1179. The order of charity as between ki_Moral theology

course to the nearer relatives-parents, children, wife. Between these

nearer relatives there is also an order of preference, as follows: (a)

objectively (or with reference to the greater or less claim to respect

and honor), the order is: father, mother, wife, children; (b)

subjectively (or with reference to the greater or less intensity of

affection), the order is the reverse, namely: children, wife, parents.

1180. The following should be noted about this order of preference

between the members of one’s family: (a) the basis of preference given

is only kinship, and hence there may be other considerations to change

the order given (e.g., a pious mother is rightly more respected and

honored by her children than a worthless father); (b) there is no

notable excess in the claim of one member of the family over that of

another, and hence those whose affections do not follow the order given

are not guilty of serious sin.

1181. The order in which relatives have a claim on assistance when

several are in equal need is as follows: (a) in cases of ordinary need

the order is, first, the wife, for a man leaves his parents for his

wife (Gen., ii. 24), second, the children, for ordinarily parents must

provide for children, and not children for parents (II Cor., xii. 14),

third, parents; after these come in order, brothers and sisters, other

relatives, friends, fellow-citizens of the same locality or country,

all others; (b) in case of extreme need, however, parents are to be

preferred to all others, even to wife, children or creditors, since one

receives life from parents.

1182. The order of charity is also observed in heaven. (a) Thus, God is

loved above all, not only objectively, but also subjectively, for His

amiability is better understood and is not for a moment neglected. (b)

Self is loved less, objectively, than those who are higher, and more,

objectively, than those who are lower in glory: for the state of the

blessed is fixed, and each of them desires that which God wills. But,

subjectively, each loves self with a more intense love, since charity

itself inclines that one first direct self towards God, and then wish

the same for others. (c) Among neighbors, since love of them will be

entirely divine, the reason of earthly preferences (such as dependence

of one on another) having ceased, those who are more perfect in

holiness will be loved with deeper appreciation and affection than

those who are nearer by kinship or friendship.

1183. The Acts of Charity.--The principal act of the virtue of charity

is love. It is sometimes spoken of as benevolence, but in reality the

love of charity includes more than mere benevolence. (a) Thus,

benevolence wishes well to another according to a right judgment, and

so it pertains to charity, which rejoices in the perfections of God and

wishes beatitude to man; but (b) love is a union of affection with

another, which makes one regard him as another self, and so it pertains

to charity, which, as said above, is a supernatural friendship, One can

be benevolent towards a stranger and for a passing moment, but love is

intimate and lasting, from its nature.

1184. Exercise of the Act of Love.--(a) From benevolence proceed

gladness at the perfections of God (I Pet., i. 8), zeal for His

external glory (I Pet., iv. 11), grief over sin committed against Him

(Ps. lxxii. 3), obedience to His commandments (John, xiv. 15, 21, 23).

(b) From the union of affection proceed a warmth of inclination and a

personal interest in the things of God, so that one rejoices over the

divine perfections, not merely because one knows that this is a duty,

but because one feels the attachment of a friend for all that pertains

to God.

1185. Charity loves God: (a) for His own sake; (b) immediately; (c)

entirely; (d) without measure.

1186. We love God for His own sake, in the sense that there is nothing

distinct from God that causes Him to be loved. (a) Thus, there is no

ulterior end on account of which He is loved, for He is the Last End of

all; (b) there is no perfection different from His nature that makes

Him lovable, since He is perfection itself; (c) there is no source of

His goodness on account of which He is loved, since He is the Primal

Source.

1187. We may love God for the sake of reward (see 1161), on account of

benefits, and for fear of punishment, in the following senses: (a) the

eternal reward is the proximate end of our love of God: “Receiving the

end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls” (I Pet., i. 9);

but the end of salvation itself, and the Last End of love of God, is

God Himself; (b) temporal rewards, benefits received, and the wish to

avoid punishment, are dispositions that lead up to love of God, or to

progress in His love; but they are not the end of the act of love.

1188. Charity loves God immediately, and so differs from natural love

of God. (a) Thus, natural love of God rises from love of neighbor whom

we see to love of God whom we do not see, just as natural knowledge

rises from the creature to the Creator. (b) Charity, on the contrary,

tends to God first, and by reason of Him includes the neighbor in its

love.

1189. Charity loves God entirely. (a) But this does not mean that the

creature’s love is adequate to the amiability of God, for God is

infinite, whereas love in the most perfect creature must be finite. (b)

It means, with reference to the object of love, that charity loves

everything that pertains to God--each of the Divine Persons, all of the

divine perfections. (e) It means, with reference to the person who

loves, that he loves God to the best of his ability, by subordinating

all else to God and preferring His love to other loves. On earth,

charity gives to God the greatest objective love; in heaven, it also

gives Him the greatest subjective love (see 1129): “Thou shalt love the

Lord, thy God, with thy whole heart” (Deut., vi. 5).

1190. Charity loves God without measure, as St. Bernard says (_De

diligendo Deo_, cap. 1). God has fixed a degree of perfection in

charity beyond which a soul will not progress, but no one should set a

limit for himself, for love has to do with God, who is not measured,

but is the measure of all things.

(a) Hence, in the internal act of love, there is no possibility of

excess, since the Object is infinitely amiable and the End of all, and

so the greater the charity, the better it is.

(b) In external acts proceeding from charity, however, there is a

possibility of excess, since these acts are a means to an end, and have

to be measured by charity and reason. Thus, it would be excessive to

give more to strangers than to one’s needy parents, for this act would

not be according to the rule of charity. It would also be excessive to

perform works of charity, when one ought to be attending to household

duties, for reason requires that everything be done at its proper time

and place.

1191. The love of an enemy may be a better act than the love of a

friend, when there are special excellencies in the former love that are

not found in the latter. (a) Thus, if the enemy, all things considered,

is a better person than the friend, and if he is for that reason

objectively preferred, this is as it should be (see 1173). (b) If the

parties are of equal merit, an act of love towards the enemy on account

of supernatural charity is better than an act of love towards the

friend on account of natural affection: “If you love them that love

you, what reward shall you have? do not even the publicans this?”

(Matt, v. 46).

1192. If all other things are equal, the love of the friend is

essentially better, while the love of the enemy is better in some minor

respects. (a) Thus, the love of the friend has a better object, for the

friend who loves us is better than the enemy who hates us; it has also

an object that has a greater claim on charity, as being nearer to self.

Hence, it is essentially a better and more meritorious act. (b) The

love of the enemy is more difficult, and may thus be a more convincing

sign that one really loves God. But the fact that an act is more

difficult does not suffice to make it more meritorious, or else we

should have to say that the love of neighbor is more meritorious than

the love of God.

Art. 6: THE EFFECTS OF CHARITY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 28-33.)

1193. Internal Effects of Charity.--There are three acts of the soul

that result from love, viz., joy, peace, mercy. (a) The joy of charity

is a repose or delight of the soul in the perfections of God and in the

union of self and the neighbor with Him: “The fruit of the Spirit is

charity, joy” (Gal., v. 22). (b) The peace of charity is the harmony of

man with God, self and the neighbor: “There is much peace to those that

love Thy law” (Ps. cxviii. 165). (c) Mercy is an inclination of the

will to relieve the misery of another; it follows from charity, for

love of the brotherhood “weeps with them that weep” (Rom., xii. 10, 15).

1194. Joy.--The precept of charity includes a precept of joy, and hence

the Apostle says: “Rejoice in the Lord always; again, I say, rejoice”

(Philip., iv. 4, 5). This joy of charity has the following properties:

(a) it is about good, not about iniquity, and it is not unrestrained;

it rejoices “in the Lord”; (b) it should not be discontinued or

interrupted by sin, but should rejoice “always.” It may, however, be

mixed with sorrow over sin or the delay of entrance into the presence

of God ( Rom., xii. 15; Ps. cxix. 5), for only in heaven will joy be

filled (John, xv. 11). St. Paul spoke of himself as “sorrowful, yet

always rejoicing” (II Cor., vi. 10).

1195. Peace.--The precept of charity also includes a precept of peace,

and our Lord commands: “Have peace among yourselves” (Mark, ix. 49).

Peace, like joy, has two properties: (a) it should be genuine (i.e., it

should be a contentment and agreement based on right), for there is a

false peace, of which Christ says: “I am not come to bring peace”

(Matt, x. 34), which rests in a good that is only apparent, and which

does not exclude great evil and anxiety (Wis., xiv. 22), (b) peace is

constant, for, as long as charity remains, there are friendly relations

with God and man, and order in the interior of the soul. Perfect

tranquility, it is true, is found only in heaven. On earth,

disturbances may arise in the lower part of the soul, or from without,

but the will continues in the peace of God (II Cor., i. 4).

1196. Reconciliation of a sinner to God is effected through an act of

perfect charity: “He who loves Me, will be loved by My Father and I

will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (a) Thus, sin is washed away, even

before Baptism or absolution, when the sinner makes an act of love of

God joined with a desire, at least implicit, of receiving the Sacrament

of Baptism or Penance. The act of love is not the cause, but the final

disposition introducing justification. (b) The punishment of sin is

forgiven, when one makes an act of love, or performs a good deed out of

love of God; but the degree of remission corresponds to the fervor of

the charity.

1197. Does the precept of peace demand unanimity of judgments?

(a) In matters of greater importance, there should be agreement in

judgments; else, there will not be that harmony of wills, desiring the

same things and disliking the same things, which constitute peace. In

necessary things, therefore, there should be unity of judgments: “I

beseech of you, brethren, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that

you all speak the same thing, and that there be no schisms among you,

but that you be perfect in the same mind and in the same judgment” (I

Cor., i. 10).

(b) In matters of slight importance, difference of opinion does not

remove friendship, for each one thinks that his judgment will better

serve the good that is sought alike by all. We find that even very holy

men have disagreed on matters of opinion--for example, Paul and

Barnabas on the question whether or not Mark should be taken on the

second missionary journey (Acts, xv. 37), Jerome and Augustine on the

status of Mosaic observances after the death of Christ. Disputes may

offend against charity, however, if they become too personal or too

heated, as sometimes happens even to minds occupied with heavenly

things (e.g., theologians, spiritual writers).

1198. Reconciliation with enemies is necessary, in order that peace may

be maintained. It includes: (a) internally, the putting away of

thoughts and feelings contrary to concord; (b) externally, signs of

renewed charity, if there has been an open breach.

1199. The duty of reconciliation does not necessitate the forgiveness

of every kind of wrong suffered from an enemy--that is, it does not

always oblige one freely to remit the consequences of an enemy’s acts.

There are three kinds of wrong: (a) offenses, which are such

contradictions offered to the will of another as do not trespass on any

strict right or occasion any damage. Example: Balbus, who is in great

distress, asks his friend Titus to secure employment for him. Titus

could easily do this favor, but he refuses; (b) injuries, which are

violations of the strict right of another, but without damage. Example:

Claudia addresses Caia in very disrespectful language when no witnesses

are present; (c) damages, which are the taking from another of what is

his, or harm done to him as regards his soul, his life, his fame, or

his fortune. Examples are theft, scandal, assault and slander.

