1052. Servile fear, as to its circumstan_Moral theology

circumstance of the state of the person who has servile fear is good,

when the person is a friend of God; it is evil, when that person is an

enemy of God. (b) The circumstance of the manner in which servile fear

is elic[i]ted is good, if punishment is not feared as the greatest evil;

it is bad, if punishment is feared as the greatest evil, for then one

makes self the principal end of life, and would be disposed to sin

without restraint, were there no punishment.

1053. The effect of evil circumstances on servile fear itself is as

follows:

(a) Servile fear is not rendered evil because of the evil state of the

person who fears. Just as a person who is habitually foolish may

actually say or do something wise, so a person who is habitually wicked

may perform virtuous acts. Mortal sin is no more a defect of servile

fear in a sinner than it is a defect of faith or hope in one who has

faith or hope without works; neither faith nor hope nor fear is to be

blamed for the state of mortal sin, but the person who has those gifts

of God is at fault. True, the sinner, by reason of his lack of love of

God, does not put fear of sin above fear of punishment. But from this

it does not follow that he puts fear of punishment above fear of sin,

for he may fear punishment absolutely (i.e., without making any

comparison between the evil of sin and the evil of punishment). The

fear which makes no comparisons is good, or else we must say that only

filial fear avails, which, as said above, is not true.

(b) Servile fear is rendered evil as to the manner in which it is

performed, when one compares sin and punishment, dislikes only the

latter, and avoids sin only to escape punishment. This kind of fear is

slavish, for it makes one do something good unwillingly, like a slave

forced to labor against his wishes, whereas God is pleased only with

service that comes from a willing spirit (I Par., xxviii. 9).

1054. Hence, we must distinguish the following cases of servile fear:

(a) Fear of punishment is purely servile when it makes a person avoid

sin, but does not make him put away his love of God.

(b) Fear of punishment is not purely servile, when it causes a sinner

not only to cease from sin, but to give up his affection for sin; this

fear is distinct from charity, but prepares for it: “The fear of the

Lord driveth out sin” (Ecclus., i. 27).

a just man, who already detests sin as an offense against God, to

detest it as involving punishment from God. This fear exists along with

charity, for the love of God and the right love of self are not

exclusive. But, as charity increases, servile fear must decrease; the

more a person loves God, the less is he concerned about his own good,

the more confidently does he hope in God, and hence the less does he

fear penalty.

1055. There are two degrees of filial fear to be distinguished:

(a) Initial fear is that of beginners in charity. On account of past

sins, they fear punishments from God; on account of their present love

of God, they fear they may be again separated from Him. The second fear

is stronger with them, and it commands that the first fear be aroused

to hold the will more firmly against whatever might separate from love.

Of this fear it is said: “The fear of God is the beginning of His love”

(Ecclus., xxv. 16).

(b) Perfected fear is that of those who are established in charity. The

more the love of God sways the heart, the more is every other love,

that of self included, subjugated to the love of God, and the less is

one troubled by the thoughts of evils that may befall self. Even in

this present life some souls are so strong in the love of God that all

servile fear disappears: “I am sure that neither death nor life ...

shall be able to separate us from the love of God” (Rom., viii. 38,

39); “Perfect charity casteth out fear, because fear hath pain, and he

that feareth is not perfected in charity” (I John, iv. 18).

1056. The perfected fear of God has two acts:

(a) In the present life, where it is possible that one may offend God

and lose His friendship, one dreads the commission of offense and the

loss of friendship. This fear should be always with us: “Keep His fear

and grow old therein” (Ecclus., ii. 6). With the growth of charity

there is a corresponding growth in the fear of separation from God,

because the more ardently God is loved, the more one realizes the

greatness of the loss sustained through sin.

(b) In eternal life, where sin and separation from God are impossible,

the blessed do not fear these evils: “He that shall hear Me, shall rest

without terror, and shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils”

(Prov., i. 33). But in the presence of the Divine Majesty the Angels

and Saints are filled with awe and reverence: “I saw them that had

overcome the beast, singing: Who shall not fear Thee, O Lord, and

magnify Thy name?” (Apoc., xv. 3, 4); “The pillars of heaven tremble

and dread at His beck” (Job, xxvi. 11); “Through whom (Christ) the

Angels praise Thy majesty, the Dominations worship it, the Powers are

in awe” (Preface of the Mass). This holy fear is unending, for the

infinite distance between God and His creatures, His

incomprehensibility to them, will never cease: “The fear of the Lord is

holy, enduring forever and ever” (Ps. xviii. 10).

1057. The filial fear of God is identical with the Gift of fear of the

Lord, spoken of in scripture: “He shall be filled with the spirit of

the fear of the Lord” (Is., xi. 3). The function of the Gifts is to

make the soul docile to the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, and to

supplement or serve the habits of virtue, and both these benefits are

conferred by filial fear.

(a) This fear makes the soul ready to follow impulses prompted by God,

for through it we subject ourselves to God as our Father, revering His

wondrous majesty and fearing to stray from Him. Indeed, this is the

first of the Gifts, for the realization of one’s nothingness before God

is the starting-point of promptitude in receiving His teaching and

guidance.

(b) Filial fear is a principle from which proceed acts of all the moral

virtues, inasmuch as the reverence for God’s surpassing majesty and

respect for His almighty power and justice incline one to lay aside

pride, intemperance, and every vice, and exercise good works that are

pleasing to Him: “The root of wisdom is to fear the Lord, and the

branches thereof are long-lived” (Ecclus., i. 27).

hope, for these two complement each other, as do the emotions of hope

and fear. Hope aspires to conquer the heights of heaven, and feels that

God is on its side; fear reminds one of the greatness of God and of the

dangers of over-confidence. Each then is necessary to balance the

other: “The Lord taketh pleasure in them that fear Him, and in them

that hope in His mercy” (Ps. cxlvi. 11).

1058. To the Gift of Fear correspond the first Beatitude and the fruits

of modesty, continency and chastity. (a) Filial fear makes one realize

that all but God is as nothing, and hence that true greatness must be

sought, not in the self-esteem of pride, nor in the external pomp of

riches and honors, but in God alone: “Some trust in chariots, and some

in horses; but we will call upon the name of the Lord our God” (Ps.

xix. 8). This is the disposition of soul to which is promised the First

Beatitude: “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom

of heaven” (Matt, v. 3). To the first of the Gifts, in the order of

preparation, corresponds the first of the Beatitudes. (b) Filial fear

makes one dread the thought of separation from God, and hence it leads

one to use temporal things with moderation, or to abstain from them

entirely, To it, then, pertain the Fruits of the Spirit, which St. Paul

names “modesty, continency, chastity” (Gal, v. 23).

1059. The Sins Against Hope.--There are two sins contrary to hope: (a)

despair, which is the opposite of hope by defect; (b) presumption,

which is the opposite of hope by excess.

1060. Since hope has many elements of which it is composed, despair--or

the falling short of hope--may happen in various ways. (a) Hope is a

turning of the soul towards beatitude, and so the omission of the act

of hope may be called despair (negative despair). (b) Hope regards

beatitude as its good, and so aversion from divine things may be called

despair (despair improperly so-called). (c) Hope pursues a good that is

difficult of attainment, and so he who is dejected by the difficulty is

said to despair. (d) Hope firmly believes that its goal may be reached,

and hence one who doubts the possibility of success in the quest of

heaven is in despair. (e) Hope has the expectation of one day entering

into eternal life, and hence he is guilty of despair who admits that

salvation will be secured by others, but denies that he himself should

expect it.

1061. Definition of Despair.--Leaving out of consideration negative

despair and despair improperly so-called, the sin we are now

considering may be defined as follows: “Despair is an act of the will

by which one turns away from the beatitude one desires, not under the

aspect in which it appears as good, but because one apprehends it as

impossible, or too difficult, or never to be realized, and under this

aspect as evil.”

(a) Despair is an “act of the will,” and as such it differs from the

intellectual sin of unbelief. The Novatians, who rejected the

forgiveness of sins, and a heretic who denies the future life, are

guilty by these acts of sin against faith, though of course one who

disbelieves must also despair (see 1029, 751).

(b) Despair is a positive “turning away from beatitude.” It differs,

therefore, from the mere omission of the act of hope or from an act of

feeble hope, as well as from the sins against the moral virtues, which

consist primarily in a turning towards some created good.

about other things.

(d) Despair turns away from God “apprehended as good and desired as the

beatitude of man,” for no one is said to despair of what he considers

evil or undesirable. Hence, despair differs from aversions and fears;

such as hatred of God (which regards Him as evil) or fear of God (which

thinks of Him, not as a rewarder, but as the author of chastisement).

(e) Despair, however, does not reject God, because He is good and

desirable, but because He is apprehended as a “beatitude that is

impossible,” or too difficult for one, or as a good that one will never

attain to. For a person does not turn away from that which he regards

as the object of his happiness, unless he considers that there is some

inconvenience in seeking after it.

1062. Is despondency about things other than God a sin? (a) It is the

sin of pusillanimity, when it makes a person abandon hope of something

which he is capable of attaining and which he should aim at, as when

students, on account of the labor required, give up hope of learning a

certain subject which they have been assigned. This sin will be treated

in the section on Fortitude.

(b) It is no sin, if a person gives up the expectation of something

about which he has no reason to hope, or which he is not obliged to

hope for. Examples: Caius gives up the hope of getting an education,

because he lacks money to pay the expenses. Balbus ceases to pray for

health, because he thinks it is not God’s will to grant that request.

Titus abandons the expectation of a long life, and even at times wishes

for death.

1063. To wish for death may include despair of salvation or other sin.

(a) If this wish means that one has no desire for any kind of existence

(as when one desires extinction), manifestly eternal life is not looked

for, and hence there is despair. It should be noted, however, that such

expressions as, “Would that I had never been born!” “Would that I were

out of existence!” often signify nothing more than weariness of life on

earth, or disgust with conditions.

(b)If the wish is not for annihilation, but only that God send death,

it is not a sin of despair; but if the wish is inordinate, some other

species of sin is committed--for example, if the person wishing to die

is not resigned or submissive to God’s will in the matter, he is guilty

of rebellion against Providence, and his sin is grave, if there is

sufficient reflection and consent.

act of virtue, as when, out of a longing for heaven, one deliberately

desires to be taken from this world, if this be pleasing to God. Thus,

St. Paul said that he desired “to be dissolved and to be with Christ”

(Philip., i. 23).

1064. Certain acts of fear or sadness must not be mistaken for despair:

(a) acts that are praiseworthy, like servile and filial fear spoken of

above (see 1048 sqq.), grief over sin, etc.; (b) acts that are a trial

from God, such as spiritual desolations in holy persons, scruples about

forgiveness of sins, anxieties about predestination, perseverance, or

the Judgment; (c) acts that are sinful, such as worldly fear, fear of

God that is purely servile, timidity (i.e., an excessive dread of death

or other evils). Those who fear that, on account of their frailty, they

may not acquire a good habit or overcome an evil one, are guilty of

pusillanimity. Those who, on account of sadness, neglect prayer are

guilty of spiritual sloth.

