2017. The Causes of Contumely.--(a) Prid_Moral theology

inasmuch as those who consider themselves better than others are quick

to express the contempt they feel for others, if they hope that this

will add to their own glory (Prov., xi. 2). But a proud person will

just as often disdain to revile those whom he despises.

(b) Foolishness (see 1621) is sometimes a cause of contumely, for the

foolish man speaks without thinking as he should or without caring what

damage his words may cause (Prov., xx. 3). Hence, those who speak

abusively to others merely in order to raise a laugh among the

bystanders, little caring about the disrespect they show, cannot excuse

themselves on the plea that it was all a joke.

show his revenge in some open and manifest way, and there is no easier

or more ready means to this end than bitter, scornful or jeering words.

Hence the danger of contumelious reprimands given by superiors. The

subject will be enraged by the hard names applied to him, and the

superior in his wrath will easily go to extremes, even of mortal sin,

on account of the language he uses (e.g., exaggerated invective) or on

account of circumstances (e.g., the scandal given).

2018. The Duty of Bearing with Contumely.--(a) As to the internal

disposition, one should be ready and willing to suffer insults without

making any answer to them, if this is necessary. For the precept of

patience requires that one be prepared in mind to tolerate injuries and

to give place to wrath, should the circumstances at any time call for

such restraint. In this sense Our Lord spoke when He commanded that one

turn the other cheek to the striker (Matt, v. 39), and He practised His

teaching by making no reply to the insolence of those who were

implacable or who only sought material for accusations.

(b) As to external conduct, one should repel contumely when there are

good and sufficient reasons for this course, and hence Our Lord

protested against the unlawful blow given Him in the court room, and

which the judge should have reprimanded (John, xviii. 23). He also

refuted those who decried Him as a blasphemer, or glutton, or demoniac,

or political disturber. But if no good end will be served by

self-defense, or if greater evils will follow from it, no answer should

be made. One should be more desirous to possess the right to honor and

fame--viz., virtue and a worthy life--than to possess honor and fame

themselves, for goodness is always a blessing, but prosperity is not

unfrequently a real misfortune. Indeed, Our Lord says that to be

persecuted, reviled and calumniated places one in the same class as the

good men of the past (Matt., v. 11).

2019. The Chief Reasons for Resistance to Contumely or Detraction.--(a)

The good of the offender, in order that his boldness be subdued and

that he be deterred from such injuries in the future, is a sufficient

reason. Hence the words of Proverbs (xxvi. 5) that one should answer a

fool, lest he think himself wise.

(b) The good of others is another reason, in order that they be not

demoralized by the vilification of one whom they have looked up to as

an example and guide, especially if silence will appear to be a sign of

weakness or carelessness or guilt. Hence, St. Gregory says that

preachers should answer detractors, lest the Word of God be without

fruit.

to enjoy the respect and esteem of others helps many a good person to

act worthily of the opinion in which he is held, and it restrains many

a sinner from descending to worse things than those of which he is

guilty. Hence, Eccl., xli. 15, admonishes that one take care of a good

name, and Prov., xxii. 1, places a good name above wealth.

2020. The Duty of One Who Answers Contumely or Detraction.--(a) The

spirit of the answer should be that of charity, not that of revenge or

of unquiet or exaggerated anxiety about personal honor or fame;

otherwise one becomes like to the offender (Prov., xxii, 2). A person

would sin even by silence in the face of contumely, if the spirit

behind his non-resistance was malicious (e.g., if he intended to enrage

the other party the more by disregarding the attack).

(b) The manner of the answer should be moderate, and the reply should

not go beyond the bounds of reasonable self-defense (see 1833). It is

lawful to deny the charge, or by retort to turn the tables on the

assailant, or to sue him for slander or libel; but it is not lawful to

challenge him to a duel or to utter calumnies (see 1843).

2021. The Duty of Making Restitution for Contumely.--(a) If contumely

is not contrary to commutative justice, there is no duty of

restitution. Hence, dishonor that is purely negative, such as the

refusal to uncover on meeting a clergyman, does not oblige one to make

restitution, for the omission is contrary to the virtue of observance

or reverence but not to commutative justice. The case would be

different, however, if negative dishonor were so marked or noticeable

as to be equivalent to positive disrespect, as when at the entrance of

a distinguished personage all in the room arise except one man who

remains seated and gives a bitter look at the newcomer.

(b) If contumely is contrary to commutative justice, restitution is

due. All agree that commutative justice is violated when contumely

becomes vilification, or when an insult is committed in the presence of

onlookers with the purpose of making the offended person seem

contemptible in their eyes. But there are two opinions about the case

when contumely is merely revilement, or an insult offered when there

are no others present and the purpose is to make the offended person

appear vile in his own eyes.

2022. Opinions on the Duty of Restitution for Revilement.--(a) One

opinion holds that injury is done, not damage, and hence that

satisfaction is owed rather than restitution. Further, it is held that

satisfaction is penal and so not obligatory (except out of charity)

before judicial sentence.

(b) Another opinion says that damage is done as well as injury, since

men regard an insult, even though offered in private, as an unjust

deprivation of a great good. Satisfaction of a very humiliating kind,

such as the begging of pardon on bended knees, as being penal, can

await an order from authority, but the ordinary forms of reparation,

such as expression of regret or request for forgiveness, should be made

without any such order (Matt., v. 24).

2023. What Kind of Reparation Should Be Made for Contumely?--(a) In

general, the rule is that contumely should be repaired by a bestowal of

the same kind of goods as those of which the offended party was

deprived; and hence dishonor is repaired by honor, disrespect by

respect. The injured party should be aware that reparation is being

made, or at least that honor is being shown him. If by reason of

contumely one is responsible for other damages that followed (e.g., if

one foresaw that one’s affront would lead to money losses, enmities,

quarrels, bloodshed, etc.), one is duty bound to make good these losses

also.

(b) In particular, the honor that should be offered in atonement is

generally an apology, for this is both satisfaction for the wrong done

and a token of esteem. At times, according to some, more is required,

for if the insult was very gross, a mere request for pardon is perhaps

not sufficient; on the other hand, less may suffice, as when the

indignity was slight. Many authors hold that a respectful apology is

sufficient reparation for any contumely. Among the lesser forms of

restitution for dishonor are signs of friendship, courteous greetings,

a pleasant chat, an invitation to call at one’s home, a dinner or

toast, a eulogistic speech, etc.

2024. The Manner of Making Apologies.--(a) They should be made with at

least as much formality as accompanied the insult. Hence, if the injury

was public, the acknowledgment of error should also be public. (b) They

may be made either personally or by intermediary. If the guilty person

cannot very well appear before the offended person, he may send his

regrets by letter or through a representative.

2025. Since the gravity of contumely depends on the relations between

the parties and other circumstances, an apology is not always necessary.

(a) Thus, if the offender is an inferior or an equal, an apology should

be made for a serious insult, at least when the offended person insists

on it. Thus, a cheerful salutation by a child does not atone for a vile

name applied to his father. If an inferior dishonors a superior through

ignorance, he makes amends by acknowledging his ignorance and showing

respect, as was done by St. Paul (Acts, xxiii. 5).

(b) If the offender is a superior, an apology is never necessary, lest

by abasing himself he lose the prestige which his office should have.

Hence, if a father has used harsh language to his child, it would not

be seemly for him to ask the child’s pardon, but he should show some

mark of kindness to heal the wound.

2026. Cessation of Obligation of Restitution.--The obligation of

restitution for contumely ceases in certain cases (see 1797, 1798). (a)

Thus, impossibility excuses, as when one cannot make reparation without

renewing an old feud that has been buried and forgotten. (b)

Forgiveness by the offended person excuses. The offended party forgives

the debt expressly when he says or shows that he does not care to have

an apology; he forgives implicitly, when he retaliates by an equally

injurious action, defends himself by retorting equal contumely on his

adversary, or obtains equivalent satisfaction from a court of justice.

2027. A confessor should not impose the duty of an apology in certain

cases.

(a) Thus, if this command would be harmful, it should be omitted, as

when a penitent is in good faith and would be put in bad faith by the

admonition. (b) If this command is not necessary, it should be omitted,

as when the duty of an apology has ceased for one reason or another. In

the case of children who speak or act disrespectfully to their elders,

it may at times be taken for granted that the elders, especially the

parents, do not expect an apology for trifling cases of disrespect.

But, on the other hand, it may often be advisable to require such

children to apologize for their rudeness, in order to cure them of it.

2028. Defamation.--Defamation (backbiting) is the unjust blackening of

the reputation of another person by secret words.

(a) It is unjust, that is, it has no reasonable motive to justify it.

Defamation differs from just revelation of secret faults.

(b) It is a blackening or besmirching, that is, a taking away or

lessening of fame. Defamation casts a shadow over or totally obscures

the brilliance of a good reputation.

and report of the public on the virtue and character or other good

qualities of a person, Thus, it is defamation to say that an individual

is a drunkard, or that a professional man is incompetent, if these

persons are not known to have such defects. If a person has no

reputation here and now, except a bad one (e.g., a criminal who has

just been convicted and sentenced to prison, a loafer who is often seen

intoxicated on the streets, a woman who is often heard peddling

scandals), it is not defamation to speak about the true and public

faults of this person; nor is it sinful to speak thus if there is some

suitable reason (e.g., to discuss a murder trial that is being reported

in the papers, or to tell a humorous incident that will do no harm).

But those who uselessly or harmfully discuss the known weaknesses of

their neighbors are sinners called gossipers or fault-finders.

(d) It is against the reputation of a person, that is, of an individual

possessed of right. The party offended by defamation can be a natural

person (i.e., a rational being, whether infant or adult, high or low,

rich or poor) or an artificial person (i.e., a society, group or

collection of individuals endowed with reason); he can be either a

living or a deceased person, for death does not destroy the soul nor

take away the right to reputation.

(e) It is against the reputation of another, that is, defamation as now

used is a sin of injustice, and one cannot be strictly unjust to

oneself; but “self-defamation” may be used in a wider sense to

designate a sin opposed to charity (see 1575 sqq.).

(f) It is accomplished by means of words, that is, by oral

communication or its equivalent. One can defame, therefore, by word of

mouth, by deaf and dumb language, by writing, by a gesture, by silence,

or by a look.

(g) It is done by words or signs that are secret, that is, by words or

signs expressed before others but in the absence of the person who is

defamed, or at least when he is thought to be absent (backbiting). The

defamer is like the thief who wishes to do harm but does not wish the

victim to know the author of the harm.

2029. The Differences between Defamation and Contumely.--(a) They

differ in their purposes, for the defamer intends to hurt another in

his reputation before the public, while the contumelious man intends to

hurt another in his honor, either in his own eyes or in those of

others. (b) They differ in their manner of procedure, for defamation is

behind the back, contumely before the face, of the party who is

injured. The defamer has some respect for his enemy, for he fears to

face him and resorts to undermining, but the contumelious sinner

despises his enemy and shows it by insulting him to his face.

2030. Various Forms of Injury to Good Name.--(a) By reason of the

intention, the injury is either defamatory (as when derogatory things

are said about another behind his back) or contumelious (as when

derogatory things are insultingly said to him in his presence). Hence,

there can be injury to reputation that is not contumelious (e.g., the

secret spreading of a rumor that Balbus is a drunkard); there can be

contumely that is not injurious to fame (e.g., the addressing of Balbus

as a drunkard when no else is by, or when those present know already

that he is a drunkard), and contumely that is injurious to reputation

(e.g., when one calls Balbus a drunkard before others who thought he

was a sober man).

