(c) The more a customer depends on a det_Moral theology

merchant to obtain such an object, the more serious must be the reason

for making or selling it. Thus, a grave reason, such as a notable loss,

is sufficient reason for selling a special fancy apparel to a notorious

“vampire” (i.e., a woman who carries on scandalous flirtations in order

to get presents), if the adornments can be obtained from other

dressmakers or modistes or stores; but a much graver reason would be

required, if the apparel could not be purchased except at one place. In

the former case, refusal to sell would not prevent the activities of

this woman; in the latter case, it would at least hinder her to some

extent.

(d) The more certain it is that an object will be employed sinfully,

the greater must be the reason for making, repairing or selling it.

Examples: Sempronius, a curio dealer, is asked by three men for a

statue of Joss along with joss-sticks and papers. The first customer

says he intends to use these articles for religious rites; the second

will not tell what his purpose is; the third wishes to present the

articles to a museum. Sempronius may not sell to the first customer

except for a most grave reason, such as fear of death if he refuses; he

may not sell to the second customer without a very great reason, such

as a very considerable loss to himself; he may sell to the third

customer for an ordinary reason, such as the profit he makes from the

sale. Titus, who sells firearms, knows that some of his customers,

though he has no particular individuals in mind, will use these weapons

unlawfully in poaching or shooting out of season. Since evil is not to

be presumed of any particular individual, Titus has the right to sell to

all for the usual reason of business profit.

1536. Is a merchant bound to inquire the use which a customer will make

of an article that is often employed for sin?

(a) If the positive law requires that the merchant inform himself, he

is bound to make inquiries necessary for obtaining the information.

Thus, if the civil law forbids the sale of weapons without a permit or

of poisons without a prescription, the merchant has to ask for the

customer’s authorization to buy.

(b) If the positive law has no such regulation, we should distinguish

between articles that are frequently used for sin and articles that are

generally used for sin. When an article of the former class is

requested, there is no obligation to make inquiries, for such an

obligation would be unduly burdensome; but, if an article of the latter

class is desired, one should make inquiries, unless one is morally

certain that the intention of the customer is good, or there is a very

grave reason for seeking no information. Thus, one may sell a deck of

cards to a stranger without asking for proofs that he is not a

confidence man in disguise; but one may not sell deadly poison to an

entire stranger merely on the strength of his word that he needs it for

medical or other lawful purposes.

1537. Sinful Cooperation in Providers of Food and Drink.--(a) There is

explicit formal cooperation with sins of gluttony, drunkenness,

violation of fast or abstinence, whenever one gladly supplies the means

for these sins to those who are about to commit them. Thus, if a host

supplies a guest who is overdrinking with all the intoxicants the

latter desires, and secretly wishes that the guest may make himself

drunk, there is explicit cooperation. There is implicit formal

cooperation when he who supplies the food or drink does not directly

intend evil, but when the act of giving the food or drink is from the

circumstances of the case an evil act, as when a person is given a meal

which will not agree with him and will make him sick or aggravate a

malady, or when a person who wishes to violate a fast ostentatiously to

show contempt is furnished with the eatables he asks for. (b) There is

unlawful material cooperation when one does not approve of the sin that

will be committed, but nevertheless without sufficient reason supplies

the food or drink. Thus, there is sinful cooperation when a restaurant

owner gives meat on Friday to one not dispensed, for no other reason

than the profit he himself will make.

1538. Material cooperation in providing food or drink to those who ask

it, but have no right to take it, is lawful when one has the right to

provide the food or drink, and there is a sufficient reason for

cooperation. The sufficiency of the reason depends on circumstances, as

explained in 1519.

(a) Hence, a greater reason is required when the sin that the other

person will commit will be greater. Thus, a grave reason, such as

indignation of a customer, might suffice for cooperation with a venial

violation of temperance or abstinence; but a graver reason, such as a

serious quarrel, is required if the violation will be mortally sinful.

A graver reason is also necessary when the consequences will be more

harmful (e.g., the fights of the drunkard, or the serious illness of

one who has neglected his diet) than when they are less harmful (e.g.,

the foolish talk of the drunkard, or the stupefaction of the glutton).

(b) A greater reason is required when the cooperation is closer. Thus,

in supplying meat the butcher cooperates only remotely, while the cook

who prepares it and the waiter who serves it cooperate proximately.

to the commission of the sin. Thus, in a large town where there are

many restaurants, the fact that a customer would quarrel if denied meat

on a day of abstinence would excuse cooperation, whereas in a small

village which has only one eating place, it seems there should be a

more serious reason, such as blasphemies or boycott or strike against

one’s business which the refusal of meat might evoke.

(d) A greater reason is called for when the sin of the other person is

more certain to follow. Thus, a restaurant-keeper who is patronized by

strangers of all kinds, temperate and intemperate, Catholic and

non-Catholic, may serve wine at meals, where this is allowed, and

provide meat on days of abstinence for all comers; for the diners are

not known to him, and it would not be possible for him to inform

himself whether they are sober in their habits or exempted from the law

of abstinence. But in a boarding house the landlady should not consent

to have strong beverages on the table, when she knows that some of

those present will thereby become intoxicated; neither should she agree

to provide meat on Fridays for a Catholic who is not excused from

abstinence, unless there is a serious reason, such as the loss of this

boarder which she cannot afford on account of her poverty. Moreover,

since dispensation is given from the laws of fast and abstinence but

not from the law of temperance, there is less certainty about the

intent to sin when one asks for meat on Friday than when one asks for a

great quantity of liquor to be brought to one’s table. Drunkenness is

also more certain when a person who asks for drink is already somewhat

under its influence.

1539. The sins with which one cooperates by supplying food or drink to

others who have no right to it are more or less serious according as

they violate the natural law or only positive human law.

(a) Thus, violation of fast and abstinence is opposed to the natural

law when it is intended as a manifestation of hatred of religion. One

may not cooperate with a violation of fast and abstinence which is

manifestly of this character.

(b) Violation of temperance is also opposed to natural law, and doubly

so when it leads to such evils as quarrels, fights, murders,

blasphemies, etc. It is not lawful to cooperate with intemperance,

unless this is necessary in order to prevent the commission of a

greater sin by the other person, or a serious loss to oneself. Thus, it

is not unlawful to supply whisky to a burglar who wishes to get drunk,

if this is the only way one can prevent the robbery of a third party or

serious injury to oneself.

positive law; and, since fasting is more difficult than abstinence, one

is more easily excused from the observance of the former than from that

of the latter. Hence, if there is a doubt whether a customer has a

right to receive the food or drink he asks for, a restaurant-keeper can

decide more readily in the customer’s favor if there is question of

fast or abstinence than if there is question of intemperance, and more

readily still if there is question of fast than if there is question of

abstinence. Generally speaking, a restaurant-keeper may supply meat on

Friday to all who ask it, provided he has other substantial food

indicated on his bill of fare and shows himself willing to serve that

as well as meat.

1540. Renting of Houses or Rooms and cooperation in Sin.--(a) He who

rents to persons who wish to carry on disorderly, immoral, idolatrous,

unlawful, or other sinful occupations or practices, is guilty of formal

or unlawful material cooperation, if he approves of the conduct of the

renters or has no sufficient reason for renting to them. The same is

true if in a similar way one permits persons bent on evil (e.g.,

pickpockets) to lounge in one’s offices, hotels, etc.

(b) He who gives the use of his house, room, hall, field, etc., to

persons who will employ them for evil, is only a material and not a

guilty cooperator, if there is no prohibition of his act, and he has a

sufficient reason for it.

1541. Examples of reasons sufficient for cooperation in renting are as

follows:

(a) A very grave reason.--In civitatibus in quibus majoris mali vitandi

causa permissum est, licet locare domum meretricibus, dummodo non

sequatur grave nocumentum vicinis honestis vel major ansa peccandi ob

domus situm, et adsit ratio proportionate gravis, utputa quod alii

locatorii non adsint, dominus notabile damnum patiatur si domus non

occupetur, et meretrices facile alium locatarium obtinere possint.

Hodie vero quum constet meretrices plerasque invite vitam turpem

exercere (white slavery) et morbis pessimis morteque praematura affligi,

meretricium vero nocumentum multigenum bono publico (the social evil)

inferre, omnis vir probus abhorrebit a pretio locario ab

administratoribus lupanarium oblato.

(b) A more grave reason.--Meetings whose purpose is contrary to the

common good (e.g., anti-religious gatherings), even though permitted by

civil law, should not be given the use of one’s premises except in a

rare case of the greatest necessity.

1542. Unlawful Cooperation of Servants, Employees, and Workingmen.--(a)

Cooperation is formal if these intend the sin of their employer with

which they cooperate, or if the act of cooperation is itself

intrinsically evil. Thus, a bookkeeper does no wrong in merely keeping

a record of receipts and expenses; but, if he notices many instances of

great frauds and injustices done by his firm and keeps at his post in

order that dishonesty may be covered up and continued, he becomes a

formal cooperator. But a bookkeeper who falsifies or destroys records

in order that his business may be able to issue an incorrect statement

of its financial condition is involved in its guilt, even though his

motive is pity or loyalty. Other examples of formal cooperation are

those of a secretary who takes down dictation which contains

blasphemous or obscene expressions, and of a taxi-driver who tells his

passengers how to get to gambling dens, or who helps a criminal to get

away by driving him through dark streets.

(b) Cooperation is material and unlawful, when the intention and the

act itself are not evil, but when there is no sufficient reason for the

cooperation. Thus, the following proposition was condemned by Innocent

XI in 1679 as scandalous and pernicious: “Famulus qui submissis humeris

scienter adjuvat herum suum ascendere per fenestras ad stuprandam

virginem, et multoties eidem subservit deferendo scalam, aperiendo

januam, aut quid simile cooperando, non peccat mortaliter, si id faciat

metu notabilis detrimenti, puta ne a domino male tractetur, ne torvis

oculis aspiciatur, ne domo expellatur” (Denzinger, n. 1201). Though the

acts of cooperation of the servant here mentioned are not intrinsically

evil, the cooperation is proximate and positive and habitual, and the

wrong done so serious that only a most grave reason, such as fear of

death, could justify the help given by the servant to his master.

1543. Lawful Cooperation of Servants, Workingmen, or Employees.--(a) If

cooperation is remote and is not indispensable to the sin to be

committed, the mere fact that one is employed by the principal cause

will excuse; for the employee is not supposed to question the employer

about the reasons of orders given, and he is not responsible for the

intentions of the employer, but for the performance of what is assigned

to himself. Hence, the following kinds of cooperation are held

permissible for no other reason than that of service: carrying liquor

or food to an employer who wishes to make himself drunk or to break the

fast, buying and carrying to him papers which he should not read,

giving him his hat and coat or getting his car ready as he starts out

to attack an enemy, opening the door to a slanderer whom the mistress

of the house wishes to employ. Also, a public taxi-driver may take his

patrons to clubs or road-houses where they will become intoxicated, if

he is in no way responsible for their intention and shows no approval

of it, and they can go just as well without him.