1065. There are two species of despair, namely, the despair of unbelief

and the despair that is found even in those that have faith.

(a) The despair of unbelief arises from a judgment contrary to faith,

as when one holds as general principles that salvation is impossible,

that God is not merciful to sinners, that all sins or certain sins

cannot be forgiven. Thus, St. Paul designates the pagans who do not

accept the Final Resurrection as those “who have no hope” (I Thess.,

iv. 12).

(b) The despair of believers arises from a judgment formed by them

which is not directly opposed to faith, but which is erroneous, and is

induced by some wicked habit or passion. Example: Titus lives a very

disorderly life, and so thinks that he is predestined to hell, or that

he is too weak to repent and persevere. Since his predestination and

perseverance are not matters of faith, he is not guilty of unbelief by

his judgment about them, but the judgment itself is wrong, and one

which he has no right to form or act on.

1066. Signs which indicate that a penitent suffering depression has not

been guilty of despair are: (a) if he retains the faith and has not

abandoned the usual practices of religion and piety; (b) if he retains

the faith, but has given up some of its practices through

discouragement or weakness, but intends to repent. His sin is sloth or

cowardice or attachment to some vice.

1067. Hence, the erroneous judgment that precedes despair is similar to

that which precedes every act of sin, namely, it is always practically

erroneous, though not always speculatively so.

(a) Judgment is speculatively erroneous with regard to duty, when one

decides that in general something is lawful which is unlawful; or vice

versa, as when one thinks that lying is pleasing to God. It is clear

that this kind of error need not precede sin, or else all sinners would

err against the faith.

(b) Judgment is practically erroneous about duty, when a person decides

that here and now he should do something which in fact he should not

do, as when he knows well that lying is displeasing to God, and yet

makes up his mind that, all things considered, he ought to tell a lie.

It is clear that this kind of error precedes every sin, for no one

wills something unless his judgment has first told him that he ought to

will it. The sinner first judges in a particular case that he should

prefer the good of pleasure or of utility to the good of virtue, or he

first neglects to consider the right manner in which he should act:

“They err that work evil” (Prov., xiv. 22).

1068. The Malice of Despair.--(a) Despair is a sin, for Holy Scripture

declares woe to the fainthearted, who trust not God and lose patience

(Ecclus., ii. 15, 16), and it holds up the despair of Cain and Judas

for reprehension. The malice of despair appears in this, that it is

based on a perverse judgment that one ought not to labor for salvation

in confident expectation, despite God’s promise and command to the

contrary. (b) It is a mortal sin according to its nature, for it

destroys the theological virtue of hope, turns man away from God his

Last End, and leads to irreparable loss.

1069. In the following cases despair is not a mortal sin, nor at times

even a venial sin. (a) When there is not sufficient reflection, despair

is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who are ignorant of the sinfulness

of despair, those who on account of great discouragement or fear do not

fully advert to their despair of amendment, do not sin gravely. Despair

is often a result of insanity. (b) When there is not full consent of

the will, despair is not a grave sin. Examples: Those who, on account

of a melancholy disposition, inclination to pessimism, past sins, etc.,

are tempted to give up the hope of salvation, are not guilty of sin,

provided they fight against these suggestions of the mind or

imagination.

1070. The gravity of despair as compared with other sins is as follows:

(a) Despair is a greater sin than offenses against the moral virtues,

for the chief inclination of despair is aversion from God, whereas the

chief inclination of the latter kind of sins is conversion towards

creatures. Thus, a person who drinks excessively does not primarily

intend offense against God, but his own enjoyment or escape from

certain worries.

(b) Despair in itself is less serious than the sins of unbelief and

hatred of God; for, while despair is opposed to God as He is our good,

the other two sins are opposed to God’s own truth and goodness.

with reference to the danger it contains for the sinner; for it

paralyzes effort and resists remedies: “Why is my sorrow become

perpetual and my wound desperate, so as to refuse to be healed?” (Jer.,

xv. 18) “If thou lose hope, being weary in the day of distress, thy

strength shall be diminished” (Prov., xxiv. 10). Despair is, therefore,

a sin against the Holy Ghost, a sort of attempt at spiritual suicide.

But (see 900) it is not unpardonable and may be overcome by divine

grace.

1071. It is important to know the causes of despair, for this knowledge

enables us to distinguish it from the mystical state known as “the dark

night of the soul,” and to prescribe suitable remedies. Despair comes

from one’s own fault, whereas mystical purgation from God is a

preparation for a higher state of divine union. The causes of despair

can be reduced to two, luxury and sloth.

(a) The secondary characteristic of a hopeful pursuit of heaven is

courage, the adventurous spirit which foregoes ease and comfort for the

sake of higher things, despising the danger and difficulty. Hence, the

vice of lust, since it makes one love bodily delights and disregard or

underestimate those that are spiritual, is a cause of despair, as well

as of other sins opposed to the spiritual life (Gal., v. 17).

(b) The chief and most distinctive characteristic of hope is its

cheerful confidence of success. Hence, the vice of sloth, since it is

sadness weighing down the soul and making it unwilling to think rightly

or to exert itself, is the principal cause of despair (Prov., xvii. 22).

1072. The apparent despair that is a trial to holy persons can be

distinguished, therefore, from the sin of despair, especially by two

signs: (a) though they are spiritually desolate and find no joy in

religious practices, these persons do not turn to unlawful delights for

consolation, but retain their dislike for lower pleasures; (b) though

overcome with dismay at the thought of their own imperfection and of

God’s holiness, they do not so lose heart as to give over their

exercises of piety (cf. St. John of the Cross, _The Dark Night_, Bk. I,

e. 9 ff.).

1073. Spiritual writers make the following recommendations for cases of

spiritual desolation: (a) the afflicted persons should understand that

the deprivation of former sensible devotion is a sign of God’s love and

has been experienced by the Saints, and should, therefore, possess

their souls in peace, leaving to God the time and manner of His

heavenly visitation; (b) they should not burden themselves with new and

heavier mortifications, lest they be overcome by too great sorrow, but

should go on with their accustomed good works, and realize that, though

bitter to them, these works are now all the more pleasing to God

(Ibid., c. 10).

1074. Some Remedies for the Sin of Despair.--(a) If the cause is lust,

one should learn that spiritual joys are nobler and more enduring than

the joys of the flesh, and should take the means to sacrifice the lower

in favor of the higher.

(b) If the cause of despair is spiritual sloth, one should meditate on

the greatness of God’s power, mercy and love, and should avoid whatever

fosters undue sadness, “lest he be swallowed up with over-much sorrow”

(II Cor., ii. 7). Thus, those who are tormented by the thoughts of past

sins or future temptations must subject their scruples to direction,

and remember the mercy shown to the good thief, to Magdalene, and other

penitents; those who have lost courage because they read spiritual

books of a rigorous or terrifying nature, or have been advised to

attempt that for which they were unsuited, should seek more prudent

instruction and counsel; those who are naturally nervous or melancholy,

should employ such therapeutical or preventive measures as are useful

or necessary. All should follow the direction of St. Peter to labor the

more, that by good works they may make sure their calling and election

(II Pet., i. 10).

1075. Presumption is the name given to certain acts of the intellect.

(a) Sometimes it signifies an arrogant self-esteem, as when an ignorant

person thinks he is able to dispute with a learned scholar. (b)

Sometimes it is a judgment about the affairs of others made rashly or

out of fear: “A troubled conscience always presumeth grievous things”

(Wis., xvii. 10). (c) Sometimes it is a conclusion based on probable

evidence, and which by jurists is called violent, strong, or weak

presumption according to the evidence (see 658).

1076. Presumption is also a name given to various acts of the will. (a)

It is used, in a good sense, to signify an excellent confidence or

hope, which seems rash according to human standards, but is really well

founded, since it rests on the immensity of the divine goodness. Thus,

Judith prayed: “O God of the heavens, Creator of the waters and Lord of

the whole creation, hear me a poor wretch, making supplication to Thee,

and presuming on Thy mercy” (Jud., ix. 17). Thus, too, Abraham hoped

against hope (Rom., iv. 18). (b) Generally, however, the word

“presumption” is applied to acts of the will in a bad sense, and

indicates the purpose to do what exceeds one’s powers.

1077. Here we are concerned only with presumption as it is an act of

the will choosing to do what exceeds one’s power. “Power” may he

understood in three ways, and thus there are three kinds of sins all

bearing the name of presumption.

(a) If a person chooses to overstep his moral power (i.e., his right of

action), he is guilty of the general sin of presumption, which is not a

special category of sin, but a circumstance common to any kind of sin

in which one acts with full knowledge, and without subjection to any

fear or coercion. Hence, in Canon Law it is said in various places: “If

anyone shall presume to transgress” (i.e., if anyone shall

coldbloodedly transgress).

(b) If a person wishes to accomplish by his own efforts something so

great and difficult that it surpasses his physical powers, he is guilty

of the special sin of presumption that is opposed to the moral virtue

of magnanimity or greatness of soul, which attempts great things for

which it is suited. Thus, he is presumptuous who undertakes a

profession, when he has no sufficient knowledge of its duties (cf.

Luke, xiv. 28 sqq.). This may be called the moral sin of presumption.

even the divine power to confer, one is guilty of the special sin of

presumption that is opposed to the theological virtue of hope, which

expects from God only such things as are worthy of God and as God has

promised. Thus, he who looks forward to a free admission into eternal

bliss, without repentance or obedience, does injury both to the

character of God and to the virtue of hope. It is this special sin of

presumption that we are now considering. It may be called the

theological sin of presumption.

1078. Definition of Presumption.--The theological sin of presumption

may be defined as follows: “An act of the will by which one rashly

expects to obtain eternal happiness or the means thereto.” (a) It is an

act of the will, and hence is distinct from intellectual sins, such as

disbelief in the justice of God or the necessity of repentance. (b) It

is an act of pleasing expectation, and so differs generically from

fear, which is an act of dreadful expectation. (c) It is a rash

expectation, and so is specifically opposed to hope, which is

well-founded expectation.

1079. The objects of presumption are material and formal.

(a) The material object is eternal happiness and the means thereto,

such as forgiveness of sin, observance of the Commandments, etc. This

object by extension would include also such extraordinary supernatural

gifts as the hypostatic union, equality in glory with the Mother of

God, etc.; for it would be rash to expect against His will what God has

made unique privileges.

(b) The formal object, or motive, of presumption is divine mercy not

joined with justice, or divine power not regulated by wisdom, as when

one hopes for heaven because one reasons that God is too merciful to be

a just judge of sinners. The motive by extension would include also the

unaided power of human nature relied on as equal to the task of working

out salvation, as when a man feels so confident of his own virtue and

his security against temptation that he thinks he can dispense with

prayer and all appointed means of grace and yet save his soul.

Similarly, a person is presumptuous if he feels that it is absolutely

impossible for him to be lost, because he has received Baptism or other

Sacraments.