(b) By reason of the purpose, defamation is willed either explicitly or

implicitly. In the former case the defamer expressly intends the

blackening of his neighbor’s reputation; in the latter case he intends

something unnecessary, such as mere indulgence of levity or

talkativeness, though the blackening of his neighbor is foreseen.

Explicit defamation is regularly a mortal offense, implicit defamation

a venial one; but the degrees of sinfulness may be changed, if the

former sin causes slight, or the latter sin serious damage.

calumny. Detraction blackens a reputation by revealing faults or

defects that are real; calumny (slander) injures reputation by stories

that are untrue. A common form of calumny is a mixture of truth and

falsehood (e.g., when a historian ascribes to a villain, in addition to

real crimes, faults of which the latter was innocent), or of

half-truths that convey the impression of what is untrue (e.g., when a

historian narrates that a certain character killed a man and does not

give the background or causes of the killing, such as provocation,

challenge, mistake; or when a biographer tells of the crimes of his

subject and glosses over the virtues, or makes no mention of his

amendment).

(d) By reason of the means used defamation is either direct or

indirect. Direct defamation is more open and positive; indirect

defamation is rather concealed or negative. There is also the

distinction of slander (which is oral) and libel (which is written or

printed). Libel is more grievous, since it has a permanence that is not

found in spoken words.

2031. Examples of Indirect Defamation.--(a) Faint praise is a subtle

mode of defamation, as when one says of an absent person that he has

not committed murder yet, or that like everyone he has some good

points, for to the listeners this indicates that the speaker does no

hold a high opinion of the person discussed.

(b) Silence is also at times a hidden form of defamation, as when Titus

says to Balbus that the absent Caius is good and Balbus out of malice

answers: “Let’s talk about something else; we must be charitable”, or

when Sempronius falsely declares in company that the absent Claudius is

to the knowledge of Julius a depraved character and Julius, who is

present, makes no protest against the misrepresentation.

being discussed is not as pious or reliable as is commonly believed, or

that there is great room for improvement, or that he is much better now

than in times past, or that there is another side to the picture, or

that he is good, but....

(d) Denial of good qualities is defamatory, when it lessens the esteem

in which a person is held. The good qualities here referred to are

those that render a person distinguished or commendable among his

fellows: chiefly these are moral qualities (viz., virtuous habits,

dispositions and acts); secondarily, natural and internal qualities

(such as learning, quickness of mind, experience, strength and health

of body, and in women, beauty); finally, natural and external goods

(such as wealth, famous ancestry, able assistants in business, or the

excellent merchandise supplied, etc.).

2032. Examples of Direct Defamation.--The following are examples of

direct defamation:

(a) sinister interpretation, as when one states that words or acts of a

neighbor that were good or at least open to a good interpretation, were

dictated by greed, ambition, pride, etc.;

(b) unjust revelation (detraction), as when one reveals secret faults

or crimes;

exceptional or indeliberate fault into an habitual or deliberate sin;

or when one distorts a sin of one species into a sin of another and far

more heinous species, or accuses a whole class or body of men because

one of their number has fallen. Those who add their own little detail

or circumstance to a defamatory tale as they pass it along are

proverbial examples of exaggeration: “_Fama crescit eundo_”;

(d) false accusation (calumny) is the worst kind of defamation.

Innocent XI condemned the proposition that one may probably use calumny

without serious sin as a defense of one’s own justice and honor (see

Denzinger, n. 1194).

2033. Direct defamation is committed either by plain words or by

insinuation. (a) Examples of defamation by innuendo are those ambiguous

expressions or half-veiled accusations that arouse suspicion and often

do more injury than plain accusations. Thus, to say with a laugh or in

an ironical tone that a certain person is human, or broadminded, or

prudent may be equal to volumes of abuse, since the words can have a

bad meaning as well as a good one. Similarly, such expressions as,

“What I know about him is not to be told,” “I know what no one would

believe,” etc., may be taken for slurs on character.

(b) Examples of defamation by plain speech are all those innumerable

statements which, either in general terms (e.g., that another person is

a scoundrel, a villain, a reprobate) or in specific ones (e.g., that

another person is a blasphemer, a thief, a liar), tend to blacken the

good name of a neighbor.

2034. Good Repute or Fame.--Good repute or fame is of various kinds.

(a) Thus, by reason of its object, good reputation is either negative

or positive. A negatively good reputation consists in the absence of

any unfavorable opinion or belief about a person, while a positively

good reputation is the common judgment in favor of a person’s worth.

(b) By reason of its relation to the real character of a person, it is

either true or false. Thus, if a man is regarded by the community as

honest, his reputation is true when he is really honest, but it is

false when he is in fact dishonest. (c) By reason of its degree, it is

either ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary good repute is that which

every person needs, and it consists in the public belief that an

individual is trustworthy and competent in the affairs and duties that

pertain to his state or occupation. Extraordinary fame is that which is

not necessary, such as the celebrity which a person enjoys for unusual

ability as a statesman, orator, financial expert, mathematician, or for

virtue that is far above the average.

2035. The Right to Good Reputation.--(a) Those who are absolutely

unknown (i.e., both as to their identity and their character) have no

right to reputation, since reputation attaches to one who can be named

or described, and hence it is not defamation (though it might be rash

judgment) to say that a stranger who passed on the street and was lost

in the darkness must have been a criminal.

(b) Those who are known by sight or name, but who have not as yet shown

what they are, have a right to a negatively good reputation, for a man

should not be considered evil until his conduct has given ground for

unfavorable judgment (see 1727 sqq.). It is not defamation to say about

an unknown family that has moved into a locality that we do not know

what kind of people they are, but it is defamation to say that they are

likely undesirable.

name there have a right to a positively good reputation; for, if the

reputation is true, it is a good which they have honestly acquired; if

it is false, it is a good of which they are in possession, and

possession itself is entitled to respect.

2036. Sinfulness of Detraction.--The civil law does not generally

punish slander if the slanderer can prove that his statements are true,

but this does not make veracious defamation morally lawful. God detests

and punishes crimes (e.g., fornication) of which human law sometimes

takes no account. The harmfulness of veracious defamation is both

public and private.

(a) Defamation Does Public Harm.--The peace and order of the community

would be seriously disturbed, if it were lawful to attack reputations

simply because one was persuaded that they were unfounded: the person

detracted would be hampered in his official business and social

relations, innocent persons would be blackened as well as the guilty,

and the friends and relatives would suffer with the person detracted.

(b) Defamation Does Private Harm.--The peace and security of the

individual would be uselessly assailed. Reputation is profitable both

in spiritual and temporal ways, and it is therefore a ruthless act to

rob a person of it, when he has done nothing in public to forfeit it

and its possession by him is harmful to no one.

2037. Right to True and False Reputation. There is, nevertheless, a

difference between the right to a true and the right to a false

reputation.

(a) Thus, the right to a true reputation is an absolute and universal

right, one which does not cease in any case, for truth and justice

demand that one should not represent as evil a person who is really

good. This right applies to an extraordinary, as well as to an ordinary

reputation.

(b) The right to a false reputation is a relative and limited right,

one which ceases when the common good on which it rests no longer

supports it (e.g., when it cannot be maintained without injustice).

Moreover, there is no right to an extraordinary reputation, if it is

based on false premises, for the common good does not require such a

right, and hence it is not detraction to show that the renown of an

individual for superior skill or success is built up on advertising

alone or merely on uninformed rumor.

2038. Sinfulness of Gossip or Criticism about Real and Known

Defects.--(a) It is not unjust, _per se_, since it does not take away

fame, that being non-existent. (b) It is sinful, if there is no

sufficient reason for it, but not mortally sinful _per se_, since grave

harm is not done to the reputation of one whose reputation is already

bad. The sin committed is usually that of idle talk or of

uncharitableness, by reason of the disedification offered the

listeners, or the malice that prompts the speaker, or the sadness that

is caused to the person gossiped about. Gossip is dangerous, since it

prepares the way for detraction, as detraction prepares the way for

calumny.

2039. Moral Species of Defamation.--(a) Moralists agree that wrongful

defamation is a sin against justice and charity. It violates justice,

since it infringes a right which is not less strict than that of

proprietorship over goods of fortune; it violates charity, since it is

opposed to friendship and love of neighbor. They also agree that other

species of sin can be added to defamation (e.g., infidelity, as when

one denies that Christ was sinless, or blasphemy, as when one defames a

Saint).

(b) Moralists disagree on the question whether certain forms of

defamation are distinct sub-species or only degrees of one lowest

species. Some hold that detraction and calumny are distinct species,

because calumny adds mendacity to defamation; others say that

detractions about specifically different sins are distinct kinds of

detraction (e.g., that it is one species of sin to say that a neighbor

is a drunkard, and another species to say that he is a thief, and the

reason is that the reputation for temperance is a different thing from

the reputation for honesty, etc.); still others hold that defamation of

parents and other immediate relations is a special form of defamation,

as being contrary to piety. There are, on the contrary, theologians who

reject all these distinctions and hold that the difference between

defamations is only one of more or less, since all of them have the

characteristic note of attack on reputation, which is one right. Hence,

just as the stealing of a cow and the stealing of a cat are only

greater and lesser forms of the sin of theft, so likewise calumny and

detraction, etc., are only major and minor degrees of the sin of

defamation (see 2012, 2013, 2115).

2040. Species of Sins of Defamation.--Since the species of sins must be

particularized in confessions, the question of the distinction between

defamations has practical importance. The common opinion on the line of

action to be observed seems to be as follows:

(a) the penitent is obliged as a rule in serious matters to tell

whether his defamation was simple detraction or calumny. The reason for

this, according to some, is the specific difference between these two

sins; according to others, the reason is that otherwise the confessor

cannot know whether the sin was mortal or venial, or what restitution

is to be imposed. As to detraction of parents or superiors, it seems

that the quality of the person detracted should be mentioned, if there

was any incitement to disrespect or disobedience;

(b) the penitent is not obliged to mention the sins or defects he

ascribed to the person he defamed. Nor should the confessor inquire

about this unless it is necessary in order to know what was the gravity

of the sin or what kind of reparation should be enjoined (cfr. 2013).

Moreover, questions about what was said might easily lead to a

disclosure of the name of the person defamed, and thus the confessional

would be turned into a place of defamation.

2041. The Numerical Multiplication of Defamations.--(a) They are

multiplied when there are many sinful acts about distinct objects; for

example, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a thief and Claudius

tomorrow as another thief, there are two calumnies (see 209).

(b) Defamations are multiplied when there are many sinful acts about

the same object; for example, when Balbus calumniates Caius today as a

thief and repeats the same calumny tomorrow, there are two calumnies.

But if Balbus begins his story today and does not finish it till

tomorrow, there is one calumny (see 214, 215).

distinct objects; for example, when Balbus calumniates by saying that

the two worst thieves he knows are Caius and Claudius, there are two

sins. But if Caius and Claudius are regarded as a unit (e.g., if they

are the firm of Caius and Claudius), there is one sin. A like calumny

would be that Caius came from a dishonest family (see 216-219). If

Balbus calumniates Caius before ten persons, he does not commit ten

defamations, it seems, but ten scandals, since the ten form a body in

the matter of fame, but are individuals in the matter of example. If

Balbus calumniates by saying that Caius has broken all of the ten

commandments, there may be ten calumnies or but one calumny, according

to the intention and the effect (see 217, 218).

2042. The Theological Species of Defamation.--(a) From its nature

defamation is a mortal sin, and hence the Apostle declares (Rom, i. 29,

30) that detractors are hateful to God. In the first place, it inflicts

an atrocious injury on the public welfare, sowing everywhere hatreds,

dissensions and disorders--so much so that detractors are rightly

called an abomination to mankind (Prov., xxiv. 9).

