1443. Is one who resists a tyrannical go_Moral theology

sedition? (a) When resistance is made by legal and pacific means, such

as the rejection of a bad government at the polls, there is no

sedition. (b) When legal and pacific means are impossible and armed

aggression against a tyrant will benefit the common good, a rebel is

not guilty of the sin of sedition. In this case, it is rather the bad

ruler who causes discords and is seditious against the common good,

whereas the people only defend themselves according to the laws. Thus,

the rebellion of the Machabees against their Syrian oppressors was not

seditious. (c) When legal means are impossible but armed aggression

will not benefit the common good, a rebel is guilty of the sin of

sedition.

Art. 9: THE SINS AGAINST BENEFICENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 43.)

1444. Having discussed in the preceding paragraphs the sins opposed to

the internal acts of charity (love, joy and peace), we come now to

treat of scandal and cooperation which are opposed to the external acts

of charity--beneficence and brotherly correction.

1445. Scandal.--Scandal is derived from a Greek word signifying a snare

or trap prepared for an enemy, or a stone or block laid in the road

that he may stumble or trip over it. In use, it is applied in a wide or

general sense, and in a strict or special sense. (a) In its wide sense,

it refers to any kind of harm, especially of a spiritual or moral

nature, that one brings on others. (b) In its strict sense, it refers

to a fall into sin which one occasions for others by misconduct.

1446. The following are some examples of the word “scandal” as employed

in its wide sense: (a) It is used to signify physical or natural

injuries of various kinds. Thus, the servants of Pharaoh called the

plagues brought on Egypt by Moses a scandal (Exod., x. 7), and the

Psalmist says of the sinner that he laid a scandal (calamity) against

his brother (Ps. xlix. 20). Those who spread defamatory gossip are

called scandal-mongers, and “scandal” often signifies opprobrium or

disgrace, as when Shakespeare speaks of the wrangling of nobles as a

scandal to the crown. (b) The word “scandal” is also used to signify

moral injuries distinct from inducement to sin. Thus, the shock and

offense given to virtuous persons by blasphemous language spoken in

their hearing is described as a scandal, and one who would prevent

another from following some more perfect course or practice to which

there is no obligation (such as entering religion, saying grace at

meals, etc.), is sometimes said to scandalize.

1447. Definition of Scandal.--In the strict sense, scandal is defined

as “any conduct that has at least the appearance of evil and that

offers to a neighbor an occasion of spiritual ruin.”

(a) By conduct is understood external behavior or manner of acting in

the presence of others. Thus, scandal differs from sin, for sin is

committed, not only by external acts done before others, but also by

internal thoughts and desires and external acts that are secret.

(b) Scandal is conduct which is evil at least in appearance, that is,

sinful, or from the circumstances seemingly sinful. Thus, an act is not

scandalous, if it is morally indifferent or a less good, and is

perceivable as being such.

or small. Here scandal strictly understood differs from scandal in the

wide senses given in the previous paragraph.

(d) Scandal is an occasion of a fall into sin, that is, it sets an

example of sin before the attention, and thus suggests to the will that

the will imitate the sin. Scandal is not, however, the cause of sin,

for a person causes his own sin in yielding consent to the suggestion

offered by scandal.

(e) Scandal is to another. A person may be said to scandalize himself

in the sense that by his looks or acts he puts himself in an occasion

of sin (Matt., v. 29, 30), or inasmuch as he maliciously makes the acts

of a virtuous neighbor an occasion of sin; but scandal is more properly

understood of an occasion of sin prepared for one’s neighbor.

1448. Causes of Scandal.--There are various divisions of scandal

according to the kinds of external acts. (a) There is scandal in words,

as profane language or calumnies spoken in a gathering of people. (b)

There is scandal in acts, as when one is perceptibly drunk or fights in

a city street. Scandal applies also to things, in so far as they are

the result of acts or related to acts, such as disedifying books,

pictures, dress. Thus, one gives scandal by having sinful objects on

display, such as profane mottoes on one’s wall, obscene advertisements

or announcements on one’s billboards. (c) There also may be scandal in

omission, as when one is conspicuously absent from Mass on Sundays.

1449. The following kinds of sinful acts are not scandalous, for they

are unknown to others, and hence cannot suggest sin: (a) internal acts,

such as wicked thoughts, desires, emotions; (b) external acts concealed

from others, such as inaudible profanity, intoxication not noticeable

by others, omission of an obligatory penance about which others have no

knowledge.

1450. There are, likewise, various divisions of scandal according to

the internal purpose of the scandalizer. (a) Scandal is directly

intentional, when the purpose of the scandalizer is to lead others to

the guilt of sin (diabolical scandal). Example: Titus blasphemes

religion before Caius in order that the latter may become irreligious,

and thus be more easily persuaded to follow a life of crime. (b)

Scandal is indirectly intentional when the purpose of the scandalizer

is to perform some action whose nature is such that it will lead others

to the guilt of sin, and he is determined to perform that action,

although not directly willing the neighbor’s guilt that will result.

Example: Titus does not like to see his children drunk, but he likes to

get drunk himself occasionally, knowing all the while that his example

encourages them to drink.

1451. In the following cases there is no intention of scandal: (a) when

one does an act that has no appearance of evil, and one neither

directly nor indirectly wills that it should be an occasion of sin to

anyone. Example: Balbus performs his duties faithfully, although he

knows to his regret that his fidelity occasions envy and hatred in

Claudius; (b) when one does an act that is evil or apparently evil, but

is invincibly ignorant of the scandal it may give. Example: Sempronius

and Titus converse together in a foreign tongue which they confidently

think Caius does not understand. The conversation is disedifying, and

Caius, who does understand, is shocked by what they say.

1452. The act of the scandalizer who intends, directly or indirectly,

the spiritual ruin of his neighbor, is called active scandal, while the

act of the person who takes occasion from the active scandal to incur

spiritual ruin, is called passive scandal. Active and passive scandal

are sometimes together, sometimes apart. (a) Thus, there is both active

and passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his

neighbor, and the scandalized does fall. (b) There is active but not

passive scandal, when the scandalizer wills the fall of his neighbor,

but the latter does not fall into the snare. (c) There is passive but

not active scandal, when one makes the good action rightly performed by

another an occasion of sin. Thus, some made the life and passion of our

Lord a pretext for not accepting Him (Matt., xiii. 57; John, vi. 62; I

Cor., i. 23), and are said to have been scandalized at Him.

1453. As to the act that occasions the spiritual ruin of another, it

must be wrong either in reality or in appearance. (a) The scandalous

act is wrong in reality, when it is forbidden as a sin--for example,

offering sacrifice in the temple of an idol, or diverting to personal

use money collected for the poor. (b) The scandalous act is wrong in

appearance, when on account of circumstances it seems to be an act

forbidden as a sin. Thus, to take part in a banquet held in a pagan

temple might seem like participation in sacrificial rites (I Cor.,

viii. 10), to expend secretly the money collected for the poor might

have the appearance of improper use of funds (II Cor., viii. 20, 21).

Hence, St. Paul directs; “From all appearance of evil refrain

yourselves” (I Thess., v. 22).

1454. The acts wrong in reality or in appearance that give scandal are

innumerable, since the whole world is seated in wickedness (I John, v.

19). But today there are a number of acts that should be specially

mentioned, as they occasion sin oftener or for more persons than other

acts. Among these are: (a) occasions of sin against faith, such as

atheistical literature, as discussed in the section on faith; (b)

occasions of sin against morals, such as obscenity in dress, pictures,

plays, writings, and dances. These last-mentioned will be discussed now

in separate paragraphs.

1455. Obscenity.--Obscenity is a quality of words, acts or objects by

which impure thoughts are conveyed, or impure desires or actions

suggested. We may consider it either internally (i.e., in the intention

of the person who uses the words, acts or objects) or externally (i.e.,

in the nature of the things themselves which are used).

(a) Thus, internal obscenity, or the will to use what will corrupt the

minds and morals of others, is of course a mortal sin. If the intention

is to deprave another, the guilt of direct scandal is incurred; if the

intention is only to satisfy one’s own wish to use the sinful words,

acts or objects, the guilt is that of indirect scandal. Thus, a woman

who dresses fashionably in order to excite impure love is guilty of

direct scandal; if she dresses immodestly, not to excite impure love,

but to follow a fashion, she is guilty of indirect scandal.

(b) External obscenity is the tendency of words, acts or objects

themselves to call up impure images in the mind, or to excite impure

desires or actions in those to whom they are presented. The use of such

words, acts, etc., is therefore a mortal sin. For, if the thing said or

done is wrong in itself (such as obscene language), it is a scandalous

sin against purity, if it is wrong on account of those who will be

influenced (such as a talk on sex matters to immature or weak persons),

it is a sin of scandal. Hence, a good or even religious motive (such as

instruction, refutation of error, health, or mysticism) does not excuse

the employment of what is clearly obscene, for the end does not justify

the means.

1456. It is not always easy to determine in particular cases when a

thing is obscene from its very nature, but the following general rules

can be given:

(a) Pictures, statues and other images are obscene, when they represent

scenes of immoral or sexual acts, or lascivious attitudes or postures;

also, when they represent nude or partly nude human figures, ut quando

depinguntur verenda adultorum vel pectora aut partes minus honestae

mulierum.

(b) Female dress or adornment is lascivious, when there is a notable

display of the person through abbreviated skirts, necks, and sleeves;

or a suggestiveness expressed in transparency of material or a

closeness of fit that brings out the lines and curves of the figure; or

in an extremity of fashion whose striking color or design will make the

wearer conspicuous and direct special attention to her physical charms.

of the lesson taught (as when purity is derided or impurity condoned),

by reason of the thing represented (as when the main theme is impurity,

or when acts of impurity are represented or suggested, or when sexual

passion is emphasized), or by reason of the players (as when they are

noted for immorality, or when their dress is indecent, or their

language objectionable).

(d) Dances are obscene in themselves when the postures, movements, or

contact of the dancers is indecent; they are obscene by reason of the

dancers, when these are indecently attired. Public dance halls,

cabarets, road houses, and night clubs--where there is no supervision

and young girls come unattended to dance until late hours with men

unknown to them, and where there is intoxication and

boisterousness--are the natural haunts of the obscene dance, but it may

be found even in more respectable places.

(e) Books or other writings contain obscenity When they inculcate or

recommend impure acts, or advise how these may be committed; when they

treat sins of impurity or narrate immoral facts or stories in such a

manner as to make vice seem alluring or pardonable to the intended

reader; when an erotic composition by language, allusions, details,

sympathetic treatment, etc., gives prominence to animal passion.

1457. As is stated elsewhere (see 1461 sqq.), scandal is not given

unless the persons affected by one’s conduct are susceptible to evil

influence. Hence, there is no obscenity when on account of

circumstances there is no suggestion of evil in things which under

other conditions would be immoral and seductive.

(a) Images of the nude in the studio of an artist, and anatomical

charts, figures or illustrations in a book intended for the instruction

of medical men, are not classed as obscene, since the persons for whom

they are made are supposed to be so much under the influence of the

esthetic or scientific principles of their professions that no harm

will be taken.

