(a) Hence, interpretative hate--i.e., a feeling against another that

makes one act in effect as if there were hatred--does precede the other

sins. Thus, if Titus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged

against him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but

this anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of

Balbus is included in the desire of revenge.

(b) Formal hate--i.e., dislike of another that is absolute, and not

modified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over

one’s own inferiority--does not precede, but rather follows the other

sins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin

of formal hate that is a special sin. Titus in the example murdered

Balbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the

thirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.

1316. The causes of the sin of hatred are as follows: (a) causes that

dispose one to hate are anger and envy, for to desire evil to another,

for revenge or on account of one’s own glory, prepares the way to

desire evil to him absolutely, which is hatred. Envy, however, disposes

to hate more than anger, since it is more akin to hatred: anger wishes

evil to another as something owed to justice, but both envy and hatred

look upon the neighbor’s good as a thing distasteful. (b) The cause

that induces sinful hatred of the neighbor is envy; for one cannot hate

that which is good unless one regards it as in some way disagreeable,

and it is the vice of envy that makes one regard one’s neighbor’s good

as one’s own evil. Hatred of God also indirectly results from envy,

for, while the creature does not envy God, his envy of his neighbor

breeds hatred of his fellow-man, and this in turn may produce hatred of

God.

1317. Various Species of the Sin of Hatred.--(a) Hatred of God and

hatred of the neighbor are sins specifically distinct, and hence to be

declared specifically in confession. They are opposed to the same

virtue of charity, but, on account of the generical difference of sin

against God and sin against the creature, they must be classed as

different species of sin.

(b) Hatred of the neighbor in itself is but one species of sin, since

all its acts have this one essential character in common, that evil is

wished to a neighbor as evil--that is, one wishes another evil in

general or every kind of evil, but does not specify particular evils,

such as damnation or death.

(c) Hatred of the neighbor on account of its circumstances or results

may be connected with sins of other species. Thus, he who hates his

neighbor because the latter is pious, adds irreligion to his hatred; he

who out of hatred wishes the death of his neighbor, adds the guilt of

murder to hatred; he who out of hatred wishes to destroy his neighbor’s

property, adds the guilt of injustice to his hatred: he who hates his

parents, adds impiety to uncharitableness; he who calls down a curse on

another, adds malediction to hate.

1318. Penitents who accuse themselves of hatred often have in mind a

sin specifically distinct from the sin of hatred, or an act not sinful

at all.

(a) Thus, “hatred of God” is sometimes used to signify a want of

resignation to the divine will.

(b) “Dislike of the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify

uncongeniality on account of difference of character, etc., or positive

disapproval of qualities or acts that deserve dislike or censure. Thus,

a penitent who always feels ill at ease in the company of a neighbor on

account of some natural incompatibility or of some fear which he

himself does not understand, or who dreads meeting an individual whose

manners are boorish or whose conversation is distasteful, may accuse

himself of sinful dislike.

(c) “Wishing evil to the neighbor” is sometimes used to signify one’s

desire that justice take its course or that the order of charity be

observed. Thus, a penitent who wished for the common good that a

criminal be punished, or according to charity that his friend would

defeat others in competition for a prize, may accuse himself that he

wished harm to the criminal or had luck to the competitors against his

friend.

1319. Circumstances of hatred should be mentioned in confession as

follows: (a) when they add a new species--thus, the person hated (e.g.,

one’s father) or the evil wished (e.g., a fall into mortal sin, loss of

reputation, death, etc.) may add a new sin to that of hate; (b) when

they multiply the number of sins within the species of hate, as when

one hates a large number of persons (see 219).

1320. The Sin of Sloth.--Sloth is a sadness or dejection of the will

about the divine good one possesses, and arises from a want of esteem

for one’s Last End and the means thereto.

(a) Sloth is a sadness of the will. Hence, the sin of sloth differs

from the passion of sadness, and also from bodily weariness. The

passions (as said in 121) are not evil in themselves, but become evil

when exercised immoderately, or turned to an evil object. Weakness or

weariness of body is not sinful, but it disposes one for the passion of

sadness, and this in turn may tempt the will to sloth, when duties owed

to God are to be attended to.

(b) Sloth is a sadness about good, and so it differs from sadness about

the smallness of one’s good. Humility demands that one be sensible of

one’s own shortcomings and of the greater merits of those who are

better. But it is not humility but ingratitude and sloth to depreciate

and grieve over the good which one has received from God, such as the

gift of faith, membership in the Church, etc.

(c) Sloth is sadness about the divine good, which is loved by charity.

Thus, the sin of sloth differs from the circumstance of sloth, which is

found in every sin. There is no sin that does not contain a sadness or

disgust about the act of the opposite virtue; the very thought of

moderation is depressing to the glutton, and religion is associated

with gloom by the irreligious. But what is special to the sin of sloth

is, that it grieves about that divine good itself over which charity

rejoices, and which is the end of all the other virtues.

(d) Sloth is a sadness about the divine good as shared by self, that

is, about the end offered oneself and the means thereto, such as

eternal beatitude, the friendship of God, the Sacraments, the

Commandments, good works and other divine gifts which should be

esteemed and received with gladness. Sloth thus differs from hatred of

God, which is a sadness over God’s own goodness; and from envy, which

is a sadness over the good of the neighbor.

(e) Sloth is a sadness over the divine good, which is considered by one

as an evil. The sin of sloth looks upon the joys of heaven or the

practice of virtue with contempt; it directly spurns them as unworthy

of love (cfr. Num., xxi. 4). Hence, sloth differs from laziness or

idleness, for this latter sin dislikes the exercise of virtue, not

because it considers virtue as evil, but because it has a dread of the

labor and exertion which virtue entails, and is overmuch in love with

repose and ease.

1321. Sloth is a sin. (a) It is forbidden by God: “Bow down thy

shoulder and bear wisdom, and be not grieved with her bands” (Ecclus.,

vi. 26). (b) It is an evil sorrow, for it grieves over good. (c) It has

evil effects, since it keeps man from his duty, swallowing him up with

overmuch sorrow (II Cor., ii. 7).

1322. Qualities of the Sin of Sloth.--(a) Sloth is a special sin,

since, as explained above, its individual objects differentiate it from

the general slothfulness that is found in every sin, as well as from

hatred, envy and laziness. But it is a sin, by comparison, rarely

committed. (b) It is a mortal sin, from its nature, since it is a

horror and detestation for the divine good. It is implicitly forbidden

in the Third Commandment, (c) It is a capital sin (i.e., a vice

naturally productive of others), for sadness inclines man to many evils

as means of escape from sorrow or of consolation in sorrow.

1323. In the following cases sloth is not a mortal sin. (a) It is not a

mortal sin if in the object there is not grave matter. When a person is

grieved at the thought that he will be forced to some spiritual good

which is not of precept but of counsel, he does not sin thereby, for

one does not sin by not choosing the counsels. Strictly speaking,

however, this grief is not the sin of sloth, which is a sorrow over the

divine good that one is bound to accept with joy. (b) Sloth is not a

mortal sin, if in the subject there is not sufficient reflection or

full consent. Hence, mere bodily weariness in serving God, is no sin at

all, and a feeling of disgust for spiritual things, not consented to,

is only a struggle of the flesh against the spirit, and at most a

venial sin.

1324. Sins that Spring from Sloth.--(a) To escape his sadness about

divine things, the slothful man avoids or flees the things that sadden

him--his last end (sin of despair) and the means thereto (sins of

cowardice and carelessness). He also attacks the causes of his

grief--the persons who would lead him to God (sin of rancor) or the

spiritual things themselves (sin of malice). (b) To console himself for

the want of joy in spiritual things, he seeks comfort in forbidden

things: his mind is unquiet and curious about that which does not

concern him, his talk is excessive, his bodily movements are restless,

and he must be continually moving from place to place.

1325. The Conquest of Sloth.--(a) Flight is a suitable form of

resistance to temptation, whenever the temptation grows stronger by

thinking over the matter, as is the case with temptations against

purity (I Cor., vi. 18). (b) Attack is a suitable form of resistance,

when the temptation becomes weaker as one thinks over the matter (see

257). This is the case with sloth, for, the more one gives oneself to

the consideration of spiritual things, the more pleasing do they become.

1326. Laziness, as distinct from the capital vice of sloth, is a

generic name given to a number of sins or circumstances of sin, and

hence it will be treated in several places.

(a) Thus, negligence is a want of prompt decision about duties to be

performed. It is opposed to the virtue of diligence or solicitude,

which pertains to prudence. Hence, negligence will be considered among

the sins against prudence.

(b) Sluggishness (_pigritia_) is a tardy performance of duty, and will

be considered among the sins opposed to diligence.

(c) Carelessness (_torpor_) is a perfunctory discharge of duties,

without thought or love. It is one of the consequences of sloth given

above (see 1324), and hence it is a sin against charity.

(d) Indolence is an excessive dislike of labor or exertion, caused by

an inordinate love of recreation or bodily rest. It will be considered

when we treat the sin of softness or delicacy, which is opposed to

fortitude.

(e) Idleness is the actual omission of one’s duty on account of

indolence, and hence it is considered among the sins against the

various precepts. Thus, under the precepts of charity and of justice

will be discussed the omission of labor to which one is bound.

1327. The sin of carelessness about the service of God is also known as

tepidity or lukewarmness. It consists in a want of fervor, and causes

one to live in spiritual languor, wishing on the one hand to live

holily and avoid sin, but fearing on the other hand the effort and

generosity required for the practice of virtue and the struggle against

evil. It is, therefore, most dangerous.

(a) Even if it is only internal, it may be more dangerous to the one

concerned than grave sin itself, since threats and promises that move a

sinner are often unavailing with one who is tepid and moving on to

grave sin. Thus, we read: “I know thy works, that thou art neither

cold, nor hot. I would that thou wert cold or hot. But because thou art

lukewarm, and neither cold, nor hot, I will begin to vomit thee out of

my mouth” (Apoc., iii. 15, 16).

(b) If it is external, this sin is a danger to others who witness the

disrespectful way in which one prays or exercises other duties owed to

God.

1328. The Sin of Envy.--Envy is a sadness at the good of a neighbor,

which one considers as a detriment to one’s own excellence or glory,

and therefore as an evil to self.

(a) Envy is a species of sadness, that is, it is a displeasure of the

will at the presence of what one regards as an evil. In this way envy

differs from the sin of rejoicing at the evils of others, which, as

will be said below (see 1342), is one of the consequences of envy,

although both are of the same species. Thus also, envy differs from

pride and vainglory (which are not aversions but inclinations), and

from covetousness (which is the desire of what belongs to another).

(b) Envy is about some good, especially about those goods from which

men obtain the esteem and honor of others, such as virtue, ability,

rank, success, prosperity. Thus, envy differs from sorrow about evil or

the evil effects of good, such as repentance for one’s sins, regret that

one is not as good as others, displeasure at the bad use that men make

of health or wealth.

(c) Envy is about the good of a neighbor, for only an insane person

would feel chagrin at the superiority of God, and self-envy is a

contradiction in terms. Thus, envy differs from sorrow at the good of

God (hatred of God), and from sorrow at the good of self (sloth). A

person may be said, however, to envy God in the sense that he is

mortified at the external glory of God, if he feels himself an

antagonist of that glory. In this way the devil is said to envy the

attributes of God, because they overcome his efforts to promote

impiety, and man is said to envy the Holy Ghost, when he is

discontented at the progress of holiness in the souls of men.

