SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY (Continued)
Question II
THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN (THE MORAL VIRTUES)
1626. After the theological virtues, which offer to God the services of
faith, hope and charity, and which direct man to his Last End, follow
the cardinal or moral virtues, which perfect the actions and passions
of man, and make of them means for tending to the Last End. Of these
four virtues (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance), prudence is
ranked first, as being the director of the others.
Art. 1: THE VIRTUE OF PRUDENCE
(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 47-56.)
1627. Definition.--All the definitions of prudence are in substantial
agreement, and from them we may formulate a detailed definition as
follows: “Prudence is the virtue that consults well about the means to
be used for leading a good life and applies the knowledge acquired
through consultation to particular contingencies as they arise.”
(a) Thus, prudence consults well, for its office is to study ways and
means to right conduct, and to arrive at a sound judgment in spite of
various uncertainties or unknown factors. Of the two practical virtues
of the intellect, namely, art and prudence, the former deals with the
application of right reason to cases in which there are, for the most
part, certain and determinate ways of arriving at the end in view
(e.g., the rules of logic or grammar, the methods of music or
sculpture); while the latter has to do with the application of right
reason to cases in which the ways of obtaining the end in view are not
certain or determinate (i.e., the infinitely varied questions of
lawfulness or unlawfulness that present themselves in concrete and
particular situations).
(b) Prudence studies the means to a good life; and hence we do not
consider a man as generally prudent, if he consults well for this or
that particular good end, but not for the general end of leading a good
life. Nevertheless, prudence falls short of the Gift of Wisdom, for
prudence is concerned with human good, wisdom with divine good.
(c) Prudence applies knowledge to the direction of conduct, for the
purpose of the practical virtues of the intellect is to guide the
activities and productions of man according to the light of right
reason. It should be noted, however, that whereas the application of
knowledge is intrinsic to prudence, it is extrinsic to art; for
prudence includes in its very essence a determination of the will to
goodness, but not so art. Hence, a painter is not the less skilled in
his profession if he voluntarily fails to exercise it or exercises it
badly, but a person skilled in moral science is imprudent if
voluntarily he fails to use his knowledge or uses it amiss. The sin
against art is not to know; the sin against prudence is either not to
know what one should know or not to apply rightly what one does know.
1628. The Objects of the Act of Prudence.--(a) Prudence is concerned,
not with speculative truth (i.e., with those things that are known for
the sake of knowledge), but with practical truth (i.e., with those
things that are known for the sake of use). It aims, not to investigate
and discover what is the nature of virtue, but to guide man so that he
may become virtuous and practise virtue. It should be noted, however,
that the acts of the speculative reason, although they do not belong to
prudence itself, are like other acts subject to the direction of
prudence; for in pursuing speculative studies one should use good
judgment as to the subjects to be considered, the time, place, manner,
etc., of study.
(b) Prudence is not concerned with necessary truths and first
principles of morality, but with their application to contingent and
particular cases, just as a physician is called on to cure, not a
universal or abstract man, but the particular and individual man before
him. But since one cannot well apply that of which one is ignorant, the
prudent man must be acquainted both with the general rules of right
living and with the particular things to which his knowledge is to be
applied. He lacks prudence, therefore, who from vincible ignorance does
not know a general principle (e.g., that too much drink is bad), or a
case to which that principle should be applied (e.g., that the quantity
of drink before one is too much).
1629. It is customary to distinguish a twofold object of a virtue,
namely, the material object (i.e., the kind of activity the virtue
perfects, whether in the field of knowledge, or of action, or of
production) and the formal object (i.e., the special viewpoint of
goodness from which the material object is considered).
(a) The material object of prudence embraces individual human actions
performed under choice and freely (_agibilia_). (b) The formal object
of prudence is the right deliberation, decision, and direction (_recta
ratio_) to be given to human actions, with a view to the observance of
the golden mean.
1630. Necessity of Certitude.--Prudence, being an intellectual virtue,
must have certainty (see on the Certain Conscience, 640 sqq.). But with
regard to particular contingencies (e.g., whether Balbus ought to marry
Caia) there are various kinds of certainty.
(a) There is the certainty of knowledge based on a generalization from
experience of what happens in the majority of cases (e.g., that persons
well mated by reason of birth, age, dispositions, etc., marry
successfully). This kind of certainty belongs to moral science.
(b) There is also a certainty of knowledge based on the indications in
a particular case (e.g., that Balbus and Caia appear to have congenial
dispositions and a mutual affection that will make their marriage a
success). This is the certainty of opinion, and while it may suffice as
a rule for conscience (see the Systems of Conscience, 672 sqq.), events
do not always verify its predictions. Hence it is said: “The thoughts
of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain” (Wis., ix. 14).
(c) There is finally the certainty of practical truth, which consists
in harmony with a good will. This is the certainty that is proper to
prudence, for this virtue is not a matter of reason alone. Hence, even
though a matter properly decided on should not take place or should
fail of the purpose intended (e.g., if the marriage of Balbus and Caia
is prevented or turns out badly), it remains that prudence was not
deceived in its decision, for that decision when made was according to
right reason and a good will (see 578).
1631. Relation of Prudence to the Other Moral Virtues.--(a) Prudence
does not direct the moral virtues to their own proper ends; for the
knowledge of those ends comes from synteresis, or moral understanding
(i.e., the natural perception of the first principles of right and
wrong), while the inclination to those ends is from the moral virtues
themselves. Prudence does not deal with first principles, nor is it an
inclination towards particular ends. Hence, it is the intellectual
virtue of synteresis that directs the moral virtues through the dictate
that right reason must be followed, that moderation must be observed,
that the passions of anger, pleasure, sorrow, etc., must be so
regulated that both extremes of excess and defect will be avoided.
(b) Prudence directs the moral virtues to the ways and means by which
their ends are to be attained; for the regulation of things particular
and variable, such as ways and means, pertains to prudence. Synteresis
is concerned with necessary principles, and the moral virtues give a
uniform and steady inclination to follow the mean of right reason, but
neither the one nor the other can indicate how principles are to be
applied or how inclinations are to be put in practice. Hence, it is the
work of moral science to determine what or how much anger, pleasure,
sorrow, etc., is moderate for the average case; but prudence has to
decide this for a particular case here and now (see on Conscience,
575). Without prudence bravery becomes foolhardiness, temperance
degenerates into fanaticism, and mercy changes to weakness.
1632. Prudence, indeed, directs the acts of all the virtues, ruling the
virtues inferior to it (i.e., art and the moral virtues), and serving
the virtues that are its superiors (i.e., the speculative intellectual
virtues and the theological virtues).
(a) Thus, in exercising the intellectual virtues through study,
contemplation, art, etc., one would go sadly astray if one did not
consult prudence as to the time, manner, and method of performing these
acts. Hence, a housewife who spent too much time in meditation would
neglect her domestic duties.
(b) In exercising the theological virtues, through acts of faith, hope,
and charity, there is also need of prudence, for it is not possible to
continue in these acts without interruption, since there are times when
other acts of virtue have to be attended to, and also times for repose.
Thus, a person who goes about giving alms to the poor at hours when he
is supposed to be at work for which he receives pay, is not prudent in
his charity, since he does not choose the right time to exercise it.
1633. The Exercise of Prudence.--The acts that belong to prudence are
those that one needs in order to direct one’s conduct to that
moderation which is the end of virtue. They are three: deliberation,
decision, direction.
(a) Hence, in the first place, prudence takes counsel on, and
deliberates about, the ways and means; (b) after ways and means have
been discovered, it passes judgment (see 575) on their suitability
(e.g., that restitution should be made at such a time, in such a way,
in such an amount, etc., or that moderation in eating and drinking
requires that this or that amount be taken, that this or that kind of
food be avoided, etc.); (c) finally, but chiefly, prudence gives the
command that what has been decided on be carried out, whether this be
the quest of certain things that are advantageous or the avoidance of
certain things that are dangerous.
1634. Qualities of Prudence.--The qualities that should characterize
prudence are carefulness and confidence.
(a) Carefulness is a watchful attention given to deliberation and
judgment enabling one to act with readiness and decision when the
moment for action has arrived. Its necessity for prudence is clear, for
one does not counsel or judge well unless one has a matter at heart, is
anxious about its success, and devotes to it serious study and
vigilance; nor does one direct well if there is hesitation and delay
instead of promptness in performing what has been decided on. In a
word, one should be quick in execution, but slow in deliberation. Hence
the admonition of St. Peter to be prudent, and to be attentive to
prayer as a preparation for a good life and for the judgment (I Peter,
iv. 7). An example of carefulness is St. Paul, who was solicitous about
all his churches (I Cor., xi. 28), ever inquiring about their
condition, their progress, their needs, etc.
(b) Confidence, as a quality of prudence, is a reliance on judgments
carefully formed which excludes worries and undue hesitations. This is
necessary as a balance to carefulness; for while it is true that
absolute certainty is not to be expected in forming decisions about
courses of action (the future event and also many present things
bearing on it being unknown to us), it is also true that
overcarefulness blinds the judgment and paralyzes decision. In the
character of Hamlet Shakespeare pictures the man who is imprudent
through excess of caution.
1635. The Parts or Kinds of Prudence.--As the divisions of parts
correspond with the divisions of wholes, we should note that there are
three kinds of wholes: a subjective, an integral, and a potestative
whole.
(a) A subjective whole is one that is present as to its entire essence
and all its power in each of the parts. This kind of whole is found in
the genus, each of whose species partakes of the entire nature and
energy included in the generic concept, just as the mode of being and
of acting expressed by the term “animal” is found fully in dogs, cats,
horses, and so on with the other kinds of animals.
(b) An integral whole is one that is not present in all its fullness
either of essence or of power in the single parts. This kind of whole
is found in a finished composite made up of heterogeneous units, such
as a house; for neither walls, nor roof, nor foundation, nor any other
single portion of the building is a complete house or has all the uses
of a house, but if any one of them is lacking the house is not integral
or complete.
(c) A potestative whole is one that is present in all its essence, but
not in all its power in each single part. This kind of whole is
exemplified in an active principle functioning through diverse
faculties, such as the soul which thinks, wills, perceives,
accomplishes by means of mind, will, sense, and bodily organs. The soul
is present in its entirety in each of these, since it is a simple
substance, but in one it exercises one power, in another a different
power, in none of them all its powers.
1636. It is customary to speak also of the integral, subjective and
potestative parts of a moral virtue. (a) Thus, the quasi-integral parts
of a virtue are those functions without which its act is not perfectly
performed; and with which it is more perfect. (b) The subjective parts
are the species into which the virtue is divided. (e) The
quasi-potestative parts are certain subsidiary or annexed virtues which
have to do with the secondary acts of a principal virtue, as not having
the full efficacy of the latter.
1637. Integral Parts of Prudence.--The integral parts of prudence,
considered as a cognitive virtue or as an index of the right means, are
those acts which enable one to have knowledge and to acquire knowledge.
(a) Thus, the acts requisite for the possession of knowledge about ways
and means are the memory of the past and the understanding of the
present situation. (b) The acts requisite for the acquisition of new
knowledge are docility, by which one learns from others, and quickness
of perception, by which one discovers for oneself.
1638. The integral parts of prudence, considered as an operative or a
preceptive virtue--that is, as the counsellor and director of life and
behavior--are the acts without which one cannot make good use of
knowledge as applied to conduct.
(a) Thus, knowledge of general principles must be applied to particular
affairs, and this supposes that one knows how to reason correctly, how
to infer the particular from the general, how to put facts together.
