

benefit the third party is not subordinate to the purpose to make a

vow, or if the promise is onerous, the dispensation cannot regularly be

given. The reason is that in these cases there is question not only of

a vow but also of a contract, not only of an obligation to God but also

of an obligation to man, and justice demands that the rights of a party

to a contract be not taken away without his consent. Thus, a vow of

stability made on entrance into a Congregation cannot be dispensed

without the consent of the Congregation itself, for the vow was also a

contract between the Congregation and the vower. There are exceptions,

however, as when the third party renounces his right, or when the Pope,

in virtue of his supreme authority over ecclesiastical goods or of his

dominative authority, grants a dispensation for which there are just

and sufficient reasons.

2237. Persons Who May Be Dispensed from Vows.--(a) Dispensation may be

granted to subjects and, in certain cases, even to non-subjects. Thus,

a superior whose faculty is not restricted may dispense himself (see

403); but it is advisable that dispensation be always sought from

another person on account of the danger of self-deception. A local

Ordinary also has the power to dispense, not only his own subjects, but

also outsiders who are in his territory (see Canon 1313).

(b) Dispensation may be given either in the confessional or outside of

the confessional, unless the contrary is stipulated in the faculty. It

is more suitable, however, that it be given in the confessional.

(e) Dispensation may not be granted except to those who are willing to

accept it, and in this respect it differs from an annulment, which may

be made even against the will of the vower. The reason for this is that

the vower placed the obligation on himself freely (see 403). This holds

at least as regards the dispensation of a private vow.

2238. Commutation of Vows.--The commutation of a vow is the

substitution of some good work for the one promised by vow with the

transfer of the religious obligation to the new work. Commutation

differs from annulment and dispensation, for these take away the

obligation while commutation only changes the matter, the obligation of

the vow remaining unchanged. Thus, if the vow to make a pilgrimage is

commuted into prayers, one is no longer obliged to make the pilgrimage,

but one is bound under vow to say the substituted prayers. The power of

the Church to commute vows is clear from what was said above about the

power of dispensation, for he who can do what is greater can also do

what is less.

2239. Kinds of Good Works that May Be Substituted for Vows.--(a) The

good work can be a better work than the old one, that is, a work which,

if not more difficult, is more pleasing to God and more spiritually

advantageous to the vower. Hence, if one has vowed to give an alms to a

poor stranger, the vow may be commuted, if the stranger has not

accepted the promise, in favor of another stranger who is poorer or in

favor of one’s father who is also poor.

(b) The good work may be a work equally good, that is, one which

morally speaking has the same difficulty or spiritual value. Thus, one

prayer may be exchanged for another of equal length, one alms for

another of equal amount, one pilgrimage for another of equal distance.

But equality is to be determined, not mathematically but morally, and

hence one kind of work may be exchanged for another, one kind of vow

for another, and it is not necessary that the works be of exactly the

same worth. In fact, the new work, which objectively is only equal, is

subjectively better, since it is more advantageous to the vower.

clearly less difficult or meritorious, as when a Mass is commuted into

a Rosary.

2240. Persons Who Have Authority to Commute a Vow.--(a) The commutation

of a non-reserved vow into something better or equally good may be made

by the vower himself, if there are no rights of a third party to forbid

this. For the ends of the original vow (viz., the honor of God and the

spiritual welfare of the vower) are thus better or at least equally

served. But ordinarily one should not commute one’s own vows, since for

most persons it is not an easy matter to decide what is a better or an

equal good. How many understand the respective rank of the virtues? And

even if one does know, for example, that religion is better than

temperance, one cannot decide from this alone that a Rosary is an equal

or a better substitute for a fast. One who wishes commutation for his

vow, therefore, should consult his confessor or another priest.

(b) The commutation of a vow into something less good can be granted

only by the one who has a special faculty; for this kind of commutation

partakes of the nature of a dispensation, inasmuch as it relaxes to

some extent the original vow. Those who have the power of dispensing

(e.g., regular confessors who have the privileges of Mendicants) have

also the power of commuting; but those who have only the power of

commuting may not change a vow into something that is of notably less

value. A good rule to follow in commuting a vow into something less is

that more frequent reception of the Sacraments be the substitute

ordered. The limitations on dispensations by reason of the rights of

third parties (see above 2236) apply also to commutations.

2241. The Cause Required for Commutation of a Vow.--(a) For commutation

into something better no cause is required, since the new work is its

own justification. (b) For commutation into something of equal value,

some cause is required, since it is a mark of inconstancy and therefore

displeasing to God to give over one’s promises without good reason. But

a light reason is sufficient, such as greater devotion or less danger

of violating the vow. (c) For commutation into something of less value,

a proportionate reason is necessary, not only for lawfulness, but also

more probably for validity, since this kind of commutation is a partial

dispensation. But the reason need not be so serious as that needed for

a full dispensation.

2242. Reversion to Original Vow.--The return to the original vow by one

whose vow has been commuted is always lawful, and in certain cases may

be obligatory.

(a) It is lawful, even though the vow was commuted into something

better; for a commutation is a privilege, and there is no obligation of

using a personal privilege (see 523). Some authors hold that this

doctrine does not apply when the vower himself commuted his vow into

something better, but the common opinion is that the principle of

privilege applies to every case, and that one may even choose between

different works if a vow has been commuted a number of times. Those who

make vows should be on their guard, however, against frequent and

needless changes, since inconstancy is harmful spiritually.

(b) The return to the original vow is obligatory according to some when

the vower commuted his own vow to something better and the new matter

has become impossible; for the effect of the commutation was not to

extinguish the old vow at once, but to offer a satisfaction in its

place, and hence when this satisfaction proves impossible the vow must

be performed. Others deny this and maintain that the old vow is

extinguished immediately, since one who commutes a former vow is

immediately held under vow to the substituted work. All agree, however,

that if the commutation is granted by authority, the old vow is

extinguished and there is no duty to return to it if the substituted

work becomes impossible, even though the impossibility is due to the

vower’s own fault. Hence, if a pilgrimage is commuted into a fast and

the vower through his carelessness becomes sick and unable to fast,

there is no obligation either to make the pilgrimage or to fast. It

should be noted, though, that private vows made before religious

profession are suspended only so long as the vower remains in the

institute he has joined, and hence, if he is dismissed or leaves, the

vows revive (Canon 1315).

2243. Duties of Confessors in Reference to Private Vows.--(a) A

confessor should not readily permit penitents to take private vows,

since a vow is a serious matter and should receive mature deliberation.

A vow taken hastily in a fit of fervor will likely be soon repented of

(see 2221). But if it seems that a penitent will be benefited by a vow,

the confessor should give permission, though it will frequently be

advisable to limit the duration of the vow at first to a month or a

year or other fixed period.