(b) If cooperation is proximate, the mere fact that one is employed is

not sufficient as an excuse for cooperation; there must be some other

reason that is sufficiently weighty in view of the gravity of the sin

and the other circumstances. Thus, to drive one’s employer to the place

where he is to receive stolen valuables is justifiable, if one is under

threat of great bodily harm if one refuses. Item ob incommodum gravius

evitandum permittitur famulo deferre litteras heri amatorias ad amasiam

cum qua illicitum commercium habet, tempus et locum conveniendi amasiae

nuntiare, excubias agere dum simul adsint. But a servant who is called

on habitually to cooperate in these ways should secure another

position, if possible.

1544. The principles given as to servants should be applied likewise to

other persons who are subordinates, with due allowance made for the

difference of circumstances.

(a) Thus, children, wives, pupils, etc., may be less excusable in

cooperation than servants, since the former may be in a better position

to remonstrate against what is ordered. Hence, if the master of the

house who sometimes goes on a spree orders a servant to bring him his

demijohn, disobedience might be more difficult than if the same order

was given the wife.

(b) Children, wives, pupils, etc., may be more excusable, since unlike

the servants they may be unable to go elsewhere. Those who agree to

work at places known as vicious resorts, or who let their employer

understand that they will not see or hear many things, or who

habitually perform services proximately related to sin (what is called

“dirty work”), are guilty of formal cooperation, at least when they can

secure good employment elsewhere. Children, on the contrary, may be so

dependent on a tyrannical father that they cannot refuse cooperation

without serious consequences to themselves.

1545. Duties of Confessors.--Instruction should be given to penitents

who are guilty of sinful cooperation. (a) The confessor should instruct

ignorant penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation, when there

is a duty of justice to do this, as when the penitents ask to be

instructed; or when there is a duty of charity, as when the sinfulness

of the cooperation in question is known to many persons, or the

penitents by reason of cooperation are giving great scandal or are in

serious danger. (b) The confessor should not instruct ignorant

penitents on the sinfulness of their cooperation--at least, not for a

time--if they are in good faith and if graver evils would result from

the instruction than from silence.

1546. Obligations to be Imposed on Penitents on Account of Sinful

cooperation.--(a) Some cases of cooperation cause the culprit to fall

under ecclesiastical penalties, for example, those who act as seconds

or spectators at duels (Canon 2351). (b) Some cases entail a duty of

reparation for scandal given, as when one has aided the diffusion of

irreligious or obscene literature or whisperings among the people. (c)

Some kinds of cooperation include dangerous occasions of sin which one

is bound to avoid, as when one works for a man who produces adulterated

wares or gets money under false pretenses.

Art. 10: THE COMMANDMENTS OF CHARITY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 44.)

1547. There is no commandment concerning charity in the Decalogue, but

charity is implicitly contained in all the commandments of other

virtues; for charity is the end of every commandment (I Tim., i. 5).

Thus, the commandments of the first table of the Law tend to the love

of God; the commandments of the second table to the love of neighbor.

On account of its supreme importance, however, charity was made the

object of special commandments in both the Old and the New Testament.

(a) In the Old Testament, at the second giving of the tables of the

Law, it is declared: “Now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require

of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in his ways, and

love him, and serve the Lord thy God, with all thy heart and with all

thy soul?” (Deut., x. 12).

(b) In the New Testament, our Lord, being asked which is the great

commandment in the law, replied: “Thou shalt love the Lord, thy God,

with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole mind.

This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like

to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two

commandments dependeth the whole law and the prophets” (Matt, xxii.

37-40).

1548. Charity must come “from a pure heart, and a good conscience and

faith unfeigned” (I Tim., i. 5), and these words may be used to

indicate how all other commandments have charity for their purpose.

(a) “A pure heart” is had by the observance of the negative

commandments of the natural law, which forbid evil, or of the

commandments about the virtues regulative of the passions; and it is a

disposition preparatory for the love of God, since an impure heart will

be taken up with evil or with earthly things, and so turned away from

the goodness of God.

(b) “A good conscience” is had by the observance of the affirmative

commandments of the natural law, or of the commandments regulative of

actions; and it too tends to charity as its goal, for a bad conscience

fills one with dread and horror of the justice of God.

or of the commandments about worship of the true God; and it leads up

to charity, for a feigned faith, or false worship, separates one from

the truth of God.

1549. Though charity is but one virtue (see 1115), it has two acts: one

about love of God, which is the end, and another about love of

neighbor, which is a means to that end.

(a) If all understood that the end includes the means and the means

supposes the end, there would be no necessity for two distinct

commandments; for there is no love of God without love of neighbor (I

John, iv. 20), and he who loves his neighbor has fulfilled the law

(Rom., xiii. 8).

(b) But since many would not perceive that one of the commandments of

charity contains the other, it was necessary to propose these

commandments separately: “We have this command from God that he who

loves God love also his brother” (I John, iv. 21).

1550. Charity extends to other objects than God and the neighbor,

namely, to self and one’s own body (see 1133 sqq.); it also has other

acts than that of love, such as the acts of joy, peace, beneficence

(see 1193 sqq.), and the suppression of uncharitable hatred, sloth,

envy (see 1295 sqq.), etc. Nevertheless, on the two commandments of

love of God and love of neighbor depend the whole law and the prophets

(Matt., xxii. 40), and other commandments about charity are not

necessary.

(a) Thus, the objects of love are either the end or the means to the

end, and, as the two commandments of charity refer to both of these,

they omit nothing that is to be loved. It was not necessary to make

express command of love of self, for nature inclines to that

sufficiently, and the duty of keeping love of self within bounds is

provided for in the commandments that God be loved above all and the

neighbor as oneself.

(b) The acts of charity distinct from love result from love, and the

acts opposed to charity are virtually forbidden in the commandments of

their opposites. Hence, there was no need of explicit precepts about

the secondary acts of charity or of explicit prohibitions of the sins

against charity. But for the sake of those who might not perceive that

the minor functions of charity are commanded and acts of

uncharitableness forbidden in the two great commandments, special and

explicit laws were given which enjoin peace, joy, etc., and forbid

hatred, envy, etc.

1551. The precepts of the secondary acts of charity are: (a) joy:

“Rejoice in the Lord always” (Phillip., iv. 4); (b) peace: “Follow

peace with all men” (Heb., xii. 14); and (c) beneficence: “While we

have time, let us do good to all” (Gal., vi. 10).

1552. The prohibitions of uncharitableness are as follows: (a) against

hatred: “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart” (Lev, xix. IT);

(b) against sloth: “Bow down thy shoulder and hear her (wisdom), and be

not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus., vi. 26); (c) against envy: “Let us

not be made desirous of vainglory, provoking one another, envying one

another” (Gal., v. 26), (d) against discord: “Speak the same things and

let there be no schisms among you” (I Cor., i. 10); and (e) against

scandal: “Put not a stumbling-block or a scandal in your brother’s way”

(Rom., xiv. 13).

1553. The Commandment of Love of God.--In the commandment of love of

God two things are expressed: (a) the matter of the commandment is God,

the object of love; (b) the manner of the commandment is that God be

loved as the Last End, to whose love all other love is to be

subordinated.

1554. There is a twofold manner or mode of performing a virtuous act:

(a) The intrinsic mode is that which comes from the nature of the

virtue commanded. Thus, in the Fourth Commandment is included not only

the substance of an act (viz., that honor be shown), but also the mode

of the act (i.e., that such honor and so much honor be shown as is owed

to a parent by his child). The intrinsic mode is always included in a

commandment along with the substance of the act prescribed (cfr. 480

sqq.).

(b) The extrinsic mode is that which belongs to some virtue different

from the one commanded. This mode is not included in a commandment.

Thus, if honor be shown to parents out of love of God, the mode of love

of God is extrinsic to the commandment, for the commandment is

concerned with the virtue of filial piety, and the mode of the act

pertains to charity, which is a virtue distinct from filial piety.

1555. The intrinsic mode of performing an act of virtue is also twofold:

(a) The essential mode is that without which an act is not virtuous.

Thus, he who gives to his indigent parents according to his means and

their needs fulfills the essential mode of the Fourth Commandment, for,

if he gave them less than he could afford and they needed, his act

would not come up to the requirements of the commandment.

(b) The ideal mode of the performance of virtue is that which adds to

the virtue greater goodness and value, and which is intended by a

lawgiver as the end, but not as the object of his command. Thus, he who

gives to his indigent parents not only sufficiently, but also with a

great willingness and cheerfulness, fulfills the Fourth Commandment

with greater perfection than another who supports his parents with less

alacrity.

1556. The mode of the love of God prescribed in the first and great

commandment is that God be loved with the whole heart, etc. But “to

love with the whole heart, etc.,” can be understood in various senses.

(a) Thus, it may be understood to mean a love that is subjectively or

intensively great, as when one loves God with much fervor and

affection. This mode of love is ideal, since the measure of loving God

is to love Him without measure, but it is not essential. The end of the

commandment is that we love God ever more and more, and perform what is

required with ever greater promptitude and gladness; but the

commandment does not fix any certain degree of intensity, although it

would be inordinate to choose to love God less intensely than we love

creatures (see 1160).

(b) “To love with the whole heart” may be understood to mean a love

that is objectively or appreciatively great, as when one esteems and

loves God as the Supreme Good. This mode of love is essential, and

hence without it the commandment is not observed. However much one

loves God, if one does not love Him as the Supreme Good, one does not

love Him aright, and does not practise the virtue of charity that is

commanded.

1557. Love of God from the whole heart, objectively or appreciatively

understood, is either actual or habitual.

(a) Actually, one loves God with one’s whole heart when there is never

any interruption or distraction to one’s love, and one is continually

engaged in an act of loving God above all else. This is the ideal mode

of fulfilling the commandment of love, and it is also the end to which

the commandment is intended to lead. But it is only in heaven, where

God will be all in all (I Cor., xv. 28), that this ideal fulfillment

will take place.

(b) Habitually, one loves God with one’s whole heart when one is in the

state of grace, preferring the love of God to every contrary love,

although it is only at intervals that one is able to make acts of love.

This is the essential mode of fulfilling the command of love here on

earth. The whole heart must be given to God to the exclusion of love

for any mortal sin, for mortal sin separates from God.

1558. The mode of loving God is expressed in various places in

scripture (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., xxii. 37; Mark, xii. 30; Luke, x. 27),

and there are slightly different interpretations given to the words by

which it is conveyed. Thus, some exegetes see in the expressions

“heart,” “soul,” “mind,” “strength,” synonymous significations of the

one thought that God should be loved over all, and they think that

different words are used only in order to give greater clearness and

energy to the thought. But the following seems also a reliable

explanation: (a) God must be loved with one’s whole heart, that is, the

will must not intend any Last End other than God; (b) God must be loved

with one’s whole mind, soul and strength, that is, the powers moved by

the will--intellect, appetites and executive faculties--must be subject

to God, must be regulated according to His will, and must carry out His

commandments.

1559. Love of God with one’s whole heart excludes, then, opposite

loves, but it does not exclude other loves that are not opposite or

other dispositions that are less perfect. (a) Thus, love of God with

one’s whole heart does not exclude love of self or of neighbor. (b)

Love of God with one’s whole heart does not exclude the use of acts in

reference to God that do not reach the height of disinterested love,

such as acts of hope, gratitude, or fear (see 1033, 1054, 1093).