1200. Whether an offender asks pardon or not, one is obliged to forgive

the offense--that is, to put aside all aversion, indignation and

hatred: “Forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive them that trespass

against us” (Matt., vi. 12). But, granting that one desires salvation

for the offender as for others, shows the common signs of charity, and

is not prompted by hatred, the following are not required: (a) that one

so pardon the offense as to take the offender back to the same special

friendship as may have existed before; (b) that one overlook an injury

so as not to require satisfaction (and hence, without acting against

charity, Gaia may insist on an apology from Claudia for the

disrespectful language used by the latter); and (c) that one renounce

restitution or reparation for damage done one. No one is obliged to

give to another what is one’s own, and, if there is no other way of

securing one’s rights, one may have recourse to court. If the result of

prosecution will be punishment of the offender rather than restitution

(as in case of libel or slander), it is not uncharitable to prosecute

the offender, if one’s motive is the fulfillment of justice, the

prevention of the same wrong to others, or the honor of one’s family

(Lev., xix. 17).

1201. There are cases, however, in which charity requires one to

forgive a debt of satisfaction or restitution, namely, when this would

impose too heavy a burden on the offender, compared with the benefit

that would be derived therefrom. (a) Thus, restitution should not be

insisted on, when the offender is repentant and can ill afford to pay

the debt, and the party offended can easily get along without the

payment. (b) Punishment should not be insisted on, if the harm done the

offender or his family will be out of proportion to any good that may

result. (c) Prosecution should not be used, if a wrong can be amicably

adjusted out of court (I Cor., vi. 1).

1202. Who should make the advances towards reconciliation after a

rupture of charitable relations? (a) If only one party was the

offender, he should normally make the first move towards

reconciliation. It is of counsel, but not of precept, that the innocent

party ask for reconciliation, unless the circumstances require that he

should do so, as when the offended party can much more easily make the

advances, or when great scandal will arise, or when the offender will

become hardened in hate and lose his soul, if the party offended does

not make efforts for peace. (b) If both parties were offenders, he who

offended more seriously should make the advances. (c) If both offended

equally, he who was first to disturb the peace should also be first to

work for its restoration. (d) If it does not appear which of the

parties was more to blame in any of the foregoing ways, both are

equally bound.

1203. The manner of seeking reconciliation is as follows: (a)

Reconciliation can be sought either in person, or through an

intermediary who is a friend to both parties. (b) It can be sought

either explicitly (by expressing regret and asking pardon), or

implicitly (by a friendly conversation or favors shown). Generally

speaking, an inferior (e.g., a child) should explicitly request

reconciliation with a superior (e.g., a parent); but it will suffice

for a superior to seek forgiveness from an inferior implicitly.

1204. The time for seeking reconciliation is the earliest possible

moment: “If thou offer thy gift at the altar, and there thou remember

that thy brother hath anything against thee, leave there thy offering

before the altar, and go first to be reconciled to thy brother, and

then coming thou shalt offer thy gift” (Matt, v. 23, 24). (a) Thus,

internal reconciliation (i.e., repentance on the part of the offender

and forgiveness on the part of the one offended) should not be delayed,

and should precede any sacred action, such as offering a gift to God,

if this latter is to be acceptable and meritorious. (b) External

reconciliation (i.e., asking pardon and making satisfaction) and the

manifestation of forgiveness should be attended to as soon as the

circumstances of time and place permit. The resolve to be reconciled

externally is included in internal reconciliation, but prudence

dictates that one wait for the suitable occasion, lest precipitation

make matters worse.

1205. Mercy.--From charity results mercy, for he who loves his neighbor

as a friend in God, must grieve over the latter’s sorrows as if they

were his own. Our Lord commands: “Be ye merciful, as your Heavenly

Father is also merciful” (Luke, vi. 36). But not all compassion is true

mercy or supernatural.

(a) Thus, as regards the object that causes sorrow, true mercy grieves

over the evils that befall another against his will, such as sickness,

failure in an enterprise, or undeserved misfortune. But wilful evil,

such as sin, provokes not mercy, but rather indignation, although one

may compassionate sinners on account of the ills their sins bring on

them (Matt., ix. 36).

(b) As regards the internal cause of sorrow or sympathy, supernatural

mercy arises from the love of charity for the one suffering; natural

mercy, from the fear one has that a similar evil may overtake oneself,

or that oneself may suffer loss on account of another’s misfortune.

from the will, regulates the emotions, and is itself regulated by

reason. Thus, mercy differs from the sensible distress a refined person

experiences at the sight of suffering, which, though good in itself,

may never lead to a wish to alleviate sorrow. Thus, also, it differs

from unregulated sympathy, which bestows help or forgiveness

indiscriminately, without thought of the greater evils that may result;

it differs from sentimentality, which does not restrain tears and other

emotional expressions within due bounds. The virtue of mercy has a care

for the interests of justice, but mere pity, like prejudice, blinds the

mind to what is true and right.

1206. The causes of an unmerciful spirit are: (a) lack of charity

towards one who is in misery; (b) pride or too much prosperity, which

makes one feel that others suffer justly, or that one is above their

condition (Prov., xxviii. 4); (c) great misfortunes or fears that have

hardened one’s disposition, or made one self-centered.

1207. Mercy Compared with the Other Moral Virtues.--(a) Mercy, if taken

for the emotion of sympathy as regulated by reason, is inferior to

prudence and justice, which are perfections of the higher powers of the

soul (i.e., of the intellect and will). (b) Mercy, if taken for an act

of the will disliking the misery of another and moving one to remove

that misery, surpasses the other moral virtues; indeed, it may be said

to be something divine, and hence more than a virtue. Certainly, it is

the greatest of the virtues that have to do with the neighbor, for of

its nature it implies freedom from some defect and the relief of that

defect in others, which is not the case with other virtues. Thus, while

prudence directs acts and justice renders to others their due, these do

not of themselves remove ignorance or destitution in a neighbor.

1208. Mercy Compared with Charity.--(a) In itself (i.e., considered

precisely as to its essential notes of freedom from misery and relief

given to the miserable), mercy is the greatest of the virtues. For,

carried to its highest development, freedom from defect means infinite

perfection; while relief of defect in others means that, out of

infinite love for the Supreme Good, relief is poured out by God on His

creatures. Thus, in God mercy is an extension of the love God has

towards His own goodness, for the benefit of creatures, and is greater

than charity: “The mercy of God is above all His works” (Ps. cxliv. 9).

(b) In its subject (i.e., considered precisely as to the perfection it

brings to its possessor), mercy is inferior in creatures to charity.

For it is better to be united by love to the Supreme Good than to

remove evil in a creature: “Above all these things have charity” (Col,

iii. 14). Mercy is the sum of the Christian religion as far as external

works are concerned, but charity is the sum of Christianity as regards

internal acts.

1209. The Obligation of Mercy.-(a) The natural law itself inculcates

mercy, but those not influenced by divine revelation have not highly

esteemed it or practised it. Thus, Plato wished that all the poor might

be sent into exile. Virgil thought that freedom from pity was a sign of

wisdom; Seneca called mercy a vice of the soul; Nietzsche taught that

compassion has no place in the morality of the superman.

(b) The divine law commands mercy, especially in the New Testament.

Assistance of the poor, the widows, the orphans, the sick, the

captives, the slaves and other unfortunates is everywhere insisted on:

“I will show thee what the Lord requireth of thee: verily to do

justice, and to love mercy, and to walk solicitous with thy God”

(Mich., vi. 8).

1210. External Effects of Charity.--Three external effects of charity

will now be considered-beneficence, almsgiving and fraternal

correction. These are not distinct virtues, but only separate acts

pertaining to the virtue of charity and proceeding--like love, joy and

peace--from the same motive of love of God. (a) Thus, beneficence

naturally results from charity, since one of the acts of friendship is

to do good to one’s friend; (b) almsgiving is one of the special ways

in which beneficence is exercised; (c) fraternal correction is a

species of spiritual almsgiving.

1211. Beneficence.--Not every act of helping others is virtuous, nor is

all virtuous assistance called beneficence. (a) Thus, to assist others

in evil is maleficence, nor is it virtuous to help them with an evil

purpose. Examples: To give money to criminals to help them defeat the

law is participation in crime. To give presents to others in order to

receive a return of favor from them is cupidity (Luke, xiv. 12). (b) To

assist others or to give to them out of compassion for misery, is

mercy; to do so out of a sense of obligation, is justice; to do so out

of love of God, is beneficence.

1212. Beneficence is a duty, and like charity should be universal:

“While we have time, let us work good to all men” (Gal., vi. 10); “Do

good to them that hate you” (Matt., v. 44). But this does not mean that

no discrimination is to be used in beneficence, or that impossibilities

are required.

(a) Not every kind of activity in which others are engaged is deserving

of assistance, not every kind of suffering of others may be removed.

Examples: Criminals or enemies of the State are not to be assisted in

their wrongdoing, but one may attempt to bring them to better conduct;

one who has been justly sentenced to prison may not be aided to escape,

but he may be visited and consoled and given religious assistance.

(b) Not all can be helped individually; even the richest and most

generous person can benefit only a small percentage of those who are

deserving. Charity requires, however, that one be so disposed that one

would help all individually, if it were possible, and that one does

help all generally, by praying for both Catholics and non-Catholics.

1213. Since it is impossible to help all individually, beneficence

should be regulated by the order of charity (see 1174 sqq.), and

particular good should be done to those with whom on account of

conditions of time or place one is more closely associated. Hence, the

following general rules are given:

(a) In benefits that pertain to a particular kind of relationship; one

should give the preference, other things being equal, to those with

whom one has that relationship. Examples: To make a banquet for another

is a benefit pertaining to friendship, and hence should be shown to one

who is a friend, rather than to one who is a business associate, but

not an intimate. To support another person is a benefit pertaining to

kinship, and hence should be shown to a parent, rather than to a

stranger.

(b) In benefits given to those with whom one has the same kind of

relationship, one should give the preference, other things being equal,

to those nearer in relationship. Example: In dispensing alms, one

should help one’s own family rather than distant relatives.

1214. If other things are not equal, the foregoing rules must sometimes

be reversed.

(a) When the common good is involved, preference should be given those

who represent it, even though others are nearer to one as regards

private good. Hence, a citizen should help the fortunes of his adopted

country rather than those of his mother country; in a civil war one

should aid rather one’s comrades than one’s kinsmen who are on the

opposite side.

(b) When a supreme good of a private person is at stake, one should

prefer to help him, even if a stranger, rather than another who is a

friend, or relative, but who is not in the same distress. Example: One

should give one’s loaf to a man dying of starvation rather than to

one’s own father, who is hungry but not starving.

another, one must prefer to give back what belongs to the other, even

if this person is a stranger, rather than use it for the good of a

friend or relative. Thus, if a person has stolen money or has borrowed

money from a stranger, he must return it to the owner, rather than make

a present of it to his own wife. An exception would be the case in

which the wife was in dire necessity, whereas the owner was not; but

the duty of restitution would remain for the future.

1215. No general rule can be laid down for all cases in which one party

is nearer to self and the other party more in need, and many such cases

have to be decided according to prudent judgment in view of all the

circumstances. It should be noted that, though wife and children are

nearer to one than parents, the latter have a greater claim on charity

when they are in equally extreme necessity, on account of the supreme

benefit of life received from them. But ordinarily one is bound rather

to provide for one’s children (II Cor., xii. 14).