1080. Presumption is rash, therefore, for the following reasons: (a)

because it leads one to expect what is impossible according to the

absolute or ordinary power of God (e.g., to share in some divine

attribute, to sit at the right hand of Christ in glory), or (b) because

it makes one expect to obtain supernatural goods in ways other than

those ordained by God (e.g., to obtain forgiveness without repentance,

to obtain glory without merits or grace).

1081. The nature of presumption as compared with temptation of God and

blasphemous hope is as follows: (a) they are alike, inasmuch as all

three wrongly expect something from God; (b) they differ, for

presumption looks towards salvation and one’s own happiness, whereas

temptation of God seeks rashly some sign from God as a proof that He is

wise, good, powerful, etc., or that the person is innocent, holy, etc.,

and blasphemous hope expects that God will help one in working revenge

or committing other sin.

1082. The Malice of Presumption.-(a) It is a sin, because it is an act

of the will agreeable to false intellectual judgments, namely, that God

will pardon the impenitent or grant eternal life to those who have not

labored for it. (b) It is a mortal sin, since it does grave injury to

the divine attributes. We cannot hope too much in God, but we can

expect what a perfect God cannot grant; in this latter respect--that

is, in its contempt of God’s majesty and justice--consists the offense

of presumption. (c) It is a sin against the Holy Ghost, because it

makes one despise the grace of God, repentance, etc., as if they were

not necessary.

1083. The gravity of presumption as compared with other sins, is as

follows:

(a) It is graver than sins against the moral virtues, because it is

directly against God. Thus, theological presumption, being injurious to

the power of God, is a more serious offense than moral presumption,

which is an exaggeration of the power of man.

(b) It is less grave than despair, for, while presumption is a

disregard of God’s vindictive justice, despair is a disregard of His

mercy, and God’s vindictive justice is due to the sins of man, His

mercy to His own goodness.

God, which, as said above, are more wicked than despair (see 1070).

1084. Presumption and Unbelief.--(a) Presumption is joined with

unbelief whenever it proceeds from a speculatively false judgment about

matters of faith. Persons, however, who are in error (e.g., Pelagians,

Lutherans, Calvinists, etc.), may be in good faith, and hence guiltless

of the formal sin of presumption. Examples: Caius expects to win heaven

by his own unaided efforts (Pelagian presumption). Balbus expects to be

equal in glory to the greatest Saints, and to be saved by the merits of

Christ without repentance or observance of the Commandments (Lutheran

presumption). Titus expects to be saved on the strength of wearing

scapulars, practising certain devotions, or giving alms, while he

wholly disregards church duties and important Commandments (Pharisaic

presumption). Sempronius thinks that all members of his sect are

predestined, and hence concerns himself little about the Commandments,

being persuaded that all must end well with the elect (Calvinistic

presumption).

(b) Presumption is committed without unbelief, when it proceeds from a

practical judgment that one should act as if salvation were obtainable

without merits or repentance, or as if natural efforts were alone

sufficient, although speculatively one does not accept such errors (see

1067). The same is true when presumption springs from a failure to

consider the divine justice or the established means of obtaining

salvation.

1085. Presumption and Loss of the Virtue of Hope.--(a) Presumption

properly so-called (i.e., hope of the impossible) takes away the virtue

of hope, for it removes the motive and reasonableness of the virtue;

now, the essence of true hope is a reasonable expectation, just as the

essence of faith is assent to divine authority. Hence, he who expects

future blessedness unreasonably (i.e., through his own efforts alone or

through exaggerated mercy exercised by God), is not hopeful, but

presumptuous.

(b) Presumption improperly so-called (i.e., hope of the uncertain) does

not take away the virtue of hope, since it does not remove the motive

of hope. Thus, one who commits sin, trusting to go to confession and to

make restitution after he has enjoyed the benefits of wrongdoing, is

presumptuous in the sense that he puts himself in a state of sin, for

it is uncertain whether the time to repent will be granted him.

However, he is relying on the mercy of God, which never abandons man

during life, and not on his own efforts, or on pardon given freely. He

is guilty of a want of charity towards self, and of injustice to his

neighbor, rather than of a want of hope.

1086. Presumption properly so-called is a sin rarely committed by

Catholics. For (a) the presumption of unbelief is excluded by their

faith in the justice of God and in the necessity of repentance and good

works; (b) the presumption that is not the offspring of erroneous

doctrines is also unusual, because even those who go on sinning with

the expectation of being saved in the end, generally have the purpose

of repenting at some future date.

1087. Is a sin worse because committed with the hope that later it will

be pardoned? (a) If, at the moment of sin, a person has the intention

to continue in sin, though he hopes for pardon, he is guilty of

presumption, and his sin is made worse. (b) If he has the intention of

sinning, but hopes for pardon, and is resolved to repent later on as a

means to pardon, he is not guilty of presumption. The intention not to

continue in sin diminishes the sin, for it shows that one is not so

strongly attached to evil.

1088. The intention to sin now and repent later varies in malice

according to circumstances.

(a) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is concomitant as regards the

sin now committed--that is, if one sins with the hope, but not because

of the hope of pardon-one is less guilty. Example: Titus while on a

tour indulges in much drunkenness, because he has the opportunity and

is not known; but he intends to repent on his return home.

(b) If the hope of obtaining forgiveness is antecedent as regards the

sin--that is, if one sins because of the hope of pardon--one is more

guilty. Example: Balbus stays away from Mass most Sundays, because he

reasons with himself that God is kind and it will be easy to obtain

pardon. Caius, when urged to repent, always replies that it will be a

simple matter to turn over a new leaf at the hour of death. Sempronius

goes on multiplying sins from day to day, because he argues that it is

just as easy to be pardoned late as early, just as easy to repent of a

hundred sins as of ten.

1089. In the following cases presumption is not a grave sin: (a) no

mortal sin is committed, if there is not sufficient reflection; for

example, a person who is invincibly ignorant of the seriousness of

presumption, or who on account of immaturity has exaggerated ideas of

his own strength, does not sin gravely if he presumes on God’s mercy or

his own power; (b) no mortal sin is committed, if there is not full

consent of the will. For example, Titus is a self-made man, and hence

is inclined at times to feel that he can work out even his salvation

without any assistance, but he rids his mind of this presumptuous

thought as soon as he takes notice of it.

1090. Are there cases in which presumption and despair are transformed

into venial sin, not on account of the imperfect knowledge or consent

of the subject, but on account of the slightness of the matter

involved? (a) If there is question of presumption and despair properly

so-called, they are never venial on account of the lightness of the

matter, for the matter, man’s eternal destiny, must always be an affair

of the utmost moment. (b) If there is question of presumption and

despair in a wider sense, these sins may be venial on account of

smallness of matter; for they may be understood with reference to

things other than salvation. Examples: Titus despairs of his success in

overcoming a habit of arriving late for his meals or of talking too

much. Balbus imprudently trusts to his own efforts to get up promptly

in the morning, or to fight against some slight distraction in prayer.

1091. The causes of presumption are as follows: (a) the presumption

which depends too much on one’s own powers arises from vainglory, for,

the more one desires glory, the more is one inclined to attempt things

that are above one, especially such as are new and will attract

applause; (b) the presumption that depends rashly on divine assistance

seems to result from pride, for a person who desires and expects pardon

without repentance, or heaven without merits, must have a very

exaggerated opinion of his own importance.

1092. The Commandments of Hope and of Fear.--Since hope is a necessary

preparation for justification, and since man should tend towards the

supernatural beatitude prepared for him by God, we cannot be surprised

that scripture in many places inculcates the duty of hope.

(a) In the first legislation, given in the Decalogue, neither faith nor

hope are enjoined by distinct Commandments, for, unless man already

believed and hoped in God, it would be useless to give him commandments

from God. Hence, in the Decalogue faith and hope are presupposed, faith

being enjoined only in so far as it is taught, as when the law begins

with the words: “I am the Lord thy God” (Exod., xx. 2), and hope being

prescribed only in so far as promises are added to the precepts, as in

the First and Fourth Commandments.

(b) In the later laws there are given distinct commandments about hope,

in order to remind man that he must observe not only the law, but also

that which the law presupposes. Thus, we read: “Hope in Him, all ye

congregation of people” (Ps. lxi. 9); “Charge the rich of this world

not to be high-minded, nor to hope in the uncertainty of riches, but in

the living God” (I Tim., vi. 17).

1093. Since acts of hope are obligatory for all adults in this life,

the Quietists were in error when they defended disinterested love and

absolute holy indifference (Denzinger, 1221 ff., 1327-1349). (a) Hence,

man can at times make acts of pure love of God, in which self is not

thought about, or even acts of renunciation of beatitude on condition

that that were possible and necessary; but the habitual state of pure

love, in which self-interest is entirely lost sight of, cannot be

admitted (Philip., iii. 14; II Tim., iv, 8). (b) Indifference to the

happenings of life, sin excluded, is good; but it is not lawful to be

indifferent about one’s own salvation, or the means thereto.

Indifference about salvation is not holy, but unholy.

1094. Is it lawful to desire to surrender beatitude for the sake of

another’s spiritual good? (a) If there is question of beatitude itself,

this is not lawful. The prayer of Moses that he be stricken from God’s

book (Exod., xxxiii. 31, 32), and of St. Paul that he suffer loss of

Messianic benefits (Rom., ix. 3), were only velleities or hyperbolical

expressions of their great love for their race. (b) If there is

question, not of beatitude itself, but of something that refers to it

(such as the time of receiving it, present certainty about its

possession), one may be willing to sacrifice this good for the benefit

of his neighbor. Thus, St. Martin of Tours was willing to have his

entrance into heaven delayed for the sake of his flock (cfr. Philip.,

i. 22 sqq.), and St. Ignatius Loyola would have preferred to remain

uncertain of salvation and labor for souls, rather than to be certain

of salvation and die at once.

1095. At what times does the commandment of hope oblige? (a) In its

negative, or prohibitory aspect, this commandment obliges for all times

and at all times (see 371). Hence, it is not lawful to despair, even

when things are darkest, nor to presume, even when they are brightest.

(b) In its affirmative, or preceptive aspect, this commandment obliges

for all times, but not at all times. Hence, the law of hope remains

always in force, but one is not obliged at every instant to make acts

of hope.

1096. By reason of the virtue of hope itself (i.e., on account of the

response one should make to the promises of God concerning eternal

life), an act of hope is obligatory on the following occasions:

(a) Such an act is obligatory at the beginning of the moral life, that

is, at the time when one first realizes that one must choose between

God and creatures as the object of one’s happiness. This moment occurs

for all when the age of reason is attained, and to it we may apply in

this connection the words of Christ: “Seek ye first the kingdom of God

and His justice” (Matt, vi. 33). This moment occurs for those who are

in the state of sin as soon as they perceive the necessity of turning

from creatures towards God: “Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and

defer it not from day to day” (Ecclus, v. 8).