1560. There are various degrees of perfection in the fulfillment of the

commandment of love of God.

(a) The most perfect fulfillment is found in heaven, where there is no

turning from the love of God by grave sin, no impediment to its

exercise by venial sin, and no interruption of its act by other

occupations.

(b) The more perfect fulfillment of this commandment found on earth is

modelled on the love of God exercised by the Saints in heaven, and the

nearer one approaches to the model, the better does one fulfill the

commandment. Thus, he who avoids not only what is against charity

(i.e., mortal sin), but also, as far as possible, what is aside from

charity (i.e., venial sin), loves God more perfectly than one who is

careless about venial sin; and he who shuns, not only things unlawful

that are harmful to charity, but also things lawful that interrupt the

exercise of charity, loves God more, other things being equal, than

another who avoids the unlawful, but whose mind is greatly occupied

with lawful temporal matters.

all those who, both in their internal and in their external acts, avoid

all that is contrary to the love of God, although they fall into venial

sin and are mostly occupied with temporal affairs. Thus is charity the

bond of perfection (Col, iii. 14), the tie that binds man to his

highest good; those who keep the commandments for its sake are

followers after perfection, those who embrace counsels for its sake are

in the state of perfection.

1561. The Commandment of Love of Self.--Love of self is understood in

many senses. (a) According to its moral character, love of self is

either sinful or virtuous, and virtuous self-love is either natural or

supernatural (as was explained in 1136). (b) According to its physical

character, love of self is either innate or elicited. Innate love of

self is the tendency of nature to desire what pertains to the

perfection of self, such as existence and its preservation (see 1108).

Elicited love of self is the choice on the part of the reason and will

of an ultimate happiness for self and of the means thereto.

1562. Charity obliges each one capable of precept to an elicited

supernatural love of self. The obligation is grave for the following

reasons: (a) the love of God includes love of self, for we cannot love

God truly unless we also love those things that are His, especially His

rational creatures made to His image and destined for His society; (b)

the love of neighbor supposes love of self, for the commandment of love

(Matt., xxii. 39) offers love of self as the model for love of others.

1563. The goods which the law of charity to self requires one to desire

and seek after, are all those things that are necessary for the

attainment of one’s happiness and due perfection.

(a) Thus, as to supernatural goods, one is bound to obtain for oneself

things necessary for salvation. One is obliged, then, to acquire a

sufficient knowledge of the faith; to enter into a state of life for

which one is suited (e.g., matrimony or religion); to avoid sin and the

occasions of sin; not to delay conversion for a notable length of time;

to put oneself in the state of grace, especially at the hour of death.

But one is not obliged to perform these duties with the motive of

charity in mind, nor to elect for self works of supererogation or

counsels of perfection.

(b) As to intellectual goods, one is bound to seek what is necessary

for a proper fulfillment of the duties of one’s station in life. Thus,

one owes it in charity to oneself to seek the education and training

that are presupposed in one’s profession or occupation, and to bestow

the necessary study and attention. See above, on the intellectual

virtues (144 sqq.) and on the sin of ignorance (904 sqq.).

preserving life and health (on the desire of death, see 1063). Hence,

in matters of food, drink, clothing, and recreation, each one is in

duty bound to follow the laws of hygiene.

(d) As to the external goods of person (i.e., honor and reputation),

there is a strict duty of guarding them or of recovering them, as far

as possible.

(e) As to external goods of fortune (i.e., wealth and possessions), one

must aim to acquire as much as is necessary for one’s subsistence and

the fulfillment of duties to others. Hence the duty of labor for those

who do not possess the necessary means. But charity to self does not

demand that one aspire to reach the top of the ladder in the financial

world or to accumulate a very large surplus. One may indeed lawfully

seek to become a millionaire, or to become so wealthy as to be able to

retire with leisure, if one goes about this lawfully; but there is no

obligation to strive after more than is reasonably necessary.

1564. Man owes it to himself to put to good use the talents God has

bestowed upon him for his self-improvement and self-development. It is

a sin, therefore, greater or less according to circumstances, to

neglect the care of the mind or of the mental culture one should

possess.

(a) Thus, reason is the faculty that elevates man above the irrational

world, and knowledge is the perfection and excellence of that faculty.

What life or health is to the body, reason or knowledge is to the mind;

and so, just as it is a sin against the body to neglect life or health,

it is also a sin against the mind to neglect reason or knowledge.

Persons predisposed to insanity who expose themselves to alienation of

mind by the use of drugs or strong spirits or by practices or

occupations that expose them to shocks (such as gambling), and others

who value ignorance, scepticism, and error as if these infirmities were

goods, sin against the mind, at least materially.

(b) Reason and knowledge are also necessary in numberless ways to man’s

bodily, social, cultural, and religious life. Without the elements of a

general education in reading, writing and arithmetic, one is very

seriously handicapped in making a bare living; and without the

education of the high school, college or university, one is frequently

under a disadvantage in seeking to better oneself or improve one’s

position. Besides these utilities for practical affairs, education has

advantages of a loftier kind: it makes its possessor a more capable

citizen, a more pleasant companion and friend, a more influential

exponent of good causes, and a greater credit to the religion he

practises; it gives enjoyment to leisure, comfort to rest, and dignity

to success; the labor of acquiring it is a discipline of the will; the

taste for higher things it imparts is a natural protection against much

that is evil; the mental power and knowledge that are its gifts enable

one to expose error and fallacy and to uphold the truth and the right.

It is of precept, therefore, that one acquire the moral and mental

training which one’s salvation and calling in life make necessary; it

is of counsel--and the counsel is one that should be much urged in our

times--that one who has the opportunity of attaining to a higher

proficiency, to the advantage of self and society, should avail himself

of that opportunity.

1565. Examples of Sins Committed by Neglect of Necessary Education--(a)

Directly, one sins against the duty of cultivation of the mind when

through laziness or malice one slights the means of acquiring necessary

knowledge--as when pupils absent themselves from school, or give no

attention to the teacher or no preparation to their lessons; or when

collegians sacrifice study to athletics and amusements.

(b) Indirectly one sins against the duty of knowledge, when one is

responsible for habits that impede or prevent necessary concentration

of mind, as when one goes about so much socially that the mind is

always in a whirl, or reads so much light literature that everything

serious becomes a bore, or overeats so much that the brain becomes

sluggish, or pays no attention to the wise rule that a sound mind needs

a sound body.

1566. The proper care of the body and of health is not merely a thing

next to godliness; it is a moral duty, and so a part of godliness. God

Himself on Sinai gave to the Chosen People of old a sanitary code, and

the faithful observance by orthodox Jews of those regulations has had

much to do with the superior health and longevity of their race. Moral

Theology, therefore, is not digressing from its proper subject-matter,

if it gives some attention to rules of health. The duties owed to

physical well-being can be reduced to the following: (a) to secure for

the body the things needed for the maintenance and replenishment of its

substance and vigor, such as food, air, sleep and exercise; (b) to ward

off or remove those things that are injurious to or destructive of

health, such as excessive heat or cold, waste matter, poisons, and

disease; (c) to assist these physical means by psychical or spiritual

ones, such as cheerfulness and the will to keep well and fit.

1567. Food and drink are naturally a prime requisite for life, since

they furnish the material from which the body is built and renewed.

They should be used, however, in such a way as to serve their purpose.

(a) Thus, the quantity and quality have to be regulated according to

the needs of the individual and circumstances, and so will vary with

climate, age, health, and occupation. The distinction of clean and

unclean foods does not exist in the New Law (Rom., xiv. 14; Matt., xv.

17-20), but it is clear that the same kinds or amounts of food and

drink do not agree with all constitutions; that overeating,

undereating, and want of variety in diet are not conducive to good

health. Physicians recommend that something raw be eaten every day and

something indigestible at every meal, and that a person watch his

weight, keeping a little overweight up to middle life and a little

underweight after that age.

(b) The manner of eating is of first-rate importance, since the

digestion is harmed if one eats without appetite or with mental

preoccupation on deep subjects, or bolts the food, or makes excessive

use of relishes or condiments.

1568. Fresh air, on which the production of pure blood and the

continuance of vitality depend, is another necessity of life. Hence, we

may well heed the following rules which hygienists lay down on this

point: (a) let in fresh air and sunshine to the places where you live

and work, and exclude dust and smoke; (b) wear light, loose and porous

clothing, so that the skin may have air; (c) get out of doors in the

open air part of the time every day, even though the weather is

uninviting, for sunshine or natural light is also a requisite of good

health; (d) breathe through the nose, and not through the mouth.

Breathing should be deep, slow and regular, and one should take

deep-breathing exercises several times a day; (e) sleep in a

well-ventilated room, or out-of-doors if possible.

1569. Rest and relaxation are needful for body and mind alike, that the

burdens of life may not bear too heavily, and nature may be allowed to

exercise her ministries of renewal and restoration. But here, as in

other things, the guiding rule must be moderation.

(a) Through excess, some harm their health by indulging in too much

repose. A strong, healthy individual who remains in bed from midnight

till noon, or who gives most of the afternoon to a prolonged nap, is

storing up more energy than he or she needs, and will feel the worse

for it. Similarly, persons whose life is one round of vacations or

diversions pay for their aimless existence in various kinds of mental

or nervous disorders, to say nothing of the moral dangers to which they

are exposed (Ecclus., xxxiii. 29).

(b) Through defect, on the other hand, some injure their health by

depriving themselves of the sleep or rest they ought to take. The time

that should be given to repose differs with the individual. The young,

brain-workers and the feeble are in greater need than others; but there

is no one who can dispense with his proper share of rest. It is sinful,

therefore, to reduce needed sleep by late retiring or early rising, or

to work unremittingly to such an extent that the bodily powers and

resistance become unequal to the demands made on them and unfitted for

duties. According to physicians, seven hours out of every twenty-four

should be spent in bed, and the hours before midnight are much more

precious for rest than the early morning hours. Some holidays and

vacations are a necessity in these days of rapid and strenuous life.

1570. Physical exercise is a factor of good health, for it stirs up the

circulation of the blood, assists digestion, and rids the body of

surplus weight. Moreover, it has great value for the mind (to which it

gives diversion and refreshment) and for the soul (since it promotes

temperance and chastity). If taken in the form of sports, physical

exercise is a training in cooperation with others, in loyalty,

discipline, and fairness. But health is impaired by excess as well as

by defect in exercise.

(a) Examples of over-exercise are athletes who carry on endurance tests

to the point of exhaustion, devotees of violent forms of contests or

matches that overtax the heart, etc.

(b) Examples of under-exercise are ablebodied persons who prefer to

lounge about the house all day rather than bestir themselves; also

those who work indoors all day and who from choice ride rather than

walk, no matter how short the distance they have to go, etc. Persons of

sedentary life who can do so, should exercise every day, preferably

out-of-doors, playing at some game like golf, taking a brisk walk of

about five miles, or doing some manual labor, such as gardening or

sawing wood. Regular gymnastics or setting-up exercises, and the habit

of sitting, standing, and walking erect at all times are prescribed by

experts on health as very important.