(d) The envious man considers his neighbor’s good as a detriment to his

own good. This is the distinctive trait of envy which sets it apart

from other forms of repining at another’s good fortune. Thus,

displeasure at the excellence or glory of another without reference to

detriment to self is not envy, but hatred; with reference to the

unworthiness of another, it is not envy, but indignation.

(e) Hence, envy looks on the neighbor’s prosperity as a calamity to

self, as a sort of punishment and the contradiction of one’s own

desires. Here envy stands in contrast with mercy, for, while the

merciful regard the misfortunes of neighbors as the misfortunes of

themselves, the envious regard the prosperity of others as their own

misfortune.

1329. The Objects of Envy.--(a) The material objects are many, but they

are reduced to excellence and glory. Excellence includes every kind of

desirable quality. Glory is the honor, fame and praise that follow on

public knowledge of one’s excellence. As a rule, envy is concerned with

the excellence of glory, but it may also be about internal or objective

excellence. Thus, if two disputants are alone, the less able will

perhaps envy the greater knowledge of the more able; but, if there is

an audience, the more able will perhaps envy the greater applause

received by his less able opponent.

(b) The formal object of envy is one, namely, the detriment to the

excellence or glory of self which the envious person sees in the

excellence or glory of another. Detriment must not be understood

absolutely here, as if the envious person lost something or failed to

obtain something on account of the other person. It must be understood

relatively, in the sense that the envious person feels that the

situation between himself and the other person is no longer the same,

that the latter has gained on him or passed him, and has thus lessened

his excellence.

1330. The Subjects of Envy.--(a) The persons most inclined to envy are

of two quite different types, namely, the ambitious and the

pusillanimous. The ambitious man ardently covets honors, and he is

correspondingly saddened when others surpass him, especially if he

already enjoys repute or is not far removed from the object of his

desires. The pusillanimous man, being petty, holds every small

advancement of others as great and as a blow to his own prestige. He

is, therefore, filled with intense envy, where a different person would

see little or no cause for such a feeling. On the contrary, those who

recognize their own unsuitability for what is above them, and those who

are great of soul, are not so much inclined to envy. There are few,

however, even among the most perfect, who are not tempted to envy in

some form.

(b) The persons who are most likely to be envied are those who in some

way or other are one’s likes or equals, for one does not feel that one

is thrown into the shade by a person who is always far above one, or by

those who are far removed in time, place, age, etc. Thus, a beggar will

envy a fellow-beggar who becomes a millionaire, but not those

acquaintances who were always rich, and still less the fortunate

persons whom he knows only from hearsay. The elder son envied his

brother, not his father (Luke, xv. 28). Many exceptions to this are

only apparent. Thus, persons sometimes are envious of those far above

them, but it is because these have advanced at their expense, as when a

poor person envies those who have the property he once owned. Persons

are sometimes envious of their equals who have not surpassed them, but

it is because these latter have obtained with little or no effort what

they themselves have gained only by hard work. Persons are sometimes

envious of their inferiors, but this is because they make a comparison

from some viewpoint in which there is equality, as when an old man

envies a youth the advantages that were not enjoyed in his own youth,

or the present promotion that surpasses his own.

1331. It was said above (see 1313) that hatred differs from other sins

against charity, inasmuch as it dislikes another’s good unqualifiedly,

whereas these other sins dislike his good with some qualification.

Hence, envy differs from hate, because envy is a qualified displeasure.

It differs from other kinds of displeasure over the prosperity of

others, because the qualification in each case is different.

(a) Thus, emulation is displeased at the thought of a neighbor’s

prosperity, not because it does not like his success, but because it

dislikes the unsuccess of self. Example: Titus is grieved when he

thinks of the virtue of Balbus, because he himself lacks virtue.

(b) Fear dislikes the prosperity or superiority of another, not on

account of the prosperity or superiority in itself, but on account of

the evil results it apprehends from that prosperity. Example: Caius is

displeased at the elevation of Claudius, because he knows the latter is

his enemy and will persecute him. He is also displeased that, in spite

of his own greater learning and soundness, he has not the influence

possessed by Balbus, who misleads many by long-winded sophistry.

(c) Indignation (_nemesis_) is displeased that a neighbor has a certain

good, of which he is unworthy. Example: Sempronius is angry because

Titus, who is dishonest, succeeds in business.

(d) Envy grieves over a neighbor’s prosperity, not because it thinks

this prosperity will actually bring about a lessening of the honor of

self, but because it regards the very fact of that prosperity, in

itself and apart from any consequences, as a change in one’s

relationship to the neighbor, and to that extent an obscuration of the

glory of self. Example: Balbus is grieved at the prosperity of

Claudius, because he knows Claudius will use his resources to defame

him. Caius is grieved at Claudius’ prosperity, because he regards it as

a reflection on his own fame, since he is less prosperous. Balbus

fears, Caius envies.

1332. Is emulation a sin? (a) If emulation is about spiritual things,

it is not sinful, but praiseworthy. St. Paul encourages a holy rivalry

among the Corinthians for the higher gifts of God (I Cor., xii. 31).

St. Jerome writes to Laeta that her daughter should be associated with

other girls as fellow-pupils, that the progress of the latter and the

praises they receive may act as a spur to the daughter not to be

outdone. One who equals or surpasses the virtue or knowledge of another

does not take away or lessen the other’s good, but improves his own

good; and thus emulation is not harmful, but beneficial in spiritual

matters. (b) If emulation is about temporal things, it is also lawful

to be sorry at their absence. But, if the desire is inordinate, then

emulation is sinful. Example: Sempronius is not inferior in ability to

Titus, and hence, while not desiring monopoly or disliking

competition, he is sorry that he has not attained an equal success in

business. Balbus is very deficient in education, in initiative and in

character, while Caius excels in all these qualities; and yet Balbus is

discontented that he does not hold the responsible position of Caius,

or one of equal importance. The emulation of Sempronius is reasonable,

that of Balbus is unreasonable.

1333. Rivalry is called jealousy, when it proceeds from a love so

ardent that it wishes to have exclusive possession of the object loved.

This jealousy is lawful or unlawful, according as the person who loves

has or has not exclusive rights.

(a) Jealousy is unlawful in a mother who is vexed because her child

loves his father as well as herself. The child ought to love both

parents, and it is an evil jealousy that makes the mother grieve when

the child does this.

(b) Jealousy is lawful in a wife who grieves because her husband gives

to others the affection he promised would be hers alone. Scripture

speaks of God Himself as jealous of the fidelity of His creatures, and

declares that He will suffer no rival, but must have sole dominion over

the heart (Josue, xxiv. 19 sqq.); and St. Paul tells the Corinthians

that he is jealous of them, with the jealousy of God, because they have

not been faithful to his preaching, but have been friendly to false

teachers (II Cor., xi).

1334. Is grief at the prosperity of another a sin, when it is caused by

fear of the harm he will do?

(a) If it is clear that the other will use his prosperity to act

against justice or charity or the like, it is not a sin to grieve over

the prosperity. For, since it is right to deprive a neighbor of the

means of sinning when one has the power to do so, it is not wrong to

wish that he lacked those means. Thus, it is not a sin to grieve over

the election of an official who will promote lawbreakers and persecute

the law-abiding: “When just men increase, the people shall rejoice;

when the wicked shall bear rule, the people shall mourn” (Prov., xxix.

2). St. Gregory the Great declares that, as it is not uncharitable to

rejoice at the downfall of an enemy, neither is it envious to be

saddened at his success; since his downfall is a blessing to the

oppressed, while his success means injustice to many.

(b) If it is clear that the other will use his power, wealth, or other

goods to inflict evils that are deserved or not unjust, it is wrong to

be sorry that he has the power, wealth, etc., just as it would be wrong

to deprive him of them. Thus, it is wrong to grieve over the election

of an honest official who will correct abuses and punish lawbreakers.

It is not unlawful, however, for a lawbreaker to be sorry for himself

at the prospect of the penalty he will receive.

(c) If it is uncertain whether the other will use his prosperity to do

injury to oneself or to others, it is lawful to fear and to be on one’s

guard, but it is not lawful to grieve unconditionally at the

prosperity, just as it is not lawful in the circumstances to deprive

the other of his prosperity.

1335. Is grief at the prosperity of another sinful, when it is caused

by his unworthiness of prosperity? (a) If the indignation could be

about spiritual things, of course it would be sinful; but this is not

possible, for it is precisely spiritual goods (such as virtues) that

make one deserving. Indignation, then, is about temporal goods, which

are enjoyed by the bad, as well as the good. (b) If the indignation is

about temporal things owned by the wicked, and one grieves that they

have prosperity, sin is committed. For it is God who distributes to the

undeserving the goods they have; His purpose is just, namely, that

these goods may be for the correction or the punishment of the wicked;

those who grieve over the prosperity of the unworthy overlook the fact

that eternal goods are a reward to man, temporal goods only a trust to

be administered. Hence, the Psalmist says: “Be not emulous of

evil-doers, nor envy them that work iniquity, for they shall shortly

wither away as grass” (Ps. xxxvi. 1).

1336. Two special cases of sorrow over the prosperity of the wicked

must be considered. (a) If one sorrows precisely because the prosperity

is had by an undeserving person, and is not thinking of the divine

cause and purpose in human affairs, it does not seem that one sins;

for, abstracting from Divine Providence, there does appear an

unsuitability in the prosperity enjoyed by the wicked, and hence it is

something to be sorry about. But such sorrow is at least a preparation

for the sin spoken of in the previous paragraph, and so it should be

shunned: “My feet were almost moved, my steps had well-nigh slipped, in

anger at the wicked, seeing the prosperity of sinners” (Ps. lxxii. 2,

3). (b) If one sorrows precisely because the sinner will use his

prosperity in such a way as to become more wicked and to incur

chastisement, the sorrow is not uncharitable, but charitable.

1337. Sorrow at being surpassed by another on account of the relative

loss of glory to self, with the wish that the other had not the good

that makes him superior, is envy, as explained above. This sorrow is a

sin. (a) Thus, it is condemned in scripture: “Let us not be made

desirous of vainglory, envying one another” (Gal, v. 26); “The

patriarchs through envy sold Joseph into Egypt” (Acts, vii. 9),

“Charity envieth not” (I Cor., xiii. 4). (b) It is not reasonable to be

grieved at the prosperity of others, since prosperity is something good

and an object of joy rather than of sorrow.

1338. From its nature envy is a mortal sin. (a) Thus, it is directly

opposed to the principal acts of charity, which are love of the

neighbor, desire of his good, and joy over his prosperity; and charity

is the life of the soul (I John, iii. 14). Secondary acts of charity,

such as kissing the sores of a leper, may be omitted without loss of

love, but envy destroys love itself. (b) Envy is directly contrary to

mercy; for, while mercy grieves at the evil of others, envy grieves at

their good. The envious are not merciful, neither are the merciful

envious.

1339. Envy is a greater sin than the other kinds of sorrow at a

neighbor’s good. (a) Thus, envy grieves over the neighbor’s good (even

if he is worthy), and is greater or less in proportion to that good;

(b) emulation grieves over one’s own deficiency, fear over the

consequences of the other’s good, indignation over the prosperity of

one who is unworthy.