(b) From the smallness of the matter or the imperfection of the act

defamation may be only a venial sin. Criticism of others is a vice so

widespread that almost all mankind (even pious persons) would be

involved in continual mortal sins, were it not for the fact that sins

of speech are frequently the result of ignorance, thoughtlessness, or

sudden passion (James, iii. 2 sqq.), and that the things said are

frequently of no great harm to the person criticized.

2043. The gravity of the harm done by defamation is well expressed by

St. Bernard when he says that defamation at one blow inflicts a mortal

Wound on the person defamed, on the defamer himself, and on the

listener.

(a) Thus, the person defamed is robbed and often irreparably of a good

name, one of the most esteemed of possessions; he is deprived of many

spiritual and temporal opportunities, and is frequently dragged down to

social and moral ruin, and even to suicide. Scripture says that the

tongue of the detractor has the sharpness of a razor, and it compares

him to an arrow dipped in poison, and to a biting serpent.

(b) The defamer destroys his own good name, at least in the sight of

God, for he defiles his own soul with guilt; he disgraces himself

before others, since it is well known that defamation is the vice of

those who feel themselves inferior or guilty. And, worst of all, his

sin is seldom repented of or repaired by satisfaction, since the

defamer is generally too proud, hateful, jealous or revengeful to

acknowledge his error, or is so blind that the thought of the harm he

has done and of the grave obligation of satisfaction never crosses his

mind.

ideals are shattered, his respect for virtue or religion is destroyed,

and he is encouraged to continue the work of the defamer.

2044. Comparison of Defamation with Other Injuries against the

Neighbor.--(a) Defamation is less sinful than injuries to internal

goods, and hence homicide and adultery, which are opposed to the good

of the body and of life itself, are graver sins than defamation.

(b) Defamation is less sinful than injury to higher external goods

perpetrated in a contemptuous manner, for defamation being secret does

not add insult to injury. Hence, just as robbery is more offensive than

theft, so is contumely more sinful than defamation.

as lands and money, for fame along with honor approaches spiritual

things on account of their relation to virtue, whereas wealth is of the

order of corporeal things. Hence, the Scriptures teach that a good name

is more important than great riches (Prov., xxii. 1), more enduring

than thousands of vast and precious treasures (Ecclus., xli, 15).

2045. It should be noted that the foregoing comparison is based on the

nature of the sins compared, for by reason of circumstances the order

given may be reversed; for example, a slight indignity is less serious

than an outrageous calumny, the theft of thousands of dollars is far

more sinful than the circulation of a ludicrous story that is harmful,

but only in a slight degree, to the reputation of a neighbor (cfr. 220

sqq.).

2046. Rule for Determining the Seriousness of Defamation.--The rule for

determining whether the matter of defamation is serious or not is the

amount of harm done by the defamation, and hence not one but several

factors have to be considered.

(a) Thus, the defect ascribed to the neighbor has to be considered, for

some kinds of defects (e.g., littleness of body or prodigality) are

less disgraceful than others (e.g., dwarfishness of mind or soul or

niggardliness), and it is more harmful to reveal one mortal sin than to

reveal a hundred venial sins.

(b) The person defamed is to be considered, for imputed defects that

are not harmful to one person may be harmful to another (e.g., the

charge of being a toper might be considered praise among persons of gay

or rough habits, but it would be regarded as disgraceful among serious

and refined persons).

attention is paid to the talk of some, but much weight is given to the

slightest words of others. Indeed, some persons’ condemnation is

equivalent to praise.

(d) Finally, the persons before whom the defamation is spoken are to be

considered, for everyone knows that it is much more harmful and

dangerous to speak ill of others before certain ones than before others

(cfr. 1461, 1462).

2047. The Harm Done by Reason of the Defects Revealed.--(a) If the

defects are natural imperfections of soul or body that do not connote

moral stain or turpitude, and if no great detriment is caused by

revelation (e.g., to say that another person is deaf, hunchbacked, a

beggar, or dense), disclosure is not in itself serious, or even sinful;

for little or no harm is done, and the defects are of such a character

that they can be readily discovered by observation. But if the defects

are very ignominious or harmful, defamation is a grave sin (e.g., to

say that a very distinguished person is illegitimate, or of a mixed

race, or that his immediate relative was a criminal).

(b) If the defects are related to moral stain, but do not imply it,

revelation of them is not a grave sin, provided no great loss is caused

by it (e.g., to say that a person is scrupulous about himself, or has

certain peccadillos or human imperfections). If a shortcoming is

usually understood as a propensity rather than as a fault (e.g., quick

temper, high-strung disposition, pride, closeness with money), there is

little if any harm done by speaking of it. But if the defects mentioned

are such as imply or insinuate actual moral lapses (e.g., to say that a

person has a venereal disease and the cause is unknown, or that he has

delirium tremens or morphinism, or is of a very passionate nature), the

revelation is defamatory and more or less sinful.

defamation. But the harm done by the imputation of moral guilt is

greater in some cases and less in others. Some sins are more

disgraceful from their degradation (e.g., carnal sins, see 224), and

from this point of view it is worse to accuse a neighbor of gluttony or

sexual irregularity than of pride. Some sins (e.g., solicitation,

sodomy) are especially heinous in the eyes of the law and produce legal

infamy, because they are more harmful to the public or more subject to

public contempt (see Canons 2320, 2328, 2343, 2351, 2356, 2357). There

are also some defamations that are less harmful to reputation, but more

damaging to material prosperity (e.g., it is usually more hurtful to

the prospects of a person in business to be charged with incompetency,

dishonesty, or carelessness than to be charged with religious

indifference or impurity). Finally, there are gradations in the malice

of the same kinds of sin (see 197), as in the angry thought, the angry

word, the angry deed, in tipsiness and drunkenness, in occasional and

habitual lying, etc.

2048. Is it sinful to narrate the secret faults of another, if at the

same time one tells of his repentance and amendment?

(a) If the infamy remains in spite of the remarks about a change of

life for the better (as is generally the case), the narrator is guilty

of sinful detraction. Thus, it is very harmful to one in an exalted

position if it is given out that he was at one time bibacious, but

succeeded in thoroughly curing his appetite. The same principle applies

to those who praise in one matter and detract in another (e.g., by

stating that a person is very learned, but also very dishonest).

(b) If the infamy does not remain, because the atonement is so

extraordinary as to make the hearers think little or nothing about the

fault, the narrator is not guilty of sinful detraction. Thus, it is not

detraction to narrate that a saint was so grieved over a lie he told

that he did lifelong penance for it, or that a person who was once

lukewarm--a thing that is quite common--has in later years become

fervent in an uncommon degree. But the stigma that attaches to uncommon

sins or carnal sins is hardly overcome by the mention of repentance,

unless the person spoken of is already long dead or is one from whom

very little is expected.

2049. The Harm Done by Reason of the Person Defamed.--(a) Serious

faults are sometimes attributed to certain persons without serious sin,

because, on account of the life led by these persons or the notoriety

they have already achieved, they suffer no serious detriment when

defects like to those already known are charged against them. Thus, if

it is well known that a person keeps company with a fast set or

consorts with a tough gang, he suffers little if one reveals that he

uses profanity, gambles, drinks to excess, etc.; and if it is known

that a person has these vices, he is not harmed much by mention of a

particular instance or by the additional report that he has been

arrested for cheating and disorderly conduct. But the case is different

if defects unlike those already known are charged (e.g., if one says of

a person known as a liar that he is also a thief), unless the person

spoken of has so black a name as an all-around cheat that no new crime

charged to his account can give a deeper dye to his reputation.

(b) Light faults or acts that are not sinful in themselves are

sometimes matter of grave defamation when spoken of certain persons,

namely, when so much is expected from these persons that even minor

defects are serious blots on their fame. Thus, to say that a layman is

a confirmed liar or loves the opposite sex might be only a venial sin

or no sin at all, but the same statements about a grave cleric would be

seriously defamatory.

2050. Defamation supposes that the party who is injured is in

possession of a good name. But it is possible that the same individual

who enjoys a good name in one place or time, has a bad name in another

place or time. Hence, a number of special cases on defamation present

themselves for consideration.

(a) Thus, there is the case in which a person who has a good name here

is juridically infamous elsewhere; that is, he has lost his good name

elsewhere through a final and valid sentence, conviction, or confession

made in a public trial (see Canon 2197).

(b) There is the case in which a person who has a good name here is

actually infamous elsewhere, that is, his crime is known to so many

persons there that it is morally impossible to keep it secret or excuse

it.

bad repute formerly; that is, his bad name of the past has been

forgotten or has been obliterated by many years of good living.

2051. Meaning of the Expression “Infamous in a Certain Place.”--(a) The

place referred to is either a closed community (e.g., a monastery, a

college, a family) or an open community (e.g., a village, a

neighborhood, a parish, a town, a city); (b) the notoriety referred to

is either universal (i.e. known to all the community), or general

(i.e., known to the greater part of the community), or sufficient

(i.e., known to so many and such talkative persons that the whole

community will shortly be made to share in it). A crime known only to

one or two, or to a small circle of Christian-living persons, is not

notorious.

2052. Number of Persons Who Are Required for Sufficient Notoriety.--(a)

Some authors assign certain definite figures for this purpose--for

example, in a closed community of thirty or a hundred members a fact is

notorious if known to seven or fifteen; in a neighborhood of forty

persons, if it is known to eight individuals from different families;

in a village whose population is one thousand, if it is known to twenty

here and there; in a town of five thousand people, if it is known to

forty here and there.

(b) Other authors hold that no invariable rule can be given, but that

in each case the matter has to be determined by a prudent judgment

based on the character of the crime, the quality of the guilty person

and of the persons present at the time, the publicity of the place,

etc. Thus, if the crime was committed in some central spot from which

news was quickly disseminated, a smaller number of spectators would

make a deed notorious in the surrounding territory.

2053. Publicity of Commission or Report.-Actual infamy or disrepute is

produced either by the publicity of the crime or by the publicity of

the report.

(a) Thus, a crime has publicity in its commission when it was done in a

public place (e.g., on the street, in a public room) or in a private

place but before a considerable number of persons, or when its

indications were publicly given (e.g., by a confession, by maintenance

of a suspected woman in one’s home), or when it was submitted to public

notice or judgment (e.g., the acts of one in public office, the words

of one who delivers a public address, the deeds of one who boasts about

them).

(b) A crime has publicity in its report, when it is widely known,

whether due to the talk of the people, or to presumptions or suspicions.

2054. Revelation about a Person Who Is Juridically in Disrepute

Elsewhere.--(a) This exposure is not contrary to commutative justice,

according to the common opinion, for the condemnation deprives the

criminal of his right to fame (as regards the matter in which he is

found guilty) in all places, and it is often to the interest of the

public to know who has been convicted of crime elsewhere. Exception

should be made for the case in which a trial is conducted secretly in

order to spare the reputation of the condemned, as when a corporation

expels one of its members after a hearing and an unfavorable vote (see

2057).

(b) This revelation is contrary to charity when it deprives a person

without reason of the good fame which he possesses and which he would

not otherwise have lost; for we should love our neighbor as ourselves.

Example: Balbus served a term in jail in the town of A, on account of

drunkenness. He then moved to the distant town of B and by his good

conduct built up an excellent reputation. Claudius from A arrives and

maliciously spreads around the news that Balbus had been once in jail

for drunkenness. Claudius sins gravely against charity.