1571. Under the head of preventive or curative measures that ought to

be attended to for the sake of bodily well-being are the following:

(a) In time of health sickness has to be guarded against. Suitable

clothing and shelter must be used as protection against injurious

effects of heat or cold; cleanliness must be cultivated by such means

as daily baths, frequent ablutions, washing of teeth, tongue and gums;

infections must be avoided; drugs or stimulants hurtful to one’s health

must not be indulged in, and attention must be given to daily, regular

and natural elimination and to the exclusion of poisons from the

system. According to authorities, one should drink at least six glasses

of water a day, but warm water is often preferable to cold or hot.

(b) In time of sickness efforts must be made at restoration of health,

if this is possible. It is of obligation to use the ordinary means to

recover physical fitness, that is, to take remedies and medicines that

are suitable, not on the advice of acquaintances or advertisements, but

on the recommendation of a competent physician in whose knowledge and

skill one has perfect confidence (Ecclus., xxxviii. 1 sqq.). But there

is no obligation to have recourse to extraordinary means of recovery,

such as a trip to a more balmy climate when one’s purse cannot afford

it. Similarly, a very painful and uncertain operation or mutilation is

not obligatory, unless one has dependents, and the danger to life from

the operation is slight. In time of sickness, as well as in health, we

should not omit to implore the divine aid.

1572. The state of mind has very much to do with good or bad health. It

is well known, for instance, that a happy, cheerful attitude helps

digestion and sleep; whereas worry, fear, anger or other emotional

stress will bring on dyspepsia, insomnia, disease, and perhaps

insanity. We should not overlook, therefore, the importance of the

mental factor in our efforts to maintain good health.

(a) Natural means of cultivating an even temper and a buoyant

disposition are: some kind of labor or occupation, avoidance of hurry

and worry in one’s affairs, cultivation of some interesting hobby or

avocation that will vary the monotony of business or work, use of

congenial recreations, whether of a more refined (e.g., conversation

with friends, literature, music, art, the drama, travel to historic or

beautiful scenes, etc.) or of a more material kind (e.g., reading tales

of mystery or adventure, raising pet animals, witnessing baseball

games, races, etc., playing billiards, cards, etc., smoking, attending

banquets, picnics, etc.). A sense of humor and laughter in moderation

are good for the health and not opposed to spirituality.

(b) Religious practices are all-important for cheerfulness of spirit.

Christian Science, indeed, is in error when it holds that faith thinks

or wills sorrow and disease and death out of existence, for evil is a

reality; but virtue and a good conscience rid one of many enemies to

peace, and there exist in the Church many supernatural and miraculous

means that benefit body, mind and spirit.

1573. Persons who give exaggerated attention to their health cannot

justify themselves by the commandment of charity to self; for this

commandment has to be interpreted according to the order of charity as

explained above (see 1164 sqq.). The bodily good has to be cared for,

but with due subordination to higher goods (Matt, vi. 25; Rom., xiv.

16).

(a) Thus, spiritual goods are more important than those of the body,

and it is lawful to practise mortifications by fastings, vigils,

hair-shirts, and the like, which, though afflictive to the flesh, are

refreshing to the spirit, provided all be done according to holy

prudence.

(b) Intellectual goods are better than those of the body, and it is not

sinful to devote oneself to studies, researches and other mental

occupations in preference to manual labor or athletic exercises which

would improve one’s physique, but not one’s mind. It is even lawful for

the sake of mental improvement to suffer some slight detriment to

health.

lawful but laudable to expose health, or even life, for the advancement

of science or the welfare of the community. Many men and women in daily

life do this as part of the day’s work.

1574. Does charity to self oblige one to desire honors, such as

dignities, titles, positions or rank, precedence, testimonials,

eulogies, medals, decorations, monuments, and the like?

(a) Charity to self demands that one strive to acquire the excellence

that is expected of one, and so to be deserving of honor. For we must

let our light shine before men (Matt., v. 16; Rom., xii. 17; II Cor.,

vii. 21).

(b) Charity to self does not require that one actually secure honors.

For one cannot force another to declare one’s praises, since he may be

prejudiced or ignorant, and it is not seemly to sing one’s own

greatness or merit (II Cor., x. 18), except in self-defense (II Cor.,

xii. 11).

honor were necessary and the manner of seeking it honorable. Thus, it

is a duty to self to seek to obtain a diploma or certificate of good

character or proficiency, if this document is needed to exercise the

profession for which one has trained.

(d) Charity to self would forbid one to seek after an honor, if the

honor would prove harmful, or if it could not be obtained in a

respectable way. Thus, if an honor rightfully belonged to another, or

if it were bestowed in recognition of evil done, or if it would impose

obligations for which one knows oneself to be unsuited, or if it could

not be attained except by dishonesty, charity to self would urge one to

fly from the honor.

(e) Charity to self in other cases would permit one either to seek an

honor (as when a dignity will be useful and will be employed for good,

and is not sought out of vainglory or hypocrisy) or to forego it (as

when it is not necessary and one is moved to shun it, not out of

contempt, but out of some virtuous motive).

1575. Does charity to self require one to desire a good name?

(a) Charity to self does require that one desire to be worthy of a good

name, for one owes it to oneself as well as to others to be blameless

(Phil., ii. 14-16) and to provide good things in the sight of men

(Rom., xii. 17).

(b) Charity to self does require that one desire to have a good name.

Spiritually, a good name is an advantage, for many a one is encouraged

to continue in virtue by the good opinion which others have of him,

while many another is discouraged from attempting or continuing a good

life because he has a bad reputation. Temporally also, a good name is

useful or necessary, for, if others do not trust us or respect us, we

shall find it difficult to secure employment or position, or to

exercise our office fruitfully. Hence, scripture admonishes: “Take care

of a good name, for this shall continue with thee, more than a thousand

treasures precious and great” (Ecclus., xli. 15).

name, since reputation may be lost through the work of detractors or

through one’s own unintentional imprudence, or through circumstances

over which one has no control.

(d) Charity to self ordinarily requires that one seek to acquire a good

name, if it has not yet been earned, also to preserve it, when gained,

to recover it, when lost; for, as a rule, there is no greater good for

which the good of reputation should be sacrificed. The means to be

employed, however, should not be evil, as when one uses hypocritical

pretense in order to pass as a man of piety, or has recourse to lying

or duelling, to undermining or attacking another in order to recover

one’s reputation. A good name is built up by fidelity to the duties of

one’s calling and the avoidance of what may be offensive or scandalous

to others; it is preserved or rebuilt by good deeds, especially those

one is known or supposed to have lacked, and in case of need by words

of self-defense, vindicating one’s conduct, or refuting aspersions or

false charges.

(e) Charity does not require one to seek after a good name, when this

should or may be sacrificed for the sake of some higher good. St. Paul

faithfully practised what he preached, that no dishonor might be

reflected on the Gospel; and yet his enemies looked on him as a seducer

and a nobody, as a melancholy and avaricious man. But the Apostle

answered his traducers that neither honor nor dishonor, neither evil

report nor good report, would move him from the exercise of his

ministry (II Cor., vi. 4 sqq).

1576. Sacrifice of reputation is not lawful, however, unless there is a

proportionately grave reason and the means are good.

(a) The end must be good and relatively important, not only if compared

with the good of personal reputation, but also if compared with the

public good and the rights of third parties. Examples: It would not be

right to allow oneself to be defamed in order to cover up the tracks of

a rascal who deserved punishment, or to distract attention from an evil

that is being done; for the purpose would then be the defeat of justice

or the success of some sinful plan. In such cases the end would not be

good. Neither would it be right to allow the sacrifice of a good name

for the notoriety and money profits to be gained in stage or book

royalties. The practice of many young men of accepting imputed faults,

of which they are not guilty, in order to be popular, or interesting,

or attractive, is also sinful. Money cannot buy back a lost reputation,

and popularity with the thoughtless is no compensation for disgrace

before the judicious and loss of self-respect. In these cases the end

is not important, if compared with the advantage of a good name. And

even when an end is good and more important than one’s fame, there will

frequently be rights of others involved that forbid a sacrifice of

reputation, as when a passive attitude in the face of calumny would

give scandal or cast discredit on one’s profession, office, work,

religion, family, or friends.

(b) The means must be good. Examples: Even if the ambition to be “a

good fellow” is praiseworthy, drunkenness and profanity are not

suitable ways of winning esteem, and the same applies to pretending

wickedness or accusing oneself of imaginary escapades and vices to

please a circle which admires wildness in youth. The means used in

these cases (drunkenness, profanity, lying) are evil in themselves.

Again, the wish to cultivate humility does not justify one in giving

scandal by consorting with evildoers as intimates, or by conducting

oneself in such a way as to lower the esteem or respect that is

entertained for one’s position. The means used in those cases are at

least evil-seeming and disedifying.

1577. Is self-detraction, that is, the revelation of some real fault or

defect, lawful?

(a) If there is question of faults or defects that are of a public

nature and generally known, a disclosure made in a good spirit and in a

proper manner, and from which beneficial and not harmful results can be

foreseen, is lawful, and sometimes obligatory. Example: Balbus has

calumniated his neighbors, and he now admits the fact, not to boast

about or excuse it, but to make satisfaction; he does not repeat the

details of his defamatory remarks, but merely states that he wishes to

retract what he had no right to say; he has every reason to think that

his present course will undo the harm caused by the defamation. Balbus

does right in thus acknowledging his mistake.

(b) If there is question of faults or defects not generally known, the

reasons for mentioning them should be more serious, unless the sins are

of a trifling nature. Examples: Caius once served a term in jail for

dishonesty, but he is now a decent citizen. His family would be

scandalized and would feel disgraced, if they knew this. But Caius

thinks it would be a suitable reparation to tell them of his former

guilt. Caius is wrong. To speak of his past experience would only add

the sin of scandal to the old one, and there are other ways in which he

can do penance in further expiation of dishonesty. Claudius wishes to

marry Sempronia, but the latter insists that there must be no secrets

between husband and wife, and that he must give her complete and

accurate answers on certain questions about his past career--for

example, whether he has ever been drunk, whether he has ever wished to

be drunk, whether he has ever had questionable relations with other

women, etc. Claudius should not deceive Sempronia, nor leave her in

ignorance of any serious objection to the marriage, even if she forgot

to mention it in her questions; but he owes it to himself not to put

himself in her power by giving her information which she would probably

use against him then or later. Titus has stolen a considerable sum,

and, for the sake of getting advice and direction on how to make

restitution, he consults a prudent friend who will regard his

communication as confidential, just as if he were a confessor. Titus

does not act against his own reputation by telling his case to this

friend.

1578. Confession of Sins against Charity Owed to Self.--(a) It is not

necessary to declare in confession that one has acted against the

charity due to self, if there is question only of sins in which

transgression of that charity was not directly intended; for to say

that one has sinned against God by blasphemy, or against self by

intemperance, or against the neighbor by injustice, is equivalent to

saying that one has hurt one’s own soul by sin. (b) It is necessary to

declare a want of charity to self, if one has expressly intended such a

sin. Thus, if a person who has been admonished to have care for his own

soul is so enraged thereat that he vows to deliver his soul over to

evil, and thereupon proceeds to commit various kinds of sin, he does

not declare his true state of conscience by merely mentioning these

latter sins. A case of this kind, however, is not usual (see 1307).

1579. The Commandment of Love of Neighbor.--Charity to

fellow-creatures, especially to members of the chosen nation, was

commanded in the Old Law. (a) Thus, internal love was made obligatory.