(b) Nor should a confessor be easy in recommending commutations of

private vows, lest those who have taken them be encouraged to make

continual changes. On the other hand, if there is a good reason for a

change (such as danger or difficulty in the old matter or greater

devotion in the new matter), the confessor should not stand in the way

of a commutation. Confessors who have not the faculties must have

recourse to authority for dispensations and dispensative commutations,

and the same course is advised for some difficult cases of annulment

(e.g., when a husband and wife have made a mutual vow of continence).

2244. External Acts of Religion in Honor of God.--We now pass on to

consider those external acts of religion in which the worshipper makes

use of divine things in order to show honor to God (see 2175). These

sacred things are of two classes, namely, objects whose use is the

sanctification of man (Sacraments and sacramentals) and words whose use

is the power they have on others or the manifestation of reverence

towards God (the Divine Name). Sacraments and sacramentals will be

dealt with later. For the present we shall speak of the honor shown to

God by the use of His Name, and hence we shall take up in turn the

following subjects: (a) use of the divine name to confirm before others

one’s declarations or promises (oaths); (b) use of the divine name to

move others to do or omit something (adjuration); (c) use of the divine

name to express praise and invocation.

2245. Oaths.--An oath is the calling upon God to witness the truth of

what we say.

(a) It is a calling upon God; that is, it is the selection of God as

the witness of what is said. The oath is not merely an address made to

others or a declaration that a fact is known to God (e.g., “God knows

she has been a good woman”); it is an address or invocation made to God

Himself. Neither is it a mere prayer that God will in some way bring

out the truthfulness of what is said; it is an appeal to Him to

corroborate that truthfulness by His own testimony. Neither does it

appeal to testimony already given (e.g., the words of God found in

Sacred Scripture), but to testimony to be given about the present

matter. A prayer to God to prove one’s innocence or the proof of a

theological proposition from the Word of God is not, therefore, an oath.

(b) It is a calling on God, and hence if appeal is made to some

creature (e.g., in the expression, “upon my word of honor”) or to some

false deity (e.g., “By Jove, I’ll do that”), there is no oath.

one’s words by God Himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived. He

who swears does not ask that God intervene here and now by some visible

or miraculous sign, but that God confirm, where and when it pleases

Him, what is said, at least on that day when He will clear up the

hidden things of darkness and reveal the secrets of hearts (I Cor., iv.

5). The proving force of the oath is that one who believes in God will

not be so wicked or rash as to call upon the All-Holy to defend

iniquity and falsehood.

2246. The Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a) By reason of the matter, an oath

is either assertory or promissory. An assertory oath refers to the past

or present (e.g,, “I swear that I saw the accident,” “I swear that I am

insolvent”), a promissory oath to the future (e.g., “I swear that I

will execute my office faithfully”). The promissory oath is either

without a pact made with another (e.g., in the comminatory oath, “I

swear that I will prosecute, if you do that”) or with a pact. This

latter oath is called confirmatory, and, according as the pact is with

God or with man or with both, it is either a sworn vow, or a sworn

contract, or a sworn vow and contract.

(b) By reason of its mode, an oath is either contestatory (invocatory)

or execratory. The contestatory oath simply calls on God as a witness

(e.g., “God is my witness that this is true,” “I swear by God, etc.”).

The execratory oath asks God, even though the Divine Name is not

expressly mentioned, to punish the swearer in his own person or in the

persons or goods that pertain to him, if the statement made is not true

(e.g., “May God strike me dead, if this is not true!” “May the devil

take my children, if I swear falsely!”). The form commonly used, “So

help me God and these holy Gospels!” has an execratory sense, the

meaning being “May God help me if I speak truly, may He deny me help if

I speak falsely!”

implicit. The former calls on God by name (e.g., “God is my witness,”

“I speak the truth in Christ”); the latter calls on some creature as

the reflection of a divine attribute, or in some other way the

representative of God (e.g., the oath of Moses in Deut., xxx. 19: “I

call upon heaven and earth this day to witness that I have offered you

life and death”).

(d) By reason of its legal form, an oath is either solemn or simple,

judicial or extra-judicial. The solemn oath is taken with ceremony

(e.g., before the altar, with hand placed on the Bible, with upraised

hand, etc.); the simple oath is taken privately, without special form

of words or ceremony. The judicial oath is taken in court or in

reference to the public decision of questions of right, fact or

delinquency (e.g., in Canon Law the oaths of calumny, malice, etc.,

which are treated in canonical works); the extra-judicial oath, solemn

or simple, is taken on other occasions (e.g., when two contractants

strengthen their compact by oath). Examples of solemn oaths in the

Bible are found in Gen., xiv. 22, xxiv. 2, 3; Jeremias, xxxiv. 18.

2247. Moral Difference between the Various Kinds of Oaths.--(a)

Essentially, there is no difference, since all the kinds agree in the

principal features mentioned in the definition. (b) Accidentally, there

is a difference in circumstances of form, solemnity, etc. Moreover, one

kind of oath may be more obligatory (e.g., the solemn oath on account

of the special deliberation given it and the scandal caused by its

non-observance is more sacred than the simple oath), or it may have

other species of obligation besides that of religion (e.g., the oath to

keep a compact binds in justice as well as religion).

2248. Lawfulness of Oaths.--(a) It is lawful to take an oath that has

the necessary qualities, for in Scripture God Himself is represented as

swearing (Gen, xxii. 16; Psalm cix. 4, Heb., vi. 13, vii. 21), holy men

swear and are praised for swearing as they should (II Cor., i. 23;

Psalm xiv. 4), and the Church has always made use of oaths. The origin

of oaths is man’s faith in God, and their purpose is the useful one of

lending authority to important assertions. Indeed, an oath is an act of

religion, for men swear only by one who is greater (Heb., vi. 13), and

hence an oath is a profession of reverence for God’s superior

knowledge, truth, and justice.

(b) It is not lawful to take an oath that lacks a necessary quality.

Here we should note an important difference between an oath and other

acts of religion, such as vows. An oath is not desirable for its own

sake, since it is occasioned by human weakness and unreliability;

hence, like medicine and other necessities occasioned by evil, it

should be used only in serious need and sparingly. A vow or other act

of religion, on the contrary, originates from the desire to honor God,

even apart from necessity, and hence it may be used oftener. This

explains why Scripture forbids the habit of swearing (Ecclus., xxiii.

9; Matt., v. 33; James, v. 12); but it is a wrong interpretation of

these texts that sees in them an absolute prohibition of oaths. From

the context and other passages it is clear that the Scriptures just

cited reprove the Pharisees who taught that promiscuous swearing was

lawful, provided only the matter was true or the Divine Name was not

used, and also those persons who delighted to swear on all occasions.

2249. Necessary Qualities of a Lawful Oath.--The necessary qualities

that should accompany an oath are expressed in Jeremias, iv. 2: “And

thou shalt swear, ‘As the Lord liveth,’ in truth, and in judgment and

in justice.” Judgment refers to the good dispositions of the person who

swears, truth and justice to the righteousness of the cause for which

he swears.