(b) During the course of the moral life, one is also bound to renew the

act of hope: “The grace of God our Saviour hath appeared to all men,

instructing us that we should live soberly, and justly, and godly in

this world, looking for the blessed hope” (Titus, ii. 11, 12), “Serving

the Lord, rejoicing in hope” (Rom., xii. 11, 12); “He that plougheth,

should plough in hope” (I Cor., ix. 10). Even those who are more

perfect must have on “the helmet of hope” (I Thess., v. 8), for by hope

all are saved (Rom, viii. 25).

an act of hope, as on that moment eternity depends (Heb., iii. vi).

But, if one has received the Last Sacraments or is otherwise well

prepared for death and undisturbed by temptations to despair, there is

no manifest need of making an express act of hope (cfr. 930).

1097. How frequently should acts of hope be made during life? (a) About

the theoretical question, there is the same diversity of opinion as

with regard to the act of faith (see 933). (b) But, practically, there

is agreement among theologians that the commandment is fulfilled by all

those who make an act of hope when this is necessary to preserve the

virtue on account of danger of presumption or despair, and who comply

with the duties of a Christian life, such as attendance at Mass and the

reception of the Sacraments.

1098. How should the act of hope be made? (a) The act is made

explicitly, when one expresses one’s confident expectation, the objects

expected and the basis of the expectation, as when one prays according

to the formulas of the Catechism or prayer books: “O my God, relying on

Thy all-powerful assistance and merciful promises, I firmly hope to

obtain pardon for my sins, obedience to Thy commandments, and life

everlasting.” This form of the act of hope is recommended, since it

expresses the essential elements of the virtue. (b) The act of hope is

made implicitly, when one offers petitions to God as one ought; for the

confidence that accompanies every good prayer makes it an expression of

hope of God and of hope in God. Thus, the words, “Thy Kingdom come,”

utter the soul’s expectation of bliss and its reliance on God. The

implicit act of hope satisfies the commandment, and hence those who

comply with the duty of prayer, comply also with the duty of hope.

1099. By reason of some virtue other than hope (cfr. 935), there also

arises at times an obligation of making an act of hope. (a) If another

virtue will be lost or endangered without the assistance of hope, one

is bound to make an act of hope. Examples: Titus is so discouraged by

the difficulties of his duties that he will not perform them, unless he

stirs up his will by thinking of the reward. Balba, on account of

aridity, finds prayer so hard that she will give it up, unless the

motive of future blessedness is before her mind. (b) If another

commandment presupposes an act of hope, one is bound to the act of

hope, although it may be made virtually or implicitly, as being

contained in another virtue. Example: Sempronius is in the state of

sin, and therefore obliged to repentance. Since repentance presupposes

hope of pardon as a means to salvation, Sempronius must not only grieve

over his sins, but must also have confidence in the divine mercy.

1100. Do those persons sin against hope by omission who wish they could

remain in the enjoyment of the present life forever?

(a) If those persons are so disposed that they would willingly forego

heaven for earth, they are guilty of a neglect of the precept of hope

(I Tim., vi. 17). Hope requires that God be the chief object of our

desires, but these persons give the first place to creatures (see 1019,

1031).

(b) If such persons are not willing to relinquish heaven, and their

wish to remain here forever merely denotes an over-fondness for life or

its goods or an exceeding dread of death, hope is not excluded, but

they are guilty, slightly or seriously according to the case, of

inordinate love of creatures.

attached to something of earth and wish to retain it as long as God

will allow, there is no sin committed. Thus, man and wife happily mated

or other friends sometimes express the wish that both might live

forever, meaning only that the thought of any separation is unpleasant.

1101. So far we have spoken of the necessity of precept of the act of

hope. But there is also a necessity of means, as was said above about

faith (see 785, 918), as regards both the act and the habit of hope.

(a) The act of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for all

adults. The unjustified man cannot prepare himself for pardon unless he

hopes in God’s mercy; he cannot resolve on amendment of life unless he

relies on the necessary divine help. The justified man must earn heaven

by his works and must pray to God in his necessities--things that are

impossible without the firm confidence of hope (Rom., vi. 23).

(b) The habit of hope is an indispensable condition of salvation for

all, infants included. For it is by justification, in which the soul

and its various powers are sanctified (Rom., v. 6), that one is

elevated to the supernatural sphere and made ready for the beatific

vision.

1102. The habit of hope is not lost by every sin against hope.

(a) It is not lost by sins of omission, for it depends on divine

infusion, not on human acts (see 745).

(b) It is not lost by sins of commission that do not remove its formal

object or motive, such as sins against charity and the moral virtues.

For it is possible for one to expect external happiness and at the same

time not love God for His own sake, or not regulate one’s conduct

conformably to the happiness desired, just as it is possible for one to

believe and yet not practise one’s belief (see 1016, 1030).

its formal object. Hence, sins of unbelief (since they remove the

foundation of hope) and sins of desperation and despair (since they

take away the formal object of hope) are destructive of this virtue. It

should be noted, however, that sins which only in a wider sense are

named presumption and despair, do not remove the object, nor

consequently the virtue of hope. Examples: Titus does not believe in a

future life, and hence does not expect it. Claudius believes in a

future life, but he is so weak in virtue that he has given up all

expectation of its rewards for himself. Balbus, on the contrary, is

living on stolen property and intends to continue to do so, but he

hopes that somehow all will turn out well in the end. Sempronius, who

is associated with Balbus, intends to make a deathbed repentance and

restitution. The sins of the first three are ruinous to hope, since by

reason of them there is no expectation of salvation, or only an

expectation that is not based on divine power. The sin of Sempronius is

presumptuous, since it risks a most grave danger imprudently; but it is

not theological presumption, since it expects forgiveness through

divine power and in a way that does not exceed divine power. It is not

contrary to, but beyond theological hope.

1103. Divine Commandments Concerning Fear.--(a) Servile fear was not

commanded in the Decalogue by any distinct precept, for fear of

punishment is supposed in those who received the law; it was, however,

commanded there implicitly, inasmuch as penalties were attached to

transgressions. Later, in order to keep man more strictly to the law

already given, instructions or commandments about the necessity of fear

were given. Thus, Job says: “I feared all my works, knowing that Thou

didst not spare the offender” (Job, ix. 28), and the Psalmist prays:

“Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear, for I am afraid of Thy judgments”

(Ps. cxviii. 120); our Lord commands: “Fear Him that can destroy both

soul and body in hell” (Matt, x. 28).

(b) Filial fear, on the contrary (i.e., reverential love of God), since

it is the principle from which proceed the external acts of respect and

homage enjoined in the Decalogue, was inculcated at the time the first

law was given. “What doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that

thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him, and

serve the Lord thy God?” (Deut., x. 12).

1104. As to the times and frequency of obligation, the principles and

conclusions given above for hope can be applied also to fear.

Art. 5: THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 23-27.)

1105. Definition.--The word “charity” (_carum_, what is held dear,

highly esteemed) is used either in a more general, or in a particular

sense.

(a) In its more general sense, it is applied to acts or feelings of

a kindly nature towards others, whether or not God be concerned in

them as the object or motive. Thus, it is applied to kindly judgments

about others, to a benevolent disposition towards their welfare, to

gratuitous relief of the needy or suffering, to the bestowal of gifts

for public benefit, and the like. In scripture the word is sometimes

applied to friendship: “It is better to be invited to herbs with

charity than to a fatted calf with hatred” (Prov., xv. 17).

(b) In its particular sense, charity refers to divine love, that is, to

the love of God for man or the love of man for God. Here we are

considering charity as the virtue by which the creature loves God for

His own sake, and others on account of God.

1106. Love in general is the inclination towards a suitable good, or

what is considered as one’s good. It is the root of all appetites of

the soul, and hence the importance that the object of love be a true

good.

(a) Every attraction is based on the recognition of some suitability in

a certain good that attracts, and so is based on love. Example: Love

may result from desire, as when from a desire of money springs love of

the giver of money; but in the last analysis it will be found that the

desire itself came from a previous love, for a person would not wish

for money, unless he saw in it some advantage which inclined him

towards its possession.

(b) Every repulsion is based on the fact that a certain thing is

opposed to that which is suitable for self, and hence results from

love. Example: Love sometimes is an effect of hate, as when one loves A

because he hates A’s enemies; nevertheless, hate is basically always

the result of some love, for one hates only those things that impede or

destroy what one loves.

something helpful or congenial, and so it presupposes love. Example: A

particular satisfaction may cause love, as when one loves a person

because his company is entertaining; but the satisfaction is due to the

love one has of being entertained.

1107. The effects of love are two; (a) union of affection, for the

lover regards the object of love as another self and desires its

presence; he delights to think of it and wishes what it wishes; (b)

separation from other things, for the lover’s thoughts are on the

object of his love, and he is jealous of anything that might take it

from him.

1108. Several degrees of love may be distinguished:

(a) Natural love is the tendency of things to their ends which results,

not from knowledge, but from nature, and which is found in the

irrational and inanimate as well as in higher forms of being. Thus, we

may say that fire loves to burn, that every being loves its own

existence;

(b) Sense love (_amor_) is the attraction that follows on knowledge

obtained through the senses, and that exists in the brutes as well as

in man. Thus, a dog loves bones, a cat loves fish. Sex-attraction is a

species of sense love;

and is a choice based on the judgment of the reason concerning the

worth of the beloved object.

1109. Rational love is of two kinds: (a) love of desire (_amor

concupiscentiae_), which is affection for an object which one desires

for oneself or for another, in such a way that good is not wished for

the object, but the goodness of the object is wished for something else

(thus, one loves food or money with the love of desire, because one

does not wish good for them, but from them); (b) love of benevolence

(_amor benevolentiae_), which is had for an object to which one wishes

good (thus, one loves a poor person with the love of benevolence when

one wishes to give him food or money).

1110. The love of benevolence is called friendship when the following

conditions exist: (a) when the love is mutual, for, if one party who

is loved does not reciprocate the other party’s affection, they are

not considered friends; (b) when the love is based on some similarity

which is a bond of union, for friendship supposes that the parties

have common interests and that they delight in each other’s company,

which is impossible without congeniality (see Ecclus., xiii. 19). Thus,

there is friendship of relative for relative, of citizen for citizen,

of soldier for soldier, of scholar for scholar. True, those who belong

to the same state in life are often enemies; but this is due, not to

the similarity of their life, but to some individual dissimilarity, as

when one is successful and the other unsuccessful, one rich and the

other poor. Aristotle remarked that potters never got along together,

and Proverbs, xiii. 10, says that between the proud there are always

quarrels; for each potter saw in the other potter one who took away

profits, and each proud man sees in another proud man an obstacle to

personal glory. Unfriendly feeling may exist, then, among those who

are alike, but friendship is impossible when the parties have nothing

special in common.

1111. Two kinds of friendship must be distinguished. (a) The friendship

of utility or of pleasure is that by which one desires good for one’s

friend, not for the friend’s sake, but for one’s own advantage or

gratification. Hence, friendships of this kind contain some love of

benevolence, but they are prompted by love of desire. On account of

this admixture of selfishness, they fall short of friendship in the

truest sense. Examples: Titus cultivates the friendship of Balbus,

because the latter is wealthy and will patronize his business; Balbus,

on his part, returns the friendship of Titus, because he finds his

prices cheaper (a friendship of convenience or utility). Caius and

Claudius associate together much and help each other gladly, but the

only thing that draws them together is the amusement they get out of

each other’s companionship (a friendship of pleasure).