1216. Almsgiving.--Almsgiving is defined: “Assistance to one who is in

need, given out of compassion and for the love of God.” Hence, this act

pertains to various virtues. (a) It is elicited by the virtue of mercy,

which means that compassion for misery is the immediate principle which

produces almsgiving. (b) It is commanded by the virtue of charity,

which means that love of God is the remote principle or end of an alms,

for, as said above (see 1205), mercy itself is an effect of charity (I

John, iii. 17). (c) Secondarily, it may also be commanded by other

virtues. Thus, if a person gives an alms to satisfy for his sins, he

performs an act of justice; if he gives in order to honor God, he

performs an act of religion; if he gives without undue grief over the

loss of what he gives, he practises liberality.

1217. Qualities Recommended for Almsgiving.--(a) Alms should not be

given ostentatiously (Matt, vi. 2 sqq.), though it is often edifying

that they receive publicity (Matt., v. 16); (b) they should be given

cheerfully (II Cor., ix. 7).

1218. Forms of Almsgiving.--(a) In the strict sense, an alms is a gift

made without any obligation of payment or return; (b) in a wide sense,

almsgiving includes selling on credit as a favor to a poor customer, a

loan granted at a low rate of interest or without interest, help in

securing employment, etc. Thus, if a poor man is sufficiently helped by

the use of an article, there is no need of making him a present of it.

1219. Almsgiving is to be distinguished, also, from mere giving. (a)

Thus, assistance given the poor out of a bad motive (e.g., to lead them

away from their religion, to induce them to crime) is sinful; (b)

assistance given the poor out of a merely natural good motive (e.g.,

pity for their sufferings) is philanthropy, but not charity (I Cor.,

xiii. 3), and may coexist with the state of hatred of God.

1220. Corporal alms, in the form of bodily necessaries given freely in

themselves or in their money equivalent, are of as many kinds as there

are bodily needs. (a) Hence, the common necessities of food, drink,

clothing and shelter should be provided as alms to the starving and to

those who lack sufficient clothing, or who are without a home. (b)

Special necessities, whether internal (such as sickness) or external

(such as persecution or imprisonment), should be relieved or assuaged

by remedies, visits, protection or relief. (c) The necessity of the

body after death is that it be cared for with the honor which the

memory of the deceased deserves, and hence burial of the dead is

numbered among the corporal alms.

1221. Thus, there are seven corporal works of mercy. (a) Those that

pertain to the needs of the body during life are mentioned by our Lord

in Matt., xxv. 35, 36. (b) The burial of the dead is praised in

scripture as a good work, as we see in the cases of Tobias (Tob., i,

ii, xii), and of those who buried our Lord (Matt, xxvi. 12, xxvii. 57

sqq.).

1222. Spiritual alms, consisting of assistance given those who suffer

want in mind or spirit, are either prayers, by which divine aid is

asked for them, or various acts by which human aid is conferred. These

acts are also of two kinds, and constitute seven spiritual works of

mercy.

(a) The defects from which a soul suffers, and which are not moral,

include ignorance in the intellect, doubt in the practical judgment,

and sadness in the affections; and hence the acts of almsgiving for

such cases are instruction, counsel, and comfort.

(b) The defects of soul which are moral are the guilt of sin and its

consequences--that is, the offense given and the burdens that result

for the sinner or others. The corresponding spiritual alms are

admonition against sin, pardon of the offense done to self, patience in

bearing with the difficult ways of others, especially if they err

through infirmity, or willingness in helping them to bear the

consequences of their errors (Rom., xv. 1).

1223. The giving of spiritual alms may suppose superiority or authority

in the giver over the receiver, or a certain procedure to be followed;

hence, in the administration of spiritual benefits, the due order of

time, place and persons has to be remembered. (a) Thus, in the

instruction of the ignorant, it is not every kind of ignorance that is

a defect, but only the ignorance of things one must know; and it is not

every person who is to give the needed instruction. (b) In the

correction of sinners, it is not every kind of reproof that is to be

used, but gentleness and secret admonition should be employed where

possible (Prov., xxvii. 6).

1224. Comparison of Corporal and Spiritual Alms.--(a) Spiritual alms

are better, because their nature is higher and they are of greater

benefit to the recipient, even though he appreciates them less. Thus,

it is better to enjoy peace of mind than to feast sumptuously. (h)

Corporal alms are sometimes more necessary in a particular case, and

hence they should be attended to first. Thus, for one suffering from

hunger food is more necessary than words of comfort (James, ii. 15, 16).

1225. Though corporal alms are not spiritual in the assistance they

give, they are spiritual in their effects. (a) Thus, they bless the

recipient corporally, by relieving his hunger or other need; (b) they

bless the giver spiritually, since God will reward his charity

(Ecclus., xxiv, 13, 14), and the person helped will pray for his

benefactor (ibid., 15).

1226. The Duty of Giving Alms.--(a) The natural law requires that we do

to others as we would be done by, and there is no one who does not wish

that help be rendered him if he falls into need. Moreover, the common

welfare requires that the rich assist the poor, for otherwise there

will be discontent and disorder. Hence, even unbelievers are not exempt

from the obligation of almsgiving. (b) The divine law, in both Old and

New Testaments, commands almsgiving: “Give alms out of thy substance,

and turn not away thy face from any poor person” (Tob., iv. 7); “Depart

from Me, you cursed, into everlasting fire, for I was hungry, and you

gave Me not to eat” (Matt., xxv. 41-42); “Let us love, not in word, nor

in tongue, but in deed and in truth” (I John, iii. 18). Tobias, Dorcas,

Cornelius, and Zacheus are praised for their charitable gifts.

1227. Almsgiving, being an affirmative commandment, does not oblige for

every moment of time, but only when right reason calls for it on

account of the state of the giver or of the receiver.

(a) The state of the giver requires him to give alms only when he has a

superfluity of goods, for no one is bound to deprive himself of what is

necessary for his own use (see 1164, 1169). John the Baptist said to

the people: “He that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath

none; and he that hath meat, let him do in like manner” (Luke, iii.

11). “That which remaineth,” says our Lord, “give as alms” (Luke, xi.

41).

(b) The state of the receiver gives him a claim on charity, when he is

in necessity and unable to help himself. Temporal goods, according to

the will of God, are for the benefit of the whole human race; and,

while the ownership of particular goods belongs to the rightful

possessor, he should not withhold the use of them from those who are in

need, when he has more than he needs for his own use. Neither is it

necessary that one be asked for an alms; one is obliged to give it when

one knows that one’s neighbor is in want, though unable or ashamed to

beg for help.

1228. It is not a precept, therefore, but only a counsel, that one give

alms in other cases. (a) Thus, when one is in equal need oneself and

has no superfluous goods, one may give to another; (b) when one’s

neighbor is not in need, or is able to help himself, one may still give

to him out of charity, if he is deserving (see 1169).

1229. Superfluities are those goods that remain over and above what are

necessary for life, or the maintenance of one’s state of life justly

acquired and socially useful.

(a) Necessaries of life are the goods one must have to provide food,

clothing and home for oneself and one’s family. Among necessaries of

life we may include what one has to set aside for old age, sickness,

increase of family, and the future sustenance of dependents who will

need it (II Cor., xii. 14). But they should not be extended to include

imaginary cases, or all the possible cases of personal need that may

arise in the future; otherwise, one is guilty of that exaggerated

solicitude for the morrow which our Lord forbids (Matt, vi. 34).

(b) Necessaries of state are the goods a person must have to keep up

his position and that of his family according to the standard of living

of his class. This includes provision for the education and advancement

of one’s children, for hospitality, adornment of home, and the care and

improvement of one’s business; but it does not include provision for

excessive pleasures or luxuries, or improbable future opportunities of

bettering one’s condition; otherwise, even the wealthiest person might

say that all his money was tied up and that he had no superfluous goods.

1230. What is necessary for the decency of particular stations in life?

(a) This does not consist in any fixed amount, for, even when

considerable additions to or subtractions from a person’s wealth have

been made, he may retain and support the same social rank. (b) It

consists, therefore, in the amount sufficient for him to maintain,

according to the opinion of prudent men, what is becoming in one of his

class. Thus, one’s position may require that one do much entertaining

or keep up an expensive household, or it may require only that one live

moderately.

1231. The giving in alms of goods for which the giver himself has need

is governed by the following rules:

(a) Necessaries of life should be given away to another, as a matter of

precept, if the common good is bound up with the life of that other,

but not with one’s own life; they may be given away to another, as a

matter of counsel, when the common good does not require it, but the

higher good of virtue invites one to sacrifice one’s life for one’s

neighbor (probable opinion). Examples: One should give away one’s last

loaf to save the life of a leader on whom the salvation of his people

depends. One may make the same sacrifice, if one is single and without

dependents, and another is married and has a dependent family. But one

may not give away what is necessary for the life of one’s family (I

Tim., v. 8).

(b) Necessaries of state, at least in part (see 1251), should be given

away to another, as a matter of precept, if the public good or the life

of a private individual are at stake, or if that which is given in alms

can be easily recovered and will now prevent a very grave calamity;

they may be given away, as a matter of counsel, if the higher good of

virtue invites one to embrace voluntary poverty: “If thou wouldst be

perfect, go sell all that thou hast and give to the poor” (Matt., xix.

21). Examples: One should offer one’s fortunes in support of one’s

government, if in some crisis the nation cannot otherwise be saved. One

may give up riches and become poor in order to follow Christ in the

religious life.

1232. Superfluities of one’s state are the goods from which the precept

of almsgiving requires that assistance ordinarily be given. But the

mere fact that one has a superfluity does not oblige one to give alms.

As in every virtuous act, so also in almsgiving there must be not only

an object according to reason, but also circumstances according to

reason. Hence, one who has a superfluity is bound to give alms only

when the proper conditions of time, place, person, etc., are present.

(a) As regards time, a person is not obliged to devote to almsgiving

the time that is needed for other duties. (b) As to persons, a person

is not obliged to give alms, if there is no needy person known to him.

1233. As to need, we may distinguish three classes of persons:

(a) Those in apparent need are such as pretend poverty, sickness, or

misfortune, in order to get sympathy and financial aid (e.g.,

professional beggars). Alms should not be given persons of this kind,

since they take what would be given to the really poor and needy.

Rather they should be exposed and punished.

(b) Those in real need through choice should not be helped, if they

take to begging because they are too lazy to work, or find it

profitable to live off others; for they have no right to beg, being

able to help themselves, and it would be wrong to encourage them in

idleness and an imposition on others (II Thess., iii. 10). But those

who are voluntarily poor for Christ’s sake, whether they belong to a

religious order or not, are worthy of respect and it is meritorious to

assist them.

for, even though they became destitute through their own fault, they

are in fact unable to help themselves now.

1234. Regarding money obtained under the false pretense of poverty and

the duty of restitution, the following rules may be given: (a) If a

person obtains considerable alms by pretending to be blind, disabled,

in great want, etc., and he is not afflicted or in need, he should give

back the money to the donors or, if this is impossible, to the poor,

since the donors wished to help the poor, not to encourage idlers. (b)

If one obtains only a small amount under a false pretense of poverty,

some moralists say there is no duty of restitution, since the donor may

be presumed to give unconditionally in the case of minute sums;

likewise, if a beggar is really poor but exaggerates his need, it does

not seem that he is bound to restitution, for those who give alms expect

a certain amount of romancing from tramps and other professional

beggars.