(b) The obscenity of dress is largely dependent on its novelty, for

things that are usual cease to excite special attention. This we can

see from the fact that styles that are conservative today would have

been extreme ten years ago. And so the scanty attire of hot countries,

the dress of the bathing beach, and the moderate decollete tolerated in

private gatherings are not obscene in their own proper times and places.

not therefore obscene, if in the main they uphold decency and morality;

otherwise, we should have to regard as immoral even the classic drama.

Newman says of Shakespeare: “Often as he may offend against modesty, he

is clear of a worse charge, sensuality, and hardly a passage can be

instanced in all that he has written to seduce the imagination or to

excite the passions.” It is a simple matter to omit from plays of this

kind the word or phrase that is offensive to modern ears or to the

innocence of youth.

(d) The fact that some individuals find all dancing a strong stimulus

to impure passion does not prove that every dance is obscene. Some

types of dance, it is true, might be rightly called “the devil’s

march”; other dances, named after various animals, may also be

suggestive. But there are also standard types of dance in which many

experience not temptation, but innocent pastime, and which have also

physical, esthetic and social values.

(e) To books and other writings should be applied what was said about

plays, namely, that they are not to be classed as obscene on account of

isolated passages unsuited for the reading of children or other

susceptible persons, or excitable to prurient or impure minds. Even the

Bible may seem objectionable to a prude, and the indecent will go

through its pages with a fine-tooth comb in the search for indecent

matter; but public opinion will rightly class as a lunatic the person

who would endeavor to have the Bible rated as obscene.

1458. Persons Who Give Scandal on Account of Obscenity.--(a) In case of

obscene pictures or statues, scandal is given by the artists, painters,

sculptors or others who make the images, and by the responsible persons

who place them in museums, galleries, parks or other places to which

there is general admission.

(b) As regards female dress, the guilty parties are proximately the

wearers, but remotely and principally the designers and society leaders

who impose their will in making the fashions dangerous and in causing

one extreme mode to follow quickly upon another.

(e) With respect to obscene plays, the scandal is given by playwrights,

managers, actors and actresses, and those who patronize or applaud

them. The public itself and the civil authorities share in the guilt,

when they supinely tolerate the degradation of the stage and the

corruption of morals.

(d) In the case of obscene dances, the givers of scandal are the

proprietors of resorts where the dances are held, the musicians and

singers (especially when the songs themselves are obscene), and the

dancers, spectators and other patrons.

(e) In the case of salacious publications or writings, authors,

publishers, printers, vendors, and the reading public share

responsibility for the scandal. Government censorship of the press is

not desirable, but government suppression of obscenity has always been

the policy of countries of English origin. The private citizen, then,

is not free of guilt if he takes no interest even when he sees piles of

indecent magazines, pictures, etc., being sold openly on the

newsstands. Canon Law (Canon 1404) forbids booksellers to sell, lend,

or keep books that deal _ex professo_ with obscenity, though there is

no objection to expurgated editions, as in the case of classical works.

1459. Results of Scandal.--The spiritual ruin occasioned by scandal is

sin.

(a) Thus, formal or material sin may be the result of scandal. Example:

Titus blasphemed before a boy who did not understand the meaning of the

word and before a youth who did understand, with the result that both

repeated the same blasphemy. Thus, the scandal given by Titus produced

material sin in the boy and formal sin in the youth.

(b) Mortal sin or venial sin may be the result of scandal, just as a

stone in the road may cause either a fall or a stumble.

committed by the scandal-giver may be the result of scandal. Thus, a

calumny spoken against a neighbor may induce a hearer either to repeat

the calumny, or to imitate the act imputed by the calumniator, or to

give up religion.

(d) Sin already committed by the person scandalized or sin which is new

to him, sin he had in mind to commit or sin he had not

contemplated--any one of these results suffice for scandal. Example: It

is scandal to recall to drunkenness by bad example a person who had

reformed, or by bad example to bring back to another’s mind and desire

a sin on which he was once resolved.

1460. Scandal resembles solicitation and complicity, since like them it

exercises an evil influence on others; but it is not identical with

them.

(a) Thus, solicitation influences another to evil by counsel,

persuasion, command, or invitation; scandal may influence to evil

either in these ways or by mere example. Again, solicitation does not

necessarily intend the fall of another into guilt, as does scandal.

Thus, one may solicit another to get drunk who had already determined

to get drunk, or one may persuade another that drunkenness is no sin,

and then solicit him to drunkenness. But, if one who intends the

demoralization and corruption of his neighbor solicits him to

drunkenness, solicitation is joined with scandal.

(b) Complicity or cooperation influences another to evil by helping him

in the commission of sin; scandal influences him to evil by suggesting

that he commit sin. Example: Titus, an elderly man, gets drunk or

praises drunkards in the presence of Balbus, a youth. Influenced by

these acts and words, Balbus tells his acquaintance Claudius that he

intends to get drunk, and Claudius supplies him with the intoxicants.

Titus is guilty of scandal, Claudius of cooperation.

1461. The persons before whom disedifying words, deeds or omissions are

done, are of two classes. (a) Persons apt to be scandalized are those

who are not experienced either in vice (especially that to which the

disedifying example would lead), or in virtue (especially the opposite

virtue); for such persons are readily subject to bad influence. Thus,

young persons Whose character is yet unformed, the ignorant and

well-meaning persons who are weak, are peculiarly disposed to be led

astray by example. (b) Persons not apt to be scandalized are those who

are habitually so bad or so good that anything disedifying done before

them is not calculated to influence their attitude towards evil.

1462. May a person hold himself guiltless of scandal, therefore,

because his wrongdoing was committed before those who are not apt to be

scandalized?

(a) If he is certain that the witnesses will not be weakened morally on

his account, and if he does not intend their fall, he is free of the

guilt of scandal. Thus, if one blasphemes in the presence of a lady

renowned for piety, or of a rough crowd of men whose daily talk is

interspersed with blasphemies, it is practically sure that no scandal

is given.

(b) If a person is not certain that the witnesses will suffer no moral

harm through his example, he cannot hold himself as not guilty of

scandal. For, no matter how good or how bad the witnesses may appear to

him, they may not be as fixed in character as he thinks, and his

misconduct may be the starting point for them of a downward course or

of a more rapid descent into evil. Generally speaking, there is this

uncertainty about the influence of bad example, for the reading of

character is no easy matter, and many sins are internal.

1463. There are two cases especially, when even the very good may

become bad or the very bad become worse through force of evil example:

(a) when the sin committed is from its nature very alluring. Sic

auctores censent vix fieri posse quin in materia luxuriae malum exemplum

peccati motus cieat; (b) the second case is when the authority of the

one who gives scandal is great. For the fact that he sides with or

seems to side with evil, will demoralize the good and encourage the

wicked in wrongdoing.

1464. Passive scandal (see 1452), that is, the spiritual fall

consequent on the example of another, is of two kinds: (a) scandal

given, which is a fall into sin occasioned by conduct really

disedifying, as when a youth becomes drunk because he has seen his

elders intoxicated; (b) scandal taken, which is a fall into sin

occasioned by conduct irreproachable in itself, but wrongly

interpreted, either out of malice (Pharisaic scandal), or out of

ignorance or frailty (scandal of little ones). The Pharisees were

scandalized at our Lord’s dining with sinners, because they themselves

were unmerciful (Matt., ix. 11 sqq.), and the weak brethren at Corinth

were scandalized at the eating of certain meats, because their

consciences were tender (I Cor., xi. 23 sqq.).

1465. Sinfulness of Scandal.--(a) Scandal in the wide sense is not

necessarily a sin. Thus, St. Peter acted out of love for his Master

when he wished to dissuade Him from the Passion, but our Lord, in order

to correct more vigorously the wrong ideas of Peter, called them a

scandal (Matt., xvi. 23).

(b) Passive scandal is always a sin in the one who falls because of the

conduct of another; but it does not always suppose that the conduct

which occasioned the fall was a sin, as is clear from the remarks made

above on Pharisaic scandal and the scandal of little ones.

the fall of another, since that conduct is either sinful, or has such

an appearance of sin that it should have been omitted. But it does not

always suppose a sin in the person who witnesses the scandal, for he

may proceed without a fall in spite of the obstacle placed in his path.

1466. Is scandal a distinct species of sin, or only a circumstance that

may happen to any kind of sin?

(a) Passive scandal is not a special kind of sin. For the scandalized

person may fall into any and every kind of sin, and the fact that

example occasions his fall does not add any special or new opposition

to the virtue against which he offends. Thus, he who breaks the fast

because he saw others break the fast, is guilty of the same sin of

intemperance as those who gave him scandal. But passive scandal may be

an aggravating or an extenuating circumstance, aggravating if the

scandal was taken, extenuating if the scandal was given.

(b) Active scandal, if it is only indirectly intentional (see 1450) and

is offered by conduct evil in itself, is not a special sin. The reason

is that in such scandal one does not specially intend the spiritual

ruin of a neighbor, but only the satisfaction of one’s own desire.

Thus, he who breaks the fast before others to satisfy his own appetite,

does not directly wish the corruption of those others, and hence his

sin is that of intemperance with the added circumstance of bad example.

by conduct not evil but evil-appearing, is reductively the special sin

of scandal, For, since all active scandal is sinful, and in this case

there is no other species of sin, the conduct not being really evil in

itself, the sin in question must be reduced to scandal. Thus, one who

is dispensed from the law of abstinence and who eats meat on a day of

abstinence in the presence of others who know he is a Catholic but do

not know he is dispensed, does not sin against temperance, but against

edification. His sin is that of scandal only reductively, since he does

not directly will the fall of others. There is also the circumstance

that the law of abstinence may suffer as a result of the scandal.

(d) Active scandal, if it is directly intentional (see 1450), is

directly also the special sin of scandal. For this kind of scandal

directly intends the spiritual ruin of a neighbor, and so is directly

opposed to a special good of another person and to the special

charitable act of fraternal correction. Hence, a person who breaks the

fast in order to lead his neighbor into a like transgression is guilty

of both intemperance and scandal; he who to make his neighbor sin

appears to break the fast, is guilty of scandal, but not of

intemperance.

1467. Practical Applications of the Preceding Paragraph to

Confession.--(a) Species of Sins.--In case of passive scandal there is

only one species of sin to be confessed, namely, the intemperance

occasioned by bad example; in case of active scandal indirectly

intended and offered by evil conduct, there is only one species of sin,

namely, intemperance, with the circumstance of publicity or bad

example; in case of active scandal indirectly intended and offered by

evil-seeming conduct, there is only one species of sin, namely,

scandal; in case of active scandal directly intended, there is only the

species of scandal, if the conduct of the scandalizer is only

evil-seeming, but there are several species of sin, if his conduct is

really evil, namely, his own intemperance and the scandal he gives.