(b) The friendship of virtue is that by which one desires good for

another, and by which the cause of attraction is the virtue of the

friends. This is true friendship, because it is unselfish and has the

highest motive; it is naturally lasting, since it is built on moral

goodness, the real good of an intelligent being (Ecclus., vi. 14-16).

Example: David and Jonathan became friends because each recognized the

other’s virtue.

1112. Charity is a true friendship between God and His intellectual

creature, for in scripture the just are called the friends of God

(John, xv. 15; James, ii. 23; Ps. cxxxviii. 17), and the conditions of

true friendship are affirmed about their relation to God. (a) There is

a mutual love of benevolence between God and the just: “I love them

that love Me” (Prov., viii. 20); “He that loveth Me shall be loved

of My Father, and I will love him” (John, xiv. 21). (b) There is a

common bond; for, while according to nature God and man are infinitely

distant, according to grace man is an adopted son of God and the heir

to glory in which he will share happiness with God.

1113. Charity is twofold, namely, uncreated and created. (a) Uncreated

charity is God Himself. The entire Trinity is called charity, just as

It is also called truth, wisdom, etc.: “God is charity, and he that

abideth in charity, abideth in God” (I John, iv. 8). The Holy Ghost

especially is called charity, because he proceeds in the Trinity as

love. Hence, in the _Veni Creator_ He is addressed as “Fount of life,

fire, charity, and spiritual anointing.” (b) Created charity is a

supernatural habit added to the will, inclining it to the exercise of

love of God and enabling it to act with promptness and delight: “The

charity of God is poured out in our hearts by the Holy Ghost who is

given to us” (Rom., v. 5). We are concerned here only with created

charity.

1114. Created charity is defined: “A supernatural virtue infused by

God, through which we love with friendship God, the author of our

beatitude, on account of His own goodness, and our neighbor, on account

of God.” Charity is given with sanctifying grace, but differs from it,

inasmuch as grace is a principle of being and makes man himself holy,

whereas charity is a principle of acting and makes acts holy.

1115. The Excellence of Charity.--Human friendship of the lower kind

is not a virtue, while that which is higher is rather the extension

or result of virtue than a virtue in itself. The divine friendship,

however, constitutes the theological virtue of charity.

(a) Thus, charity is a virtue, since through it our acts are regulated

by their supreme standard and our affections united to the divine

goodness.

(b) Charity, although it exercises a sway over the other virtues, is

distinct from them; for it has its own proper object, namely, the

divine goodness, all-perfect in itself: “These three: faith, hope and

charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

objects of love, is but one virtue, since it has but one end (i.e.,

the goodness of God), and it is based on but one fellowship (i.e., the

beatific vision to be bestowed by God).

1116. Charity is less perfect than the act of the intellect by which

God is seen intuitively in the beatific vision, but it is preeminent

among the virtues of this life. (a) Thus, it is superior to the

normal virtues, for while they regulate actions by the inferior rule

of reason, charity regulates them by the supreme rule, which is God

Himself. (b) It is superior to the other theological virtues, since it

tends to God in Himself, whereas faith and hope tend to God as He is

the principle whence we derive truth and blessedness: “The greatest of

these is charity” (I Cor., xiii. 13).

1117. The other virtues require charity for their perfection.

(a) Without charity the other virtues are either false virtues, or true

but imperfect virtues; for they are then directed, not to the universal

and last End, but at most to some particular and proximate good end.

Nor are they meritorious without charity, for “if I should distribute

all my goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be

burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing” (I Cor., xiii.

3).

(b) With charity the other virtues become true and perfect virtues.

Examples: Titus gives alms to the poor in order to win them to

infidelity (false charity). Caius avoids drunkenness, not because he

dislikes it, but because he is a miser and dislikes to spend money

(false temperance). Balbus has no religion, but is very faithful to his

family duties (imperfect justice). Claudius discharges his duties to

his family and neighbors out of love for God (perfect justice).

1118. The influence of charity on the other virtues is expressed by

various titles.

(a) Charity is called the informing principle of the other virtues.

This does not mean that charity is the type on which the other virtues

are modelled, or the internal character that makes them what they are;

otherwise, all the virtues would be absorbed in the one virtue of

charity. It means, then, that the other virtues derive the quality of

perfect virtue from charity, through which they are directed to the

Last End.

(b) Charity is called the foundation and root of virtues (Eph., iii.

17), not in the sense that it is a material part of them, but in the

sense that it supports and nourishes them.

virtues, because it directs the other virtues to the Last End, and

produces their acts by commanding their exercise: “The end of the

commandment is charity” (I Tim., i. 5).

1119. Charity causes the other virtues, negatively by forbidding evil,

affirmatively by commanding good (I Cor., xiii, 4-7).

(a) It forbids that evil be done the neighbor, either in desire or in

deed: “Charity envieth not, dealeth not perversely.”

(b) It forbids evil passions by which one is injured in oneself, such

as pride, ambition, greed, anger: “Charity is not puffed up, is not

ambitious, seeketh not her own, is not provoked to anger.”

wrong: “Charity thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity.”

(d) It commands that good be done the neighbor, bears with his defects,

rejoices over his good and bestows benefits upon him: “Charity is

patient, is kind; rejoiceth with the truth, beareth all things.”

(e) It commands that good be done towards God by the practice of the

theological virtues of faith and hope, and by continuance in them:

“Charity believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things.”

1120. Direction is given by charity to the other virtues that makes

them perfect and meritorious.

(a) Actual direction--that is, the intention here and now to believe,

or hope, etc., out of love for God--though more perfect, is not

required for merit in faith, hope and other virtues: otherwise, merit

would become extremely difficult and rare.

(b) Habitual direction--that is, the mere fact that one has the habit

of charity, though it in no way influences an act of faith, or of hope,

etc, now made--does not suffice; otherwise, it would follow that an act

of faith recited by a person in the state of charity, but here and now

unconscious, is meritorious, which would make merit too easy.

made and never retracted, of acting out of love for God, which

continues, though it is not adverted to, while one believes, hopes,

etc.--at least is necessary; otherwise, one would make oneself

deserving of the Last End, without ever having desired it, for the

other virtues do not tend to the Last End in itself. In practice,

however, there is no person in the state of grace who does not perform

all his acts that are human and virtuous under the direction of

charity, actual or virtual.

1121. Production of Charity.--The virtue of charity belongs to the

appetitive part of the soul, but supposes a judgment by which its

exercise is regulated. (a) Thus, the power of the soul in which

charity dwells is the will, for its object is good apprehended by the

intellect; but (b) the judgment by which it is regulated is not human

reason, as is the case with the moral virtues, but divine wisdom (Eph.,

iii. 19).

1122. The Origin of Charity.--(a) Charity is not caused by nature,

nor acquired by the powers of nature. Natural love of God, indeed,

is possible without grace; but charity is a supernatural friendship

based on a fellowship in the beatitude of God. (b) It is introduced

or begotten by other virtues, in the sense that they prepare one to

receive it from God (I Tim., i. 5).

1123. The cause of charity, then, is God, who infuses it into the soul:

“The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,

who is given to us” (Rom., v. 5). The measure according to which God

infuses the gift of charity depends on His will and bounty.

(a) The Angels received charity at their creation, according to their

natural rank, so that those who were higher excelled those who were

lower, both in nature and in grace.

(b) Those who receive charity through infant baptism have it according

“to the measure of the giving of Christ” (Eph., iv. 7; cfr. John, iii.

8; I Cor., xii. 2).

according to his proper ability” (Matt., xxv. 15), that is, according

to the disposition with which he has prepared himself. But the

preparation itself depends on the grace of God (Col., i. 12).

1124. Charity may be increased: “I pray that your charity may more and

more abound” (Philip., i. 9). It must, however, be noted that: (a) the

increase is not in the motive of charity, for the goodness of God is

supreme and incapable of increase, nor is it in the objects of charity,

for even the lowest degree of this virtue extends to all those things

that must be loved on account of God; (b) the increase, then, is in the

manner in which charity exists in the soul, in that it becomes more

deeply rooted and takes stronger hold of the will, whose acts of love

become correspondingly more intense and fervent. Just as knowledge

grows as it becomes clearer and more certain, so does charity progress

to higher degrees as it exists more firmly in its subject.

1125. With reference to the increase of charity, acts of love are of

two kinds: (a) the less fervent are those that do not surpass the

degree of charity one already possesses; (b) the more fervent are those

that surpass the degree of charity one has. Example: If one has ten

degrees of habitual charity, an act of five degrees is less fervent, an

act of fifteen degrees is more fervent.

1126. Every act of charity, even the less fervent, contributes to an

increase of the charity one already possesses. This is true whether the

act be elicited by charity (i.e., an act of love of God), or commanded

by charity (i.e., an act of some other virtue performed out of love for

God). Every act of charity merits from God an increase of the habit of

charity (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Can. 32). Even a cup of cold

water given in the name of a disciple shall not go without its reward

(Matt., X. 42).

1127. As to the manner and time in which the increase takes place,

there are various opinions, but the following points sum up what seems

more probable:

(a) The increase of the habit of charity merited by a more fervent act

is conferred at once, for God confers His gifts when one is disposed

for their reception. Example: Titus, who has habitually ten degrees of

charity, makes an act of charity whose degree is fifteen; he thereby

merits the increase of the habit, and it is conferred at once.

(b) The increase of the habit of charity merited by less fervent acts

is not conferred until the moment one enters into heaven or purgatory,

for there is no time during life on earth when one has a disposition

equal to the added quantity contained in less fervent acts, since, as

just said, more fervent acts are rewarded at once by the increase that

corresponds to them, while less fervent acts do not dispose one for an

increase then and there. But the increase must be conferred when one

enters into glory; otherwise, one would lose the degree of beatitude

one merited during life. Hence, those who make many--even though less

fervent--acts of charity during life, will receive a very high degree

of reward for them hereafter.

1128. The increase of charity will come to an end in the future life,

when one has attained the degree of perfection to which one was

predestined by God (Philip, iii. 12). But, as long as a person lives

here below, he may continually grow in charity, for each increase makes

him capable of receiving from the infinite power of God a further

participation in the infinite charity, which is the Holy Ghost (II

Cor., vi. 11).

1129. Charity is absolutely perfect, when it loves God in the same

degree in which He is lovable--that is, infinitely; but it is clear

that so great charity is possible only to God. Charity is relatively

perfect, when one loves God as much as one can. This relatively perfect

charity is possible to man (Matt, v. 48; I John, ii. 5, iv. 12, 17);

but it has three degrees:

(a) The perfect charity of heaven, which is not possible in this life,

consists in this, that one is constantly occupied in thinking of God

and loving Him.

(b) The perfect charity of earth, which is special to some of the just,

consists in this, that one gives all one’s time to divine things, as

far as the necessities of mortal existence allow.

consists in this, that habitually one gives one’s whole heart to God,

permitting no thought or desire opposed to the divine love.