Even those who are not skilled dialecticians have a certain amount of
natural logic, and are able to make good use of data or premises in
drawing conclusions about their obligations, and thus to make a prudent
application of what they know.
(b) Knowledge gained through deliberation has to be effectually made
use of; that is, the reason must impose its judgment carefully formed,
must determine the line of action to be followed, must properly dispose
the means in view of the end. This requires that a person should so
direct his future acts as means to the end he has in view that they
will be good in themselves (foresight or providence) and in their
circumstances (circumspection), and that he will be guarded against
external impediments that might hinder him, steering clear of both
Scylla and Charybdis (caution): “The prudent man considereth his steps”
(Prov., xiv. 15). Examples: Titus wishes to help the poor, and decides
on certain methods of raising the money that are dishonest and
disedifying. Balbus wishes to induce Caius to go to church, and
therefore shows him marks of friendship, not reflecting that these acts
of friendship, on account of the character of Caius, will arouse only
haughtiness or suspicion. Claudius, in order to practise mortification,
resolves on a fast, but also makes up his mind to visit certain friends
who will try to make him break his resolution. Sempronius resolves to
provide well for his family and also for certain deserving charities,
but he fails to insure his property, to invest his money well and to
make a will, with the result that neither his family nor the poor are
provided for as he had intended. Titus lacked foresight, Balbus was not
circumspect, Claudius and Sempronius were incautious.
1639. The Subjective Parts or Species of Prudence.--Prudence in general
is the right direction of human actions to their ends; and hence there
will be as many different kinds of prudence as there are different
kinds of ends of human actions. But the division of ends will be into
the particular good of the individual and the common good of the
multitude, and thus there are the two species of individual or personal
prudence and social prudence.
(a) Individual prudence is the right management of his own acts by the
individual, with a view to his personal uprightness.
(b) Social prudence is the right management of the acts of others or of
self, with a view to the general welfare of a society.
1640. Social prudence in turn is subdivided in accordance with the two
classes of society, the perfect and the imperfect, into political and
domestic prudence. (a) Political prudence is the right administration
of the affairs of a larger multitude, such as the State. (b) Domestic
prudence is the right administration of the affairs of the family.
1641. Political prudence, according to usage, often has or may bear an
unfavorable and evil signification. Hence, as we are considering now
the virtue of prudence, we should remark that political prudence here
is something very different from political methods or practices that
are wise in evil, but not in good, though often called prudent (see
1651, 1674 sqq.). Examples: (a) Evil forms of government, such as
tyranny, oligarchy, or mob rule, cannot be said to have the virtue of
political prudence, no matter how successful they may seem, for they do
not rule in the interests of the people at large, and this interest is
the very beginning and end of true social prudence. (b) Evil practices
in the regulation of government or of political parties--such as
employment of foul means to maintain the interests of the State,
corruption, bribery, intimidation, used for the purpose of winning the
election of a ticket or candidate--cannot be honored with the name of
prudence, but should rather be called Machiavellism and dishonest
politics.
1642. Prudence exercised for the benefit of the nation as a whole
should be found, not only in rulers, but also in private citizens. We
may distinguish, then, the following kinds of prudence:
(a) in those who conduct the affairs of the nation there should be
governmental prudence or statesmanship. Of rulers prudence in the
highest degree is expected; for the chief function of prudence is to
direct actions, and the heads of States must direct not only their own
actions but those of great bodies of men. Scripture speaks of prudence
and justice as the two virtues that are especially needed in a prince
(Jer., xxiii. 5);
(b) in those who direct the defense of the nation against its enemies
there should be military prudence, for bravery has to be guided by
wisdom: “A wise man is strong, and a knowing man, stout and valiant,
because war is managed by due ordering, and there shall be safety where
there are many counsels” (Prov., xxiv. 5, 6);
(c) in subjects there should also be political prudence, for, as they
are rational beings and members of society, they should willingly rule
their acts according to the law and should fulfill their own particular
offices with a view, not only to their own individual good, but to the
good of the whole community.
1643. Utility of Prudence for Society.--Hence, we see that none of the
virtues is selfish or concerned exclusively with the good of
individuals. (a) Thus, prudence, as just said, is political and
domestic as well as individual; (b) justice is legal (i.e., towards
society) as well as commutative (i.e., towards individuals); (c) even
temperance (e.g., avoidance of drunkenness) and courage (e.g., defense
of public safety) pertain to the common good and are commanded in laws
of the State.
1644. Prudence attends chiefly to good morals, but it attends also to
other goods that benefit human life.
(a) Thus, personal prudence directs one, not only to seek after virtue,
but also to seek after lawful conveniences and to shun such things as
are embarrassing or undesirable. Hence, the prudent man acts so as to
avoid offense and to gain the good will of others; he studies the
dispositions of those with whom he lives, so as to live peaceably,
etc.; he protects himself against the attacks and snares of the
unfriendly (cfr. Acts, xxiii. 6; Matt., xxii. 17).
(b) Domestic prudence provides not only for the virtuous lives of the
members of the household, but also for their health and happiness, food
and clothing, and other necessities and lawful pleasures (Luke, xii.
42).
(c) Political prudence is exercised, not only in the regulation of the
conduct of the people through good laws, but also in the promotion of
their welfare, peace, prosperity, and contentment.
(d) Military prudence provides for religion and good morals, by
appointing chaplains, giving opportunity for religious exercises,
insisting on discipline and military virtues, etc.; but it also looks
after the interests of the individual men, the efficiency of all
branches of the service, preparedness of the fighting forces, etc.
1645. Neither should practical prudence or practicality (i.e., the
knowing what to do and how to do it) be identified with merely material
pursuits, since it is a quality that pervades all human activity, from
the lowest to the highest, from the manual to the intellectual, from
the temporal to the spiritual. Just as there are unpractical mechanics
and business men who are not skilled at their work, so also there are
practical students and church people who do their own work well and get
good results.
1646. The Potential Parts of Prudence.--As was explained in 1636, the
potential parts of a virtue are certain annexed virtues, usually
inferior ones, that have to do with the secondary acts of a virtue to
which they are subordinated. The principal act of prudence is
direction, its secondary acts are deliberation and decision (1633).
Hence, we have the following potential parts of prudence:
(a) wise deliberation (_eubulia_), which is a habit of debating with
oneself according to correct methods the means to be employed for
virtuous choice;
(b) wise decision, which is an habitual state of the mind which makes
it ready to draw right conclusions about the means to be chosen for
virtuous conduct.
1647. Wise deliberation and wise decision differ from prudence, which
is wise direction, and they are subject to it just as counsellors are
subject to a commander. But is it possible for these three virtues to
exist apart?
(a) If there is question only of natural dispositions to these virtues,
they may exist apart. Thus, we find that certain persons have an
imagination ready to discover ways and means; that others are not so
inventive, but are remarkable for common sense in choosing the most
suitable means; and that still others are so inclined to some virtue
that they will promptly make use of means that tend to it. The first
class are readily listened to in deliberations, the second in
decisions, while the third are usefully employed in executing matters
that suit their natural bent (e.g., the naturally generous in
dispensing alms).
(b) If there is question of the virtues themselves, they do not exist
apart; for a man is not prudent if he does not deliberate as he should
(e.g., if he searches for evil means to effect his good purpose), or if
he does not decide as he should (e.g., if he concludes to prefer evil
means to the good ones his deliberation had shown him), or if he does
not direct his actions as he should (e.g., if he neglects to carry out
what he had decided on as a necessary duty or performs it in a careless
or improper way). True prudence, then, is wise in deliberation, in
decision, in direction. A good man may be excused if he is not
resourceful, or if he lacks sound judgment in worldly matters, but one
who is imprudent in the matter of a virtuous life is not a good man.
1648. The Persons Who Possess Prudence.--Political prudence, if
understood of the ability to rule well, is not found in all persons,
not even in all the good.
(a) Thus, those who are imprudent in their own affairs are not fitted
to rule, and hence a man who is unjust, or intemperate, or cowardly,
lacks political prudence: “If one knows not how to govern his own
house, how will he be able to take care of the Church of God?” said St.
Paul in discussing the qualifications of prelates (I Tim., iii. 5). He
who does not know how to obey well does not know how to rule well.
(b) Those who have infused prudence on account of the state of grace
are not necessarily fitted to govern, for even children have the grace
of prudence through Baptism and there are many grown-up persons of
saintly lives who are not a success in office and administration. Thus,
Pope Celestine V, though a most holy man, resigned from the Papacy,
because he felt himself unequal to the task of ruling in troublous
times.
(c) Those who have acquired prudence through reason and experience, and
who are therefore just, temperate and strong, are morally well fitted
in natural endowments to rule. He who has learned to obey well is
prepared to learn to rule well.
1649. Political prudence pertains to subjects as well as to rulers,
although not in the same manner.
(a) Thus, rulers in the civil community should have political prudence
in a supreme degree, or statesmanship, so that they may be able to
discharge well the function of sovereignty entrusted to them, whether
as legislators by deliberating wisely and choosing suitable laws, or as
judges by correctly interpreting and applying the law, or as executives
by maintaining the government and enforcing its laws.
(b) The citizens who exercise the power of suffrage should be gifted
with no small degree of political prudence: they should be loyal to the
institutions, laws, and welfare of the country, able to form a good
judgment about men and measures that are the issues in a campaign, and
ready to vote according to conviction rather than prejudice or personal
interest.
(c) The people can also exercise political prudence when obeying the
laws, as when they act from a sense of duty and as rational beings, not
unwillingly or blindly; for thus they rule themselves as freemen and
enlightened beings, deliberating and deciding with themselves how they
may cooperate for the common good and directing their acts according to
law.
1650. The principles just given concerning political prudence will
apply also, due proportion being observed, to domestic prudence.
(a) Hence, it is the duty of those who have authority over a family or
a similar community to cultivate domestic prudence, without which they
cannot discharge rightly the duties of their position of parent,
rector, superior, manager, etc. Confessors and directors of souls need
especially to be prudent; for even though a priest is thoroughly
grounded in the principles of a moral system of conscience and in the
teachings of ascetical theology, he will have to be guided by prudence
in making use of his knowledge, so as to apply it well in the great
variety of cases that will come before him, and to decide what will be
most useful for the spiritual welfare of each individual subject.
(b) It is the duty of those who elect or appoint others to positions of
authority (such as the positions of guardian, teacher, superintendent,
etc.) to be assured beforehand of the fitness of the person chosen as
regards prudence, namely, that he is devoted to the welfare of those
whom he will rule, that he has acquired sufficient knowledge and
experience, and that his habits are temperate, resolute, just.
1651. Relations between Prudence and Other Virtues.--In the preceding
paragraphs the possession of prudence has been joined with the moral
virtues. Hence the question presents itself: Can one who lacks the
moral virtues possess prudence?
(a) Evil prudence, which chooses ways and means well adapted to some
nefarious scheme, and imperfect prudence, which means and judges well
but does not strongly resolve, are of course found in sinners. Evil
prudence is called after the virtue, because it is a counterfeit of the
latter’s goodness, but it is more properly named astuteness or cunning.
Its sinfulness is strongly expressed in Rom., viii. 6, which declares
that the prudence of the flesh is death. Imperfect prudence is also
sinful, for it permits a right judgment to remain ineffectual and is
thus recreant to conscience. Examples of evil prudence are the unjust
steward mentioned in the Gospel (Luke, xvi. 1), who was wise enough to
cheat his master and serve his own interests, and artful swindlers who
know how to lure their victims and then escape without detection.