(b) Number of Sins.--As many sins of scandal are committed as there are

persons present to be scandalized, for scandal is given to those

present as individuals, not as parts of a group (see 219). Hence, one

commits more scandals by being drunk on a public street than by being

drunk with a roomful of companions; and by attacking religion before a

large assembly than by attacking it before a small circle.

should confess especially the end and the means employed, for on these

depends the important distinction between directly intentional and

indirectly intentional scandal and the specific character of the sin

committed, as explained in the preceding paragraph.

(d) Circumstance of Condition of the Persons Involved.--This should be

mentioned in confessing scandal, if it adds a new malice. Thus, the

fact that scandal is given by a superior bound by his office to give

good example, adds to the violation of charity a violation of justice;

the fact that the person whose ruin is intended is consecrated to God,

or married, or a relative, adds to the malice of intentional scandal

against chastity; the fact that a person is scandalized entirely

against his will, makes the sin scandal rather than simple solicitation.

(e) Circumstance of the Result of Scandal.--The results of scandal

should be confessed when they add a new malice to the sin or induce an

obligation of restitution. This subject will be considered in the three

following paragraphs.

1468. Is the scandalizer guilty of the species of sin to which his

conduct is calculated to lead the scandalized? (a) If the scandal is

directly intentional, that is, if the scandalizer intends that some

special sin or sins shall be committed by the one scandalized, the

former is guilty in desire of that which he intends that the latter

shall be guilty of in reality (cfr. 96, 102). Hence, if by calumniating

clerics or religious or church members one intends that one’s listeners

shall be induced to repeat these calumnies, or to do what the

calumniated persons were said to do, or to abandon religion, one is

guilty in desire of the particular sin or sins that one wills.

(b) If the scandal is only indirectly intentional, that is, if the

scandalizer foresees but does not expressly will the fall of the

scandalized (e.g., if he calumniates others to injure the calumniated

and not those who hear the calumny), the matter is more difficult, and

authorities differ in their opinions. Some moralists think that the

scandalizer is guilty of the result he foresees, because he wills it

interpretatively by offering the occasion for it. Others think that he

is not guilty of the result foreseen, because he does not effect it,

either in intention (for he does not desire it) or in reality (for he

is not bound, except by charity, to prevent its accomplishment in

others); he permits, but does not approve, the sin of his neighbor.

1469. A practical application of the previous paragraph to confession

may be made as follows: (a) those who are guilty of direct scandal must

confess not only their own sin, but also the sin to which their conduct

leads their neighbor; (b) those who are guilty of indirect scandal are

not obliged, according to the second opinion given above, to confess

the species of sin to which their conduct incited the beholder, and

hence, if their conduct was only evil-seeming, it suffices for them to

confess that they gave scandal.

1470. Is the scandalizer responsible for the injuries to third parties

resulting from the sins occasioned by his scandal?

(a) According to one opinion, he is bound to make his share of

restitution for injustices occasioned by his own bad example, because

it is admitted that he who counsels injustice is so bound, and example

is more persuasive than words of counsel. Hence, one who steals from

his employer before fellow-employees, and so brings on a custom of

stealing among them, is bound to restore, not only what he took

himself, but also a share of other losses not made good to the employer.

(b) According to the more common opinion, however, the scandalizer in

the present case is not held to restitution, except as regards his own

ill-gotten goods, even if there is question of scandal directly

intended. For, either the scandalizer is not guilty of the injustice

committed by the others, as not desiring it; or, at any rate, he is

only the occasion, not the cause or cooperator in that injustice.

1471. If scandal amounts to incitation or cooperation, the guilt of the

neighbor’s sin and responsibility for injury the neighbor causes are

incurred by the scandalizer.

(a) Thus, bad example may amount to incitation to sin, as when a person

knows that others are directed to imitate him, and yet he gives them

bad example. Even though he does not directly intend their fall into

sin, he does intend his own conduct, while realizing that there is

attached to it the circumstance that it is an invitation to sin; and

hence it would seem that the guilt of this sin is also contracted.

(b) Bad example may amount to cooperation in sin, as when a person by

his bad example shows others the way to commit sin, which they could

not have learned without his example. Hence, if a person opens a safe

to steal, knowing that other dishonest persons are observing in order

to learn the combination and steal, it seems that to some extent he

shares in the guilt and duty of restitution of the thieves who learn

from him. There is no doubt that a defamer is bound to make reparation,

not only before his immediate listeners, but also before others who

have listened to them; for, by defaming before talkative persons, he

virtually authorized them to spread his words.

1472. The Gravity of the Sin of Scandal.--(a) From its nature all

active scandal is a mortal sin. It turns man away from Christ (I Cor.,

viii. 12); it is spiritual murder, destructive of the souls of others,

and so contrary to the mercy and brotherly correction required by

charity (Rom, xiv. 15); it brings on oneself the wrath of God (Matt.,

xviii. 6), and on one’s family, friends and profession obloquy and

disgrace.

(b) From the indeliberation of the act or from the smallness of the

matter, active scandal may be venial, as will be seen in the following

paragraph.

1473. Mortal and Venial Scandal.--(a) Passive scandal is always a sin,

mortal or venial according to the fall occasioned by the conduct

witnessed. But mortal sin may be occasioned by venial sin, as when an

inferior takes the liberty to blaspheme, because his superior used

profane language; and venial sin may be occasioned by mortal sin, as

when the blasphemy of an infidel provokes his neighbor to use profane

language against the blasphemer.

(b) Active scandal indirectly intended is sometimes a venial sin, as

when the scandalous conduct is only a venial sin, or is no sin but has

the appearance of a slight sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when

the scandalous conduct is a mortal sin, or when a person so despises

the spiritual welfare of his neighbor that he chooses to do an

evil-seeming act that will cause the neighbor to fall into serious sin.

a person intends by conduct venially sinful to lead a neighbor into

venial sin; sometimes it is a mortal sin, as when one intends to lead

one’s neighbor into mortal sin, or commits a mortal sin in order to

lead one’s neighbor into venial sin.

1474. Increase and decrease in gravity of scandal depends on the

internal dispositions of the scandal-giver and the external influence

he has on the person scandalized. (a) The internal factors on which the

quantity of scandal depends are the amount of deliberation and the

degree of intention. It is more serious to speak a scandalous word with

premeditation than to speak it somewhat thoughtlessly; more scandalous

to speak it when the hearer’s spiritual ruin is directly intended, than

when that ruin is not directly intended. (b) The external factors on

which the quantity of scandal depends are the amount of influence the

bad example has and the character of the evil to which it leads. It is

more serious to corrupt A, who would not otherwise have been corrupted,

than to corrupt B, who would have been corrupted even without one’s bad

example; it is more serious to cause another to commit mortal sin, than

to cause him to commit venial sin.

1475. Persons Scandalized.--Is it possible to scandalize people who are

firmly rooted in virtue?

(a) If the question be understood of scandal in a wide sense, even the

perfect may be scandalized. They may be shocked and horrified at the

evil example they witness; they may be hindered from performing the

external good works they desire to accomplish (I Thess., ii. 18). But

these things do not hinder them internally, or separate them from the

love of God (Rom., viii. 38, 39).

(b) If the question be understood of possibility in an absolute sense,

even the perfect may suffer real scandal, that is, they may be

influenced to sin on account of the example witnessed. Since they are

not confirmed in grace in this life, it is not repugnant that they

commit sin and lose grace.

sense--that is, if we consider what we should expect in view of the

character of perfect men, and what does usually happen--the perfect

cannot be scandalized, since they are so firmly united to God that the

sayings or doings, no matter of whom, cannot cause them to sin (Ps.

cxxiv. 1, 2), although they may at times be disturbed thereby (Ps.

lxxii. 2).

1476. Is it possible that the perfect should give scandal?

(a) If the question be understood of absolute possibility, even the

perfect may give scandal, since they are not immune from defect (I

John, i. 8). (b) If the question be understood of relative possibility,

as explained above, the perfect cannot scandalize, for their sins are

mostly internal acts not entirely deliberate, while the external words

or acts in which they fall short deviate so slightly from right as to

offer no occasion of sinning to another. The perfect man is one who is

on his guard, especially that he become not a stumbling-block to

others, and it is therefore a rare exception when he causes scandal.

1477. Duty of Avoiding Scandal.--At times it is impossible to avoid

giving scandal, unless one surrenders some spiritual or temporal good.

Hence, on this point there are two questions to be considered: (a) When

is one obliged to surrender spiritual goods for the sake of avoiding

scandal? (b) When is one obliged to surrender temporal goods for the

sake of avoiding scandal?

1478. The Surrender of Spiritual Goods in order to Avoid Scandal.--(a)

Spiritual goods that are so necessary that one cannot give them up

without committing sin may not be surrendered; for, according to the

order of charity, one must be more solicitous to keep oneself from sin

than to preserve others, and moreover a good end does not justify

sinful means. Hence, it is not lawful to commit mortal or even venial

sin to avoid giving scandal to another. Examples: One may not tone down

the doctrine of right and wrong in order to keep another from

blasphemy. One may not tell a slight lie to keep another from taking

undeserved offense.

(b) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin are not to be

neglected on account of malicious or Pharisaic scandal, as long as

there is a good reason which calls for their use; for the person who

takes malicious scandal from these spiritual things is in difficulty

through his own fault and can rescue himself, and it is not reasonable

that his malice should be permitted to impede the benefit of others.

Thus, our Lord declared that no attention was to be given the scandal

which the Pharisees took from His doctrine (Matt., xv. 14).

neglected on account of Pharisaic scandal, if there is no great reason

for their use; for one should not give another an occasion of sinning,

even if the other is in bad faith, unless there is necessity. Thus, our

Lord declared that the act of teaching truth to others should be

omitted, if it would only provoke rejection (Matt, vii. 6). Example: A

wife may omit saying grace aloud, if her prayer moves her husband to

mimicry or to attempts to make the prayer a mockery.

(d) Spiritual goods which can be put aside without sin should be

omitted on account of the scandal of little ones, as long as it remains

scandal from weakness or ignorance; for charity requires that one

assist those who are in spiritual need, and persons who are in danger

of scandal through no fault, or through a slight fault of their own,

are in spiritual need. Hence, one should conceal or delay the

performance of good works that are not necessary, if they would

scandalize the weak, or else one should explain to these persons the

righteousness of such works. In any case, one should not do these works

before those who without malice will be scandalized, but should await

such a time as will give them better knowledge, or put them in bad

faith. Examples: If a person knows that personal acts of piety which he

performs seem to some well-meaning persons superstitious and will shake

their faith, he should omit these acts when such persons are present.

If parents are scandalized because a child wishes to leave them in

order to become a priest or a religious, the child should delay for a

while, if there is hope of a change of view on their part.

1479. As was said in the chapter on law (see 288 sqq.), the higher law

has the preference in case of a conflict. Now, natural law itself

requires that one avoid the scandal of the weak. Hence the following

cases:

(a) Negative precepts of the natural law may not be contravened in

order to avoid the scandal of the weak; for such contravention is

necessarily sinful. Hence, one may not lie or commit perjury to prevent

scandal.