2055. Revelation about a Person Who Is Actually in Disrepute

Elsewhere.--If the person in question will in all likelihood soon lose

the reputation he has here, the following cases must be considered:

(a) if the disrepute is based on the publicity of a misdeed, the

revelation is not opposed to commutative justice; for he who sins

publicly thereby resigns his right to reputation as regards all those

persons and places to which knowledge of his delinquency is likely to

arrive. The revelation is against charity, however, if there is no

sufficient reason for it; but since the news would be soon brought

hither from other sources, no great harm is done and no serious sin

committed by the revelation;

(b) if the disrepute is based on public rumor and the rumor is unjust,

revelation, according to some, is opposed to commutative justice, since

it is nothing but a continuation and extension of the original injury.

Others hold that, unless one knows the rumor to be false, revelation is

not unjust in this case, since, as is supposed, the revealer was not

the author of the rumor, and those to whom he spoke would have learned

it shortly even without him. Of course, if the person about whom the

revelation is made suffers some considerable damage by reason of the

early loss of his good name, the person who makes the revelation

unnecessarily is guilty of serious sin. And rumor should never be

represented as an established fact.

2056. If the revelation is made about one who is actually in disrepute

elsewhere, but who is in little danger on that account of losing the

good name which he has here, opinions differ regarding the extent of

the guilt.

(a) Some hold that revelation in this case is a grave sin against

charity, since in a serious matter it saddens a neighbor, and thus

violates the rule of love to do unto others as we would have them do

unto us; and others add that it is also a grave sin against justice, if

the party spoken against is solicitous about his fame, since it

deprives him without reason of a great good to which he is entitled on

account of undisturbed possession.

(b) Others hold that this revelation is not a grave sin, either against

justice (since the right of the community to know about crimes that

were committed elsewhere prevails over the right of the individual) or

against charity (since charity does not oblige under grave

inconvenience).

that, if the crime in question is one that is very detrimental to the

public (e.g., murder, treason, white slave traffic, scandalous

impurity), the opinion under (b) is true; whereas, if it is one that is

not of that character (e.g., drunkenness in a private person), the

opinions under (a) are true. Some also distinguish in the case of

non-pernicious delinquencies between those that are notorious elsewhere

by reason of the public way in which sin was committed and those that

are notorious only on account of rumor; in the former case, they say,

the manifestation is not unjust, for, although public good does not

call for it, the guilty person himself has forfeited his right by the

public manner in which he sinned; but in the latter case it may easily

be unjust (see previous paragraph). The mere fact, however, that a

fault which contains no threat to the public welfare was committed in a

public manner does not seem to be a sufficient reason for manifestation

(e.g., when it will injure a man in earning a living or in supporting

his family), and we believe that one who speaks of such a fault without

necessity sins against charity, if not against justice, and that the

sin is often mortal.

2057. Notoriety in a Closed Community.--Notoriety in a closed community

is not absolute publicity, and hence the conclusions just given on

absolute publicity do not apply to closed communities.

(a) Thus, if a fault is actually notorious in a closed community, the

members may speak about it to one another, if there is any sufficient

reason for this. Hence, if the majority of the members of a religious

house know about a fault that has been committed there, it may be

divulged to one who is in ignorance about it for his instruction or

warning. Similarly, servants in a house may tell other domestics about

faults which are commonly known in the house.

(b) If a fault is notorious in a closed community but not outside, the

members as a rule may not speak or write about it to outsiders without

injustice, for generally speaking there is no reason arising from

necessity or utility for such a revelation. Moreover, the community

itself suffers in repute from such disclosures, since outsiders will be

impressed with the thought that the community has wicked members or is

lax, and that there is a lack of unity among them. To carry stories

from one monastery or house to another (even of the same Order) is a

form of detraction to outsiders, according to St. Alphonsus.

2058. Revelation about a Person Formerly in Disrepute.--When the

revelation concerns one who was in disrepute formerly, but who has a

good name now, either because his crime has been forgotten or because

he has lived it down, a distinction must be made between juridical and

actual notoriety.

(a) If the former disrepute was juridical notoriety, the revelation of

it is not unjust, since condemnation pronounced in a court of law gives

the right to others to make the sentence known in any place or at any

time; but more probably it is mortally uncharitable, if made without

necessity, since it harms the other person or his family in the

reputation which he has honestly recovered, thus depriving him of a

good most useful to him and hurtful to no one else.

(b) If the former disrepute was actual notoriety only, the revelation

is uncharitable, according to all, since it does not observe the golden

rule of doing to others as we would be done by. Many hold that it is

also unjust, since an obliterated crime is the same as an occult crime,

which cannot be divulged without injustice (see 2067). Moreover, the

person who has built up for himself a new reputation has a right to it,

and by the revelation of the old reputation this right is infringed,

inasmuch as his present good name is also lost or made useless. It

should be noted that the common good sometimes makes exceptions, and

thus it is not forbidden to historians to make revelations about

happenings that throw a new and unfavorable light on the youth or

earlier years of persons no longer living (see 2072 Sqq.).

2059. Case in Which the Name of the Person Defamed Is Not Given.--(a)

If there is nothing to indicate the individual and no reflection is

cast on a body to which he belongs, _per se_ no sin is committed.

Hence, if one says, “A certain person whom we shall call Balbus stole a

sheep,” there is no defamation in the narrative, even though a real

happening is described. Similarly, if one says that in the city where

he is speaking there are many criminals, or that even among his

numerous auditors there are doubtless some who are living in mortal

sin, there is no defamation.

(b) If there is something to indicate the individual meant, or if

reflection is cast on a body to which the individual belongs, sin is

committed by the remarks. Hence, if the narrative about Balbus and the

stolen sheep went on to describe incidents so that the hearers could

easily perceive that Balbus was a person known to them, this person

would be injured in his fame. Again, if one states that in a certain

city which one names 90% of the married people are addicted to

drunkenness, or that the party who was guilty of some scandalous act

was a member of a Religious Institute, harm is brought directly upon

individuals or damage is done to societies. It is true that an

organization is not really discredited by the misdeeds of one of its

members, but in popular opinion very often the disgrace of one is the

disgrace of all.

2060. Defamation of Deceased and Legal Persons.--(a) Defamation of the

dead, whether they be long or only recently dead, is sinful _per se_,

since the departed are capable of a glorious or inglorious memory, and

it is reasonable that one should wish one’s good name to be respected

after one’s death, both for one’s own sake and for the sake of others.

Hence the saying, “_De mortuis nil nisi bonum_.” But _per accidens_ it

is not sinful to make revelations about the dead when this is necessary

for historical truth (see 2072 sqq.). Defamation of the dead in itself

is less sinful than defamation of the living, since the dead have less

need of a good reputation; but circumstances may be such that one who

defames a dead person does serious harm and commits a mortal sin.

(b) Defamation of legal persons is also sinful _per se_, since these

bodies possess along with other rights of natural persons the right to

a good name. Public esteem is very necessary for them, and they are

protected in their enjoyment of it by the laws. Thus, it is injurious

to state that a certain Religious Order or monastery or diocese is

relaxed, or that a certain business corporation is not well managed.

But _per accidens_ it is not sinful to make revelations about

organizations, when there is a sufficient reason for the revelation

(see 2067). For example, if a political party is preying on the

citizens, or if a mercantile house is practising frauds, the common

good would require one to make these facts known. Neither is it sinful

to mention faults or defects that are notorious, for example, that a

certain government is warlike, that a certain people is backward, that

a certain group is devoted to erroneous principles or practices (Tit.,

i. 12).

2061. The Harm Done by Reason of the Person of the Defamer.--(a) The

person of the defamer increases the harm when his authority is greater.

A person who is supposed to be better informed (e.g., one who reports

that he was an eyewitness of the event he narrates), or who enjoys a

better reputation for truth (e.g., one who is in an official position,

or who is thought to be honest and disinterested), does more harm by

defamation than another whose authority is weak.

(b) The person of the defamer decreases the harm when his authority is

less. Hence, those who give out unfavorable reports about others with

reservations (such as “perhaps,” “it is not impossible,” “it seems so,

but I would not swear to it,” etc.), and also those whose weight as

authorities is light (such as talkative, lightminded, envious, gossipy,

or untruthful persons), do less harm than persons who are held in

higher repute. The confessor should not let these defamers off easily,

however, since many of them act on the principle that if enough mud is

thrown, no matter how foolish the charges, some of the mud will stick.

2062. One of the commonest forms of defamation is the narration of some

crime or defect at second hand, as when the defamer introduces his

remarks as follows: “They say,” or, “It is reported,” or, “I hear,” etc.

(a) The mode of defamation here lessens the sin when it weakens the

effect of the story upon the hearers. Hence, if one says that the talk

of the town is that Claudius is a heavy drinker, and the listeners

gather from this only that there is a vague rumor which cannot be

traced to any source or be confirmed by any fact and which is therefore

unreliable, the harm is less.

(b) The mode of defamation here does not lessen the sin when it does

not weaken the impression of the story; on the contrary, it increases

the sin when it adds strength to the story. Hence, if one says that

Claudius is said to be an excessive drinker, and if from the phrasing

the listeners will understand that the report originated with very good

authorities, or that it is based on general knowledge of the public,

the harm is greater. Justice is violated if the narrative itself

inclines the hearers to sinister thoughts or suspicions, for then the

narrator causes the harm; charity alone may be violated if it is only

the character of the listeners (e.g., their suspicious or frivolous

minds or their own guilt) that engenders in them evil opinion, for then

the narrator only occasions the harm (cfr. 1447, 1464).

2063. The Harm Done by Reason of the Listeners.--(a) The quality of the

listeners makes a difference, since it may cause the person defamed to

suffer more or less readily in their eyes (e.g., if they are

suspicious, or prejudiced, or credulous, or guilty themselves, they

will more easily believe evil about others) or in the eyes of others

(e.g., if the listeners are newsmongers or enemies of the person

defamed, the spread of the defamatory story is more certain). The loss

itself may be greater or less on account of the character or position

of the listener (e.g., loss of reputation with a friend or a virtuous

person is felt more, loss of reputation with customers or employers is

more damaging, etc.).

(b) The quantity of the listeners also makes a difference, since it is

more harmful, other things being equal, to be defamed before several

than before one. Hence, the fact that many persons are present when the

defamation is uttered is an aggravating circumstance of the sin.

Whether it multiplies the sin numerically, so that one commits as many

sins of defamation as there are persons who hear and are impressed, is

a disputed point. Those who hold for multiplication argue that the

defamed person has a distinct right to his reputation with each person

present; those who deny multiplication contend that the right to

reputation is a single object, since reputation is the opinion of

others, whether they be many or few. This latter view seems to be more

common, and its practical bearing is that a penitent need not mention

the number of persons before whom he defamed his neighbor (see 217).

2064. Is the malice of defamation aggravated by the fact that the

listeners are peculiar and think the defect mentioned is far more

serious than it really is?

(a) If only the harm to reputation is considered, it does not seem that

the over-strict notions of the listeners increase the sinfulness of

defamation; for the harm to reputation is to be measured by the common

opinion, not by the singular ideas of certain persons. Example:

Sempronius tells that Balbus wastes a little time in telling humorous

incidents and reading detective stories. The small group of auditors

think that this is one of the blackest of crimes.

(b) If other harms are taken into account, the peculiar ideas of the

listener may add to the sinfulness of defamation. Thus, if a young

person of delicate conscience will be scandalized at hearing that Caius

plays cards, or if older listeners will be led by this remark to take

their trade away from Caius, the sins of scandal and of unjust damage

are added to defamation. Defamation often destroys in the listener all

faith in humanity, or all belief in religion.

2065. Detraction to One Discreet Person.--Is detraction a mortal sin,

if the revelation of a serious sin is made without sufficient reason

but to only one prudent and discreet person, who will neither divulge

the information, nor be influenced by it to the harm of the party

spoken against?

