(b) From the imperfection of the act or _Moral theology

cursing becomes at times a venial sin. The act is imperfectly

deliberate when one curses in a sudden fit of temper; it is imperfectly

intentional, when one curses in fun or from habit and does not really

wish that the evils pronounced should be fulfilled. The curses, “Go to

hell,” “God damn you,” are usually not meant or understood to express a

wish that the person addressed be consigned to eternal punishment.

Hence, they are generally in themselves venial sins only. But it should

be remembered that venial curses of this kind may become mortal by

reason of scandal (e.g., when parents habitually address such curses to

their children, or other superiors to their subordinates), or by reason

of irreverence (e.g., when children curse their parents). The matter of

a curse is light when the evil spoken is harmful only in a small degree

(e.g., to wish that a person may lose a small sum of money).

2114. Rules for Deciding as to Gravity of the Sin.--Persons who have

expressed a grave curse against a neighbor are sometimes in doubt

whether there was enough ill-will in the curse to make it a mortal sin.

For such doubts theologians give the following rules:

(a) if the reason for doubting is that after the curse one cooled off

and hoped that no evil would happen to one’s neighbor, mortal sin was

committed during the curse, but the bad disposition quickly passed away;

(b) if the reason for doubting is that one is not sure about the state

of mind one was in during the curse, a good index of that state of mind

will be the feeling one has towards the person who was cursed. Thus, if

one is well disposed towards that person, the presumption is that the

curse was not meant except as an expression of anger; but if one is

hostile to that person, the presumption is rather that the evil in the

curse was really intended. If one is indifferent as regards the person

whom one cursed, the presumption will follow what one is accustomed to

desire in one’s curses, whether that be to give forceful expression to

displeasure or to manifest a malevolent hatred.

2115. Circumstances Which Change the Moral Species of Cursing.--There

are certain circumstances of person and objects which change the moral

species of cursing, and which must therefore be mentioned in confession.

(a) Thus, by reason of difference in the persons cursed the species is

changed, for where special love or reverence is owed a special sin is

committed by hatred or irreverence. The gravest curse is that against

God, which is the sin of blasphemy (see 887 sqq.). Next in wickedness

is the curse against one’s parents, which is a sin of impiety.

(b) By reason of difference in the evils that are desired, the species

is also changed, since the essential malices of the will and of the

deed are the same (see 90, 242). In this respect cursing differs from

contumely and detraction, for in these sins the evils spoken are not

pleasing, but rather displeasing to the speaker (see 2103). Hence, he

who wishes death to his neighbor commits murder in his heart, he who

wishes loss of property is a thief at heart, etc. But if one curses a

neighbor in a general way, without mentioning any particular evil, one

sins by hatred.

2116. Numerical Multiplication in Sins of Cursing.--(a) By reason of

the specific difference in the evils wished (e.g., death, disgrace,

poverty), one is guilty of several sins by one and the same act; for,

though the act is physically one, it is morally many, as was said in

the previous paragraph. But some authors add that only one sin is

committed if all the evils wished are united in the mind as expressions

of the one sin of hate or as means of the one purpose of injury (see

217).

(b) By reason of the different persons cursed, one is also guilty of

several sins by one and the same act, or at least is guilty of one sin

that is equivalent to many; for he who curses a whole family or group,

formally and expressly intends evil to each member, and thus he differs

from a thief who steals from many persons, but does not will individual

injuries (see 218).

2117. The Cursing of Evil.--(a) It is not sinful to curse evil as such,

that is, to wish that sin or wrong may be defeated. Hence, it is lawful

to pray against the evil spirits, the enemies of God and man. But it is

sinful to curse any creature of God, even though he is among the lost,

for the nature of every creature is good, since it comes from God.

(b) It is not sinful to curse evil tropologically, that is, to curse a

creature of God that is taken to represent evil, as being its cause

(e.g., Job cursed the day of his birth, the beginning of many evils),

or location (e.g., David cursed Mount Gelboe, the spot where Saul and

Jonathan were slain), etc. But it would be a sin to curse these

creatures of God in themselves.

2118. It is not sinful to curse an irrational creature on account of

its relation to man, if there is a sufficient reason to curse man

himself (see 2112), either on account of the good of justice (e.g.,

when God cursed the earth as a punishment on Adam, when Christ cursed

the fig-tree as a sign of the curse on Judea), or on account of the

good of utility (e.g., when one wishes that the liquor ordered by a

drunkard may be lost).

2119. Unlawful Cursing of an Irrational Creature.--(a) It is unlawful

to curse an irrational creature, considered precisely as a creature of

God, for in so doing one reflects on God Himself, and incurs the guilt

of blasphemy.

(b) It is unlawful to curse an irrational creature, considered

precisely in relation to man, if there is no just cause to curse man.

Thus, if one wishes that a neighbor’s cattle may die, intending only

the harm that will be done the neighbor, one is guilty of sinful

cursing (see 2113).

precisely in itself, for such an act is vain and useless. Those who

curse the inclemency of the weather, the infertility of the soil, the

stubbornness of mules or other animals, the uselessness of a tool,

etc., do not generally speaking commit a grave sin, since they intend

only to voice their impatience with conditions that are displeasing.

2120. Murmuring.--Murmuring is the expression of unjust discontent or

complaint by inarticulate sounds or by secret words.

(a) It is unjust, and so it does not differ essentially from the sins

of speech given above. If it is an injustice to honor, it is reducible

to contumely; if it is an injury to fame, it pertains to defamation,

etc. The injustice of murmuring results either from the thing

complained of (e.g., a child murmurs against the just orders of its

parents), or from the manner of the complaint (e.g., a subordinate

complains against an unjust order, but angrily, contemptuously, or

uselessly).

(b) It is made by inarticulate sounds (e.g., by whistling, grunting),

or by secret words (e.g., in whispered, inaudible manner). This is an

accidental difference between murmuring and other vocal sins.

2121. Fraud.--Having discussed the various kinds of injustice that are

committed in involuntary commutations, we now pass on to the study of

those injustices that are done in voluntary transactions (see 1748).

These vices can be reduced to the following:

(a) injustices perpetrated against a person who is entirely unwilling

(viz., theft and robbery), as when one steals an object that had been

entrusted to one as a pledge or loan, or compels another, by fear or

violence, to sign a contract unfavorable to himself and which he does

not wish to agree to. It is unnecessary to speak of theft and robbery

in contracts, since the same principles apply to them as to theft and

robbery outside of contracts (see 1890 sqq.);

(b) injustices perpetrated against a person who is partly willing,

since he consents to a contract, but is also partly unwilling, since

unfairness or fraud is used against him. These injuries are of two

general kinds: fraud, a sin committed in buying and selling and other

contracts in which payment is made for some valuable consideration;

usury, a sin committed in the loan of money in which payment is made

for something that is nonexistent.

2122. Definition of Fraud.--By fraud (see 1677-1679) we here understand

any unlawful conduct on the part of one party to a contract that puts

the other party under a disadvantage in agreeing to the contract (e.g.,

misrepresentations about the excellence of merchandise), or that takes

away the equality that should exist between the parties (e.g., an

excessive price charged for merchandise; see 1750). The contract of

sale is the type of all onerous contracts (see 1749), and to it all the

others, whether certain or aleatory, can be reduced, for in every one

of them there is a thing that is purchased (e.g., in aleatory contracts

the hope of securing some prize), and a price that is paid for the

object of purchase. Hence, it will suffice to speak of the frauds that

are committed in sales, and the same principles that govern these can

be applied to other kinds of contract.

2123. Two Kinds of Injustices in Sales.--Equality between the buyer and

the seller requires that each give the other a good equivalent for what

he receives. Hence, the injustices committed in sales are reducible to

two kinds: (a) injustices in the prices charged or paid; (b) injustices

as to the goods furnished or taken.

2124. Injustice Regarding the Price.--Sin is committed in reference to

the price charged as follows:

(a) by fraud, when one of the parties uses deception against the other

party in order to charge more or pay less than is fair; for one who is

party to a contract has the right that no lying or trickery be used

against him, a contract being an agreement to which knowledge and

consent are requisite;

(b) by overcharge or underpayment; for sale has for its purpose the

mutual advantage of the buyer and seller, and hence one of them should

not be overburdened for the advantage of the other, but the burdens and

benefits should be equally distributed. Hence, it is unjust to sell an

object for more than it is worth, or to buy it for less than it is

worth.

2125. The Criteria of a Just Price.--(a) The constitutive norm of a

just price is not merely subjective, that is, the fairness does not

depend on the arbitrary wishes or on the special needs of the

contractants, or on some monopoly which controls the prices; it is

objective, that is, founded on the value of the thing sold, its

capacity to be of benefit and satisfaction to its possessor, its

rarity, the amount of labor put into its production and care, etc.

(b) The manifestative norm for commodities that are in common use (such

as the necessities of life and the more usual luxuries) is the common

judgment expressed either in law (legal price) or in the free custom of

buyers and sellers at a particular place and time (market price); for

objects that are not in common use and that have no settled price

(e.g., rare archeological finds, ancient documents or paintings) the

norm is the prudent and free judgment of the parties, or the decision

of an expert chosen by them.

2126. The Obligation of Observing Prices Settled by Law Or Custom.--(a)

The legal price (e.g., in some countries the prices on government

monopolies, such as tobacco and salt), which in modern times is rare,

is ordinarily obligatory in virtue of commutative justice, since its

disregard harms one of the parties to the sale. But in exceptional

cases the price may for reasons of equity be no longer obligatory

(e.g., when the lawgiver does not insist on its observance).

(b) The market price is ordinarily of like obligation, and for the same

reason. But it should be noted that the current price allows of some

latitude, since the common estimate does not agree on exactly the same

figure, and hence there is a highest, a lowest, and an average price.

Injustice is done when one sells above the highest market price, that

is, when one charges a sum notably in excess of that charged by others

at the same place and time; or when one buys below the lowest market

price, that is, when one pays a sum notably less than that paid by

other buyers. St. Alphonsus gives as a rule that when a commodity is

valued at 5, it may be sold for 6 or bought for 4; when valued at 10,

it may be transferred or acquired for 12 or 8; when valued at 100, it

may be exchanged for 105 or 95.

2127. When the Market Price May Be Disregarded Without Injustice.--In

some exceptional cases one may disregard the market price without

injustice, if there are reasons that justify this.

(a) Reasons that rest on the matter of the contract are that the thing

on sale has increased or decreased in value (e.g., the merchandise is

of extraordinary excellence or rarity), or that the contractant would

lose or risk loss from the sale itself by keeping to the market price

(e.g., the buyer would by his purchase deprive himself of money that

could be used more profitably in another transaction; the article if

sold would have to be replaced by the seller at a higher price; the

vendor by waiting can make a better sale later; the object which a

person wishes to purchase is especially prized by the owner and cannot

be duplicated). In these cases, however, the vendor should give notice

to the buyer that for special reasons a higher price is being asked, so

that the latter may have the choice of going elsewhere, if he prefers.

(b) Reasons that rest on the manner of the contract are that certain

exceptional forms of sales are justified by law or custom and do not

violate basic justice. Auction sales are of this kind, and, if the

conditions of aleatory contracts are observed so that the risk will be

equal on both sides, it is not unfair to take a price above the highest

current price or to bid and buy below the minimum price.

2128. If the reason for the increase is the accommodation of the sale

itself to the purchaser, because he specially prizes the article, does

it justify an increase above the market price?

(a) If the article has become of greater value to many because of its

own worth, the market value has also risen, and one may raise one’s

price; but if its greater value to many is due only to public distress,

as in time of war, it would be a cruel form of injustice known as

profiteering to raise the price exorbitantly.