(b) Affirmative precepts of the natural law should be contravened in

order to avoid the scandal of the weak, but only when such scandal is a

greater evil than the omission of the thing commanded. Thus, one should

omit a fraternal correction or a punishment, if the one corrected would

be made worse, or the punishment occasion a schism. But one may not

neglect to help a person in extreme need because of scandal.

scandal of the weak, unless contravention of the law is a greater evil

than permission of the scandal. Thus, the preaching of the Gospel is

commanded by divine law, and yet it may be omitted to avoid scandal

(Matt., vii. 6). Item integritas confessionis de jure divino est, et

tamen poenitens deberet peccatum silere, si intelligeret confessarium

cui ex necessitate confiteri deberet grave ex eo scandalum passurum.

But it is not lawful to omit Baptism in order to avoid scandal to those

who will be provoked to anger or blasphemy.

(d) Precepts of ecclesiastical law should be contravened, when

otherwise there will arise a scandal of the weak which is a graver evil

than the contravention of the precepts. Thus, a parish-priest should

say Mass on Sunday, even though not fasting, if this is necessary in

order to avoid great scandal among the people. A wife may omit Mass or

a fast, in order to prevent her ignorant husband from using blasphemies

or imprecations, or to avoid notable dissensions in the home. Puella

quae scit juvenem infirmum ex suo aspectu scandalizari debet sacro

omisso domi manere.

1480. In order that scandal of the weak may be considered a greater

evil than contravention of a grave precept, it is necessary that the

following conditions be verified:

(a) The evil of the scandal must be certain and grave, for an uncertain

or slight scandal is not a greater evil than certain contravention of a

grave precept. Thus, if one only has vague fears that scandal may be

given, or if one has no determined person in mind and thinks only that

someone or other will be harmed, there is no excuse for contravention

of the precept.

(b) The evil of contravening the precept must not impose intolerable

hardships or lead to greater scandals; for one is not required to

attempt the impossible, or to give scandal in order to avoid scandal.

Thus, it would be unreasonable to expect that a student should never

read the classical poets or philosophers of Greece or Rome, lest

scandal be given some person overstrict in this matter; that a wife

absent herself from Mass permanently, lest her ignorant husband be

provoked to rage; that a young lady be deprived of fresh air and

exercise, lest an old relative be disedified. If we have to choose

between occasioning irreligion in one person by attending Mass and

occasioning irreligion in many persons by staying away from Mass, we

should rather permit the scandal of the one. Moralists generally hold

that scandal of the weak does not justify absence from obligatory Mass

oftener than once or twice, and some hold that it does not require

absence from Mass at all.

1481. Good works that are of counsel only (such as evangelical

poverty), and those that are obligatory only under certain conditions

(such as almsdeeds), may be more easily put aside in order to avoid

scandal of the weak. It should be noted, however, that for some persons

these works are of precept, and hence they are to be judged, as regards

those persons, according to the rules given for contravention of

precepts. (a) Thus, the counsels are obligatory for those who have

vowed them (e.g., religious).

(b) Corporal and spiritual works of mercy are obligatory for prelates

and other clerics because of their office.

1482. Spiritual goods, therefore, whether of precept or of counsel, are

not to be surrendered entirely on account of any scandal, whether it be

Pharisaic scandal or scandal of the weak. But, out of charity for

others, these goods should not be made use of (apart from necessity) in

a way that would occasion spiritual ruin to anyone. Hence, if there is

danger of scandal: (a) they should be concealed, as when one goes to

Mass early in the morning or by another way, so as not to occasion

blasphemy in one’s neighbor; (b) they should be delayed, as when one

puts off a fraternal correction until the other person is in a frame of

mind to be corrected with profit; (c) they may be used but should be

explained, as when one is called to give Baptism to a person dying in a

notorious resort and takes witnesses with him, or tells the bystanders

the reason of his visit.

1483. When Should Temporal Goods be Surrendered for the Sake of

Avoiding Scandal.--(a) Temporal goods of which one is not the owner,

but only the custodian or administrator, may not be surrendered at will

on account of scandal; for no one has the right to give away the

property of others. Hence, rulers in Church or State may not

arbitrarily surrender common property; guardians may not give up the

property of their charges.

(b) Temporal goods of which one is owner should be surrendered on

account of the scandal of little ones, unless a greater evil results

from such surrender; for, as said above (see 1165 sqq.), one should be

willing to suffer some detriment in temporal things to avert from one’s

neighbor detriment in spiritual things. Hence, one should abstain from

a certain food, if one’s eating of it will cause spiritual ruin to some

innocent person (I Cor., viii. 13).

scandal; for this would be injurious to the common good, since it would

encourage the wicked to despoil the conscientious, and it would also be

injurious to the wicked themselves, since they would continue in sin by

keeping what was not their own. Hence, one may demand money owed, even

if the debtor is greedy and will use profane language.

1484. The surrender of temporal goods spoken of in the previous

paragraph may be understood in a number of senses.

(a) It can be understood either of the act of giving another what is

held by us and is our own property, or of the act of permitting another

to keep that which is held by him but which belongs to us. Charity may

call for either kind of surrender as a means to the avoidance of

scandal. Example: Rather than have a bitter quarrel or lose a

friendship over a few cents of change, it is better to let the other

man keep what he owes you, or give him what you do not owe, if he is

also in good faith.

(b) The surrender of temporal goods can also be understood either of

the internal willingness to sacrifice temporal things for things

spiritual, when necessity requires, or of the actual external

sacrifice. Charity demands the internal willingness, but it does not

always demand the actual sacrifice; for sometimes such a sacrifice

would be harmful to the common welfare and the welfare of individuals.

Thus, the saying of our Lord that we should not contend with a neighbor

who wishes to take our coat, but should rather let him take our cloak

as well (Matt, v. 40), and the saying of St. Paul that the Corinthians

should prefer to suffer injury and fraud rather than have lawsuits

against fellow-Christians (I Cor., vi. 7), are to be understood of a

willingness to sacrifice temporal things in order to avoid scandal,

when a greater good makes this necessary. But those texts do not mean

that it is obligatory or advisable to make an actual sacrifice at other

times.

giving over to others without protest or remonstrance, or of a yielding

to them only after one has tried to prevent scandal without incurring

temporal loss. Charity does not require, even when there is danger of

scandal of the weak, that one should surrender one’s goods without any

effort to save them. Thus, if an ignorant Catholic is shocked because

his priest asks for money to support the Church, the latter will do him

a service by explaining the right the Church has to be supported and

the duty of the members to contribute.

1485. Temporal goods may be understood here either of things of great

value (e.g., necessaries of life) or of things of minor value (e.g.,

luxuries). (a) Thus, if scandal will place a neighbor in extreme

spiritual need, even things of great value should be surrendered, if

this is necessary to avoid scandal. (b) If scandal will not place him

in extreme need, one is not obliged to surrender any except things of

minor value (see 1165 sqq.). Thus, St. Paul does not ask that his

converts give up all food in order to avoid scandalizing the weak, but

only such food as they can get along without (Rom, xiv. 15; I Cor.,

viii. 13).

1486. Should church goods ever be surrendered in order to avoid scandal

of the weak? (a) On the one hand, goods of the Church have a special

sacredness, because they have been given and set apart for spiritual

purposes and the common good of the Church. Hence, he would be an

unfaithful steward who would devote them to merely temporal ends, such

as the enrichment or exaltation of himself or of his friends, or who

would alienate them without due authority. (b) On the other hand, the

temporal goods of the Church are to serve spiritual ends, and the

spiritual must not be subordinated to the temporal. Hence, one of the

chief causes of scandal in the Church is the appearance of avarice in

churchmen (even as regards goods that are not personal, but common),

especially if they seem to put money before the salvation of the

people. There are times, therefore, when to avoid scandal a prelate or

priest ought to forego something really due the Church.

1487. Cases of Scandal and Renouncement of Church Goods.--(a) If there

is question of Pharisaic scandal alone, one should not renounce the

goods of which one is the custodian, but should resist spoliation as

far as one is able. Thus, St. Thomas of Canterbury would not agree to

the invasion of church rights by Henry II. So also a pastor should not

neglect the collection of dues needed for the maintenance of the

church, because some malcontents will take offense at this; neither

should he yield to the extortionate demands of some hired person who

will be scandalized because more is not paid.

(b) If there is question of the scandal of the weak, concessions should

be made, lest spiritual things be made to suffer for the temporal.

Thus, St. Paul would not accept any support for himself from persons

newly converted to Christianity, lest this prove a hindrance to the

preaching of the Gospel (I Cor., ix. 12). For the sake of the ignorant

or the weak, therefore, the Church does not insist on dues and other

payments, until these persons have had the opportunity of learning

their duty. The faithful, indeed, are bound to contribute to the

pastors who serve them, but the precept is an affirmative one, and

obliges therefore not at all times, but when the conditions of time,

place, person, etc., make this possible. It would be a real scandal of

the weak, if a person were driven from church because he did not

realize his duty of contributing, or if a poor person were taxed beyond

his means, or if an affluent cleric were always asking for money and

never giving to the needy, or if a priest were to talk collections

instead of doctrine, or devoted most of his time to money-making

enterprises. Anything that commercializes religion is also a scandal

both to Catholics and non-Catholics.

1488. Duty of Repairing Scandal.-The paragraphs immediately preceding

have spoken of the duty of avoiding scandal. There is also a duty of

repairing scandal that has been given. (a) Thus, there is a duty of

charity to repair the scandal one has given; for, if all are required

to practise fraternal correction, those especially are bound to this

who are responsible for the sins of others. (b) There is sometimes a

duty of legal justice, as when superiors, who are bound from their

office to give good example, give scandal to their subjects. (c) There

is sometimes a duty of commutative justice, as when the scandalizer has

employed unjust means (such as force, fear or traps) in order to lead

another into scandal.

1489. Ways of Repairing Scandal.--(a) Scandal is repaired publicly or

privately. Reparation is public, when it is made before the community,

and private, when it is made before individuals. (b) Scandal is

repaired explicitly or implicitly. Explicit reparation is made by

retractation of one’s words, by condemnation of one’s acts, by the

destruction of one’s scandalous writings, by efforts to bring back to

virtue those whom one has misled, etc. Implicit reparation is made by

reformation of one’s conduct, the abandonment of that which gave

scandal, the practice of good example, prayer for the person

scandalized, etc.

1490. Particular Kinds of Scandal to be Repaired.--(a) Scandal is

public or private. Public scandal is given before the community at

large, as when one openly apostatizes so that it is the talk of the

whole neighborhood or town, or writes a signed article favoring

atheism, or makes a disedifying speech before a gathering of people.

Scandal is private, when it is given before a few persons, and when it

does not tend to become generally known, as when husband and wife

quarrel before their domestic circle.

(b) Scandal is ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary scandal is given by

bad example alone; extraordinary scandal adds to bad example injury or

injustice, or the debt of punishment for a crime. Thus, one who becomes

slightly intoxicated at a party gives ordinary scandal; while one who

by trickery schemes to get another into a situation in which he will be

effectually scandalized, or who strikes an inoffensive priest, or who

spreads disedifying printed matter, is guilty of extraordinary scandal.