1340. Envy is not a mortal sin in the following cases: (a) if the

object is not grave, as when one is envious about some trifle (such as

good looks); (b) if the subject does not give sufficient reflection or

full consent, as when infants are jealous of one another, or adults

feel the stirrings of envy. Even holy men are not above the first

movements or inclinations towards envy, and very many envious thoughts

are not mortal, because not fully adverted to.

1341. Degrees of Gravity in Sins of Envy.--(a) There are no different

species of envy of the neighbor, for all acts of envy have the one

essential trait that they are sorrow over the excellence of another,

viewed, not absolutely in itself, but relatively as a lessening of

one’s own excellence. We should distinguish, however, the envy which is

a sin against God (viz., envy at another’s spiritual good, or sorrow at

the diffusion of grace) from the envy which is a sin against the

neighbor.

(b) There are different degrees of envy within the species, according

to the greater or less excellence of the good which is envied. Thus, it

is a greater sin to be envious about spiritual things (e.g., another’s

influence for good) than about temporal things (e.g., another’s ability

to get money); it is a greater sin to be envious about the wellbeing of

the body than about dress, style, etc.

1342. Envy is one of the capital vices, that is, it is an evil tree

which from its very nature yields the evil fruits of other sins. The

fruits of envy are progressive in evil.

(a) Thus, in the beginning of envy, one tries to diminish the glory of

the person one envies, either secretly (sin of whispering) or openly

(sin of detraction).

(b) In its progress, envy rejoices at the adversity of the neighbor, if

its attempt to injure succeeds; or it sorrows over his continued

prosperity, if its effort at blackening has failed. Rejoicing at a

neighbor’s adversity is not different specifically from envy; but the

affliction over the neighbor’s prosperity now spoken of is of the same

species as the vice which sought to undermine the neighbor. Thus, if

the envious person resorted in vain to detraction, his grief at the

failure of his efforts is in guilt a sin of detraction.

(c) In its consummation, envy becomes hatred, as was said above on the

causes of hate (see 1316).

1343. Envy is not the first of the seven capital vices. (a) Thus, it is

caused by pride, for one who inordinately desires his own excellence

will easily grieve over what he regards as the lessening of that

excellence by the excellence of another. (b) It is caused by vainglory,

for one who inordinately longs for fame and honors, will easily be

grieved over the fame and honors enjoyed by others.

1344. In what way is envy preeminent among sins? (a) Envy is not the

most enormous vice, for, as said above (see 1301), hatred of God is

from its nature the worst of all sins. But there is one kind of

envy--namely, envy of a brother’s spiritual good--which has a place

among those gravest offenses called “sins against the Holy Ghost” (see

899).

(b) Envy is most like to the sin that brought all woe into the world,

for “by the envy of the devil death entered the world” (Wis., ii. 24).

It was sorrow at the gifts bestowed upon our first parents that moved

the demon to tempt them, and accordingly his envy led to their fall and

to the loss of original justice by the Whole race.

1345. Useful Considerations against Envy.--(a) Envy is useless, since

it does not obtain that on which one’s heart is set, or obtains it only

by the sacrifice of charity, which is something better. (b) Envy is

harmful, since it carries its own torment with it (Gen., iv. 5; Wis.,

vi. 25; Prov., xiv. 30), and brings on many sins against the neighbor.

Through envy the first murder was committed (Gen., iv. 8), and it was

envy that brought about the crucifixion of Christ (Matt, xxvii. 18).

1346. Useful practices against envy are: (a) the uprooting of its

causes, pride and vainglory; (b) the cultivation of an unselfish

charity and of emulation of what is best in others: “So that by all

means, whether by occasion, or by truth, Christ be preached, in this I

rejoice, yea, and will rejoice” (Philip., i. 18); “Let us consider one

another, to provoke unto charity and to good works” (Heb., x. 24).

Art. 8: THE SINS AGAINST PEACE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 37-42.)

1347. The following sins are opposed to the peace of charity: (a)

discord, which is opposed to peace in wills; (b) contention or

quarreling, which is opposed to peace in words; (e) schism, war, fights

and sedition, which are opposed to peace in works.

1348. Discord.--As here understood, discord is a disagreement in the

wills of two or more persons in matters pertaining to the divine good,

or the good of the neighbor, and concerning which charity requires that

they be in agreement.

(a) Discord is a disagreement in wills, that is, in wishes and desires.

Hence, it is not the same as difference of opinion (see 1197), which is

a disagreement in judgments.

(b) It is about matters in which agreement is necessary, that is, in

which the law of God requires that all wish the same things, and have

but one heart and soul. Thus, discord differs from disagreement about

matters of supererogation. Examples: Titus and his wife are at

variance, because Titus is unwilling to give any alms. Balbus and his

wife are at variance, because she wishes him to give away in alms more

than is strictly necessary. In the first husband there is discord, but

not in the second.

(c) Discord is opposed to the divine good, or the good of the neighbor.

Thus, it differs from a disagreement with another who is attacking the

divine good or the good of the neighbor. The standard of concord is the

divine will, and he only of the persons at variance is discordant who

is not in harmony with the divine will.

(d) Discord is confined to those matters in which charity calls for

agreement. If it be some other virtue that demands unanimity (e.g.,

justice), the disagreement is not discord in the special sense now

employed, Thus, he whose will refuses consent to the command of a

superior is disobedient; he whose will refuses to pay the debt due a

creditor is dishonest.

1349. There are two kinds of discord: (a) intentional discord, which is

the act of one who knowingly and purposely contradicts in a matter

about which charity requires that he agree;

(b) unintentional discord, which is a disagreement between persons, who

both intend the divine good or the good of the neighbor, but who are

divided in opinion as to what that good here and now requires.

1350. Sinfulness of Intentional Discord.--(a) From its nature, this

species of discord is a mortal sin, since it directly excludes charity.

Hence, those who are guilty of discord shall not obtain the kingdom of

heaven (Gal, v. 21). (b) From the lack of sufficient reflection or

consent, the first impulses towards discord are not mortal sins.

1351. Sinfulness of Unintentional Discord.--(a) From its nature, this

kind of discord is not opposed to charity, nor is it sinful; for the

concord of charity consists in a union of wills, not in a union of

opinions. Thus, the disagreement between Paul and Barnabas about John

Mark (Acts, xv. 39) was not sinful, although the difference of judgment

indicated their human limitations. (b) From its circumstances, this

kind of discord may be sinful, as when it is caused by culpable

ignorance in matters of faith, or is carried on with obstinacy.

1352. By whom is the sin of discord committed? (a) It is committed

sometimes by one party only, as when one knowingly resists the will of

another who wishes to perform a necessary act of charity. (b) It is

committed at other times by both parties, as when each in defending his

own good infringes knowingly on the charity due the other.

1353. Is it lawful to promote divisions, when one’s purpose and the

result will be good? (a) To promote division that takes away the

concord of charity is never lawful, but a mortal sin: “There are six

things the Lord hates, and a seventh which His soul detests, a sower of

discord among brethren” (Prov., vi. 16, 19). (b) To promote division

that takes away a concord of malice is lawful and praiseworthy. Thus,

St. Paul introduced a dissension between the Pharisees and the

Sadducees, who had been in agreement against him (Acts, xxiii. 6, 7).

But the intention of the Apostle was to win the Pharisees to the

defense of the Resurrection and of himself, not to incite the Sadducees

to a denial of the Resurrection, and so there was no question of his

using evil means for a good end.

1354. The Origin of Discord.--(a) The disagreement with the will of a

neighbor arises from envy. For he who considers the excellence of his

neighbor as a lessening of his own excellence, is inclined to

contradict the wishes of the neighbor, even if he recognizes them as

good. (b) The preference of one’s own will and persistence in it are

due to pride and vainglory. For he who unduly desires his own

excellence or fame does not wish to yield to others or change his

purposes. He feels that, even though he is in the wrong, he must not

take what he regards as a position of inferiority.

1355. Contention.--Contention is discord carried into words or

equivalent signs, (i.e., a dispute or altercation), in which one denies

what the other affirms. It is divided as follows: (a) by reason of the

intention, it is either an investigation of the truth, a defense of the

truth, or an attack on the truth; (b) by reason of the manner in which

it is conducted, it is either suitable or unsuitable to the persons and

the matter in question.

1356. Contention whose aim is the discovery of the truth is lawful as

follows. (a) Such contention is lawful and useful in itself, for it is

a means of acquiring useful knowledge, of seeing both sides of a

question, and of sharpening the mind for the refutation of error.

Hence, a contest in a court of justice, a controversy in a scientific

journal, a public debate on some important matter, and a theological

disputation are according to their nature lawful, and may be necessary.

Even to argue against the truth, for the sake of practice in discussion

or to bring out the truth more clearly and forcibly, is, apart from

danger, scandal, or prohibition, not unuseful.

(b) Debate is unlawful in its manner when a disputant does not argue

according to the rules, appeals to prejudice or ignorance, uses an

insulting tone or unparliamentary language, etc.

1357. The Sin of Contention.--Contention is a sin when its aim is the

concealment or discomfiture of the truth. (a) From its nature this kind

of contention is a mortal sin, for it is the external expression of

internal discord in matters about which charity requires concord and

the same speech. Hence, the Apostle numbers contention among the works

of the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 20). (b)

From the lightness of the matter or the imperfection of the consent,

this kind of contention is very often, if not usually, only a venial

sin, or no sin at all. Examples: A person argues against what he knows

is true, but the matter is trivial (e.g., his weight); or he is

distracted by the heat of dispute or the tactics of the other party.

1358. Mortal sin is not committed by contention, therefore, unless the

truths against which one contends are of a serious kind. Such truths

are: (a) truths of a religious or moral character, such as the

doctrines of faith and the commandments of God; (b) natural truths of a

universal character, the knowledge of which pertains to the perfection

of the intellect, such as first principles; (c) natural truths of a

particular character in which important rights are involved. Example:

An historian who writes against some deservedly revered person of the

past, or a lawyer who attempts to prove against an accused what he

knows is not a fact, are guilty of the sin of contention.

1359. Hence, one may be defending one kind of truth and contending

against another kind of truth at the same time. St. Paul, accordingly,

makes the distinction between announcement of the truth out of charity

and announcement of the truth out of contention (Philip, i, 15 sqq.).

(a) The truth is defended out of charity when one does not use truth as

a means for the defense of error; (b) it is defended out of contention

when one makes use of it as a means for the propagation of error. Thus,

while St. Paul was imprisoned at Rome in 61, certain personal enemies

preached Christ, but at the same time spoke or hinted falsehoods

against St. Paul in order to undermine his authority or add to the

bitterness of his captivity. Similarly, if one defends the truth to

make oneself appear different or better than one is, one speaks from

contention.

1360. Ways in which one is guilty of the mortal sin of contention: (a)

when one contends formally against the truth, that is, when one knows

the truth and intends to overcome it or suppress it; (b) when one

contends virtually against the truth, that is, when one is so bent on

carrying one’s point that one does not care whether it is true or

false. Thus, the Sophists aimed to win, right or wrong.