(a) Thus, an oath should have judgment; that is, the person who swears

should do so only from serious necessity, with faith and devotion, and

in a manner respectful to God whom he invokes. An oath that lacks

judgment is called incautious or disrespectful, as when one swears

about a trivial matter or swears jokingly.

(b) An oath should have truth; that is, one should not swear except to

that which one believes to be true, after reasonable diligence has been

used in seeking for the truth. An oath that lacks truth is called false

or perjured, as when one swears to what one knows or believes to be

false, or promises what one does not intend to fulfill, or swears that

one is certain when one has only opinion, or swears with a purely

mental reservation, or swears after insufficient investigation of a

matter.

one has no right to promise (e.g., to tell a lie), and one should not

say what one has no right to say (e.g., what is defamatory). The matter

of the oath, then, both as to its object and its circumstances, must be

good, even though one is swearing truthfully and respectfully. An oath

that lacks justice is called a wicked oath, as when one promises under

oath to commit murder, or not to follow what is of counsel, or swears

about a real fact in such a way as to do unnecessary harm to another

person or to boast about one’s own crimes.

2250. Sinful Oaths.--(a) An incautious or disrespectful oath is from

its nature only a venial sin, since its malice consists, not in any

direct injury to the divine truth or other attribute, but only in

levity of mind; and, moreover, it is not opposed to the purpose of an

oath, which is to confirm the truth. But accidentally it may be a

serious sin on account of the scandal it gives (e.g., when a person of

standing swears without necessity), or on account of the danger to

which it exposes the swearer (e.g., when one swears habitually and is

thereby put in the occasion of swearing falsely or unjustly). On

account of the evils of familiarity, etc., to which habitual swearing

leads, Our Lord warn us to be content as a rule to support the truth

with simple assertion or denial (Matt., v. 2). At least for ordinary,

daily communications the word of a Christian or honest man ought to be

sufficient without his oath.

(b) A lying or perjured oath is from the nature of the act always (see

172) a mortal sin, since it consists essentially in contempt for God

and disrespect for His attributes. The perjurer dares to ask God to be

an accomplice in a lie, or else supposes that God can be deceived.

Hence, only by reason of the imperfection of the act can perjury ever

escape the guilt of mortal sin, as when one commits perjury without

sufficient reflection on or full consent to the oath or to its falsity.

Pope Innocent XI condemned the doctrine that perjury is only a light

sin (Denzinger, n. 1174). In Canon Law those who perjure themselves are

debarred from acting as witnesses or giving expert testimony, and are

subject to penalties at the discretion of the Ordinary (see Canons

1757, 1795, 2323). In American civil law perjury is a false oath given

before a tribunal and is a crime against public justice, while

subornation of perjury and false oaths given on private occasions are

also crimes or punishable offenses.

be given only after consideration and in a respectful manner, is a sin

against religion and any other virtue it offends. The sin committed by

reason of the oath is from its nature mortal according to some, since

the swearer gravely insults God by asking Him to become a partaker in

sin and by turning into an instrument of sin what should be an act of

religion; others hold that the sin is only venial, since it is not

serious disrespect to ask God to witness the truth of what is true;

others again make the gravity of the sin depend on the wickedness of

the matter or circumstances. This wickedness committed by reason of the

statement or promise is venial or mortal according to the case. Thus,

there is grave injustice in revealing a fact seriously detrimental to

another and which one is bound to keep as confidential; there is venial

scandal in swearing in order to lead another person into a slight fault

of detraction; there is a grave sin of impurity in promising to commit

adultery; there is a light sin of theft in promising to steal a small

sum of money. Finally, others hold that the oath is mortally sinful

when it furthers a grave sin (e.g., an oath confirming serious

detraction), and that it is venial in other cases (e.g., an oath

confirming a boast about past mortal sins).

2251. Mental Reservation in an Oath.-(a) Strict mental reservation

(i.e., the internal restriction of one’s words so that the listener

cannot gather the true meaning, as when one says one has seen Rome,

meaning a picture of Rome) is a lie, and hence cannot be used in an

oath without perjury. See propositions condemned by Innocent XI

(Denzinger, n. 1176).

(b) Wide mental reservation (i.e., the internal restriction of one’s

words that may be gathered by the listener from circumstances, as when

a servant says his master is not at home, meaning that he cannot be

seen) is lawful only when there is some reason of justice or charity

that demands it. Hence, it is a mortal sin to swear with this kind of

reservation when the questioner has the right to know the truth; it is

no sin at all when the questioner has no right to question and mental

reservation is the only escape from a serious evil. If the questioner

has no right to demand an oath and the deponent has no right to use

mental reservation (e.g., when the oath is only private and not

concerned with contract or other important matter), the sinfulness of a

mental reservation is a matter of dispute. Some think the oath is

mortally sinful, because it is gravely irreverent to God to call on Him

to witness testimony meant to deceive. Others think the oath is only

venially sinful, because the offense is not against truth or justice,

but only against judgment or discretion.

2252. Cooperation in Sinful Oaths.--(a) Formal cooperation is never

lawful, because it makes the cooperator will the guilt of what is done.

Thus, he who by command, counsel, promise, etc., induces another to

swear falsely is guilty as the principal or accessory to the crime (see

1513, 1778).

(b) Material cooperation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason

for it, as when a public official demands the oath according to law

from a person who, as he knows, will swear falsely. For the public good

demands that in certain cases oaths be administered, notwithstanding

that for some persons this will prove an occasion of perjury. But the

lawgiver should not multiply temptations by demanding sworn statements

unnecessarily; otherwise the oath becomes a mere formality deprived of

proving value, and the crime of perjury is made common.

2253. Sinful Oaths Demanded or Accepted by Private Persons.--(a)

Incautious or Disrespectful Oaths.--It is not lawful to ask or receive

an oath, when there is no great public or private need for it;

otherwise one makes a sacred act cheap and common. Neither is it lawful

to ask or receive an oath from those who do not believe in oaths (e.g.,

the Mennonites, some Quakers); otherwise one compels another to swear

against his conscience and indevoutly. Those who believe that oaths are

sinful may be required, nevertheless, to bind themselves on their

solemn word of honor, and may be punished in the same manner as

perjurers if they speak falsely.

(b) Perjured Oaths.--It is not lawful for a private person to ask or

receive an oath from another, if he is sure that the latter will commit

perjury; but one may ask and receive an oath, even though one does not

know whether the other person will swear truly or not, if one has a

sufficient reason.

oath, in which something sinful is promised or stated; for the thing

itself is then desired and there is formal cooperation. But it is not

necessarily sinful to ask or receive a wicked oath, in which the

sinfulness is found, not in the matter of the oath, but in the

dispositions of the swearer, for there may be only material

cooperation. Thus, he who exacts a sworn promise of murder agrees to

murder, but he who demands a sworn statement against a third party for

which there is necessity does not necessarily agree to hatred, if the

person taking the oath swears out of hate or revenge.