The Lord forbade hatred, revenge, remembrance of injuries (Lev., xix.

17), and commanded love of fellow-citizens (ibid.) and kindness to

foreigners dwelling in the land (Lev., xix. 33). (b) External love was

also obligatory. Alms and help were to be given the needy (Deut., xxii.

1, 2, xv. 11), loans were to be made without interest (Deut., xxiii.

19), kindness was to be shown to widows, orphans, the blind, the

crippled (Exod., xxii. 22, 23; Lev., xix. 14), part of each harvest was

to be left for the poor, and in the third, seventh and fiftieth years

special assistance was to be rendered the needy (Lev., xix. 9, xxv.

2-12; Deut., xiv. 28, 29).

1580. In the New Testament, which is the law of love, the precept of

charity to neighbors is given with greater clearness and perfection.

(a) Thus, internal love must be universal and modelled on the love

which Christ had for humanity. Enemies are to be loved as well as

friends, the bad as well as the good (Matt., v. 43-45), Gentiles as well

as Jews, since there is one Lord of all (Rom., x. 12). The new

commandment, whose observance will mark the faithful follower, is an

imitation of the charity of Christ (John, xiii. 34, 35). (b) External

charity must be practised, even at the cost of self-sacrifice (I John,

iii. 16), for it will be regarded by Christ as done to Himself (Matt.,

xxv. 40), and will be the subject of interrogation and eulogy at the

judgment (Matt., xxv. 34-46).

1581. In giving the commandment of love towards fellow-creatures, our

Lord indicated both the reason for the love and the mode in which the

love should be exercised: “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself”

(Matt, xxii. 39).

(a) The reason for this love is that a fellow-creature is our neighbor,

or, as it is elsewhere expressed, our brother (I John, iv. 20, 21), our

friend (Lev., xix. 18). He, like ourselves, is made to the image of God

and is destined for the same beatitude.

(b) The mode of this love is that it should be similar, though not

equal, to the love one has for oneself. Hence, the end of loving our

neighbor should be God, that it may be a holy love; the rule to be

followed in loving him should be that we agree with his wishes in good,

but not in evil, that the love may be just; the manner of loving him

should be that one wishes him well, not that one only seeks pleasure or

advantage from him, and so the love will be sincere. For, as love of

self must be holy, just and sincere, the same qualities are required in

love of the neighbor.

1582. The following conditions must, therefore, be met in the love of

neighbor which charity commands:

(a) Love must not be of a covetous or selfish or superficial kind, but

must be sincerely benevolent and beneficent (see 1109). Those who wish

to retain the companionship or association of a neighbor because this

redounds to their own gain, on account of his wealth, influence, etc.,

while harming the neighbor, love themselves rather than the neighbor.

Nor is love of neighbor genuine if it exists only in the emotions, or

if it is manifested only in expressions of good will; for true love

includes benevolence and will be translated into beneficence when the

occasion presents itself (James, ii. 14 sqq.; I John, i. 22). Persons

who are most ready to shed tears at the distress of others, or who are

most profuse in compliments or good wishes, are frequently most

unwilling to assist others, especially if some sacrifice is necessary.

(b) The love of the neighbor must not be a sinful benevolence or

beneficence, but must desire for him and confer on him what are real,

and not merely apparent goods, such as we ought to desire for ourselves

(Matt., vii. 12). Those who secure for others lower and unnecessary

goods at the sacrifice of those that are higher and necessary, putting

wealth, pleasure, or position above virtue and a good conscience, have

not the love of charity, for “what does it profit a man to gain the

whole world, and lose his soul?” (Matt., viii. 36).

for him and confer on him real goods out of a supernatural motive. This

motive is the friendship one has for God, so that the neighbor is loved

because God loves him and desires to communicate to him a share in the

divine life through grace and glory. The motive of charity is absent,

therefore, when one loves only one’s friends, when one is kind to

others out of pity, or generosity, or admiration for their good

qualities, if there is no thought of God in this philanthropy or

humanitarianism.

1583. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with

as to its acts by all those who are leading a good Christian life. (a)

Thus, the internal acts of sincere affection, peace, joy, and mercy are

exercised by prayer for the living and the dead, or a devout recitation

of the Lord’s Prayer. (b) The external acts of spiritual and corporal

mercy are performed by those who are giving according to their means

and the necessities they meet.

1584. The commandment of love of neighbor is sufficiently complied with

as to its motive, even though the supernatural motive is not actually

present before the mind, or other and natural motives are also present.

(a) Thus, the supernatural motive directs our love of neighbor, if it

is present virtually, as will be explained in 1590. (b) Natural motives

of love that are good in themselves (such as ties of relationship or

nationality, common intellectual or other interests, the virtue or

ability of a neighbor) do not detract from the supernaturality of love,

provided their influence is subordinated to the divine friendship and

the desire of beatitude for the neighbor. Even a certain amount of

natural repugnance is not inconsistent with charity; on the contrary,

charity is seen to be great, if for love of God one does good to

implacable enemies, or waits on persons suffering from a loathsome

disease.

1585. Fulfillment of the Commandments of Charity.--We speak now only of

the commandment of love, in which the other commandments of charity are

contained (see 1550 b). The love which is commanded must have the

following qualities: (a) on the side of the subject who loves, it must

be internal and made at the proper times--that is, one must love from

the heart and affection, as well as in works and manifestations, and

must make and renew the act of love as the law requires; (b) on the

side of the object loved, it must be both universal and well-ordered;

one must not only love all to whom charity is due (see 1133 sqq.), but

one must also bestow love according to the rank of precedence in which

charity is due (see 1158 sqq.).

1586. The act of charity can be made in various ways.

(a) It is made in itself, when one elicits or expresses love; it is

made in its manifestations, when one performs an act of virtue distinct

from charity. One who sincerely loves God with his whole heart will

keep the commandments (John, xiv. 21), and hence acts of temperance,

justice, fortitude, etc., may be called acts of love, in the sense that

they are indications of love.

(b) The act of charity may be made internally or externally. Thus,

affection for another as a friend in God, and a sincere desire of his

good, are internal acts of love; while spiritual or temporal alms

bestowed upon him, such as instruction or aid in time of sickness, are

external acts of love.

called explicit with reference to a person or object which is loved in

itself, and not as included in another; it is called implicit with

reference to a person or object loved as included in another, as when

means and end involve each other, or a part is contained in the whole.

Thus, he who loves God above all things loves God explicitly and his

neighbor implicitly; he who loves his neighbor as a future co-sharer in

bliss loves his neighbor explicitly and God implicitly (see 1549); he

who includes all mankind in a common act of love, gives explicit love

to the race collectively, and implicit love to individual members of

the race not mentioned (e.g., enemies or strangers).

1587. For the fulfillment of the commandment of charity other acts of

virtue are not enough. There must also be love. (a) Thus, as to charity

towards God, our Lord declares that love of God is the great

commandment on which the others depend, and St. Paul makes salvation

depend on love: “If any man love not our Lord Jesus Christ, let him be

anathema” (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) As to charity towards the neighbor,

the fulfillment of other commandments in his regard is inferior to the

fulfillment of the commandment of fraternal love, and thus the

commandments of justice to others are distinct from the commandment of

love. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that we are not obliged to

love our neighbor by a formal act of love (Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, n.

1160).

1588. For the fulfillment of the law of charity, external acts of love

are not enough; there must also be internal love or affection.

(a) With regard to charity towards God, there can be no question of

external charity through acts of beneficence, as is clear; but one is

obliged to signify one’s love of God, if silence would cause scandal or

convey an expression of hatred of God. Mere lip-service, however, will

not do, for God must be loved and served from the heart (Matt., xxii.

37; Eph., vi, 6; II Thess. iii., 5; etc.).

(b) With regard to charity towards the neighbor, external charity is

commanded (see 1210 sqq. and 1551). But there must also be internal

charity, for we are bidden to love our neighbor as we love ourselves

(Matt, xxii. 39), as Christ loved us (John, xv. 12), from the heart (I

Pet., i. 22). If a man distributed his goods to feed the poor, not out

of love, but out of vanity or other sinful motives, his act would not

be an exercise of charity. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that

we may satisfy through external acts alone the precept of loving our

neighbor (Denzinger, n. 1161).

1589. Must the internal act of love be explicit? (a) Love of God should

be explicit, for the commandment of charity is that God be loved as the

Last End, and the other commandments are to be observed as means to

that End (see 1120, 1547). The Last End is that which is loved for its

own sake, and hence distinctly, while the means are loved for the sake

of the Last End. (b) Love of the neighbor is required to be explicit as

regards all neighbors in general, when this is necessary for the

preservation of charity towards God, or the fulfillment of obligations

of charity towards man; it should be explicit as regards an individual,

when this is necessary for the proper discharge of external works or

other duties of charity, as when one will not be able to overcome a

temptation to hatred unless one makes an act of charity which expressly

includes the person one is tempted to hate. But one who loves his

neighbor implicitly through an act of supernatural love of God, and

neglects no external duty of charity towards others, is considered to

have sufficiently complied with the law in ordinary circumstances.

1590. The Intention of Performing All Good Works out of Love for

God.--(a) This intention is actual, when one expressly wills God as the

Last End of one’s actions. The commandment of loving God above all

things does not require an actual reference of each good work to His

love (see 1120, 85, 86).

(b) This intention is virtual but explicit, when previously a person

had the actual intention and never retracted it, and now acts under the

influence of that explicit and unretracted intention, though he does

not advert to the Last End as he now acts. Thus, if an act of love of

God above all things is made supernaturally by a Christian or naturally

by a non-Christian, and later on by reason of the acts of love these

persons give alms to the poor and do not think of God as they give the

alms, their works are not actually, but virtually and explicitly done

for His love. The commandment of love of God, as we shall see (1593

sqq.), obliges one at certain times to elicit an act of love of God as

the Last End, loved above all things else (in unbelievers it must be an

act of natural benevolence, and in believers an act of supernatural

charity); and, since such an act includes a consecration of one’s works

to God, the commandment requires likewise at certain times a virtual

and explicit reference of good works to the love of God.

act of love of God influencing a present act, but this act itself is

good, tending from its character and object to the Last End, and it is

precisely its character and object that cause it to be chosen by the

agent. Thus, if an infidel, who has made no offering of his works to

God, gives an alms out of love of mercy, or honors his parents out of

love of piety, or pays his debts out of love of justice, he has

explicit love for virtue and implicit love for the Author and End of

virtue. The commandment of love of God, being affirmative, does not

oblige one at all times to elicit acts of love of God as the Supreme

Good, and hence, apart from the occasions when that affirmative

commandment calls for exercise, a virtual and implicit intention of

acting for the sake of God suffices to excuse from sin.

1591. Applications of the Preceding Paragraph.--(a) A Christian who

makes acts of love of God at the necessary times fulfills the

commandment of loving God with his whole heart and the precepts of

doing all things for the glory of God (I Cor., x. 31), and in charity

(I Cor., xvi. 14), and in the name of Christ (Col., iii. 17).