1361. When the aim of contention is the overthrow of error: (a) in

itself, such contention is good and praiseworthy, and at times

necessary; (b) by reason of circumstances, it may be a venial or a

mortal sin. Examples: A dispute on a matter that is unbecoming, such as

which of the disputants is greater (Luke, xxii. 24); dispute with

greater warmth than the case requires; a dispute that leads to scandal

or other evil consequences, as in religious controversies (I Tim., ii.

14).

1362. The Causes of Sinful Contention.--(a) The cause of that which is

principal in contention--namely, the departure from the truth held by

another and the stand made for error--is envy, pride and vainglory, as

said above (see 1854) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which

is secondary in contention--namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and

the shouts or screams of the contenders--is anger.

1363. The sins in act against the peace of charity are the following:

(a) schism which is opposed to the peace of the spiritual society, the

Church; (b) war, which is opposed to international peace, and sedition,

which is opposed to national peace; (c) fighting, which is opposed to

peace between individuals.

1364. Schism.--Schism (etymologically, a split, rent) is defined: “A

voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church.”

(a) Schism is a voluntary separation, that is, a separation intended

for its own sake. Every sinner in a sense separates himself from unity,

for sin divides one from God (Is., lix. 2); but it is only the

schismatic who expressly intends separation as such. Other sinners

expressly intend some inordinate gratification. Moreover, schism is not

the same thing as the state of the unbaptized, who have not separated

themselves from unity, or of the excommunicated, whom the Church

herself rejected from her body on account of some sin other than schism.

(b) Schism is a separation from unity, and so it differs from disbelief

in unity (heresy) and dislike of unity (hatred). One may separate

oneself from unity, although one believes in it. One may hate unity,

and yet not separate oneself from it. Further, schism does not

necessarily include affiliation with some schismatical body or the

setting up of such a body.

(c) Schism is a separation of oneself from unity--that is, schism does

not deprive the Church of the note of unity, but separates the

schismatic himself from that unity which is in the Church. The

schismatic may wish to take away the unity of the Church, but he

accomplishes only the loss of union of himself with the Church.

(d) Schism is a separation from unity, that is, from fellowship in the

mystical body of Christ (I Cor., xii). It is a refusal to recognize the

authority of the head of the Church, or to communicate with those

subject to him. Thus, schism differs from disobedience to the head of

the Church or to particular prelates in the Church, for one may disobey

orders and still recognize the authority of him who gives the orders.

(e) Schism is a separation from the unity of the Church, that is, of

the spiritual kingdom of Christ on earth. Hence, rebellion in matters

purely civil against a churchman who has civil authority, is not

schism, but is unjust war or sedition. Schism is possible only in the

Church Militant, for the members of the Church Suffering and the Church

Triumphant cannot fall away from unity.

1365. The Principal Schismatical Movements.--(a) In Apostolic times

there were local factions and dissensions, though not real schisms, at

Corinth (I Cor., i. 10 sqq.) and in Asia Minor (III John, i. 10). (b)

In post-Apostolic times there have been numerous schisms, such as that

of the Novatians at Rome in the third century, that of the Meletians in

Egypt in the fourth century, that of the Donatists in Africa in the

fourth century, that of the Acacians in the East in the fifth century.

The most lamentable of all the schisms, because of the number of those

whom it led away from unity, was the Eastern Schism, begun by Photius

in the ninth century and made permanent under Michael Caerularius in the

eleventh century.

1366. Schism is voluntary in two ways: (a) directly, when one intends

schism itself, wishing to separate oneself from the head or members of

the Church; (b) indirectly, when one intends to do that from which

schism follows. Thus, a person who prefers to act as if he were not a

member of the Church rather than desist from his design of calling or

presiding over an unauthorized Council, is guilty of schism, even

though he does not directly intend separation from the Church. His case

is similar to that of one who does not wish to kill his neighbor, and

yet is determined to do something from which the neighbor’s death will

surely result.

1367. There is a threefold unity of the Church, as follows: (a) unity

in the theological virtues and in the Sacraments. All the faithful have

the same faith, hope, charity, Sacraments, and thus there is a unity of

similarity; (b) unity between head and members. There is but one head

of the Church, Christ in heaven and the Vicar of Christ an earth. Thus,

there is a unity of subordination; (c) unity between the members of the

Church. All the faithful form but one society, and all are parts of one

great whole. Thus, there is a collective unity.

1368. The sin of schism is committed in two ways (Canon 1325, n. 2).

(a) It is committed by separation from the head of the Church on earth

and the keystone of unity, that is, the Pope (Col., ii. 18, 19). The

mere fact that a man is in rebellion against his bishop does not make

him a schismatic, if he continues to acknowledge subjection to the Holy

See. But such rebellion is often the first step towards schism. (b) The

sin of schism is also committed by separation from the members of the

Church. Thus, one who refuses to communicate with Catholics in matters

of faith or worship, choosing to act as an independent in those things,

is a schismatic.

1369. Rejection of a decision or command of the Pope can happen in

three ways:

(a) The reason for rejecting the decision may be the thing commanded,

and not the one who gave the command, as when a person refuses to keep

a fast or make a restitution commanded by the Pope, because he

considers it too difficult. In this case the person is guilty of

disobedience, but not of schism, even though he persists in his

refusal; for he rejects a commandment of the Church, not the head of

the Church.

(b) The reason for rejecting the command may be the one who gave the

command, considered as a private individual. As the Pope in his

personal relations is not above human weakness, he may be swayed by

hatred, prejudice or impulsiveness in issuing commands to or forming

judgments about individual subjects. Hence, if we suppose that it is

reasonably certain that a Pope is unfavorable to an individual, and

that the latter accordingly is unwilling to have a case in which he is

concerned fall under the immediate decision of that Pope, neither

schism nor any other sin is committed; for it is natural that the

person should wish to protect his own interests against unfairness.

(c) The reason for rejecting the Pope’s judgment may be the one who

gave the command considered in his official capacity as Pope. In this

case the person is guilty of schism, since he disobeys, not because the

thing ordered is difficult or because he fears that the individual will

be unjust, but because he does not wish to recognize the authority of

Pope in him who issued the judgment.

1370. Comparison of Heresy and Schism.--(a) These sins are not the

same, since heresy is opposed to faith, schism to charity. A person who

really believes that the Church is one in its head and its body, may

nevertheless out of pride, hatred, ambition, interest,

self-sufficiency, etc., decide not to recognize the authority of the

head, or not to communicate with the body. (b) There is an intimate

union between heresy and schism, since every heretic separates himself

from the unity of faith, while schism is always found to adopt some

heresy as a justification for its separation (I Tim., i. 6). Thus, the

Eastern Schism soon trumped up charges of heresy against the Church,

and history shows that schism almost invariably leads to a denial of

papal primacy.

1371. The Opposition between Schism and Charity.--(a) Charity in itself

is a spiritual bond of unity between the soul and God, for love is

unitive. One who sins against this unity by offending God or his

neighbor, is not thereby a schismatic, since one may hate an

individual, for example, without hating the Church. (b) Charity in its

effect is the communion of all the faithful in one mystical body of

Christ, for charity inspires the desire to love, not only individuals,

but also the spiritual society formed of individuals in the entire

world. One who sins against the unity and peace of the Church is a

schismatic.

1372. The Sinfulness of Schism.--(a) Schism has a special seriousness,

since it is opposed to the union and peace of mankind as a whole in the

universal spiritual society which is the Church. It seems to be the

greatest sin against the neighbor; for other sins are against the

individual or against the multitude in temporal things, while this sin

is against the multitude and in spiritual things. Scripture (cfr. I

Cor., i. 10) and Tradition (e.g., St. Clement of Rome, St. Ignatius of

Antioch, St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, St. Augustine) energetically condemn

the sin of schism.

(b) Objectively, it is not as serious as unbelief, since unbelief is

against God, schism against the neighbor; but subjectively, or in its

consequences, it may be greater than unbelief, as when a schismatic

sins with greater contempt than an unbeliever, or is an occasion of

more danger to others.

1373. Schism, like heresy, may be either formal or material (see 828).

(a) Formal schism is that described above, in which one wishes to

separate oneself from the unity of the Church, and is in culpable

revolt. It is a mortal sin. (b) Material schism is that in which one is

in fact separated from the unity of the Church, but is in good faith.

An example is the Great Schism of the West (1378-1417), when there were

rival claimants for the Papacy, and invincible ignorance among the

people as to who was the true head. This kind of schism is not a mortal

sin.

1374. The Spiritual Powers of Schismatics.--(a) The power of Orders is

not lost through schism, for that power is conferred through a

consecration, and the consecrations of the Church are permanent. Hence,

a schismatical priest can perform validly the acts that pertain to the

power of Orders, such as the celebration of Mass and administration of

the Sacraments; but he does not perform those acts lawfully, unless the

Church permits, for the power of Orders should not be used by an

inferior except as permitted by the superior.

(b) The power of jurisdiction may be lost through schism, for that

power depends on a commission received from a superior, which may be

withdrawn by him. Hence, a schismatical priest deprived of jurisdiction

could not absolve, excommunicate, grant indulgences, or perform other

acts that pertain to the power of jurisdiction.

1375. The law of the church on the powers of schismatics is as follows:

(a) All schismatics incur _ipso facto_ excommunication, as well as

various inhabilities and penalties (Canon 2314). It is fitting that

those who separate themselves should be declared outside the communion

of the faithful, and this is what Moses commanded to be done at the

time of the schism of Core: “Depart from the tent of these wicked men

and touch nothing of theirs, lest you be involved in their sin” (Num.,

xvi. 26).

(b) The excommunicated are forbidden the celebration of Mass and the

active use and administration of the Sacraments and sacramentals,

except when the faithful apply to them or when there is danger of

death, as declared in Canon 2261.

(c) The excommunicated are denied the power of jurisdiction except in

certain cases where the Church grants it for the sake of the common

good. Thus, they may give absolution in danger of death (Canon 882), or

in common error (Canon 209), or at request, if they are not _vitandi_

or sentenced (Canon 2261). It is the teaching of learned authorities

that the Roman Church for the good of souls has allowed ecclesiastical

jurisdiction to remain in the schismatic Oriental Churches for the

conferring of the Sacraments.

1376. War.--War is defined as a state of conflict between two or more

sovereign nations carried on by force of arms.

(a) It is a state of conflict, and so differs from passing conflicts,

such as battles, skirmishes, campaigns. The enemy in war is not only

those with whom one is actually fighting, but all those who side with

them, as counsellors, helpers, etc.

(b) War is between sovereign nations, and so differs from civil war,

sedition, riots, duels. Moreover, war is made by nation against nation,

not against particular individuals or groups of individuals within a

nation.

(c) It is carried on by force of arms, and so differs from trade war,

rivalry in preparedness for war, embargo, blockade, breach of

diplomatic relations, etc.

1377. There are two kinds of war, just and unjust. (a) War is just when

undertaken for a right cause (e.g., the independence of the nation);

(b) it is unjust when undertaken for a wrong cause (e.g., the

enslavement of a nation).

1378. Just war is either offensive or defensive. (a) Offensive war is

attack made on an enemy in order to avenge an injury or enforce a right

(e.g., invasion of the enemy’s territory to obtain compensation for

damages inflicted by him); (b) defensive war is resistance to unjust

attack made or menaced by an enemy (e.g., war made on the invader of

one’s country).