1235. What is one’s duty in cases of doubtful need? (a) Minute

inquiries are inexpedient, since the really deserving are often

unwilling to publish their needs; (b) refusal of alms except in cases

where one is certain of the need, is not a good general rule to follow,

since it is a less evil that an unworthy person be helped than that a

worthy one be refused.

1236. There are three degrees of corporal need (cfr. 1165). (a) A

person is said to be in extreme need, when he is in manifest danger of

losing his life, if help is not given him at once. This does not mean,

however, that a person is not in extreme need until he is breathing his

last breath; for at that moment he is beyond the reach of human aid.

(b) A person is in grave need, when he is in probable danger of death,

or is in manifest danger of some very serious misfortune, such as

severe sickness, amputation of some member, long and bitter

imprisonment, insanity, loss of good name, reduction from wealth to

poverty, destruction of home by fire, etc. (c) A person is in common

need, when he suffers the inconvenience of poverty, such as being

obliged to beg, to deprive himself of many things, to wear poor clothes

or to eat ordinary victuals, but is not in danger of any serious loss.

1237. Rules on Giving Alms from the Superfluities of One’s State.--(a)

To those who are in extreme or grave necessity alms must be given in

each individual case, for these cases are rare, and the persons in need

have a personal claim on one’s charity when this is the sole means of

saving them from death or other great evil. Example: Last year Titus

saved a mother from death and her child from disease by giving his

money and services free of charge. This would not exempt him from the

duty of doing a like charity, if a like necessity presents itself now.

(b) To those who are in common necessity alms must be given from time

to time--now to one, now to another, as prudence dictates--but there is

no obligation for an individual case. Even the richest man could not

give to all who are in common need, and their want is not so pressing

that any one of them can be said to have an individual claim.

1238. Gravity of the Obligations to Give Alms.--(a) For cases of

extreme and grave necessity, the obligation of almsgiving is grave.

There is general agreement among theologians on this point, since the

loss suffered by the neighbor is serious and the withholding of help

indicates a lack of charity (I John, iii. 17). Example: The priest and

the levite who passed by the wounded man on the road to Jericho were

guilty, from the nature of their act, of mortal sin.

(b) For cases of common necessity, the obligation of almsgiving, as it

appears, is also grave; for it seldom happens that one is called on to

assist those who are in extreme or grave necessity, whereas almsgiving

is inculcated as an ordinary duty, and the reasons given by our Lord in

Matt., xxv. 41-46, for exclusion from heaven seem to be neglect of alms

in common necessity. But some theologians hold that the obligation is

only light, since the need is light; and, since these authorities are

numerous and of repute, a confessor could not refuse absolution to a

rich man who refused on principle to give anything to those in common

necessity. Such a one should be advised, rather than reproved, on this

point.

1239. From what was said above, the following conclusions may be drawn

about the gravity of the sin of refusing alms: (a) It is certainly a

mortal sin to refuse alms to one in extreme or grave need, and probably

also a grave sin to refuse ever to give alms to those in common need,

(b) It is not a mortal sin to refuse an alms in a particular case, if

one is not sure of the obligation (e.g., if there is doubt about one’s

ability to give the alms or the other’s need), or if it seems that

others will give assistance, or that the need will disappear, or that

one will suffer some serious inconvenience by giving, etc.

1240. Refusal of Alms and Restitution.--(a) The mere refusal of an alms

does not oblige one to make restitution. For restitution is the giving

back to another of what strictly belongs to him, and it cannot be said

that a poor person has a strict right to a gift from another. A

violation of charity may be gravely sinful, and yet not oblige to

restitution. (b) The refusal of an alms, if joined with injustice, does

oblige one to make restitution. Thus, if by threats or force one

prevents a starving man from taking the food that has been denied him,

injustice is committed; for in extreme necessity one has the strict

right to take what is necessary, and reparation should be made if this

is prevented.

1241. Alms given from ill-gotten goods are sometimes lawful, sometimes

unlawful.

(a) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because they belong to

another and the present possessor has no right to keep them, it is not

lawful to give them as alms, for they must be returned to the owner. An

exception would have to be made, however, for the case of extreme

necessity, for in such a case the person in danger of death would have

a right prior to that of the owner not in need. Example: It is unlawful

to give stolen money as an alms to the poor, when one is able to

restore it to the rightful owner.

(b) If the acquisition of the goods was unjust, because both giver and

receiver acted against law and forfeited their rights to possession,

the former has no claim to restitution, nor the latter to retention,

and the goods ought to be devoted to alms. Example: If a simoniacal

transaction is forbidden under pain of loss of the price paid and

received, the receiver is obliged to give the money to the poor.

it was made was unlawful, the gain is shameful, but still it belongs to

the one who has earned it, and may be devoted to alms. Example: Titus

hired Balbus to work on Sundays. The violation of the Sunday law was a

sin, but the labor given was serviceable to Titus and difficult to

Balbus. Hence, the latter is not bound to give back the money, but may

keep it and use it for a good purpose.

1242. Though shameful gain may be used for almsgiving, it should not be

devoted to sacred purposes, when this will cause scandal or be

irreverent to religion. Thus, the chief priests would not accept the

“blood money” of Judas for the use of the temple (Matt., xxvii. 6),

because the law forbade the offering of gifts that were an abomination

to the Lord (Deut., xxiii. 18; Ecclus., xxxiv. 23).

1243. The Proceeds of Gambling and Almsgiving.--(a) Profits made from

gambling may not be used for alms, when one is bound to restore them to

the loser. Thus, according to natural law he who wins money at cards or

similar games from a minor or other person who has not the right to

dispose of money, or who wins through fraud, must give back the

winnings. Likewise, restitution is due according to some, if the civil

law makes such aleatory contracts null and void; but others deny this.

(b) Profits made from gambling may be devoted to alms, when according

to law one has a right to them, as when one has played for recreation,

with moderation and with fairness to the loser.

1244. Persons who may give alms are all those who have a right to

dispose of goods as gifts. Others who have no such general right (e.g.,

religious, wives, children and servants), may also give alms as

follows: (a) They may give alms from any goods that belong to them, and

of which they have the control. Thus, a wife may give alms from money

which is her own, by inheritance, earnings, etc. (b) They may give alms

from such goods as are placed in their charge and dispensation. Thus,

the procurator of a religious house has the right to give alms with

permission of his superior and according to his Constitution (Canon

537). A religious who is a parish priest may administer and dispense

parish alms (Canon 630, Sec.4). (c) They may give alms with express or

implied permission. Thus, children may give articles of food to the

poor, when their parents consent. (d) They may give alms without

permission in a case of extreme need. Thus, a wife could make use of

her husband’s money without his consent, if this should be necessary to

save a life.

1245. The right of a wife to give alms from her husband’s earnings is

as follows: (a) from the money given her for the support of herself and

the family, the wife may give reasonable alms; (b) from the common

money of the family she may give alms with her husband’s express or

presumed consent. But, if he is miserly and unwilling to give alms, she

may nevertheless use what is reasonable according to the family

resources for almsgiving (e.g., in helping her impoverished parents).

1246. The right of servants to give alms from the goods of their

employer is as follows: (a) the rule is that servants have no right to

give away anything that belongs to their employer without his express

permission, for, if permission could be presumed, the property of

employers would not be safe; (b) an exception to the rule is made for

such things as are to be thrown away (e.g., leavings of the table),

since if they are given in alms the proprietor suffers no loss.

1247. Since charity should be universal, no class of persons, such as

strangers, unbelievers or sinners, may be excluded from the benefit of

almsgiving (Matt, v. 45). However, charity is also well ordered, and

hence there is a preference to be observed, as follows:

(a) Other things being equal, one should favor those who are nearer to

oneself by bonds of kinship, friendship, etc., since their claim on

one’s charity is greater. Charity begins at home.

(b) If other things (such as worthiness, need or public utility) are on

the side of those not related by kinship, friendship, etc., the order

of preference may be reversed. Thus, if a person had to choose between

helping a distant relative for whom he was not specially responsible,

and who was a worthless fellow, or who was not in great need or who was

not of great value to the community, and helping a stranger, who was

most deserving, or in dire distress, or of great value to the

community, the latter should be assisted rather than the former.

the one who is more worthy or who feels his distress more. Thus, a

person who is poor through misfortune is more deserving than one who

gambled his money away; those who were once wealthy feel the sufferings

of poverty more than those who are inured to a life of privation.

1248. Is it permissible for one appointed to distribute alms to keep

some himself, if he is really poor? (a) If the persons are designated

to whom the alms are to be given, the distributor must give only to

them; (b) if it is left to the discretion of the distributor, he may

keep a reasonable alms for himself.

1249. The amount that should be given in alms has to be measured

according to the income of the giver and the need of the receiver.

(a) As to the income of the giver, he should give in proportion to his

income: “According to thy ability be merciful. If thou have much, give

abundantly; if thou have little, take care even so to bestow willingly

a little” (Tob., iv. 9). A rich man who spends more in the barber shop

on cosmetics, etc., than he gives to the poor, and a poor man who gives

more towards alms than to the feeding of his own family, are not giving

according to their means.

(b) As to the need of the receiver, a person should give his share

towards providing for the case before him. Thus, if there is no one

else who can or will give, and a neighbor is in grave necessity, a

charitable person will bear the whole expense, as was done by the good

Samaritan. But if the necessity is ordinary (as in the case of street

beggars), or there are others who will help, a smaller alms suffices.

Steady employment is a better charity than temporary doles, inasmuch as

it gives permanent assistance.

1250. Hence, in the following cases alms are excessive: (a) When,

outside the instances given in 1231, one gives away all the necessaries

of one’s life or station. The poor widow who gave all her living (Luke,

xxi. 1-4) is praised, but doubtless she was able somehow to obtain

enough to provide for her own life. (b) Alms are excessive when one

gives from one’s superfluities so much that the recipients are spoiled

and encouraged to do nothing for themselves, For the purpose of

almsgiving is not that those who have wealth be impoverished and others

enabled to live in luxury, but that the poor be relieved of suffering

and the rich gain the merit of charity (II Cor., viii. 13).

1251. Regarding the obligation of giving all the goods of one’s station

in life or of one’s superfluities, the following points should be noted:

(a) Some theologians hold that, in a case of extreme necessity, one is

bound to give all the goods necessary to one’s state of life, since a

neighbor’s life is a more important good than one’s own position in

life. Others deny this on the ground that one is not bound, even for

preserving one’s own life, to have recourse to extraordinary means and

so lose the rank and style of living one has. Thus, a self-supporting

workingman would not be obliged to reduce himself to beggary in order

to prolong the life of a dying person. A well-to-do person is not

obliged to sell his office, conveyance, books, and other things needed

for his business or profession, in order to rescue a captive held for

ransom by bandits.

(b) There are theologians who hold that one is bound to give away all

one’s superfluous wealth in alms, even apart from cases of extreme or

grave necessity; but others teach that, while this is of counsel, it is

not obligatory, since the needs of the poor will be sufficiently

relieved if all who have means give something from their superfluities.

Moreover, the retention of some superfluous goods is necessary for the

promotion of industrial and commercial enterprises, and, by increasing

national wealth, this policy indirectly benefits the poor.

1252. Ecclesiastical law, however, requires all clerics who enjoy a

benefice to give all that remains over and above from the returns of

the benefice, after they have provided for their own decent

maintenance, to the poor or to pious causes. This obligation is held as

grave. It will be treated below when we come to the special duties of

the clergy.