Instances of imperfect prudence are persons who deliberate well on the
means to overcome assaults of temptation or to escape occasions of sin,
but whose resolutions never last.
(b) Indifferent prudence is resourceful in finding ways to accomplish
purposes that are good, but that are not necessarily referred to moral
aims. Thus, certain men seem to have an uncanny instinct in business or
industry of hitting on the methods that lead to success and of acting
at the right time, and a similar fact is observed in the fields of
science, medicine, art, etc. This kind of ability of knowing and doing
the right thing is variously described as insight, discrimination,
tact, and is variously explained as luck, genius, industry, etc. But,
morally speaking, it is neither virtuous nor sinful, since we find, for
example, that men endowed with business acumen or a practical sense of
the uses of some art or science devote their talents sometimes to good,
sometimes to evil, according to the difference of their characters.
(c) Good prudence is that which in thought and in act functions well
with regard to the means for leading a good life. It is only this
prudence that receives the name of virtue; and, since it is clear from
its concept that it supposes a good life, we must conclude that the
virtue of prudence is not found in sinners. It may happen, therefore,
that a man is most sagacious in managing temporal affairs, or most
skillful in administering the spiritual interests of others, and withal
most imprudent, because he neglects his own salvation.
1652. Sins that Cause One to Forfeit the Virtue of Prudence.--(a)
Infused prudence is lost by any and every act of mortal sin, whether
the sin be against the knowledge had through faith or the knowledge had
through reason. (b) Acquired prudence is lost by repeated acts of
mortal sin opposed to the knowledge had through reason, but not by one
sole act. Thus, a person who through experience and practice has become
prudent in overcoming past vices, loses this prudence if he disregards
the lessons of the past and exposes himself to the old dangers of
mortal sin (see 138).
1653. We may sum up as follows regarding sinners and the possession of
the virtue of prudence:
(a) sinners guilty of venial sin only have infused prudence, and also
the habit of natural prudence, if they have acquired it by their own
efforts;
(b) sinners guilty of mortal sin against supernatural light (e.g.,
those who sin against faith or hope) have not the infused virtue of
prudence, though they may have the acquired virtue;
(c) sinners guilty of habitual mortal sin against natural light (e.g.,
those who are accustomed to sin against temperance or justice) have
neither the infused nor the acquired virtue of prudence. Even one
mortal sin, though it will not take away the inclination of the habit
of prudence, will deprive one of the perfection of the virtue of
prudence, for which it is required that in every act there be a
judgment agreeable to a good will.
1654. The Virtue of Infused Prudence in Those Who Are in the State of
Grace.--(a) Infants in the state of grace through Baptism possess this
virtue in an habitual, but not in an actual manner--that is, on account
of their sanctification they have the power, but on account of their
want of reason they have not the use of the power.
(b) All adults in the state of grace have this virtue both habitually
and actually, as far as the need of salvation requires its exercise.
Grace enables them either to perceive what they should do to live well,
or to seek counsel from the better instructed and to distinguish
between good and bad advice.
(c) Some adults in the state of grace have good judgment in a superior
degree and are able to direct not only themselves but others, and to
deliberate and decide rightly, not only in matters necessary for
salvation, but in all kinds of affairs pertaining to the direction of
human life.
1655. Can the Acquired Virtue of Prudence Exist in Young People?--(a)
If there is question of a formed habit of prudence, the virtue is not
in the young, but in those who are advanced in years. Acquired prudence
is originated by deliberation on particular cases and by habit, and
these are not had without experience and time. Hence, this virtue is to
be looked for in the elderly, both because the passions that disturb
calm deliberation are no longer so impetuous in them, and because their
years have taught them many lessons and given them the opportunity to
acquire fixed ways of acting: “In the ancient is wisdom, and in length
of days prudence” (Job, xii. 12; cfr. III Kings, xii).
(b) If there is question of a formative prudence, this is found in the
young, for they deliberate and decide at times with judgment and
firmness, and, if such acts are frequently repeated, they will
eventually proceed from a settled moral inclination. It is necessary,
therefore, that the moral training of the young begin early, that
instruction, counsel and direction be given them by parents and other
guides, so that the way of virtue may be made more easy. The young are
in duty bound to listen frequently, willingly and reverently to the
admonitions of their elders, and hence the modern tendency of youth to
act as critics of morals is as foolish as it is presumptuous.
1656. Is There Such a Thing as an Instinctive or Native Prudence?--(a)
If we speak of the knowledge of universal principles of right and wrong
which are applied by prudence, those principles that are most general
are known naturally (i.e., even without instruction or inference), but
not so the less general principles that follow from them (see 320
sqq.). Broadly speaking, therefore, one might say that prudence is
natural, for in respect of its first principles it has a natural
evidence; but it is more correct to say that knowledge of first
principles belongs to intuitive reason or understanding, which is also
called synteresis in reference to practical truths (see 145), and which
is a gift of nature.
(b) If we speak of the particular knowledge of virtuous aims that is
presupposed to prudence, one may possess naturally a right judgment
about those aims, inasmuch as the right objectives of human life are
not variable but determinate, and accordingly may be the centers of
attraction to nature, which is drawn to the invariable and determinate,
as is seen in irrational creatures. In fact, certain persons are by
nature disposed to certain virtues (e.g., temperance), and readily form
accurate judgments as to what concerns these virtues. Broadly speaking
again, we may say that prudence is natural in the sense that nature
disposes some persons to judge rightly about moral ends.
(c) If we speak of the particular knowledge concerning ways and means
to fulfill virtuous purposes, there is no natural knowledge of this
kind, for the ways and means to moderation are infinitely varied
according to the differences of affairs, persons, and circumstances.
And since prudence strictly understood is concerned, not with universal
principles or the ends of virtues, but with individual cases and the
particular means to be employed, it follows that in the strict sense
prudence is not natural. But just as we find that some men are better
fitted by nature to judge correctly in speculative matters, so also
some persons are superior to others in the ability to reason about
practical cases and the means conducive to morality.
1657. The Growth and Decay of Prudence.--(a) As repeated acts form a
habit of prudence, so do repeated acts strengthen prudence already
formed, especially when the chief act of prudence (i.e., the command
that things wisely deliberated on be performed) is often brought into
play. Even infused prudence is augmented and perfected by use and
practice: “Strong meat is for the perfect, for them who by custom have
their senses exercised to the discerning of good and evil” (Heb., v.
14).
(b) As prudence consists primarily in a dictate which applies the
reason’s knowledge to the control of will and conduct, this virtue is
corrupted chiefly by passion. We see that those who are swayed by
pleasure or pain lose sight of the true motive of choice and action,
and do not issue to themselves the order which prudence and their
better judgment inspire. Thus, lust deceived even the elders of the
people (Dan., xiii. 56), and bribes blind even the prudent (Exod.,
xxiii. 8). Nature enables a man to judge rightly about the universal
principles of right and wrong; but, when judgment is to be given about
particular lines of action, “as a man is, so he judges,” the licentious
man judging for pleasure, the cowardly man for neglect of duty. Hence,
the moral virtues must be united with prudence, else it perishes.
(c) As prudence presupposes a fund of general moral principles,
forgetfulness is an impediment to this virtue; yet not so that every
loss of memory which deprives one of arts and sciences will also take
away prudence. For, while art and science consist entirely of
knowledge, prudence has also a moral element derived from a right
inclination of the will towards goodness, and its chief office is the
utilization of principles in practice. The virtuous man will continue
to follow prudence, even though he has forgotten its theory or rules,
guiding himself by good habits formed or by the counsel of those wiser
than himself.
1658. The Gift of Counsel.--The Gifts of the Holy Ghost supplement the
theological virtues by ministering to them; but they supplement the
moral virtues, of which prudence is the first, by aiding and perfecting
them. The Gift that corresponds directly to prudence is Counsel, for
both are concerned with the direction of human acts, prudence directing
by the standard of human reason and counsel by the Holy Ghost Himself.
1659. Definition.--Counsel is defined as “an infused habit which makes
the soul prompt to receive and act upon the enlightenment offered by
the Holy Ghost about the means to be chosen with a view to its own
eternal salvation.”
(a) Counsel is different from the virtue of wise deliberation spoken of
in 1646; for, while the virtue enables one to do good in a human manner
and from one’s own motion (e.g., by seeking advice, by making
inquiries, etc.), the Gift enables one to do good in a superhuman
manner and under the motion of the Holy Ghost (i.e., by hearkening to
the advice offered by God).
(b) Counsel is different also from the charism of good counsel, which
makes certain persons remarkable as advisors or directors. Thus,
Mathathias when dying said to his sons: “I know that your brother Simon
is a man of counsel; give ear to him always, and he shall be a father
to you” (I Mach., ii. 65). St. Antoninus of Florence was so successful
in guiding those who came to him with their difficulties that he was
called “Antoninus of the Counsels.” The Gift is intended to benefit its
possessor, and it is therefore had by all the just; but the charism is
for the benefit of others, and is freely bestowed according to the will
of God only on certain individuals who have a special mission of
directing or assisting their neighbors.
1660. Subject-Matter of Counsel.--The subject-matter of the Gift of
Counsel embraces all that pertains to salvation, both the things that
are necessary and are commanded and the things that are not necessary
and are only counselled.
1661. The Gift of Counsel may direct one at times to courses that are
singular and extraordinary. But, since the Apostolic rule is that one
should not believe every spirit but should prove the spirits whether
they are from God (I John, iv. 1; I Thess., v. 21), persons who feel
called to unusual kinds of life should submit their ideas to the
judgment of the Church: “Arise and go into the city, and there it shall
be told thee what thou must do” (Acts, ix. 7).
1662. The Beatitude and Fruits that Correspond to the Gift of
Counsel.--(a) Counsel directs one to all the means that are useful for
the attainment of life eternal, but especially to acts of mercy, for,
as St. Augustine remarks, without mercy shown to others we cannot be
freed from our own evils. Cognate to Counsel, therefore, is the Fifth
Beatitude: “Blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy”
(Matt., v. 7).
(b) Counsel is practical, and hence its ultimate result will be action
of some kind. The acts which its farseeing view puts especially into
exercise are acts of mercy, and acts of mercy have sweetness and
agreeableness when accompanied by a sympathetic love of the afflicted
and a cheerful and generous service of their needs. There belong to
mercy, then, the two delightful acts or fruits of the Spirit mentioned
in Gal., v, 22, and called goodness (i.e., internal benevolence) and
kindness (i.e., external beneficence).
1663. The Sins Against Prudence.--There are two classes of sins opposed
to prudence. (a) Manifestly opposed to it are those sins that consist
in a want of the acts or conditions requisite for prudence. These may
be called sins of imprudence or sins that offend prudence by way of
non-use. (b) Seemingly allied with prudence are those sins that consist
in a wrong application of the acts or conditions of the virtue. These
may be called sins of pseudo-prudence, or sins that offend against
prudence by way of abuse. We shall speak first of imprudence and then
of pseudo-prudence.
1664. Kinds of Imprudence.--There are three kinds of imprudence. (a)
Negatively considered, imprudence is nothing more than the absence of
prudence, and it is not necessarily a sin. Thus, children and young
people through no fault of their own are negatively imprudent, though
of course their lack of prudence may be traced back to original sin.
(b) Privatively considered, imprudence is the failure to have the
habitual prudence that one is bound and able to possess. This failure
is due to the fact that one has taken no pains to educate oneself
through study, sermons, instructions, etc., so as to be able to act
prudently when the occasion arises. Privative imprudence is therefore
reducible to the sin of negligence, although negligence itself, as
being opposed to carefulness (1634), is also against prudence, as we
shall see.