2254. Fictitious Oaths.--A fictitious oath is one in which a person

swearing externally has no intention internally to call on God as a

witness.

(a) This kind of oath is invalid, for, as was just said, without a real

intention to swear there is no oath. Hence, a fictitious oath produces

no obligation of religion, but there may be an obligation of justice,

as when the oath is the unjust cause of damage to another.

(b) This kind of oath is sinful, for, if it testifies to error, it

includes the grave sin of external dishonor to God; if it testifies to

truth, it includes the venial sin of taking God’s name in vain. The

fictitious oath is a grave sin if the circumstances are such that a

sincere oath is gravely obligatory, as when a superior or judge

lawfully imposes an oath in a serious matter, or the parties to an

important onerous contract bind themselves by oath in order to

strengthen their pact.

2255. Expressions Confused with Oaths.--Expressions that are sometimes

mistakenly confused with sinful swearing are the following: (a) profane

or vulgar talk, such as “Hell,” “The devil,” “Doggone it”; (b) cursing,

such as “Go to hell,” “God damn you,” “Damn it”, (e) contumely, such as

“bastard,” “son of a bitch”; (d) vain use of the name of God, such as

“by God,” “Christ,” etc., when used as common exclamations; (e)

temptation of God, such as: “If there is a God, may He strike me

dead!”; (f) blasphemy, such as: “May God perish, if this is not true!”

The expressions, “This is as true as the Gospel,” “God’s own word is

not more truthful,” “I am as innocent as the Blessed Virgin,” etc., if

used to confirm the truth, are not meant to assert the speaker’s

equality to God and the Saints, and hence they are venial sins of

taking the Lord’s name in vain. But, if they are used to confirm error,

they are mortal sins of blasphemy.

2256. Obligation Imposed by Promissory Oath.--An assertory oath imposes

the obligation of telling the truth and of repairing any damage that

results from the falsity or injustice of the declaration. In addition,

a promissory oath binds one in virtue of religion to perform one’s

promise; for, as said above (2249), an oath must have truth. Hence,

Scripture bids those who have sworn to fulfill the promise (Matt., v.

33) not to make the word of no effect (Num, xxxi. 3). But the thing

promised must be possible and lawful, or otherwise the oath lacks

judgment or justice. (a) Thus, an impossible promise is not binding,

for no one can oblige himself to perform what he cannot perform (cfr.

2201); (b) an unlawful promise is not binding, for no one can oblige

himself to perform what he is bound not to do. Thus, an oath to revenge

murder by murder is null, and sin is committed both in taking and in

keeping it.

2257. Obligation Imposed by Negative Oaths.--The obligation of a sworn

promise not to do what is better (e.g., not to take a vow), or to do

what is vain and useless (e.g., an oath to count the steps one takes),

depends on the circumstances. (a) If there are no rights of a third

party involved, these oaths do not hold (e.g., he who swears not to vow

acts laudably in disregarding the oath). For one may not call God to

witness or be guarantee for that which is less pleasing to Him, or

which in no way honors Him, and for which there is no claim on the part

of a third person. (b) If there are rights of a third party involved,

these oaths oblige one to give the third party what he is entitled to

from the promise (e.g., a nurse who swears to remain with a sick person

may not violate the oath by entering religion).

2258. Obligation of Oath Is Personal.--An oath added to a promise made

to man and obligatory in justice is personal, and hence it binds the

one who makes the oath, but not his heirs (see 2216).

2259. Interpretation of Promissory Oaths.--(a) An oath should be

interpreted strictly, for the presumption is that the promisor intended

to place upon himself the least possible burden. Thus, if a person

swears to observe the statutes of a certain Congregation, it should be

understood that he pledges himself to present, not to future statutes;

if he swears not to gamble, the oath does not forbid games in which

money is not played for. But if the promisor acts deceitfully, the oath

is to be interpreted according to the intention of him who receives the

promise (Canon 1321).

(b) An oath is always subject to the limitations and reservations which

the nature of the case, law, or custom demands. Hence, even though an

oath is made unconditionally, the following conditions are understood:

“If fulfillment will be physically and morally possible,” “saving the

rights of superiors,” “unless the other party renounces his right,”

“unless the other party fails to keep his part of the agreement,”

“unless there comes a notable change in conditions.” If the promisor

explains beforehand to the promisee what he understands by the oath, he

swears only in the sense thus set forth by him.

resolution, promise, vow, contract) that it confirms, for the accessory

follows the principal. Hence, if the act to which the oath is attached

cannot be obligatory (e.g., an act detrimental to eternal salvation, or

the public good, or the rights of a third party), the oath gives no

strength to this act (Canon 1318); if the act is naturally invalid

(e.g., a promise obtained through substantial fraud), the oath is also

invalid; if the act does not become effective (e.g., a promise not

accepted), neither does the oath become effective; if the act ceases to

oblige (e.g., a promise of secrecy made for a time), the oath also

ceases to oblige; if the act is not obligatory under grave sin, the

oath is not obligatory under grave sin (e.g., if one swears to observe

the statutes of a university, one is not bound to observe those that

are commonly neglected, one commits no sin by transgressing those that

are merely penal or optional, and one commits no grave sin by violating

those that oblige under venial sin).

2260. Kind of Obligation Produced by a Valid Promissory Oath.--(a) The

obligation is one of religion, because the significance of the oath is

that it adds the duty of respect owed to God to the duty of fidelity

owed to the promise. Men swear in order to make their promises more

trustworthy through the sacredness of the oath. The violation of a

promissory oath is, therefore, always a sin against religion. There are

other sins added in some species of oath, namely, a second sin against

religion in case of a sworn vow, a sin against justice and fidelity in

case of a sworn contract, a second sin against religion and a sin

against justice and fidelity in case of a sworn vow and contract (see

2246 a).

(b) The obligation, other things being equal, is less than that

produced by a vow, because the vow binds in virtue of fidelity to God,

but the oath only in virtue of respect. The obligation of fidelity

seems to be stronger, because unfaithfulness always contains

disrespect, but not vice versa. Moreover, in the case of a vow not only

the fulfillment of the promise, but the thing promised itself is

sacred, which is not true in the case of an oath. An assertory oath,

however, seems to be more binding than a vow, because it is a greater

injury to God to make Him the witness for falsehood than to break a

promise made to Him.

2261. Degree of the Obligation of a Valid Promissory Oath.--(a) The

obligation is grave, from the nature of an oath, because the virtue of

religion is preeminent among the moral virtues (see 2146). There is no

doubt that mortal sin is committed when one gives a sworn promise and

has no intention to fulfill it, for this is perjury (see 2250 b); and

also when one unjustly refuses to live up to an important engagement

made under oath, for this is irreligion and injustice in a serious

matter. The remarks on grave matter in vows (2211) apply here, but,

since the vow obliges more strictly, a somewhat greater amount is

needed for serious matter in violation of an oath.