1253. Is there any definite amount or percentage, then, which should be

contributed to alms?

(a) For a case of extreme or grave necessity, one should contribute

enough, according to one’s ability, either in conjunction with others

or alone (if others will not help), to give relief. Thus, if a neighbor

is about to die of starvation, a charitable man will give food free of

charge. If a poor man is about to be treated unjustly, a charitable

lawyer will give him advice without charge. But it is not necessary

that one provide extraordinary remedies or helps--for example, that one

pay the expenses of a trip to Europe for a poor person whose health

would be benefitted by the travel.

(b) For cases of common necessity, St. Alphonsus held that one should

give two per cent of what remains from the yearly income after the

necessities of life and station have been taken care of. But other

moralists believe that today the amount cannot be fixed mathematically,

and that only the general direction can be given that one should be

generous according to one’s means, and regulate one’s yearly alms

according to the prevalence of poverty.

1254. Is it better to give a little to many, or much to one person in

need? (a) If the one person is in great need, and others are only in

slight need, it is better to give to the one in great need. Example: If

one has ten dollars to give in alms, it is better to buy an overcoat

for Titus who is shivering from the cold, than to give ten one-dollar

bills to ten men who need new collars and neckties. (b) If the need is

equal, it is better to divide the alms, for thus more distress is

alleviated and the danger of spoiling a recipient with overmuch bounty

is avoided. Example: Caius has $30,000 to give in charity and there are

three deserving institutions of charity known to him, all of which are

in great need--a hospital, an orphan asylum and a school. He ought to

divide his money between the three.

1255. The Time for Giving Alms.-(a) One should give at one time all the

amount of one’s alms for a certain period, if one is able to do this,

and there is a need that calls for it--“He gives twice who gives

quickly” (Prov., iii. 28)--for the poor may perish or may be driven to

acts of desperation or violence, if help is postponed. (b) One may

distribute one’s almsgiving if there is no urgent call for it--that is,

one may make partial contributions at various times, retaining

meanwhile money for almsdeeds in order to invest it for future

charities, or to await greater needs to which it may be applied, etc.

1256. The Manner of Giving Alms.--(a) One gives alms directly when one

ministers relief personally to the needy, giving food to the starving

and medicine to the sick, helping to put out a fire, etc. (b) One gives

alms indirectly when one pays taxes for the support of alms-houses,

public hospitals, orphan asylums, homes for the aged, the insane, etc.;

when one contributes to charitable collections or drives or to

organizations for relief (such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society);

when one assists or promotes movements for the free education of those

who cannot pay, for the betterment of living and working condition of

laborers, for security against loss of employment, pensions for the

aged, etc.

1257. Public charity done by the State is useful and necessary under

the conditions of modern life, but it does not and cannot take the

place of charity done by the Church or by private individuals.

(a) State-administered charity does not reach all, or even the most

deserving, cases of need. Hence, those who pay their taxes for the

support of state charities are not thereby exempted from the obligation

of contributing to cases they may meet, especially of extreme or grave

necessity. The payment of these taxes, however, diminishes need, and so

it also diminishes the amount one is bound to give in alms.

(b) State charity provides for the corporal needs of the recipient, and

it is imposed as compulsory on the giver. Hence, it cannot take the

place of alms given by the Church or by individuals that will care for

both soul and body, and that are given cheerfully and received

gratefully.

1258. Fraternal Correction.--Fraternal correction is defined: “An act

of charity and mercy by which one uses suitable words or other means in

order to convert one’s neighbor from sin to virtue.”

(a) Thus, it is an act of charity, for it is a love of our neighbor and

the desire of his spiritual welfare that prompts this correction.

Hence, the admonition of a sinner for his own good differs from a

correction administered to a wrongdoer for the good of another or of

the public; the former is fraternal correction and is an act of

charity, while the latter is judicial correction and is an act of

justice.

(b) Fraternal correction is an act of mercy, for, just as feeding the

hungry and other corporal alms remove bodily misery, so does admonition

of sinners remove spiritual misery.

it proceeds from charity and mercy, it must be regulated by prudence.

It is not an easy matter to correct another successfully, and hence the

need of good judgment as to the means to be employed, whether they

shall be words or equivalent signs (e.g., sad looks, a gesture of

disapproval, a change of subject of a sinful conversation, or refusal

of help), and whether one shall use reproof, instruction, counsel, or

warning.

(d) Fraternal correction aims at turning a neighbor from sin to virtue.

It is the proper remedy for sins of negligence, as judicial correction

is for sins of malice. It is applied, also, chiefly to the cure of sin

that has already been committed; but it should be extended so as to

include the prevention of sin in the future, since there is no less an

obligation of preventing than of removing sin. Hence, those who are in

dangerous occasions receive fraternal correction when a charitable

warning is given.

(e) Fraternal correction is given to a neighbor (i.e., to an

individual), and so it differs from the general censure of vice that is

given by preachers, whose duty it is to correct sins that are

prevalent, provided this be done prudently, in such a way as to effect

good and not harm. Unpopularity or other such handicaps do not excuse a

preacher from the duty of correction.

1259. Fraternal correction is a grave duty, and more important than

that of almsgiving. (a) The natural law requires that a person should

do unto others as he would wish them to do unto himself, and everyone

ought to wish that, if he needs correction, it will be given him. Even

the pagans proclaimed the need of correction. Seneca desired to have a

monitor who, by advice and reproof, would guard him against the dangers

of evil examples and conversations; and Plautus said that a friend who

refuses to chide the faults of his friend is himself worthy of blame.

(b) The divine positive law also commands that one should correct one’s

brother in order to save him from another offense (Ecclus., xix. 13,

14), and to win him back to good (Matt. xviii. 15), that the spiritual

should instruct with mildness those who have committed some

transgression (Gal, vi. 1), that a sinner should not be treated as an

enemy, but admonished as a brother (II Thess., iii. 15).

1260. Does the duty of fraternal correction oblige one to go out and

seek a person who is living a life of sin? (a) If the sinner is under

one’s care, so that one is responsible for him, there is a duty to seek

him as long as there is hope of amendment; for the good shepherd goes

after the lost sheep (Matt., xviii. 12, 13). Hence, parents, pastors and

superiors must try to win back their subjects from the ways of sin. (b)

If the sinner is not under one’s care, there is no duty to seek him

out; for obligations that are owed to our neighbor in general, but not

to any determinate person, do not require that we go out to look for

the persons to be aided, but only that we aid those whom we meet.

Hence, a private person is not obliged to frequent the haunts of vice

and crime in order to reform those who are there; but the community at

large has duties regarding such cases.

1261. Since the precept of fraternal correction is affirmative, it does

not oblige for every time and place; acts of virtue must be so

performed that not only the object and the motive shall be good, but

the circumstances also should be suitable. But the object and motive of

correction (viz., the conversion of a sinner) are primary, and the

circumstances of time, place, etc., secondary considerations. (a)

Hence, correction is good and a duty when it will serve to convert or

improve a sinner, now or later, although it may be imperfect as to some

of the circumstances. (b) Correction is not good, nor a duty, when it

will not serve to convert the sinner, even though other circumstances

would seem to call for it (Ecclus., xxxii. 6). Consequently, a person

ought not to correct when either he or the other person is under the

influence of anger, lest matters be made worse. This, of course, is

said of fraternal, not of judicial correction; for a judge or other

superior must condemn even when the culprit will not be made better, in

order to restrain him from evil and to provide for the common good, the

protection of justice, and the avoidance of scandal.

1262. In the following cases fraternal correction defeats its own

purpose: (a) when the sinner will not be bettered by the correction,

for his continuance in sin will become graver by reason of his

rejection of the admonition; (b) when the sinner will become hardened

and embittered by correction, and as a result commit more numerous or

more serious sins. Thus, if one knows that a blasphemer is only made

worse by scolding or remonstrances, it is a sin to attempt to correct

him as to those ways: “Rebuke not a scorner lest he hate thee” (Prov.,

ix. 8).

1263. The duty of fraternal correction depends, therefore, on the

knowledge or opinion one has about the success it will have. Hence, the

following cases may occur: (a) If one is certain that the correction

will be beneficial, one should give it; if one is certain it will not

be beneficial, one should omit it. (b) If it is likely that the

admonition will be profitable, and certain that it will not be

positively harmful, it should be given, for a physician in order to

help a sick person should give a remedy that is harmless, even though

only probably beneficial, if there is nothing else that can be done.

doubtful whether it will do harm (e.g., when one is dealing with a

stranger, whose character one does not know), one should weigh the good

and the evil and decide accordingly, as will be explained in the next

paragraph.

1264. Cases of doubt concerning the advantage of a fraternal correction

may occur as follows: (a) If the good expected is superior to the evil

that is feared, one should give the correction. Example: If it seems

that a sinner, if admonished, may suffer great confusion or be for a

time estranged, but may also be finally converted, the good result of

conversion is to be preferred to prevention of confusion or

estrangement. If it seems doubtful whether correction will help or hurt

a dying man, the good of his salvation should be preferred to the good

of freedom from a new sin. (b) If the good expected and the evil feared

are about equal, the correction should be omitted, since the negative

precept of not injuring a neighbor outweighs the affirmative precept of

doing him a service.

1265. When is sin committed by omitting fraternal correction? (a) If

the correction is omitted out of charity, the omission is good and

meritorious. Example: Titus omits to correct Sempronius, because he

thinks the reproof would do harm to the latter or to others, or because

he awaits a more favorable occasion. (b) If the correction is omitted

contrary to charity (i.e., because a person hates his neighbor or

disregards his spiritual welfare), the omission is a mortal sin.

Example: Caius neglects to correct Sempronius, because he prefers to

see Sempronius go to ruin rather than lose his friendship or incur his

enmity. (c) If the correction is omitted in spite of charity, the

omission is a venial sin. Example: Balbus, who is not a superior, fails

to correct Sempronius, because through frailty he fears to give

offense, or to be considered over-bold, but he prefers the latter’s

spiritual welfare to his own human fears and interests, and would give

the correction, if he felt that it was absolutely necessary.

1266. The sin committed by delaying fraternal correction is to be

judged according to the rules just given about omission of correction.

But is it lawful to put off correction in the hope that the sinner,

through experience of the evil effects of sin, may become more

tractable? (a) If there is hope of present amendment through

correction, this should not be delayed; otherwise, one is careless

about the honor of God, the edification of others, and the possible

hardening of the sinner or his death in the midst of his sins. (b) If

there is no probability of present amendment through correction, one

can only wait in the hope that the experience of the evils of sin may

bring the prodigal back to God.

1267. It is not often necessary for one who is not a superior to make

fraternal correction, since there are many conditions that must exist

before one is obliged to it. These conditions include the purpose to be

attained, of which we have just spoken, and the proper circumstances,

which are as follows: (a) the fault to be corrected should be a known

and serious sin; (b) the person to give the correction should be one

who has the right and duty to correct; (c) the manner of giving the

correction should be such as will promote the end in view.