(c) Contrarily considered, imprudence is the voluntary omission of some
act or condition demanded by prudence (as when one is so taken up with
amusements that one makes no effort to deliberate on an important
matter or deliberates with undue haste), or the voluntary commission of
an act exclusive of an act or condition of prudence (as when one
expressly contemns deliberations or decides to act against the rules of
prudence). This kind of imprudence is a mortal sin when it leads away
from things necessary for salvation; otherwise it is a venial sin.
1665. Sinfulness of Imprudence.--Is imprudence a general sin, that is,
a sin which is included in every kind of sin?
(a) Imprudence is not included in every kind of sin in the sense that
it forms a part of the very nature of every kind of sin; for, just as
prudence has its own special acts (i.e., to direct according to
reason), distinct from those of other virtues, so has imprudence its
own special defects that do not belong to other kinds of sin.
(b) Imprudence is included in every kind of sin in the sense that
everyone who sins acts imprudently in sinning; for, just as one does
not act virtuously unless prudence directs one, so one does not act
sinfully unless there is some defect in the deliberation, or decision,
or direction given by reason.
1666. It should be noted that, while the defects against deliberation,
decision, and direction are so many different kinds of imprudence, they
do not form species of sin distinct from the motivating sin if they are
all directed to one evil purpose. Hence, if a person has deliberated
badly, decided badly, and directed badly in the matter of striking a
priest, he needs to confess but one sin, namely, that of laying
sacrilegious hands on a cleric.
1667. The Sin of Haste.--The sin of haste or precipitancy passes over
or hurries over the processes of deliberation that ought to precede
action; it devotes little or no attention to memory of past
experiences, understanding of present conditions, or conjecture of
future possibilities; it does not give to a question the proper amount
of study or of consultation. It is of two kinds, ordinary and rash.
(a) Ordinary precipitancy results from a strong inclination of the will
or of the passions, as when a person speaks in anger before he has
thought of the serious consequences of his words, or marries without
reflection, or purchases an article the worth of which he does not
know, or agrees to something about which he is in the dark, etc. Both
Holy Writ and popular proverbs strongly condemn this sin.
(b) Rash precipitancy results from contempt of the law, as when one so
despises an ordinance as to violate it without the slightest hesitation
or reflection. This sin pertains to pride as well as to imprudence. In
various censures the word “rashness” or “temerity” is used as here
given, as when excommunication is pronounced against rash violators of
the law.
1668. The Sin of Thoughtlessness.--The sin of thoughtlessness or
inconsideration is a neglect or contempt of the means of arriving at a
wise decision. It is a failure, therefore, to make use of right
understanding, which looks well at the particular case before it and
studies and measures it in the light of first principles.
(a) He is guilty of thoughtlessness, then, who fails to do what he can
to judge rightly about his duty; nor is he excused if he leaves the
whole matter to God, for it is temptation of God to expect that He will
provide when man does not do his own part (Prov., iv. 25).
(b) He is not guilty of thoughtlessness who has not the opportunity of
judging, or who lacks sufficient knowledge, or who is taken unawares;
nor is he guilty of temptation of God, if in such difficulties he
commits all to Providence. Thus, when various nations were gathered
together to fight against Juda, King Josaphat prayed: “As we know not
what to do, we can only turn our eyes to Thee” (II Par., xx. 12). And
Our Lord promised special help to the disciples for cases of need when
they were unable to help themselves (Matt., x. 19).
1669. The Sin of Inconstancy.--The sin of changeableness or inconstancy
is committed when, owing to anger, jealousy or other inordinate
passion, the reason repudiates things that had been rightly decided on
and fails to act on judgments that had been rightly made (Is., xxxvii.
3). From inconstancy result incontinence (i.e., instability in the face
of pleasure) and effeminacy (i.e., instability in the face of sadness).
1670. Causes of the Sins of Haste, Thoughtlessness, and
Inconstancy.--(a) Every inordinate desire brings on these sins by
diverting the mind from a good to an evil object. Experience shows that
the avaricious, the ambitious, the angry, the jealous, etc., do not
listen to reason, but act imprudently: “Where envying and contention
is, there is inconstancy” (James, iii. 16).
(b) Desire of pleasure, especially of venereal pleasure, is most fatal
to prudence by extinguishing the judgment of reason. The intellect is
immaterial and is occupied with abstract truth, whereas sensual
delights are immersed in the material and sensible. Hence, carnal sins
are more injurious to prudence than spiritual sins. The sensual man not
merely does not listen to reason, but he does not even hear it. Venus
steals away the reason, said Aristotle, and this truth is well
exemplified in King Solomon.
1671. The Sin of Negligence.--The sin of negligence is opposed to
carefulness or diligence, and consists in the failure of the reason to
direct properly an act, or some circumstance of an act, to which one is
obliged.
(a) Negligence is a general sin in the sense that it has no special
matter of its own, such as a passion to be moderated (as is the case
with temperance and fortitude) or an action to be regulated (as is the
case with justice). The acts of reason should extend to every kind of
matter, and hence a person may be negligent (and likewise inconstant,
thoughtless, hasty) with reference to any kind of action or passion.
(b) It is properly a special sin, as being the opposite of carefulness,
which is a special act of prudence.
1672. Negligence is distinct from the following sins: (a) from laziness
and lukewarmness, which are defects of the external act, while
negligence is a defect of the internal act (see 1326, 1327); (b) from
sins of omission, which pertain to external acts and are results of
negligence, and are opposed to some other virtue than prudence (e.g.,
negligence in paying debts is against justice); (c) from inconstancy,
which fails to command an act to which one is bound, as though one were
impeded, while negligence fails because there is a want of promptness
in the will. The inconstant man is easily diverted from his course; the
negligent man is slow in getting under way.
1673. The Sinfulness of Negligence.--(a) It is a mortal sin when some
act or circumstance necessary for salvation is omitted on its account
(e.g., when a debtor puts off from day to day the payment of a bill,
and in consequence causes a great injury), or when it proceeds from
contempt or preference of the creature to God. (b) It is a venial sin
when the act or circumstance omitted is not necessary for salvation
(e.g., when a judge causes a slight injustice by reason of his
procrastination), or when it proceeds from a want of fervor.
1674. False Prudence.--So far we have considered the sins of
imprudence; now we shall speak of the sins of false prudence, which
turn to wrong objects the acts that prudence employs for good, or which
use inordinately the care that prudence employs in moderation. Thus,
there are several kinds of imitation-prudence.
(a) Prudence is in love with the good of virtue as the end of life; the
prudence of the flesh is in love with some pleasure or utility, and
makes this good the center of attraction for all its acts.
(b) Prudence deliberates and judges about good and lawful means for its
end; astuteness deliberates and judges how it may make use of evil
means, and it employs trickery and fraud to perform what it decides on.
(c) Prudence is chiefly concerned about the spiritual, but its concern
is not excessive; solicitude for temporal things or for the morrow is
more anxious about the things of this world, or is unduly anxious about
spiritual things.
1675. The prudence whose end is bad is the sin of those Who counsel,
judge, and direct well as to the means for securing temporal goods
which they have made the supreme purpose of their lives. This sin is
given the one general name, “prudence of the flesh,” from Rom., viii.
6, where the aspirations of the flesh are contrasted with the
aspirations of the spirit. But it is also sometimes distinguished
according to the different kinds of created things in which false
prudence puts its desire, or according to the different kinds of
allurements to such created goods.
(a) Thus, those who aim chiefly at internal goods (i.e., bodily
pleasures, health, etc.) are said to have the prudence of the flesh,
while those who long mostly after externals (such as fine clothes,
jewelry, estates, etc.) are said to have the prudence of this world:
“The children of this world are more prudent in their generation than
the children of light” (Luke, xvi. 8).
(b) We may also divide prudence about a wrong end into earthly, animal
and devilish, according to the threefold source of temptation, as was
explained above in 1623.
1676. Sinfulness of the Prudence of the Flesh.--(a) If prudence of the
fiesh be understood in its stricter meaning as designating the
condition of those who make the things of this world the be-all and the
end-all of existence, it is a mortal sin; for it is impossible that one
should have two last ends or serve two masters whose interests are
opposite: “The wisdom of the flesh is an enemy to God, for it is not
subject to the law of God, neither can it be” (Rom., viii. 7).
(b) If prudence of the flesh be taken in a less strict sense as
signifying the behavior of those who make God the supreme end of their
lives, but who in some affair plan shrewdly for a particular end that
does not entirely square with right reason, it is then a venial sin. An
example is a host who is very practical in buying supplies and making
all the arrangements for a banquet at which the guests will conduct
themselves with too much hilarity.
(c) If prudence of the flesh be used in a wide or improper sense as
signifying the care of the body and other temporal things for the sake
of a good end, it is not sinful, but virtuous. Thus, a person who is
careful about his diet in order that he may conserve his health and be
enabled to work more efficiently and fruitfully, is virtuously prudent.
The use of the term “prudence of the flesh,” for these last two cases
is inaccurate and misleading.
1677. Astuteness, Trickery and Fraud.--The prudence whose means are bad
is the sin of those who skillfully plan and carry out wicked ways and
methods of securing some desired end, even though it be a good end.
(a) The planning of wicked means through which some design can be
successfully achieved is the sin of astuteness, and the persons who are
well-fitted for such things are known as schemers and plotters. The
counsel of the Jews against Christ (Matt., xxvi. 3-5) and the bribery
of the sepulchre guards (Matt., xxviii. 12-14) are examples of
astuteness.
(b) The carrying out of astute plans may be done either by violence or
by stealth; but, as evil loves to hide itself and to pose as good lest
its success be endangered, schemers usually resort to trickery and
fraud. Lord Bacon’s essay on “Dissimulation” is a good description of
the method of worldly policy.
1678. Trickery in general is the secret employment of sinful means with
the view to impose on others and thus gain some advantage one has in
mind. Hence, it has a wide application and includes fraud as well as
other uses of unlawful means. But trickery may be distinguished from
fraud as follows:
(a) trickery is the execution of an astute plan by words calculated to
deceive or circumvent another person. Words are the chief means of
communication between men, and hence trickery is more usual than fraud.
Examples of trickery are the artful traps prepared for Our Lord by the
Pharisees when with apparent respect they asked His views about the
condemnation of the adulteress (John, viii. 3 sqq.) and the payment of
tribute (Matt., xxii. 17), their purpose being to obtain evidence that
He spoke against the Law;
(b) fraud is the execution of astute plans by means of dishonest
actions, as when a person cheats by not observing the rules of a game,
or defrauds by selling inferior goods, or imposes on others by passing
himself off as their friend, etc.
1679. Trickery may be used for good as well as evil ends, and thus St.
Paul disowns the practice of persuading men to embrace the Faith by
appealing to their prejudices or by toning down the Gospel: “We
renounce the hidden things of dishonesty, not walking in craftiness,
nor adulterating the word of God; but by manifestation of the truth
commending ourselves to every man’s consciousness in the sight of God”
(II Cor., iv. 2).