(b) An infidel invincibly ignorant of the supernatural law, who makes

acts of natural benevolence with reference to God when he should, does

not sin against the precept of charity, and observes the law of natural

love.

natural or supernatural, sins in that act. His sin is venial, if the

evil intended is small (e.g., an alms given purely out of vainglory);

it is mortal, if the evil is grave (e.g., an alms given for the purpose

of seduction into serious sin).

1592. It should not be inferred from what has been said on the

qualities which charity must have, or the influence it must exercise,

that the duty of love of God is only for the perfect, or that it is

with difficulty accomplished. (a) On the contrary, charity is a

universal obligation, for it is the first commandment (Matt., xxii. 38),

and he who does not love is accursed (I Cor., xvi. 22). (b) Neither is

the commandment hard (I John, v. 3), for nature itself inclines one to

love the Supreme Good, and grace helps one to remove the impediments to

a love of friendship that will cling to God above all. The observance

of the commandments indicates that one is guided habitually by love,

while a devout recitation of the Lord’s Prayer is an actual expression

of that love; and hence conscientious persons should not worry lest

they may have been wanting in God’s love.

1593. With reference to the times when the precepts of charity oblige,

we should distinguish three kinds of precepts: (a) the negative

precepts forbid sins against charity (such as hatred, envy, scandal,

etc.), and they oblige at all times; (b) the positive precepts of

external beneficence oblige when occasion requires, as was said above

(see 1210 sqq.); (c) the positive precepts of internal love oblige at

certain special times, as will now be explained.

1594. The precept of love of God obliges directly--that is, by reason

of the virtue of charity itself--at the following times: (a) at the

beginning of the moral life, that is, of the use of reason; (b) during

life; (c) at the close of life, or when one is about to die (Denzinger,

nn. 1101, 1289).

1595. The Obligation of an Act of Love of God at the Beginning of the

Moral Life.--(a) The beginning of the moral life here signifies the

moment when a child arrives at a full use of reason, and is able to

deliberate on things of grave importance, such as the duty of having a

supreme purpose in life and of doing good and avoiding evil. This

moment does not coincide necessarily with any fixed period of the

child’s age (e.g., the seventh year), but depends on the gradual

development of the moral conscience and may be earlier or later

according to intelligence, surroundings, education, etc, (see 932).

(b) The act of love of God here signifies the turning to God as one’s

Last End, but it may be made either formally or virtually, according to

the knowledge had. A formal act of love of God is made, when one has

explicit knowledge, either through faith or through natural reason,

concerning God as the Supreme Good and Last End, and when one loves Him

as such. A virtual act of love of God consists in a resolution to

direct one’s life according to reason, or in a love of the goodness of

virtue; for in such an act there is implied a love of the Author and

End of moral good. The faithful who cannot remember having made this

first act of charity when they came to the use of reason, should not

disturb themselves at this, for the commandment was fulfilled by any

service they freely offered to God.

moral life is, that in that moment one has the choice placed before one

of good or evil, and that faith, hope and charity, being fundamental

precepts, should precede the other virtues of the law.

1596. Ignorance as Excusing from the Act of Love of God.--(a) Ignorance

of God as the Author of the supernatural order excuses from the precept

of supernatural love or charity, if it is invincible ignorance. Thus, a

pagan who knows nothing of revelation does not sin by omitting an act

of charity towards God.

(b) Ignorance of God as the Author of the order of nature does not

excuse from a natural act of benevolence towards God, if the person in

ignorance, though an infidel, has sufficient use of reason, for

ignorance of God is then inexcusable (Rom., i. 20).

1597. The Obligation of the Act of Love of God throughout Life.--(a)

The existence of an obligation to make frequent acts of love of God

during life is a consequence of the preponderant part played by charity

among the virtues (see 1115 sqq.), for how is one to regulate one’s

life according to the virtues, if one does not frequently renew that

virtue which is the inspiration and direction of all the others? The

Old Testament requires that one have the commandment of love of God

frequently in one’s thoughts (Deut., vi. 5-7), and in the New Testament

it is called the commandment on which all the others depend (Matt.,

xxii. 37-40). The Church has condemned propositions that made

infrequent performance of the act of love--such as once in a lifetime,

once in five years--sufficient (Denzinger, nn. 1155-1157).

(b) The details of this obligation--that is, the frequency with which

and the times at which the act of love of God must be made under pain

of grave sin--is a matter of dispute among authorities. Some think once

in three years sufficient; others, guided perhaps by the analogy of the

precept of yearly Communion, regard once a year as sufficient; others,

with St. Alphonsus, hold for once a month, basing their opinion on the

difficulty of overcoming temptations if acts of love of God are omitted

for more than a month; others, with Scotus, think the act of love of

God should be made once a week, for, since the Sundays are set aside

for the worship of God, the Church seems to have thereby determined

with regard to the act of divine charity that which the law of God had

left undetermined; finally, some teach that an act of love of God must

be made daily, arguing that Christ commanded the Lord’s Prayer to be

said daily, and that its first petitions contain formal acts of love of

God.

1598. None of the opposed opinions just given can be considered as

demonstrated and theoretically certain. But in actual life this offers

no difficulty, and the following are accepted as practical rules that

may be acted on:

(a) Those who live habitually in the state of grace may be regarded as

having fulfilled sufficiently the commandment of love of God, for “if

any man love Me, he will keep My word” (John, xiv. 23).

(b) Those who live habitually in an occasion of sin or in sin itself,

no doubt neglect the commandment of love of God; but it is not

necessary that they accuse themselves of the omission to their

confessor, since it is understood in the mention of the occasion of sin

or bad habit. The confessor, however, ought to admonish careless

penitents about the obligation of love of God, of recitation of the Our

Father, etc. Mortal sin revokes the direction of one’s works towards

God, and, though one is not obliged to renew that direction immediately

after repentance, a delay beyond four or five months according to some

authors would be notable.

1599. Obligation of the Act of Love of God at the Close of Life.--The

duty of making an act of love of God when one is at the point of death

is admitted by all for the following cases: (a) the dying person is

directly obliged to make an act of love of God when this is the only

way in which he can secure justification, as when he is not in the

state of grace and cannot receive the Sacraments; (b) the dying person

is indirectly obliged to make an act of love of God when otherwise he

cannot securely struggle against temptations to despair, doubt, etc.

1600. The duty of making an act of love of God at the time when death

is near is considered as doubtful by some authorities when the

following points are morally certain: (a) when the dying person has

already sufficiently complied with the duty of making an act of love

(e.g., when he made such an act just before he fell into danger of

death), or is now in the state of grace (e.g., when he has received

absolution with attrition just before or after the danger); and also

(b) when the dying person will not expose himself on account of

omission of the act of charity to the violation of any serious

commandment.

1601. In practice, the priest who is attending the dying person should

act as follows:

(a) He should remind the dying person of the obligation, if it appears

certain, and should suggest to him the motives and assist him in

pronouncing the form. In many manuals of the Ritual exhortations and

aspirations suitable for this purpose are given.

(b) The priest should recommend the act of love of God, even though the

obligation does not appear certain, if no harm will result from his

doing so. For this will better prepare the dying person for entrance

into eternity.

uncertain and harm would result from his doing so (e.g., if the dying

person is in good faith, and would be much disturbed if told about the

act of love to be made).

1602. Thus far we have spoken of the obligation which the precept of

love of God imposes directly, or by reason of charity itself. There is

also an obligation that is indirect, or by reason of some virtue or

commandment distinct from charity.

(a) Thus, by reason of a virtue distinct from charity, one is bound to

make an act of love of God, if this act is the only means of avoiding

sin against that virtue. Example: Titus suffers severe temptations to

injustice, and finds that only the love of God keeps him from

injustice. In temptation, therefore, he should make an act of love of

God.

(b) By reason of a commandment distinct from that of charity, one is

bound to make an act of love of God, if otherwise one cannot fulfill

rightly the commandment in question. Thus, if a person has to receive

or administer a Sacrament of the living, or solemnly to administer a

Sacrament, when he is not in the state of grace and has not the

opportunity of receiving absolution, he is obliged to make an act of

perfect contrition, which includes an act of love of God.

1603. An implicit love of neighbor is contained in every true act of

love of God (see 1549, 1586). But in some cases love of neighbor must

be explicit (see 1589).

(a) Thus, one is bound to explicit love directly (or by reason of

charity itself), when the law of charity requires this. _Per accidens_,

charity requires an internal act of love, when without this act some

good commanded by charity (e.g., reconciliation with an enemy, alms to

one in distress) will not be done, or some evil forbidden by charity

(e.g., hatred, revenge) will not be overcome. _Per se_, it does not seem

that charity requires explicit acts of love towards the neighbor, but

only those implicit acts contained in the love of God; in practice,

however, conscientious persons frequently make explicit acts of

fraternal charity, as when they pray for the living and the dead, or

say the Our Father with due attention and devotion.

(b) One is bound to explicit love indirectly (or by reason of some

other virtue than charity), when apart from such explicit love that

other virtue cannot be exercised as commanded. Example: Balbus is often

tempted to defraud Caius, and does not resist the temptation

successfully, unless he puts himself into a charitable disposition

towards Caius.

1604. The Necessity of Charity.--(a) The habit of charity is necessary

as a means (see 360, 785) for all persons, infants included, so that

without it no one can be saved. For it is only with this virtue that

one possesses the divine indwelling (I John, iv. 16), and is made a

friend of God. Those who have not the wedding garment of charity are

cast into the outer darkness (Matt., xxii. 13).

(b) The act of charity is also necessary as a means of salvation to all

adults, for it is only by actual charity that they turn towards their

Last End, and without actual charity they are in death (I John, iii.

14). A person who is justified through attrition joined with a

Sacrament receives grace and the habit of charity, and by his voluntary

acceptance he consents to the divine friendship and thus makes an act

of charity.

beginning of the moral life, frequently during life, and at the hour of

death (see 1594 sqq.).

1605. Is it possible that a sin against the love of God be only venial?

(a) The imperfection of the act makes such a sin only venial, as when

without full deliberation one wishes to omit an obligatory act of love.

(b) The slightness of the matter makes such a sin venial, when it is

aside from, but not contrary to, the love of God, as when one makes an

act of love of God with culpable lukewarmness. Venial sin is not,

strictly speaking, opposed to the commandment of love, since it does

not destroy love.

1606. As the order of charity is commanded as a part of the law of

charity, one is obliged not only to love those to whom love is

commanded, but also to give greater love to those to whom greater love

is due.

(a) God must be loved above all creatures, since He is to be loved with

the whole heart (Deut., vi. 5; Matt., x. 37).

(b) Self must be loved more than the neighbor, for love of neighbor is

commanded only as like to that of self (Matt., xxii. 9).

ought to lay down our lives for the brethren (I John, iii. 16). The

claims of self and of the neighbor to love are in the following order:

the spiritual goods of self, the spiritual goods of the neighbor, the

bodily goods of self, the bodily goods of the neighbor, the external

goods of self, the external goods of the neighbor.

(d) Among neighbors, those who are better or more nearly related to

self should be given the preference in love; for we should do good to

all, but especially to those who are of the household of the faith

(Gal, vi. 10), and those persons are specially blamed who have no care

for their own and for those of their own house (I Tim., v. 8). The

claims of neighbors on our help (as was explained in 1176 sqq.) rank in

the following order: wife, children, parents, brothers and sisters,

other relatives, friends, domestics, citizens of the same town, state,

and country, and, finally, all others.