1379. Just war is called defensive in two senses. (a) In the strict

sense, it is defensive when the nation whose rights are unjustly

attacked does not initiate hostilities, that is, does not declare or

begin the war. (b) In a less strict sense, it is defensive when the

nation unjustly attacked declares war or strikes the first blow. Thus,

if the innocent nation knew that the enemy was secretly preparing war

against its independence, it would be on the defensive, even though it

declared war.

1380. War is not against the law of God. (a) Under the law of nature

Melchisedech blessed Abraham returning from victory over the four kings

(Gen., xiv. 18-20). (b) Under the written law, God many times ordered

or approved of war, as can be seen from Exodus and following books in

numerous places. (c) Under the New Law, John the Baptist acknowledged

the lawfulness of the soldier’s profession (Luke, iii. 14), a centurion

was praised by Christ (Matt, viii. 10), Acts, x. 2, speaks of the

officer Cornelius as a religious man, and St. Paul lauds warriors of

the Old Testament such as Gedeon, Barac, Samson, etc. (Heb, xi. 32-34).

Our Lord Himself used physical force against evildoers (John, ii. 14

sqq.).

1381. Certain sayings of our Lord--for example, that those who take the

sword shall perish by the sword (Matt, xxvi. 52), and that one should

not resist evil (Matt, v. 39)--are not an endorsement of extreme

pacifism, but are respectively a condemnation of those who without due

authority have recourse to violence, and a counsel of perfection, when

this serves better the honor of God or the good of the neighbor.

Moreover, these words of Christ were addressed, not to states, which

are responsible for the welfare of their members, but to individuals.

The Quakers have done excellent service for the cause of world peace,

but their teaching that all war is contrary to the law of Christ cannot

be admitted. The spirit of the Gospel includes justice as well as love.

1382. War is not against the law of the Church. (a) The Church has

never condemned war as such. She has always labored for the promotion

of peace or for the lessening of the evils of wars that could not be

prevented; but her official declarations and the writings of the

Fathers and Doctors show that she recognized that recourse to arms by

nations is not necessarily sinful. (b) The Church has put her approval

on some wars as necessary and laudable. Thus, the Crusades, to which

the salvation of Christian civilization is due, were promoted by the

Church; military orders for the defense of the Holy Sepulchre were

instituted by her, and she has raised to the honors of the altar

soldiers like Sebastian, Maurice, and Martin of Tours.

1383. War is not against the law of nature. (a) As the law of nature

allows even a private individual to use force to drive off an unjust

aggressor, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to have recourse to

defensive war when its rights are invaded. (b) As the law of nature

allows the individual to seek satisfaction for injury and restitution

for loss, it cannot be unlawful for a nation to make offensive war when

another nation will not make reparation, unless compelled to it by

force. If physical coercion were unlawful, a conscienceless nation

would take advantage of this at the expense of other nations, and thus

a premium would be set on iniquity.

1384. Like every other act, war is not morally good, unless its object,

its purpose and its circumstances are in accord with right. War is not

lawful, therefore, unless the three following conditions exist:

(a) Hostilities must be authorized by the public authority, for the

care of the State against internal and external disturbances has been

committed to the ruler (Rom., xii. 4; Ps. lxxxi. 4), and the individual

or the subject state can have recourse for protection of its rights to

the higher authority.

(b) There must be a just cause for war, that is, some fault on the side

of the other nation; for, if a nation may not use force against its own

subjects without sufficient reason, much less may it do so against

those who are not its subjects.

(c) There must be a right intention, that is, the desire to obtain some

good or to ward off some evil. Even if war is declared by the proper

authority and there is a sufficient reason for it, those who take part

in the war are guilty of sin if they have evil motives, such as the

exercise of cruelty, revenge, pride, or avarice. To delight in war

because one loves excitement or wishes to show one’s skill or get

promotion, is not a right frame of mind.

1385. What public authority has the right to declare war? (a)

Ordinarily, only the sovereign power--that is, the person or body in

whom the chief authority is vested according to the constitution of the

nation--can make war. War is an act of the nation, and hence only the

authority that represents the nation can make war. Subordinate bodies

in a confederation or union of states have the right to make war, if

custom or law allows it.

(b) In extraordinary circumstances, an inferior power can authorize

war, as when war is necessary and it is impossible to await a

declaration from the sovereign power. Thus, if a province were suddenly

invaded, it would be lawful for the head of the province to make war on

the invaders at once. It seems, indeed, that the head of a province

could justly authorize the invasion of a neighboring state, to protect

such province against aggressions, if the central authority would do

nothing; for such a war would be really defensive.

1386. In order that the cause of war be just, it is necessary that the

enemy nation has done or now menaces an injury which cannot be repaired

without war, and which is so serious that the evils of war are less

than that of toleration.

(a) Thus, a serious injury or grave dishonor inflicted by another

nation is the only just cause for the armed conflict which constitutes

war, for war is exercised as a punishment or a compulsion, and these

are unjust if no grave and formal fault is supposed.

(b) Only an injury that cannot be otherwise repaired is a just cause

for war, because a state has no right to use force against another

sovereign state except as a last resort. Hence, if the country at fault

has already made satisfaction or has promised to make satisfaction, war

should not be declared.

(c) Only an injury so grave that it outweighs the risks and losses of

war is a justification for making war, for when two effects, one good

and one evil, follow from an act, there must be a proportionately grave

reason for permitting the evil effect before acting (see 104, 105). It

would be wrong to avenge some small insult or some isolated injury at

the expense of immense treasure and enormous loss of life. Modern

warfare is so devastating that only the gravest reasons known to

society can authorize it. For, according to scientists, a single H-bomb

may cause death and destruction over a wide area, perhaps the space of

a hundred square miles. In view of the havoc which is foreseen to

outweigh the benefits of victory, it could happen that a nation with

justice on its side and the potential to wage war would nevertheless

not be justified in waging war (see 1410). This destructive power of

modern weapons, however, need not imply a sweeping condemnation of all

warfare. Spiritual values, e.g., freedom from tyranny, freedom to

worship God, still hold primacy over material values and can be deemed

so precious as to outweigh the great loss of lives and property

involved in defending them or recovering them through modern warfare.

“A people menaced by, or already victims of unjust aggression, if it

desires to think and to act in a Christian manner, cannot remain in

passive indifference” (Pope Pius XII, Christmas Message of 1948).

1387. In comparing the advantages and disadvantages of war, one should

take into consideration, not only the losses oneself will suffer, but

also the losses that will be suffered by others. (a) Thus, if the enemy

nation will be ruined as the price of one’s obtaining some small right,

charity would urge that one abstain from war. (b) If the world in

general or posterity will suffer greater evils materially or

spiritually than a nation is now suffering from the denial of some

non-essential right, charity at least should rule out a declaration of

war.

1388. Is there a just reason for war, when a fault has been committed

on both sides? (a) If the injuries are about equal and still in being,

there is no reason for war, for neither nation is in a position to

accuse the other of injustice. (b) If the injuries are quite unequal or

one nation has shown a willingness to cease from injury, the less

guilty nation has a right to make war; but it should first clear itself

of injustice, before it proceeds to chastise injustice in the other.

1389. Sufficient causes for making war are: (a) grave injury to the

honor of a nation, such as insult to its ruler or ambassadors (II

Kings, x.); (b) injury to the natural right of the nation to existence,

self-preservation, property, free action within its own sphere; thus, a

people may make war to defend their independence (I Mach., iii. 59), to

recover territory taken from them unjustly, to resist a violation of

neutrality (II Kings, viii. 5), to protect their own citizens and

commerce; (c) injury to the rights of the nation under positive law.

Thus, a nation may make war to uphold important international

agreements, to enforce the observance of treaties, and the like.

1390. Injury done to a third nation or to the subjects of a third

nation may also be a sufficient reason for war. (a) Thus, out of

justice, a nation is obliged to help its allies in a just war; for to

help those with whose interests one’s own interests are involved is

only self-defense. (b) Out of charity, a nation that has the right of

intervention may lawfully go to war to protect a weaker nation against

a stronger and bullying nation, to assist a government unjustly

attacked by its subjects, or to help innocent subjects who are

tyrannized over by their government.

1391. Is it lawful to go to war over religion or morality?

(a) Error in the religion or immorality in the practices of another

people is not a sufficient reason for making war on them. No one can be

forced to believe, says St. Augustine; and it is likewise true that no

one can be forced to love virtue, whereas external conformity without

conviction or love is hypocritical. Moreover, a nation has no authority

to correct the sins of those not subject to it. Hence, it would not be

right to attack a people for the sole reason that it was pagan or

polygamous.

(b) Interference, however, with the religious rights of others or

sinful practices that are injurious to others are a sufficient reason

for war. No war ever had a more legitimate cause than the Crusades,

which were undertaken to defend the Christian religion against the

unspeakable atrocities of infidels. The cause of humanity justifies a

war to put an end to such evils as cannibalism or human sacrifice.

1392. Is it lawful to make war on another nation in order to bring to

it the benefits of modern civilization? (a) If the uncivilized nation

lacks a government and suffers from disorder, it is an act of charity

for a civilized nation to set up a government there which will act for

the benefit of the people of the country. It is also lawful to make war

on those who resist the government thus established. (b) If the

uncivilized nation has its own orderly form of government and is at

peace, no other nation has the right to interfere under pretext of

introducing a higher type of government. Colonial expansion is not a

sufficient reason for war in such circumstances.

1393. The following causes for war are not sufficient:

(a) Motives clearly sinful are such as do not suppose any injury done

by the other nation, but rather some evil passion of pride, greed,

jealousy, suspicion, or selfishness on one’s own side. Hence, it is not

lawful to go to war for the glory of a ruler or of the nation, for the

enlargement of one’s territory, for the advantage that may be gained

over a commercial rival, for the preservation of the balance of power,

or for the prevention of difficulties at home.

(b) Motives apparently just, but really sinful, are injuries done by

another, if one has secretly provoked them in order to have a pretext

for war. It is not right to make war on a people because of attacks

made by their citizens, if these attacks were purposely caused by one’s

own citizens.

(c) Motives of displeasure with another nation are not sufficient as

motives for war, if the other nation has violated no right of justice,

but only acted in a way not consonant with charity or friendship. Thus,

the fact that one nation denies another financial assistance or the

tariff advantages granted to a third nation is not a _casus belli_; for

in matters of benevolence or privilege there is no strict claim or

title, and hence no right to have recourse to arms.

1394. Is war lawful when the justice of the cause is doubtful? (a) The

government may not declare war, unless it is morally certain that right

is on its side. The consequences of war are so dreadful, and the use of

force against another nation is such an extreme measure, that one

should refrain from hostilities as long as one’s moral right is

uncertain.

(b) Volunteers not already enlisted may not offer their services to a

belligerent, unless they are morally certain that his cause is just.

They participate in war from choice, and they should assure themselves

that their choice is correct.

(c) Subjects called to the colors should fight for their country, even

if they are in doubt about the justice of the cause, for the

presumption is on the side of the government. This does not mean,

however, that one should be willing to fight for one’s country, right

or wrong. nor that one would be obliged to fight for a cause manifestly

unjust, or to obey an order flagrantly wrong.