(b) The obligation may be light on account of the smallness of the

matter involved. Even a vow, which is more binding than an oath, may be

of venial obligation in this way (see 2211). A person who makes a

promise under oath, fully intending to keep the promise, but who later

changes his mind without sufficient reason, does not show disrespect to

God, since when the oath was made he intended to abide by it, and does

not seriously injure his neighbor, since, as we suppose, the matter of

the oath is small. The sin, therefore, is one of inconstancy or levity,

and, if there is disrespect, it is slight. Thus, if a person who had

sworn to drink no more wine took a drop now and then, these

transgressions would be only venial. Some authors, however, believe

that every unfaithfulness to a promissory oath, no matter how small the

subject-matter, is a grave sin, because perjury is committed by the

breach of promise. This is commonly denied, because the meaning of a

promissory oath is that God is called on to witness the truth of a

present intention and the obligation (great or small) of a future

performance.

2262. Cessation of Obligation of Promissory Oath.--The obligation of a

promissory oath, like that of a vow (see 2226), ceases intrinsically or

extrinsically.

(a) Intrinsically, an oath ceases when there is a substantial change in

the matter (e.g., it is or has become impossible or unlawful, as in

Herod’s oath to Salome), when the principal reason for the oath has

ceased (e.g., Titus swore to give an alms to Sempronius because the

latter was poor, but before the alms was given Sempronius became rich),

or when the time or condition by which the oath was limited terminates

the obligation.

(b) Extrinsically, an oath ceases by condonation (e.g., when the State

or a private person to whom a sworn promise has been made yields the

right and remits the obligation), by annulment (e.g., when a father

nullifies the oath of his minor child), by dispensation (e.g., when the

Church absolves from an oath taken under grave compulsion), by

commutation (e.g., when the Church changes the matter of a sworn vow

into something more suitable). Those who can annul, dispense or commute

vows have the same power over oaths; but if the dispensation of an oath

is detrimental to others who are unwilling to forego the promise, only

the Apostolic See can dispense, and then on account of a necessary

reason (see Canon 1320).

2263. Adjuration.--Adjuration is the invocation of the name of God used

in a request or command to another person in order to move that person

to do or omit something.

(a) It is an invocation, and in this respect it is like an oath, for

both an oath and an adjuration call upon the name of God.

(b) It calls upon the name of God either explicitly (e.g., “I command

you in the name of God”) or implicitly (e.g., “I beseech you for the

sake of the passion of Christ”). If command or request is made in the

name of a creature and without reference to God’s attributes reflected

in them, there is not, properly speaking, an adjuration, as when one

implores a favor from another person in the name of a Patron Saint, or

of one’s country, parents, friendship, etc.

prayer, which cannot be made in the form of a command. But adjuration

may be used in prayers to God Himself or to the Saints, as is done in

obsecrations.

(d) Its purpose is to move another to an act or omission, and thus it

is different from an oath. The end of an oath is to confirm one’s words

by the testimony of God; the end of an adjuration is to influence

another to a certain course through an appeal to his respect, fear or

love of God.

2264. The Species of Adjuration.--(a) Adjuration is solemn or simple

(private). The solemn adjuration is made in the name of the Church by

her ministers and in the ritual form prescribed by her, as in the

exorcisms of Baptism. The simple adjuration is made by private persons

and without ritual ceremony.

(b) Adjuration is imperative or deprecative. The imperative is given in

the form of a command to inferiors or demons, as when St. Paul writes

to the Thessalonians: “I charge you by the Lord that this epistle be

read” (I Thess., v. 27). The deprecative is given in the form of a

request made to God or to any creature not damned, as when St. Paul

writes to the Romans: “I beseech you, brethren, by the love of God that

you present your bodies a living sacrifice” (Rom., xii. 1).

2265. Qualities of Lawful Adjuration.--Adjuration is lawful and an act

of the virtue of religion, since it professes reverence for the divine

attributes in using them as the most efficacious motives of appeal.

But, like an oath, adjuration must be accompanied by qualities that

make it lawful.

(a) Thus, there must be judgment, and hence those persons are guilty of

sin who employ adjuration without necessity (e.g., those who constantly

urge the love of God and other religious motives when asking for any

favor), or without devotion (e.g., those who in anger are wont to

command “for God’s sake,” etc.). The sin committed does not seem grave,

since there is no great disrespect and the malice consists in taking

God’s name in vain, not in insult.

(b) There must be truth, and hence an adjuration is sinful when used

for a lying cause, as when a well-to-do person pretends to be indigent

and begs that alms be given him for the love of God. The sin committed

does not seem grave, since the act to which the other person is invited

is good, and the act of adjuration itself does not ask God to testify

to the lie, but only uses His name without reason. If the deception is

mortally sinful, however, some authorities think that the adjuration

added to it is a grave sin against religion.

used to obtain something unlawful, as when one demands in the name of

God that another person tell a lie or commit murder. The adjuration is

gravely irreverent to God if the thing sought (e.g., murder) is a

mortal sin; it is lightly irreverent, according to the common opinion,

if the thing sought (e.g., a harmless lie) is only a venial sin.

2266. Persons Who May Be Adjured.--God may be adjured, but only in a

deprecative manner, as is done in the obsecrations, “through Jesus

Christ,” “through Thy Passion and Death,” etc. The purpose of

adjurations addressed to God is not to change the divine decrees, but

to obtain through His goodness what He intended from eternity that we

should obtain by prayer. But the same form of adjuration cannot be used

for all creatures.

(a) Thus, deprecative adjuration may be used in reference to those who

are in some way one’s superiors. Hence, we may pray the Angels and

Saints to grant a prayer for the love of God, and a beggar may ask in

Our Lord’s name that a wealthy man give him an alms.

(b) Imperative adjuration may be used in addressing subjects or

inferiors. Adjuration of demons must not be made in friendly words, nor

with a view to obtaining services or knowledge from them, but in words

of reproach and only as a means to end their nefarious activities.

(e) No kind of adjuration may be used in regard to irrational

creatures, since they are without knowledge sufficient for receiving a

command or a request. The adjurations of animals, the elements,

inanimate objects, etc., that are contained in the Ritual, must be

understood as deprecative adjurations addressed to God, or imperative

adjurations addressed to evil spirits, that the creatures prayed over

may be to our benefit and not to our hurt. Examples are the exorcisms

of water, salt, mice, locusts, houses, or storms.

2267. The Use of Exorcisms.--(a) As to their effect, exorcisms are of

two kinds, exorcisms in the strict sense (i.e., the expulsion of demons

from possessed persons) and exorcisms in the wide sense (i.e., the

diminution of demonic influence). Examples of the former are found in

the Gospels, where Our Lord drives out many evil spirits from afflicted

persons; examples of the latter are found in the exorcisms administered

in Baptism and in the exorcisms of salt, water and other inanimate or

irrational creatures.