1491. It rests with the prudent judgment of the confessor or

ecclesiastical authority to decide in particular instances the way in

which scandals are to be repaired. But in general the following rules

may be given:

(a) Public scandal should be repaired publicly, even though it has not

actually seduced those who are aware of it; for otherwise the evil

influence remains. Thus, a drunkard should take the pledge of total

abstinence, or else give an example of sobriety; an apostate should

renounce his errors as openly as he defended them.

(b) Private scandal may be repaired privately, that is, before the few

persons who were scandalized. Thus, the husband and wife who quarrelled

before their children make reparation when they tell the children not

to quarrel, and when they strengthen this advice by good example.

over a new leaf. Thus, one who has been away from Mass and the

Sacraments for a long time makes reparation when he appears at church,

goes to confession, and receives Communion; one who has been keeping

bad company makes reparation when he separates from his former

associates.

(d) Extraordinary scandal is repaired explicitly, that is, by making

the restitution or satisfaction which justice demands, or by performing

the penalty required by the law. Thus, if through treachery a person

has seduced another from virtue, he must either himself or through

others endeavor to recall the scandalized person to his former virtue;

if a person has been guilty of laying violent hands on a cleric, he

must perform the penance prescribed; if a person has distributed

scandalous literature, he must try to stop its circulation, or to

distribute contrary literature.

1492. When satisfaction requires public apology or retraction, this can

be made in various ways. (a) Thus, one may withdraw through the press

false statements publicly made; (b) one may apologize before a number

of witnesses authorized to make this known; (c) one may retract before

the pastor or confessor, with the understanding that the priest will

later declare that all due satisfaction has been made.

1493. Denial of Sacraments in Cases of Scandal.--Is it lawful to

administer the Sacraments to one who has not made satisfaction for

public scandal?

(a) If the obligation of reparation is not grave, it is lawful to

administer the Sacraments, since the person who gave the scandal is not

subject to grave sin and unworthy of the Sacraments, and his admission

to them will not be a new scandal.

(b) If the obligation of reparation is grave, it is lawful to admit the

party in question to the Sacrament of Penance; for every person rightly

disposed has a right to absolution, and the fact that a person who gave

scandal goes to confession is edifying. But absolution should be given

on condition that reparation for the scandal is seriously promised.

rule to admit to the other Sacraments, until the reparation has been

actually performed. Thus, if it is notorious in a parish that a certain

individual has been living in a serious occasion of sin or has been

circulating impious doctrines, the occasion of sin should be removed or

the doctrines should be retracted, before the individual is admitted to

Communion, etc.; otherwise, a new scandal would be given the faithful

from the apparent approval given the scandalizer by the minister of the

Sacrament received.

1494. In certain cases, however, the Sacraments other than Penance may

also be given before reparation for grave scandal has been made,

namely, when the circumstances are such that the administration of the

Sacraments will offer no scandal. (a) Thus, a dying person who is

penitent but unable to perform some satisfaction for scandal given is

granted the Sacraments. (b) A person who is well disposed, but who has

not yet made satisfaction for scandal, may sometimes be given Communion

privately. (c) A person who is not well disposed, and who will not make

satisfaction for scandal, is sometimes permitted to contract marriage

before the priest, namely, when there is a grave reason for marriage

and scandal is precluded.

1495. Seduction.--Having discussed scandal, which leads others into sin

by bad example, we shall now consider, first, solicitation or

seduction, which leads others into sin by moral inducement, and,

secondly, cooperation, which assists another to sin (see 1460).

1496. Seduction is some external act (words, writing, signs or gesture)

by which one directly and explicitly seeks to win the consent of

another to sin. There are various modes of solicitation.

(a) There is command to sin, which is an authoritative direction to

commit sin imposed by a superior on his subject. Command is given

expressly, as when a father tells his son to steal; or implicitly, as

when he tells his son that it will please him if the son steals.

(b) There is counsel to sin, which is direct persuasion to do evil made

through argument that sin is lawful, or through instruction on the ways

of committing sin, or through advice, request, promises, threats, etc.,

as when one writes in praise of suicide to a person who is very

discouraged, and recommends it.

through flattery, insinuation, calumny, narratives, etc. Thus, Absalom

worked on the people of Israel and beguiled them into rebellion against

his father (II Kings, xv. 1-6). Those who ridicule temperance and so

lead others to drink excessively, entice to drunkenness. A host who

offers little except fine meats on a Friday entices to the violation of

abstinence.

1497. The Malice of Solicitation.--(a) The gravity of this sin

according to its nature is mortal, but it may be venial on account of

imperfect deliberation or smallness of matter (see 1473). Thus, it is a

mortal sin to command one’s son to commit grand larceny or perjury, a

venial sin to command him to commit petty theft or tell a harmless lie.

(b) The circumstances of the sin that aggravate or extenuate are the

greater or less degree of deliberation and malice, the greater or less

evil of the sin to which one induces one’s neighbors, etc. (see 1473,

1474). (c) The species of the sin of solicitation is twofold; there is

the sin of scandal, opposed to charity, inasmuch as a neighbor is led

to sin, and there is also the sin which one persuades a neighbor to

commit (see 1468 sqq.).

1498. Applications to Confession and Satisfaction.--(a) Since the

seducer willed the species of sin to which he induced his neighbor, it

does not suffice that he tell in confession that he induced another to

sin; he must also tell the species of sin (e.g., theft), to which he

induced or attempted to induce another. (b) Since the seducer is guilty

of injustice against the person seduced, if he employed fraud, traps,

violence, etc., it does not suffice in such cases merely to confess

that he seduced; he must also tell that he used unjust means to seduce.

make reparation for scandal given (see 1488 sqq.). (d) Since the

seducer is responsible for temporal damages that are due to his

influence (e.g., when he commands A to steal from or calumniate B), he

is held to restitution for any such damages (see Vol. II on Justice).

1499. In confessing a sin whose nature implies an accomplice (e.g.,

obscene conversation), is it necessary to mention the circumstance that

one seduced the other party? (a) If the seduction includes a special

malice against charity or against justice, it should be mentioned.

Thus, if the party seduced had been innocent and was scandalized, or

was trapped into sin, the fact of seduction should be mentioned. (b) If

the seduction includes no special malice against charity or justice, it

seems there is no obligation to mention it. Thus, if the party

solicited had been living a life of sin and consented to the

solicitation without any detriment to ideals or any unwillingness, no

scandal is given and no injustice committed by the solicitation, as far

as that party is concerned, and there seems to be no reason why the

circumstance of seduction must be confessed.

1500. Seduction is incitement to sin, and so differs from mere

permission of sin in another. It is never lawful to incite to sin, but

it is lawful for a sufficient reason to permit sin in others, as was

said above in reference to Pharisaic scandal (see 1477, 1482, 1483).

But, in applying this principle to concrete cases, it is sometimes

difficult to draw the line between incitement and mere permission. We

shall discuss now the following cases in which this difficulty occurs:

(a) when one requests another to do something which one knows will be a

sin for him; (b) when one advises another to commit a less rather than

a greater evil; (e) when the opportunity for another to commit sin is

not removed, or is prepared.

1501. Is it lawful to ask another to do something, when one knows that

he will not consent without sinning?

(a) If the thing requested is sinful in itself, the request is also

sinful. Hence, it is not lawful to ask a thief to sell the goods he has

stolen, nor is it lawful to request absolution from a priest who lacks

jurisdiction.

(b) If the thing requested is lawful in itself, but there is no

sufficient reason for the request in view of the fact that the other

will sin by granting it, the request is sinful. Hence, it is not lawful

to ask baptism from a person who is in the state of sin, when one can

easily obtain it from another person who is in the state of grace.

for the request, one does not sin by making the request. Hence, it is

lawful for the sake of the common welfare to require that witnesses

take an oath, even though one knows that one of them will commit

perjury.

1502. Is it lawful to advise another to commit a less evil in

preference to a greater evil?

(a) If the other has not made up his mind to commit either evil, it is

not lawful to advise that he do either. Thus, to counsel another to

steal, and to make his victims the rich rather than the poor, is a

species of seduction.

(b) If the person has made up his mind to commit the greater evil and

the lesser evil is virtually contained in the greater, it is lawful to

advise that he omit the former for the latter. For in thus acting one

prevents the greater evil and does not cause the lesser evil, since it

is virtually contained in the greater evil which the other person had

already decided on. Thus, if Titus is bent on stealing $100, Balbus is

not guilty of seduction, if he persuades Titus to take only $10. We are

supposing, of course, that Titus is so determined to steal that it is

out of the question to deter him from taking at least a small amount.

lesser is not virtually contained in the greater, it is not lawful to

recommend that he commit the smaller instead of the greater sin. For,

if one does this, one does not save the other from the internal guilt

of the greater sin intended, while one does add the malice of the

lesser sin which was not intended. Thus, if Titus plans to kill Caius,

it is not lawful to advise that he rob him instead, or that he kill

Claudius instead, for robbery is a specifically distinct sin from

murder, and Claudius is a different person from Caius. But, if Titus

planned to kill Caius in order to rob him, it would not be unlawful to

point out that the robbery could be carried out without murder and to

advise accordingly.

1503. Not all theologians accept the last solution just given. (a) Some

reject it, and hold that, even when the lesser evil is not virtually

contained in the greater, it is lawful to advise the lesser. They argue

that what one does thereby is not to commit the lesser evil, to induce

it or approve it, but only to permit it in order to lessen the harm

that will be done, and they confirm their argument from scripture

(Gen., xix. 8). According to this opinion, then, which has some good

authorities in its favor, it would be lawful to advise robbery in order

to dissuade another from the greater evil of murder. (b) Others modify

the solution given in the previous paragraph, and hold that it is

lawful to propose the lesser evil or mention it, provided one does not

attempt to induce the other person to carry it into effect.

1504. Is it lawful so to prearrange circumstances that an occasion of

sin will seem to offer itself to another?

(a) If the end and the means used are good, this is lawful; for there

is no scandal or seduction, but sin or the danger of sin is permitted

for a proportionately grave reason. Examples: Sempronius knows that

someone is robbing his desk, and it is important that he discover the

thief. He leaves the desk open and watches from concealment to see

whether a suspected person who is coming to the room will steal.

Claudius is quite certain that Titus is stealing his chickens, but he

needs evidence in order to have Titus convicted and deterred from

future stealing. So, he leaves doors open and hides himself with

witnesses that Titus may be caught in the act.

(b) If the end or means is bad, it is not lawful to prepare an

opportunity for sin, because in either case one intends something

sinful. Examples: Sempronius knows that his wife Titia has been

unfaithful and he threatens to leave her. She, wishing to have a

countercharge to make or to secure evidence to discredit his word,

hires various dissolute females to lay traps for him and his friends.