1680. The gravity of the sins of astuteness, trickery and fraud depends
on the character of the object, end and circumstances. (a) Thus, on
account of the object the sin is grave when the means chosen are very
bad (e.g., serious calumnies), venial when the means are slightly evil
(e.g., lies about unimportant matters); (b) on account of the end the
sin is mortal when one intends to perpetrate a serious offense (e.g.,
clever ruses to get into a house in order to rob it), venial when the
purpose is not so bad (e.g., cheating at cards in order to win a small
sum); (c) on account of the circumstances the sin is made mortal by
some grave defect or disorder in the act resulting from the condition
of time, place, person, etc. Thus, there might easily be great scandal
if a person of authority were known to lie habitually, as it suited his
interests.
1681. Solicitude.--Another form of spurious prudence is solicitude,
that is, an inordinate carefulness about temporal things or about the
future. Its sinfulness appears from the following considerations.
(a) Our Lord condemns solicitude: “Be not solicitous therefore saying:
‘What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be
clothed?’ ... Be not solicitous for the morrow, for the morrow will
be solicitous for itself. Sufficient for the day is the evil thereof”
(Matt, vi. 31, 34).
(b) Solicitude seeks temporal things without the moderation that reason
requires, does not duly esteem the spiritual, and does not confide in
Divine Providence. Without any human care God bestows upon man the gift
of life itself, provides for the animals and plants, directs the whole
inanimate creation, and it is therefore unreasonable to fret and fume
over the temporal things of one individual as if God were unable or
unwilling to see to them (Matt, vi. 25 sqq.).
1682. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about Temporalities.--(a) Solicitude
is sinful on account of the things sought if one makes temporal things
the end of life, as when a person follows religion purely as a business
matter, for the sake of the living and worldly advantages this secures.
(b) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate desire of
obtaining some good, when one pursues the temporal with such avidity
that the spiritual is made to suffer, as when a person devotes so much
time and thought to business, politics, society or science that
religion is more and more set aside in his life: “The cares of this
world choked up the word” (Matt., xiii. 22).
(c) Solicitude is sinful on account of the immoderate fear of losing a
temporal good, when one is deterred from religion by the thought that
fidelity to virtue means the sacrifice of the necessaries of life.
Examples of this immoderate solicitude are persons who never attend
church or contribute to religion, lest they lose time or money, or who
practise race-suicide to escape the burden of supporting a family.
1683. Cases of Lawful Solicitude.--(a) When the end is a genuine
temporal good, moderate solicitude is not only lawful but is a duty
dictated by prudence. Thus, a man who labors industriously and who
saves, spending economically for the support of himself and his
dependents and the upkeep of his home and business, is prudent in the
true sense of the word, provided he is not too much absorbed in
money-making or too anxious about financial affairs: “Work must be
attended to, but worry must be banished” (St. Jerome).
(b) When the end is a spiritual one, moderate solicitude is also a
duty. Thus, St. Paul was solicitous for his Churches (II Cor., xi. 28),
Timothy for the Philippians (Phil., ii. 20); those who have charge as
almoners should be solicitous for the goods given for the poor, etc.
1684. Cases of Unlawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) Solicitude is
unlawful on account of the end that is intended, when one makes
temporal things one’s god, and is therefore perturbed about the future,
as when a person has set his heart upon obtaining some honor by fair
means or foul, and is restless and disturbed in mind lest it escape him.
(b) Solicitude is unlawful on account of immoderate desire, when one
seeks for more than one should, as when a person who has sufficient
means busies himself about too many things and deprives himself of
peace and health in order to be wealthier in the future.
(c) Solicitude is unlawful on account of the unsuitability of the time,
when one anticipates the season for care, as when a farmer worries
during planting season about the harvest, and during harvest time about
the next planting. Those who willingly occupy and disquiet themselves
with forebodings of dire calamities that are uncertain (e.g., the
imminent destruction of the world) or of evils that cannot be prevented
(e.g., their death), are also guilty of sinful solicitude.
1685. Cases of Lawful Solicitude about the Future.--(a) When the end is
a lawul temporal good, moderate solicitude about the future is good,
for providence for the future is a part of prudence (see 1654).
Scripture praises the ant which gathers its food in the summer against
the winter (Prov., vi. 6). Joseph stored up a reserve of grain (Gen.,
xii. 34 sqq.); Our Lord appointed Judas to act as treasurer for Himself
and His followers (John, xii. 6); the Apostles kept for future expenses
offerings made from the sale of fields (Acts, iv. 34, 35). (b) When the
end is spiritual, reasonable solicitude is also good, and this is seen
in the conduct of the early Christians who gathered alms in advance
that they might have the means to bestow assistance during a famine
which had been predicted (Acts, xi. 27 sqq.).
1686. False Prudence and Avarice.--The sins of false prudence are
caused chiefly by avarice. (a) They are sins in which reason plays a
great part, though it is not put to a good use; and hence they do not
naturally spring from carnal vices or cowardice, which obscure reason.
Avarice, on the contrary, reasons much on how it may get and keep; it
is shrewd, cunning, deliberate, foresighted. (b) They are sins that
have recourse to stealth and secrecy, and thus are unlike pride,
vainglory, and anger, which incline to display and openness. But
avarice puts utility above considerations of glory or revenge, and
prefers to be without fame or to bear with slights rather than lose
profits.
1687. Commandments of Prudence.--Prudence is not expressly commanded in
the Decalogue, but there are precepts concerning this virtue in other
parts of Scripture.
(a) Prudence is not enjoined in the Decalogue, because the ten
commandments are concerned with those ends of virtue that are manifest
to all, whereas prudence is about the means to practise virtue.
(b) Prudence is commanded in many places of Scripture: “Get wisdom and
with all thy possession purchase prudence” (Prov., iv. 7); “Walk in the
ways of prudence” (ibid, ix. 6); “Purchase prudence, for it is more
precious than silver” (ibid, xvi. 16); “Be ye prudent as serpents”
(Matt., x, 16); “Speak the things that become sound doctrine, that the
aged men be sober, chaste, prudent” (Tit., ii. 1, 2); “Be prudent and
Watch in prayers” (I Peter, iv. 7).
Art. 2: THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE
(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 57-60.)
1688. After prudence follows justice. This virtue regulates human
actions and renders to others their due, and so it has preeminence over
fortitude and temperance, which govern the passions and make man
virtuous as regards his own acts only and not as regards his neighbor.
The logical order, then, is that justice should precede fortitude and
temperance.
1689. Nature of Justice.--In God justice is an attribute in virtue of
which He so treats His creatures that they can have no well-founded
complaint against Him: “His own justice supported Him. He put on
justice as a breastplate” (Is, lix. 16, 17). In man it is goodness
towards God or towards neighbors; and it is called in Scripture by
various names, such as “justice,” “equity,” “truth,” “righteousness.”
(a) In a wide sense, justice signifies the general virtue of holiness,
or the collection of all the virtues, as when Our Lord says: “Blessed
are they that hunger and thirst after justice (i.e., holiness)” (Matt.,
v. 6). Holiness, as a supernatural life communicated to the soul, is
also called justice or justification: “The justice of God by faith of
Jesus Christ, unto all and upon all them that believe in Him” (Rom.,
iii. 22).
(b) In a strict sense, it signifies the special moral virtue that
consists in a firm purpose of the will to give to everyone his due or
right: “Love justice, you that are judges of the earth” (Wis., i. 1);
“If in every deed you speak justice” (Ps. lvii. 2). In its strict sense
the word “justice” is hereafter used.
1690. Definition of Right.--Right signifies originally that which
follows a straight course or does not deviate from the true standard,
as in the expressions “right ahead,” “to be in the right.” But in moral
matters right has the derived meaning of that which is good, proper,
suitable; and in general it is of two kinds, objective and subjective,
the former being the foundation of the latter.
(a) Objective right is that which is prescribed by law, or it is the
law itself as the rule and standard of what ought to be done,
especially in the relations of men towards one another. In this sense
there is a twofold right, natural and positive, according as reason
itself or free will imposes a law (see 286, 296).
(b) Subjective right is that relationship introduced between men by
reason of the laws governing their conduct one to another, which gives
to one an authority to exercise certain capabilities (active right,
right properly so-called), and imposes on another the necessity of
respecting that authority (passive right, duty).
1691. Right properly so called is defined as the moral power of doing
or possessing something.
(a) It is a moral power, that is, a power created by the moral law
giving one a true title and forbidding others to interfere with its
enjoyment and use. It is not a physical power, for might does not make
right; on the contrary, he who has moral power is sometimes hindered
from exercising it by another who has physical power. Nor is it a mere
legal power, or capacity to act validly and within human law, but an
ethical power that enables one to act licitly before God and conscience.
(b) It is a power to do (e.g., to labor) or to have (e.g., to own
land). The former includes also the moral power to forbear action
(e.g., to rest on Sunday), to require that another act (e.g., pay what
he owes me), or that he forbear action (e.g., keep off my property);
while the latter includes also the power to acquire, to use, to
transfer, etc.
1692. Divisions of Right.--(a) By reason of its source, or of the law
from which it springs, a right is either natural (e.g. the right to
life, liberty, pursuit of happiness), positive-divine (e.g., the right
to receive the Sacraments), positive-human (e.g., the right of
parishioners that Mass be said for them by their pastor, the right of
citizens to vote and to be voted for). (b) By reason of its term, or of
the power which it confers, a right is strict (legal) or non-strict
(moral). One has a strict right when something is due one, because it
is one’s own by a proper and exclusive title (e.g., the right to life
and property). One has a non-strict right when something is due one,
only because it is something common that is to be distributed and one
is a deserving member of the community (e.g., the right to receive an
appointment from the government), or because virtue (e.g., the right to
receive gratitude for benefits shown) or the perfection of virtue
(e.g., the right to be treated with liberality or affability or
friendship by others) requires it.
1693. Natural rights are subdivided as follows:
(a) in respect of their object, some rights are absolute, as being
based on nature alone (e.g., the right of a child to support from its
parent arises from natural origin); or they are relative, as being
based on nature in its relation to concrete and contingent facts (e.g.,
the right of an owner to private possession of his land arises from the
nature of land, which was made to serve man, and from the contingent
fact that it cannot serve man as a rule without private ownership);
(b) in respect of their source, some rights are innate, that is, they
are had from birth by the very fact of human nature (e.g., the right of
life in the newborn child); others are acquired, that is, obtained in
course of time through some contingent fact. Thus, titles to goods of
fortune which the owner is the first to possess (original titles) are
obtained by occupation and accession; titles to goods obtained from
others (derivative titles) are obtained through prescription,
inheritance, contract;
(c) in respect to their firmness, some rights are alienable, that is,
they are such as may be renounced or superseded lawfully, since they
are not obligatory (e.g., the right to marry, the right to drink
alcohol); while others are inalienable, that is, not subject to
renunciation or deprivation, as being obligatory (e.g., the right to
repel temptation, the right to serve God).
1694. Signs by which Strict and Non-Strict Rights May Be
Distinguished.--(a) That to which one has a strict right belongs to one
as one’s own, and hence it must be determinate or determinable. The
right of a beggar to receive some assistance from someone is not a
strict right, since it cannot be urged against any particular thing or
any individual person; but the right of a creditor is a strict right,
since it can be urged against the debtor for a definite amount.
(b) That to which one has a strict right is owed in justice, and hence
it may be enforced by legal means, or in case of need by physical
force. The right of a child not to be slighted in the distribution of
presents made by its parents, the right of a person who has had a
falling out with another that the latter shall accept advances for a
reconciliation, and the right of a benefactor that the beneficiaries
show signs of gratitude, are not strict rights, because they cannot be
enforced in courts of justice, but the right of a laborer against his
employer is a strict right, since it can be vindicated by legal means.