(b) As to their manner, exorcisms are also of two kinds, the solemn and

the private. The former are made in the name of the Church in the

manner prescribed by the Ritual, and their administration is reserved

to clerics who have a special and express permission from the Ordinary

(Canon 1151, Sec. 1). The latter kind may be made even by members of the

laity, and we read that certain Saints, like St. Anthony and St.

Catherine of Siena, had great power over evil spirits. It is

recommended that priests frequently use private exorcisms, at least

secretly, for persons who are vexed by temptations or scruples, and for

which they may use the form: “In the name of Jesus Christ, unholy

spirit, I command you to depart from this creature of God.”

2268. The Effects of Adjurations.--(a) Adjurations addressed to one’s

fellow-men upon earth impose no obligation of religion upon the persons

addressed. Hence, if a rich man turns a deaf ear to an appeal for

charity made in the name of God, he violates charity but not religion;

if a child disregards a command urged upon him for the love of God, he

violates obedience but not religion.

(b) Adjurations addressed to demons are not of infallible efficacy, at

least as to the entire effect intended, for power over the spirits of

darkness is given only in such measure as is needed for the propagation

of the Gospel. But we believe that an exorcism pronounced lawfully by

one who has the Order of Exorcist acts _ex opere operato_, at least to

restrain the wickedness of the demons: “In My name they shall cast out

demons” (Mark, xvi. 17).

2269. Praise of God.--Having discussed oaths and adjurations, in which

honor is shown the name of God, and the immediate end of which is or

may be some human advantage, we come now to the honor shown the name of

God by praise in which the immediate end is some spiritual advantage.

Praise is defined as “the declaration of another’s greatness with

approval.” The divine praises include the prayers of wonder, of honor,

of thanksgiving; but they differ from prayer properly so called or

petition (see 2153).

2270. Internal and External Praise of God.--(a) Internal praise is

expressed by the thoughts and affections of the soul. This is the most

important part of praise, and without it external praise loses much of

its value. Our Lord reproved the Pharisees for honoring God with their

lips, while their hearts were far from Him (Matt., xv. 8), and St. Paul

admonishes the Ephesians to sing and make melody to the Lord in their

hearts (Ephes, v, 19).

(b) External praise is expressed in words (“I will bless the Lord at

all times, His praise is always in my mouth,” Psalm xxxiii. 1), or in

song (“Admonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual

canticles, singing in grace in your hearts to God,” Col., iii. 16), or

by music (“Praise Him with sound of trumpet, with psaltery and harp,

with timbrel and choir, with strings and organs, with high-sounding

cymbals,” Psalm cl).

2271. Excellence of Praise of God.--(a) Praise Is Due to God.--His

essence and attributes are ineffable and above all praise (Ecclus.,

xliii. 33), and they must be honored by the superior acts of worship

and reverence. But the effects of His goodness shown to us should be

declared and glorified: “I will remember the tender mercies of the

Lord, the praise of the Lord for all the things the Lord hath bestowed

upon us” (Is., lxiii. 7).

(b) Praise of God Is Advantageous to Man.--Internal praise lifts the

soul on high and prepares it to receive benefits from God, while

external praise helps the mind to keep its attention fixed on God,

excludes those things that are contrary to Him, and offers edification

to others. St. Augustine narrates in his _Confessions_ how profoundly

he was moved in spirit, even to tears, on hearing the hymns and

canticles of the Church.

2272. Qualities that Should Be Present in the Divine Praises.--(a)

Internally, there should be devotion. It is useful that those who

perform or assist at the praises of God understand what is said, but it

suffices for devotion that they know His greatness and goodness is

being proclaimed. The intention should be to honor God, and hence there

is no act of personal religion if in reciting or hearing God’s praises

one intends only ostentation or pleasure; attention should also be

given to what is said, and hence St. Augustine says that it is a sin to

think rather of the music than of the praise of God proclaimed by the

music (see 2164 sqq.).

(b) Externally, the divine praises should be respectful to God and

helpful to recollection and devotion. Hence, the law of the Church

excludes from her services all that is of a disturbing, profane or

sinful character, such as theatrical displays, musical instruments that

distract the mind from religious thoughts, lascivious airs or those

suggestive of the dance. The Code prescribes that impure music of every

kind must be eliminated from churches (Canon 1264), and Pius X in his

Motu Proprio of 1903 lays down the rule that there must be nothing in

the services of the Church that is calculated to diminish piety, give

reasonable scandal or disgust, or offend the decorum of sacred

functions or the sacredness of the place (see also Instruction on

Sacred Art [Holy Office, 30 June, 1952], AAS 44-542). The sin committed

by misbehavior or levity during divine services depends on the

seriousness of the disrespect shown to God or the scandal given the

beholders.

2273. The Sins against Religion.--Inasmuch as religion is a moral

virtue and therefore consists in the observance of a golden mean, the

sins opposed to it are the extremes of excess or defect. (a) The sins

of excess offend, not because they offer too much worship to God (a

thing that is impossible), but because they exceed by giving worship

where it is not due or in a manner that is not due (superstition). (b)

The sins of defect offend by denying due religious reverence to God

Himself (temptation of God, perjury) or to sacred things (sacrilege,

simony).

2274. Superstition.--Superstition is false religion, or a vice that

offers improper worship to the true God or divine worship to a false

god. Improper worship of the true God is either false or superfluous.

(a) False worship is opposed to the truth of religion (e.g., Old

Testament rites which signify that Christ is still to come), or of

rites (e.g., Mass by a layman, Mass according to a form disapproved by

the Church), or of facts (e.g., fictitious revelations, ecstasies,

mysticism, miracles, relies), or of morals (e.g., human sacrifice,

praises of God to the accompaniment of lascivious words or music, etc.).

(b) Superfluous worship is offered when an external observance in no

way serves the purposes of religion (viz., the glory of God, the

elevation of the soul to Him, the repression of the passions), or is

opposed to law or common custom. The purposes of religion are not

served by actions foolish in themselves (e.g., the repeated mumbling of

meaningless sounds) or in their intent (e.g., undue emphasis given to

minor details of a religious act, such as color of the candles on the

altar, the stature of the celebrant, the hour or condition of the

weather, etc., as if weighty consequences depended on them). The chain

prayer is another example of a superstition that places all the virtue

of an act of worship in some small external circumstance. The law and

custom are not followed in such superstitions as additional crosses,

alleluias, credos, etc., made in violation of Mass rubrics, or a

devotion consisting of fasts on Sundays, or new forms of piety that

lack ecclesiastical approval. There is no superstition, however, in

modes of worship approved by the Church (such as novenas, tridua,

Gregorian Masses, and the like), for the Church recognizes no devotion

or ceremony unless it is true and useful as an expression of religion.

2275. The Sinfulness of Improper Worship of God.--(a) False worship is

from its nature a grave sin; it is seriously insulting to God because

it offers Him dishonor as honor, and it is also seriously harmful to

man because it casts discredit by its falsity on the name of religion.