1268. One should not attempt to correct a fault, unless one is morally

sure that a fault has been committed, or is about to be committed. For

this reason the scrupulous, who are inclined to suspect or see evil

where there is none, are generally excused from the duty of making

corrections. Reasons why doubt, fear, suspicion or rumor do not

suffice, are: (a) correction is not pleasant to the one corrected, and,

if his guilt is not provable, he will be able to argue with the

corrector, and so quarrels and enmities will result; (b) charity bids

us to give the benefit of the doubt to a neighbor, and, if this is not

done, the one who is being corrected will be able to correct the

corrector on account of uncharitable suspicions.

1269. Is one obliged, therefore, to make inquiries into the conduct of

those whom one suspects of wrongdoing?

(a) If there is question of judicial correction, the public authority

is bound in justice to examine juridically into matters of doubt before

acting.

(b) If there is question of fraternal correction, a parent or other

superior is bound in charity to make paternal inquiries into the

conduct of his subjects; for, as a father does not wait until his

children ask for corporal goods but inquires about their needs, so

neither should he wait until their spiritual distress is brought to his

attention. The superior here should avoid the extremes of suspicion, on

the one hand, which will lead him to act rashly and win for him the

hatred of his subjects, and of over-trustfulness, on the other hand,

which will foster all kinds of secret irregularities. Likewise, he

should not betray a special watchfulness about one individual that will

be harmful to the latter’s reputation.

should not inquire into the affairs of others. Those who go about

spying on or shadowing others, even if their purpose is to reform, are

acting against charity to themselves and to the persons they wish to

improve; their own affairs will suffer, since the number who need

reformation is large, and the person who is being investigated will be

annoyed or otherwise injured: “Lie not in wait, nor seek after

wickedness in the house of the just, nor spoil his rest” (Prov., xxiv.

15).

1270. The kinds of faults that call for fraternal correction are as

follows: (a) grave sins should be corrected, for otherwise one allows a

soul to perish that might have been saved (Matt., xviii. 14, 15), (b)

slight sins or transgressions of rules should also be corrected, when

they are the occasion of grave scandal or disorder in a community, and

superiors who are negligent about this commit mortal sin; (c) slight

sins or transgressions should not be corrected in ordinary cases, for

these faults are so numerous that, if one had to correct them, an

intolerable burden would be laid on everyone, Persons who scold and

lecture over every trifling misdeed are regarded as pests and do more

harm than good.

1271. The purpose of fraternal correction is to save one who is in

danger of losing his soul. Hence, it should not be restricted to those

sins that are an offense to the corrector, but it should extend also to

sins that are against God, the neighbor, or the offender himself.

1272. Since fraternal correction is given for the purpose of converting

a sinner from the evil of his ways, it is not called for when one’s

neighbor is not a sinner, strictly speaking, or has already reformed.

Thus, there is no need of this correction in the following cases: (a)

when a person sins through ignorance and is not guilty of formal sin;

(b) when a person who was a sinner in the past has given up his old

ways.

1273. A person who sins from vincible ignorance should not be corrected

unless the two following conditions are present: (a) there must be hope

of amendment, otherwise the admonition would only aggravate the

sinner’s guilt; (b) there must be no greater evil that will result from

the admonition and correction.

1274. A person who sins from invincible ignorance is not guilty of

formal sin, and hence, as said above, he is not a subject for fraternal

correction. But charity often requires that he be instructed especially

by superiors, confessors, etc., with a view to the prevention of

various evils. These evils are of the following kinds: (a) injury to

God, as when a person unacquainted with the language uses expressions

that are blasphemous; (b) injury to self, as when a child not

understanding the power of liquor becomes intoxicated; (c) injury to

the neighbor, as when a person who does not know that it is a fast day

causes scandal by not keeping the fast.

1275. If there is hope that the instruction will have a good result,

one should instruct the invincibly ignorant in order to prevent injury

to God, themselves, or their neighbor; but, if it seems that an

instruction will do only harm or more harm than good, it should be

omitted. The duty of instruction rests especially on superiors, such as

parents, teachers, confessors. These principles are applied to various

cases as follows:

(a) A material sin may have been committed in the past. Titus through

inadvertence ate meat on a day of abstinence, but gave no scandal;

Balbus did the same thing, and this caused considerable scandal. Now,

there might be an obligation of telling Balbus what he did in order to

repair the scandal, but no such obligation would exist in the case of

Titus. Sempronius and Caius both married invalidly, but are in good

faith. If Sempronius is told about his marriage, matters can be easily

rectified; but if Caius is informed that his marriage is null, he will

abandon his putative wife and his family, and there will be serious

discords and scandals. Hence, Sempronius should be told, but not Caius.

(b) Material sin may be about to be committed against the natural or

divine law. Titus is about to destroy what he thinks is an abandoned

and useless picture, but which is in reality a very valuable work of

art belonging to Balbus. Caius is going to the altar to be married;

Claudius knows of a diriment impediment to the marriage, but cannot

make it known without causing a scene and giving great scandal. Titus

should be instructed, but it is a duty to say nothing to Caius.

Sempronius sees Claudius and others eating meat on a day of abstinence,

which they have forgotten. He also sees Father Balbus, who has

forgotten to put on an alb or a chasuble, going to the altar to say

Mass. There is no obligation to call the attention of Claudius to the

day of abstinence, but for the sake of respect to divine worship the

attention of Father Balbus should be directed to the missing vestments.

1276. Certain past sins do not demand fraternal correction: (a) those

sins that have been repented of, especially if there is no danger of a

relapse (e.g., a wife should not be always reminding her now sober

husband that he was addicted to drink before he met her); (b) those

sins that will in all probability be remedied shortly without one’s

intervention. Hence, it is not necessary to reprove Titus because he

drank too much, if he is not careless about his salvation and will soon

approach the Sacraments, or if his parents or wife are better fitted to

make the correction and will not fail to do so.

1277. To what persons may correction be given? (a) Judicial correction

can be given only to one’s subjects, since it supposes authority; (b)

fraternal correction can be given, not only to inferiors and equals,

but also to superiors. For charity should be shown to all those who are

in need of assistance, and, the higher the office, the greater the

danger. Superiors who are giving scandal or doing harm to others should

be remonstrated with by their equals, or, if need be, by their

subjects. Fraternal correction among the clergy is especially

advantageous.

1278. When fraternal correction is given to a superior: (a) the

superior should take a proper correction with gratitude and humility,

imitating St. Peter when reproved by St. Paul (Gal., ii. 11); (b) the

inferior should give the correction without boldness or harshness, but

respectfully and mildly: “An elderly man rebuke not, but entreat him as

a father” (I Tim., v. 1). It is better that the person giving the

correction be himself of some standing, lest the act seem to proceed

from contempt, and so only embitter the superior who is at fault.

Example: Children should plead with parents who steal, get drunk or

neglect religion, to mend their ways.

1279. What persons may administer correction? (a) Judicial correction

as just said can be given only by a superior; (b) fraternal correction

may be given by any person who is not so unfitted that a correction

from him will necessarily be useless or harmful. It is not required,

however, that one be immaculate, for if immunity from all sin were

necessary in a corrector, who could reprove delinquents (I John, i. 8)?

1280. The fact that a person is known to be a sinner, or not in the

state of grace, or guilty of the same things he reproves, does not

unfit him for giving a fraternal correction; because, in spite of his

own sinfulness, he may retain a right judgment and so be able to

correct wrongdoing. In the following cases, however, correction made by

a sinner is reprehensible, on account of circumstances other than that

of the person: (a) the motive of the correction is sinful, when the

sinner corrects only in order to distract attention from himself, to

conceal bad deeds by good words, to practise revenge, etc.; (b) the

mode of the correction is sinful when the sinner corrects with pride,

as if he himself were above correction: “Wherein thou judgest another

thou condemnest thyself, for thou dost the same things which thou

judgest” (Rom, ii. 1); (c) the consequences of correction made by a

sinner are an evil circumstance, as when scandal results. Thus, if a

person who is guilty of far greater sins corrects his neighbor, this

has a demoralizing effect, when the impression is given that good words

rather than good deeds are important.

1281. One who prefers his neighbor’s conversion to his own deviates

from the right order of charity, since he should love himself more. But

a person may without any transgression against the precept of fraternal

correction seek to correct his neighbor before he has corrected himself.

(a) Thus, from the nature of correction itself or from the provisions

of the commandment, there does not seem to be any obligation of

correcting self before correcting others; for a humble correction made

by a sinner with acknowledgment of his unworthiness to censure others,

or by a sinner who is thought to be good or to have reformed, may be

just as efficacious as a correction made by a truly virtuous man. But

it is of counsel that one correct oneself as a means towards the better

correction of another.

(b) Because of special reasons, a person may be otherwise obliged to

correct himself before he attempts to correct another, as when

self-correction is the only means towards obtaining some necessary end.

Thus, a superior who cannot enforce discipline because he is

unobservant himself, the friend of a dying man who cannot convert the

latter unless he gives evidence of his own conversion, a person who

cannot repair the scandal he has given unless he manifests

repentance--all these should begin by correcting themselves. One should

take the beam out of one’s own eye, if otherwise one cannot remove the

mote from a neighbor’s eye (Matt, vii. 5).

1282. All suitable persons, then, are bound by the duty of fraternal

correction: “He gave to every one of them commandment concerning his

neighbor” (Ecclus., xvii. 12). But the duty rests more heavily on some

than on others. (a) Thus, bishops and other pastors are held out of

justice to fraternal correction, and even at the peril of life. (b)

Other prelates, confessors, parents, husbands, masters, teachers and

guardians, are held to fraternal correction from charity and by reason

of their office; but they are not held to this duty when there is grave

personal danger to themselves. (c) Private persons are held out of

charity, but their obligation is less than in the case of those whose

office requires them to make corrections.

1283. A person is not bound to make a correction for the sole reason

that he is able to make it successfully. For he is excused: (a) if

correction by him is not necessary, as when parents or others better

able than himself will attend to the matter; (b) if his correction will

bring on himself evils which he is not obliged to incur.

1284. An obligation of making a correction even when this will cause an

injury to the corrector, exists in the following cases: (a) If the

correction is necessary to avert extreme spiritual evil (i.e.,

damnation), one should be prepared to make a sacrifice, even of life

itself, to give the correction (see 1165). Example: Titus is dying of a

contagious disease, and will lose his soul, if Balbus does not come to

advise him. (b) If the correction is necessary to avert grave spiritual

evil, a pastor should be willing to risk his life, and another person

should be willing to risk the loss of money, and even some injury to

health. But a subject is not bound to correct his superior, when this

will bring on him persecutions; a scrupulous person is not bound to

correct, for this would cause him worries and suffering.

1285. The manner of making a correction is as follows:

(a) The internal dispositions should include charity towards the one

corrected and humility as regards one’s own fitness. For fraternal

correction is not opposed to the commands of bearing with the

weaknesses of others (Gal, vi. 2), and of not proudly preferring self

to others (Philip., ii. 3). One should correct inferiors paternally,

equals kindly, and superiors respectfully. In every correction there

should be seriousness mingled with mildness.

(b) The external order to be followed is that given by our Lord in

Matt., xviii. 15-18, namely, that, when possible, admonition should be

given privately, and that one should not proceed to accusation before

superiors until other means, such as the calling in of witnesses, have

proved unavailing. The order to be followed in fraternal correction is

not only of the positive divine law, but it is also of the natural law.

For the natural law requires that we do for others what we wish done

for ourselves, and there is no one who does not desire that correction

be given him in such a way that the least possible injury be done to

his feelings and to his good name.