(a) If the purpose of the speaker is to inflict serious injury on his

neighbor, mortal sin is committed, since the gravity of the sin is

measured by the malevolence of the will.

(b) If the purpose of the speaker is not to inflict serious injury, but

only to indulge his love of talk, levity of mind, etc., the gravity of

the sin depends on the actual harm that is done; for one wills

indirectly the harm connected with one’s acts, even when one does not

desire it directly (see 102). Hence, if the harm is in fact serious,

mortal sin is incurred by the detractor, unless he is excused from it

by the imperfection of his deliberation or consent. How much harm,

then, is done in this case? Most moralists, it seems, think grave harm

is done, since the loss of good name with one prudent man is generally

more distasteful than its loss with many light-minded persons. Some

moralists, however, dissent from this view, and hold that the harm done

is small. They argue that the loss of good name with one prudent person

(exception being made for the cases when he is the one person whose

esteem is prized above that of all others, or when the crime revealed

is an enormous or very degrading one) is not a great blow to

reputation, since reputation consists in the opinion of many persons,

and since a prudent man will be inclined to help rather than harm one

who has been defamed in his presence. The advocates of the first

opinion appeal also to the analogy of contumely and rash judgment, for

these two sins are grave, even when the loss of honor or good opinion

is in respect to one person only. But their adversaries deny the

assumed parity: for, while contumely includes the purpose to injure and

rash judgment includes the imputation to another of a defect of which

he is not guilty or not known to be guilty, the detraction now

considered is innocent both of design to injure and of calumny. Both

opinions are probable, but the former seems to be more common and more

likely.

2066. Belittling a Person to Himself.--It is not impossible to belittle

a person to himself, for example, to make him believe that lie is

illegitimate, that he is regarded with contempt by others, that his

ability is mediocre or his character defective, etc. Is this

defamation, or is it sinful?

(a) To lower a person in his own estimation is not defamation in the

strict sense of the word, since defamation is properly an injury to the

reputation that one has with one’s neighbors or with the public, not to

the opinion one has of oneself. This sin belongs rather to derision

(see 2106).

(b) To lower a person in his own eyes is sinful or not sinful according

to the purpose intended or the means employed. Thus, if a parent,

wishing to correct the pride or presumption of his son, gives the

latter a true picture of his failings or limitations, the act is one of

virtuous correction. But if an envious person, wishing to produce a

sense of inferiority in another, deprives the latter of rightful peace

of mind and of reasonable confidence in self, charity and justice are

violated and there is a duty of restitution.

2067. Disclosing Matters Detrimental to Third Party.--In what cases is

it lawful to disclose to others matters that will be detrimental to the

reputation of a third party?

(a) If the communication is false, it is never lawful, no matter how

important the reason; for the end does not justify the means. It is

sinful, therefore, to resort to calumny as a defense of one’s own

reputation or dignity (see 2035, 2036).

(b) If the communication is truthful and the matter is already well

known to the persons addressed, there is no defamation, unless the

communication makes these persons strongly convinced, whereas they had

been rather uncertain before, or reveals to them some important detail

about which they had been in ignorance.

unknown to the parties addressed, there is defamation, unless the

person whose defects are revealed has lost his right to good name on

account of the right of another person which has precedence and cannot

otherwise be upheld (cfr. 2035). In this latter case there is no

obligation to maintain silence, neither from justice (since the lesser

right must yield to the greater right) nor from charity (since this

virtue does not oblige at the cost of great inconvenience). Thus, Our

Lord made known to the Apostles that the Pharisees were hypocrites

(Luke, xii, 1; Matt., xvi. 6), and St. Paul told Timothy that Alexander

and Hymeneus had neither faith nor a good conscience (I Tim., i. 20).

2068. Rights that Have Precedence over a False Reputation.--(a) The

public good is to be preferred to a false reputation, for the public

welfare is the ground for the right to such reputation, the subject

himself being unworthy of the good name he bears (see 2037). It is

right, therefore, to denounce criminals or conspirators to the proper

authorities, or to testify against them. Employers have the duty to

discuss together the failings or imperfections of their employees that

interfere with the business; subjects should manifest abuses about

which they are asked in a canonical visitation; students in a college

should give information about companions who are depraving the morals

of the student body or exercising an evil influence on the other

residents, etc.

(b) The private good of innocent parties may be preferred to the fame

of one who enjoys a false reputation. One may reveal secret defects for

one’s own defense; for example, a person whose life, honor or property

is being unjustly attacked may reveal sins of the guilty in order to

deter them or weaken their authority; a person who has been injured by

his superior or another party may speak of this to a friend for the

sake of obtaining consolation, or to a confessor, a lawyer or other

adviser for the sake of obtaining counsel or assistance. One may also

reveal secret defects for the protection of others; for example, one

should put unsuspecting persons on their guard against seducers,

impostors, quacks; one should reveal impediments that stand in the way

of a marriage, or should warn a young woman that the man to whom she is

engaged is a criminal or diseased; one should make known the true

author of a crime for which an innocent person is about to suffer; one

should tell the truth to inquirers about the incompetency of servants

or other persons whom one has employed.

preferred to the lower good of his false reputation; for it is to his

interest that his higher good be promoted, even at the expense of an

inferior good. It is lawful to tell parents about the misdeeds of their

children (e.g., that a daughter is involved in a scandalous liaison),

in order that the latter may be corrected; or to speak to the friends

of wayward persons about the misconduct of the latter in order that

prayers may be said for their conversion.

2069. Unlawful Attack on Another’s False Reputation.--If the false

reputation of another is not the unjust cause of a loss that is feared,

it is not right to deprive him of his good name. Examples: (a) It is

not lawful to accuse a person who is about to be promoted to some

office or dignity of which he is worthy, if the motive of the

accusation is to secure the honor for oneself or one’s friend;

otherwise ambitious persons would be encouraged to practise spying,

manufacturing of evidence, etc., and the public peace would be greatly

disturbed. (b) It is not lawful to accuse a person who is giving one no

offense, if the motive of the accusation is to distract attention from

oneself or to make oneself shine by the comparison.

2070. Conditions that Justify Revelation of Another’s Defects.--In

revealing defects on account of some necessary good, one must observe

the conditions for an act of double result (see 103).

(a) Thus, the action itself must not be evil, and hence one may not

break the seal of secrecy to which one is bound (as will be said in the

next Article in discussing violations of secrets), nor make use of

knowledge unjustly acquired, nor reveal more or to more persons than

the case demands, nor reveal anything, if a warning to the offender

will suffice (see 1286).

(b) The good result must be intended, and the evil result of detriment

to fame must be only permitted. Those who assign pious motives (pity,

zeal, sincerity) for talk against a neighbor, but who are really

actuated by hatred, revenge, ambition to defeat a rival, or other like

passion, sin on account of their wrong intention. A hypocritical form

of defamation is practised by some persons exteriorly devout, who under

the pretext of asking prayers for their neighbor’s conversion spread

stories about those whom they dislike.

Hence, the good result intended must be one that is likely to follow on

the revelation, and it must be of some importance; for it would be

cruel to throw away a neighbor’s good name on the mere possibility that

a considerable good would be secured, or on the certainty that only a

slight benefit would be obtained. It does seem, however, that the good

which is hoped for must be of an equal dignity with the good of fame,

since the innocent and the guilty party are not on the same footing,

and furthermore all admit, for example, that the fame of an employee

who is stealing from his employer is not to be preferred to the goods

of the employer. In doubt about the seriousness of the evil following

on revelation, the innocent party is to be favored.

2071. Revelations about Public Officials or Candidates for Public

Office.--(a) These are lawful when the public good calls for them

(e.g., when a man has used corrupt practices in order to be elected, or

when he is incompetent, or when he has been guilty of malfeasance in

office), and the conditions of the previous paragraph are observed.

(b) These revelations are unlawful when the public good suffers from

them (e.g., when the safety or dignity of society itself would be

injured by attacks on the head of government), or when the due

conditions are not observed (e.g., when one resorts to personalities

about a deserving public official, or practises muckraking because of

mere prejudice or partisanship). The law permits fair comment on public

persons or works, but it also grants an action for criticism that

contains unfair aspersions of personal character or unjust accusations

about public conduct.

2072. Revelations about Historical Personages.--(a) These revelations

are not lawful unless there is a proportionate reason that justifies

them. For historians there are sufficient reasons to narrate

impartially the crimes as well as the virtues of those who appear in

their pages. These reasons are: the nature of history as a record of

facts and causes (“the first law of history is that it dare not tell

any untruth, that it fear not to tell any truth,” Leo XIII); the rights

of the persons who are treated in the annals (e.g., it is often

impossible to understand the deeds of one character in history or to do

him justice unless the secret crime of another character is revealed);

the rights of the readers (e.g., the reader has the right to know that

the persecutors of religion have been wicked in their personal lives).

The historian, therefore, may search for material bearing on the lives

and deeds of historical personages of the past, he may collect similar

material relating to current events, he may narrate defects or

delinquencies of the past that were unknown or forgotten. But matters

of a purely private character that have no bearing on public events do

not belong, according to some moralists, to the legitimate province of

the historian; for otherwise there would be an end to the rights of the

dead over their fame. Moreover, there is the risk of calumny and of

violation of elementary justice, since the historian is a

self-appointed judge and the person condemned is not able to defend

himself.

(b) These historical revelations are not lawful unless the conditions

mentioned in 2070 are observed. Thus, a historian should not write down

details that were told him in confidence by a person long since dead;

he should not be swayed either by unreasonable likes or unreasonable

dislikes in the expression of his views; he should not publish what

will cause harm rather than good, such as circumstances in the lives of

persons recently deceased which, if revealed, will be detrimental to

living persons.

2073. It is not always easy to determine whether more harm is likely to

result if the persons whose glory is dimmed are high in public esteem

on account of the prestige of their office or their great exploits.

Much will depend on circumstances and on the author’s manner of

treatment.

(a) Thus, _per se_, or from the nature of things, it does not cause

greater harm to narrate truth about the imperfections of great men, for

only error or prejudice or evil has reason to fear the truth. The

inspired Scriptures themselves deal candidly with the public failings

of personages who were high in religious or civil position, for

example, the hesitation of Moses, the infidelity of Aaron, the fall of

King David, the disobedience of the prophet Jonas, the denials of

Peter, the doubts of Thomas, the treason of Judas. These histories are

not harmful, but, on the contrary, contain most useful lessons of

instruction, warning and direction.

(b) _Per accidens_, or on account of special conditions, it may be more

harmful to write of the failings of the great (cfr. 1001). Thus, the

class of persons for whom one is writing may be immature (e.g., a

textbook of history for children would give scandal if it spoke openly

of sexual crimes), the conditions of the time may be unfavorable (e.g.,

a new historical production might lead to injury to some class of

persons at a time of great prejudice against them), the total effect of

a book may be bad (e.g., chronicles of scandals, historical biographies

or novels or plays written in a seductive manner). The class of modern

writers known as “debunkers,” whose aim it is to destroy all

hero-worship, offend against truth and ideals by the prominence they

give to evil, while the so-called psychological historians are

frequently purely subjective as well as immoral.