(b) If the article has become of greater value to one person only, the

seller may not raise his price for that reason, since the special worth

the article has is not inherent in it, and hence it may not be sold by

the owner as if it were his own possession. If, however, the purchaser

wished to add something as a free gift, there would be no objection to

his doing so. The same principles apply to the purchase of an article

at less than its value, for the sole reason that ready money has

special value for the seller.

2129. Unjust Sales Based on Ignorance of Real Value.--There are also

cases in which an object is purchased at an unjust price because its

true value was unknown to the contractants or was hidden.

(a) If the value was unknown on account of substantial error (e.g., a

woman buys paste ornaments, thinking they are genuine diamonds), the

contract is invalid; if it was unknown on account of the individual

error of a contractant (e.g., a woman buys a diamond of great value for

a few dollars, because the seller did not know the value of the jewel),

the contract is unjust; if it was unknown on account of public error

reflected in the current price (e.g., an art dealer buys at a low price

a masterly painting, because his superior judgment enables him to

recognize in it qualities which others did not perceive), the contract

is both valid and just. It is also lawful to buy at the present prices

when one knows from sources that one can honorably use that the objects

purchased will soon rise greatly in value, for one is not bound to

share with others one’s personal knowledge.

(b) If the hidden value is no man’s property or is abandoned (e.g., a

man buys a field in which he, but not the owner, knows that a treasure

is concealed, or he buys a goose and finds gold pieces in its stomach

and cannot discover how they got there), the buyer is entitled to

acquisition; but if it has an owner who can be discovered (e.g., a man

buys a coat in a second-hand store and discovers a large quantity of

money in bills sewed inside the lining, and is able to trace back the

coat to its former wearer, if he tries), the buyer is bound to

restitution.

2130. Obligation of Restitution on Account of Unjust Prices.--(a)

Unjust Possession.--If there was bad faith without fraud, the seller

should restore the difference between what he received and the highest

current price, the buyer the difference between what he paid and the

lowest current price. Overcharges or underpayments in conventional

prices should be compensated for according to a reasonable standard,

such as the decision of the experts.

(b) Unjust Damage.--If there was bad faith and fraud with resultant

damages to one of the parties, the losses should be made good, even

though the just price itself was not violated by excess or defect (see

1762).

obligation of restoration, unless we suppose substantial error, lack of

proper consent, conditional agreement, etc., which make the sale null

or rescindable (see 1725).

2131. Injustice Regarding the Thing Sold.--Having spoken of the

injustices committed in reference to the price, we shall now treat of

the injustices committed in reference to the thing sold. The contract

supposes that the thing sold be of a certain character, and hence

injustice is done if one of the parties wilfully misleads the other

about that character.

(a) Thus, the species of the thing sold enters into the contract, and

so it is unjust to deceive another person about the nature of the thing

that is being sold (e.g., if the seller gives inferior substitutes or

adulterated goods to those who desire the genuine and pure article, or

if the buyer deceives an inexperienced merchant into thinking that the

high-grade clothing material he has for sale is low grade).

(b) The quantity of the thing sold is also a part of the contract, and

it is unjust to take advantage by giving less or taking more than is

agreed on: “Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag, a greater

and a less, neither shall there be in thy house a greater bushel and a

less” (Deut., xxv. 13, 14).

there is fraud if one of the parties deceives the other about it (e.g.,

if the horse sold is sickly or slow, when he is supposed to be healthy

and speedy).

2132. Defects in the Thing Sold.--If there are defects in an article

sold, but a fair reduction in the price is made on account of the

imperfection of the article, there is no injustice in the price. But

the seller is unjust, nevertheless, if he conceals the defects in spite

of a contrary condition in the contract, for he injures the buyer by

leading him into an agreement against his will.

(a) There is an indicated condition when the buyer inquires whether

there are defects in the article, having the intention to take nothing

that has any considerable defect. In such a case if the seller conceals

even an accidental defect (i.e., one that makes the article less

suitable for the buyer), the contract is null on account of lack of

consent, or at least, as others think, it is rescindable on account of

the fraud practised. But if a defect is inconsiderable, the contract,

unless it is expressly stipulated to the contrary, is good and lawful,

for there is hardly anything that has not some small defects.

(b) There is an implied condition when the buyer makes no inquiry, but

there is a substantial defect (i.e., one that makes the article

dangerous or unsuitable for the purchaser), and this defect is hidden,

either because it is of a kind that would escape most persons, or

because the purchaser is inexperienced or unable to perceive it for

himself. Since every person who buys intends to get something useful,

there is no consent and the contract is invalid, if one is given

something harmful (e.g., corrupted or poisonous food instead of good

food), or something entirely useless to him either for service or for

sale (e.g., a lame horse instead of a sound horse for one who deals in

race-horses).

2133. Circumstances in Which Defects Need Not Be Revealed.--Fairness of

price being supposed, the seller is not unjust in not calling attention

to defects in the thing he sells, if the buyer does not ask about

defects and there is no implied condition that the seller should

volunteer the information. This happens as follows:

(a) if the defect is hidden, but only accidental, there is no condition

that the seller shall point out the defect, for the understanding is

only that the buyer shall receive something serviceable at a fair

return for his money, Nevertheless, most merchants wish to please the

public and will take back or exchange an article that is not

satisfactory;

(b) if the defect is open, but accidental, there is no condition that

the seller shall instruct the buyer about things that the latter can

and should observe for himself; for it is supposed that the buyer will

exercise ordinary care and prudence in making purchases, nor is the

seller paid for supplying this, nor for assisting the buyer to make

good bargains. Thus, if a man were to buy a one-eyed horse, because he

had not examined the horse, he should blame his own negligence, not the

silence of the seller, for his bad bargain.

2134. Definition of Trading.--Trading (_negotiatio_) in the strict

sense is the purchase of an object with the intention of selling it

unchanged at a profit. If any one of the conditions mentioned in this

definition are lacking, there is trading in a wide sense. (a) Thus,

trading includes purchase, and hence he who sells the produce of his

own farm or vineyard is not strictly a trader; (b) there must be an

intention of reselling the thing bought, and hence there is trading

only in a wide sense if one buys an article for one’s own use but,

finding it unsuitable to that use, sells it to another person; (c) the

object must be sold unchanged, that is, in the same form in which it

was received, otherwise there is not strict negotiation, as when one

buys colors and canvas and makes them into a picture; (d) the object

must be sold at a higher price than was paid for it, and hence it is

not trading in the strict sense to let a customer have an article for

just what it has cost oneself.

2135. The Morality of Trading in the Strict Sense.--(a) In itself,

trading has the appearance of evil, inasmuch as money-making may be an

encouragement to avarice. But in reality profit as an end is morally

indifferent, neither good nor bad, and all will depend on the ultimate

reason for which one engages in business. He who makes the whole

purpose of his existence the acquisition of gain is a materialist, but

he who has some higher end, such as public benefit or private

maintenance, is virtuous in his aims. (b) For clerics, trading is

forbidden by Canon Law (Canon 142), and the reason is that clerics

should be free from the distractions and dangers of commerce, so as to

devote themselves entirely to their own spiritual duties (II Tim., ii.

4).

2136. Usury.--The sin of usury is committed in two ways.

(a) Usury in the strict sense is the taking of interest by reason of

intrinsic title (i.e., on account of the use) for money or other

fungible loaned on condition that it be restored in kind (_mutuum_).

This is unjust since it exacts payment for that which is nonexistent,

that is, for use, as a distinct value, of a fungible whose only value

is in its use (see Aristotle, _Politics_, Bk. I, Ch. 10, 1258b 2-8; St.

Thomas, Summa Theologica II-II, q. 78, a. 1). This was the opinion of

most medieval theologians based on the fact that money was solely a

medium of exchange. Interest was permitted, however, on the grounds of

extrinsic titles, e.g., compensation for the expense of a transaction

(_damnum emergens_), the loss of opportunity to make good bargains

(_lucrum cessans_).

(b) Usury in the wide sense, which is all too common, is the taking of

interest for a fungible loaned at _mutuum_, where there is an extrinsic

title (e.g., the loss or inconvenience suffered by the lender) for the

interest, but the rate charged is unjust, exceeding that fixed by law

or that which is fair and reasonable (see Canon 1543). This is unjust

when the lender takes more than his loan is worth; it is uncharitable

when the lender does not demand more than the worth of his loan, but

does exact what is due in a heartless manner. Examples of usury in the

wide sense are the acts of loan sharks who take advantage of the

distress of the poor to make them pay enormous interest for small

loans, or who hold the debtor to the strict letter of the agreement at

a great loss to him.

In recent years a new concept of usury in the wide sense has emerged.

It is based upon the fact that in modern times the function of money

has changed. In ancient times it was solely a medium or measure of

exchange that could not be turned easily into capital. With the

emergence of the capitalistic system, opportunities for investment

increased, and money assumed the role of a factor of production. Money

assumed a new value and function: it became virtually productive, and

so today money does fructify. To place money, then, at the disposal of

another to be employed in profitable ventures constitutes an economic

service and, as such, is worth its price as any other service. This

price of money constitutes modern interest, which seems to differ

radically from the old contract of interest and to be more one of hire

or lease. So viewed, interest, or the price of money, is determined in

the same way as the price of any other service; the unjust price, or

usury, is an excessive price. This is the modern concept of usury.

2137. Principles Obligatory in All Forms of Contract.--The principles

of equality and honesty that are morally obligatory in sales and loans

at interest are also obligatory in other forms of contract. The

following are examples of equality.

(a) Gratuitous Contracts.--Obviously these contracts do not require

equality in respect to recompense, since their nature is that no

recompense is given for what is received. But in other ways equality

must be observed. Thus, there must be mutual consent, offer on one side

and acceptance on the other; there must be mutual respect, for each

must honor the gratuitous promises made to the other; there must be a

return of the same thing in quality and quantity as was borrowed,

unless this would mean (as in _mutuum_) a loss to the borrower, etc.

Moreover, the fact that all the advantage is received by one party is

balanced by the fact that this party must bear the ordinary expenses

and is held to special care himself, but cannot exact special care in

the other party. Thus, a borrower has all the advantage from a loan,

and he is obliged to use extreme care in using the lender’s property,

while a depositor has all the advantage from the contract of deposit

and cannot demand more than ordinary diligence of the depositary in

guarding the goods left with him.

(b) Aleatory Contracts.--Aleatory contracts, or contracts of chance,

are concerned with some uncertain event whose outcome depends upon luck

or skill or a combination of both. The chief forms are betting, lottery

and gaming (all are considered as gambling), to which must be added

insurance and market speculations. All of these are indifferent in

themselves and obtain their morality from circumstances. However,

gambling, besides conforming to the requirements of contracts in

general, must observe some special conditions to guarantee its

lawfulness:

1) The outcome should be objectively uncertain and not a “sure thing”

to be truly a contract of chance. While the contractants may be

subjectively certain of winning, neither may so manipulate the matter

as to exclude the other’s chance of winning. Should one insist upon

betting against another’s assurance of a certain outcome, he is making

a gift, hardly a bet.

2) Each must stake what belongs to himself and is not needed for

satisfying other obligations, e.g., supporting one’s family, paying

creditors, etc. Failure to observe this condition leads to many sins of

theft or negligence. Should a person gamble with money belonging to

another, _per se_ he has a right to the winnings under the title of

industrial fruits. However, if it would be impossible for him to

restore in the event of a loss, the wager is void and the winnings must

be restored to the other player, since the amount bet could not be

lawfully won by the other contestant.