1395. What is the meaning of “moral certitude” in the previous

paragraph? (a) Some moralists believe that a high degree of probability

of the righteousness of his cause suffices in order that a ruler may

take steps towards war. (b) The greater number of moralists, however,

hold that no degree of probability suffices. The justifying reasons

must be clearer than day, and the state which goes to war must not

entertain a single doubt that its cause is right. This opinion we

prefer; for, if a jury may not sentence an accused to death as long as

there is a reasonable doubt of his innocence, neither ought a nation to

pass what is really a death sentence on hundreds or thousands of

citizens as long as there exists a doubt of a compelling reason for

such a course. It should, however, be observed that a ruler who has

only probable evidence that an injury has been done already, may have

certainty that it will be done, if it is not prevented by war.

1396. Is it possible that the cause of war should be just on both

sides? (a) Materially or objectively, the cause of war is just only on

one side, for, if one nation has the right to demand satisfaction or

restitution, manifestly the other nation has no right to refuse or

resist. (b) Formally or subjectively, the cause of war is just only on

one side, if the facts and obligations are known to both disputants,

for the nation that knows the right of the other side and yet opposes

it, does not act in good faith. (c) Formally or subjectively, the cause

of war is just on both sides, if the nation that is objectively in the

wrong is subjectively persuaded that it is in the right. And, even

though a government is in bad faith, its people as a rule will be in

good faith as a result of not understanding the facts or merits of the

controversy.

1397. It is possible that there should be objective justice and

injustice on the same side. (a) Thus, the side which is just as regards

the cause of the war, may be unjust in its conduct of the war on

account of the unlawful means it employs to win, or its continuation of

a hopeless struggle. (b) The side which was just as regards the

original cause of the war, may be unjust as regards a new cause that

appears. Thus, a nation which goes to war to regain a lost territory,

but which continues to fight for the sake of conquest after the

legitimate end has been achieved, contends for a just cause at the

beginning, but for an unjust cause later on. (c) The side whose grounds

are justifiable from the immediate point of view may be in the wrong if

causes are traced farther back.

1398. What are the duties before the beginning of war, according to

natural law?

(a) Examination of the Cause of War.--It is clear that those charged

with the declaration of war are bound to examine diligently and

prayerfully into the dispute, weighing the reasons on both sides, and

asking light from on high. To this end they should seek the counsel,

not of a few, but of many--not merely among those who are experts in

the diplomatic, legal, economic, and military aspects of the question,

but also among those who will look at the matter from its ethical side

and who are guided by fairness and justice. Since it is the people who

have to bear the burdens of war, it seems that many wars in the past

would have been prevented, had the wishes of the people been consulted.

(b) Judgment about the Merits of the Controversy.--It is also clear

that those who have to decide for war or peace should be impartial in

their judgment. Hence, they have to be on their guard against jingoism,

yellow journalism, and war interests, as well as against the pacifist

or the favorer of a foreign country at the expense of his own. They

should not proceed to offensive war, if their cause remains doubtful,

unless the other side provokes war by refusing peaceful settlement;

but, if they are in possession, they have the right to make defensive

war.

(c) Judgment about the Feasibility of War.--Prudence demands that, even

when a nation is convinced that it has a just cause to make war, it

should nevertheless refrain from this, unless it has a well-grounded

expectation that war will improve matters (Luke, xiv. 31, 32).

Statesmen who plunge their people into adventures whose end they cannot

at all foresee, are criminals.

(d) Efforts at Peaceful Solution.--Even if the cause is just and the

war feasible, hostilities should not be resorted to except as a last

means. Hence, pacific means--such as direct negotiation, mediation,

arbitration, judicial settlement, or pressure through trade embargoes,

boycotts, breach of diplomatic intercourse, etc.--should be tried in

the first place.

1399. The Chief Duties before Beginning War, According to International

Law.--(a) Before war is declared, an ultimatum should be issued to the

other nation, offering it final terms and a last opportunity to make

apology or satisfaction. (b) Foreigners who are in one’s territory

should be given an opportunity to settle their affairs and leave the

country within a reasonable time. (c) Ambassadors and other

representatives of the enemy should be provided with passports.

1400. In itself, as said above (see 1380 sqq.), war is not unlawful.

But in the light of the conditions required for a just war and of

circumstances as they are today, can war at the present time be ever

justifiable? (a) If the supreme interests of a nation are at stake

(such as its independence, the policies or interests vital to its

existence, its obligations under covenant or treaty of peace), war can

still be lawful today, for a nation cannot surrender its right to

self-defense, or betray its solemn engagements of cooperative defense.

(b) If less than supreme interests are at stake, war today seems

unjustifiable, for what proportion is there between the minor interests

of a single or several nations and the enormous destruction of modern

war and the dislocation of international security? Efforts of statesmen

to secure a world pact, outlawing or renouncing war as a means of

national policy, indicates progress for this view.

1401. What are the duties during war? (a) One should use every lawful

means, according to one’s position, to secure victory for one’s

country. Fighting to gain only a “stalemate,” in itself, is immoral.

(b) One should avoid such means as are opposed to natural or

international law.

1402. It is not true that all is fair in war, for even a just cause

cannot sanction unjust means. The commandments of God and the laws of

nations retain their force even amid the clash of arms. Examples of

acts of war that are unlawful, as being opposed to the natural law are

the following: (a) acts of irreligion, such as wanton destruction of

churches or monasteries; (b) attempts to seduce enemy soldiers from the

obedience or loyalty owed their commanders; (c) murder, that is, the

direct killing of innocent and unarmed persons, as when one refuses

quarter to soldiers who wish to surrender, fires on an officer bearing

a flag of truce, sinks passenger ships not engaged on errands of war,

massacres the civil population by raids from the air, places a

defenceless population at the mercy of savages or criminals employed as

soldiers; (d) the dishonoring of women, the establishment of brothels

for soldiers; (e) stealing, such as the unauthorized pillage of a town

or countryside; (f) lying, such as breaking treaties, not keeping faith

with the foe, entering into perjured agreements, circulating false

stories of atrocities, forging of documents, etc.

1403. Just war is resistance to unjust aggression, and so the same

means are lawful in warfare as are lawful in private aggression. (a)

Thus, the means used against an aggressor must not be evil in

themselves, as when a person protects himself against a murderer by

making an innocent person a shield. Hence, in war one may not use any

means that is opposed to the law of God, or to human contracts or other

obligations. (b) The means employed must be such as are really

necessary for overpowering the aggressor. Thus, it is not lawful to

kill a burglar when wounding him will suffice for the protection of

one’s property. Likewise, in war it is not lawful to exterminate or

depopulate an enemy, if the end of war can be attained by depriving the

enemy of his weapons.

1404. The principal classes of acts of war from the moral standpoint

are: (a) acts in which violence is done to things connected with

religion; (b) acts of violence against persons; (c) acts of violence

against property; (d) acts used to conceal truth.

1405. Acts of War and Sacred Times.--(a) It is lawful to carry on

warfare, offensively or defensively, on feasts, when this is necessary,

just as it is lawful to do servile work on those days in case of

necessity (I Mach., ii. 41; John, vii. 23). (b) But if a suspension of

hostilities can be arranged for feast days (especially for the greater

ones, such as Christmas and Easter), warfare should be discontinued at

those times.

1406. Acts of War and Sacred Places.--(a) It is lawful to attack a

church building, if it is certainly being used for military purposes.

It is also lawful to attack fortifications, and thus unintentionally to

harm adjacent church buildings. (b) It is not lawful, apart from these

reasons of real military necessity, to injure sacred places or edifices.

1407. Acts of War and Sacred Persons.--(a) It is lawful for clerics to

cooperate in a just war in spiritual ways, as by exhortations, prayers,

and religious ministrations. Moses prayed for the armies of Israel

during battle (Exod., xvii. 8 sqq.), the priests accompanied Josue

around the wall of Jericho (Jos., vi. 4), and St. Bernard and other

holy men preached crusades. (b) It is not lawful, apart from necessity

(as in case of conscription), for clerics to take part in actual

fighting. Warfare is unbecoming in a cleric, because he is enrolled for

a spiritual warfare (II Tim., ii. 4), and because his leader, Christ,

shed His own blood, not that of others (Matt, xxvi. 52). Hence, the

Church forbids clerics to volunteer as soldiers (Canon 141).

1408. The persons to whom violence is done during war are: (a)

Combatants, that is, all those who are engaged in the actual promotion

of the war. Direct combatants are the fighters, such as the officers

and privates of army, navy, and air force; indirect combatants are the

unarmed auxiliaries of the soldiers in military ways, such as makers of

munition, transporters of supplies, and those in the communication

service. (b) Non-combatants are enemy subjects who are neither fighters

nor auxiliaries of the armed forces, such as chaplains and members of

the medical service in the army, persons in civil life and occupation,

old men, women, and children. (c) Neutrals are those who are not

subject to either of the warring contenders, and who take no part in

the hostilities, although they may sympathize with one side.

1409. The Killing or Wounding of Enemy Combatants.--(a) According to

natural law, it is lawful to kill or wound the enemy in battle, or to

starve him by blockade, just as it is lawful in self-defense to kill or

wound an unjust aggressor. (b) According to international law, it was

expressly forbidden to attack in ways that make war more cruel without

hastening the decision.

1410. The Killing or Wounding of Non-Combatants.--(a) The indirect

killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is unintentional and

unavoidable) is lawful, according to the rules given for double effect

(see 103, 104). Hence, it is lawful to bombard the fortifications,

arsenals, munition works, and barracks of a town, to sink passenger

liners that are carrying arms or stores to the enemy, to cut off food

supplies from a town or country in order to starve out its troops,

although these measures will entail the deaths of some civilians as

well as of combatants. Humanity requires, however, that an effort be

made to spare the non-combatants, when possible, as by serving warning

of attack, so that they may be removed to safety. When it is a

question, however, of the use of modern weapons (the atom, hydrogen or

cobalt bombs) on military targets in the vicinity of large cities,

where it is foreseen that many thousands of civilians will be killed or

severely wounded, then the principle of double effect seems to rule out

the lawfulness of using such devastating weapons. The immediate evil

effect, the slaughter of the innocents, could hardly be called

incidental and only reluctantly permitted. Concretely, the inevitable

results of the use of such weapons would have to be intended directly,

if not as an end, at least as a means.

(b) The direct killing of non-combatants (i.e., killing which is

intentional) is unlawful and constitutes the sin of murder.

Obliteration bombing, the dropping of H-bombs or atom bombs on a

residential section of a city containing no military objectives, are of

this character; for they are attacks on civilians. It can not be argued

that such an attack would probably break down the morale of the

citizens to such an extent that they would force their rulers to make

peace and so save many thousands of lives. For this argument is based

on the principle that a good end justifies evil means.

Occasionally it is argued that modern “total” warfare demands that all

citizens contribute to the war effort and that consequently everyone is

a combatant. The argument can hardly be sustained, for Catholic

doctrine insists that those whose participation is only remote and

accidental are not to be classified as combatants. In a well-documented

article on “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing,” by John C. Ford,

S.J. (_Theological Studies_, V, 1944, pp. 261-309), the validity of the

distinction between combatants and innocent non-combatants, even in the

condition of modern war, is upheld. Fr. Ford shows that in an

industrial city, as found in the United States, three-fourths of the

population belong to the non-combatant category, and he lists more than

a hundred trades or professions which, according to the natural law,

exclude their members from the category of combatants. Direct attacks

on such a population clearly would constitute unjustifiable killing or

wounding of non-combatants.