1286. In what cases should secret admonition be used?

(a) For public sins (i.e., real sins known or soon to be known to the

larger part of the community), no secret admonition is required, since

the guilt is already publicly known; a public correction, on the

contrary, is necessary to remedy the scandal: “Them that sin reprove

before all, that the rest also may have fear” (I Tim., v. 20).

(b) For occult sins that are against the common good or the good of a

third person no secret admonition is required, but one should denounce

them immediately; for the spiritual or corporal welfare of the

multitude or of an innocent private individual is a greater good than

the reputation of the guilty person. Exception should be made, however,

for the case in which one is certain that by a secret admonition one

can correct the sinner and prevent the harm that threatens others.

Examples: If Titus knows that there is a plot to rob the house of

Balbus, and that any effort to dissuade the criminals would only bring

him into danger, he ought to warn Balbus or the authorities. If

Claudius knows that in his school a certain student is teaching the

other boys to steal and become drunk, he should make this known, and

hence cannot be absolved if he refuses. But the seal of the

confessional must be observed.

third person, one should have recourse to secret admonition before

making the sins known. This will save the sinner from loss of

reputation and from consequent hardness in sin; it will also save

others from a share in his infamy, or from the scandal caused by

publicity.

1287. What is the obligation of reporting an occult sin that is doing

harm in a community, when the person who reports will suffer for

telling what he knows? (a) If harm to the community will result from

silence, one is obliged even at the cost of great inconvenience to

speak (see 1284). Example: Claudius knows that a fellow-student has a

bad influence over his companions, and is leading more and more of them

into stealing, with the result that a large number will be corrupted

and the institution disgraced. But he cannot speak without serious harm

to himself, because he also has been implicated, or because informers

are regarded and treated as traitors. (b) If some private harm will

result from silence, one is not bound at the cost of great

inconvenience to speak. Example: If Claudius knows that only one or two

are being led astray, he is not bound to implicate himself or to incur

the ignominy of being regarded as a spy.

1288. There are exceptional cases in which occult faults, not injurious

to others, are reproved publicly, without previous private admonition.

(a) God as the supreme ruler has the right to publish hidden sins,

although He admonishes men secretly through the voice of conscience or

through external preaching or other means. St. Peter, in making known

the sin of Ananias and Saphira, acted as the instrument of God’s

justice and in virtue of a revelation given him (Acts, v. 3, 4, 9). (b)

Members of a society who are agreed to remind one another publicly of

transgressions of their regulations, do not violate the order of

fraternal correction given by Christ, if there is nothing defamatory in

these reminders. Example: The proclamations made in the chapter of

faults in religious orders.

1289. May a prelate (e.g., in a visitation) oblige his subjects to

carry to him, without a previous secret admonition of the person to be

accused, information about the secret sins of fellow-subjects that are

not harmful to others?

(a) If a sin is entirely secret, and the subjects have not renounced

their right to reputation in the sight of the prelate, the latter has

no right to give orders that he be informed at once, since the rule

given by Christ requires that a fraternal correction be first given. A

subject would be bound, therefore, if such orders were given, to obey

the divine injunction, rather than that of the prelate (Acts, v. 3, 4,

9).

(b) If a sin is entirely secret, but subjects have renounced their

right to receive first a private admonition, a prelate may require that

information be brought to him at once. This is the rule in certain

religious societies; but even in them a sin should not be reported to

the prelate if the sinner has already amended, nor should the higher

superior be informed if the immediate superior can take care of the

matter sufficiently. These religious have a right to their reputation.

(e) If a sin is not entirely secret, because there are some indications

(such as ill-repute or grounds for suspicion), a prelate may require

that information be brought to him immediately.

1290. If, after several private admonitions have been made, there is no

hope of success by this method, what should be done? (a) If it appears

that the other means prescribed by our Lord will be successful, they

should be tried, just as a physician has recourse to new remedies when

old ones have failed. (b) If it appears that any further efforts will

do harm rather than good, the attempt to correct a private sin that

harms only the sinner should be given up.

1291. The order to be followed in fraternal correction, after personal

reproof or remonstrance has failed, is as follows:

(a) One should enlist the services of one or two others to assist in

making the brotherly correction. The conversion of the culprit is more

important than his reputation with these others; whereas their

knowledge of the matter safeguards the corrector from the charge of

being a mischievous talebearer, should things go further, and it should

arouse the culprit to the need of correcting himself, before his case

is brought before the superior for correction.

(b) When other things have failed, recourse should be had to the

superior of the person at fault, if there is hope that this will prove

successful. If the superior is imprudent or given to wrath or is known

to dislike the person to be corrected, or if the latter would only be

enraged by a reproof from this superior, charity would urge one to say

nothing about the matter. Example: Titus makes himself intoxicated from

time to time. Balbus is the only one who knows this, and he tries to

correct Titus. But, as the latter denies the accusation, Balbus asks

Caius and Sempronius, friends of Titus, to be witnesses; and all three

of them make an effort to convert Titus. This correction also has no

effect, and so Balbus and the other two make the matter known to the

parents of Titus, that they may watch their son more carefully and keep

him away from occasions of drink.

1292. What are the duties of a superior to whom a subject has been

reported for fraternal correction? (a) He should try to discover the

truth of the matter. Means to this end are a consideration of the

character and motives of the accuser, the reply which the accused makes

in his own defense, and in case of necessity a confrontation of accuser

and accused, a cross-examination, etc. (I Cor., i. xi; Dan., xiii. 5).

Those who make a practice of gladly carrying tales to superiors are

disturbers of peace, and they should be given to understand that their

accusations are not wanted, and that they should mind their own

business.

(b) If the superior has reason to believe that the accusation in

question is true, he should use moderate remedial measures, while at

the same time preserving the good name of the person to be corrected.

For the information has been brought before him, not as judge, but as

father of the person accused, and hence public punishments or

corrections injurious to reputation must be avoided. Removal from an

office, a change of place and special vigilance may be used, when this

can be done prudently.

1293. Cases in which a subject may be reported to his superior for

fraternal correction without previous admonitions are not impossible;

for the law given by Christ concerning the order to be followed is

affirmative, and hence obliges only under the proper circumstances. (a)

Thus, if previous admonitions would be harmful, whereas an admonition

by the superior will be beneficial, recourse should be had at once to

the superior. (b) If an admonition by the superior will be more

advantageous, the other admonitions may be omitted. Thus, if the

superior is more revered by the person to be corrected and will be

listened to more readily, or if there is danger of delay in making

previous admonitions, it is better that the matter be brought before

the superior at once. What is said of the superior can be applied also

to some other pious and prudent person from whom a correction would be

better received.

1294. The obligation of fraternal correction by private individuals may

be summed up as follows: (a) One is bound to correct when one is

certain about a grave sin which will not be corrected except by

oneself, and when one has good reason to hope that the correction will

be profitable to the sinner and not unreasonably harmful to the

corrector. Those who interfere when these conditions are not present

are meddlesome or imprudent, rather than charitable. (b) One is bound

to report to a superior when one is certain about a grave sin which is

harmful to the community or which cannot be corrected so well by

private admonition, if one believes that it will not be reported except

by oneself, and that one’s report will be for the good of others and

not an undue detriment to oneself. Those who report of their own choice

when these conditions are not existent, are malicious tale-bearers or

rash news-carriers, rather than charitable accusers.

Art. 7: THE SINS AGAINST LOVE AND JOY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 34-36.)

1295. The sins against charity and its subordinate virtues can be

reduced to the following: (a) hatred, which is opposed to love; (b)

sloth and envy, which are contrary to the joy of charity; (c) discord

and schism, which are opposed to the peace of charity; (d) scandal,

which is the opposite of beneficence and fraternal correction.

1296. Hate.--Hate is an aversion of the will to something which the

intellect judges evil, that is, contrary to self. As there are two

kinds of love, so there are also two kinds of hate. (a) Hatred of

dislike (_odium abominationis_) is the opposite of love of desire, for,

as this love inclines to something as suitable and advantageous for

self, so hatred of dislike turns away from something, as being

considered unsuitable and harmful to self. (b) Hatred of enmity (_odium

inimicitiae_) is the opposite of love of benevolence, for, as this love

wishes good to the object of its affection, so hatred of enmity wishes

evil to the object of its dislike.

1297. Hatred of God.-A thing cannot be hated unless it is looked upon

as evil, and hence God cannot be hated except by those who regard Him

as evil to themselves.

(a) Thus, those who see the Divine Essence (i.e., the blessed), cannot

hate God, for His Essence is goodness itself, and, therefore, the

blessed can see in God only reasons for love. (b) Those who see God

obscurely through the things made by Him (i.e., wayfarers on earth),

cannot hate God considered as the author of effects that are in no way

displeasing to the will, such as existence, life, intelligence; but

they can hate God as the author of effects displeasing to their will,

such as law and punishment. Thus, no one can hate God because God has

given him being, for existence of itself is something good and

desirable; but a depraved will can hate God for having forbidden sin,

or for inflicting chastisements, or for permitting some evils to

accompany the blessings of life. That hatred of God is not a mere

possibility, the scriptures in many places attest: “The pride of them

that hate Thee ascendeth forever” (Ps, lxiii. 23), “Now they have seen

and hated both Me and My Father” (John, xv. 24).

1298. It should not be inferred from what has just been said that it is

not God in Himself that is hated, but only His works; nor that it is a

sin against God to dislike evils or even divine punishments.

(a) Thus, God Himself is not the principle or motive cause of the

hatred directed against Him, for in God there is no evil that can

produce dislike; but God is the term or object of the hatred aroused in

the sinner by the divine effects that displease him, as the texts given

above from scripture indicate. For example, a man hates his neighbor on

account of certain defects he perceives or thinks he perceives; the

defects are the principle, but the neighbor is the term of the hatred.

(b) Dislike of the evils that are in the world, or of chastisements

sent by God, is not dislike of God Himself, since God does not ask us

to love evil, but only to endure such evils as cannot be cured. Even

murmurs against Providence are usually manifestations of impatience,

not of hatred of Providence. It is only the sinner that dislikes God

Himself for permitting or inflicting evils, who is guilty of hatred of

God.

1299. Hatred of God of various kinds. (a) As regards the intention, it

is either interpretative or formal. Interpretative hatred is aversion

that is not intended directly or for its own sake, but only indirectly

and by reason of something else whose love is preferred. Formal hatred

is an aversion that is intended directly and expressly in itself. Every

mortal sin is an act of interpretative hatred of God, since mortal sin

consists in placing one’s own pleasure or interest above the friendship

of God; but it is only the special sin which attacks God directly that

constitutes formal hate. Thus, he who murders his enemy does not

directly intend dislike of God, but revenge; whereas the condemned

murderer who blasphemes God, because he is to be executed, directly

dislikes God. (b) As regards the degree of malice it contains, formal

hatred of God is either dislike or enmity. Dislike of God is the sin of

those who do not like some attribute of God; enmity towards God is the

sin of those who wish some evil to God. Thus, one who deliberately

wishes that God would sanction injustice dislikes the divine attribute

of justice, while an unjust man who wishes he might be rid of God and

His judgment is guilty of enmity to God.

1300. Hatred of God as a Special Sin.--(a) Interpretative hatred of God

is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every mortal sin;

but formal hatred is a special sin, and indeed one that is

comparatively rare, and that must be specially mentioned in confession.