3) A reasonable proportion should be observed between what is bet and

the probable winnings, and all betting should offer a fair chance of

winning. Equality is not necessary, but odds and handicaps should be

offered by the favored side. However, the odds may be waived by other

bettors.

4) Honesty must prevail to exclude fixing the outcome or an unlawful

style of play. The conventions of each bet or game establish the norms

of cheating. Thus, hidden cards, marked cards, false dice void a bet.

But running a horse solely to “tighten him” or “round him into shape”

without full effort to win is expected in horse racing. Winnings

through cheating must be refunded.

5) The loser must pay. Since civil law forbids many forms of organized

gambling, the question arises whether a wager that has been outlawed

constitutes matter for a valid contract that must be fulfilled. If the

law is purely penal, the contract is valid and the obligations ensue;

if it is a law that binds morally, then the contract is invalid, and

the loser probably need not pay, but has acted sinfully in gambling.

Although not sinful in itself, gambling is so open to serious abuse

that it has been strictly regulated by civil laws which bind in

conscience.

Insurance is reduced to the category of contracts of chance, although

its purpose is different from gambling, for it is concerned not with an

uncertain good, i.e., to make money quickly, but with an uncertain evil,

i.e., to avoid loss. In many instances an individual who does not take

out insurance gambles more than one who does.

Conditions Requisite for Validity. The special conditions requisite for

the validity of an insurance contract are founded upon its aleatory

nature. This involves especially that the matter of the contract is in

some way outside the control of both insured and insurer and beyond

their power, both legal and moral, to govern beforehand. From this

follows the second essential condition, that there be some risk for

both parties. Some moralists today maintain that many insurance

contracts are unjust to the insured by reason of defect of

proportionate risk on the part of the insurer. They argue that the

insurer avoids all risks and makes increasing profits annually whenever

insurance is on such a large scale that the use of statistical tables

favors the insurer. The fact that insurance companies are listed among

the most wealthy corporations lends credence to the argument and

explains why some moralists favor the insured in cases of restitution

not involving fraud on the part of the beneficiary. Other moralists

insist that such injustice can not be proved, that high profits are

owing to increased efficiency and better service, that premiums are

adjusted when it becomes apparent that they are out of proportion to

the risks involved by the insurers.

On the part of the insurer is required the ability to pay indemnities

occurring at the normal rate, but not to cover all at once. His right

to the premiums is correlative to the obligation to pay the stipulated

indemnities, while his liabilities are based upon probable losses

occurring successively. In regard to the insured, his basic obligation

is to make an honest and complete disclosure of the risk involved.

Moral cases, for the most part, are concerned with error, innocent

misrepresentation, and fraud on the part of the insured. Both the

natural and civil law indicate the effect of these elements on an

insurance contract.

The natural law invalidates a contract in which consent of one or both

parties arises from substantial error concerning the nature or the

matter of the contract--in insurance, the risk involved. In general,

then, whenever the error of the insured is such that he would not have

contracted had he known the facts, the contract is invalid, even if the

error was due to innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation on the

part of the insured. In such cases, the innocent insured has no right

to the indemnity owing to the invalidity of the contract; he has,

however, a natural right to all premiums paid out, since no contract is

involved and the insurer has no claim to them. In case of fraud, at

least after judicial decision, the insured would have no right to the

premiums and must also recompense the insurer for expenses sustained.

Error is considered accidental and as not invalidating in natural law

when the insurer, knowing the facts, would have issued a policy, but at

a higher premium. In this case the beneficiary may accept the

indemnity, but must return the difference in the amount owed in

premiums.

A special case of substantial error involving a disease unknown to the

insured and undiscovered or undiscoverable by the insurance company

doctors is considered by moralists as not invalidating a contract in

natural law. It is argued that the insurer must assume such risks and

that the insured intends to cover such unknown conditions. Moreover, an

invalidating clause concerning such a contingency may be considered

penal in nature and obligatory only after the sentence of a judge.

Insurance contracts and the civil laws governing them are so

complicated that expert legal knowledge is required to understand the

legal status of many insurance cases. However, a few dispositions of

the civil law which differ from the tenets of the natural law should be

kept in mind by the priest or confessor in dealing with the matters.

Two favor the insurance companies over the insured:

1) when fraud or misrepresentation lead to accidental error, the

contract is declared void or voidable;

2) innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation in good faith leading

to accidental error also render the insurance contract voidable or

perhaps even void. It is probable that the beneficiary in such cases

might be permitted to claim the benefits due him according to the

naturally valid contract, since these civil law dispositions are

contrary to the conclusions of the natural law. He would be obliged,

however, to restitution for damages caused by his fraud or

misrepresentation committed with grave theological fault.

One prescription recognized by civil law and in some places made

mandatory favors the insured, the convalidating or incontestability

clause. The insurance company recognizes the validity of the policy

after a specified period of time has elapsed, even in cases involving

fraud on the part of the insured. If the contract prior to the time was

voidable, the company loses its right to contest its validity; if the

contract was void, it becomes convalidated. By terms of this clause,

the natural-law obligation to restore by reason of fraud ceases and the

beneficiary may lawfully keep the insurance money.

Obligations Arising after the Policy Is Issued. 1) The insured must pay

the premiums at the times and according to the terms stated in the

policy.

2) The insured must not increase the risk assumed by the company.

Concretely, in cases of property insured, the insured is bound in

commutative justice not to deliberately destroy or damage the property

covered by the policy under penalty of losing all rights to

compensation. Compensation could be claimed, however, if the damaging

or destructive action was only theologically right.

3) He must not claim or accept indemnity for articles not damaged; he

must not submit a claim beyond a just estimate of the real damage. Some

moralists maintain that a claim may be made for a higher amount with

the intention of getting a just value after the insurance adjustor has

made his investigation and lowered the estimated value. The adjustor’s

estimate, even if higher than the insured estimate, may be accepted

provided no means have been taken to prevent a full and free

examination of damage.

Operations on the stock market and similar markets are primarily

contracts of buying and selling; they become contracts of chance when

they assume the quality of speculation, i.e., gambling on future

changes of prices. It is generally conceded that such contracts are not

morally wrong in themselves and follow the laws of betting. Additional

justification is added on the ground that such transactions in many

instances supply the capital required for large-scale operations,

future deliveries, etc. Occasional dissenting voices insist that

certain aspects of such transactions, e.g., dealing in future values of

wheat, rye, and other commodities, are immoral since they tend to

determine prices independent of the real value of the products, the

laws of supply and demand, etc. However, the arguments seem to involve

more abuses controllable, if not actually controlled, by marketing laws

and civil laws rather than any immorality in the operations themselves.

between the recompense and the thing received. Thus, in a lease the

lessor must not charge excessive rent, and the lessee must pay the rent

faithfully; in a contract of labor, the employer must pay a fair wage

(that is, one that at the minimum will meet the primary needs of the

worker and his family to live in frugal comfort, and which will

moreover equal the special value of the service given; for a complete

treatment of the theology of the just wage, see Fr. Jeremiah Newman,

“The Just Wage,” _Theology Digest_, Vol. 2, Spring 1957, pp. 120-126,

and “A Note on the Living Wage,” by Edward Dui, S.J., in the same

issue), and the laborer on his part must give a fair day’s work as to

quantity and quality; in partnership, the members must divide the

profits and loss according to a reasonable distribution; in guaranty,

pledge, and mortgage, justice requires that the burden assumed be not

out of proportion to the benefit that is received.

2138. Fraudulent Contracts.--Examples of fraud in contracts are the

following:

(a) in gratuitous contracts, a donee who by false representations

obtains a gift, a lender who fails to make known to the borrower

defects or dangers in the thing loaned;

(b) in onerous contracts, a landlord who conceals defects from one who

is renting a house, members of a business concern who keep back

information from partners or who give out false statements in order to

entice investors, creditors who conceal their knowledge about the

unreliability of a man for whom surety is given them;

thing supposed to be uncertain but about which he has certain

information, or who knows that he will be unable to pay should he lose,

or who will allow no odds though he knows that the probabilities are in

his favor; in gaming, a player who pretends to be ignorant in order to

inveigle another person into a game of skill, or who does not observe

the rules of the game, or who fixes the cards or dice for himself in a

game of chance; in lottery, a drawer who manipulates the lots so as to

favor some of the players, etc.

Art. 5: THE QUASI-INTEGRAL AND POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE

OF RELIGION AND THE OPPOSITE VICES

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 79-100.)

2139. The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice.--The integral parts of a

virtue are certain functions necessary for the perfect use of the

virtue; for example, memory, perception, docility and quickness are

needed for the fullest exercise of prudence (see 1648 sqq.). These

parts are called here “quasi-integral,” so as not to be confused with

the properly integral parts, or divisions of quantity, in a material

composite. In its first use “integral part” is spoken of bodily things;

in its derived use of incorporeal things (such as virtues). The two

previous articles treated the subjective parts of justice; the present

article will begin with a consideration of the integral parts and the

opposite sins.

2140. The integral parts of justice are expressed in the words of Psalm

xxxiii. 15--“Turn away from evil, and do good”--for the perfectly just

man will both establish the equality of justice by giving others their

dues, and will preserve that equality by refraining from injuries.

(a) Thus, these integral parts are acts of virtue, and hence the

avoidance of evil here is not a purely negative attitude; it includes a

positive repudiation by the will of all wish to harm others, and it is

exercised especially when one is attacked and yet refuses to resort to

injustice.

(b) These integral parts of justice are also distinct, one from the

other. The other moral virtues regulate the passions by bringing them

to the moderation that lies midway between two evil extremes, and hence

in respect to those virtues to turn away from evil is the same thing as

to do good. But justice regulates human operations and external things

both by reducing them to due equality and also by avoiding that which

upsets the equality, and thus in the matter of justice it is one thing

to do good, another thing to avoid evil.

distinct from other virtues. For, while every virtue turns away from

evil and does good, the two acts we are now considering do these things

with the express purpose of fulfilling justice. Thus, he who observes

the commands and prohibitions of the law in order to render to God and

the common good their dues, is perfect in general or legal justice; he

who gives to other individuals what is owed them and also avoids doing

them injury, is perfect in particular justice. To the two integral

parts of justice are opposed the two sins of transgression and omission

(see 35-39).

2141. The Potential Parts of Justice.--The potential parts of justice,

that is, its annexed virtues, are those good habits that are subsidiary

to justice, partaking in some degree, but not entirely, of its nature

or activity. We saw above (1664 sqq.) that wise deliberation and wise

decision belong to prudence, inasmuch as they are concerned with the

government of conduct by reason, but that they fall short of its

principal act, which is wise direction, and hence they are counted as

potential parts. In like manner, there are a number of virtues which

must be assigned to justice, since they regulate man’s will towards

others, but which must be considered as its potential parts, because

they do not share in one or the other of the two remaining essential

notes of strict justice, namely, that a return is given which is equal

to a debt, and that the debt is owed on account of a strict or legal

right (see 1692).

2142. In the following enumeration are given the chief potential parts

of justice in which there is a strict debt, but not an equal repayment.

(a) Thus, to God man owes whatever honor and veneration he manifests,

but with all his efforts man can never pay to God a worship that is

equal to the debt. Thus, man cannot sufficiently thank God for His

benefits: “What return can I make to the Lord for all that He has done

for me?” (Psalm cxv. 12). The virtue of religion, therefore, is a

potential part of justice.

(b) To parents children cannot make a full return for the benefits of

life and upbringing, and the same may be said of one’s country: “A due

return is out of the question in honors paid to the gods and to parents

... but a person is considered to be virtuous if he pays such regard

as lies within his power” (Aristotle, _Ethics_, lib. VIII, cap. 16).