1130. Those who are growing in charity are divided into three classes:

(a) the beginners, or those whose chief care is freedom from sin and

resistance to what is contrary to divine love; (b) the proficients, or

those who must still fight against temptation, but whose chief

attention is given to progress along the way of virtue; (c) the

perfect, or those who are progressing in holiness, but whose chief

desire is to reach the end of the journey and be with the object of

their love (Philip., i. 13).

1131. The Decline of Charity.--(a) Actual charity can decline, in the

sense that subsequent acts can be less fervent than those that preceded

(Apoc., ii. 4). (b) Habitual charity cannot grow less in itself. The

only causes that can be supposed for a decline in habitual charity are

omission of the act of charity and commission of venial sin; the

former, however, cannot lessen charity, since this habit, being

infused, does not depend on human acts; the latter, which is a disorder

about the means to the end, does not contradict charity, which is the

right order of man with reference to his Last End itself. Thus, charity

differs from human friendships, which grow cold through neglect or

slights. (c) Habitual charity can be lessened, first, with reference to

the disposition that makes for its preservation and increase (as when

one commits numerous and dangerous venial sins), and secondly, with

reference to itself (as when one rising from sin has less charity than

he had before). But in neither of these cases does the same numerical

habit decrease.

1132. The Loss of Charity.--(a) The charity of the blessed cannot be

lost, because they see God as He is, and are constantly occupied in

loving Him. But the charity of earth, since it proceeds from a less

perfect knowledge and is not always in use, may be surrendered by man’s

free will (see Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 12, 13, 14, Can. 23).

(b) The habit of charity is lost, not only by any sin against the love

of God, but by any other mortal sin opposed to other virtues (see

Council of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 15). Every mortal sin is a turning

away from the Last End, and so is incompatible with charity, which is a

turning to God, the Last End: “He that hath My commandments and keepeth

them, he it is that loveth Me” (John, xiv. 21). Venial sin diminishes

the fervor of charity, but does not remove charity itself.

1133. The Object of Charity.--There is a threefold object of charity:

(a) the formal object, that is, the reason for love, which is the

infinite amiability of God in Himself, as known from the supernatural

illumination of faith; (b) the primary material object, that is, the

chief thing which charity loves, which is God (i.e., the divine

Essence, the divine Persons, the divine attributes): “Thou shalt love

the Lord, Thy God. This is the greatest and the first commandment”

(Matt, xxii. 37, 38); (c) the secondary material object, that is, the

thing loved because of God, which is self and the neighbor: “And the

second is like to this: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (ibid,

39).

1134. The love of creatures is not always an act of the virtue of

charity. (a) Sinful love of creatures, by which one loves them more

than God or inordinately, destroys or deviates from charity. Hence, St.

John says: “Love not the world, nor the things that are in the world”

(I John, ii. 15). (b) Natural love of creatures, by which one loves

them on account of reasons apart from love of God (such as the benefits

one derives from them or the excellences they possess), is not charity,

even though good. Thus, gratitude which sees in another only a

benefactor, friendship which sees in another only a congenial spirit,

and philanthropy which sees in another only a fellow-man, differ from

charity, although they are good in themselves. (c) Supernatural love of

creatures, by which one loves them on account of the divine that is in

them, inasmuch as they are friends of God or made for the glory of

one’s divine Friend, does not differ specifically from love of God, for

in both loves there is the same motive (viz, the amiability of God

Himself).

1135. Since charity is friendship, it does not include among its

objects those things that are loved with the love of desire (see 1109),

that is, those things whose good is desired, but for another.

(a) Hence, charity itself is not an object of charity, for it is loved

not as a friend, but as a good that one wishes for one’s friends. The

same applies to other virtues and to beatitudes.

(b) Irrational creatures are not objects of charity, for a fellowship

with them in friendship, and especially in the beatific vision, is

impossible. We can love them out of charity, however, inasmuch as we

desire their preservation for the sake of those whom we love with

charity (e.g., desiring that they be preserved for the glory of God or

the use of man).

1136. Love of self is of various kinds.

(a) Sinful self-love is that by which a person loves himself according

to his lower and corrupt nature, and not according to his higher or

rational nature, or loves himself egotistically to the hurt of others.

Of those who indulge their passions it is said: “In the last days shall

come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves” (II Tim., iii.

1, 2); of those who love themselves selfishly it is said: “All seek the

things that are their own, not the things that are Jesus Christ’s”

(Philip., ii. 21); whereas charity seeketh not her own (I Cor., xiii.)

to the exclusion of others, but desires what is for the advantage of

the neighbor (I Cor., x. 33).

(b) Natural self-love is that necessary desire which each one has for

his own good, happiness, existence, etc. (II Cor., v. 4), or any desire

for reasonable self-improvement that is not prompted by a supernatural

love of God. This love is stronger than love for another, for it

implies not merely union, but unity. It is not friendship, but the root

of friendship, for one is said to be friendly towards another when one

holds him as another self.

consequently for self as a friend of God.

1137. If by “self” we understand the substance and nature of man, as

composed of soul and body, then both good and bad understand aright the

meaning of self and desire its preservation. But if by “self” we mean

principally the inward man and secondarily the outward man (II Cor.,

iv. 16), then only the good understand what self is, and have a true

love for it, whereas the wicked hate their own souls (Ps. x. 6). For

the five marks of true friendship are shown to the inner man by the

good, to the outward man by the sinner: (a) the good are solicitous for

the life of the soul, the wicked for that of the body; (b) the good

desire spiritual treasures for the soul, the wicked carnal delights for

the body; (c) the good labor to provide for the needs of the soul, the

wicked work only for the needs of the body; (d) the good are pleased to

converse with their souls, finding there thoughts of past, present and

future good things to delight them, while the wicked seek to distract

themselves from wholesome thought by pleasure; (e) the good are at

peace with their souls, whereas the wicked are troubled by conscience.

1138. Supernatural love of self, which pertains to charity, extends not

only to the soul, but also to the body; for (a) according to its

nature, the body is good, since it is from God and may be employed for

His service (Rom., vi. 13), and hence it may be loved out of charity

with the love of desire on account of the honor it may give to God and

the service it may render in good works; (b) according to grace, the

body is capable of sharing in secondary beatitude, through

glorification with the soul, and hence it may be loved with charity and

with the love of benevolence, inasmuch as we desire for it a share in

beatitude: “We would not be unclothed, but clothed over, that that

which is mortal may be swallowed up by life” (II Cor., v. 4); (e)

according to the consequences of sin that are in it, the body is a drag

on the soul, or a hindrance to it, and one should not love but rather

desire the removal of its imperfections. Hence, St. Paul desired to be

freed from the body (Rom., vii. 24; Philip,, i. 23), and the Saints

have shown their hatred of the body’s corruption by the mortifications

to which they subjected it (John, xii. 25).

1139. Love of neighbor is of three kinds: (a) sinful love, which is all

love that is excessive, irregulated, or directed to what is evil in

others; (b) natural love, which is all love that is attracted by some

excellence of a human or created kind, such as knowledge or skill; (c)

supernatural love, which is that by which one is drawn towards another

on account of the divine in him, such as his gifts of grace and of

heavenly calling.

1140. Hence, it seems that there is no such thing as a special and

distinct virtue of human friendship. (a) Thus, friendships of utility

or of pleasure are clearly not virtues, since they are not caused by

attraction towards moral good. (b) Virtuous friendships are the

consequences of virtues rather than virtues, for the attraction one has

for one’s friend arises from the attraction for the virtue one sees in

him. Thus, friendship for another because he is not the slave of

passion, is an exercise of the virtue of temperance. (c) Supernatural

friendships are not distinct from the virtue of charity, for the gifts

and graces which evoke them are participations of God’s goodness, which

is the object of charity.

1141. The neighbors whom we are to love according to charity are all

those who can have with us the relation of supernatural friendship,

that is, all rational creatures. (a) Hence, the Angels are objects of

this love, and in the resurrection men will be fellow-citizens with

them (Heb., xii, 22); (b) our fellow-men are objects of this love, for

they also are called to the heavenly companionship (ibid., 23).

1142. Charity for Sinners.--Should we love with charity those who are

sinners and enemies of God? (a) If we consider sinners precisely as

enemies of God, we may not love them, for their sin is an evil, an

offense to God and a hurt to themselves. On the contrary, we should

hate even in those who are nearest to us whatever is opposed to love of

God (Luke, xiv. 26). (b) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures

of God, we may not love them with charity or as friends, if they are

demons or lost souls; for in their case fellowship with us in beatitude

is out of the question. We may, however, love their nature out of

charity towards God, desiring that it be preserved by Him for His

glory. (c) If we consider sinners precisely as creatures of God, we may

love them with charity or as friends, if they are still in the present

life; for we should wish that God may be glorified in them by their

conversion and salvation. The commandment of love of neighbor was not

restricted to loving the just.

1143. If sinners be considered precisely as they are enemies of God, is

it lawful to hate them and wish evil to them? (a) It is lawful to hate

the evil that is in sinners, but not their persons. He who hates their

sin, loves themselves, for their sin is against their own interests. In

this way the Psalmist hated sinners (Ps. cxviii. 113, cxxxviii. 32).

(b) It is lawful to wish that punishment overtake sinners, if one is

actuated, not by a spirit of malevolence, but by love of justice (Ps.

lvii. 11; Wis., i. 13; Ps. x. 8). It is also lawful to wish that the

sinfulness that is in them may be destroyed, that they themselves may

be saved. In this sense we may understand some of the imprecations that

are met in scripture (Ps. ciii. 35). Thus, a judge sentences a

criminal, not because he hates the man before him, but because he

wishes to reform him, or to protect society, or to do an act of justice.

1144. The evils of punishment or of destruction of sin are in a broader

view not evils, but goods. But the following punishments may not be

desired: (a) that anyone living lose his soul and be condemned to hell,

for charity requires that we desire the salvation of sinners; (b) that

a sinner be punished by blindness of heart and go from bad to worse. He

who wishes sin approves of the offense to God; but it does not seem

unlawful to wish that God permit a person to fall into sin, as a means

to a spiritual awakening.

1145. Association with Sinners.--(a) It is never lawful to associate

with sinners in their sins, for thus one becomes a sharer in their

guilt. Hence, St. Paul says: “Go out from among them and be ye

separate” (II Cor., vi. 17). (b) It is not lawful to associate with

sinners even in matters indifferent or good, if one is weak and apt to

be led away by them into sin (see 258 sqq.). (c) It is lawful to

associate with sinners in things not forbidden, if one is not

endangered, and if one aims to convert them to better ways. Thus, our

Lord ate with sinners, because He came to call them to repentance

(Matt., ix. 10-13).

1146. Friendship with Sinners.-(a) If this means that we like and

dislike the same things as the sinners, it is an evil friendship, and

it should be discontinued; (b) if it means that we seek to bring the

sinner to imitate our good likes and dislikes, the friendship pertains

to charity (Jer, xv. 19).