Claudius out of revenge wishes that Caius be sent to jail, and he

therefore employs agents to provoke Caius into something criminal in

word or deed that will justify incarceration. Balbus knows that

Mercurius is a dangerous character, and he frames a scheme by which

Mercurius will be invited to participate in an act of banditry and be

captured. Titia and Claudius sin, because their purpose is wrong;

Balbus sins because he uses wrong means. All three are guilty of

seduction, at least in intention.

1505. Seduction was described above (see 1496) as an inducement to sin

through such manifest means as command, counsel, or enticement. But

there is also a more subtle form of seduction, which does not appeal

directly to the intellect or will, but makes a physical approach by

acting upon the body, senses, or imagination. This is a more cunning,

but none the less guilty form of seduction, examples of which are the

following:

(a) Seduction through bodily states is exemplified in those who

minister secretly to others drinks or drugs or foods that will produce

emotional disturbances or mental confusion and make them more

susceptible to temptation.

(b) Seduction through the senses is exemplified in those who surround

others with pictures, companions, music, examples, etc., that

continually speak of the desirability of vice or the undesirability of

virtue.

suggestion when used to produce a vivid and strong impression of

something dangerous to be thought on. A spirit of bigoted uniformity

which demands that all dress, think and act alike even in matters where

there should be liberty, may also be very seductive; for, rather than

commit the unpardonable sin of seeming queer, a person may take to

drunkenness or whatever vice is popular in his crowd or group.

1506. Cooperation in Sin.--Cooperation or participation in sin,

strictly understood, is help afforded another, whom one has not

seduced, to carry out his purpose of sinning.

(a) Hence, cooperation differs from scandal and solicitation, for these

lead into sin one who had not decided on sin, while cooperation

supposes that the other party had already made up his mind to sin. The

scandalizer leads into sin, but does not help in its commission; the

cooperator does not lead into sin but he helps in its commission.

(b) Cooperation, however, may include scandal and solicitation as

regards future sins or as regards third parties. Example: Balbus, who

had decided on his own initiative to steal, finds to his surprise that

his conduct receives aid and comfort from Titus, a person of some

authority. This cooperation will act as an example or incitement to

Balbus to repeat the offense, and will likewise be an occasion of sin

to others.

1507. Cooperation is also different from complicity as follows: (a) The

cooperator acts as assistant or subordinate agent to the one who

commits sin, providing him with moral or physical help, or supplying

him with the means requisite for the act of sin. Thus, he whose

services are commandeered by robbers and who carries away the stolen

goods, or who puts a revolver into the hand of one bent on murder or

obscene books into the hands of one bent on the corruption of youth, is

a cooperator. (b) The accomplice acts as an equiprincipal or coordinate

agent with another in the commission of the same sin, performing his

own proper part or share of the joint act of sin. Thus, he who enlists

as a member of a robber band and acts as their chauffeur or lookout at

the time of “hold-ups,” or who fights a duel, or who carries on an

obscene dialogue, or listens willingly to obscene talk, is an

accomplice. The accomplice is always guilty, but the cooperator may be

guiltless.

1508. Kinds of Cooperation.--Divisions of Cooperation according to

Different Kinds of Acts.--(a) From the viewpoint of the internal act,

cooperation is either formal or material, according as one does or does

not intend the sin whose external commission one is aiding. Examples:

Caius offers a burglar information as to ways of climbing into a

second-story window. Claudius, being covered by a revolver, makes no

resistance or outcry while bandits are rifling his employer’s office.

Caius is an abettor of crime and a formal cooperator on account of his

guilty intent; Claudius aids the commission of burglary, but he is only

a material cooperator, since he does not intend what the criminals

intend.

(b) From the viewpoint of the external act, cooperation is positive or

negative, according as one does something to help the principal agent,

or does nothing to impede him. In the examples given above, Caius was a

positive, Claudius a negative cooperator. Positive cooperation is given

in a moral manner, as when one votes for an unjust law or sentence, or

cheers a sinful remark; or in a physical manner, as when one helps

bandits to bind and gag their victims, or leaves doors and windows

unfastened for the convenience of thieves.

1509. Divisions of Cooperation according to its Degree of

Influence.--(a) From the viewpoint of its activity, cooperation is

either occasional or effective. By occasional cooperation is understood

that which leads another into sin, or allows him to be drawn into sin,

but does not assist him to commit sin (e.g., scandalous example,

failure to give a fraternal correction or admonition). By effective

cooperation is understood assistance given another enabling him to

carry out, or to carry out more easily, an act of sin on which he had

resolved. As is clear from the explanation given above (see 1506),

there is question here only of effective cooperation.

(b) From the viewpoint of its nearness to the act of the principal

agent, cooperation is either immediate or mediate, according as one

shares in the sinful act of the principal agent, or in some act that

preceded or followed it. Thus, he who helps a thief to carry away

stolen goods is an immediate cooperator, while he who supplied the

thief with necessary keys before the theft, and he who offered refuge

to the thief or concealment for the stolen goods after the theft, are

mediate cooperators.

cooperation is either indispensable or not indispensable, according as

the principal agent cannot act without it, or can. Example: Balbus

supplies intoxicants to Titus and Sempronius, who are intemperate.

Titus cannot secure intoxicants except from Balbus; Sempronius can

secure them elsewhere. Balbus’ cooperation is indispensable for Titus,

but not for Sempronius.

1510. Cooperation is also divided from the viewpoint of responsibility

or of the consequences incurred through it, into unjust cooperation and

merely unlawful cooperation.

(a) Unjust cooperation is participation in the guilt of an injury done

to a third party which involves the duty of restitution or strict

reparation. Thus, those who act as “fences” or receivers of stolen

goods, cooperate in injustice and are bound to restitution to the

rightful owners.

(b) Unlawful cooperation is participation in a sin that contains no

injustice to a third party, and that entails only the obligations of

repentance and satisfaction, and, if the case requires it, of amends

for scandal, proofs of sincerity, avoidance of dangers and submission

to penalty. Thus, those who cooperate by marrying illegally, or by

providing obscene literature to persons who demand it and insist on

having it, are guilty of sin and also fall under various punishments

prescribed in law. Cooperation, in so far as it is unjust, will be

treated specially under the head of Justice (see Vol. II); here we are

concerned with cooperation in general, and as it is a sin against

charity.

1511. Formal cooperation is either explicit or implicit. (a) It is

explicit, when the end intended by the cooperator (_finis operantis_)

is the sin of the principal agent. Examples: Balbus gives incense money

to an idolater, because he approves of idolatry and wishes to see

idolatrous rites performed. Caius joins an anarchistic society because

he agrees with its aims and wishes to help in their fulfillment.

(b) Formal cooperation is implicit, when the cooperator does not

directly intend to associate himself with the sin of the principal

agent, but the end of the external act (_finis operis_), which for the

sake of some advantage or interest the cooperator docs intend, includes

from its nature or from circumstances the guilt of the sin of the

principal agent. Examples: Balbus detests idolatry, but in order to

show courtesy he helps a pagan to burn incense before an idol, or he

assists in the repairing of a pagan shrine, though his act is looked on

as a sign of worship. Caius joins a freethinking society, not because

he likes its principles, but because he wishes to obtain through

membership certain social or financial advantages which he cannot

obtain in any other way.

1512. Mediate cooperation is also subdivided into proximate and remote.

(a) It is proximate or remote by reason of nearness, according as the

act of sin will follow closely or otherwise on the act of cooperation.

Thus, he who gives a ladder to a burglar cooperates in a remote

preparation; he who holds the ladder while the burglar goes up

cooperates in a proximate preparation. (b) Mediate cooperation is

proximate or remote as to definiteness, according as the preparation

points clearly or only vaguely to the commission of sin. Proximate

cooperation is an action which, from its nature or circumstances, is

regarded as morally connected with the evil action of the principal

agent, while remote cooperation is an action that has no such moral

connection with the sin that is committed. Thus, he who sells a

revolver to a gunman who is preparing for a murder cooperates

proximately, while he who sells the materials for this weapon

cooperates only remotely. Again, if one sells to a burglar a “jimmy,” a

dark lantern, a mask, a revolver, and explosives, the cooperation is

definite, since the circumstances indicate that robbery is

contemplated. But if one sells a burglar a pair of soft-sounding shoes,

the cooperation is indefinite, for the burglar may wish them in order

to give no disturbance in his own home, and not in order to attract no

attention in the homes of others.

1513. The Sinfulness of Cooperation.--The Sinfulness of Formal

Cooperation.--(a) Formal cooperation is always sinful, for it includes

the approval of the sin of another and the willing participation in the

guilt of that sin.

(b) Formal cooperation is from its nature opposed to charity; for

charity disapproves of the sins of others and strives to prevent them,

while formal cooperation, on the contrary, approves and assists the

sins of others.

sin of the principal agent, in so far as the will of the cooperator

delights in or approves of the circumstance of help given to the sin of

the other (see 1468). Thus, if one opens the door to a caller whom one

suspects to be a burglar and at the same time mentally sympathizes with

the act of burglary, one is guilty in will of the act one approves.

(d) Formal cooperation as to its external act is opposed to the virtue

violated by the cooperator, when the external act has a malice of its

own. Thus, if one swears falsely in order to conceal the presence of a

burglar hidden in the house, one is guilty of perjury; if one disobeys

the laws of the Church by marrying clandestinely, one is guilty of

disobedience; if one scandalizes third parties by cooperating with sin,

one is guilty of scandal; if one shares in fraud, one is guilty of

injustice, etc. Hence, in confession it does not suffice to say that

one has cooperated in sin, but one must also tell the sin committed and

the necessary circumstances.

1514. The Sinfulness of Material Cooperation.--(a) Material

cooperation, in itself, is sinful; for charity commands that one strive

to prevent the sin of another, and much more therefore does it forbid

one to help in the sin of another. (b) Material cooperation, in case of

great necessity, is not sinful; for charity does not oblige under

serious inconvenience to self, and it does not forbid one to cooperate

by an indifferent act to prevent a neighbor from committing a greater

evil than the evil he has in mind. He who cooperates materially through

necessity does not cause sin, but uses his own right, which the bad

will of the other abuses and makes an occasion of sin (see 1447 d).

1515. Lawfulness of Material Cooperation.--The conditions necessary in

order that material cooperation be lawful are the same as for any other

act that has a double result (see 104); for from the cooperation follow

two results, one that is bad (viz., the sin of the other person) and

one that is good (viz., the avoidance of loss or the retention of

good). Two of the conditions required in the principle of double result

need not be considered, however, since their presence is manifestly

assured by the very fact that the cooperation is merely material. (a)

Thus, the condition that the good effect must not be secured through

the evil effect is verified; for, if one intends the sin of the other

party as a means to the good end, cooperation is formal. Hence, if

Balbus helps Claudius to get sinfully drunk, so that Claudius may go to

confession the sooner, the cooperation of Balbus in the drunkenness of

Claudius is formal. (b) The condition that the evil effect is not

intended is also verified; for the very definition of material

cooperation excludes the intention of the sin committed by the other

party.