Hence, the virtue of piety is also a potential part of justice. In

exceptional cases, however, a child may make an equal or even a greater

return to his parents for the benefits received from them; for example,

by saving his father from death he makes an equal return for the

benefit of life, and by converting his parents to the faith he gives

them spiritual life, which is more valuable than the natural life he

received from them.

good they do us by their instruction and example, and hence the honor

we show them is less than the benefit we receive from them. The virtue

of reverence (_observantia_) is then a potential part of justice.

2143. Degrees of Moral Debt.--The remaining potential parts of justice

are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some

law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the

greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.

(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one

cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the

character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from

the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and

deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue

of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor

to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of gratitude to him

for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of

gratitude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are

readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular

justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on

the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions

has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social

intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral

obligation, one imposed by God but not enforced legally. Compensation

for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the

debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other

benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account

of ingratitude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an

act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private

person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but

lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.

(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can

preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of

virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friendship or

affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and

to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because

of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better

for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all.

Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to

money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to

others willingly and generously. Without friendship and liberality the

peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with

them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and

distinction.

2144. Epieikeia.--The above-mentioned potential parts of justice are

adjuncts of particular justice. There remains one more virtue to be

noted, that of epieikeia or equity, which pertains to legal justice.

This is a subjective part of justice, since it is the superior function

of legal justice, guiding it to follow what is substantial right, and

preserving it from the danger of mere legalism or over-strict

interpretation or application of Written law (see 358). With this, the

crowning virtue of justice, the enumeration of its parts is brought to

a close.

2145. The Virtue of Religion.--We shall now proceed to treat of the

various parts of justice in the order in which they were given above

(2142-2144), beginning with the virtue that renders to God His due.

Religion (holiness) is defined as “a moral virtue that disposes us to

offer to God the worship and honor that belong to Him as the supreme

Author of all things.”

(a) Thus, religion is a moral virtue, for, though it tends towards God,

it is not numbered among the theological virtues, but among the moral

virtues, being one of the potential parts of justice.

(b) It is an inclination, that is, it is a habit of the soul or the

exercise of that habit in some act. The acts of religion are either

elicited by it or commanded by it, according as they are its own proper

activities and proceed directly from it and are directed immediately to

God (e.g., acts of adoration, sacrifice, prayer), or belong to some

other virtue employed by religion for the honor of God; for example, to

visit the widows and orphans in their tribulation is an act of mercy,

to keep oneself unspotted from this world is an act of temperance, but

when used for the honor and glory of God these acts are also acts of

religion (James, i. 27).

(e) It is paid to God, that is, being an act of justice, it renders to

another what is His due. Religious honor given the saints or sacred

images refers to God, for whose sake they are venerated.

(d) It is paid to God as the Supreme Being, that is, just as we are

bound to tend to God and to serve Him, because He is our Last End, so

are we bound to honor Him, because He is our Maker and Ruler.

(e) It offers to God the tribute of worship, that is, some internal or

external work done in acknowledgment of God’s Majesty and with the

purpose of impressing the worshipper or others with the sense of His

greatness, or it is the sense of that greatness.

2146. Religion as a Moral Virtue.--(a) Religion takes its rank among

the moral, not among the theological, virtues. A theological virtue has

the Last End for its immediate object or subject-matter (e.g., faith is

concerned directly with God, since it believes Him and in Him), and has

no mean of virtue (e.g., faith cannot go to extremes by believing God

too much); whereas a moral virtue has the means to God for its

immediate object (e.g., justice is concerned directly with the actions

we owe to others) and it must observe the golden mean (e.g., justice

must pay the just price, neither more nor less, and at the proper time,

place, and to the proper person, etc.). Now, it is clear that religion

has for its immediate object the due performance of worship, although

God is the person for whose sake it is offered and His excellence the

foundation of its necessity; and also that one must observe moderation

in worship as to circumstances of place, time, etc., although it is

impossible to be extreme in the quantity or fervor one gives to

worship, since even the best efforts will fall short of the honor God

deserves (Ecclus., xliii. 33).

(b) Religion is the greatest of the moral virtues, since the person in

whose favor it is exercised is God Himself, and its obligation is

correspondingly stricter than that of the other virtues. General and

particular justice are owed to creatures, but the claim of a creature

is much less than that of God. There is no contradiction in making

religion a part of justice and then preferring it to justice, for it is

more correct to speak of the integral and potential parts of virtues as

quasi-parts, since they are called parts only from analogy to parts

that are found in material or living things, though they are not

similar to those parts in all respects (see 1647, 1648, 2139). Neither

does the fact that religion cannot pay in full make it inferior to

justice, since in matters of virtue good will take precedence over the

ability to pay. Since religion is the supreme moral virtue, irreligion

is the chief offense against the moral virtues (e.g., malicious

blasphemy is worse than injustice or intemperance).

2147. Superiority of Religion as a Virtue.--Religion, therefore, is

superior to the following virtues: (a) it is superior to legal justice,

the chief of the moral virtues that deal with human and natural good;

(b) it is superior to humility, the chief of the moral virtues

moderative of the passions; (c) it is superior to mercy, the greatest

of the virtues that relieve distress, for religion is offered to God,

not for His utility, but for His external glory and our benefit; (d) it

is greater than repentance, for it honors God, while repentance only

disposes or prepares for satisfaction to His honor; (e) it is greater

than large external offerings made to God without spirit, for

“obedience is better than victims” (I Kings, xv. 22); that is, the

internal acts of religion (reverence and devotion) are of more

importance than external acts of worship conducted with great pomp or

magnificence but without the inner reverence, the obedience or other

dispositions pleasing to God.

2148. Necessity of the Acts of Religion.--(a) The internal acts

(devotion and prayer) are chiefly necessary, for these are exercised by

the soul, and it is through them that the external acts are made

truthful: “God is a spirit and those who adore Him must adore in spirit

and in truth” (John, iv. 24).

(b) The external acts (adoration, sacrifice, etc.) are also necessary

to man. God does not need these acts (Psalm xlix. 13), it is true, for

no creature can add to the glory God has from Himself. But man needs

the elevation and perfection which he receives from communication with

the Supreme Being, and, as he is not all spirit, he must employ symbols

and ceremonies to arouse, hold and strengthen the affections of his

soul. Hence, although the ceremonial law of the Old Testament was

abolished by Christ (see 342), the Christian religion recognizes the

need of ceremonies, as is plain both from the Scriptures and the

teaching and practice of the Church at all times. In the New Testament

we read that Our Lord used vocal prayer, prayed on His knees, and made

use of sacred hymns; and like external acts of religion are ascribed to

Sts. Peter, Paul, and Stephen (Luke, xxii. 31; Matt., xxvi. 39; Acts,

ii. 42, vii. 59, ix. 40). Public worship is also a necessity on account

of the nature of the Church as a visible society.

2149. The Internal Acts of Religion.--These internal acts are offerings

made to God of the worship of the soul itself, and they may be reduced

chiefly to two: (a) devotion, which is the offering of the will and the

highest act of religion, since from the will the other acts arise; (b)

prayer, which is the offering of the intellect; for in prayer the

thoughts of the mind rise to God as an oblation made to Him.

2150. Definition of Devotion.--Devotion is defined as “the will to give

oneself readily to those things that pertain to the divine service.” We

find an example of it in Exod., xxxv. 21, where it is said that the

multitude offered first fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout

mind. One who is devoted to another is strongly attached to that

other’s interests, and so one who is devout is zealous for the service

of God.

(a) Thus, devotion is an act of the will, that is, an offering of

oneself to the service of God, the Last End. But devotion will be found

in other acts in so far as they are done under the will’s impulse, such

as prayer, adoration, sacrifice. The looks, gestures, and voice of

those who pray or take part in services of divine worship are

influenced by internal devotion, and so become fitting expressions of

honor shown to God and an inspiration to beholders.

(b) Devotion contains a ready willingness, that is, the devout person

is quick to choose the divine honor as a purpose, quick also to select

and to employ suitable means for this purpose. The great model of this

is Our Lord, who declared that His very food was to serve His Father

(John, iv. 34).

that is, to the worship or honor of God. Thus, he who offers himself to

God intending the offering as an act of spiritual union or friendship

exercises the virtue of charity, while he who forms the intention of

doing good in order to glorify God exercises devotion. But devotion and

charity are not separated, for charity inspires devotion and devotion

nourishes charity.

2151. Devotion should not be confused with emotion, spiritual

consolation, or pious exercises known as devotions.

(a) Thus, emotion or pleasure of a non-religious kind is not devotion,

though sometimes mistaken for it when the emotion or pleasure is of an

elevating kind and occasioned by religious exercises. Neither esthetic

joy (e.g., over the music, the ceremonies, the architecture of the

church), nor literary pleasure (e.g. over a sublime passage of Holy

Writ or a charming liturgical composition), nor intellectual

satisfaction (e.g., over the refinement and culture imparted by

religious truths), is necessarily joined with that strong attachment to

God and inclination to do His will which is the soul of devotion.

(b) Spiritual consolations are sometimes called devotion, but they are

not the same thing as the devotion we now speak of. Substantial

devotion with which we are now concerned is in the will and consists in

the strong inclination to praise and honor God, whereas accidental

devotion is rather in the sensible appetite and consists in a feeling

of sweetness or elevation in exercises of piety which sometimes reacts

upon the body, as when a devout person weeps for joy at the thought of

God. Substantial devotion is essential and should be maintained, even

though there is no feeling of attraction or fervor. An example of this

is furnished by Our Lord, who prayed earnestly during the agony in the

garden and the desolation on the cross. Accidental devotion is not of

itself evil, nor useless, and it may be desired and prayed for; but it

is dangerous for those persons who are puffed up by it, or who become

inordinately attached to it, or who are disposed to mistake it for

substantial devotion, for, like the consoling vision of Thabor, it is

passing and is not an end in itself.

the Blessed Virgin, the Saints, celebrated shrines, etc., whether of a

liturgical or a popular, of a public or a private kind. Examples are

the Forty Hours’ Devotion, novenas, consecrated days and months, the

use of scapulars, medals, etc., pilgrimages, and the like. All these

devotions that have the approval of the Church are good and useful in

themselves. But devotees often made a bad use of them, substituting

devotions for devotion and the non-essential for the essential, as when

religion is made to center in pictures or music or a sentimental

attachment for some favorite Saint. Persons who multiply external

observances may be without the least degree of real devotion.

2152. External and Internal Cause of Devotion.--The external cause of

devotion is God, who by grace bestows the will of serving Him gladly,

and therefore the Church prays God to bestow upon us the disposition of

piety and devotion, and to increase in us devotion unto salvation. But

there is also an internal cause, namely, mental prayer or consideration

of divine things, for the will follows on the intellect. Hence, it is

impossible to animate external acts of worship with true devotion,

unless one practises daily or frequent mental prayer. The subjects of

mental prayer that promote devotion are reducible to two:

(a) one should think on one’s own weakness (sins, dangers, temptations,

etc.) and one’s need of God, for this serves to remove the impediments

to devotion. Those who would be devoted to God must free themselves

from presumption and self-confidence in the spirit of the pilgrim going

up to the Temple who said; “I will raise my eyes to the mountains from

which help cometh to me” (Psalm cxx, 1);

(b) one should think on points that will excite the love of God, such

as the thought of His goodness, the memory of His benefits, the

mysteries of the life of Christ; for these considerations by inspiring

charity will thereby indirectly introduce devotion to God. “It is good

for me to cling fast to God and to place my hope in the Lord,” said the

Psalmist, after he had thought over the blessings received from

Providence (Psalm lxxii. 28).