1411. The Sentence of Death for Military Crimes.--(a) It is lawful to

sentence to death persons guilty of international crime, such as those

who approach when warned to halt, civilians who fire on the troops,

guerrillas, pirates, spies and deserters. (b) It is not lawful to

sentence to death persons not guilty of international crime. Thus, a

private soldier should not be executed because under orders he killed a

non-combatant; a hostage, not guilty of any capital crime, should not

be put to death, because his fellow-citizens for whom he is held rebel

or break faith.

1412. Imprisonment and Restraint.--(a) Combatants may be made prisoners

of war, non-combatants are subject to the restrictions of military

rules when their territory is occupied, and in very exceptional cases

they may be transported behind their enemy’s lines. (b) Prisoners of

war and inhabitants of occupied territory are to be treated as human

beings, but not better than the soldiers of one’s own army. They may

not be reduced to slavery, held as hostages, tortured or starved to

death, or placed in front trenches as a shield to one’s own forces.

1413. The Destruction or Seizure of Property During War.--(a) The

military property of the enemy nation or of its subjects may be

confiscated or destroyed, just as an individual has the right to

destroy the weapon of an unjust aggressor. Hence, a commander may

demolish fortifications, war factories, airships, warships, weapons and

artillery; he may cut off or seize supplies and provisions of money,

food or drink.

(b) The public, non-military property of the enemy may be occupied by a

successful invader. He may appropriate movable goods (works of art and

some others are excepted by international law), and he may use

immovable goods (public places of worship, museums, etc., are excepted

by law).

(c) As to private property of enemy subjects on land, international law

requires that immovables generally be respected, and movables can be

seized only for some necessary purpose of war. Requisitions and

contributions may be exacted and soldiers may be billeted in the homes

of citizens, but only so much may be levied as is needed for army

maintenance and civil administration, and compensation must be made, or

a receipt be given for future compensation. War is made, not against

private persons, but against the state.

(d) As to private property on sea, the usage has been that the merchant

ships of the enemy may be captured and made a lawful prize.

(e) The property of neutrals on land must not be molested, unless it is

not really neutral, as when it is being used by the enemy. As regards

the ships and shipping of neutrals on the high seas, they are not up to

the present protected by international agreement. Rather the naval

powers are divided between the theories of command of the seas and

freedom of the seas. Thus, Great Britain claims the right to search,

seize and hold the vessels or cargoes of neutrals who carry contraband

or attempt to trade with the enemy in the face of a blockade.

1414. It is an axiom that booty taken in war belongs, not to the

private soldiers, but to their government. Hence, the question arises:

Are private soldiers, who take the goods of citizens without

authorization from their officers, bound to make restitution? (a) If

they take what is necessary for their own sustenance, they act against

military discipline, but not against justice, and are not bound to

restore. (b) If they take other things, they are bound to restore,

since international agreements make this a duty of justice. But, if

neither of the belligerents observed this agreement, the obligation of

restitution cannot be insisted on as grave.

1415. Is it lawful to give over a city to be looted by the soldiery?

(a) In ancient times, this was sometimes permissible, as when

compensation and victory in a just war was otherwise impossible. (b) In

modern times and according to present international law, looting is

strictly forbidden. Violation of agreements by city heads gives no

right to attack the property of the citizens who are not responsible,

and valiant defense of the city by its troops does not forfeit the

rights of the inhabitants to their goods.

1416. Stratagems in War.--(a) It is lawful to use various artifices for

concealing one’s plans from the enemy, such as camouflage, smoke

screens, censored reports of engagements, etc. Thus, Josue by command

of the Lord prepared an ambush for the citizens of Hai (Jos., viii. 2).

(b) It is lawful also to conceal one’s identity by wearing the uniforms

of the enemy in order to obtain information about his plans. The Lord

commanded Moses to send out men to spy on the land of Chanaan (Num.,

xiii. 1). While it is not lawful to tell or signify untruth, it is

lawful to conceal the truth from those who have no right to know it.

1417. Reprisals are acts of retaliation by which one replies to

unlawful aggressions of the enemy by equivalent aggressions against

him. Their morality depends on circumstances. (a) Thus, if the act of

the enemy is opposed only to international law, it is not unlawful to

use the same act against him, for, since he has broken faith, the

treaty obligation no longer binds the other side. For example, if the

enemy, contrary to agreement, uses poison gas in warfare, it is lawful

to use poison gas against him. Reprisals should not be made, however,

without authorization from the proper authority. (b) If the act of the

enemy is opposed to natural law, it is not permissible to retaliate by

the same kind of acts. Two wrongs do not make a right. But one may

retaliate in lawful ways, or else issue a protest and await

compensation at the conclusion of the war. Thus, if the enemy murders

the civil population, this does not justify one in murdering enemy

citizens who are in one’s power.

1418. Duties of the Nation Victorious in War.--(a) The victorious

nation must not prolong the war after victory has been gained, or after

the enemy has sued in good faith for peace or armistice. (b) It must

not exact from the defeated foe more than it has a just right to.

1419. The Rights of the Victor.--(a) If the cause of the victorious

nation was unjust, its victory gives it no claim, for might does not

make right. On the contrary, it may be obliged to make restitution to

the defeated nation for the losses it has suffered. (b) If the cause of

the victor was just, the victorious nation has a claim to three things:

(i) to the satisfaction or restitution for the sake of which the war

was undertaken; (ii) to compensation for damages caused by the enemy

during the war, and (iii) to guarantees against a recurrence of the

former injury. Supervision of peace treaties by an impartial tribunal

has much to recommend it, since victors are prone to disregard charity

and justice when treating with a conquered foe, and to extort from him

forced agreements.

1420. The Obligation of a Victor Whose Cause was Unjust.--(a) If the

victorious nation fought in good faith, and only later perceived the

injustice of its cause, it is bound to restore only those things which

it has not consumed, and which make it better off than it was before

the war. (b) If it fought in bad faith, it should restore all. Victory

does not prove that one was right, but only that one was stronger. It

does not make a bad cause good.

1421. The Obligation of a Victor Who Fought Without Due Authorization,

or with a Wrong Purpose.--(a) Soldiers who inflict damage on the enemy

against the orders of the commanders (e.g., by burning dwellings,

robbing private citizens, murdering, etc.), are obliged to restitution

for those injuries, for such acts are not war, but brigandage. (b)

Soldiers who fight with a wrong motive (e.g., out of hatred), are not

obliged to restitution, since they have not committed injustice; for

similarly a judge, who sentences a convicted criminal, sins if his

motive is hate, but he is not held to restitution.

1422. What Indemnity may be Imposed on the Vanquished?--(a) According

to justice, one may exact compensation for the losses and expenses one

has sustained on account of war, since the enemy is responsible for

these. (b) According to charity, one may be obliged to relinquish part

of what is owed, or to grant easier terms of payment, or to cancel a

debt, as when the enemy is greatly impoverished, or cannot easily pay

at present.

1423. In cases of doubt, as when counter claims are made and neither

party is entirely victorious, or when a vanquished nation denies its

ability to pay what is demanded, recourse may be had to other ways of

settlement. (a) Thus, in the former case a compromise or mutual

condonation of claims, especially if both sides are exhausted by the

war, seems the reasonable solution. (b) In the latter case submission

to an impartial tribunal of arbitration would benefit the victors as

well as the vanquished, since in the long run it is not to the

advantage of the former that the latter be deprived of its goods and

productivity.

1424. Guarantees for the Future.--(a) One may insist on such guarantees

as will insure against a probable renewal of the offense committed by

the conquered nation. Hence, one may require that it destroy or deliver

over fortifications and munition plants, sink warships, reduce its

military force, punish certain individuals, or depose certain rulers.

(b) One may not insist on such guarantees as will make a renewal of war

by the enemy, now or in the future, absolutely impossible. As said

above, a nation has the right to go to war to defend itself against

aggression, but it has no right to work at destroying equality or

competition on the part of other nations. Hence, it is not lawful to

demand that the conquered nation surrender its independence or the

management of its affairs, or that one be allowed to annex all the

territory taken during war, if one’s rights or reasonable security does

not require these conditions. Subjugation or temporary occupation are

lawful, however, if there is no other way of obtaining redress or

securities.

1425. Punishment of Enemy Soldiers for Crimes Committed during

War.--(a) Special crimes committed during war (e.g., massacres of

non-combatants) may be punished, but the punishment should be visited

on those responsible, not on those who merely executed orders. (b) The

crime of the war itself should not be revenged on private soldiers, for

it is unjust to punish subjects for the madness of their officers and

rulers. As to the latter, moral guilt is not easily established. The

Nurenberg trials held commanders and high officers responsible for

crimes against humanity, and not without precedent.

1426. Preparation for Future Wars.--(a) Reasonable preparedness is not

only lawful, but a duty of the state to its own people. A nation should

have such a military establishment or such alliances as will safeguard

its right against probable attack. (b) Unreasonable preparedness is

unlawful since it burdens the people and prepares the way for war.

Examples of unreasonable preparations: maintenance of an army or navy

far in excess of those nations of similar rank; oppressive military

expenses or burdens; maneuvers offensive to other governments or too

dangerous for the troops engaged; ruinous competition in armaments.

1427. Preparation for peace or against war is a duty no less obligatory

than preparation for defensive war. Two chief ways of preparing for

peace: (a) will for peace; (b) work for peace.

(a) The will for peace is promoted when the nations educate their

people to a realization of the brotherhood of man, of the wrongfulness

and folly of a narrow nationalism, of the sinfulness of war which has

not all the conditions of a just war in its favor. Without the will for

peace, conferences and treaties will effect little.

(b) Work for peace is done by all who give their service to practical

plans for the prevention of war and the preservation of lasting world

amity. Among these plans are agreements among nations to substitute

moral right for material force, to abolish conscription and armaments,

to establish international tribunals, associations and world courts, to

make arbitration of disputes among themselves compulsory, to codify

international law. History bears witness to the many and great services

to humanity which the Popes have rendered by acting as arbiters between

nations that were on the point of war. If jealousies prevent agreement

among governments, the peoples of the world should nevertheless

continue to work for peace and by constitutional means make their

wishes prevail among the governments. With the Church we should pray:

“From pestilence, famine and war, deliver us, O Lord.”

1428. Fighting.--Fighting is an angry conflict between two or more

persons carried on by means of physical violence.

(a) Thus, it is an angry conflict, and so differs from contests of

strength or skill made for the sake of sport, amusement, recreation,

health, exercise and training. Hence, wrestling and boxing matches,

football games, fencing and similar athletic contests, in which fair

play and a sportsmanlike spirit prevail, are not fighting as here

understood. Similarly, the tournaments of the medieval knights were

sports or spectacles, rather than fights.

(b) It is a conflict, and so differs from punishment inflicted by

lawful authority, as when a police officer uses his club to prevent a

crime, a parent or teacher chastises insubordinate children, or a sober

man scuffles with an inebriate to take away his flask or with a lunatic

to deprive him of a weapon.

(c) It is a conflict between two or more individuals, and so differs

from war and sedition, which are conflicts between nations or parts of

a multitude.

(d) It is conducted by means of physical violence, that is by the

infliction of bodily injuries or harm. Thus, fighting differs from

quarreling, which is a dispute in words. It makes no difference whether

the attack be made by fists, fingernails or teeth, or by weapons or

missiles, or whether the bodily harm be direct (e.g., a blackened eye)

or indirect (e.g., a hat knocked off the head).