It should be noted that a strict right is one that is granted as a
proper, exclusive and enforceable power by any law, whether natural or
positive, and hence the fact that human law will not vindicate a right
(e.g., the right arising from a contract naturally good, but legally
not defensible, the right of a parent to his child’s respect) does not
prove that the right is not strict.
1695. A strict right to have or to own is either _in re_ or _ad rem_.
(a) A right _in re_ (real or complete right) is the right to that which
one already lawfully has as one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has
to the wages paid him by Balbus). (b) A right _ad rem_ (personal or
inchoate right) is the right to that which one is entitled to obtain as
one’s own (e.g., the right that Caius has to receive the wages promised
him by Balbus).
1696. Legal Enforcement of Strict Rights.--(a) The right _in re_
authorizes recourse to a real action (_actio in rem_), that is, to a
suit against the thing itself, no matter where it be or by whom it be
held, as when one sues to recover one’s property through the ejectment
of a wrongful possessor; for the thing is immediately and juridically
bound to him who has the right, as being his own.
(b) The right _ad rem_ enables one to enforce one’s claim by a personal
action (_actio in personam_), that is, to bring a suit against a
definite person on whom one has a claim by reason of contract, domestic
relationship, fiduciary position, etc., as when one sues for recovery
on account of the non-fulfillment of the conditions of a compact.
1697. The right _in re_ to property is either perfect or imperfect.
(a) A perfect right (right of full dominion) is that which enables one
to exercise all the prerogatives of ownership, that is, to dispose at
will of an object (e.g., to sell, lend, give away, etc.), to use it
(e.g., to occupy a house, to make alterations in it, to tear it down,
etc.), and to exclude others (e.g., to put a fence about one’s property
to exclude the public).
(b) An imperfect right (right of partial dominion) is had when one is
restricted as to the right of the disposition of one’s goods, for
example, when one is forbidden to sell; or when one has the right of
disposition without the right of use, for example, when one is
forbidden on account of the vows of religion to use property one owns
(radical dominion); or when one has the right of use without the right
of disposition, for example, when one is forbidden to make permanent
alterations in a house one occupies as tenant (indirect or useful
dominion); or when one has the other rights of ownership but lacks the
right of exclusion, for example, when one may not exclude a neighbor’s
flock from grazing in one’s pasture (ownership subject to servitude).
1698. The Subject of Justice, or the Faculty of the Soul in Which It
Exists.--(a) Justice is not in the intellect, for we are not called
just because we know a thing rightly, but because we act rightly; (b)
nor is it in the sensitive appetite, since a sense faculty does not
apprehend the relations between rights and duties; (c) hence, justice
is in the rational appetite or will.
1699. The Objects or Subject-Matter of Justice.--(a) The material
object of justice (i.e., all those things with which it deals) is
remotely the external things which are the objects of exchange and
distribution among men, and proximately the actions by which they are
exchanged or distributed.
(b) The formal object of justice (i.e., that which it principally
intends in dealing with its material object) is that the rights of
others, or their inviolable moral power of doing, having or acquiring,
may be respected. Justice thus differs from charity. For charity is
owed also to self, justice only to the neighbor; charity considers the
neighbor as he is one with self and gives him what belongs to self,
while justice considers the neighbor as he is distinct from self and
gives him what belongs to him.
1700. Since justice is shown not to self but to another, it is not so
fully-realized when two persons are in some sense one.
(a) Parent and child are especially one, since the child is from the
parent and a part of the parent, and hence the natural obligations that
spring from their special relationship pertain to the virtue of filial
and paternal piety, which is not strictly justice, but obliges more
strictly on account of the greater rights involved. But obligations
that spring from relationships that are common (e.g., from a contract
between a father and his son) pertain to strict justice; for in these
relationships they treat with one another, not as father and son, but
as man and man. Employer and employee may also be considered as one,
inasmuch as the latter is the agent or instrument of the former, and
the same conclusions may therefore be applied to them.
(b) Husband and wife are less perfectly one than parent and child and
than master and servant, for neither is descended from the other, and
neither is servant to the other. But since they form one conjugal
society and the husband is head of the wife, they owe one another
stricter obligations than if they were strangers to one another,
although those obligations partake less rigorously of the character of
justice.
1701. Division of Justice.--Justice is divided according to the rights
it respects into legal and particular. (a) Legal justice (observance of
law) is that which is owed by the individual, whether he be ruler or
subordinate, to the community of which he forms a part, or to the law
and the common good of the entire body. (b) Particular justice
(fairness) is that which is owed to the private good of an individual.
1702. Is legal justice a distinct and separate virtue, or only a
general condition found in all virtues?
(a) Practically speaking, legal justice is a general virtue, inasmuch
as its desire of promoting the common good will impel a man to observe
all the laws and to practise other virtues than justice, such as
fortitude and temperance. The law commands us to perform the actions of
the courageous man, of the temperate man, of the gentle man, and hence,
as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), legal justice is often
regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all virtue, more
glorious than the star of eve or dawn.
(b) Essentially, it is a distinct virtue, for it alone moves a man
primarily and directly to respect the rights of the common good as
being that greater whole of which the individual is but a part. It
differs even from patriotism and filial piety (for these are moved by
one’s own debt to the source of one’s life) and from obedience (for
legal justice seeks the welfare of the community even in things that
are not commanded).
1703. Comparison of Legal and Particular Justice.--(a) Particular
justice partakes more of the nature of justice, for there is a greater
distinction or separation between the party who has an obligation and
the party who has a right, when the latter is an individual, than when
the latter is a whole of which the former is a part. A distinctive
characteristic of justice, as said just above, is that it takes account
of the independence or “otherness” of those between whom it exists, so
much so that only in a metaphorical sense can we speak of justice when
only one person and nature is in question (e.g., justice between man
and his soul, body, powers).
(b) Legal justice is a more perfect virtue than particular justice or
filial piety, since it seeks a higher object (that is, the common good
as such) and is more voluntary.
1704. Is the right which the community has to receive from the goods of
its members one of legal or one of particular justice?
(a) The right of eminent domain (i.e., the right which the State has
over the goods of private persons when they are necessary for the
common good) is a right of legal justice, for even without compulsion
the citizen should be willing to contribute what is necessary for the
community of which he is part.
(b) The right of the members of a government to receive compensation
for their services is a right of particular justice, for there is an
implicit contract between the rulers and the State that the former will
serve the interests of the latter and that the later will pay the
expenses of the former, as if both parties were private individuals
(see 1708).
1705. Distributive and Commutative Justice.--On account of the
inequality or equality of the individuals between whom it exists,
particular justice is subdivided into distributive and commutative,
which are distinct species of justice.
(a) That the distinction is well-founded is proved by the fact that
this justice--that is, relations towards particular persons--is either
the relation of whole to part or of part to part. The former relations
are governed by distributive justice, which is defined as the virtue
that inclines the ruler, as the representative of the community, to
portion out the public goods (e.g., money, honors, offices) and burdens
(e.g., taxes), not according to favoritism or personal likes, but
according to merits and abilities; the latter relations are governed by
commutative justice, which is defined as the virtue that inclines the
individual to pay to other individuals what is their due, whether the
rights be personal (e.g., the right to reputation) or real (e.g., the
right to wages or price). Commutative justice receives its name from
the fact that it is oftenest called for in commutations (i.e., in
exchanges, such as buying and selling).
(b) That the distinction of particular justice into distributive and
commutative is specific appears from the fact that the main
characteristics of justice (viz., debt owed another and equality
between payment and debt) are found in each of these kinds of justice
in a way proper to itself. There is a debt in commutative justice when
a thing is owed another because he has an individual right to it and it
is already under his dominion; there is a debt of distributive justice,
when a thing is owed another because he has a community interest in it
and a right that it be entrusted to him in view of his merits or
abilities.
1706. Thus, the equality observed in commutative justice is
arithmetical, or of quantity (e.g., if a horse is worth $100, it is
just to pay $100 for it); the equality observed in distributive justice
is geometrical, or of proportion (e.g., if one who had an average of
90% in a civil service examination receives a position that pays $90,
it is just to give another whose average was 80% a position that pays
$80). An indication of the specific difference between distributive and
commutative justice is that the same individual may be just in private
matters and unjust in public matters. Example: Titus, an office-holder,
pays his personal debts faithfully, but he appoints only his friends,
whether they be worthy or unworthy, to important honors.
1707. Corrective Justice.--Corrective (i.e., vindicative or punitive)
justice is a virtue inclining a public person or a superior, such as a
ruler, magistrate, or judge, to inflict on evil-doers penalties
adequate to their faults. It is not to be confused with just vengeance
or retaliation, which is the virtue that moderates in a private person
the desire for punishment of an offense against self, and which is not
justice strictly speaking, either commutative or distributive, but only
a potential part of justice (as stated below in Article 6).
(a) Thus, corrective justice is elicited by commutative justice, for a
punishment is inflicted by a judge in order that there may be equality
between the satisfaction made by the evil-doer and the debt owed to
another on account of the offense. It aims at redressing an unfairness
by taking away so much from the offender and adding so much to the
party offended, that both will stand in the same position as before. If
the person punished accepts the penalty in the same spirit, he also
practises commutative justice.
(b) Corrective justice may be commanded by legal justice, for the judge
may intend the punishment for the sake of the common good, as well as
of the individual who has been injured.
1708. Different Species of Justice in One Act.--Different species of
justice may be present in one and the same act. (a) The same act may be
elicited by one kind of justice and commanded by another kind of
justice (see 56 sqq.), as in the examples given just above of
vindicative justice. (b) The same act may be elicited by two kinds of
justice, as when a debt is owed both in virtue of commutative and of
distributive justice. Some think an example of this is found in the
payment of government employees, for payment is made by distribution
from common funds (distributive justice), and it is owed for services
contracted for (commutative justice). But it seems more correct to say
that wages for services given the community are due in commutative
justice rather than in distributive justice; for in the former justice
equality is between what is given and what is received, in the latter
between the proportion received by one and the proportion received by
another, and government salaries should be paid on the basis of value
received in service (see 1704, 1755, 1767).
1709. The Object of Justice.--The function of a moral virtue is to
direct according to moderation all those things that are subject to the
free will of man, and can be regulated by reason, namely, the actions
of man and the external things of which he makes use.
(a) The actions of man can be understood either in a wide sense, so as
to include both those internal affections that are accompanied by
notable bodily changes (the passions, such as anger, sadness), and
those actions that do not so strongly act upon the body (operations).
Every virtue has for its object action in the wide sense, for virtue is
defined as a habit that makes the agent good and his action good; but
not every virtue has action in the strict sense for its object, since
the virtues of fortitude and temperance regulate, not the operations,
but the passions.
(b) Operations are of two kinds, namely, internal, by which men do not
communicate with one another (such as thoughts and desires), and
external, by which men communicate with one another. These latter
either have to do with external things (such as land, houses, money,
produce, etc.), and we then have such operations as loan, sale, lease
and other contracts, or no external thing is introduced, and we have
such operations as honor, praise, calumny, etc. All the moral virtues
have to do with the internal operation of choice, for virtue is a good
election of the will; but there is this difference between justice and
the other moral virtues, that fortitude and temperance merely dispose
the intellectual appetite for a good choice by the regulation they give
to the sensitive appetite, while justice has for its proper act to
choose well the means for moderating external operations. As for
external operations themselves, these are the objects of justice, but
not of the other two moral virtues.