2153. Prayer.--Prayer can be taken in various senses. (a) Thus, in the

widest sense prayer is any act of religion or a holy life. St.

Augustine says that a good life is the best of all prayers, and the

command of Christ that we pray always has been understood to mean that

we should always follow good. (b) In a less wide sense, prayer is the

raising of the mind to God, in order to praise, adore, thank Him, etc.

The motive of veneration here present distinguishes prayer from mere

thoughts about God as when one studies or discusses theological

subjects to satisfy curiosity or to impart information.

God. By suitable things are meant such as are lawful and becoming, and

hence it would not be a prayer, but a mockery, to ask God for help to

accomplish sin or for miracles in trivial matters. We are now

considering prayer in its strict and less wide senses.

2154. The Psychology of Prayer.--(a) Prayer in its nature is an act of

the reason, for it is a conversation or communication with God. It

belongs, however, not to the speculative, but to the practical reason,

since it is not a mere process of apprehension, judgment or reasoning,

but the arrangement and presentation of requests, plans, etc., before

God with a view to their acceptance by Him. By prayer, then, we do not

understand thinking on God, as in meditation and contemplation (though

these are known as mental prayer), but speaking to God.

(b) Prayer in its origin is an act of the will, for the practical

reason presents before God only such things as are desired by him who

prays. Prayer is the interpreter of desire. Indeed, God may take the

will for the request and grant what has not yet been asked: “The Lord

heard the desire of the poor” (Ps. ix. 17); “Before they cry I shall

hear them” (Is., lxv. 24). Moreover, prayer should spring out of an

inclination towards God Himself and a desire for union with Him (Ps.

xli. 1. 2; Ps. xxvi. 4).

2155. The Necessity of Prayer.--(a) Prayer is not necessary on God’s

account, as though He needed to be informed of our wants, or could not

be happy without our homage, or might be induced to change His plans;

(b) it is necessary for our own sakes, for, although God could and

sometimes does grant favors unasked, He wishes that ordinarily we

should have the double benefit of the prayer and of the favor given in

answer to the prayer. God could grant the crops of the fields without

human cultivation, or even tools and finished articles without human

invention or labor, but man would then lose the fruits that belong to

labor of mind and body. Prayer is most beneficial, even when

unanswered: it attracts man to perform his basic duty of honoring his

Creator, to keep in use his spiritual powers, and to exercise the

necessary virtues of faith, hope and charity; it gives him the

privilege of speaking directly with God and with Christ and of asking

for what he desires--an intimacy that must in time correct and elevate

man’s whole spiritual life; then prayer is a pouring out of the heart

to God the Heavenly Father, and this will afford relief in times of

misfortune or peril.

2156. The Duty of Prayer for all Adults.--(a) Prayer is necessary from

divine precept, as is declared in many passages of Scripture. Thus, we

are commanded to watch and pray (Matt, xxvi. 41), to pray always and

not to faint (Luke, xviii. 1), to ask and to knock (Matt., vii. 7

sqq.), to pray without ceasing (I Thess., v. 17), to watch in prayers

(I Peter, iv. 7). In the Mass the Lord’s Prayer is prefaced with the

words: “Commanded by salutary precepts and admonished by divine

instructions, we make bold to say: Our Father, etc.” There is, however,

no divine precept of vocal prayer or as to the use of the form of words

given by Christ, but one must pray at least mentally and in the manner

indicated by Christ.

(b) Prayer is also necessary as a means (see 360), at least generally

speaking; not that God could not save man without prayer, but that He

has made it an indispensable condition, as is true also of Baptism,

without which salvation is not conferred. This is the common opinion

and it rests on strong arguments. Thus, there are certain necessary

goods (such as perseverance) that cannot be had except through prayer,

and there are certain necessary duties (such as the acts of faith,

charity, and religion) that are not exercised apart from prayer. Then,

there is the teaching of the Church and of the Fathers and Doctors that

prayer is needed in order to observe the Commandments (Council of

Trent), that no one is assisted who does not pray (Gennadius), that

prayer is to the soul what breath is to the body (St. Benedict), that

he who prays will certainly be saved, while he who prays not will

surely be lost (St. Alphonsus).

2157. Times and Frequency of Prayer.--As to the times and frequency of

prayer, in fulfillment of the obligation, there are the same opinions

and conclusions as for the acts of faith, hope, and charity (see 929

sqq., 1095-1097, 1593 sqq.). On this point we may conclude as follows:

(a) directly, or by reason of the precept of prayer itself, there is a

duty to pray at the beginning of the moral life, frequently during life

(whether daily, weekly, monthly, yearly, etc. cannot be precisely

determined; but there is no practical difficulty, since those who

devoutly hear Mass at the times commanded comply with the duty of

prayer), and also in danger of death. At the outset of the moral life

the reason and will should turn to God, and this is prayer at least in

the widest sense; during life prayer should be frequent and continuous

according to the words of Scripture; at the hour of death, prayer is

necessary, since we are specially bidden to ask for perseverance till

the end;

(b) indirectly, or by reason of some precept distinct from that of

prayer, prayer is necessary whenever one needs to have recourse to God

to fulfill some command or avoid something prohibited. Thus, one should

pray at Mass, for according to church law Mass must be heard devoutly;

one should pray when a dangerous temptation assails one, or when there

are great calamities, especially of a public character, for according

to the precept of charity one must help oneself and others in

difficulties.

2158. Practical Corollaries about Prayer with Reference to

Confession.--(a) Practical Catholics, that is, those who comply with

the precepts of the Church, but who accuse themselves of neglecting

morning and evening prayers or grace at meals, cannot be judged guilty

of sin, even of venial sin, on account of this neglect; for there is no

common precept directly obliging to such prayers. But there may often

be a venial sin for other reasons, as when the omission is due to a

spirit of lukewarmness, or when indirectly there is a duty to pray at

those times for special reasons, such as daily needs or temptations. We

do not agree, then, with the opinion that omission of morning and

evening prayers, especially when it is habitual, is never sufficient

matter for absolution.

(b) Unpractical Catholics, that is, those who have been away from Mass

or the Sacraments contrary to the laws of the Church as habitual

transgressors, and who say nothing about their neglect of prayer,

should be questioned whether in all the years of absence from their

duties they have also omitted all prayers. For, if this be the case,

they have sinned against the duty of prayer. Morning and evening prayer

and grace at table should be earnestly recommended to all, because

these are customs that have come down from the earliest times, and also

because those who disregard them often come to neglect all prayer, or

at least expose themselves to dangers or to the loss of precious graces.

2159. To Whom May Prayer Be Offered?--Only God may be addressed as the

Bestower of favors (“The Lord giveth grace and glory,” Ps. lxxxiii.

12), but the Saints may be prayed to as intercessors before God (“The

smoke of incense of the prayers of the saints ascended up before God

from the hands of the angel,” Apoc., viii. 4). Hence, the Church asks

God to have mercy on us; it asks the Saints to pray for us. It is

lawful privately to invoke the prayers of an infant who died after

baptism, of a soul in Purgatory, and one may ask the prayers of those

who are still alive, as St. Paul frequently does in his Epistles. There

is no command that we pray to the saints, and hence one who did not

pray to them would not be guilty of grave sin _per se_; but there would

be grave sin, if their intercession was neglected on account of

contempt, and venial sin, if one failed to call on them (especially on

the Blessed Virgin, the Mediatrix of all graces) on account of

negligence about one’s own spiritual good.

2160. The Persons for Whom Prayer Is Offered.--There is an obligation

of charity to pray for ourselves and also for others, for we should ask

for the things that we are obliged to desire (see 2161). This duty is

taught in Holy Scripture (e.g., Our Lord prayed for Peter; St. Paul

asks for the prayers of his Churches; St. James, in v. 16, admonishes

us to pray for one another that we may be saved); also in the creed and

liturgy of the Church, for we profess belief in the communion of

saints, and offer Masses and suffrages for the living and the dead. One

should pray for enemies in common prayers that are offered for all, and

in special prayers for them in particular, when there is a special

reason, such as their grave necessity or the scandal that would be

given if one refused to join in a special prayer for one’s enemy

(Matt., v. 44); but one may not pray for the success of the evil

projects of an enemy, and one is not obliged to make special prayers

for him apart from necessity (see 1151). For the excommunicated one

should pray in private prayers and also in public prayers, when this is

permitted by the law, as in the services of Good Friday and under

certain conditions in Masses (Canon 2262). For sinners prayers should

be said, unless they are already lost. The souls in Purgatory are also

to be prayed for, although the obligation does not seem grave, since it

is not certain as to any particular soul that it is in need of our

prayers. As to the blessed, one may pray for their canonization or

accidental glory, not for their essential glory, which they already

possess.

2161. Things that May Be Prayed for.--(a) Evils.--One may never pray

for moral evil, even of the slightest kind, and it would be a grave

irreverence to beseech God to become our helper in the commission of

sin. As to physical evils, one may not ask them as evils or for their

own sake; but it is lawful to pray for them in the larger sense in

which they are goods. Thus, for oneself one may ask from God sickness,

poverty or death, in so far as these ills are means of correction,

improvement, merit, penance, or escape from sin; for an enemy one may

ask that God restrain him, even by the use of temporal misfortunes, if

this be necessary to keep him from sin.

(b) Indifferent Things.--One may not desire an indifferent thing, if

there is no moral purpose to justify it (see 83). Hence, one may not

ask God for the gratification of idle wishes (e.g., that one win a game

in which the only purpose in gain), but it does not seem that there is

grave irreverence in so doing.

intention, since we must seek first the kingdom of God and His justice

(Matt., vi. 33), which are more important; neither may we ask for any

determinate temporal thing unconditionally, since we are uncertain

whether it will prove beneficial or harmful. But temporal things may be

asked for from a secondary intention (that is, in so far as they are

means that assist us to attain spiritual goods) and conditionally (that

is, under the proviso that they will prove spiritually beneficial).

Thus, the Church prays for protection against storms and disturbances,

and asks for good weather, abundant harvests, peace, etc.

(d) Spiritual Goods.--Eternal salvation and the means thereto we should

pray for as the principal objects of our desire and should ask for them

unconditionally; for God is our true End, and the things that lead to

Him cannot be harmful to us. Miracles may be asked for, but it is wrong

to beg God for privileges that are reserved for others (e.g., to sit at

the right hand of Christ in glory).

2162. The Qualities of Prayer.--(a) As to its manner, prayer is either

unaccompanied or accompanied by external acts of worship, such as

bodily gestures or speech. But not infrequently the thoughts are voiced

in words, and we then have what is known as vocal prayer. Prayer made

by a private person for himself or others may be internal; but public

prayer that is offered by the ministers of the Church in the name of

the Church should be vocal, since it should be manifested to the people

for whom it is being offered. But the use of words or other external

signs is advantageous even in private prayer, since it excites greater

devotion in a person and is a help to attention.

(b) As to persistence, prayer is continuous or interrupted. Prayer

should be continuous if there is question of its cause, which is

prayerfulness of spirit, or desire of salvation; and in this sense may

be understood the words of Scripture that command us to pray always

(Luke, xviii. 1; Eph., vi. 18; I Thess., v. 17 ), But if we speak of

prayer itself, it is impossible to pray unceasingly in this life, as

there are many other things that have to be done and rest is a

necessity.

belief of the pagans that the efficacy of prayer depends on many words

(Matt, vi. 7), but He did not forbid long prayers, since He often spent

nights in prayer. The rule about the length of private prayers is that

one should pray for such a space of time as is favorable to devotion,

and should cease from prayer as soon as it becomes tedious; similarly,

public devotions should not be so lengthened out that those present

become wearied and inattentive. The Fathers of the Desert were wont to

offer many brief but ardent ejaculatory prayers, fearing that prayer

long drawn out would fall away from the fervor of intention with which

it began. But, if devotion continues, prayer should not easily be

broken off.