1429. Kinds of Fighting.--(a) As to its origin, fighting is provoked or

unprovoked, according as one who fights is attacking another or

defending himself against attack. (b) As to its manner, it is an

ordinary fight or a duel, according as it takes place without or with

previous arrangement and stipulated conditions. (c) As to its eject,

the civil law distinguishes between assault and battery. Assault is a

show of violence against the person of another, as when one lifts one’s

fist or cane in a threatening manner to put another in fear of bodily

harm. Battery is the actual infliction of personal violence, as when

one strikes, pushes, scratches, bites, or spits on another.

1430. The Sinfulness of Fighting.--(a) Unprovoked fighting is from its

nature a mortal sin. It is classed among the works of the flesh that

exclude from the kingdom of heaven (Gal, v. 20, 21), and it is

essentially opposed to the charity owed to a neighbor. It is frequently

only a venial sin, either because the act is not entirely deliberate,

as when one fights in sudden anger, or because the violence is of a

trifling kind, as when school-children pull one another’s hair or throw

snowballs.

(b) Fighting under provocation is no sin at all, when one intends only

to defend one’s rights and does not go beyond what is necessary for

lawful defence, as when one struggles with a burglar who is trying to

enter one’s house, and pushes him through the door. It is a venial sin,

when the person who is resisting aggression acts with some slight

degree of hate or revengefulness, or inflicts a little more injury than

is really necessary. It is a mortal sin, when the person who was

attacked fights in a spirit of hate and revenge, or deliberately and

needlessly seeks to kill or seriously maim the adversary.

1431. Causes of Fighting.--The remedy of sinful fighting is the removal

of its causes. The sources of fighting are proximate and remote.

(a) The immediate cause is anger. The angry man provokes fights (Prov.,

xv. 18, xxix. 22), for anger, being a desire of revenge, is not content

to injure another secretly, but wishes to punish him--that is, to

injure him in such a Way that he will know he is being punished and

will feel grief on that account. Anger also blinds one to the

foolishness of one’s actions, and so leads one precipitately into

quarrels and fights (Prov., xviii. 6).

(b) The remote cause of fighting is an inordinate desire of temporal

things, such as wealth, power, ease: “Why are there wars and disputes

among you? Is it not because of the desires that war among your

members?” (James, iv. 1). Those who are overmuch concerned with their

own interests, easily take offense at what they consider slights or

insults or opposition, their rage bursts forth, and they proceed at

once to visit revenge on those at whom they are offended. It was greed

and envy that caused the herdsmen of Palestine to fill up the wells dug

by Isaac and to fight with his servants for possession (Gen., xxvi. 14

sqq.).

1432. Hatred and Fighting.--(a) Hatred is not necessarily a cause of

fighting. The hater wishes evil to his neighbor, not as punishment, but

absolutely; his passion is calmer, more lasting, and more insatiable

than that of the angry man. If it suits him, he will bide his time

patiently, pretending friendship, but all the while plotting ruin to

the one he hates. (b) Hatred at times does bring on fighting, for, if

the hater sees that he can safely attack openly, he will use quarreling

and fighting as a means to his purpose.

1433. Occasions that Frequently Bring On Fighting.--(a) Boasting about

self or depreciation of others in the presence of persons who will take

offense occasions fights, for “he that boasteth and puffeth himself up

stirreth up quarrels” (Prov., xxviii. 25). Thus, disputes over the

respective merits of nations or political parties often bring on bloody

encounters. (b) Drunkenness occasions fights, for it so stupefies the

mind that one minimizes one’s danger and exaggerates one’s own

strength, and so is emboldened to attack others (Prov., xxiii. 29, 30).

1434. Evil Consequences of Fighting.--(a) Charity is wounded by

fighting, wherefrom there often result lasting hates, discords,

scandals. (b) Justice is wounded by fighting, as when a person unjustly

maims or kills his neighbor, and is himself imprisoned or executed, to

the disgrace and deprivation of his dependents.

1435. Duelling.--A duel is a prearranged combat between two persons

fought with deadly weapons, for the purpose of settling a private

quarrel.

(a) Thus, it is a combat, and hence the “suicide duel,” in which the

contenders draw lots with the understanding that the loser must kill

himself within a specified time, is not properly a duel.

(b) A duel is prearranged, that is, the time, place, and weapons are

determined in advance. Hence, if two feudists meet accidentally and

proceed at once to shoot, their combat is not strictly a duel. It is

not necessary, however, that a formal letter of challenge and a letter

of acceptance precede the fight.

(c) It is between two persons, that is, a determinate combatant is

matched against a determinate opponent. A true duel, however, might be

carried on between many couples simultaneously, as in the fight between

the twelve soldiers of Abner and the twelve soldiers of Joab (II Kings,

ii. 13-17). The presence of seconds or witnesses is not essential to a

duel.

(d) A duel is fought with deadly weapons, that is, with such arms as

are capable of inflicting severe wounds, so that there is serious

danger of grave wound or mutilation or death. There is no duel,

therefore, if one fights with weapons that cannot do serious harm (such

as fists, light sticks, mud), or if by agreement one uses dangerous

weapons in a way that precludes injury (e.g., by padding the edge of

one’s sword, loading one’s revolver with blanks, firing into the air,

as in sham or mock duels). But academic duels, in which students try to

stab each other in the face with small daggers, are true duels; for,

while the fighters are well protected in vital parts and serious or

fatal wounds rarely happen, it remains true that this manner of

fighting is mortally dangerous. The same remark applies to duels fought

on condition that only one or two rounds of shots shall be fired, or

that fighting shall cease as soon as blood has been drawn.

(e) A duel is fought for the purpose of settling a private quarrel. A

hand-to-hand combat during battle between two soldiers of contending

armies is not a duel in the proper sense of the word, since there is no

private quarrel between them, but only the public quarrel of their

countries.

1436. The Morality of Duelling.--(a) Generally, the duel is mortally

sinful. Like ordinary fighting, it is against charity, and in addition

it includes a will to kill or gravely injure another, to expose one’s

own life or limb to chance, and to usurp the function of the State.

This applies to the challenged as well as to the challenger, for one

can decline the combat to which one is dared.

(b) Exceptionally, a duel would not be sinful, if it took on the

character of a war, or of self-defense against an unjust aggressor.

Thus, in order to shorten a war or to lessen the bloodshed, it might be

lawful to make the whole issue depend on a single combat between the

commanders or between champions chosen from opposing armies, as in the

case of David and Goliath (I Kings, xvii); but in modern times such a

practice has been abandoned. Again, if a person had to choose between

certain death, if he refused a duel, and possible death, if he

consented to a duel, it would seem that he is in the position of one

attacked by an unjust aggressor; but it is not easy to picture such a

case as happening in normal conditions.

1437. The Fallacy of the Arguments for Duelling.--(a) The amusement of

the spectators was the purpose of the gladiatorial duels fought in

ancient Rome. But today there is no one who would not grant that the

butchering of human beings to make a holiday for the populace is

savagery.

(b) The decision of doubtful cases before the courts was the purpose of

the judicial duels fought among the Germans and Lombards in the early

Middle Ages. But manifestly such duels are a temptation of God, since

they rashly call on Him to disclose, through a duel between the

litigants, what the evidence in court did not disclose. The outcome of

the duel shows which party is stronger or more skilful, not which is in

the right.

(c) Training in bravery and the termination of serious differences is

the excuse offered for military and university duels. But to kill,

cripple, or brutalize youth does not make the nation stronger, and the

substitution of violence for law as a means of settling disputes is an

encouragement to crime.

(d) Satisfaction for insults or other injury, or the avoidance of the

reputation of being a coward, is the reason given for so-called affairs

of honor. But is it not a superstition and a relic of barbarism to

think that dishonor is wiped out by a dishonorable fight, or that a

person shows himself brave because he lacks the moral bravery to act

against the wrong opinions of the multitude?

1438. Penalties against Duelling.--(a) Church law deprives of

ecclesiastical burial those who die as the result of a duel, if

unrepentant (Canon 1240); it also declares excommunication reserved

simply to the Holy See and infamy against duellists and their helpers

(Canon 2351). (b) Civil law in English-speaking countries makes

duelling a crime. If death results, it is regarded as murder, and the

seconds are liable to punishment as accessories.

1439. What is the moral duty of restitution on account of injuries

caused in a duel? (a) The challenger and his heirs have no right to

restitution. (b) The challenged, if he accepted willingly, has no right

to restitution, for his free acceptance of the fight implies the

cession of such a right. (c) The challenged, if he accepted under grave

compulsion, has the right to restitution. If he is wounded, the

aggressor should pay the medical expense; if he is killed, the heirs

should be compensated.

1440. Sedition.--Sedition is a discord between different factions of the

same multitude so grave as to extend to physical conflict, and to the

destruction of the unity of the State.

(a) It is a discord, that is, a disagreement of wills, and so it

resembles schism, war and fighting. Difference of opinion in the

political parties of a country is not sedition, since there is a unity

of will and purpose in all of them with reference to the common good

and the peace of the State (cfr. 1197, 1348). In fact, under a

democratic system of government, the existence of some opposite parties

has proved a useful, if not necessary means of stimulating the interest

of citizens, and of expediting the business of legislation.

(b) Sedition is between different factions of the same multitude, that

is, between different sections or groups of the same body politic.

Thus, it differs from war (which is between states), and from fighting

(which is between individuals).

(c) Sedition extends to physical conflict, that is, it tends from its

character to break out into violence and to array the opposite factions

in fight against one another. If not accompanied by actual hostilities,

it is simple sedition. But, if fighting has begun, it is insurrection

or rebellion, when the people seek to overthrow the government; it is

civil war, if one part of the nation seeks to secede from or overcome

the other.

(d) It is prejudicial to the civil unity and peace of the people, that

is, it tends to the violent dismemberment of the State, or at least to

the disturbance of the common good. Thus, sedition is more serious than

riots, tumults, gang-warfare, and like particular disturbances, which

are not directed against the State itself, or against the harmony of

the whole body of the people. Sedition differs also from the peaceful

separation of parts of a state, and from the lawful self-defense of the

people against a tyrannical government.

1441. From the definition given above, it is plain that sedition is a

special distinct species of sin. (a) It differs from spiritual discord,

for unlike schism it is opposed, not to the unity of the Church, but to

the unity of the State. (b) It differs from other kinds of temporal

discord, for unlike war and fighting it is opposed, not to peace

between nations or individuals, but to peace between the members of the

same civil body. War takes away peace with foreigners, sedition takes

away peace with fellow-citizens; fighting attacks a private person or

persons, sedition attacks the public welfare of the country.

1442. Sedition in the strict meaning given it above is always sinful.

(a) Thus, it is a mortal sin from its nature, since it is opposed to

what is manifestly one of the greatest of temporal goods, namely, the

unity of the State. (b) It is opposed to charity, as destroying the

bond of peace; it is opposed to justice, as injuring a unity based on

law and common utility, to which the nation has a strict right. (c)

Sedition is graver in some persons than in others. Thus, the moral

causes of sedition (i.e., those that sow discords or promote

disaffection) are more responsible than those who are led and who carry

out acts of violence. The gravity of the sin in each case depends on

the amount of damage that is due to one’s influence or acts.