2074. Revelations about Persons Who Figure in the News of the Day.--(a)

If the matters revealed are of a public nature, the lawfulness or

unlawfulness of the revelation will depend on the reasons for it and

the manner in which it is given. In discussing political affairs, a

newspaper has the right to call attention to mistakes and faults of

public men, since the freedom of the press in this respect is a

protection to liberty and to progress, and those who enter public life

implicitly consent to criticism of their conduct; in reporting the

news, a newspaper has the right to speak of murders, robberies and

other public crimes that have been committed, since the common good

requires that the authors of public offenses be known as such. But if

this kind of news is disserviceable in any instance to the order,

peace or dignity of the community, or if the news is obtained in

unjust or dishonorable ways, or if the motive is merely to gratify

curiosity, to indulge prejudice, or to make money, the newspaper

management is morally guilty, even though it may be legally within its

right. Yellow journalism and “tabloidism” are reprehensible because

they are injurious to the minds and morals of their readers on account

of the undue prominence given to crime, even of the most disgusting

sort, and the appeal made to sense and emotion rather than to thought.

(b) It the matters revealed are of a private nature, the morality of

the revelation has to be judged by the principles given in 2067 sqq. It

would be wrong to make a practice of spying into the private life and

affairs even of public persons merely to add interest to one’s columns;

but if there is some really important advantage to the public or to a

private person that will be served, and if the other conditions are

observed (see 2070), one may publish even private defects that are real

and certain.

2075. Injustice in Professional Critics.--(a) Injustice is done by

professional critics (such as book reviewers, dramatic and art critics,

and the like) to the persons who rely upon their opinion, if there is a

compact with them to give a competent and unbiased judgment and the

compact is not lived up to by the critic with resultant damage to the

client (see 1793). If there is no compact, the critic is nevertheless

guilty of deception and uncharitableness, if he performs his office

carelessly (e.g., by eulogizing a worthless book or play or picture).

(b) Injustice is done the person criticized, if his work is undervalued

purposely (e.g., because the critic is jealous, or in an ill humor or

is hired by others to dispraise), or if uncalled-for personalities are

indulged in at the expense of the person’s fame. A carping critic may

by the stroke of the pen spoil the work of years, and hence ignorance

does not excuse those censors who practise wholesale and unfair

denunciations (see 905).

2076. Cooperation in Defamation.--Not only the defamer sins, but also

those who cooperate with him. Among the cooperators with defamation are

those who give orders for defamation, those who show how it can be

done, those who protect defamers, and those who participate in

defamation by directing the conversation to a certain subject or by

joining in the criticisms. The most ordinary form of participation in

defamation is that of the listener, for no one defames successfully

unless he has a sympathetic listener. Those who listen to detraction in

such a way as to consent to what is said share in the guilt of the

detraction. This happens as follows:

(a) the listener consents directly to defamation when he spurs the

speaker on (e.g., by saying, “Tell us about So-and-So,” by insincerely

praising an absent person in order to excite dispraise, by nodding

approvingly, cheering, or smiling, by showing great marks of favor to

those who bring him news against others or of disfavor to those who

refuse to do this), or when he rejoices internally at the defamation he

hears, because he hates the victim:

(b) the listener consents indirectly to defamation when he does not

spur the speaker on nor approve of what is said, but omits to stop the

defamation or to protest against it, when he could and should do one or

the other of these things.

2077. Sinfulness of Direct Consent to Defamation.--The listener who

consents directly shares in the guilt of the defamer according to the

words of St. Paul: “They who do such things (detractors, etc.) are

worthy of death, and not only they that do them, but they also that

consent to them that do them” (Rom., i. 32), Indeed, St. Bernard says

that it is not easy to say which is more deserving of condemnation, to

defame or to listen to defamation. But we may distinguish as follows:

(a) he who spurs the defamer on is more guilty than the defamer. This

listener sins against the detractor whom he scandalizes by inducing to

sin, against the detracted whom he deprives of his good name. Thus, he

is both uncharitable to the detractor and unjust to the detracted, and

is the moving cause of all the harm that is done (cfr. 2065);

(b) he who hears the defamer willingly may be more guilty internally

than the defamer, since his hatred of his neighbor and his love of

injustice may be more intense; but externally his sin is less, since,

as is supposed, he is not bound to resist the defamation and he does

not give any cooperation to the external injustice. He sins against

justice affectively (i.e., in wish), but not effectively (i.e., in word

or deed).

2078. Persons Who Listen from Curiosity.--What of those listeners who

hear defamation willingly, not because they approve of the harm or evil

that is being done, but because they are unusually curious or the

speaker is unusually interesting?

(a) If these listeners could and should stop the defamation, they

consent to it indirectly by their silence and thus are guilty (cfr.

2079).

(b) If these listeners are not able or are not bound to stop the

defamation, some would nevertheless hold them guilty of grave sin,

since they wish to hear something only because the knowledge will give

them pleasure, knowing all the while that this knowledge cannot be had

except at the expense of the good opinion they have of a neighbor. But

the general view is that in this case there is no grave sin; for the

listener does not approve of the moral evil (he is interested only in

the graceful or eloquent or witty manner of the speaker, or the

strangeness of the things related, or he is only concerned to hear the

latest news, cfr. 234), and what he hears does not cause the lowering

of his neighbor in his own opinion. But here it is supposed that the

listener in no way encourages the defamation and that he is not bound

to stop it. Curiosity about things that do not concern one is, however,

a venial sin.

2079. Sinfulness of Indirect Consent to Defamation.--The listener who

consents indirectly to defamation by not impeding it as he should is

also guilty of sin, and in Scripture his conduct is strongly forbidden:

“Have nothing to do with detractors” (Prov., xxiv. 21); “Hedge in thy

ears with thorns, hear not a wicked tongue” (Ecclus., xxviii. 28).

(a) It is commonly admitted that the listener in question sins doubly

against charity, and grievously if the defamation is seriously harmful;

for he sins against the detractor by refusing to give a brotherly

correction (see 1258 sqq.), and he sins also against the one detracted

by refusing to raise his voice in behalf of the absent who cannot

defend himself.

(b) It is also commonly admitted that, if the listener is the superior

of the defamer or of the person defamed, he sins more gravely, since he

is specially bound to correct his subject who is detracting in his

presence, or to defend his absent subject who is being defamed. If the

listener is a private person not responsible for the defamed person’s

reputation, he does not sin against justice by his indirect consent to

the defamation. Indeed, the inferiors or equals of the defamer rarely

sin gravely by their neglecting to oppose his defamatory remarks.

2080. Guilt of Superior Who Consents to Defamation.--Is the superior

who indirectly consents to defamation of a non-subject by a subject

guilty thereby of injustice?

(a) As regards the spiritual injury (i.e., the guilt of sin incurred by

the defamer), the superior is guilty of injustice towards his subject,

if by reason of his office or contract he is bound to correct faults

and neglects to do so. Thus, a bishop or pastor is supported by his

people, and there is at least an implied agreement that he will direct

them in spiritual matters and reprove their faults. Hence, it seems

that a spiritual superior of this kind is unjust, if he fails to

correct a subordinate who carries defamatory tales to his ears.

(b) As regards the temporary injury (i.e., the detriment to fame

incurred by the person maligned), all depends on whether the superior

is bound by reason of his office or contract to prevent injury to

non-subjects by those who are his subjects. If the superior exercises

his authority in the temporal order and has an agreement with those not

subject to him to protect them against defamation by his subjects, he

is bound in justice to abide by his agreement. But the common opinion

is that a superior in the spiritual order is not responsible _ex

officio_ for the fame or other temporal welfare of those not subject to

him.

2081. Is the superior who indirectly consents to defamation of a

subject guilty thereby of injustice?

(a) If the superior has authority in the temporal order, he is unjust

by his inaction, in so far as law, custom or agreement hold him to

prevent the defamation of his subject. Thus, a guardian entrusted with

the care of his ward’s reputation is unjust if he makes no effort to

prevent defamation of the latter.

(b) If the superior is in the spiritual order, some believe that he is

unjust by inaction, since fame is closely connected with spiritual

goods, being necessary for moral influence over others and useful for

personal perseverance in virtue. But others--and it seems more

commonly--deny this, and state that the relation between fame and

spiritual goods is only accidental.

2082. Circumstances Which Lessen Guilt of Indirect Consent.--Indirect

consent to defamation is often only a venial sin. (a) Thus, by reason

of the lightness of the matter, as when only trivial defects are

mentioned by the defamer; (b) by reason of insufficient reflection, as

when the listener is distracted in mind and does not clearly advert to

the sinfulness of the words he hears; (c) by reason of insufficient

consent, as when the failure to stop or protest against the defamation

is due to slight laziness, to bashfulness, or to fear of the speaker,

at least when the defamation is not extremely harmful to fame or other

good, or gravely slanderous.

2083. Inaction in the Face of Defamation.--Inaction in the face of

defamation of a third party is sometimes no sin at all.

(a) Thus, there is no sin when one is unable to act (e.g., when a

slanderous speech is being delivered by a person in authority who will

not suffer any interruption to be made), or is unable to act with any

success (e.g., when the attempt to correct would provoke worse

defamation, when the listener is too unskilled to refute or

remonstrate). Scrupulous persons should not attempt to correct, since

they are not suited for this. Their attempts to defend an absent person

would generally make them ridiculous, and would often be unjust to the

person whom they suspected of defamation.

(b) There is no sin when one is not obliged to act (e.g., when

interference will expose one to very serious evils, when the defamation

is not grave or is not taken very seriously, when the listener is

uncertain whether the speaker is really guilty of defamation or whether

he himself is bound to intervene). It is sometimes unwise to interrupt

a defamatory story, for many such story seems to promise dire

disclosures at its beginning, but when heard to the end is seen to be

an affair of no importance or to contain little that is new or

startling or credible.

2084. Ways of Opposing Defamation Made in One’s Presence.--(a) Positive

resistance is made by a command to the defamer to be silent, or by

refutation of his words if they are false, or by a rebuke if his words

are true. This mode of correction is generally required if the listener

is the superior of the defamer, and is sometimes suitable if he is the

latter’s equal.

(b) Negative resistance is made by leaving the company, by having no

share in the conversation, by changing the subject, by showing

displeasure or at least gravity in one’s looks or acts: “The north wind

driveth away rain, as doth a sad countenance a backbiting tongue”

(Prov., xxv. 23). This mode of resistance is usually the proper one for

an inferior, and as a rule is found more satisfactory even between

equals (see 1267).

2085. Restitution for Defamation.--Restitution for injuries committed

is necessary (see 1759), and hence it is required of the defamer. In

the language of Scripture (Prov., xiii. 13), he that speaks ill of his

neighbor obliges himself for the future. The two injuries to be

repaired are: (a) the unjust taking, that is, the fame of which he has

deprived his neighbor; (b) the unjust damage, that is, the detriment to

fame or the losses that resulted from the defamation (such as failure

to obtain or keep a position, decline of business, etc., which were

foreseen at least in a confused manner). It is clear there is no duty

of restitution, if in spite of talk against a neighbor he suffered no

loss (e.g., if the listeners gave no heed or credence to the talk).

2086. Gravity of Obligation of Restitution.--The obligation of

restitution for defamation is grave or light according to the degree of

injury done, and the grave obligation binds even at the expense of

serious inconvenience, the light obligation at the cost of small

inconvenience. But the following points should be noted:

(a) the injury is not necessarily grave if the defect imputed to

another is grave, for many circumstances have to be considered (e.g.,

blasphemy is a serious charge, but it would not be very harmful to a

man publicly known as very impious, see 2053 sqq.);

(b) the injury is not necessarily slight if the defect imputed is

slight, for circumstances may make the injury considerable (e.g., it is

not very defamatory to say that a woman is very talkative, or unable to

speak or spell correctly, but this would be very damaging if it lost

the woman a very lucrative position as secretary).