1710. The purpose of the other moral virtues is to regulate man in
himself; for the passions that are moderated by fortitude and
temperance (such as fear and desire) affect primarily their subject and
not other persons. The purpose of justice, on the contrary, is to
regulate man in his relations to others; for external operations and
things directly affect others, either helping or injuring them, But
both the passions and external operations have effects and consequent
ends that give them new relationships, and hence we may distinguish
between the primary object to which a virtue tends directly, and the
secondary object to which it tends only indirectly on account of the
effects of the primary object.
(a) The primary object of justice is external operations and external
things; the primary object of fortitude and temperance is the passions,
for justice seeks the good of others, whereas fortitude and temperance
seek the good of the agent.
(b) The secondary object of justice is the passions, whenever its
principal object cannot be easily regulated without regulation of the
passions. Thus, when lust urges to the injustice of adultery or avarice
to the injustice of denial of payment due, justice calls on the virtue
of temperance or liberality, as the case may be, to moderate the
passion opposed to it. Similarly, the secondary object of fortitude and
temperance may be external operations, whenever the effect on the
subject of the principal object (i.e., the passions) has reactions in
reference to other persons. Thus, if fear is moderated by fortitude and
desire by temperance, these virtues have external consequences such as
combat against evil, abstinence from food or drink that belongs to
others; but if anger is immoderate, it may lead to unjust attack, and
if desire is immoderate, it may lead to the injustice of theft of food
or drink.
1711. The Golden Mean of Virtue.--The golden mean of virtue is not the
same in all the moral virtues (see 154).
(a) Thus, fortitude and temperance regulate the passions for the
benefit of their subject, that he may avoid in them the extremes of
excess and defect. Hence, the middle way they follow must be determined
by reason from a consideration of the subject and his circumstances
(the mean of reason), and so will vary with different subjects and with
individual cases. Thus, in the matter of temperance it is an old saying
that what is one man’s meat is another man’s poison. It would be absurd
to say, therefore, that there is only one middle way of temperance, and
that all persons must conform to the same rule as to quality and
quantity of food and the time and manner of eating and drinking. On the
contrary, the rule here must suit the subject, and that will be
moderate which agrees with the health, appetite, duties, manner of
life, etc., of the person.
(b) Justice, on the contrary, regulates external operations for the
benefit, not of the subject, but of other persons whom they affect, in
order that the subject in dealing with others may avoid inequality,
which means excess on one side and defect on the other side. Hence, the
middle way of justice is discovered by reason from a consideration of
external things or acts owed to other persons (the mean of reason and
of the thing), and so it does not vary with the circumstances of the
subject. If the real value of a horse is $100--it makes no difference
whether the seller be a prince or a peasant, whether the buyer be rich
or poor--the just payment will be $100. Excess will be unfair to the
buyer, deficiency to the seller.
1712. Though the mean of justice is determined, not by reference to the
person who acts, but by reference to some external thing, it may be
that this external thing cannot be evaluated without consideration of
the person to whom justice is owed.
(a) In distributive justice this is always the case, for the mean of
the thing in distributions consists in equality between relative
proportions of distributions and relative merits or abilities of
persons to whom distributions are made. Hence, distributive justice
must consider the conditions of the person to whom it is owed as
compared with the conditions of other persons, in order to observe
equality by giving proper shares to all.
(b) In commutative justice, this is sometimes the case, namely, when
the condition of a person who has been offended (e.g., that he is a
ruler) increases the debt of satisfaction that is owed him; for the
mean of the thing in commutative justice is equality between the
payment and the debt.
1713. Is observance of the mean of the thing sufficient to make an act
just, no matter what may be the dispositions of the subject?
(a) If there is question of material justice, the reply is in the
affirmative, for a virtue is said to be exercised materially when its
mean is observed. The mean of fortitude and temperance cannot be
observed without reference to the condition of the subject (e.g., he is
not brave who undertakes a difficult task that is beyond his strength);
but the same is not true of justice (e.g., he is just who pays the last
penny of a debt though the payment was beyond his means and required a
sacrifice).
(b) If there is question of formal justice, the reply is in the
negative, for a virtue is said to be exercised formally (i.e., from a
virtuous habit) when the motive of the subject and the circumstances
are agreeable to reason. Thus, he who performs deeds of valor purely
out of vainglory exercises fortitude materially, not formally; and
likewise he who pays his debts faithfully, merely in order to avoid the
penalties of the law, exercises justice materially but not formally.
1714. Comparison of Justice and the Other Virtues.--The differences
between particular justice and the other moral virtues are, therefore,
the following:
(a) justice is for the good of another, the other virtues for the good
of the agent himself;
(b) justice deals with external actions and things, the others with the
passions;
(c) justice follows a mean of the thing, the others a mean of reason;
(d) justice is had materially without any suitability to the
circumstances of the agent, not so the other virtues.
1715. While justice is inferior to the theological and intellectual
virtues (see 156, 157, 1028), it is superior to most of the moral
virtues that perfect the sensitive or the intellectual appetite. The
superiority of justice to fortitude, temperance, and the annexed
virtues, such as mercy (see 1207), is seen from the following reasons.
(a) Legal justice is greater than those other virtues, for, while they
pursue the private good of their subject, it seeks the public good.
“Great is the splendor of justice,” says St. Ambrose (_De Officiis_,
lib. I, cap. 28), “which is born for others rather than for itself, and
which aids society and the community. It holds high position, that all
may be subject to its judgment, that it may bestow assistance, not
refuse responsibility, take upon itself the dangers of others.”
Moreover, since the law commands us to perform the actions of the
courageous man, of the gentle man and of the temperate man, legal
justice, as Aristotle says (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 2), is often
regarded as the supreme virtue, the summary of all the virtues, more
glorious than the star of eve or dawn.
(b) Private justice is also greater than those other virtues, since it
perfects a nobler power of the soul (viz., the will), and seeks the
good, not only of its own possessor, but also of others. Justice too is
impartial or blind as between persons, demanding satisfaction, even
though a debtor be a monarch, and granting redress, even though an
injured party be the humblest or most undeserving of mankind. An
indication that justice is nobler than regulation of the passions is
seen by Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 4) in the fact that it is
more difficult and rarer: “Many people are capable of exhibiting virtue
at home, but incapable of exhibiting it in relation to their neighbor.
Accordingly, there seems to be good sense in the saying of Bias, that
‘office will reveal a man,’ for one who is in office is at once brought
into relation and association with others. As then the worst of men is
he who exhibits his depravity both in his own life and in relation to
his friends, the best of men is he who exhibits his virtue, not in his
own life only, but in relation to others; for this is a difficult task.”
1716. Two virtues of the sensitive appetite that appear more excellent
than justice are courage and liberality, but in reality justice is
nobler than they.
(a) Thus, courage seems to be better, because it is more essential to
the common good in time of great danger; but in reality justice is more
useful to the community, for at all times, whether in peace or in war,
it is justice that preserves unity and contentment among the people and
promotes courage and devotion to the public welfare.
(b) Liberality seems to be better than justice, because it gives more
than is due, while justice gives only what is due. But, on the other
hand, justice is of more general advantage, since of necessity
liberality must be exceptional and shown only to comparatively few,
while justice must be exercised continually and must be shown to all;
justice is also more necessary, for one must be just in order to be
liberal, and not vice versa, since no one is praised as generous unless
he first pays the debts of justice; finally, although liberality gives
more than is due and may thus be a greater private benefit, justice
without liberality is more serviceable to the common interest than
liberality without justice.
1717. Two virtues of the will which some authorities hold to be more
important than justice are the virtues of religion and mercy.
(a) The virtue of religion has a nobler object, since it regulates the
worship owed to God, while justice regulates the things owed to man;
and its obligation is stricter even than that of legal justice.
(b) The virtue of mercy, which is a rational inclination of the will to
relieve the suffering or misfortune of others, is held to be greater
than justice, because to relieve the distress of the community or of an
individual indicates greater perfection than to pay merely what is due
to another.
1718. Virtues may be compared, not only from the viewpoint of the
objective excellence which they have from their own natures (whereby
they are unequal and rank according to the greatness of their objects),
but also from the viewpoint of the subjective participation of them in
the souls of their possessors.
(a) In a certain sense, all the virtues are equal in their possessor,
since all of them alike are related to charity as their perfection (see
1118), and all of them increase or diminish in like proportions with
the growth or decline of grace, which is their root (see 745).
(b) In a certain sense, too, the rank of the virtues may depart from
the order of the dignity of their objects. For the facility and
promptitude of exercise of an infused virtue does not depend formally
on the infused virtue itself, but on subjective conditions, such as
natural inclination or custom, or on a special gift of God (see 135,
136); and hence it may happen that a saint shows greater excellence and
enjoys greater renown in an inferior than in a superior virtue. Thus,
Abraham was singular in faith, Moses in meekness, Josue in bravery,
David in fervor and devotion (Ecclus., xlv-xlviii), and St. Joseph is
praised as “a just man” (Matt., i. 19).
1719. Injustice.--Just as the word “justice” is taken in a wide sense
for holiness or the collection of all the virtues, and in a strict
sense for a special cardinal virtue, so likewise the word “injustice”
is taken widely as a synonym for any transgression, iniquity, or sin
(“He sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust,” Matt., v. 45), but
strictly for violation of the special virtue of justice (“Hear what the
unjust judge saith,” Luke, xviii. 6). It is of this latter injustice
that we now speak.
1720. Species of Injustice.--Injustice is of two kinds. (a) Legal
injustice is a special vice that moves one to despise the common good
or to act against it intentionally. Thus, if one steals or overeats
merely to gratify a passion for money or for food, there is a certain
condition of legal injustice, inasmuch as one violates a law; but if
one does these things also or solely to injure the common good, there
is a special sin of legal injustice, to be declared in confession. (b)
Particular injustice is a special vice against the private good of
others that moves one to seek for more than is one’s share, or to
desire more of the benefits and less of the burdens than equality
appoints. Examples: To sell above the just price or buy below the just
price (commutative injustice); to show favoritism in the distribution
of public offices or burdens, as when a person in authority showers
public benefits on his unworthy relatives or friends, and overburdens
with taxes those who are not his friends (distributive injustice).
1721. The Theological Species of Legal and Particular Injustice.--(a)
From its nature injustice is a mortal sin, for it is an attack on a
very great good, namely, the peace and security of society; the very
foundations of orderly community life are shaken when injustice is done
either to common or to private rights. Moreover, acts of injustice
(unlike sins of mere passion), if the matter is serious, offend against
charity, the life of the soul; for charity “envieth not, dealeth not
perversely” (I Cor., xiii. 4); while injustice injures the neighbor and
leads to hatred, quarrels, and separations. Hence, the Apostle says of
injustice: “Do not err: neither adulterers, nor thieves, nor covetous,
nor extortioners, shall possess the kingdom of God” (I Cor., vi. 10);
and Our Lord, speaking of justice, says: “If you would enter into life,
keep the commandments” (Matt, xix. 18).
(b) From want of sufficient advertence in the subject (see 173 sqq.),
or from smallness of matter in the object (see 172), a sin of injustice
may be only venial. Thus, if one takes money that belongs to another on
account of vincible ignorance due to slight negligence, or if one takes
only a small amount that does no serious injury, the injustice is
venial.