(b) Superfluous worship is from its nature a venial sin, since it

contains no notable irreverence towards God and, being outlawed, does

not reflect on religion. Accidentally, however, it may be a mortal sin,

as when it is performed in such a way as to cause great scandal.

2276. Worship of False Deity.--Worship of a false deity is performed by

offering a creature an act of homage due to God alone. Hence, there are

three species of this superstition: (a) a creature is recognized as

God, when it is offered a service (such as sacrifice) that testifies to

supreme and infinite excellence (idolatry); (b) a creature is given the

credit of divine knowledge, when instruction about hidden matters which

only God could bestow is asked from it (divination), (c) a creature is

treated as the supreme ruler, when assistance which only God can grant

is sought from it (vain observance).

2277. Definition of Idolatry.--Idolatry is the supreme worship of

_latria_ offered to a creature.

(a) It is supreme worship, and hence the inferior reverence of

_hyperdulia, dulia_, or civil honor, offered respectively to the

Blessed Mother, angels, saints, superiors, etc., is not idolatry. The

external signs of worship that belong to God alone (such as sacrifice,

temples, priesthood, altars, etc.), may never be used in the veneration

of creatures; nor the signs that are common to God and creatures (such

as genuflexions, prostrations, prayers, etc.), if the intention is to

adore.

(b) Idolatry is offered, that is, by it an act of worship is intended

or is at least performed in a serious manner. Hence, it would not be

idolatry so to enact a pagan ceremony that the onlookers could

understand that no religious rite was being performed (e.g., if it were

done on the stage, or in a joking manner).

that is shown the images of the Trinity or of Christ on account of the

persons represented by them is not idolatry. The creature to whom

idolatry is shown is either a person (e.g., an Angel, the soul of a

departed person, a living human being), or an irrational creature

(e.g., the bull Apis, a sacred plant), or an inanimate substance (e.g.,

statues or pictures, the elements, the heavenly bodies), or a

fictitious being (e.g., Jupiter and the other gods of mythology).

2278. The Kinds of Idolatry.--(a) Idolatry is either internal or

external. Internal idolatry has the intention to adore a creature, as

when a Satanist offers sacrifice to demons. External idolatry performs

an outward rite that signifies adoration of a creature, although there

is no will to give adoration, as when a Christian out of fear of death

reluctantly burns incense before an idol. (b) Internal idolatry is

either perfect or imperfect. Perfect idolatry includes belief in a

false god, as when an ignorant pagan prays to the sun and moon.

Imperfect idolatry is committed when, without belief in a false god,

there is the will to offer it divine worship on account of hatred of

God, wish to obtain favors from demons, or the like.

2279. The Sinfulness of Idolatry.--(a) Idolatry is a most grievous

crime. It entails rebellion against the majesty of God, attack on the

virtue of religion, unbelief or denial of faith, and scandal; and hence

it is forbidden in the first commandment: “Thou shalt not have strange

gods before Me. Thou shalt not adore them, nor serve them” (Exod., xx.

3 sqq.).

(b) Idolatry in itself and in its highest degree is the most grievous

of sins, for it includes both hatred of God (since it would deprive Him

of His unique excellence by giving His honors to creatures) and

blasphemous unbelief (since the idolater publicly professes that God is

not above all). Now, it was said above that unbelief, hatred of God and

blasphemy are the most enormous of sins (see 820, 895, 1301, 1302), and

so it follows that the worst form of idolatry is graver than other sins.

it, may be less grievous than other sins. Thus, it is worse to hate or

deny God internally than to worship an idol externally only; it is

worse to blaspheme with great hatred and contempt than to practise

idolatry with less malice. Imperfection of the act, as in cases of

ignorance or want of consent, makes the sin venial, or no formal sin at

all.

2280. Comparison of Different Sins of Idolatry.--(a) Internal idolatry

is worse than external idolatry, because the former, though not the

latter, includes approval of the superstition committed. (b) Imperfect

idolatry is worse than perfect idolatry, if both be considered

precisely as idolatry, since the former proceeds from malice, and the

latter from greater or less ignorance. (c) External idolatry is

aggravated when its motive is more sinful or makes the act more

voluntary (e.g., it is worse to pretend sacrifice to an idol if the

motive is to ingratiate oneself with the idolaters or to spite the

Christians, than if the motive is to escape death at the hands of the

pagans).

2281. Idolatry Possible in Christian Worship.--The guilt of idolatry

may be incurred even by Christians offering worship to God. (a) Thus,

in the adoration of the Eucharist there would be idolatry, at least

material, if an unconsecrated host were exposed for veneration or given

in communion. (b) In the veneration of the Saints there would be

idolatry, if they were honored or invoked as if they possessed divine

attributes.

2282. Definition of Divination.--Divination (soothsaying,

fortune-telling) is a form of superstition in which the evil spirits

are invoked explicitly or implicitly with a view to the discovery of

what is future or occult.

(a) It is a form of superstition, because it seeks to obtain through

natural means knowledge that cannot be had except from God, or

substitutes other teachers for God.

(b) It contains the invocation of evil spirits, for the information

sought surpasses the powers of nature and, being illicit, cannot be

expected from supernatural powers that are good (such as God, the

Angels, the Saints).

on the evil spirits when one prays to the demon or makes an agreement

with him; there is implicit invocation when one does not address an

evil spirit, but does employ means for the discovery of knowledge which

are not adequate, either from their nature or from the will of God, for

the desired effect.

(d) The knowledge desired is of future or occult things, that is, of

such things as cannot be foreseen in their causes or discovered by

natural means (such as the future acts of free beings, the secret

thoughts of the heart).

2283. Distinction between the Fact and Sin of Divination.--(a) The fact

of divination--that is, the actual manifestation by evil spirits of

things humanly unknowable--is not impossible, since the demons are far

superior to man in intelligence and knowledge, and it is the teaching

of revelation that they use their powers to mislead and seduce mankind.

Their knowledge, however, does not extend to future contingencies, nor

to the secrets of hearts, and their word cannot be relied on. A case of

real communication by an evil spirit is that of the girl of Philippi

possessed by a pythonical spirit (Acts, xiv. 16-18), and some think

that the same can be said of the Witch of Endor (I Kings, xxvii. 7-25);

but no doubt there have been many instances of divination in which the

intervention of demons was only imaginary.

(b) The sin of divination is committed when one has the will to receive

occult knowledge from forbidden sources, or uses the means to obtain

knowledge from those sources, even though there be no communication or

response on the part of the spirits of evil.

2284. Forms of Explicit Invocation.--Divination in which there is

explicit invocation of the demon is of various kinds according to the

medium through which instruction is given or expected.

(a) Thus, the medium is direct if it is an external sensible appearance

representing the demon (_praestigium_) or an internal picture in the

imagination or a dream containing his answer (oneiromancy).

(b) The medium is indirect and rational when it is a human being, dead

or living. Divination through the evocation of the departed is known as

necromancy, while that which is given through living possessed persons

is called pythonism. Modern Spiritism partakes of the character of both

necromancy (since the spirits of the departed are consulted) and

pythonism (since persons supposed to be under the control of familiar

spirits act as mediums).