2087. Conditions Which Entail Duty of Restitution.--Restitution is not

obligatory unless one is the unjust and efficacious author of the

damage (see 1763). Hence, disclosures unfavorable to the reputation of

others entail the duty of restitution only when the following

conditions are present:

(a) the detriment to fame or other loss must be unjust objectively, and

hence those who have a just reason for exposing the vices of others are

not held to restitution;

(b) the detriment must be unjust subjectively, and hence one who in

good faith speaks of a neighbors sin, thinking that it is true and

public, whereas it is false or secret, is not bound to restitution, if

he discovers his error after the results of the defamation have been

removed (see, however, 2102). But if he discovers his mistake while the

neighbor is still under a cloud because of the report, he becomes from

that moment responsible and subjectively unjust, if he does not take

steps as far as he conveniently can to correct the error (see 1769);

cause, and hence one is not bound to restitution if a listener

understands one to disparage when in fact one has not disparaged.

2088. Cooperators and Restitution.--Those who cooperate in injustice

are also held to restitution (see 1778 sqq.), and hence the following

are bound to indemnify a defamed person:

(a) positive cooperators are held to restitution, such as those who

command, counsel, or encourage defamation. The same is true of those

who share in a defamatory conversation or who merely listen, but by

their questions, or show of interest or approval, induce the defamer to

continue, or to speak with more assurance;

(b) negative cooperators are also held to restitution, if they were

bound in justice to resist or impede defamation. This will apply

chiefly to a superior who does not prevent, as he should, the

defamation of his subject or community, whether by a subject or a

non-subject (see 2080 sqq.).

2089. Circumstances of Restitution.--We shall now speak of the

circumstances of restitution for defamation: (a) the persons bound to

restitution besides the defamer, namely, his heirs, the listeners,

etc.; (b) the persons to whom restitution is to be made; (c) the manner

of making restitution; (d) the time for making restitution (see 1781

sqq.).

2090. Restitution for Defamation to Be Made by an Heir of the

Defamer.--(a) For the injury to fame, it seems that the heir is not

bound, since the duty of restitution of fame is a personal one, that

is, an obligation to perform an act of retraction or apology, not an

obligation to pay compensation (see 463). But some hold that defamation

may be satisfied for by pecuniary compensation (1750, 1802), and that,

if the injured party should insist on this kind of compensation for the

infamy suffered, the heirs would be obliged to pay it.

(b) For the damages resulting from injury to fame the heir is bound,

since restitution for losses is a real one and rests upon the property

or estate of the deceased. But those who are in good faith are

sometimes to be left undisturbed, lest they become guilty of formal sin.

2091. The Persons to Whom Restitution for Defamation Is to Be

Made.--(a) To the person defamed restitution of fame is owed, and this

is true even when the person is already dead. Just as one who dishonors

the dead by desecrating their tombs or their remains owes it to their

memory to make reparation, so one who defames the dead owes it to their

reputation to make restitution. In fact, the heirs may be bound in

conscience to insist upon this restitution, and it seems they cannot

condone it, since it is not their own fame that has been hurt.

(b) To the listeners restitution is not owed, since no injustice was

done them, but reparation for scandal given them may be obligatory.

And, since justice to the person defamed requires retraction or other

reparation, the defamer must recall his words before the persons to

whom he addressed them. Hence, if defamation appeared in a journal, the

honorable reparation should also appear in the same journal and with

the same prominence given it as was given the offensive remarks.

2092. Responsibility of Defamer for Spread of Defamation.--Is the

defamer bound to recall his words to the wider audience that learned

them from his first listeners?

(a) If the defamer is not responsible for the spread of his talk beyond

the circle which he addressed (e.g., if he imposed strict silence upon

his listeners or had good reason to think that they would keep his

remarks to themselves, and his words nevertheless leaked out), the

common opinion is that he is not held to reparation before the

subsequent listeners.

(b) If the defamer is responsible for the spread of his talk (e.g., if

he gave his listeners permission to quote or repeat, or if he knew well

that they would carry his words far and wide), he is bound to

reparation before the later listeners, in so far as this is possible,

especially if he was guilty of calumny. Whether he or his listeners

have the first duty of restitution will depend on the relationship in

their cooperation (see 1784). If he can do nothing better, he should

admonish his listeners to retract before their listeners.

2093. The First Way of Making Restitution for Defamation.--(a) If the

defamation was by calumny, the defamer (and also the propagator) must

take back his words, admitting that what he said was untrue. If

necessary, he should also make affidavit to this effect, or even admit

that he lied. The reason is that the innocent party has a greater right

to his fame than the guilty party. But the defamer is not obliged to

confess his own malice, when this is not necessary, and it may suffice

to say merely that his former statement was not correct.

(b) If the defamation was by detraction, the defamer cannot truthfully

say that his words were false, and he must counteract directly or

indirectly the effect of his defamation by something favorable to the

person he has injured. If the listeners will not be confirmed in their

belief by his explanation, the defamer should explain to them that his

statements were unjust, that he had no right to make them, that he

wishes them to regard as unsaid all that he said, etc. (direct

revocation). If this cure would be worse than the sickness by

strengthening the belief of the listeners that the defamation was true,

the defamer should be silent about his former statements. But he should

so honor or praise the person defamed that others will be led to

believe, not that restitution is being made, but that the former good

opinion they had of the person defamed was correct (indirect

revocation). Thus, if the defamer knows that the injured person has

reformed, he may call attention to and emphasize the virtues he now

has; if the defamed person has still the same failing, he may be

excused, when possible, or praised for the good qualities he does

possess, or he may be spoken of in general terms of esteem; if the

listeners have been led to dishonor the person who was detracted, the

defamer may show special signs of esteem or confidence to the latter,

etc.

2094. Other Methods of Making Restitution.--If the listeners will not

be impressed by any of the methods of satisfaction just indicated, what

should be done?

(a) If, in the case of calumny, the listeners are unwilling to accept

the formal statement that the defamation was untrue, the defamer is

obliged to nothing more. For the slanderer has done all that is

possible to change the erroneous view of the listeners, and the bad

opinion they have of their neighbor must now be attributed, not to the

defamer, but to their own wickedness or stubbornness.

(b) If the listeners cannot be properly impressed by the direct or

indirect revocation of detraction, the defamer, being unable to make

honorable compensation by restoration of fame, should make a profitable

compensation by the bestowal of a benefit that will in some way be

commensurate with the good of reputation and be acceptable to the other

party. Thus, if the person defamed is satisfied with money or something

measurable in terms of money, he should be given damages; if this kind

of compensation is of little use or is not esteemed (few persons of

honor would take money alone as pay for a lost reputation), he should

be given some other good which in his own judgment and that of a

prudent man is more nearly an equivalent for the good of which he has

been deprived. An apology is not sufficient, since the begging of

pardon does not restore what was taken; neither is it generally

advisable, because the admission to another that one has been secretly

defaming him and is now sorry for this may lead to quarrels and hatreds

rather than to forgiveness and peace.

2095. Legal Reparation for Defamation.--One who has been sentenced by a

lawful judgment of court to reparation and penalty for defamation is

obliged to obedience, but if the satisfaction decided on by a jury is

excessive or meager, it can be set aside by the court. In Canon Law

(Canon 2355) one who has been convicted of defamation may be sentenced:

(a) to satisfaction; (b) to damages; (c) to suitable penalties, even to

suspension or removal from office or benefice.

2096. The Time When Restitution for Defamation Is to Be Made.--(a) It

should be made as soon as possible, for the longer it is delayed the

greater the injury that is suffered, since defamation becomes harder to

correct as it progresses, or at least has a longer life when it is not

corrected early. But prudence will sometimes dictate that one await a

psychological or favorable moment for a retractation. (b) Restitution

should be promised before absolution is given, and, if there is a

well-founded doubt about the sincerity of a promise, the confessor may

delay absolution until restitution has been made.

2097. Cessation of Duty of Restitution.--The duty of restitution

ceases, at least temporarily, in certain cases (see 1797 sqq.), and

hence one who has been guilty of injustice through defamation is

sometimes excused from reparation. (a) Thus, one is excused temporarily

on account of impossibility; (b) one is excused permanently on account

of the cessation of the other party’s good name or the termination of

one’s own obligation.

2098. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Impossibility.--(a)

Physical impossibility excuses, for example, when one does not know who

the persons were before whom one detracted, or cannot recall who the

person was whom one defamed. But in this case the defamer should at

least make satisfaction by praying for the person whom he defamed, or

by having Masses offered for him.

(b) Moral impossibility excuses from restitution, as when the defamer

will suffer a far greater loss than he inflicted on the person defamed

(e.g., if the defamer cannot retract without losing his life, or a

reputation which is far more valuable than that of the obscure person

who was defamed). But if the defamer has subjected the injured party to

the peril of death, or if he has calumniated an innocent man, he must

make satisfaction even at the peril of his own life or at the cost of

his own fame; for the right of the innocent prevails over that of the

guilty defamer.

2099. Excuse from Restitution on Account of Cessation of Other Party’s

Good Name.--The defamer may also be excused from restitution on account

of cessation of the other party’s good name through another cause, as

when the secret defect first made known by the defamer becomes public

from another source.

(a) The detractor is excused from the duty of restoring reputation,

since the person he defamed has now independently of the first

defamation lost his right to reputation (see 2053 sqq.).

(b) The detractor is not excused, however, from payment for damages

which the defamed person suffered from the first defamation or for

expenses which it caused him. Some moralists hold him obligated also

for some compensation for the infamy suffered before the crime became

public through others.

2100. Excuse from Restitution on Account of the Termination of

Obligation.--(a) The act of the defamed person ends the obligation,

when, without injury to others, he expressly or tacitly condones the

offense; for he has dominion over his own fame, as he has over his own

money or lands. Thus, it may often be presumed that parents overlook

the restitution owed them by their children for criticisms made by the

latter.

(b) The act of the defamed person also ends the obligation, according

to the common opinion, when he has inflicted an equal injury by defaming

his defamer and is unwilling to make satisfaction for the injury; for

though it is unlawful to repay evil with evil, and though one damage

does not cure another damage, he who will not pay a creditor cannot

insist that the creditor pay him an equal debt. Thus, if Titus has

burned the barn of Claudius and Claudius then burns the barn of Titus,

and neither will pay damages, the debts neutralize each other, if the

losses are equal. The same principle applies in defamatory

recriminations.

2101. Right of Defamed Person to Condone Injury.--The person defamed

has the right to condone the injury, if it is only personal to himself,

but he has not always the right to condone the injury when the

defamation causes harm to others.

(a) Thus, the defamed person would sin against justice and his act

would be invalid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the

fact that his own fame was necessary for the fame of others (e.g., when

a monk loses his good name, the monastery is also disgraced), or was

necessary for the fulfillment of duties owed by him in justice to

others (e.g., when a prelate, priest or public official loses his good

name, the good influence he should exercise over his subjects is

ended). This conclusion is probable.

(b) The defamed person would sin against charity, but his act would be

valid, if he forgave the debt of restitution despite the fact that his

fame was necessary for the fulfillment of charitable duties owed to

others, or that his silence in the face of defamation would cause great

scandal (e.g., when a preacher loses his reputation, his words do not

move, and thus he is unable fruitfully to accomplish works of charity

by instructing the ignorant, etc.).

2102. Excuse from Restitution When Reputation Has Been Recovered.--The

obligation of restitution for defamation also ceases when reputation

has been recovered without any act on the part of the defamer; for it

is clear that one is not bound to give back that which is already had.

But restitution may be due, nevertheless, for damages incurred, and

some think that compensation (e.g., apology, honor, praise) should be

made for the injury of infamy that existed before the good name was

regained.