1147. Should one continue to show signs of special regard to a friend

who has taken to ways of sin? (a) As long as there is hope of

betterment, one should not deny the other the benefits of friendship.

If it would be wrong to desert a friend because he was perishing from

starvation, much more would it be wrong to desert him because he was

perishing morally. (b) But if all hope of betterment has gone, one

should give up a companionship which is not profitable to either party,

and may prove harmful.

1148. Charity towards Enemies.--Enemies can be considered in two

senses: precisely as enemies, or precisely as human beings destined for

beatitude. (a) If considered as enemies, they are not to be loved with

charity--that is, it should be displeasing to us that they are enemies

and opposed to us, for it would be contrary to charity to love in a

neighbor that which is evil in him. (b) If considered as human beings,

enemies should be loved with charity--that is, their nature created by

God and capable of receiving grace and glory should be pleasing to us,

for love of God should make us love all that belongs to Him, even that

which is not well disposed towards ourselves.

1149. The precept of love of enemies did not originate with the law of

Christ. (a) It pertains to the natural law, for (i) it follows from the

natural principle: “Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,”

and (ii) it was known by natural reason (e.g., Plato and Cicero knew

it). (b) Love of enemies was commanded in the Old Law, being the second

great commandment of that law (Matt., xxii. 39), and was taught in

various Old Testament books (Lev., xix. 17, 18; Exod., xxiii 4, 5;

Prov., xxi. 21, 22). (c) It was renewed by Christ, who corrected the

false interpretation of Leviticus, xix. 18, given by the scribes and

Pharisees, who taught: “Thou shalt love thy friend and hate thy enemy.”

In the Sermon on the Mount our Lord declares: “I say to you: Love your

enemies: do good to them that hate you: that you may be the children of

your Father who is in heaven” (Matt., v. 44, 45).

1150. The following examples of love of one’s enemies are found in the

Bible: (a) in the Old Testament, Joseph forgave his brethren who had

sold him into Egypt, David spared the life of his persecutor Saul and

wept over the ungrateful Absalom, and Moses prayed for the people who

had rebelled against him; (b) in the New Testament our Lord mourned

over Jerusalem which had rejected Him, and on the Cross prayed for His

enemies.

1151. What kind of love must we entertain for enemies?

(a) A general love of enemies is that which extends to all neighbors

for the love of God, no exception being made as regards enemies. This

kind of love is required. Example: Caius makes an act of love in which

he declares his love for his neighbor, but mentions no names. Titus

makes this act of love: “I love all except Caius.” The act of love made

by Caius is sufficient, that of Titus is insufficient.

(b) A special love of enemies is that which extends to them in

particular, not as included in the human race or the community, but as

individuals, as when one expressly mentions the name of an enemy in his

act of love. This kind of love of enemies is not required at all times.

1152. Is there an obligation of special love of enemies? (a) In cases

of necessity (e.g., when the omission of a special love would bring on

hate), one is bound to special love. (b) Outside of cases of necessity,

one is bound to be willing to love an enemy in particular, if the

necessity should arise. (c) Outside of necessity, one is not bound to

love an enemy in particular, for it is impossible to give such

attention even to all those who are not enemies. But to give an enemy

more love than is required is a sign of perfect charity.

1153. The principles just given as to internal love of enemies apply

also to external love, or to the signs by which internal love is

manifested. For St. John says: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue,

but in deed, and in truth” (I John, iii. 18).

(a) Hence, it is not lawful to deny to an enemy the common signs of

charity (i.e., such benefits as are bestowed on his community or class

as a whole), for to do so would be to signify a desire for revenge

(Lev., xix. 18). Consequently, he who excludes his enemies from prayers

offered for his neighbor sins against charity.

(b) In cases of necessity, as when an enemy is in great need as to

life, fame, fortune or salvation, one is bound to show special signs of

charity, such as salutation, conversation, assistance, etc. Thus, we

are told: “If thy enemy be hungry, give him to eat; if he be thirsty,

give him to drink” (Prov., xxv. 21).

an enemy, should there be need.

(d) Outside of necessity, one is not bound actually to manifest

particular love for an enemy, by speaking to him, trading with him,

visiting him, etc. Hence, David, although he had pardoned Absalom,

would not meet him (II Kings, xiv. 24). To confer special benefits on

an enemy when there is no obligation is a counsel of perfection: “Do

good to those that hate you” (Matt., v. 24). This heaps coals of fire

upon the head of the enemy, curing him by the salutary pain of

repentance, and so overcomes evil by good (Rom., xii. 20, 21).

1154. The common signs of charity are not limited to those that are

shown to all mankind, but include also such as are usually shown by one

Christian to another Christian, by one citizen to a fellow-citizen, by

a relative to a relative, etc. Thus, to make a social call, though it

would be a sign of special regard in the case of one not a relative,

might be only a common sign of charity in the case of a relative.

(a) Hence, it is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that

are customarily shown to all men. Example: Titus dislikes Balbus, and

therefore refuses to sell to him, does not return his salutations,

speaks to all others in company, while ignoring Balbus, and will not

even answer if Balbus addresses him.

(b) It is against charity to deny an enemy signs of charity that are

commonly shown to all those to whom one is similarly related. Examples:

Claudia calls on her other children frequently and makes them presents,

but she keeps away from one daughter, even when the latter is sick and

poor and she is calling next door. Sempronius habitually invites to his

house for family festivities all his relatives except his brother.

shown, but which one has bestowed out of liberality on the group to

which the latter belongs. In such a case a special sign of charity

becomes common. Example: Titus prepares a banquet for a neighboring

institution, and purposely sends no invitation to two members whom he

dislikes.

1155. The rule that common signs of charity must be shown does not

apply, if some higher or more urgent duty requires that they be

omitted: however, internal charity must persist all the while.

(a) Thus, by reason of charity owed to self or to the better interests

of an offender, one should at times omit the common signs of charity.

Examples: Caius avoids Balbus, with whom he has had a quarrel, because

he knows well that Balbus is seeking some pretext to get revenge. Titus

has a surly way of speaking, and his mother, in order to cure him, does

not answer until he has spoken civilly.

(b) By reason of justice, the signs of charity should sometimes be

denied as a punishment. Examples: Claudia punishes her children, when

they are disobedient, by refusing them for a time privileges given the

other children. For the same reason she refuses to call on a daughter

who ran away from home and married a worthless fellow.

this is required for the protection of one’s own rights. Example: Titus

goes about defaming Sempronius and his family, but appears very affable

when he meets Sempronius; the latter knows all this, and hence is very

cool with Titus, to show that the injuries are not held as light.

1156. The following are the rules for judging whether (apart from

scandal to others) sin has been committed through refusal of the signs

of charity:

(a) If internally there is hatred (i.e., a contempt for one’s neighbor,

as if he were unworthy of common charity), or malevolence (i.e., a will

to exercise spite), then one is guilty of grave uncharitableness,

unless the smallness of the matter makes it only a venial sin.

(b) If externally the denial of charity is such that in the judgment of

a prudent man it indicates real hatred, and the injured party perceives

this and is scandalized or hurt thereby, the sin of uncharitableness is

committed, even though there be no internal hatred. The gravity depends

on the scandal or offense caused the other party. Example: Claudius and

Balbus, once very friendly, have had a disagreement. Now, when Claudius

sees Balbus coming in his direction, he turns off by a side street, not

to show hatred, but to avoid a meeting. If Balbus does not know this,

or does not care, no sin--or at most only a venial sin--is committed;

but if Balbus is deeply wounded or scandalized by this conduct,

Claudius sins seriously against charity.

1157. Refusal of Greetings.--(a) To refuse to exchange a bow or

salutation (such as “Good morning”) indicates a want of charity, when

such mutual courtesy is expected according to custom; not, however,

when custom does not require it, Example: In Balba’s office the girls

employed usually salute one another on arrival and departure, but Balba

never salutes Titia, and hence is regarded as her enemy. On Caius’

street the neighbors are of a very mixed kind, and it is not customary

to speak to everybody. Hence, the fact that Caius never salutes certain

neighbors, whom he dislikes, does not signify any uncharitableness on

his part.

(b) To refuse to salute another first, where custom expects this, is a

mark of uncharity, unless one has a sufficient excuse. Examples:

Claudius has a grudge against Sempronius, an elderly man who is much

his senior, and says he will never salute him as others do. Titus

refuses to greet Balbus, his acquaintance, when they meet, because in

the past Balbus has treated his greetings with contempt, and shows that

he does not care to notice Titus.

of charity.

1158. The Order of Charity.--Charity not only requires that we love

God, ourselves, and our neighbors, but it also obliges us to love these

objects according to a certain order, some being preferred to others.

(a) God must be loved above all, more than self (Matt, xvi. 24), more

than father and mother (Matt., x. 37; Luke, xiv. 26), for He is the

common good of all, and the source of all good.

(b) Other things being equal, one should love self more than one’s

neighbor, for the love of self is the model for the love of neighbor

(Matt., xxii. 39), and nature itself inclines to this in accordance

with the saying: “Charity begins at home.”

on account of their greater nearness to God or to ourselves.

1159. Love can become greater in two ways: (a) objectively, when the

person loved is esteemed as of greater worth, or has more titles to

affection, or has a more enduring right to be loved; (b) subjectively,

when the person loving is more touched and moved in his feelings, even

though the object be not more amiable in itself.

1160. The Character of our Love of God.--(a) It must be supreme

objectively, since He is infinite perfection and has the highest of all

claims on our love. Hence, one should be disposed to suffer any loss

rather than abandon God. (b) It must be supreme subjectively, in our

desire, that is, realizing that God is the highest good, we should at

least wish to give Him the utmost of our fervor and ardor. (c) It need

not be supreme subjectively, in fact; for we are not always masters of

our feelings, and things that are nearer to us affect us more than

those that are more important, but remote from sense. Hence, it is not

against charity that one should be more moved sensibly at the thought

of a dear human friend than at the thought of God, provided the will

places God above all.

1161. Regarding the love of God for the sake of reward, we must note:

(a) If there is question of the eternal reward, one may love and serve

God for the sake of reward, provided one makes the reward the end of

one’s service, but not the end of God; for salvation is really the end

of our faith (I Pet., i. 9), but God is the end of all, and He is to be

preferred to all. This love of God for the sake of reward coexists with

charity, for one may love a friend for his own sake, and at the same

time expect benefits from the friendship, provided the love of

benevolence is uppermost. (b) If there is question of a temporal

reward, one may love and serve God for the sake of the reward, not in

the sense that spiritual things are made a means and temporal things

their end, but in the sense that one hopes one’s service of God will be

so blessed that one will have health, strength and opportunity, so as

to be enabled to continue and progress in that service.

1162. Regarding the love of self (i.e., of the inner man, or our

spiritual nature), we should note: (a) Objectively, one esteems others

who are higher in sanctity than oneself (e.g., the Blessed Virgin), as

more worthy of love. But one may desire for self according to charity

such progress in virtue that one will pass some others who are now

better than oneself; for the virtue of charity is given us that we may

perfect ourselves. (b) Subjectively, one holds self as being nearer

than other persons, and thus loves oneself with a greater intensity.