2163. The Confidence Requisite for Successful Prayer.--(a) Confidence

must exclude doubt or distrust in reference to God or prayer itself:

“How shall they call on Him whom they have not believed?” (Rom., X.

14); “Let not that man (that wavereth) think that he shall receive

anything of the Lord” (James, i. 6, 7).

(b) Confidence does not exclude doubt about one’s own dispositions (“It

is not for our justice that we present our prayers before Thee, but for

the multitude of Thy tender mercies”); on the contrary, the prayer of

the Pharisee was not heard, because he trusted in himself (Luke, xviii.

9). Neither does confidence in prayer mean that one may ask

unconditionally for temporal things (see 2161 c).

2164. Intention and Attention.--Attention is the voluntary application

of the mind to that which is done, or the consideration or advertence

of the mind given to an act. It differs from intention, which is an

act, not of the reason, but of the will, consisting in the purpose to

perform an act. Prayer requires both intention and attention.

(a) There must be intention, for prayer in its origin is an act of the

will and it pertains to religion only because of the devotion by means

of which it is elicited. A man who, while reading aloud from a novel,

recites the words of a prayer contained in the novel, does not pray,

for his intention is pleasure or instruction, not worship. And even one

who says or answers prayers attentively during services does not really

pray if his motive is not one of religion. (b) There must be attention,

for prayer is of its nature an act of the mind (see 2154). A parrot or

a phonograph is not said to pray when it repeats the words of the Our

Father or Hail Mary.

2165. The Intention Required in Prayer.--(a) An actual intention is had

when one either expressly or implicitly wills to offer a prayer, as

when one says internally; “I will now say a prayer,” or when without

such express act one deliberately performs that which is a prayer,

making internal acts of faith, reciting the Rosary, reading from a

prayer-book, etc. This kind of intention is necessary at the beginning

of prayer, and is the best that may be had during the course of prayer.

(b) A virtual intention is had when one is occupied in prayer on

account of an actual intention previously formed and not retracted, but

here and now, on account of human weakness, one is thinking of

indifferent things impertinent to the prayer and its purpose. This kind

of intention continues unless withdrawn directly by contrary intention

or indirectly by the performance of acts inconsistent with prayer.

Virtual intention suffices during the course of prayer, for a

continuous and uninterrupted actual intention is humanly impossible.

The more the mind struggles to keep the thought fixed on one object

alone, the more do other thoughts arise to distract, as experience

proves.

account of any actual intention previously formed, but on account of a

propensity or inclination resulting from previous acts. This is not

properly an intention and it does not suffice for prayer, since with it

the acts performed do not proceed actually or virtually from any

determination of the will. Thus, a person who is asleep or intoxicated

is not said to pray when he mechanically repeats well-known words of

prayer, for his will has no part in those words, any more than the will

of the somnambulist has part in the dangerous walks he takes.

2166. The Attention in Prayer.--(a) By reason of its object, attention

is external or internal, according as the mind is taken up only with

the externals of prayer (i.e., the exclusion of external acts

inconsistent with prayer and the proper bodily posture) or with the

things internal to prayer (i.e., the words, sense and purpose of the

prayer). Internal attention is called verbal or superficial when it is

directed only to the words, as when a person who does not understand

the meaning of a prayer says it carefully so as not to mispronounce the

words; it is literal, when it is directed only to the sense, as when a

person who says a very obscure prayer pays close attention so as to

follow its meaning; it is spiritual, when it is directed to the purpose

of prayer (i.e., the worship of God by an act of religion), or to the

objects of prayer (i.e., eternal salvation or the means thereto, such

as grace and the virtues, the mysteries of religion, etc.).

(b) By reason of its subject, attention is either perfect or imperfect.

Perfect attention excludes every distracting thought, even such as are

involuntary; imperfect attention excludes voluntary but not involuntary

distractions.

2167. Acts that Exclude External Attention.--What external actions are

inconsistent with external prayer and exclusive of external attention?

(a) Those acts exclude external attention which either from their

nature (on account of the great mental application they demand) or from

the weakness of a person’s mind (for it is not everyone who can like

Julius Caesar think on several things at the same time) make it

impossible to have recollection in prayer when those acts are being

performed. Acts of this kind are reading about other matters, painting,

writing, carrying on conversation with those around, boisterous

laughing, etc. But if the one who prays engages in these acts

inadvertently (e.g., if a person reciting the Breviary does not notice

that he is giving considerable attention to an inscription or

advertisement on an adjacent wall), the distraction is merely

involuntary and inculpable.

(b) Those acts do not exclude external attention that either not at all

or only in slight measure interfere with internal recollection in

prayer. Such acts are slow walking, riding, looking about at the

scenery, picking a flower now and then, dressing, undressing, bathing,

combing the hair, etc, The Church prescribes certain prayers to be said

while the priest vests for Mass, and it was an old rule among the monks

to join labor and prayer.

2168. When External Attention Is Sufficient.--Is external attention

sufficient in prayer when internal attention is voluntarily excluded?

(a) In public prayers external attention is sufficient as to a number

of effects. Thus, in the administration of the Sacraments the want of

internal attention in the minister does not make the Sacrament invalid,

since the Sacraments produce grace _ex opere operato_; in public

suffrages the indevotion and distraction of the priest do not deprive

the beneficiary of the impetratory fruit, since the public prayers are

offered in the name of the Church itself; in the Divine Office merely

external attention suffices to fulfill the positive obligation,

according to many, because it is not certain that the Church requires

more.

(b) In all prayers mere external attention is insufficient for the

personal effects of impetration, merit and satisfaction. For to pray

with willful indevotion is not an act deserving of remission, reward

and a favorable answer, but rather of punishment (“Before prayer

prepare thy soul and be not as a man that tempteth God,” Eeclus.,

xviii. 23); it is disrespectful to God and therefore cannot claim the

benefits of an act of worship.

2169. The Kind of Internal Attention Required in Prayer.--(a) The

minimum that suffices for the personal benefits of merit and

impetration is the verbal or the literal attention, and the imperfect

attention that is mixed with some unwilled distractions or mind

wanderings. Indeed, a person who intends to pray well, but whose whole

prayer is a continual distraction in spite of his efforts to be

recollected, does not lose, but rather by reason of his good will and

effort increases, his merit. But for spiritual refreshment there must

be freedom from distraction; for, just as a student gets no mental

nourishment from a lesson if his mind is many miles away, and a

listener gets no instruction from a discourse spoken in a foreign

language (I Cor., xiv. 4), so one who prays with an absent mind loses

the devotion and joy that are afforded by actual communion with

heavenly thoughts.

(b) The maximum that should be aimed at in prayer for the greater

blessing it brings is the spiritual attention fixed on the presence of

God and the perfect attention that keeps away as far as possible the

interruption from any vain, perverse or extraneous thoughts.

2170. Distractions.--Just as certain external acts exclude external

attention, so also certain internal states exclude internal attention.

These latter are known as distractions, and may be defined as internal

acts or omissions opposed to the nature or purpose of prayer, but

performed during prayer.

(a) Distractions are either acts or omissions. Thus, a person who

slumbers lightly or is partly asleep during prayer is inattentive or

wanting by omission; while the person who thinks out plots for stories

or plays during prayer time is distracted or wanting by commission.

(b) Distractions are sometimes opposed to the nature of prayer. To the

nature of vocal prayer belong the words and the sense, and hence, even

though one is rapt in meditation, there is no vocal prayer if words are

mispronounced or left out or so changed or transposed as to make

nonsense or no sense, though negligence about a word here and there

does not necessarily exclude superficial attention. Those who from long

familiarity with forms of prayer are able to repeat them automatically,

with no thought about the words or their meaning, direct or mystical,

are not distracted if their thoughts are on the motive of prayer. But

it would not be fitting to observe no order in these matters, for

example, to dwell always on the glorious mysteries during passiontide

prayer and on the sorrowful mysteries during paschal prayers.

purpose of prayer itself is the union of the mind with God, while the

purpose of the one who prays is the special good to which he directs

his prayer. Union with God is necessary above all in prayer, and though

it need not be expressly thought on, as was said above (2169), yet

there must be no thought in the mind contrary to it. Thoughts, desires

and imaginations are contrary to the end of prayer when they are not

means to that end (e.g., sinful thoughts, idle thoughts, thoughts on

lawful occupations or affections that have nothing to do with the

prayer), or when they are means to that end but are perverted to a

purely natural use (e.g., when verbal attention is made an exercise in

voice culture, or literal attention a grammatical study, or attention

to the purpose of prayer means that one is speculating on foolish

questions about divinity or thinking on the money, food, or clothing,

for which one is praying as if they were the ends of prayer).

Scrupulous persons make attention itself a distraction, for they worry

all during prayer lest their thoughts be wandering, and so they are

thinking about themselves rather than about the words, meaning or

purpose of prayer.

(d) Distractions occur during prayer. Hence, an interruption is not a

distraction, as when one who is praying is called to attend to some

business or leaves off prayer for the moment to make a note of some

important thought that came to mind. Neither is the breaking off of

prayer a distraction, as when one starts to pray but feels so

distracted or unwell as to give over for the time being the attempt to

pray.

2171. Voluntary and Involuntary Distractions.--(a) Voluntary

distractions result in the first place from purpose, as when one who is

praying deliberately dozes at intervals when he feels drowsy, or

deliberately turns over in his mind the points of an address he intends

to give; they result in the second place from negligence, as when the

person who is praying does not expressly wish to be inattentive, but

hurries through his words with no pains to keep his thoughts on what he

is doing or why he is doing it. Those who rarely speak or read about

divine things, but give themselves much to foolish reading or talk,

prepare for themselves many distractions, unless they counteract this

by special aids to recollection, such as pictures or prayer books.

(b) Involuntary distractions are those that result neither from purpose

nor from carelessness, but from human weakness. Thus, a person who is

troubled with scruples or with a severe headache or nervous strain, who

is worn out bodily or much worried mentally, or who is surrounded by

noise or disturbance, is often physically unable to concentrate his

mind for any length of time, no matter how much he may desire to do so.

Indeed, St. Thomas says that it is hardly possible for anyone to say an

Our Father without some distraction, and many persons are distracted

against their will by every slight sound or movement that falls under

their notice.

2772. Sinfulness of Distraction in Prayer.--(a) Involuntary

distractions are not sinful, since one is not bound to the impossible.

Hence, a penitent who has nothing except these distractions to confess

may not be absolved, since there is no matter for absolution in his

confession.

(b) Voluntary distractions are sinful, since, though one is free to

address God at any time, one is bound to do this in a respectful manner

and in spirit and in truth, as God requires. Communion with God is by

means of the mind, and it is disrespectful to turn the mind away to

other things when the communion has been sought. Besides, lip service

is displeasing to God, just as burnt offerings were not acceptable when

made without love. But the sin is of its nature only venial; for the

intention to pray, together with the essential moral goodness of the

act, is retained, and the defect consists in the circumstance that the

intention is executed remissly (see 78).

2173. When is voluntary distraction a grave and when a venial sin? (a)

It is a venial sin when one says a non-obligatory prayer, even with the

express will to be inattentive, and also when one says an obligatory

prayer (such as the Divine Office) with distractions due to

carelessness, but without abandonment of the intention to pray. (b) It

is a mortal sin when one indulges in distractions from contempt, and

also when one says an obligatory prayer with distractions that last

during a notable part of the prayer and that are deliberately

entertained.