The usual ways in which reputation is recovered without the act of the

defamer are: (a) by overthrow of the defamation, as when the facts

against it become manifest, or when witnesses prove its falsity, or

when a tribunal declares it a criminal libel; (b) by oblivion, as when

a misdeed of years ago has faded entirely out of the public memory. If

the defamer is uncertain whether his past defamations have been

forgotten, he has to act with great prudence; for, if he makes

inquiries the memory of the defamations may be awakened, while if he

says nothing, the defamations, because never corrected or retracted,

may break out anew. He should consider the circumstances, therefore,

and treat the defamed person as he would wish himself to be treated in

a like case.

2103. Whispering or Tale-Bearing.--Whispering (_susurratio_), also

called mischief-making and tale-bearing, is a speech unfavorable to

another person secretly made with the purpose of breaking up a virtuous

friendship.

(a) It is unfavorable speech, that is, the whisperer says something to

his listener that will turn the latter against the person spoken about.

The thing attributed to the absent person may be either something evil

or something that is only seemingly evil, but in either case it will be

something displeasing to the listener. Whispering, therefore, does not

necessarily include defamation.

(b) It is secret, that is, the whisperer speaks privately, and usually

in the way of confidence to the person whose mind he wishes to impress.

Often, however, he goes now to one of the friends, now to another,

speaking in different senses to each, to make his work doubly

effective. This kind of whisperer is known as double-tongued: “The

whisperer and the double-tongued is accursed” (Ecclus., xxviii. 15).

whisperer intends to destroy the feeling of respect and affection which

his listener has for the absent person, or even to instill into the

listener’s mind a feeling of disrespect and dislike for the absent

person. Whispering, therefore, is incomplete when it ends a friendship,

and complete when it makes enemies of those who had been friends and

sows discords and quarrels: “A passionate man kindleth strife, and a

sinful man will trouble his friends, and bring in debate in the midst

of them that are at peace” (Ecclus., xxviii. 11); “When the tale-bearer

is taken away, contentions shall cease” (Prov., xxvi. 20). Whispering,

then, differs from simple defamation, whose purpose is to steal away

fame, for the mischief-maker intends to steal away friendship.

(d) It is directed against a virtuous friendship, for there is no sin

but rather an act of charity in the effort to end a sinful or harmful

friendship, as when a parent tries to keep his daughter away from a

wicked man with whom she is infatuated, or his son away from a

disorderly set whose companionship appeals to the youth (see 1353).

2104. The Sinfulness of Whispering.--(a) Theological

Species.--Whispering is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is

hateful to God (the soul of the Lord detesteth “him that soweth discord

among brethren,” Prov., vi. 19), and deprives man of the boon of a

virtuous friendship, the greatest of external goods. “A faithful friend

is a strong defence, and he that hath found him hath found a treasure.

Nothing can be compared to a faithful friend, and no weight of gold and

silver is able to countervail the goodness of his fidelity. A faithful

friend is the medicine of life and immortality” (Ecclus., vi. 14-16).

Whispering is a greater sin than contumely or defamation, since honor

is less esteemed than friendship, and reputation is only a means to

friendship.

(b) Moral Species.--Generally, whispering is a sin against justice on

account of the unjust means (e.g., force, fraud, lies, detractions) to

which it resorts; but from its nature it is only a sin against charity,

for the injured party has no strict right to friendship, which is a

free relationship that may be terminated at will by either of the

parties.

2105. Circumstances Which Affect the Species of Whispering.--Is the

species of whispering changed by circumstances?

(a) The theological species is changed when the sinful act is imperfect

in malice (e.g., when the whisperer had not reflected well on the evil

that would be caused by him), or when the harm done is slight (e.g.,

when no enmity was caused and the friendship broken up was not strong

or important to the friends). It is not a small matter, however, to

destroy friendships that are very necessary, such as the friendship

between husband and wife, between parent and child.

(b) The moral species is not subdivided, for, though there are

different kinds of friendships (see 1111), whispering is not directed

against the special features, but against the general character common

to all of them, namely, unity of soul and mutual affection. Hence, the

whisperer is not obliged to mention in confession whether the

friendship he broke up was based on utility, or pleasure, or virtue. It

is clear, however, that a new species may be added to whispering. Thus,

he who separates husband and wife, intending to secure the wife for

himself, is guilty also of adultery; he who separates a business man

and his patrons, intending to attract the trade to himself, is guilty

also of theft; he who separates ruler and subjects by his whispering,

is also guilty of sedition, etc.

2106. Derision.--Derision is a jest that reproaches another with some

defect or evil in order to put him to confusion.

(a) It is a jest, that is, it is spoken in fun and consists in making

the defects of another person the object of laughter or amusement.

Thus, it differs in manner from contumely, detraction and whispering,

which are spoken seriously.

(b) Its purpose is the confusion of the person ridiculed, that is, it

intends to take from him the good opinion that he is entitled to have

of himself and the peace of conscience that he enjoys. Thus, it differs

in object and purpose from the other injurious words hitherto

considered (see 2009). The intention to put another person out of

countenance by ridicule is either formal or material, according as the

purpose before the mind is to disconcert that person, or only to have

one’s joke, though one sees that this will mean shame and suffering for

the victim of the joke.

2107. Distinction between Derision and Jesting.--Moderate jesting at

another’s expense is not derision, nor sinful, if it is justified by a

reasonable motive. (a) Thus, a serious motive for jesting at another is

fraternal correction. To ridicule a person who is making a fool of

himself is often the best way to correct him, for many persons are less

moved at being called wicked than at being called absurd. Similarly, a

satirical rebuke sometimes serves to abash a person who has an exalted

opinion of himself. In such cases a truth spoken in jest is an act of

charity to a sinner. (b) A playful motive for jesting at another is

recreation. The good-natured exchange of banter about trivial defects

between persons who enjoy this give and take is a reasonable form of

amusement in itself; indeed, it pertains to the virtue known as

_eutrapelia_. But some persons who enjoy a jest at the expense of

another are extremely sensitive to ridicule and fly into a rage if fun

is poked at themselves, or even if they suspect that someone is

laughing at them.

2108. Even jesting whose purpose is good may be sinful on account of

the offensive or immoderate way in which it is conducted (see 2010).

There are three general forms of jest, but they do not constitute

distinct species of sin when jest is unlawful, since the difference

between them is accidental as far as morality is concerned.

(a) Thus, jest of the mouth is one that is made by words or laughter.

(b) A jest of the face is made by the expression of the countenance

(e.g., by wrinkling up the nose, sticking out the tongue).

horseplay, and the like.

2109. The Sinfulness of Derision.--(a) When the derider makes light of

a grave evil, he commits a mortal sin, for he shows grave contempt

towards the person derided, treating the latter as if he were entirely

worthless--one whose misfortunes were matters for joke. Indeed,

derision is a more serious injury than contumely, for the contumelious

person treats the evil of his neighbor as something serious, whereas

the derider makes sport of it and is thus more insulting. In Scripture

grave punishment is threatened to deriders: “God shall scorn the

scorners” (Prov., iii. 34). But if an evil grave in itself is commonly

looked upon as light on account of the inferior condition of the person

who has the defect (viz., because he is an infant or an idiot), there

is no grave sin of contempt.

(b) When the derider makes light of an evil that is really light, there

is no contempt shown, but there may be serious embarrassment caused to

the person derided. For the peace of a good conscience is a great

blessing (“Our glory is this, the testimony of our conscience,” II

Cor., i. 12; “A secure mind is like a continual feast,” Prov., xv. 15),

and that which disturbs it can be a serious distress and harm. If the

butt of the joke does not take the matter much to heart, the sin is

venial. But should he suffer great mental pain or disturbance on

account of the ridicule, the quality of the sin is disputed. Some think

that mortal sin is committed, if the derider foresees the serious evil

that will ensue; but others hold that the sin is venial, since it is

the over-sensitiveness of the person derided that accounts for his

great discomfiture of mind.

2110. The gravity of the sin of derision is increased by the object

against whom it is directed; for the greater the reverence due a

person, the greater the injury shown by making a mockery of him.

(a) Thus, the worst form of derision is that which is directed against

God, and it is not distinct from blasphemy. Hence, Isaias (IV Kings,

xix. 6) calls the deriders of the God of Israel blasphemers, and St.

Luke (xxii. 64, 65) says that the soldiers who gave Our Lord a mock

coronation spoke in blasphemy.

(b) Next in gravity is derision of parents, and Scripture declares the

special horror of this sin: “The eye that mocketh at his father, let

the ravens of the brooks pick it out and the young eagles eat it”

(Prov., xxx, 17).

persons, for virtue deserves honor, and those who dishonor it deter

men, as far as in them lies, from cultivating or esteeming it.

2111. Cursing.--Cursing in general is the speaking of evil for some

person or thing, that is, in order that the evil spoken may befall him

or it. Thus, it differs from contumely and derision, which are the

speaking of evil to another, and from defamation and whispering, which

are the speaking of evil against another. Cursing is also different

from prediction of evil, and some passages in the Imprecatory Psalms,

though couched in terms of malediction, are prophecies of the future,

rather than curses. An example is Psalm cviii, which foretells the fate

of the traitor Judas. Cursing is expressed in two ways:

(a) imperatively, when one pronounces with authority that punishment is

to be inflicted or evil visited upon some person or object. In this way

God decrees eternal or temporal penalties against sinners, judges

sentence criminals, and the Church anathematize the contumacious;

(b) optatively, when one who has not the power or authority to command

punishment, expresses the wish that misfortune or evil of some kind may

overtake a person or thing. Examples are: “Bad luck to you,” “May you

break your leg,” “The devil take you,” “God damn you.” A curse made in

the form of a prayer is called an imprecation.

2112. When Cursing Is Not Sinful.--Cursing a person is not sinful when

the evil which is ordered or wished is not intended as to the evil that

is in it, but as to some good; for so the intention is directed to

good, not to evil.

(a) Thus, evil may be ordered on account of the good of justice that is

in it, as when a judge decrees capital punishment, which in its

physical being is an evil, but morally is the vindication of justice

and therefore a good. Some of the curses made by holy men in the Bible

are of this character: they proclaim the just sentence of God, as when

Elias called down fire from heaven upon his persecutors (IV Kings, i),

and Eliseus cursed the boys that mocked him (IV Kings, ii. 24); or they

express the submission of the human will to the just decree of God:

“And the Levites shall pronounce with a loud voice, ‘Cursed be he that

abideth not in the words of this law,’ and all the people shall say,

‘Amen’” (Deut., xxvii. 14, 26).

(b) Evil may be desired, if the intention takes in only the good of

public or of private utility that is contained in it, as when one hopes

a jury will find a dangerous criminal guilty, if one has in view, not

the sufferings or death of the criminal, but the safety of the

community. It is right, therefore, to wish confusion and defeat to the

enemies of religion, of the Church, or of one’s country; it is lawful

to pray God to visit a sinner with sickness that he may thereby be

reformed or prevented from harming others. But in wishing evils one

must remember that it is not always lawful to do what one wishes may

happen in some lawful manner, nor is it lawful to wish a greater evil

as a means of escape from a lesser evil (see 1308 sqq.).

2113. Sinfulness of Cursing.--Cursing a person is sinful when the evil

ordered or wished is intended precisely as it is the hurt or loss of

this person.

(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, since it shuts out the curser

from heaven (“Neither cursers nor extortioners shall possess the

kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10), and it is essentially opposed to

charity, being the natural expression of hatred (see 1296). But, other

things being equal, optative cursing is less serious than defamation,

for it is less harm to another to wish him evil (e.g., that he be

defamed) than to inflict that evil on him.

2017. The Causes of Contumely.--(a) Pride is sometimes a cause,