1516. Hence, we may confine our attention to the two remaining

conditions stated in the principle of double effect, and conclude that

material cooperation is lawful when and if the act of the cooperator is

itself good or indifferent, and he has a reason sufficiently weighty

for permitting the sin of the other party.

1517. The first condition of material cooperation is that the act of

the cooperator must be good or at least indifferent; for, if it is

evil, the cooperation becomes implicitly formal. But, since it is often

difficult to determine in particular instances whether cooperation is

intrinsically evil or merely indifferent, one must examine the nature

and circumstances of the act.

(a) Thus, according to its nature, an act of cooperation is

intrinsically evil, if it has no uses except such as are evil; it is

indifferent, if, according to the intention of those who use it, it is

now good, now evil. Hence, it is intrinsically wrong to assist in the

manufacture or distribution of obscene books or pictures, or of drugs

or instruments used exclusively for immoral purposes, since the only

use to which such things can be put is sinful. It is also intrinsically

wrong to take part even remotely in pagan superstitions, or to give any

immediate assistance to an act which from its nature is opposed to the

Sixth Commandment. But it is not intrinsically wrong to assist in the

manufacture of firearms or poisons, which have many good uses, or to

act as bodyguard to a person who fears harm from others.

(b) According to its circumstances, an act of cooperation is evil, if

by reason of adjuncts it is wrong, as when it signifies approval of

evil, gives scandal to others, endangers the faith or virtue of the

cooperator, or violates a law of the Church. Thus, it is not from the

nature of the act wrong to invite a pedestrian to ride in one’s car;

but it is wrong from the circumstances when the pedestrian asks to be

taken to a spot where he intends to commit robbery. It is not wrong

intrinsically to work at building a temple; but it is wrong from the

circumstances, when this act is regarded by the public as a sign of

adherence to a false religion, or when the act causes scandal (see

983). The laws of the Church on mixed marriage or neutral schools

afford other examples of cooperation lawful in one set of

circumstances, but unlawful in another on account of significance,

scandal, danger, etc.

1518. But the circumstance that the cooperator knows for certain that

the principal agent will use the cooperation for sinful purposes, or

will take scandal to the extent of being strengthened in his evil

designs by reason of the assistance given, does not necessarily make

cooperation evil.

(a) Thus, the cooperator may know from the declaration of the principal

agent just what is to be done, and yet have no will whatever to concur

in the evil. Hence, if a person is forced at the point of a revolver to

help in robbing his own guests, he knows very well what is being done,

but he certainly does not approve of it.

(b) The cooperator may know that scandal will be occasioned by the

cooperation, either to the principal agent or to others, but he may

have sufficient reasons for permitting it (see 1478, 1482). Thus, if

the employee of an undertaking establishment has orders to assist at

the funeral of an anarchist, and will lose his means of livelihood if

he does not comply, he is not obliged to suffer this great detriment to

avoid Pharisaic scandal or even scandal of the weak. But he should, if

possible, declare his want of sympathy with anarchy, if he knows of

some anarchist present who regards his cooperation as a mark of

sympathy for the principles of the deceased.

1519. The second condition for lawful material cooperation is that the

cooperator should have a reason sufficiently weighty for permitting the

evil connected with his cooperation. The standards for judging whether

a reason is sufficiently weighty, are the rules given above on

permission of an evil effect (see 105).

(a) Hence, the graver the sin that will be committed, the graver the

reason required for cooperation. Thus, a greater reason is required for

cooperation in assault than for cooperation in theft.

(b) The nearer the cooperation is to the act of sin, the greater the

reason required for cooperation. Thus, he who sells paper to the

publisher of obscene books cooperates remotely; he who sets the type or

reads the proofs of such books cooperates proximately. A greater reason

is necessary for the latter than for the former cooperation.

the greater the reason required for cooperation. Thus, a more serious

reason is needed to justify giving intoxicants to a person who abuses

liquors, if he is unable to procure them elsewhere, than if he can

easily get them from others. But the fact that, if you deny intoxicants

or other cooperation, another person will grant what you deny, is not

of itself a sufficient reason for cooperation.

(d) The more certain the evil act, the greater the reason required for

cooperation. Example: Titus gets drunk frequently, Balbus at intervals.

Hence, a greater reason is needed for providing liquor to Titus than to

Balbus.

(e) The more obligation one is under to avoid the act of cooperation or

to prevent the act of sin, the greater the reason must be for

cooperation. Hence, a much greater reason is necessary for lawful

cooperation by those who are bound _ex officio_, from piety or justice,

to prevent a sin (such as parents, spiritual directors, and policemen)

than on the part of those who are not so bound.

1520. Reasons for cooperation correspond in gravity with the importance

of the goods or evils involved (see 1163 sqq.).

(a) Hence, a grave reason for cooperation exists when, if one refuses

it, a great good will be lost or a great evil incurred. A day’s wages

or income is generally a great good; a severe or long-continued pain,

great anger of an employer or other superior, things that bring on

notable annoyance, shame, repugnance, etc., are examples of great evils.

(b) A very grave reason for cooperation is the gain or retention of a

very great good or the avoidance of a very great evil. A notable

percentage of the goods of one’s station in life should be considered

as a very great good. A severe and long-continued illness, unemployment

on the part of the breadearner of a needy family, serious detriment to

one’s honor, reputation or peace of mind, etc., are examples of very

great evils.

grave without being supreme, such as the loss of one’s station in life,

incurable disease, loss of an eye or other principal member, severe or

perpetual imprisonment.

(d) Most grave reasons for cooperation are the public safety of Church

or State, loss of all one’s property, death, extreme disgrace, and the

like.

1521. When the sin committed by the principal agent is grave, but

contains no injustice to a third party, the reasons for cooperation

need not be so serious as when the sin is grave and unjust.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is justified in order

to avoid grave loss to self; for example, one may ask absolution from

an unworthy minister, in order to recover the state of grace more

quickly.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and

indispensable cooperation, is lawful when it is necessary in order to

avoid a moderate loss. Examples: One may receive Communion from an

unworthy minister in order to make the Easter duty more conveniently.

One may supply intoxicants to a drunkard in order to avoid a brawl, if

there is no time to call in the strong arm of the law to subdue the

drunkard.

avoidance of a slight loss. Example: A butcher may sell meat on Friday

to a cook who will serve it to some persons bound by abstinence, if the

cook can easily get the meat from others and the profit will go

elsewhere, unless the butcher sells her the meat.

1522. When the sin committed by the principal agent is a grave

injustice to a private party, the reasons for cooperation need not be

so serious as when the sin is against the public good.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is permissible, if

without it one cannot avoid a loss to self that is both certain and of

a higher kind, or at least a greater one of the same kind than that

which will be suffered by the injured party; for this latter would be

unreasonable, if he expected one to suffer a greater loss in order to

spare him. Example: Mercurius, a servant, is threatened with instant

death if he does not open a safe of his employer, take from it certain

papers, and deliver them to a burglar.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and

indispensable cooperation, is allowed if necessary for the avoidance of

an equal loss to self. Examples: The burglar mentioned above can blow

open the safe if Mercurius refuses to open it, but, if he is put to

this trouble, he will steal from Mercurius valuables comparable to the

papers in the safe. Claudius, a servant, opens a backdoor, the only way

through which a burglar can enter secretly, because he is taken by

surprise, and refusal on his part will inevitably cost him the loss of

papers equally as valuable as those the burglar wishes to secure.

Sempronius wishes to rob a house, but he cannot get there without the

assistance of Caius, a chauffeur. Caius understands the purpose of

Sempronius, but, if he refuses to take him to the house, Sempronius

will give out information that will do almost as much harm to Caius as

the robbery would do to the owner of the house.

avoidance of a loss to self less than the loss of the injured party,

but in proportion to it, Example: Balbus is usually honest, but today

he is going out to “fleece” a number of unsuspecting victims, and he

gives orders to his servant Titus to get his coat and hat and open the

door, and to his chauffeur Caius to drive him to the gambling place.

Titus and Caius have an inkling of Balbus’ plans, but no proofs. If

they disobey his orders, other servants will do what Balbus asks, the

swindling will not be stopped, but Titus will be demoted, and Caius

thrown out of the position necessary for his livelihood.

1523. When the sin committed by the principal agent is against some

good of a public character, though not against the common safety, still

greater reasons are necessary for cooperation than those given above.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable cooperation is allowed to avoid a

greater public evil, or an equal public evil joined with grave loss to

self; for it is lawful to permit a lesser in order to escape a greater

evil. Thus, the law may tolerate certain evils for the sake of public

tranquillity, if the attempt to suppress them would lead to serious

disturbances. One may delay to denounce a practice that is doing harm

to a family, if an immediate complaint would cause an equal harm to the

family and bring on the maker of the complaint a serious evil.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable cooperation, or mediate and

indispensable cooperation, is permitted when it is necessary to avoid

an equal public evil, or a very serious personal evil proportionate

according to prudent judgment to the public harm done. Thus, an actor

who has a harmless part in a somewhat evil play may act it for a time,

if the company can easily obtain substitutes but he cannot easily

obtain other employment and needs his wages. Similarly, the owner of

the only theatre in town may rent it to that company in order to be

able to refuse it to another company that is worse.

is need of avoiding a grave loss to self which cannot be prevented

except by cooperation. Thus, the ushers in the theatre who have no

present way of supporting dependents except by the wages they are

earning, may help patrons to seats, even when the play that is being

shown is not morally unobjectionable.

1524. When the sin committed by another is directed against the

necessary public welfare (i.e., against the common safety of Church or

State), one may not cooperate, but should resist. In this case: (a)

cooperation is unlawful, for there is no greater public good to justify

it, and much less can it be justified by private good; (b) resistance

should be made, if possible; for the individual should be willing to

suffer loss, spoliation, and death itself to conserve the safety of the

Church or of the State.

1525. In giving reasons sufficient for cooperation with sins injurious

to the sinner alone or to some third party, we considered only the harm

or loss to oneself that would result from a refusal to cooperate. But

the good of others may also suffice for cooperation.

(a) Thus, the good of the sinner may justify one in cooperating, as

when one assists in order to prevent the commission of a greater evil.

It would not be wrong to give whisky to one who wished to make himself

drunk, if otherwise he would take poisoned alcohol.

(b) The good of a third party may justify cooperation, as when one

assists in perpetrating a minor injury against him in order to stop a

major injury. It would not be wrong to bind and gag a man who was being

robbed, if otherwise a burglar would murder him.

political affairs it is at times necessary in indifferent matters to

compromise with opponents, whose general policies one does not approve,

in order to secure the election of good citizens or the passing of good

laws, when these ends are very important for the general welfare. It is

lawful to administer a Sacrament to one who is unworthy in order to

avoid a public evil, such as disturbance or scandal among the people.

1526. Lawfulness of Immediate Cooperation.--(a) If one cannot cooperate

immediately without performing an act that is intrinsically evil (see

1517), immediate cooperation is, of course, unlawful. Thus, if one

helped a trembling assassin to administer poison or to stab or shoot to

death the victim, one would be an accomplice in murder; if one assisted

a decrepit pagan to burn incense before an idol, one would be an

accomplice in false worship. (b) If one can cooperate immediately

without performing an act intrinsically evil, immediate cooperation is

held lawful by some authorities, but there are others who say that all

immediate cooperation is sinful.