1607. The order of charity is commanded, because it is a mode intrinsic

to the performance of the act of charity (see 1554); it is a

circumstance without which the act of love is not in proportion to the

person to whom it is shown. Thus, love given to God is not in

proportion to His lovableness, if it is exceeded by the love given to a

creature; love given to the members of one’s family is not in

proportion to their claims, if it is less than the love given to

strangers.

(a) Hence, outside cases of a neighbor’s need, the law of charity

requires that one give him the amount of internal love that corresponds

with the external charity due to him. Thus, love for a father should be

in proportion to the external honor one is bound to show one’s parent;

love for a brother in proportion to the external marks of friendship

that are due a brother. He who has no filial love for his parents, or

fraternal love for his brethren, does not fulfill the law of charity.

(b) In cases of a neighbor’s need, the law of charity requires that the

internal love be in proportion to the external charitable assistance

one should give. Thus, if a parent and a stranger are in equal

necessity, more help and more love are due the parent; but if a

stranger is in need, and a parent is not in need, more help and more

corresponding love, as to that particular case, are due the stranger.

1608. It should be noted, however, that there is a twofold love of the

neighbor.

(a) Obligatory love is that which is commanded, and which is due another

as a debt, such as love for God, for a parent, for all neighbors in

general, etc. The amount of love for fellow-creatures that is

obligatory is, of course, not infinite, for no creature is infinitely

lovable; neither is it mathematically fixed, for, as said above, it may

be greater or less according to circumstances; but it is comparative or

relative--that is, it should agree with the higher or lower claim to

external charity that a neighbor has on one.

(b) Optional love, or love of supererogation, is that which is not

commanded, but which may be given lawfully, such as special friendship

outside a case of need for an enemy or stranger. As there is no precept

regarding this kind of love, neither is there any precept regarding the

order of love as between those to whom it is given, and one may invert

the order that is obligatory as regards commanded love. Thus, if a

brother and a cousin are both well-to-do, and one has property to

bequeath to which neither of them has any right, it is not against

charity to leave more to the cousin and less to the brother, or some to

the cousin and none to the brother. This supposes, however, that in the

matter of obligatory love the preference in order of charity has been

shown the brother (as explained in 1158-1182).

Art. 11: THE GIFT OF WISDOM

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 45, 46.)

1609. Wisdom is the Gift of the Holy Ghost which corresponds with and

serves the virtue of charity (see 159 sqq., 808 sqq., 1041 sqq.), and

hence it is discussed in this place.

The following points concerning Wisdom will be treated: (a) the Nature

of the Gift of Wisdom; (b) the Persons who Possess the Gift of Wisdom;

Wisdom; (d) the Sin of Foolishness, which is opposed to Wisdom.

So far is it from being improper to give some space in Moral Theology

to the Gifts of the Holy Ghost (as if they pertained only to higher

mysticism), that it is even necessary to emphasize them. The Gifts are

essential to salvation, and play a most important part in the daily

spiritual life, whether in correcting or reinforcing the virtues, or in

giving immediate direction from the Holy Spirit. Man, it is true, does

not set them into action, but it is man’s part to value them, to hold

himself in readiness for them, and to hearken to their whispered

enlightenment and counsel. The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are the very

soul of Theology and of the Christian life.

1610. The Nature of the Gift of Wisdom.--Wisdom is defined as “a habit

for judging things in the light of their First Cause, the Supreme Good,

which is infused into the soul along with sanctifying grace.”

(a) Wisdom is a habit, and so it differs from passing acts. Thus, a man

in the state of sin who avoids idolatry, judges in the light of the

highest cause that worship is not to be given to creatures; but he

lacks the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and therefore does not judge in

virtue of that special instinct or power which originates from the

abiding presence of the Holy Ghost.

(b) Wisdom judges, and this sets it apart from habits that belong to

the will (e.g., the Gifts of Piety, Fortitude, and Fear), as well as

from habits whose chief act is assent (e.g., the virtue of Faith) or

penetration (e.g., the Gift of Understanding).

all, or the Supreme Good, as when our Lord explained that the condition

of the man born blind was due to the purpose of God to be glorified

through that blindness (John, ix. 3). The wise man is he who goes back

to first principles, to the origins of things, to ultimate purposes;

but it is not every wisdom that estimates things according to the

Supreme Good, and there is a false wisdom (see 1623) whose canon of

excellence is the imperfect good opposed to Supreme Good. The Gift of

Wisdom, therefore, is distinct from sinful wisdom, which is wise at

doing evil (Jer., iv. 22); from particular wisdom, which understands

well the theory and practice of some science, art, or profession, and

is able therefore to decide correctly and to arrange successfully such

matters as fall under a special kind of activity, as in medicine or

architecture or strategy (I Cor., iii. 10).

(d) The things that make up the object of Wisdom are, in the first

place, divine things (e.g., the attributes, plans, government,

operations of God); and, in the second place, created things, whether

in the speculative order (e.g., mind and matter, good and evil,

science, religion, history), or in the practical order (i.e., human

actions). Wisdom contemplates the divine as known from faith or the

beatific vision, and then, with the things of God as its rule, it

judges the things of earth and directs the conduct of men: “The

spiritual man judgeth all things” (I Cor, ii, 15). Thus does Wisdom

differ from the Gifts of Knowledge and of Counsel; for Knowledge is

concerned directly with secondary causes and rises from the creature to

the Creator, While Counsel is not a speculative but a practical Gift,

and is a response to direction given by the Holy Spirit for the

guidance of conduct.

(e) The Gift of Wisdom is an infused perfection of the intellect, “a

wisdom descending from on high” (James, iii. 15). Hence, while it

resembles the virtue of Wisdom, which also judges human and divine

things through first causes (see 145), it differs from that virtue,

even with reference to the same objects, on account of its different

way of approach. Theology and philosophy judge correctly because they

employ study and the investigation of reason; but the Gift of Wisdom

has a right judgment because it depends, not on analysis or

argumentation, but on a supernatural knowledge had through faith (or

vision in case of the blessed) and a supernatural experience of God

through charity. Wisdom may express itself, indeed, in the concepts and

language of philosophy or theology, but it is not through scientific

processes that it knows and judges.

(f) The Gift of Wisdom is infused into the soul along with sanctifying

grace; for, like the other Gifts of the Holy Ghost, it is intended to

supplement through the action of the Holy Spirit the control exercised

by grace, which is imperfect on account of the limitations of the

virtues. The Gift of Wisdom, therefore, is an ordinary and normal fact

in the spiritual life, and must not be confused with rare and

extraordinary phenomena--with the “word of wisdom” (I Cor., xii. 8),

which was granted to the Apostles and at times to other preachers of

the faith, nor with the clear contemplation of God bestowed in the

state of innocence, nor with the infused knowledge or light of glory

enjoyed by Christ and some of the Saints while on earth. Thus, while

all who are in the state of grace possess the Gift of Wisdom,

comparatively only a few have received the “word of wisdom”--that is,

the ability to instruct others in the higher mysteries of faith and to

explain to them with ease and in suitable language the meaning of these

mysteries and their relation to supreme causes. Both these graces are

supernatural, but, while the Gift of Wisdom is needed by each

individual for his own sanctification, the word of wisdom is needed

only in certain cases for the sanctification of others.

1611. From the foregoing definition it is seen that Wisdom belongs both

to the will and to the intellect.

(a) In its cause, Wisdom belongs to the will. The cause of right

judgment by means of divine things is either the suitability of the

intellect, which knows well how to judge, or the suitability of the

will, which is inclined towards divine things. Thus, he who is well

versed in moral science will give a correct decision about a case of

chastity as it falls under the inquiry of reason, and he who is chaste

will judge correctly about the same case, even without moral science,

but from the sympathy he has for the virtue. The intellectual virtue of

Wisdom, then, judges aright because the intellect is sound in its

procedures; but the Gift of Wisdom is right in its judgments, because

the will has been united to God through charity, so that there has

resulted in one a suitability for judging about the things of God:

“Give me one who loves, and he will understand what I say” (Augustine,

_Tract. xxvi. in Joan_.).

(b) In its essence, Wisdom belongs to the intellect, for it consists in

judgment, and this is an act that is exercised, not by the affections,

but by the reason. Through love the soul becomes one spirit with God (I

Cor., vi. 17), and the will experiences the sweetness of this union

(Ps. xxxiii. 9); the intellect then judges concerning the divine which

has been the object of its mystical communion. The Gift of Wisdom,

built as it is on faith and charity, differs utterly from private

interpretation of revelation (which is subversive of faith) and from

the Modernistic experience of the divine (which is explained as a

natural intuition had by a special religious sense of a reality that is

divine and yet only subjective and unknowable).

1612. From the definition and explanation of the Gift of Wisdom it also

follows that this Gift is practical as well as speculative.

(a) Primarily, Wisdom is speculative, for one must consider divine

things in themselves before one applies them to other things; and,

moreover, the object of Wisdom is God, who is the first truth in the

order of knowledge or speculation. It is by Wisdom, then, as well as by

the other intellectual Gifts or extraordinary graces, that the act of

supernatural contemplation is exercised; but Wisdom, more perfect than

the other Gifts, ascends at once to things that are heavenly, divine

and eternal, and thinks of God as transcending in perfection every

known or knowable degree of created excellence, and as being most true,

most beautiful, most lovable (Eph., iii. 17-19).

(b) Secondarily, Wisdom is practical, for God whom it contemplates is

the supreme rule of action, as well as the first truth. Thus does the

higher Gift of Wisdom unite in itself what are found separate in lower

virtues--the speculative quality of the virtue of Wisdom and the

practical quality of Prudence (see 1620).

1613. The practical uses of the Gift of Wisdom are indicated in

Coloss., iii. 16-17, iv. 6: “Let the word of Christ dwell in you

abundantly, in all Wisdom, teaching and admonishing one another in

psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles, singing in grace in your hearts

to God. All whatsoever you do in word or in work, do all in the name of

the Lord Jesus Christ.... Walk with Wisdom towards them that are

without, redeeming the time. Let your speech be always with grace,

seasoned with salt.”

(a) The contemplation of divine things is useful for instruction in the

truths of faith and the duties of religion (“teaching and admonishing

one another”); for the mind becomes in a way divine, like the things on

which it dwells, filled with knowledge of God and of Christ and of the

means of holiness.

(b) Wisdom helps one to fulfill the duty of praying to God with

reverence and interior devotion (“singing in your hearts to God”); for

Wisdom makes one perceive and feel the sweetness and attraction of the

things of God.

Christ”); for the intellect which judges things in the light of

eternity and with the fervor of divine charity will not mislead in

matters of salvation.

(d) It enables one to profit by opportunities of edification

(“redeeming the time”); for the example of a life directed by tender

love of God and by kindness and courtesy to all is a recommendation of

virtue and religion in the sight of the world.

1614. Wisdom is a Gift of the Holy Ghost, and is numbered with the

other six communications of the Spirit: “And the Spirit of the Lord

shall rest upon him, the Spirit of Wisdom, etc.” (Is., xi. 2).