(such as iron, stone or crystal) in which figures or signs appear;

idols from which oracles are received; tables or ouija boards from

which answers are given by raps or writing; divining rods supposed to

lead the way to any hidden person or thing, etc. (geomancy); or some

liquid body (hydromancy), or air (aeromancy), or fire (pyromancy), or

the entrails of sacrificial victims or natural prodigies, such as

lightning (haruspicy). Here also may be mentioned the superstition of

ordeal by fire, boiling water, combat, etc., once used to determine the

guilt or innocence of an accused person.

2285. Forms of Implicit Invocation.--Divination in which there is only

implicit invocation of evil spirits is manifold, just as the natural

causes from which preternatural knowledge is expected are manifold.

Among the principal forms are the following:

(a) that which is made from the human mind, when clairvoyance or

clair-audience is employed. It is supposed that certain persons have

the natural gift, at least when in a trance or hypnotic state, of

perceiving what is done or said at a distance without any of the normal

means of communication, and even of reading minds. This supposed inborn

gift is sometimes called second sight or telepathy. Some authorities

hold that there is sufficient evidence for vision at a distance as a

sixth sense in certain individuals, especially among primitive peoples

and persons bound by a tie of blood or intimate friendship. Moreover,

many facts learned through telepathy seem to have been verified

sufficiently to render telepathy probable. Accordingly, to believe

telepathy or to practice it, excluding all superstition and invocation

of demons, is not illicit.

(b) divination that is made from the human body in physiognomy,

phrenology, and chiromancy. The physiognomist pretends that he is able

to discover the hidden character, latent abilities or defects, secret

thoughts, etc., by a study of the features or expression of the

countenance. The phrenologist claims that he can read the mental and

moral traits of a person from the bumps or prominences of the skull.

The chiromantist, or palmist, promises to foretell the future, read the

past, discover the present secret character and aptitudes of an

individual from an inspection of the shape, lines and configuration of

his hand and of the character of the lines and marks of his palms;

astrology. This pseudo-science gives predictions about the fortunes of

an individual drawn from a study of his horoscope (i.e., the aspect of

the heavenly bodies at the moment of his birth) and of certain rules of

interpretation;

(d) divination that is made from non-human and contingent events in

augury and auspice, which divine from the voices or manner of flight of

birds; in omen or portent, which divine the future from some chance

happening (such as meeting with a red-haired woman or a hunchback, a

sneeze, etc.), in sortilege, which divines by lots or signs arbitrarily

chosen (such as the letters that appear on opening a book at random,

the numbers or figures that appear when cards are drawn or dice

thrown). Superstitions about omens are of two kinds, some happenings

being regarded as signs of good luck (e.g., to find a pin), others as

signs of bad luck (e.g., to meet a black cat, to spill the salt, to

break a mirror, to raise an umbrella in the house).

2286. The Malice of the Sin of Divination.--(a) The Theological

Species.--If there is explicit invocation of evil spirits, divination

is of its nature a mortal sin that admits of no lightness of matter,

for it gives divine worship to a creature, acts on friendly terms with

the enemy of God, and prepares one for apostasy and eternal damnation.

If there is no explicit invocation of the spirits of evil, the sin is

of its nature mortal on account of the implicit commerce with the

devil; but generally the sin will be light on account of the

dispositions of the offender (e.g., because he is ignorant, or consults

divination as a joke or from curiosity, or has no faith in it). Hence,

the faithful should be warned not to go to fortune-tellers or put faith

in dreams, but, apart from such cases as serious scandal, habitual

direction of one’s life by superstition, cooperation in serious sin of

a diviner, etc., the sin will usually be venial, at least in young

people. Persons who occasionally act or omit to act in some indifferent

matter on account of dreams they have had are often excused from all

sin on account of the fear or hope which the dreams excited.

(b) The Moral Species.--All forms of divination, it is commonly held,

belong to the same species of worship of a false god (Deut., xviii.

10-12). Yet, the confessor should be told about an explicit pact with

evil spirits, if there was one, since thus he will be able to decide

the gravity of the sin and to make inquiries about other sins that

usually accompany such a pact (e.g., blasphemy, promise to serve the

devil, sacrileges, etc.).

2287. When Knowledge Is Obtained from God.--There is no sin of

divination when knowledge is obtained from God.

(a) Thus, God can communicate directly in a vision or dream, and there

are examples of this in Scripture, But generally one should not be

guided by dreams as if they were means for supernatural knowledge,

since nearly all dreams are produced by natural causes. It is not

sinful to believe that a dream of an extraordinary kind (e.g., one in

which the future is wonderfully foretold or a warning given, or which

produces great spiritual good) was sent by God.

(b) God can communicate through other human beings, and hence it is not

superstitious to put faith in the private visions or revelations that

have been recognized by the Church, or that have the marks of

genuineness required by the Church.

irrational beings or by means of portents. Thus, Gedeon took the words

of enemy soldiers as a premonition of victory (Judges, vii. 15);

Eliezer chose a sign by which to recognize the woman who should be the

wife of Isaac (Gen, xxiv. 14); the ordeal of bitter waters was

prescribed in Numbers, v. 11 sqq.; Josue discovered the guilt of Achan

by lots (Josue, vii. 14), and St. Matthias was elected to the

Apostolate by lots (Acts, i. 23-26). But these were exceptional cases

in which men were inspired to consult God as they did, and it would be

superstitious to seek knowledge in these ways against the will of God.

Those who desire light and guidance should have recourse to the

teachers God has provided on earth and should pray to God, leaving to

Him the ways and means of His answer. Hence, the Church has declared it

unlawful, even in private, to call upon the good spirits to give

answers through automatic writing (_Collect. de Prop. Fide_, 1894), or

to interrogate the dead at spiritistic seances (AAS, 1917, IX, 268). It

is not superstitious, however, in a grave matter when there is no

ordinary means of instruction at hand, to offer a prayer to God and

then have recourse to lots to decide what course shall be followed

(Prov., xvi. 33).

2288. When Knowledge Is Obtained Through Natural Causes.--There is no

sin of divination when knowledge of the future or of hidden things is

obtained through proportionate natural causes or indications.

(a) Thus, knowledge of future happenings is naturally deducible from

their necessary causes, when these causes are known. The effect may be

predicted with certainty if the cause is so determined to one course

that its result is invariable (e.g., the revolution of the earth around

the sun always brings on the four seasons of the year); it may be

predicted with the greatest probability if the cause is so constituted

that almost always it has a certain consequence (e.g., a seed properly

planted usually grows into a tree). Hence, there is no superstition in

astronomical predictions, weather forecasts by meteorologists, tables

of life expectancy drawn up by insurance experts, etc., since these are

inferences from known scientific laws.

(a) Thus, a vow is invalidated by substantial ignorance or error (e.g.,