1527. Arguments for the Opposing Opinions on Immediate

Cooperation.--(a) Those who deny the lawfulness of all immediate

cooperation argue that immediate cooperation does not differ from

complicity, and hence that it is always intrinsically wrong. If theft

is the taking away of goods without the knowledge and consent of the

owner, what shall we call the act of a servant who assists a thief by

carrying out the family silver to a waiting automobile? The fact that

the servant does this to save himself from wounds or death cannot

change the moral character of the act, else we shall have to say that

the end may justify the means. And what is said of theft, can be said

likewise of other species of sin.

(b) Those who affirm the lawfulness of immediate cooperation in certain

cases argue that circumstances may take away evil from an act of

assistance given to a sinner, so that the act becomes indifferent or

good. Thus, theft is the taking away of what belongs to another against

the reasonable will of the owner. Now, the owner would be unreasonable

if he were unwilling that one should cooperate in removing his goods,

if one had to do so in order to protect one’s life, at least if one had

not engaged to defend his goods; for one is bound to protect one’s life

in preference to the goods of another. If a starving man may take a

loaf of bread without the owner’s consent, why may not one save one’s

life by assisting a desperate criminal to carry off money? Moreover, it

is commonly admitted that a person in great need may lawfully ask a

Sacrament from a minister who is unworthy and who will sin by

conferring it; that is, one may cooperate immediately with the unworthy

administration of a Sacrament and yet be free of guilt on account of

the circumstances.

1528. Special Cases of Cooperation.--The cases of cooperation, like

those involving scandal, are innumerable, but there are certain cases

which occur today more frequently than others, namely, those of

cooperation with evil publications, dances, and theatres, and those of

the cooperation of merchants, innkeepers, renters, servants, and

workingmen. Cooperation in sins against faith and sins against justice

are treated in their proper places, but it will be useful here to speak

of these other special kinds of cooperation, since they offer many

difficulties and a consideration of them now will illustrate the

general principles on cooperation just given. However, the following

points should be noted:

(a) The application of the definitions and rules about cooperation to

particular cases is one of the most difficult tasks of Moral Theology,

and hence there will be found great diversity of opinion among

theologians on particular points. Space forbids a discussion here of

the opposing opinions, and we shall have to content ourselves, in some

of the illustrations that follow, with solutions that are likely, but

whose opposites are also likely.

(b) The cases that follow are treated according to the principles of

cooperation. But frequently in actual life there will be other factors

to be considered, such as the occasion of sin to oneself or scandal to

others. It should be remembered, then, that when a particular kind of

material cooperation is here said to be lawful, this must be understood

as abstractly speaking; for in an individual instance there may be

circumstances of danger or disedification which would make it

unlawful--a thing that often happens.

1529. Formal Cooperation with Evil Reading Matter.--(a) Cases of formal

cooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are those of

the managers, editors, ordinary collaborators and authors of

periodicals, newspapers, books, etc., which are opposed _ex professo_

to faith and good morals; for these persons are the brains which direct

and select what is to be written and published, and the matter they are

creating or putting on paper is evil, and has no direct purpose except

evil.

(b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention to do

harm are those of the responsible heads of printing or publishing firms

and their printers, who agree to publish such objectionable written

matter; of booksellers, owners of newsstands, etc., who agree to sell

it; for, as we suppose, these persons understand that the matter in

question is intrinsically harmful and gravely forbidden.

1530. Cooperation with evil newspapers and other reading matter is

material and lawful if the matter itself is not entirely evil, that is,

if it has good uses as well as bad, and one has a reason for

cooperation that is just and proportionate to the kind of cooperation.

The following are examples of cooperation that may be merely material

and lawful:

(a) Moral cooperation is given by writers of good matter who assist as

collaborators; by those who offer small notices or advertisements; by

readers who use a book, periodical, newspaper, etc., for the good

matter it contains and skip the rest. For all these persons contribute

in a greater or less degree, according to their influence, reputation,

and ability, to the prestige and success of the journal, magazine or

volume, with which their names are connected or which they patronize.

Reasons sufficient to excuse in these cases, given by some authors, are

the following: for a permanent contributor, a very grave reason, such

as the need of support for his family which he cannot earn in any other

way; for an occasional contributor, a rather grave reason, such as the

opportunity of refuting error or of setting forth true principles (see

Canon 1386, Sec. 2); for the habitual reader, a reason somewhat grave,

such as the advantage of reports useful for his business which cannot

be found elsewhere; for the occasional reader, a slight reason, such as

entertainment to be derived from reading a good story; for the small

advertiser, a slight reason, such as profit in business. Those who by

laudatory descriptions in advertisements or book reviews urge others to

buy and read evil books are guilty of seduction, rather than

cooperation (see 1495).

(b) Financial cooperation is given by those who endow or subsidize a

publication, by shareholders, by large advertisers, by subscribers,

etc. Reasons considered sufficient in these cases are as follows: for

the original providers of capital, only a most grave reason; for the

buyers of much stock or advertising space, only a very grave reason;

for subscribers, a grave reason such as would suffice for habitual

reading.

publication and by those who furnish necessary material. Among the

producers, the proximate cooperators are, first, the managers of the

printing company, and, secondly, the printers, the “readers” and the

correctors; the remote cooperators are the typesetters, arrangers of

ink and paper, binders, and machine operators. For proximate

cooperation it is held that a most grave reason suffices, as when a

printer cannot otherwise support himself and his family; for remote

cooperation a grave reason is needed. Among the distributors, there are

degrees of proximity in cooperation as follows: first, those who put

the reading matter into the hands of others (e.g., by keeping it on the

tables in their waiting rooms or offices); next, those who keep it for

purchasers who may ask for it; finally, those who are employed as

keepers of newsstands, newsboys, etc. We cannot think of any reason

sufficient to excuse the first kind of cooperation, since there is no

lack of good reading matter which doctors, lawyers, barbers, etc,, can

provide for those who are waiting in their rooms; for the second kind

of cooperation, a very grave reason suffices, such as loss of trade by

a poor bookseller, if he would not supply his patrons with popular

books or periodicals of a less elevated kind; for the third kind of

cooperation, a grave reason suffices.

Among the suppliers are those who sell to the printer his ink, type,

machinery, etc. These cooperate only remotely, and it is held that

profit is a sufficient reason for their cooperation. This we admit, if

the cooperation is not indispensable, but we do not think that profit

alone would uniformly justify voluntary cooperation upon which depended

the publication of pernicious matter.

1531. Formal Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.--(a) Cases of

formal cooperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are

those of the originators of sinful dances and the writers of indecent

plays. (b) Cases of formal cooperation on account of implicit intention

to do harm are those of the managements that produce bad shows,

organize bad dances, or make the arrangements or issue the invitations

for these affairs.

1532. Material Cooperation with Evil Dances or Plays.--Material

cooperation is lawful, if the cooperation is not itself intrinsically

wrong, and if there is a sufficient reason for permitting it.

(a) Cases of immediate material cooperation are those of players and

dancers who have harmless parts in the performance. A very grave

reason, such as avoidance of penury, is considered as sufficient excuse

here, at least for a time.

(b) Cases of proximate material cooperation are those of musicians or

singers, who do not perform lascivious music; of spectators, who show

no approval of the evil that is done; of those who buy tickets but do

not attend. A more serious reason is required in the musician at the

dance than in the musician at the play, for the former directs the

dance, while the latter only accompanies the play. Likewise, a more

serious reason is required when one attends often, or when one’s

patronage is essential to the success of the occasion, than when one

attends only rarely, or when the play or dance does not depend on one’s

presence or patronage.

rent their theatres or dance-halls or cabarets, of ushers, guards,

box-office employees, stage hands, etc. It is held that profit is a

sufficient reason to justify the owners in renting their places, if the

theatrical company or dance management can readily find other places in

case they are sent away. The ushers, guards, and the like are excused,

if they cannot easily find other employment; but this does not justify

gazing on immodest spectacles or laughing at or applauding obscene

jokes.

1533. Formal Cooperation by the Manufacture or Sale of Objects Whose

Sole Purpose is Gravely or Venially Sinful.--(a) Cases of explicit

cooperation are those of the inventor of contraceptives or of

instruments that frustrate generation, of the designers of blasphemous

representations or of tablets in honor of false deities, the authors of

somewhat profane or irreverent cards, and the like. (b) Cases of

implicit cooperation are those of persons who, for profit only, make or

sell objects such as those just mentioned, while knowing that the

purpose to which they naturally tend is the commission of sin.

1534. Material cooperation by the manufacture or sale of objects that

are used for gravely or venially sinful purposes, is lawful under the

conditions given in 1515. Hence, in the first place, the cooperation

itself must not be intrinsically sinful, that is, the object made or

sold must have good as well as evil uses. There are two classes of

objects of this kind: (a) there are some objects which may have good

uses, but which in fact are nearly always made to serve bad ends (e.g.,

idols, insignia of forbidden societies, pictures of the nude,

ultra-fashionable dress, certain drugs or poisons, blackjacks, and

pistol silencers); (b) there are other objects which are indifferent in

themselves, although often employed for sinful uses (e.g., dice,

playing cards and chips, rouge, lipsticks, necklaces and other feminine

adornments, imitation jewelry, adulterated articles, and the like).

1535. The rules about proportionate cause for cooperation by the

manufacture or sale of things that are employed in committing sin are

those given above in 1519.

(a) Hence, the greater the sin that will be committed or the more

harmful the consequences that will ensue from the use of an object, the

greater the reason required for making, repairing or selling it. In

some instances only a most grave reason will excuse, such as peril of

instant death for refusal. Thus, one may not sell poison or drugs to a

person who contemplates suicide, murder, or abortion. One may not sell

narcotics to a person who asks for them in good faith and who cannot

obtain them elsewhere, but who will become a drug-fiend if they are

given him. One may not sell morphine, heroin, etc., to a person who is

already a drug-addict and who will abuse the drugs, unless there is a

very grave reason for not refusing, such as danger that refusal will

lead him to set fire to the building. If one has all the playing cards

in some remote hamlet, one should not sell them without grave reason to

a customer who will spend a great part of the time at games to the

neglect of serious duties, nor without a very grave reason to a

customer who is a card sharper and who will swindle many innocent

victims, or to a gambler who will waste the money due to his wife and

family.

(b) The more closely related an object is with sinful uses, the graver

must be the excuse for having part in its manufacture or sale. Thus, an

ordinary reason (e.g., profit) might suffice for selling a lamb to a

pagan or attractive ornaments of dress to a woman, where only a very

grave or most grave reason would suffice for selling incense to a pagan

or ornaments that are frequently used as amulets or charms. Generally

speaking, it is seriously wrong and gravely sinful to make or sell

articles whose ordinary use is gravely sinful.

1443. Is one who resists a tyrannical government guilty of the sin of