(a) Likeness to the Other Gifts.--The Gifts of the Holy Ghost are

energies diffused in the powers of the soul as instruments of the

supernatural governance of the indwelling Spirit, just as the moral

virtues are the instruments of the natural governance of reason. The

infused virtues (e.g., faith or charity), unlike the acquired virtues

(e.g., temperance or fortitude), do not suffice for the government of

the soul; for, while these latter are according to nature, the former

surpass nature, and are received by it imperfectly. Hence the need of

the Gifts, which on earth supplement the infused virtues, strengthening

them against contrary vices, developing secondary acts of the virtues

which the virtues only initiate, and in heaven perfecting the blessed

in good.

(b) Unlikeness to the Other Gifts.--Wisdom, which is enumerated by

Isaias in the first place, is also given the highest rank among the

Gifts by theologians, on account of its greater elevation, more

universal scope, and the directive power it exercises. Fittingly, then,

is Wisdom assigned as the Gift that serves Charity, the queen of the

virtues: Charity loves God above all things; Wisdom dwells with delight

upon the object of this love (Wis., viii. 16), looks upon life with the

eyes of love, and in directing its human actions communicates to them

something of the savor and sweetness of divine charity.

1615. The Persons Who Possess Wisdom.--The Gift of Wisdom, as said

above (see 1610), is given with sanctifying grace, and hence only those

and all those who are in God’s friendship have this supernatural

endowment.

(a) Only those in the state of grace have divine Wisdom, for without

love of God it is impossible to have that right judgment of things that

is consequent on the relish for and connaturality with divine things.

Hence, it is said: “Wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul, nor

dwell in a body subject to sins” (Wis., i. 4).

(b) All those who are in the state of grace have the Gift of Wisdom,

for man is so weak and the supernatural virtues are so far above him

that, even when he has received these virtues, he is unable to make

proper use of them or to preserve them in time of temptation, unless he

has received the supplementary forces that will enable him to obey more

easily and promptly the voice and impulse of the Holy Ghost. Thus,

Charity destines man to beatitude, but, unless he has Wisdom to value

this virtue and privilege, to spurn the false wisdom of the world, to

think on the love of God with delight and to make it the norm of his

judgments and decisions, he will not progress in Charity, nor retain

it, nor arrive at the beatitude to which it destines him.

1616. Though all who are in the state of grace possess all the Gifts of

the Holy Ghost, these Gifts are not had in the same way by all their

possessors. Thus, the following points should be noted with reference

to the Gift of Wisdom:

(a) The Gifts, like the infused virtues, are possessed habitually by

baptized children and insane persons, and actually by adults. Just as

infants have the possession but not the use of certain natural gifts

(such as reason and responsibility), so likewise supernatural life and

powers are granted them through baptismal regeneration, but the

exercise of this life and of these powers is prevented by their

inability to realize what they possess and to make use of it. The lack

of bodily development, which impedes the use of natural reason, also

impedes the use of supernatural Wisdom.

(b) The Gift of Wisdom is had in itself by all who are in the state of

grace; but in its extension, which is the “word of Wisdom,” it is

possessed only by highly gifted souls who have a special mission from

God (see above, 1610 sqq.). With sanctifying grace, each one receives

the supernatural Gift of judging rightly about heavenly things and of

regulating his conduct by them in so far as is necessary for the

attainment of salvation; otherwise, we should have to say that grace is

inferior to nature, and does not provide what is necessary for its end.

But the ability to explain heavenly things so as to draw others to the

truth, and to apply heavenly doctrines to the guidance of others so as

to lead them to good, is one of the gifts freely given, which the

Spirit divides according as He wills (I Cor., xii. 11): “To one by the

Spirit is given the word of Wisdom, to another the word of Knowledge,

etc.” (ibid, 8).

1617. The Gift of Wisdom in itself (i.e., as intended directly for the

benefit of the recipient and not for the benefit of others) is also had

in varying degrees. (a) Thus, different persons do not possess this

Gift in equal measure; for to some is granted the contemplation of

loftier mysteries not granted to others, and suprahuman Wisdom plays a

greater part in the direction of some lives than in that of others. (b)

The same persons do not possess Wisdom in an equal degree at all times.

Thus, in Baptism all the Seven Gifts are received, but in Confirmation

they are in some way perfected, either in themselves by a greater

refinement or sensibility to the action of the Holy Spirit, or as

regards their possession by their subject through a firmer hold of them.

1618. The Exercise of the Gift of Wisdom.--(a) The external magisterium

(i.e., revelation and the teaching Church) conveys the truths of faith

to the mind of the believer. (b) The internal Teacher, the Holy Ghost,

illuminates the soul with Wisdom, so that it ponders on the first

principles of faith and makes the love of them control its judgments,

Words, and actions: “You have the unction from the Holy One and know

all things” (I John, ii. 20), that is, all that is needed for salvation.

1619. The Beatitude and the Fruits that Correspond to Wisdom.--The

Gifts of the Holy Ghost, by supplying for what is imperfect in the

habits of virtue (e.g., by protecting faith against dullness of

perception, hope against presumption, charity against distaste for

divine things), give to these virtues a perfectionment like to that

which they will have in the state of beatitude, and to their exercise a

corresponding enjoyment. Hence, to the Gifts, which are most excellent

habits, correspond those most perfect or most delightful acts of virtue

known as Beatitudes and Fruits (see 159 sqq.).

(a) There appears a special correspondence of the seventh beatitude

(“Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the sons of

God,” Matt., v. 9) with Wisdom, both as regards their merit, and as

regards their reward. The work of Wisdom is to reduce all things to

unity, to see life and the world as a whole, to look upon creatures as

parts of one great divine plan. Similarly, the work of the peacemakers

is to put an end to dissension and division and to reconcile the

warring powers of the soul, or to introduce harmony between those that

are at enmity: “The Wisdom that is from above is peaceable” (James,

iii. 17). Again, the reward promised the peacemakers is that they shall

be called the sons of God, and of Wisdom it may be said that it makes

one the image of the Son of God, who is Eternal Wisdom.

(b) The Fruits of the Holy Ghost that are assigned to Wisdom are, with

regard to God: charity, or a tender love of God (“The charity of God is

poured out in our hearts,” Rom., v. 5.), joy, or delight at union with

God (“Rejoice in the Lord always,” Phillip., iv. 4), peace, or security

in the enjoyment of God (“There is much peace to them that love Thy

law,” Ps. cxviii. 165). The Fruits that have reference to the love of

neighbor are: goodness, or an internal benevolence characterized by

sweetness (“The fruit of the light is in all goodness,” Eph., v. 9),

and kindness, or a beneficence accompanied by cheerfulness (“The Lord

loves the cheerful giver,” II Cor., ix. 7).

1620. St. James (iii. 17, 18) describes the direction which Wisdom

gives to human actions (see 1612, 1613) and the fruit of peace to which

it conducts them, as follows: “The Wisdom that is from above, first

indeed is chaste, then peaceable; modest, easy to be persuaded;

consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, without judging,

without dissimulation. And the fruit of justice is sown in peace to

them that make peace.”

(a) Thus, first, Wisdom directs one to be free from sin (“chaste”), for

the fear of the Lord is the beginning of Wisdom (Ps. cx. 110).

(b) Next, Wisdom directs one to work for peace within one’s own soul,

by following moderation where one can decide for oneself (“modest”), by

seeking advice where one is in doubt (“easy to be persuaded”).

well disposed towards their good or benefit (“consenting to the good”),

compassionate and helpful in their distress (“full of mercy and good

fruits”), not partial or hypocritical in criticizing their defects

(“without judging, without dissimulation”).

(d) Finally, Wisdom, having sown in peace, reaps the peace of

righteousness. False wisdom leads to wrangling and disorder, true

Wisdom to concord and harmony.

1621. The Sins Opposed to Wisdom.--Just as blindness and dullness-that

is, the want of all or of sufficient perceptiveness in spiritual

things--are opposed to the Gift of Understanding (see 912), so

stupidity and foolishness--that is, the want of all or of sufficient

good judgment about spiritual things--are opposed to the Gift of Wisdom.

1622. Foolishness is defined as “a slowness and darkness of mind that

is due to some moral defect, and that makes it difficult for one to

judge rightly about the Last End of things and the Chief Good.”

(a) Foolishness is slow and darksome, and thus the contrary of Wisdom,

which is alert and discerning.

(b) It is a defect of judgment, and so differs from the sins of

blindness and dullness of heart.

things of greatest value, and thus it is different from the innocent

simplicity of many good persons, whose judgment is not sound in affairs

of this world.

(d) It is brought on by moral fault, and is therefore not to be

identified with invincible ignorance, which is a physical imperfection

caused by nature, as in the weak-minded and the insane.

1623. Just as true Wisdom seems foolishness to the world, so does true

foolishness seem wisdom to the world (I Cor., iii. 18 sqq.). There is a

counterfeit wisdom, which places its last end in some created good, and

which is therefore foolishness before God. St. James (iii. 15)

describes false wisdom as “earthly, sensual, devilish”; and these words

express very well three chief classes of worldly wisdom. (a) Some of

the worldly-wise aim above all things at amassing and increasing wealth

or other external possessions (earthly wisdom). (b) Others seek chiefly

pleasure, health, comfort, or other bodily goods (animal wisdom). (c)

Others imitating Lucifer, who is king over all the sons of pride (Job,

xli. 25), devote their whole lives solely to the pursuit of inordinate

excellence of some kind--that is, of selfish domination or honors or

glory, etc. (devilish wisdom).

1624. The foolishness we are now considering is sinful, for it is a

voluntary choice of evil, a violation of commandments, and the

ruination of man. In scripture the term “fool” is applied to the

wicked, the impious, the objects of divine anger (Ps. xiii. 1), and

hence it was that our Lord declared severe penalty against those who

call another a fool (Matt., v. 22).

(a) Foolishness is a voluntary choice of evil, for it consists in a

turning away from spiritual things or an entire absorption in the

things of this world, with the result that one becomes unfitted to

judge aright concerning the values of human existence: “The animal man

does not perceive the things of the Spirit of God” (I Cor., ii. 14).

But the fact that his taste is perverted, and that he has no relish for

the spiritual, is due to his own deliberate rejection of good and the

cultivation of evil.

(b) Foolishness is a violation of commandments about the knowledge and

employment of truth (see 914 sqq.): “See how you walk, not as unwise,

but as wise” (Eph., v. 15, 16).

judgment, it barters away the future for present satisfaction and sells

its birthright for a mess of pottage: “The prosperity of fools destroys

them” (Prov., i. 32); “Thou fool, this night shall thy soul be required

of thee” (Luke, xii. 20).

1625. The causes of the sin of foolishness, as was said above (see

1623), are the wrong and sinful views taken of life, which make men

judge all things by the standards of gain or pleasure or power, rather

than by the standard of the First Cause, in comparison with whom all

these lower goods are but trivial. But, among all the vices that lead

mankind astray from Wisdom, the preeminence is held by lust, for its

attraction is greater and its hold on the soul more complete. As

chastity especially disposes for heavenly contemplation and Wisdom (see

912) by the refinement and elevation and spirituality it gives the

mind, so does sensuality especially indispose for these goods by the

coarseness and degradation and materialism that follow in its wake.

(c) The more a customer depends on a determinate manufacturer or