1163. Is it lawful to sacrifice one’s own spiritual goods for the

benefit of a neighbor?

(a) One may not sacrifice necessary spiritual goods for the benefit,

spiritual or temporal, of any one, not even of the whole world; for in

so doing one inflicts a wound on one’s own soul and prefers the good of

others to one’s own spiritual welfare. Hence, it is not lawful to wish

to be damned in place of another; to commit sin, mortal or venial, to

prevent another from sinning; or to expose oneself to the certain and

proximate danger of sin for the sake of another’s spiritual progress.

(b) One may, however, sacrifice unnecessary or less necessary spiritual

goods for the benefit, spiritual or temporal, of a neighbor; for, by

doing this, one chooses the course which God wishes, and does not

lessen but rather increases one’s own profit. Thus, a priest should

interrupt his devotions to hear the confession of a penitent; a

daughter should give up the idea of becoming a nun as long as her

parents need her; a lay person should stay away from Mass on Sunday, if

an invalid has to be cared for, or a dying person must be baptized; it

is laudable to make the heroic act of charity, by which one transfers

the satisfactory value of one’s good works to the souls in purgatory;

one may expose oneself to a remote danger of sin in order to perform a

great service of charity, as in waiting on a sick person who on account

of irritability is a great temptation to anger; one may wish that one’s

entrance into heaven be delayed, so that one may labor longer for souls

(Philip., i. 23, 24).

1164. The Love of the Body.--(a) One should prefer the spiritual

welfare of one’s neighbor to one’s own bodily welfare, for our neighbor

is called to be a partaker with us in the beatific vision, while the

body will share only in accidental glory. (b) One should prefer one’s

own bodily welfare to that of another, all other things being equal,

for it has more of a claim on one.

1165. There are three kinds of spiritual necessity in which a neighbor

may be placed, and in which one might be called on to sacrifice one’s

bodily welfare for the other’s good (cfr. 1236), Thus, there is: (a)

extreme spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor will perish

eternally unless help is given him, as when an infant is about to die

without baptism; (b) grave spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor

runs grave danger of losing his soul unless help is given, as when a

dying person, who is in mortal sin, asks for a confessor, because he is

scarcely able to make an act of perfect contrition; (c) ordinary

spiritual need, or that in which a neighbor is in remote danger of

damnation, or in proximate danger of sin, but can easily help himself,

as is the case with those who from choice live in occasions of sin.

1166. For a neighbor who is in extreme spiritual need, one should risk

death (I John, iii. 16) or lesser evils, if the following conditions

are present: (a) if there is a good prospect of success in helping the

needy one (e.g., a mother is not obliged to undergo an operation

dangerous to her life, in order to secure the baptism of her child, if

it is uncertain that the baptism can be administered); (b) if there is

no one else who can and will give the needed help; (c) if there is no

reason of public good that stands in the way; thus, if by helping one

in extreme need a person would lose his life, and so deprive of his aid

a large number who are also in extreme need, he should prefer to help

the many rather than the one.

1167. For a neighbor who is in grave spiritual necessity, the same risk

is not required of all. (a) The risk of death itself is required of

pastors of souls (John, x. 11), since they have bound themselves to

this. Hence, a pastor who would refuse to go to a parishioner dying of

pestilence and needing absolution and Extreme Unction, would offend

against justice, while another priest who would go to such a dying

person would practise the perfection of charity; for the dying person

can help himself by an act of contrition, and the strange priest is not

bound by office to care for him. (b) The risk of some great corporal

evil (such as a sickness or impairment of health) should be taken even

by those who are not pastors of the person in need, if there is no one

else to help. Thus, if a pastor were sick, another priest ought to

visit a dying person, even at the risk of catching a severe cold.

1168. For a neighbor who is in ordinary spiritual necessity charity

requires that something be done (Ecclus, xvii. 12). (a) But it does not

require the risk of life or of serious bodily loss, for the person in

danger can easily and better help himself. Thus, it is not necessary

that one should penetrate into the haunts of criminals and endanger

one’s life, in order to drag away one who chooses to go to such places.

(b) It does require that one be willing to undergo a slight bodily

inconvenience or deprivation. Thus, an ordinary headache or the loss of

a meal ought not to stop one from counselling another in order to keep

him away from bad company.

1169. If only corporal good (life, health, liberty, etc.) is compared

with corporal good of the same kind, then, as said above, one should

prefer one’s own good to that of another. Thus, it is not lawful to

offer oneself as substitute for a condemned criminal, or to put one’s

family into bankruptcy to save another family from bankruptcy. But, if

a neighbor’s corporal good is of a more important kind or is connected

with higher goods, then one may sacrifice one’s own good for that of

another.

(a) Thus, one may prefer a greater corporal good of a neighbor to a

lesser corporal good of one’s own. Examples: One may weaken one’s

health to save another’s life. One may give of one’s blood for a

transfusion to assist another who is in danger of death.

(b) One may prefer an equal corporal good of a neighbor to an equal

corporal good of one’s own, if the common good requires this; for the

good of all is preferable to that of an individual. Thus, one may

expose oneself to the peril of death in order to protect a public

person whose life is very important to the nation. Thus, policemen and

firemen, soldiers and sailors, are daily imperilling their own safety

for the safety of the public.

private individual, to one’s own equal good, if the intention is to

practise virtue, to assist a person in need, or to give edification. At

least, it is more probable that this is lawful, for the good of virtue

is a higher good than the good of the body, and the Fathers praise holy

men who sold themselves into slavery, or who gave themselves as

hostages to barbarians, for the liberation of captives; and they hold

up for admiration Damon and Pythias, each of whom was ready to die for

the other. Hence, it is not against the charity owed to self to jump

into a river and risk one’s life in order to rescue a drowning person,

for heroic charity is a hotter adornment to self than mere, ordinary

charity. Similarly, if two explorers in a wilderness have only enough

provisions for one to reach civilization, one of them may surrender his

rations to the other, that both may not be lost.

1170. There are two exceptions to the rules just given: (a) A person

should not risk his life for another’s life, if he thereby endangers

his own salvation (e.g., if he is in a state of sin and cannot

reconcile himself to God). But this case is theoretical, for it is

admitted that one who makes the supreme sacrifice of giving his life

with a virtuous intention, has not only charity, but the perfection of

charity (John, xv. 13), which will certainly purify him even from a

multitude of sins. (b) One should not risk one’s life for the life of

another, if a third party has a higher claim on him. Thus, a married

man, who has a dependent wife and children, may not throw away his life

for the sake of a friend.

1171. The order of charity between different neighbors is as follows:

(a) as to good in general (e.g., the attainment of salvation), we

should love all neighbors alike, for we should desire salvation for

all; (b) as to good in particular (e.g., the degree of beatitude), we

should love some more than others. Thus, we should desire a higher

degree of glory for the Blessed Virgin than for the Saints.

1172. The reasons for loving one neighbor more than another can be

reduced to two. (a) One neighbor may be nearer to God than another, and

hence more deserving of love--for example, a saintly acquaintance may

be nearer to God than a sinful relative. (b) One neighbor may be nearer

to ourselves on account of relationship by blood or marriage,

friendship, civil or professional ties, etc. Thus, a cousin is nearer

by nature to his cousin than another person who is not a relative.

1173. The order of charity as between those nearer to God and those

nearer to self is as follows:

(a) Objectively, we should esteem more those who are better, and desire

for them that higher degree of God’s favor which belongs to their

merits. But we may desire for those nearer to ourselves that they will

finally surpass in holiness those now better than they are, and thus

attain to a greater beatitude. Moreover, while we prefer in one respect

(i.e., that of holiness) a saintly person, who is a stranger, we prefer

in many respects (e.g., on account of relationship, friendship,

gratitude) another who is less holy.

(b) Subjectively, the love for those nearer to self is greater, that

is, more intense, more vividly felt. The preferences for those nearer

to self, therefore, far from being wrong or the expression of mere

natural love, are expressions of charity itself. For it is God’s will

that more love should be shown to those who are nearer to us: “If any

man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he

hath denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel” (I Tim., v. 8).

Hence, charity itself inclines one to have more love for one’s own, and

it supernaturalizes filial piety, patriotism, and friendship.

1174. The order to be followed in the manifestation of charity will

correspond with the order of charity itself. (a) To those to whom

greater objective love is due, on account of their holiness, more

respect due to their excellence should be shown. (b) To those to whom

greater return of love is due on account of the benefits they have

shown (as parents, friends, etc.), more assistance should be given

spiritually and temporally. That is, if one had to choose between

helping either a relative or a stranger who was more virtuous, one

would have to decide in favor of the relative. (c) To those to whom

greater subjective love is due, more signs of affection (such as

visits) should be given.

1175. Exceptions to the above are the following cases, in which the

good of the better person should be preferred:

(a) if the common good requires such a preference. Thus, public

interest demands that in conferring positions, making appointments, or

voting for candidates, one should not be guided by family affections or

private friendships, but only by the common welfare; and one should

decide in favor of the better man;

(b) if the person nearer to self has forfeited his claims to

preference. Thus, a son who has treated his father with contempt and is

a wastrel, may be deprived of his share of the family goods in favor of

strangers who are self-sacrificing and who promote some holy cause.

1176. The order of charity between various kinds of natural

relationships is as follows: (a) the relationship that arises from

consanguinity is prior and more stable, since it arises from nature

itself and cannot be removed; (b) the relationship of friendship, since

it arises from one’s own choice, may be more congenial and may be

preferred even to kinship, when there is question of society and

companionship (Prov., xviii. 24).

1177. In practice, other things being equal, one should manifest more

love to a relative in those things that belong to the relationship.

(a) To those who are related by blood, corporal or temporal assistance

is more due. If one has to choose between helping one’s indigent

parents or an indigent friend, one should rather help one’s parents.

(b) To those who are spiritually related (e.g., pastor and parishioner,

director and penitent, god-parent and god-child), more spiritual

assistance in instruction, advice and prayer is due. Thus, a pastor is

supposed to be more solicitous about instructing his congregation than

his relatives who belong to another congregation.

religious, etc., more is due in things political, military, religious,

etc., than to others. Thus, a soldier owes obedience to his officer,

and not to his father, in matters that pertain to army life; a priest

owes deference to an ecclesiastical superior in clerical matters, not

to his parents.

1178. Kinship, as being an older and more fundamental relationship,

should have precedence in assistance over any other kind of private

relationship in case of conflict and extreme necessity. (a) Thus, as

regards spiritual matters (e.g., calling a priest to give absolution),

if a parent and a spiritual father were both in extreme necessity,

one’s first duty would be to one’s parent. (b) As regards temporal

matters, if one has to choose between assisting one’s needy parents and

remaining in some relationship in which one cannot help them, one

should give up the relationship, if possible. Thus, a Religious is

allowed to return to the world, if his parents require his support.

1052. Servile fear, as to its circumstances, may be evil. (a) The