2174. Distractions during Divine Office are the absence of the

attention which the Church requires under grave sin for satisfaction of

the canonical obligation. There are two opinions about the kind of

distractions that make recitation insufficient and gravely sinful.

(a) According to the older opinion, internal attention is required, but

it seems that generally those who maintain this view do not hold that

internal distractions alone deprive the Office of its sufficiency.

Thus, they state that one who has had voluntary distractions may

consider that he has fulfilled his duty, unless he is certain that he

also adverted to his state of distraction and did nothing to end it.

(b) According to the opinion of many modern authors, external attention

suffices. Hence, in this view mortal sin is incurred by notable defect

in external, but not in internal attention.

2175. The External Acts of Religion.--We proceed now to those acts of

religion which are performed in an outward manner. But it should be

noted that just as devotion and prayer find external expression (as in

vocal prayer), so the external acts of religion should proceed from

internal devotion. The outward religious acts may be classified under

three groups: (a) the acts in which one offers one’s body as a mark of

veneration to God (adoration); (b) the acts in which one offers

external goods, whether given (sacrifices, offerings, first-fruits,

tithes) or promised (vows); (c) the acts in which one makes use of

divine things to honor God (Sacraments, oaths, adjuration, praises).

2176. Definition of Adoration.--Adoration or worship is honor shown to

God through bodily acts offered in acknowledgment of His supreme

excellence and of our dependence on Him.

(a) Thus, it is acknowledgment of dependence on God, and as such it

differs from mere honor, which may be shown even to an equal.

(b) It is an acknowledgment of supreme excellence, and so it differs

from veneration shown to creatures who are above us. Adoration

(_latria_), therefore, is not the same thing as the sacred cult or

veneration shown the Blessed Virgin (_hyperdulia_) and the Saints

(_dulia_) on account of their supernatural grace and glory; much less

is it the same thing as the civil cult shown to persons illustrious for

natural qualities, such as acquired knowledge, political dignity or

power, etc.: “The Lord thy God shalt thou adore and Him only shalt thou

serve” (Matt, iv. 10).

2177. Unity and Variety of Adoration.--Adoration is but one, though it

has various expressions. (a) The unity of adoration depends on the

unity of its object. There is but one God to whom belong the various

divine attributes, and the three Divine Persons share the same majesty.

Hence, there is but one adoration. (b) The variety in adoration is in

the expression. The higher expression of adoration is internal: it does

not depend on bodily acts or places, and it is offered by Angels as

well as by man. The lower expression of adoration is made through

bodily acts, such as genuflections, prostrations, prayer with face to

the east, and the use of sacred places for worship, all of which

externals are employed as aids to devotion and symbols of the divine

glory (Matt., xviii, 20; Luke, xix. 46). Some of the actions here

mentioned are sometimes used in the religious or civil cult shown to

creatures, but internal adoration belongs to God alone.

2178. Definition of Sacrifice.--Sacrifice is the offering to God and a

real changing of a sensible thing, made by a lawful minister, in

acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion and of our subjection to Him.

(a) It is an offering or oblation; that is, one makes a gift directly

to God Himself. Thus, sacrifice differs from contributions of the

people made for the clergy or the church.

(b) It offers a sensible thing, that is, some object perceptible by the

senses or hidden under sensible species; for sacrifice is an outward

sign of the inner offering, by which the soul itself is subjected to

God.

performed in the name of the community, and hence it may be offered

only by those who represent the community. St. Paul declares that a

high-priest is chosen from men to offer sacrifice, and that no one may

take the honor to himself unless he is called as Aaron was (Heb., v. 4).

(d) It is made to God alone, since God alone is our First Beginning and

Last End: “He who sacrifices to other gods besides the Lord shall be

put to death” (Exod., xxii. 20). Mass in honor of the Blessed Virgin or

the Saints means that sacrifice is offered God in thanksgiving for

their merits or in petition that we may imitate their virtues.

Oblations may be made to men, but sacrifice may be offered only to God.

(e) It is through a real change of the thing offered, which thus

becomes the victim of sacrifice; for the supreme act of worship

reserved to God acts upon the substance itself of an external thing to

signify that the worshipper offers his own being to God. The change in

the thing sacrificed consists in its being made sacred, or set apart as

the central object in the supreme act of worship.

(f) It is made in acknowledgment of God’s supreme dominion and of our

subjection to Him; that is, it is an act whose direct and proper end is

the exercise of the virtue of religion. Thus, sacrifice differs from

acts of self-sacrifice such as continence, abstinence, martyrdom, even

when they are offered in honor of God, for the direct and proper end of

these acts is some other virtue than that of religion. The act of

sacrifice may have no purpose except worship, but other virtuous acts

have their own ends to make them praiseworthy, even when they are used

as acts of worship.

2179. The Essentials of Sacrifice.--(a) The outward sign may be said to

consist of matter and form. The matter is some sensible thing used as

victim, whether it be inanimate (e.g., the bread and wine of

Melchisedech), or animate (e.g., the paschal lamb), or human (e.g., Our

Lord in His passion). The form is some sensible action that makes the

victim sacred by dedicating it to sacrificial oblation (e.g., the

breaking of bread, the libation of wine, the offering of the slain

lamb, the voluntary and visible acceptance of death by Our Lord). In

the Mass Christ is sacrificed, not as existing under His own

appearances, but as present under the sacramental species and offered

through His representatives; and hence in the Mass the Victim is

sensible by means of the species that signify and contain Him, while

the dedication by the Supreme Priest is made sensible through the words

of the ministering priest who acts for Christ.

(b) The inner thing that is signified in sacrifice is primarily the

offering of self to God, in recognition that from Him we have our being

and in Him is our happiness. But secondarily it signifies the fruits we

derive from union with God (e.g., the benefits of redemption and

salvation). Thus, the sacrificial death of Christ is also a symbol of

man’s death to sin and life in God (I Peter, iv. 1).

2180. The Obligation of Sacrifice.--(a) The internal or spiritual

sacrifice is obligatory for all, since all are bound to offer God

devotion of will, communion of mind, recognition of His supremacy. (b)

The external sacrifice improperly so called, which consists in the

practice of works of virtue, is obligatory for all in so far as

commanded acts are concerned, but not when virtuous deeds are of

supererogation. (c) The external sacrifice properly so called, which

consists in an outward sign indicative of internal worship of God, is

by natural law necessary, for reason itself shows to man that he is an

inferior and dependent being, and so should acknowledge the superiority

of God and his own submission by acts suitable to his nature as a being

composed of body and soul, and for whom sensible things are signs of

spiritual truths.

2181. Exemptions Based on the Natural Law.--Though the external

sacrifice strictly so called is obligatory from natural law, it is not

a primary precept of nature, nor does nature determine its details.

(a) Hence, the fact of the obligation may be unknown to an individual,

since (though reason indicates it) it is not evident and rests upon a

number of premises from which it has to be reasoned out. Unlike the

duty of honoring parents, which is immediately inferred from natural

principles, the duty of offering sacrifice is only remotely inferred,

and hence admits of invincible ignorance (see 320).

(b) The manner of fulfilling the obligation, since not defined by

natural law, has to be determined by positive laws, or, in the absence

of these, by suitability to the circumstances in which one lives.

Before the positive divine law was given, there was no obligatory rite

for sacrifice and the oblation was not entrusted to any special body of

men, and hence we read that in the times of the patriarchs there was

great freedom as to the ceremonies and the ministry employed in

sacrifice. But under the Mosaic Law the manner of sacrificing was

minutely prescribed and its office entrusted to the sons of Aaron, even

to the exclusion of monarchs; while under the law of Christ there is

but the one sacrifice of the Cross perpetuated in the Mass in an

unbloody manner, and the ministers who have power to offer sacrifice

are only the bishops and priests.

2182. Is Sacrifice Superior to All the Other Acts of Religion?--(a)

Sacrifice is not superior to the internal act of religion, for devotion

or the internal sacrifice is the soul that animates and moves the

external rites (see 2149): “The multitude offered victims and praises

and holocausts with a devout mind” (II Par., xxix. 31); “Obedience is

better than sacrifice” (I Kings, xv. 22).

(b) Sacrifice is preeminent among the external acts of religion. Some

acts of religion are optional (e.g., vows, oaths, adjurations), but

sacrifice is a natural obligation. Some acts of religion are

obligatory, but marks of respect similar to them may also be shown to

creatures (e.g., customary offerings, praises), whereas no kind of

sacrifice may be offered to a creature. Some acts of religion are

reserved to God, but they have no rite that is peculiar to the worship

of God and that may not be exercised by all (e.g., acts of adoration),

whereas sacrifice has a service reserved to God and which only priests

can perform. Sacraments are primarily for the welfare of man; sacrifice

is primarily for the honor of God. Non-sacrificial acts of religion may

be performed in the name of an individual (e.g., adoration), whereas

sacrifice is in the name of the community; other acts of religion may

signify dependence on God for temporal and corporal things (e.g.,

offering of first-fruits), but sacrifice signifies the dependence of

the soul itself on God for existence and beatitude.

2183. Offerings.--Offerings are gifts made immediately to God, to be

employed without change for divine worship or for the needs of the

ministers of divine worship, the purpose being to worship God by the

tribute paid.

(a) Thus, offerings are gifts; that is, they are offered to God without

the compulsion of any law, or at least without any determination by law

of the amount to be given. Natural reason teaches man that he should

bestow something from his goods in this manner as a thank offering for

the divine bounty, when there are representatives of God to whom the

gift may be given. The gift should be a free-will offering (Exod., xxv,

2), unless there are special circumstances that render it a debt, such

as contract, promise, custom, or the need of the ministers of the

Church.

(b) They are made immediately to God Himself, and so they differ from

tithes or other dues that are paid to the clergy for their support.

offering of sacred vessels or altar furnishings), or at least they are

not changed into the sacred condition of a sacrificial victim (e.g.,

offerings of candles, incense, etc., that are consumed during Mass).

Thus, simple oblation differs from sacrificial oblation.

(d) They are devoted to the service of God, since they are gifts made

to Him. Hence, they are used in divine worship and, if consecrated

(e.g., chalices, vestments), may not be used for other purposes; or

they are used for the needs of the ministers of divine worship or of

the poor, since those who serve the altar should live by the altar (I

Cor., ix. 14), and Our Lord shared His purse with the poor (Matt.,

xxvi. 9, 11).

(e) They are given as a mark of honor to God, especially in recognition

of favors received from Him. Thus, in the Old Law the people were

obliged to give the first-fruits of their fields and crops to God, in

thanksgiving for the gift of the promised land and of its fruits

(Deut., xxvi. 10).

2184. Goods Unsuitable as Offerings to God.--There are certain goods,

however, that should not be used as offerings to God.

(a) Thus, those goods that are forbidden by positive law may not be

offered to God. In the Old Law certain animals could not be offered to

God, either because they were legally unclean (e.g., dogs were

associated with pagan rites and were regarded as symbols of rapacity),

or because they were of inferior quality (e.g., a blind or lame sheep

or other animal worthless to its owner).

(b) Those goods that the offerer has no right to give away or that are

unsuitable on account of circumstances may never be given as offerings

to God. Thus, one may not make an offering to God of money that belongs

to another (Ecclus., xxxiv. 21); a son may not give as a gift to God

the money he should spend on his needy parents (Matt., xv. 3-6).

Neither may one offer corrupted wine for the Mass, nor the wages of

prostitution to the church if there will be scandal, nor gifts that are

mean and contemptible, etc.