This is a sin which is distinct, not only from the sins against the

other theological virtues (e.g., unbelief, despair), but also from the

sins against the other objects of charity (e.g., hatred of the

neighbor).

(b) Formal hatred of God is not a special sin against the Holy Ghost

(see 899); but its malice pervades every such sin, and it is thus a

general sin against the Holy Ghost. For example, presumption is a

dislike of God’s law which requires that one must attain salvation

through the observance of the commandments; rejection of the known

truth is a dislike of God’s revelation.

1301. The Gravity of Hatred of God.-(a) It is a mortal sin from its

nature, and can never be venial on account of the smallness of the

injury, but only on account of lack of deliberation or consent. Dislike

of even one attribute of God is a grave injury, for everything

pertaining to God is perfect and infinitely lovable. (b) Hatred of God

is the worst of all mortal sins; for it is directly opposed to God (the

supreme good) and to charity (the most excellent virtue in a creature),

whereas other mortal sins offend against these goods only indirectly.

1302. The comparison just made between hatred of God and other sins

supposes that the other sins do not include hatred of God, for it is

clear that simple hatred of God existing in the will is less serious

than a composite sin, such as external blasphemy uttered to manifest

internal hatred of God. (a) Thus, hatred of God without unbelief is

worse than unbelief without hatred of God; (b) hatred of God without

hatred of the neighbor is worse than hatred of the neighbor without

hatred of God.

1303. Degrees of Malice in Hatred of God.--(a) A new species of sin is

added to hatred of God, when out of hatred one proceeds to sin against

creatures, or to commit other offenses against God Himself. Example:

Titus hates God, and therefore persecutes those who believe in God, and

also blasphemes God. (b) A new degree of malice is added to hatred of

God when one proceeds from dislike to enmity, or when the circumstances

of person, place, manner, etc., aggravate the malice. Example: Hatred

of God outwardly manifested adds the evil of scandal; not so hatred of

God that is concealed.

1304. Hatred of Creatures.--All dislike of God is sinful, because there

is nothing in God that merits dislike. But in creatures imperfections

are found as well as perfections.

(a) Hence, dislike of the imperfections of our neighbor (i.e., of all

that is the work of the devil or of his own sinfulness), is not against

charity, but according to charity; for it is the same thing to dislike

another’s evil as to wish his good. Thus, God Himself is said to hate

detractors, that is, detraction (Rom., i. 30), and Christ bids His

followers hate their parents who would be an impediment to their

progress in holiness, that is, the sinful opposition of those parents

(Luke, xiv. 26). Only when dislike is carried beyond reason is it

sinful. Thus, a wife who dislikes her husband’s habit of drunkenness so

much that she will not give him a necessary medicine on account of the

alcohol it contains, carries her dislike to extremes.

(b) Dislike of the perfections of nature or of grace in our neighbor

(i.e., of anything that is the work of God in him), is contrary to

charity. Thus, God does not hate the detractor himself, nor should

children ever hate the person of a parent, or the natural relationship

he holds to themselves, no matter how bad the parent may be. As St.

Augustine says: “One should love the sinner, but hate his vices.”

1305. The same principles apply to dislike of self. (a) Thus, one

should dislike one’s own imperfections, for they are the enemies of

one’s soul. So, contrition is defined as a hatred and detestation of

one’s vices, and it is a virtue and an act of charity to self. (b) One

should not dislike the good one has, except in so far as it is

associated with evil. Thus, one should not regret one’s honesty, even

if by reason of it one loses an opportunity to make a large sum of

money; but one may regret having married, if one’s choice has been

unfortunate and has made one’s life miserable.

1306. Should a person dislike in others their opposition to himself?

(a) If their opposition is unjust, he should dislike it, for it is then

a sin in them and an injury to himself, and charity to them and to self

requires that he should dislike what is harmful to all concerned. (b)

If their opposition is just, he should like it, for it is virtuous in

them and beneficial to himself: “Better are the wounds of a friend than

the deceitful kisses of an enemy” (Prov., xxvii. 6).

1307. Direct enmity to self is not possible, for nature inclines each

one so strongly to love of self that it is impossible for anyone to

wish evil to himself as evil: “No one hateth his own flesh” (Ephes., v.

29). But indirectly a person may be at enmity with himself, inasmuch as

he wishes evil under the guise of good; and hence St. Augustine,

commenting on the words, “He that loveth his life shall lose it” (John,

xii, 25), says: “If you love self wrongly, you hate it; if you hate

self rightly, you love it.” This indirect enmity to self happens in two

ways. (a) A person sometimes wishes himself what is not a true, but

only an apparent good, as when he chooses the satisfaction of revenge

rather than that of pardon of injuries. (b) A person sometimes chooses

what is good, not for his true, but for his lower self, as when he

decides to gratify the body at the expense of the soul.

1308. Is it ever lawful to wish evil to self or to others? (a) It is

not lawful to wish anyone evil as evil, for even God in punishing the

lost does not will their punishment as it is evil to them, but as it

contains the good of justice. Hence, it is contrary to charity to wish

that a criminal be put to death, if one’s wish does not go beyond the

sufferings and loss of life the criminal will endure. (b) It is lawful

to wish evil as good, or, in other words, to wish misfortunes that are

blessings in disguise. Thus, one may wish that a neighbor lose his arm,

if this is necessary to save his life.

1309. One may easily be self-deceived in wishing evil to one’s neighbor

under the pretext that it is really good one desires, for the true

intention may be hatred or revenge. Hence, the following conditions

must be present when one wishes evil as good:

(a) On the part of the subject (i.e., of the person who wills the

evil), the intention must be sincerely charitable, proceeding from a

desire that the neighbor be benefitted. Thus, it is lawful to wish that

a gambler may meet with reverses, if what is intended is, not his loss,

but his awakening to the need of a new kind of amusement. St. Paul

rejoiced that he had made the Corinthians sorrowful, because their

sorrow worked repentance in them (II Cor., vii. 7-11). Of course, the

desire of a neighbor’s good does not confer the right to wrong him, for

the end does not justify the means.

(b) On the part of the object (i.e., of the evil which is wished to

another), it must be compensated for by the good which is intended. It

is not lawful to desire the death of another on account of the property

one expects to inherit, for the neighbor’s life is more important than

private gain; but it is lawful to wish, out of interest in the common

welfare, that a criminal be captured and punished, for it is only by

the vindication of law that public tranquillity can be secured (Gal.,

v. 12).

1310. Is it lawful to wish the death of self or of a neighbor for some

private good of the one whose death is wished? (a) If the good is a

spiritual one and more important than the spiritual good contained in

the desire to live, it is lawful to desire death. Thus, it is lawful to

wish to die in order to enter into a better life, or to be freed from

the temptations and sinfulness of life on earth. But it is not lawful

to wish to die in order to spare a few individuals the scandal they

take from one’s life, if that life is needed by others as a source of

edification (Philip., i. 21 sqq.). (b) If the good is a temporal one

but sufficiently important, it does not seem unlawful to desire death.

Thus, we should not blame a person suffering from a painful and

incurable disease, which makes him a burden to himself and to others,

if, with resignation to the divine will, he prays for the release of

death; for “death is better than a bitter life” (Ecclus., xxx, 17). But

lack of perfect health or a feeling of weariness is not a good reason

for wishing to die, especially if one has dependents, or is useful to

others.

1311. Is it ever lawful to wish spiritual evil to anyone? (a) Spiritual

evil of iniquity may never be desired, for the desire of sin, mortal or

venial, is a sin itself (see 242), and it cannot be charitable, for

charity rejoiceth not with iniquity (I Cor., xiii. 6). It is wrong,

therefore, to wish that our neighbor fall into sin, offend God,

diminish or forfeit his grace, or lose his soul. On the contrary, we

are commanded to pray that he be delivered from such evils. (b) The

good that God draws out of spiritual evil may be desired. Some are

permitted to fall into sin, or be tempted, that they may become more

humble, more charitable, more vigilant, more fervent. It seems that the

permission of sin in the case of the elect is one of the benefits of

God’s predestination, inasmuch as God intends it to be an occasion of

greater virtue and stronger perseverance. It is not lawful to wish that

God permit anyone to fall into sin, but it is lawful to wish that, if

God has permitted sin, good will follow after it.

1312. Gravity of the Sin of Hatred of Neighbor.--(a) Hatred, whether of

dislike or of enmity, is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is

directly opposed to the virtue of charity, which is the life of the

soul.

(b) Dislike, if enmity is not joined to it, is rarely in fact a mortal

sin. Aversions and antipathies for others usually are either

indeliberate, or have to do with what are real or fancied defects in

others. Dislike is a mortal sin only when one despises another so much

that one deliberately loathes even that which is of divine provenance

in the other, or dislikes a real imperfection so immoderately as to

inflict serious injury (e.g., by refusing pardon or the common signs of

charity, by giving grave scandal, etc.)

wishes only a small harm (e.g., the loss of a small sum of money), or

because one wishes harm, even a great harm (e.g., the commission of

mortal sin), without full deliberation. Enmity is a mortal sin,

however, when one deliberately wishes a grave evil (e.g., mortal sin or

the loss of reputation) to one’s neighbor.

1313. Hatred Compared with Other Sins Against the Neighbor.--(a) Hatred

is a graver sin than other internal sins against the neighbor, such as

envy, anger; for, while each of these latter attacks some particular

kind of good of the neighbor or only to a limited degree, hatred may be

directed against any good and knows no measure. Thus, covetousness is

directed against the external goods or possessions of a neighbor, while

hate may extend to either internal or external goods. Envy is opposed

to the neighbor’s good relatively, in so far as it is considered an

obstacle to one’s own glory, but hate detests another’s good

absolutely. The hater finds his satisfaction, not in any profit derived

for self, but in his aversion for another’s good, and the harm that is

wished his neighbor. This comparison here made should be understood,

other things being equal, so that hatred of another’s life is

contrasted with envy of his life, etc.; for, if the goods are not the

same, hatred may be a lesser sin, as when hatred of a neighbor’s

temporal good is compared with envy of his spiritual good. (b) Hatred

of a neighbor is a more serious sin than external offenses done against

him, for hatred sets the will wrong, and it is in the will that sin

takes root: “He who hates his brother is a murderer” (I John, iii. 15).

The external act, on the contrary (e.g., killing an innocent man), is

not a formal sin when the will is guiltless. (c) Hatred is a less

harmful sin to the neighbor than external offenses; for example,

internal dislike and malevolence will not break any bones, as may

happen from a severe blow.

1314. Why is hatred not numbered among the capital vices? As was said

above (see 269), a capital vice is one from which naturally and usually

other species of sin take their origin. Now, hatred of God or the

neighbor, in the natural and usual course of sin, does not precede, but

rather follows other sins. Hence, hatred is not a capital sin. This

will appear more clearly if we distinguish two kinds of hatred:

(a) Hate of that which is truly evil and opposed to the true good of

man (e.g., hate of vice), is naturally prior to other disinclinations,

since rational nature first inclines one to love its good and hate its

evil (see 1106).

(b) Hate of that which is not evil (as hate of God or of the neighbor),

is naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already

corrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that

the whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before

hatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the

freedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.

1315. In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that hatred of

the neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as

was remarked above (1299) concerning sins against God.

1179. The order of charity as between kinsfolk gives preference of