1722. Rule for Determining the Gravity of Sins of Injustice.--The rule
for judging whether the matter of a sin of injustice is great or small,
is the quantity of injury it inflicts, or the degree of reasonable
unwillingness of the offended person to suffer the injustice; for sins
against the neighbor are culpable precisely on account of and in
proportion to the harm they do to others. Hence, since every injustice
offends either the public or private good, or both, the following acts
of injustice are gravely sinful:
(a) mortal sin is committed when injury is done to a private right in a
matter of such great moment that the person offended is reasonably and
gravely unwilling to sanction the injustice (e.g., cases of calumny,
adultery, incendiarism). But if the injury itself is small and the
party offended is nevertheless gravely unwilling to suffer it, only
venial sin is committed against justice, but there may be a mortal sin
done against charity, as when one steals a worthless trinket, knowing
that the owner is so unreasonably attached to it that the loss will
almost break his heart or will provoke in him violent anger, profanity,
etc.;
(b) mortal sin is also committed when injury is done to a public right
in a matter so important that the community is with good reason gravely
averse to the commission of the injury. This happens when the common
good is directly attacked, as when a citizen rebels against lawful
government, or when the peace and security of the community is
imperilled because of injury done to a private person, as when one
steals a sum that is considerable from a wealthy person, even though
the latter will not seriously feel the loss. Hence, an injury to a
private person that does not seriously harm him may seriously harm the
community, and be gravely sinful on account of the disastrous
consequences to social order that would follow if such an injury were
not gravely forbidden.
1723. Moral Species of Legal and of Particular Injustice.--These are
distinguished according to the main classes of objects or rights that
are injured or offended (see 199). Hence, there are the following four
kinds of injustice:
(a) injuries to spiritual rights or goods, whether natural or
supernatural (e.g., superstition, idolatry, simony);
(b) injuries to internal goods of soul (e.g., lies) or of body (e.g.,
murder, mutilation);
(c) injuries to external goods, whether incorporeal (e.g., calumny) or
corporeal (e.g., theft, fraud).
1724. Accidental Forms of Injustice.--There are also many accidental
forms of injustice, that is, variations that do not of themselves
change the moral species (see 200).
(a) Thus, as to its manner, injustice is done either positively, by
action (e.g., by stealing from an employer), or negatively, by omission
(e.g., by allowing another to steal from one’s employer). In both cases
the same kind of injustice is committed; for example, he who permits
theft is just as much a thief as if he had stolen himself.
(b) As to its consequences for the injured person, injustice is either
merely injurious or injurious and damaging, according as a strict right
is violated without loss (e.g., adultery from which no child is born),
or with loss to the injured party (e.g., adultery from which a child is
born). The character of the sin is the same in both cases, but in the
latter case restitution is due (cfr. 1199, 1200). The loss (_damnum_)
that results from violation of a strict right (_injuria_) may be in
internal goods (such as salvation, life, health, sanity of mind) or in
external goods (such as reputation, money, property).
(c) As to its consequences for the party who does the injury, injustice
is either profitable to him (as in the case of unjust taking) or
unprofitable (as in the case of unjust damage). The moral species is
the same in either case, for the fact that the unjust person gains by
his injustice does not make the injury greater, and the fact that he
does not gain does not make the injury less.
1725. Injury is not suffered by one who knows and wills an act that is
done contrary to his right (Rule 27 of the Decretals), for such a one
cedes his right. Hence, if a man looks out with a smile while
neighborhood boys take apples from his orchard and the latter take this
as permission, no injustice, material or formal, is done. But the legal
maxim needs interpretation, for the following two conditions are
necessary in order that there be a surrender of right:
(a) the party who consents must be able to surrender his right, since,
if he is not able to do so, his cession is invalid. Hence, one who
kills a person asking for death is unjust to God and to the State; one
who commits adultery with a woman whose husband gives permission is
unjust to the marriage state and the lawful children; one who strikes a
cleric who waived his privilege of canon (_privilegium canonis_) is
unjust to the clerical state; one who takes property from a ward with
the latter’s consent, is unjust to the estate, since the ward has no
authority to alienate it. Many of the martyrs, it is true, wished to
lose their lives at the hands of persecutors, but this meant only that
they consented to the will of God, not that they consented to their own
murder by the tyrants, for they had not the right to give the latter
dominion over their lives;
(b) the party who consents must really will to yield his right, and
hence, if there is error, fraud, fear or violence, the cession is of no
effect. Thus, a buyer who through ignorance takes a defective article
or pays an exorbitant price, a workman who through necessity accepts
less than a living wage, or a man who yields his purse to a burglar at
the point of the revolver, does not surrender his rights, since true
consent is wanting. Similarly, when one follows the counsel of Christ
not to resist spoliation (Matt., v. 40) or when a saintly person
rejoices over injury done him (Heb., x. 34), the intention is not to
surrender rights to the unjust, nor to approve their conduct, but to
practise heroic virtue by patience, humility, forgiveness, etc.
1726. Internal Injustice.--Does internal injustice (i.e., the intention
of injuring another) make an external action unjust?
(a) If the intention makes the external act to be a violation of a
strict right, it also makes the external act unjust. Thus, to take a
book from another’s room is of itself an indifferent action, for there
may be, no violation of right (e.g., when the intention is to borrow),
or there may be such violation (e.g., when the intention is to steal).
(b) If the intention does not make the external act a violation of
strict right, even though that act be harmful to the other party, it
does not make the external act unjust. Hence, if the other party has no
strict right against the external act (e.g., Titus sees the house of
Balbus on fire, but he is not hired to take care of Balbus’ property,
and he gives no alarm in order that the house may burn down) or if the
agent has a strict right to perform the external act (e.g., Claudius, a
judge, condemns Sempronius, according to law, but his chief intention
is the harm he will inflict on the latter), the unjust intention does
not make the external act unjust. But in these cases sin, and even
grave sin, is committed against charity.
1727. Judgment.--Judgment, or the right determination of what is just
and due to others, is the proper act of the virtue of justice, and
hence Aristotle (_Ethics_, lib. V, cap. 7) declares that people take
their disputes to a judge as to justice personified. Judgment is either
public or private. (a) Public judgment is passed by a judge who has the
authority to compel disputing parties to abide by his decisions. (b)
Private judgment is passed by individuals without public authority
concerning the morals or conduct of others.
1728. Since judgment is an act of virtue, it is lawful, and we find
that both in the Old and the New Testament men have been appointed with
authority to judge others. Thus, God ordered that judges be chosen in
all the cities of Israel (Deut., xvi. 18); St. Paul declares that the
judge is the minister of God (Rom., xiii. 4), and from Apostolic times
tribunals have been set up in the Church. But certain conditions are
required for moral goodness, both in those who ask for judgment and in
those who pass judgment.
(a) Thus, those who seek judgment must be actuated by proper motives
and must conduct themselves in a virtuous manner. Our Lord in Matt., v,
teaches that it is better to suffer temporal loss rather than to
contend in judgment from a motive of revenge to the prejudice of one’s
spiritual good, and St. Paul condemns the Corinthians because they gave
scandal by reason of their lawsuits before heathen tribunals and had
recourse to frauds and injuries in their litigation (I Cor., vi. 1
sqq.).
(b) Those who pass judgment must have a good intention, must proceed
according to law, and must decide according to prudence. If the first
condition is wanting, judgment is unjust or otherwise sinful, according
as the judge chooses against the right or is merely prompted by some
human motive (such as hatred, anger, vainglory, avarice); if the second
condition is lacking, judgment, if public, is usurped or illegal, if
the third condition is not had, judgment is rash. But it should be
noted that the Church has condemned the teaching of Wicliff that office
and authority are forfeited by sinners (Denzinger, 595, 597).
1729. First Condition of Righteous Judgment.--The first condition of
righteous judgment is that the purpose of the judge be just and
sincere. But is it possible for judgment to be righteous if the judge
is a bad man--that is, if he is in the state of mortal sin?
(a) If the sin of the judge is public, and judgment is given against a
sin of the same character (e.g., if a notorious thief passes sentence
on another thief), serious scandal is given; for justice is discredited
and an occasion offered for criticism of authority and for lawlessness.
But if the sin is not of the same character as the one condemned (e.g.,
if a notorious thief passes sentence on a murderer), the scandal is not
grave in so far as justice is concerned.
(b) If the sin is not public, it is clear that no scandal is given; and
if the judge is moved by the duty of his office and by zeal for justice
to condemn even the same kind of sin of which he himself is guilty, he
commits no sin whatsoever in so doing (cfr. 1280). But he is guilty of
hypocrisy if he uses the opportunity to pretend a personal
righteousness which he does not possess. It is this that Our Lord
reprobated in the Pharisees, who, although guilty of many and grave
crimes, wished to put to death an adulteress in order that they
themselves might thus shine as immaculate. The words, “Let him that is
without sin among you cast the first stone” (John, viii. 7), condemn
hypocrisy in judges, though they do not require that a judge be free
from all sin. But though sinners may act against sin as lawmakers,
prosecutors, judges, jurymen, police, etc., they should be admonished
by their office to reform themselves according to the words of St.
Paul: “In judging another, thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the
same things which thou judgest” (Rom., ii. 1).
1730. Second Condition.-The second condition of righteous judgment is
legality, if there is question of judgment in court.
(a) Thus, the judge must have public authority, for, just as laws
cannot be made except by public authority, neither can they be
interpreted except by the same authority (Rom., xiv. 4). Hence,
proceedings that are not held in the proper place, at the proper time,
or in the manner prescribed by law are void, and the same is true if a
court has not jurisdiction over the parties or over the subject-matter
in controversy.
(b) The judge must administer justice according to the law and the
usual method observed in courts, since his office is to interpret, not
to make law or custom (_jus dicere, non facere_). His opinions as
precedents may affect the development and growth of law, and hence he
is especially bound to be faithful to general principles that are
binding on him. If a statute in its operation is found to impede the
just disposition of controversies, judges perform a public service by
indicating this to those who have authority to regulate procedure. If
the application of a law would work injustice, no judge can in
conscience pronounce sentence according to that law; but there are many
cases recognized in jurisprudence in which courts of equity afford
relief to rights that cannot be defended or protected in courts of law,
and in cases of this kind the judge should be guided by recognized
principles of natural justice and the rules of his court.
1731. Third Condition.--The third condition of righteous judgment is
that the sentence or decision be prudent or well-founded. Thus, in a
judicial process the facts of a case must be examined and the rules of
evidence be observed in judging the meaning of the facts. Since rash
judgment is a sin committed, not only externally and in public, but
also and especially internally and in private conclusions formed about
the character or deeds of others, and since it is one of the commonest
of sins, it will be well to explain its nature somewhat fully.
(a) It is an internal sin, and so it differs from external acts against
the neighbor; but calumny, detraction, and unjust sentence are its
outward expressions.
(b) Rash judgment is an internal sin of decision in which something is
affirmed or denied mentally about a neighbor, and so it differs from a
mere representation or thought. This distinction is important for
scrupulous persons who think that mere suggestions against others that
flash through their minds are rash judgments. These suggestions are a
very common temptation, and, if repelled, are an occasion of merit;
they become sinful only when entertained with pleasure.
(c) Rash judgment is a decision unfavorable to another in matters of
character or honor. Thus, it differs from favorable decisions (as when
without reason one holds that another is virtuous or has extraordinary
merit), and from unfavorable decisions on matters other than character
or honor (as when one concludes that a neighbor is mentally or
physically deficient, and these defects are not connected with
depravity nor considered as ignominious), and from unfavorable
decisions that relate to sin but are not personal (as when one thinks
that an expression used by an ignorant man is blasphemous, but passes
no judgment on the state of conscience of the man).
(d) Rash judgment is a decision that expresses conviction, and not mere
supposition. Thus, it differs from the prudential attitude by which one
assumes for the sake of security that a stranger is to be distrusted,
since he may be dishonest.