2185. Contributions.--Contributions to the support of the clergy and

church causes are neither sacrifices nor offerings in the strict sense

of these words, since they are given not directly to God but to the

ministers of God. The manner of making contributions to the Church has

varied with time.

(a) Thus, in the first ages of the Church clerics having the care of

souls were supported by the voluntary gifts of the people. These gifts

were made especially during Mass. Bread and wine and other things

necessary for divine worship and the support of the clergy were brought

at the Offertory (the origin of the present Offertory collection),

while food for the agapae or for the poor was presented for a blessing

towards the end of the Canon, or before Mass.

(b) After peace had been given to the Church and the number of the

faithful and of the clergy had greatly increased, it was found

necessary to devise means for a more regular and certain supply of

income. As early as the sixth century the ancient customs of

first-fruits and tithes were made the subjects of conciliar enactments

and imposed as specific taxes on crops or revenues. A more permanent

system of church support was that of endowments or benefices which,

owing to the increasing difficulties of older methods, sprang up about

the sixth century and became universal in the eleventh. Fees in

connection with the administration of sacred rites and stipends for

Masses were in use in the seventh century.

tithes are rare, though recognized by Canon Law. In some countries

where benefices have been confiscated, part compensation is made in the

form of pensions; in other countries (e.g., in the United States) the

free-will offerings of the faithful is the usual system.

2186. Obligation of Contributing to the Support of the Clergy.--(a)

Natural Law.--Those who serve the common welfare, whether in spiritual

or in temporal matters, should be supported by those whom they serve;

for, as their time and labor is given to others, it is a duty of

justice that these latter make a return for the benefits received.

Hence, just as citizens are naturally bound to contribute to public

officials, so are the faithful naturally bound to contribute according

to their means to the ministers of religion.

(b) Divine Law.--Our Lord commanded His disciples to depend for their

maintenance on those to whom they preached (“For the laborer is worthy

of his meat,” Matt., x. 10); and hence St. Paul says (I Cor., ix. 13,

14): “They who work in the holy place eat the things that are of the

holy place, and they that serve the altar partake with the altar. So

also the Lord ordained that they who preach the Gospel should live by

the Gospel.”

namely, that the faithful are obliged to support the clergy (Canon

1496); and as to the manner of making contributions they sanction local

customs, such as parish payments (Canon 463) and tithes and

first-fruits (Canon 1502), command the payment of _cathedraticum_

(Canon 1504), etc.

2187. The Church, the Apostolic See, individual churches and moral

persons of ecclesiastical law have the right to the temporal means

requisite for their mission; and hence the faithful have the duty to

contribute to necessary church causes, such as divine worship, the

spread of the Gospel, and charity (Canons 1495 sqq.).

2188. Quality of the Obligation of Contributing to the Church.--(a) The

obligation is one of justice as well as of religion, for there is a

quasi-contract between the faithful on the one side and the Church and

its ministers on the other side, the latter being obliged to give

spiritual ministries and benefits, the former to supply the temporal

sustenance and means. Hence, St. Paul compares the salaries given to

the clergy to the wages or fruits paid to the laborer. It is not

strange that those who sow spiritual things for others, should reap

from the temporal things of the latter: for a soldier does not serve at

his own expense; a planter, a shepherd, a plowman, and a thresher

expect a share from their labors; indeed, even the animal that serves

man is worth its keep (cfr. I Cor., ix. 4 sqq.).

(b) The obligation is grave, because it arises both from justice and

from religion (see 1748, 2148). He who refuses to contribute to the

Church evades payment for services given him and also denies to divine

worship his share of support.

2189. Attitude Towards Persons Refusing to Contribute.--The duties of

the priest towards those who refuse to contribute their share to the

support of the Church may be defined as follows:

(a) as to absolution, it should not be denied unless there is certainty

that the penitent is in grave sin. Hence, according to Kenrick and the

common opinion, unless there is a law fixing a tax or the delinquent

church member is inflicting severe privation on the church or heavy

burdens on others who have to contribute more than their share, the

confessor should not enjoin payment under pain of denial of absolution.

Apart from these cases, the Church, for the sake of souls, does not

insist upon her right, as we see in the dealings of St. Paul with the

Corinthians who neglected to give towards his support. The Apostle did

not correct these men, although he would have done so had he considered

them guilty of mortal sin;

(b) as to restitution, it seems it should not be insisted on. One who

has guiltily refused to pay his church dues has offended justice, it is

true, but the Church is concerned more with spiritual than with

temporal things, and rather than place an obstacle to the conversion of

a sinner or occasion scandal to the weak, she prefers to forego what is

really her due (see 1487);

not be denied to those who are unable or unwilling to pay the customary

fees. The recipient of the rites disgraces himself by unwillingness to

do what others do, but religion itself would be degraded if the rites

were refused for reasons of money.

2190. Those to Whom Religious Contributions Are Due.--(a) The entire

Church should contribute to the support of the Pope, the Pastor of the

whole flock of Christ, who is charged with the welfare of all. In the

Old Law the Levites themselves were obliged to pay tithes to the

high-priest (Num, xviii. 26 sqq.); but the amount to be given to

Peter’s Pence is left to the generosity and religious devotion of the

contributors. (b) Each individual church or body in the Church should

contribute to its own bishop or superior a just amount for necessary

uses, as determined by law or lawful custom.

2191. Vows.--A vow is a promise made to God to perform that which is

better.

(a) It is a promise, that is, an agreement by which one binds oneself

under obligation to another to do or omit something (Eccles., v. 3, 4),

Thus, a vow differs from deliberation about doing good or the purpose

to do it, for it includes in addition to deliberation and purpose the

decree of the reason which places one under the moral necessity of

performing one’s promise. Thus, persons who make good resolutions or

who promise themselves that they will carry out certain good courses

(e.g., a drunkard who takes the pledge to abstain from intoxicants) do

not sin against a vow when they break their resolutions. Even a promise

or resolution made under oath is not necessarily a vow; and hence one

who swears to observe chastity may be freed from the obligation by an

ecclesiastical superior who has not the power of dispensing from a vow

of chastity (see 2234, 2262).

(b) A vow is a promise made to God; that is, the person who takes the

vow intends to honor God and to bind himself to God. A vow may be made

in honor of the Blessed Virgin or other Saint, in the sense that one

vows to God what one promises to the Saint, or that one calls on the

Saint to witness or to assist the vow, or that one offers the vow

principally to God and secondarily to the Saint. Hence, if one were to

make a promise to a Saint (e.g., if a girl promises perpetual virginity

to the Blessed Virgin) with no thought about God or no thought of

obliging oneself before God, the act would be a promise pertaining to

the virtue of veneration (_dulia_), but it would not be an act of

religion or a vow. Promises made to living persons even under solemn

circumstances (e.g., a death-bed promise made to a dying mother) are

sacred, but they have not the nature of a vow.

a vow is a free promise made to God, to whom only good is pleasing and

to whom the lesser good is less pleasing, a vow does not promise God

what is evil or entirely indifferent or less pleasing. It would

dishonor a human being to promise him something offensive, it would not

honor him to promise something vain or useless, it would not show him

special honor to promise to do something less agreeable to him. Hence,

it would be irreligious to take a vow to steal, or to count one’s

steps, or to prefer marriage itself to celibacy. Certain solemn

promises are called vows (e.g., the vows of Baptism, the marriage

vows), but they are not vows in the strict sense as here understood,

for they do not promise that which is better, the promisors having no

intention to place on themselves the obligation of religion.

2192. The Various Kinds of Vows.--(a) By reason of its object, a vow is

either personal (i.e., the promise of some act or omission, such as a

fast or the avoidance of an occasion of sin), real (i.e., the promise

of some payment or object, such as an alms), or mixed (i.e., the

promise of some action and some object, such as pilgrimage to a shrine

with an offering).

(b) By reason of its subject, a vow is either singular (i.e., made by a

physical person) or common (i.e., made by a moral person or community).

taken for one year) or perpetual (i.e., a vow taken for life).

(d) By reason of its manner, a vow is either absolute (e.g., an

unconditional vow of chastity) or conditional (e.g., a vow to go on

pilgrimage, if one recovers one’s health; a vow to enter religion, if

parents consent). A conditional vow is either non-penal, as in the

example just given, or penal, in which the promise is that one shall

undergo a penalty if fault is committed (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary

every time one uses profane language, to fast every time one becomes

intoxicated, to give alms every time one is dishonest).

(e) By reason of its form a vow is either express (i.e., externally

manifested by words or other signs) or tacit (i.e., externally assumed

by reason of some office to which it is annexed, as when one takes the

subdiaconate in the Latin Church, to which is attached the duty of

celibacy. (It must be noted, however, that some authors consider

celibacy arising from the subdiaconate as a duty arising from

ecclesiastical law and not from a vow.) The express vow in turn is

explicit (i.e., manifested by signs that immediately express the vow,

as when the vower mentions poverty and chastity) or implicit (i.e.,

manifested by signs that express another vow which includes the

implicit vow, as when the vower mentions only obedience according to

the rule, but the rule includes the other two vows of poverty and

chastity). An explicit vow is either determinate (i.e., one in which

the thing promised is definitely indicated, as when one vows a

pilgrimage) or disjunctive (i.e., one in which the vower promises to

perform at his will one or more out of a number of things indicated, as

when he vows either to make a pilgrimage or to perform a fast).

(f) By reason of its position before the Church, a vow is either

private (i.e., one made without the intervention or acceptance of the

Church, as when a person in danger of shipwreck makes a vow for his

safety) or public (i.e., one made before the Church and accepted in its

name by an ecclesiastical superior, as in the essential vows made in

approved Orders or Congregations). The public vow is either simple or

solemn, according as the Church has determined for different religious

institutes.

2193. Vows in Canon Law.--The canonical dispositions in reference to

vows in general will be found in Canons 1307-1315, while religious vows

are treated in the section on religious (Canons 492 sqq.), and the

effects of vows on matrimony are declared in Canons 1072, 1073, 1058. A

fuller treatment of the canonical aspects of vows than can be given

here will be found in commentaries on these parts of the Code.

2194. Distinction between Solemn and Simple Vows.--Is the distinction

between a solemn and a simple vow one of divine or one of

ecclesiastical law?

(a) As to accidental solemnity (i.e., the conditions of time, place,

age, fitness, rubrics, etc.), the solemn vow depends on the Church, for

there is no doubt that the Church has the right to determine these

matters as circumstances may require. Hence, the Church may appoint

conditions for the validity of a solemn vow, and she may also change

these conditions as she sees fit.

(b) As to the essential solemnity (i.e., the internal characteristic

that distinguishes the solemn from other vows), the solemn vow depends,

not on the law of the Church, but on the divine law, since, unlike

other vows, it is not a mere promise of acts, but an irrevocable giving

over to God of one’s person itself and an internal spiritual

consecration or espousals accepted by the Church. This is denied,

however, by some authorities, who place the difference between the

solemn and the simple vow in the different juridical effects which they

produce in Canon Law, the solemn vow making acts opposed to it invalid

and the simple vow rendering opposed acts illicit, but not invalid (see

Canon 579). All agree that the Church may for just reasons dispense

even in solemn vows.

2195. Knowledge and Deliberation Necessary for Valid Vow.--In the

intellect of him who takes a vow there must be such knowledge and

deliberation as are required for making an important contract, for he

who takes a vow assumes a grave obligation (see 1883). The rule given

by many is that the deliberation which suffices for a mortal sin

suffices also for a vow, but this does not appear to be exact, since a

mortal sin may be committed when there is only a confused perception of

the gravity of the sin (see 177).

(b) From the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter,