952. Procedure of the confessor with a p_Moral theology

excommunication on account of membership in the Masons or other like

society should be as follows: (a) the faculty to absolve must be

obtained (see 949), (b) the following promises must be exacted from the

penitent--that he will withdraw entirely from the sect and that he will

repair, as well as he can, the scandal he may have caused; (c) the

penitent must be required to renounce the sect, at least in the

presence of the confessor, and to deliver over to him the books,

manuscripts, insignia, and other objects that are distinctive of it

(the confessor should give these objects to the Ordinary as soon as he

prudently can, but, if grave reasons prevent this, he should burn

them); (d) a salutary penance should be given and frequent confession

urged.

953. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to the Odd

Fellows or other society forbidden by name, but without censure, should

be as follows: (a) if the penitent is contrite and promises to leave

the society, he can be absolved without special faculties; (b) if the

penitent is contrite but wishes to retain nominal membership, the case

must be referred to the Archbishop of the Province or to the Apostolic

Delegate; (c) if the penitent wishes to retain full membership, he is

not repentant and cannot be absolved.

954. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who belongs to a

society not condemned by name, but which the confessor himself regards

as evil should be as follows: (a) if the confessor is certain that the

society is one of those condemned implicitly by the Church, because it

exacts inviolable secrecy or blind obedience to its leaders, or has

Masonic characteristics, etc., he should treat it in the same way as

the societies condemned by name; (b) if the confessor is certain that

the society is condemned by natural law for the penitent before him

(e.g., on account of the evil associates and moral dangers it

contains), he should treat it as any other occasion of sin, but it

should be noted that no priest or local Ordinary has authority to

condemn publicly and by name any society not condemned by the Church;

rules for an uncertain conscience (see 678, 679, 742), and for the

prudent administration of the Sacraments (see Vol. II).

955. As one of the chief remedies against evil societies is the

formation of Catholic societies, the Code (Canon 684) praises those of

the faithful who enroll as members in associations established or

recommended by the Church. Catholic societies distinct from religious

Orders or Congregations are of two kinds.

(a) Distinctly religious societies are those instituted for the purpose

of promoting a more Christian life among their members, or of fostering

works of piety and charity, or of contributing to the solemnity of

public worship. Such are the Secular Third Orders, Confraternities of

the Blessed Sacrament and of Christian Doctrine, and other pious unions.

(b) Societies that are not distinctly religious, but whose membership

and spirit are Catholic, are of many kinds. Such are the Knights of

Columbus, Ancient Order of Hibernians, Catholic Daughters of America,

Volksverein, Young Men’s Institute, etc.

956. Communication in Worship.--Communication with non-Catholics (as

was said above in 882) is either religious or non-religious. It is

clear that communication in non-religious matters does not contain a

profession of error, but the same cannot be said of communication in

religious services, since these are not only acts of worship, but also

expressions of faith in the creed of a certain religion. We must

distinguish, however, between private and public communication.

(a) Communication is private, when a Catholic and non-Catholic offer

together the Lord’s Prayer or other similar prayer as a private

devotion, not as an act of official worship. Private devotion is not

the expression of a sectarian creed, and, if there is nothing false in

it and no danger of scandal or perversion from communication between

Catholic and non-Catholic in such devotion, this kind of communication

is not unlawful. In the following paragraphs there will be question of

public communication.

(b) Communication is public, when the rites performed are the official

services of the Catholic Church or of some non-Catholic sect (e.g., the

Mass, the Lord’s Supper of the Lutherans, the Evensong of the

Anglicans, the prayer-meeting of other sects). Thus, public

communication takes place either when non-Catholics take part in

Catholic worship, or Catholics take part in non-Catholic worship.

957. Participation of non-Catholics in Catholic services is either by

mere presence, or by reception or performance of Catholic rites.

(a) Mere presence consists in a purely material attendance at a

service, as when non-Catholics assist at Mass and sit, rise and kneel

with the congregation or remain seated throughout. There is no

objection whatever to this kind of participation; on the contrary,

non-Catholics should be invited to Catholic sermons and services, and

made to feel welcome, for in what better way can the divine command of

working for their conversion be complied with? Only excommunicated

persons are excluded from the offices of the Church (Canon 2269, Sec.1).

It is also allowed that Catholic bishops and clergy accompany a

non-Catholic ruler to the church, and assign him and his escort an

honorable place therein.

(b) Reception of Catholic rites is had when non-Catholics, without

performing any liturgical function, receive some spiritual favor

through the rites of the Church, as when a non-Catholic receives a

priest’s blessing.

some office in a liturgical function of the Catholic Church, as when a

Protestant acts as sponsor at a Catholic Baptism.

958. Cases of reception of Catholic rites by non-Catholics permitted by

law are the following:

(a) Reception of Sacramentals.--Since the purpose of these rites and

objects is to implore graces and temporal favors with a view to the

illumination and salvation of the recipient, and since our Lord Himself

blessed and cured even the pagans, the Church permits blessings and

exorcisms to be conferred on non-Catholics (Canons 1149, 1152).

Similarly, blessed candles, palms, ashes and other real sacramentals

may be given to them. Examples: The Church has permitted priests to

visit the homes of Mohammedans to bless and pray over the sick, and

also to bless the houses of schismatics, provided they were summoned

and avoided all communication in prayer.

(b) Reception of Sacraments.-Since it is possible that the salvation of

a dying person may depend on absolution, good moralists, relying on

decisions of Roman Congregations, hold that conditional absolution may

be given to a heretic or schismatic who is dying and unconscious, or

even to one such who is dying and conscious, provided he is in good

faith and contrite, and danger of scandal has been removed.

is nothing in the nature of things to prevent the application of Mass

to any persons who are living or in Purgatory; and from Canon 809 it

appears that Mass may be offered for any living person, and also for

any deceased person about whose salvation we may entertain hope. Hence,

neither the divine nor the ecclesiastical law forbids the application

of Mass for heretics, schismatics, or infidels. The Church also permits

Mass to be said privately, all scandal removed, for excommunicated

persons. Under these same conditions, then, Mass may be said for

non-Catholics, both living and dead (Canon 2262, Sec.2, n. 2).

(d) Reception of the Suffrages of the Church.--Since God wishes all to

be saved and public peace to be maintained (I Tim., ii), and since the

Church desires that Ordinaries and pastors should have at heart the

conversion of non-Catholics (Canon 1350), public prayers for the

prosperity of non-Catholic rulers and officials--likewise sermons,

missions and other works for the conversion of unbelievers--are not

only allowed, but recommended and required.

959. Non-Catholics have not the same right as Catholics to receive the

rites of the Church, and hence when they are admitted to them, there

are certain restrictions to be observed.

(a) Restrictions as to Sacred Things.--As admission of non-Catholics to

sacramentals, etc., is a favor, not a right, it should be confined to

cases allowed by the Church. Thus, it is forbidden to grant indulgences

or to give the nuptial blessing to non-Catholics, and only in very

exceptional cases may any ceremonies be permitted at mixed marriages

(Canons 1102, 1109). Non-Catholics may not receive the Pax; may not be

invited to take part in the solemn services of receiving ashes on Ash

Wednesday, palms on Palm Sunday and candles on Candlemas Day; may not

receive ecclesiastical burial (Holy Office, June 8, 1859). Children

sent by their parents to non-Catholic services may not be confirmed

(Holy Office, August 28, 1780); a Catholic priest is not allowed to

supply for a non-Catholic minister, by accompanying the body of a

non-Catholic from the home to the graveyard, even though the body be

not brought to Church, nor the bell tolled (Holy Office, January 26,

1886). It is not permissible to lend a Catholic church to non-Catholics

for their services.

(b) Restrictions as to Persons.--As superstition and irreverence have

to be avoided, the sacramentals may not be administered or given at all

to non-Catholics about whose good faith and purpose there is doubt.

benefit non-Catholics, must avoid anything that would cause scandal or

have the appearance of equal recognition of believers and unbelievers.

Thus, when Mass is offered for outsiders, the same publicity and pomp

is not permitted as when there is question of Catholics.

960. As regards the performance of Catholic rites by non-Catholics, the

Church disapproves of every kind of such participation, but does not

refuse to tolerate the more remote kind, when there is grave necessity

and no scandal is caused.

(a) By more remote participation we understand such as scarcely differs

from passive assistance (e.g., to act as witness at a marriage), or

such as carries with it no recognition as an official of the Church

(e.g., to act as substitute or temporary organist). Hence, the Church

has permitted this kind of participation in particular cases, when the

authorities decided that there was urgent necessity and no scandal.

Examples: Moralists hold that, when a heretic or schismatic has been

designated as sponsor at Baptism and cannot be refused without grave

offense, he may be allowed to act as witness. The Holy Office has also

declared that heretics should not be used as witnesses at marriage, but

may be tolerated as such by the Ordinary, when there is a grave reason

and no scandal (August 18, 1891); that a non-Catholic organist may be

employed temporarily, if it is impossible to secure one who is a

Catholic, and no scandal is caused (February 23, 1820); that in certain

special circumstances girls belonging to a schismatical sect might be

allowed to sing with the Catholics at church functions, especially at

Exposition and Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament (January 25, 1906).

(b) Proximate participation is the exercise of functions connected with

a sacred rite (e.g., to act as server at Mass), or that imply a

recognition of the religion of the one who participates (e.g., to act

as representative of some sect at a funeral and receive liturgical

honors). The Church has always refused to tolerate this kind of

participation. Examples: Non-Catholics may not act as sponsors at

Baptism or Confirmation under pain of invalidity of sponsorship (Canons

765, 795), nor chant the Office in choir (Holy Office, June 8, 1859),

nor be employed as singers of the liturgical music (Holy Office, May 1,

1889), nor carry torches or lights in church ceremonies (Holy Office,

November 20, 1850). Likewise, non-Catholics may not become members of

Catholic confraternities, nor assist at Catholic services as official

representatives of some sect or sectarian society.

961. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services may happen

today in so many ways, and it is so difficult at times to draw the line

between lawful and unlawful communication, that it is well before

considering these cases to state the general rules that apply here.

(a) It is lawful to perform an act from which two effects follow, one

good and the other bad, if the act in itself is good or indifferent, if

there is a sufficiently grave reason for performing it, if the evil

effect is not intended, and if the evil effect be not prior to the good

effect (see 104).

(b) Circumstances vary in different localities and countries, and

communication that would signify unity of belief in a place where

Catholics and non-Catholics are very unequal numerically might be very

harmless in a place where there is no great numerical difference.

Offense to non-Catholics should not be given needlessly.

communication is lawful or unlawful pertains to the Ordinary (Canon

1258).

962. Participation of Catholics in non-Catholic services is either

active or passive. (a) Participation is active when one takes a part or

fulfills some function in an act that is an official expression of the

worship and belief of a sect, even though this takes place outside a

church, or is not open to the general public.

(b) Participation is passive, if one merely assists as a spectator, and

not as a worshipper, at something pertaining to non-Catholic worship.

963. Sacred things in which communication is possible are of three

classes:

(a) the chief acts of divine worship (i.e., Sacrifices, Sacraments,

sacramentals);

(b) the secondary acts of divine worship (such as prayers, processions,

vows, oaths, the Divine Office, hymn singing, scripture reading, etc.).

In the Protestant denominations some one or other of these is, as a

rule, the central or distinctive service, although some have other

proper features of their own, such as the silent meeting of the

Quakers, the seance of the Spiritualists, the march of the Salvation

Army, the charity kiss of the Dunkards;

of feast or fast), and objects (e.g., images, badges, aprons, banners,

robes), pertaining to divine worship.

964. It is unlawful for Catholics in any way to assist actively at or

take part in the worship of non-Catholics (Canon 1258). Such assistance

is intrinsically and gravely evil; for (a) if the worship is

non-Catholic in its form (e.g., Mohammedan ablutions, the Jewish

paschal meal, revivalistic “hitting the trail,” the right hand of

fellowship, etc.), it expresses a belief in the false creed symbolized;

(b) if the worship is Catholic in form, but is under the auspices of a

non-Catholic body (e.g., Baptism as administered by a Protestant

minister, or Mass as celebrated by a schismatical priest), it expresses

either faith in a false religious body or rebellion against the true

Church.

965. It is unlawful for Catholics to simulate active assistance in the

worship of non-Catholics, for, while the non-Catholic rite would be

avoided, something which appeared to be that rite would be done, and

thus profession of faith in it would be given.

(a) Hence, it is not lawful to do an indifferent act which bystanders

from the circumstances will have to conclude is an act of false

worship. Thus, Eleazar would not eat lawful meat which was put before

him in order that he might pretend to eat the meat of sacrifice after

the manner of the heathen (II Mach., vi).

(b) It is not lawful to accept a false certificate of participation in

false worship. Hence, the early Church condemned as apostates the

Libellatics (i.e., those Christians, who, to protect themselves in time

of persecution, obtained by bribery or otherwise a forged or genuine

magistrate’s certificate that they had sacrificed to the heathen gods).

966. It is unlawful for Catholics to assist passively at non-Catholic

worship, unless there are present the conditions requisite for

performing an act that has two results, one good and the other evil

(see 104); for even passive assistance frequently involves sin.

(a) Hence, the assistance itself must be really indifferent, that is,

it must be a merely passive presence without any active participation

in the service. Examples: A person who stands in the rear of a Quaker

meeting house as an onlooker assists passively; but one who sits

quietly among the others present, as if in meditation, assists

actively. A person who sits in a pew during a revival in order to see

what is going on, assists passively; but, if he joins with the

congregation in bowing, groaning, etc., he assists actively.

(b) The evil effect that may result from assistance (such as scandal

and danger of perversion) must not be prior to the good effect;

otherwise, evil would be done for the sake of good. Examples: Titus, a

non-Catholic, goes to Mass as a spectator, with his Catholic friend

Balbus. He then asks Balbus to assist as a spectator at the services of

his denomination, and thus see for himself that the latter is better.

Balbus, in order to be courteous, consents. Here Balbus aims to show

politeness, which is good, but the means he uses--namely, the

impression he gives that he is not convinced of the superiority of his

own religion--is bad.

scandal) must not be intended or approved, but only permitted. Example:

Caius, a Catholic public official, has to attend funerals and weddings

in Protestant churches as a mark of the public respect for notable

persons. He knows that a few will take scandal at his action, but he

wishes only to do his duty as an official, and not to offend anyone

(see on Scandal).

(d) The cause of assistance must be in proportion to the kind of

assistance. Hence, a greater reason is required for assistance on

several occasions than on one, for assistance at infidel than at

heretical services, for assistance at the primary than at the secondary

act of worship, for assistance by a priest than for assistance by a

layman, etc. Example: Graver reason would be necessary to justify

assistance at a non-Catholic funeral, if there were signs of

anti-Catholicism manifested (e.g., flower designs and regalia of a

hostile sect placed on the coffin), than if the service contained

nothing offensive.

967. Cases of communication in false sacrificial rites are as follows:

(a) Active participation is had in such acts as the slaying and

offering of victims, the burning of incense before idols, the eating of

sacrificial banquets; (b) Passive participation is had when one merely

watches the rite of sacrifice without taking any part therein.

968. Cases of communication in the Sacrifice of the Mass are as

follows: (a) Active participation is had in such acts as taking the

part of deacon in a schismatical Mass, assisting at a schismatical Mass

with the intention of hearing Mass formally (i.e., of offering it with

the priest). If on Sunday, one is where there is only a schismatical

church, one is excused from the obligation of hearing Mass, and may not

hear Mass in that church (Holy Office, December 5, 1608; August 7,

1704). (b) Passive participation is had when one is present merely as a

spectator, kneeling before the Blessed Sacrament, but giving no other

signs of religious devotion. This is permissible under the conditions

mentioned above (see 966), if there is no scandal, or danger of

perversion (Holy Office, April 24, 1894).

969. Cases of participation in the Sacraments or sacramentals, real or

reputed, are as follows: (a) Active participation takes place when one

receives a Sacrament from a non-Catholic minister, or offers one’s

child to receive a Sacrament from such a minister, or contracts

marriage in the presence of such a minister, or acts as sponsor at a

non-Catholic baptism or confirmation or as the religious witness at a

non-Catholic marriage, or answers in public non-Catholic prayers, or

takes ashes blessed by schismatics. (b) Passive participation is had

when one merely looks on at the administration of a Sacrament or

sacramental by a non-Catholic minister, without signs of approval or

union in what is being done.

970. There are certain cases that seem to be active participations in

Sacraments with non-Catholics, and yet are permitted by the Code. In

reality, however, there is no active communication in those cases.

(a) Canons 886 and 905 allow the faithful to receive communion and

absolution according to a Rite different from their own, so that one

who belongs to the Latin Rite may lawfully receive in Communion a Host

consecrated according to the Greek Rite, or go to confession to an

Oriental priest. But in these Canons there is question of different

Rites within the Catholic Church, not of those of non-Catholics.

(b) Canons 742 and 882 allow those who are in danger of death to

receive Baptism and absolution from an heretical or schismatical

minister, and theologians apply the same principle to Extreme Unction

and the Viaticum. But there is no communication in non-Catholic

ceremonies in these cases, for the Sacraments belong to the Catholic

Church, and for the sake of the dying she authorizes non-Catholic

ministers to act as her representatives, provided there is no scandal

or danger of perversion.

971. Cases of participation in non-sacramental rites are as follows:

(a) Oaths and Vows.--Participation is active when one swears in words

or by other signs which, according to local usage, manifest belief in

the creed of some sect; it is not active, when the manner of the oath

does not signify adherence to a false creed; Example: If one is

required to swear, by touching or kissing the non-Catholic Bible, as a

sign of approval of Protestantism or Masonry, one may not consent. But,

if the Government presents a non-Catholic Bible with no thought of

Protestantism, there is no approval of Protestantism in the one who

swears on that Bible, although, if the custom is not general, there

might be scandal if no protest were made. A Catholic may bring his own

Bible with him, or ask for a copy of the Catholic Bible.

(b) Services--Participation is active when one marches in an Anglican

procession, plays the organ or sings at Y.M.C.A. services, joins in the

prayers or responses offered in a Protestant church, etc. (Holy Office,

July 6, 1889). Participation is passive if one looks on during a rare

visit, or listens by radio to the musical program broadcast from

Protestant services, or if one is obliged to attend non-Catholic

services habitually, not as a profession of faith, but as a matter of

civil duty or of domestic discipline, as happens with soldiers or with

inmates of public institutions. Participation is not active if one

adores the Blessed Sacrament carried in a schismatical procession which

one meets by chance and unavoidably. Examples: Titus belongs to the

honorary guard of a state ruler, and has to accompany the latter to

non-Catholic services on certain state occasions. Balbus is tutor in a

non-Catholic family, and is expected to take his charges to their

church and back home on Sundays. Claudia is a maid in a non-Catholic

family, and is ordered to hold one of the children while it is being

baptized by the non-Catholic minister. In all these cases the presence

at the services is purely passive, since the intention of the Catholic

present is not to perform any religious duty, but only some civil or

domestic service (see IV Kings, v. 18). But, on the other hand, the

martyrs during the reigns of Elizabeth and her successors refused to

attend the Anglican services, because this was required by law as a

sign of conformity to the Established Church--that is, an active

presence was prescribed.

972. Cases of participation in religious places, times and objects are

as follows:

(a) Places.--Participation is active when one orders one’s body to be

buried in a sectarian graveyard, when one enters a schismatical or

heretical church privately in order to visit the Blessed Sacrament or

pray, when one offers up Catholic services in a non-Catholic temple, if

these things are looked upon by the public as indications of identity

of belief between Catholics and non-Catholics. Participation is merely

passive, if one visits non-Catholic places of worship out of curiosity

in order to look at the pictures, hear the music or listen to or take

part in a political lecture or debate. In case of necessity, the Church

permits Catholic services to be performed in the same building as that

wherein non-Catholic rites are held, e.g., the Church of the Holy

Sepulchre at Jerusalem which is used by various denominations (Holy

Office, 12 April, 1704).

(b) Times.--Participation is active if one observes new moons,

sabbaths, and days of fast as prescribed in the Old Law.

condemned society, the ring or other emblem of Freemasonry, etc., or

makes use of other insignia whose sole purpose is to indicate

membership in some sect, unless it be evident that these are used for

some other purpose (e.g., in order to act a certain part in a play).

973. Cases of participation through attendance at non-Catholic

religious instructions are as follows:

(a) Active participation in worship is had when one listens to a

preacher, Sunday school teacher, etc., and signifies approval by

joining in “Amens” or other acclamations.

(b) Participation is merely passive, if at church or over the radio,

one listens out of curiosity, or in order to be able to refute errors,

or for the sake of perfecting oneself in diction or eloquence, or of

showing respect to a person whose funeral oration is being delivered,

etc. But, even though there be no active participation, it will usually

be unlawful to listen to these sectarian discourses on account of the

danger of perversion to the listener or of scandal to others. Catholics

who are scientifically trained and staunch in faith may for good

reasons hear sectarian sermons, but the greater number would be

disturbed or unsettled (see the principles given above on dangerous

books and schools, 854-857, 868). Moreover, even those who have a right

to listen to non-Catholic religious talks have to be on their guard

against scandal, for outsiders may regard their attention as approval

of doctrine or participation in cult, and Catholics not sufficiently

instructed may regard their example as an encouragement to imitate

(cfr. 979, 981).

974. Participation in non-Catholic assemblages or occasions whose

character is of a mixed kind (partly religious and partly

non-religious) are permitted by the Church, when due regard is had for

avoidance of scandal, perversion, denial of faith, etc.

(a) Some of these occasions are chiefly religious, but are also looked

on as family or civic solemnities, such as christenings, weddings,

funerals. Hence, it is allowed to assist at the religious part of the

occasion in a passive way for the sake of courtesy, or to exercise some

function which is looked upon as belonging to the non-religious part

of the occasion. Caution must be taken to ensure that the particular

sect involved does not consider the exercise of the particular function

as participating in the religious aspect of the ceremony. Likewise,

on condition that the possibility of scandal, perversion, etc., has

been removed, the following functions may be performed. One may act

as a witness at the christening of a near relative who is not a

Catholic; however, it is forbidden to be a sponsor, even by proxy,

at baptisms performed by a heretical minister (Holy Office, decr.,

May 10, 1770). To be pallbearer or undertaker at a funeral, to be an

usher at a wedding, to be an extra bridesmaid, etc., may be permitted.

(If the function of best man or maid of honor be considered as merely

attendants to the bride or groom, such participation in itself would

not be illicit; but since the danger of scandal might often be present,

such participation is dangerous. It is lawful for a Catholic pastor

to attend the funeral of a non-Catholic friend or relative, provided

he does not wear his sacred garb and takes no part in the ceremonies.

Canon 1258, Sec.2 establishes the general norm regulative of these

cases: a passive or merely material presence may be, for a serious

reason, tolerated as a mark of esteem or social courtesy at funerals,

weddings, and similar functions, provided there is involved no danger

of perversion or scandal; in a doubtful case, the serious reason for

this presence must be approved by the local Ordinary.

(b) Other occasions are chiefly non-religious in character, but are

also partly religious, or have the appearance of being religious. Such

are, for example, the coronation, birthday, wedding, or funeral of a

ruler, school commencements, political conventions, patriotic meetings,

civil marriage before a magistrate who is also a non-Catholic minister.

When these exercises are chiefly non-religious or entirely civil, even

though conducted in non-Catholic churches or by non-Catholic ministers,

the Church grants permission to participate in them to some extent, if

there is sufficient reason.

975. Among the mixed occasions just mentioned are not included such

as have an anti-Catholic or anti-religious spirit, such as funerals

from which all manifestations of religion are excluded on account of

hatred of religion, entertainments held by forbidden societies in which

the members are present in regalia, picnics under the auspices of the

Orangemen, etc.

976. Cooperation in Religious Activities.--A third danger of making

external profession of a false religion is cooperation in activities

whose tendency or principles are erroneous (see 944). Cooperation in a

false religion is of two kinds, immediate and mediate. (a) Cooperation

is immediate, when one takes a part in an act of a false religion

itself (e.g., by worshipping an idol). This kind of cooperation was

discussed above, as participation or communication (see 956-975). (b)

Cooperation is mediate, when one takes part, not in an act of a false

religion, but in some other act which is a preparation for a help to

the act of a false religion. This is the kind of cooperation we are now

considering.

977. Mediate cooperation is of various kinds. (a) It is proximate

or remote, according as the preparation or help afforded to false

religion is near to or far from the religious act. Thus, to make ready

the lights, incense, flowers, etc. in front of an idol is proximate

cooperation; to give money to an idolatrous priest or bonze is remote

cooperation. (b) Mediate cooperation is material or formal, according

as the intention of the cooperator is to share in or help error itself,

or merely to help those who are in error, while disapproving of their

error. Thus, if one prepares a pagan temple for worship or contributes

money towards its maintenance because one’s sympathies are with its

idolatry, one’s cooperation is formal; if one does these things only in

order to make a living or to show friendship to an individual pagan,

one’s cooperation is material. It is clear that formal cooperation is a

grave sin against faith, and hence we shall speak now only of material

cooperation.

978. The principles governing the lawfulness of material cooperation

will be treated at length below in their proper place among the sins

opposed to charity. But since, on account of the mixed conditions of

society today, there are innumerable cases of material cooperation

in religion, it will be useful to state in advance in this place the

principles bearing on material cooperation and their application to

cases on religion and worship. The principles are the same as those

given for an act that has two effects, one good and the other bad.

Hence, material cooperation is not lawful, except when the following

conditions are present:

(a) The action of him who cooperates must be good in itself or at least

indifferent, for of course, if it is evil, it is not lawful. Thus, if

a person were to give to one pagan temple objects he had stolen from

another temple, his action would be intrinsically sinful on account of

the theft. Similarly, if a person were to contribute to a collection

list as “sympathizer” with a school for the propagation of atheism

or as “beneficiary” from the sacrifices to be offered an idol, his

act would be intrinsically sinful as being a promotion of error or

superstition, even though he were not really a sympathizer with atheism

or a believer in idols.

(b) The intention of him who cooperates must be good; for, if he wills

to help a false religion, he is guilty of formal cooperation; if he

wills some other wrong end, he is guilty of some other species of

sin. Thus, if one who does not believe in idolatry contributes to it

on account of sympathy with anti-Christian movements, he is guilty of

enmity to the truth.

gravity of the sin which will be committed by others, to the proximity

and necessity of the cooperation, and to the obligation which one has

of preventing the sin of others. Examples: To contribute to a sect

which plots the downfall of legitimate authority is never lawful,

for there is no reason of temporal or private good that can be a

compensation for the destruction of the public good. To contribute

to the building of a Mohammedan mosque does not require so serious a

reason as to contribute to the building of a pagan temple, for mosques

are not used for idolatry. A graver reason is needed to justify ringing

the bell or ushering the people to their seats for a service of false

worship than to justify sweeping and dusting the temple the day before

the service, for in the former case the cooperation is closer. A

greater reason is required to build a house of false worship, when

there is no one else to build it, than when there are many others who

will gladly build it if one refuses, for in the former case one’s

cooperation is so necessary that without it the false worship cannot

take place, but not so in the latter case. A much more serious reason

would be required to justify parents conducting their children to a

place of false worship than would be required to justify a public

chauffeur in taking passengers thither; for the parents have a special

duty to guard the religion of their children.

979. The above principles on mediate cooperation are clear enough, but

it is frequently very difficult to apply them on account of the

uncertainty as to whether or not a particular act of cooperation is

indifferent in itself, or whether a particular reason for cooperation

is sufficient. But the following rules will help:

(a) An act is indifferent or good, when it does not tend to evil from

its very nature or the circumstances, but has purposes that are not

bad. It is bad when either intrinsically (i.e., from its nature) or

extrinsically (i.e., from circumstances) it tends necessarily to evil.

Examples: A derisory image of Christ and the manual of an obscene cult

are intrinsically evil, inasmuch as they necessarily convey error or

immorality. To draw up plans for a temple of idolaters in a Christian

country would have the appearance of favoring the propagation of

idolatry; to work on the construction of a temple in a pagan country

where the lending of one’s labor is regarded as a sign of acceptance of

paganism, to help build a meeting house for a sect that plots the

overthrow of government or religion--all these acts are indifferent in

themselves (for one may also draw plans and put up walls for good or

indifferent purposes), but from the circumstances they are evil in the

cases given.

(b) Reasons for cooperation may be ranked as great, greater and

greatest according to the kinds of goods that are at stake, and their

sufficiency or insufficiency may be determined by measuring them with

the gravity of the cooperation that is given. Great reasons are: fear

of serious suffering, or of the wrath of husband or other superior, or

of loss of an opportunity to make a considerable profit. Greater

reasons are: fear of loss of position, or of notable detriment to

reputation or fortune, or of severe imprisonment. Among the greatest

reasons for cooperation in the worship of a false religion are the

following: danger of loss of life or limb, of perpetual imprisonment,

of great dishonor, of loss of all one’s earthly possessions, of

disturbance of the public peace.

980. Cases of cooperation in false religion that occur most frequently

are: (a) contributions made to schools, churches, institutions; (b)

labor given to buildings and objects of worship or instruction; (c)

labor given to acts of worship or instruction.

981. Contributions to false worship are unlawful, even apart from

scandal, danger of perversion, and the bad intention of the cooperator

in the following cases:

(a) When on account of circumstances the contributions are signs of

sympathy with religious errors. Examples: Titus gives many stipends for

Masses to a schismatical priest. Balbus, when asked, contributes

liberally to a fund for the building of a hall under the auspices of

atheists. Caius, without being asked, gives a small donation towards

the erection of a pagan temple. Claudius sends in a subscription to the

treasury of a political organization whose purpose is anti-religious,

and promises to support their ticket.

(b) Contributions, even though they manifest no sympathy with religious

error, are unlawful, when there is no reason for the cooperation, or

only an insufficient reason. Examples: Caius contributes to a pagan

temple for no other reason than that he has not the heart to refuse

anyone. Titus advertises constantly in an antireligious paper in order

to help his business (cfr. 1530).

982. If there is no bad intention on the part of the contributor, and

if the danger of scandal or perversion is excluded, contributions are

permitted under the following conditions, of which both must be present:

(a) The contribution must not be a mark of sympathy with religious

error. This condition will be fulfilled more readily in countries of

mixed religion, where Catholics and non-Catholics have been long

associated together, and where non-Catholic denominations are engaged

in many things other than the preaching of their doctrines, such as

works of benevolence. Example: Balbus contributes at times to the

building or maintenance of Protestant orphan asylums, hospitals, and

schools, in a locality where these institutions are open to all and a

contribution is not regarded as a sign of agreement with sectarian

purposes.

(b) There must be a sufficient reason for making the contribution, such

as the common good or great private necessity. Examples: Claudius

contributes to the building of a non-Catholic church, in order that

Catholics may thus obtain exclusive use of a church till then used by

Catholics and non-Catholics alike. Titus buys tickets for bazaars, lawn

fetes, oyster suppers, dances, picnics and other entertainments held

for the benefit of non-Catholic churches, since, if he does not do

this, he will lose trade and his business will be injured.

983. The building of houses of false worship, the production and sale

of articles used in false worship, are unlawful also in two cases:

(a) when, on account of circumstances, they are a mark of approval of

the false worship. Examples: Christians of Japan were forbidden by the

Church to cooperate in the erection of altars or temples to idols, even

if threatened with death or exile, and the reason of the prohibition

seems to have been in each instance that such work was looked on and

demanded as a profession of faith in paganism. Similarly, the

construction of non-Catholic edifices in a Catholic country, of a pagan

temple in a Christian country, or of an atheistic hall, would be signs

of approbation of error. It is difficult to see how one who sells idols

to those who request them for purposes of idolatry does not show favor

to false worship, although he might be excused if, under threat of

great harm, he delivered them with a protest that he was acting under

compulsion;

(b) when there is no reason, or no sufficient reason, for cooperation

with false worship. Example: Balbus helps to build non-Catholic places

of worship for no other reason than that he is asked to do so, or that

he receives good pay.

984. Building non-Catholic temples or furnishing the appurtenances of

worship, scandal and other evil being avoided, are lawful under two

conditions as above:

(a) the work must not be regarded as a sign of approval of false

worship. Examples: The Church has permitted Christians to assist in the

construction of Mohammedan mosques, when this was done unwillingly by

them and under compulsion. The manufacture of statues of Buddha or of

other idols is not a sign that one approves of idolatry, because these

objects have legitimate uses, such as adornment of palaces or art

galleries. Similarly, the production and distribution of emblems of a

non-Catholic sect or secret society is regarded as being in itself an

indifferent sect, on account of the various uses to which such objects

may be put;

(b) there must be a reason sufficiently grave for doing this kind of

work. Hence, a greater reason is needed to build a pagan temple than a

Mohammedan mosque, and graver reason to build a mosque than an

heretical place of worship; likewise, greater reason is required to

cooperate as architect than as hirer and supervisor of labor, greater

reason to cooperate as supervisor of labor than as stonecutter,

bricklayer, etc.; greater reason is required to justify selling than

making idols; greater reason to justify selling altar cloths and breads

for the Lord’s Supper than for selling pews and stained glass windows.

Examples: Since lights, benches, bells, tables, cloths, etc., are not

necessarily intended for direct use in acts of worship, a sufficient

reason for selling them to non-Catholic churches is the profit that

will be made. But, since vestments and chalices pertain directly to

worship, a more serious reason is required for selling them than

business gains.

985. Making the preparations for non-Catholic services is unlawful

in the two cases given above, that is, when there is approval or

insufficient reason. (a) If the work manifests an approval of the

services, it is unlawful. Such positions as sexton, sacristan, usher,

beadle, church-warden, and trustee, imply recognition of the worship

or membership in the congregation, although the same does not seem to

be true of membership in the civil corporation of a church, nor of

external offices such as janitor, caretaker, and attorney. Examples:

Balba, an Anglican who is sick, wishes her minister to bring her

communion. She asks her nurse, Titia, who is a Catholic, to telephone

the minister to bring communion, and also directs Titia to prepare an

altar and assist the minister on his arrival by lighting the candles,

making responses, etc. Titia may not consent, for such immediate

cooperation would mean approval of and participation in Anglican rites.

Claudius, a Catholic, is hired by the minister of a Protestant church

to take care of the yard and garden about the church and parsonage.

Sometimes the minister asks Claudius to play the chimes in his church

tower which call the people to the services. The gardening work is

indifferent, but the playing of the chimes seems at least an unlawful

cooperation, since it is an invitation to non-Catholic worship.

(b) If there is no sufficient reason for the work, it is unlawful.

Examples: Gaia, a Catholic, acts as scrubwoman and cleaner in a

schismatical church for no other reason than friendship for members

of the altar society. On certain feast days her husband, Caius, a

Catholic, takes pilgrims to the schismatical church in a bus, only

because he makes considerable profit.

986. Making preparations for non-Catholic services, scandal and other

danger being avoided, is lawful when the two conditions given above

are present. (a) Hence, the preparations must contain no indication

of approval of the services. Examples: If Titia, the nurse mentioned

in the previous paragraph, called in an Anglican nurse to receive and

fulfill the orders of Balba, she would show that she did not herself

approve of the rites, and her act would be indifferent in itself.

If she could not avoid telephoning the minister without serious

consequences, it would not be unlawful for her to tell him that Balba

wished him to call. She might even in great necessity prepare the

table herself, but could take no part in the rite. The acts of telling

the minister that a visit from him was desired and of preparing the

table would not be, in the circumstances, approving of the rite that

followed. If Claudius mentioned in the foregoing paragraph wound up

the clock in the church tower, or rang the bell at certain times to

indicate the hour of the day, his acts would be indifferent, since they

have no necessary reference to worship.

(b) There must be a reason sufficiently grave for engaging in the

work that prepares for the services. Examples: If Caia mentioned in

the preceding paragraph were in great poverty and could find no other

employment, this would be a sufficient reason for her cooperation.

Likewise, if her husband drove a bus that carried passengers to

whatever destination they desired, and he could not refuse to let

them off at the church without being dismissed or causing other like

inconveniences, he would have sufficient reason for his cooperation.

987. The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.--The third

commandment of faith (mentioned in 918) has been considered so far in

its negative aspect--that is, as a prohibition against the denial of

truth or the profession of error. It remains to consider it in its

affirmative aspect--that is, as a precept of profession of faith or of

denial of error.

988. The ways of making profession of faith are various: (a) It is made

implicitly, if one performs acts that suppose faith; explicitly, if one

declares in words one’s internal belief. Thus, a Catholic professes his

faith implicitly by observing the precepts of the Church; explicitly,

by reciting before others an act of faith or the Creed.

(b) The declaration of one’s faith in words is made in ordinary ways,

if one affirms it to others, privately or publicly, or if one teaches

it or defends it in debate; it is made solemnly, if it is recited

according to a prescribed form as a ceremony. Thus, a Catholic who

answers to a questioner that he is a Catholic, or who explains the

truths of faith to an inquirer, or who replies to the objections of

an unbeliever, makes an ordinary profession of faith; one who reads

before the bishop or other designated authority a formula prescribed by

the Church, makes solemn profession of faith. The solemn profession of

faith is usually made before the altar, on which candles are lighted;

and he who makes profession of faith kneels before the authority who

receives it. Sometimes witnesses are present and the profession is

signed.

a declaration of one’s adherence to the faith of the Church and a

recantation of previous errors); sometimes it is a declaration or

oath that one rejects errors or accepts truths. Thus, converts before

reception into the Church abjure the errors they formerly held;

officials in the Church before assuming authority make a profession of

faith in which they reprobate Modernism and express their belief in the

Creed and the teachings of the Church.

989. The existence of a divine precept of profession of faith is proved

from revelation and intrinsic reasons, as follows:

(a) “If thou confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and believe in

thy heart that God hath raised Him up from the dead, thou shalt be

saved. For with the heart we believe unto justice, but with the mouth

confession is made unto salvation” (Rom., x. 9, 10). This precept

obliges under grave sin, since it is required for salvation.

(b) The first reason for external profession of faith is the honor of

God; for it is a mark of disrespect to God to be ashamed or afraid

to acknowledge oneself as a believer in His Word or a witness to its

truth, on account of what others may think or say or do.

good. It is well known that faith is strengthened by external acts, and

that it grows weak and decays among Catholics who have no priests or

churches or means of practising their faith.

(d) A third reason for profession of faith is the good of others, for

the confession of faith is an encouragement to those who are strong in

faith, an example to those whose faith is weak, and a light to those

who have not the faith.

990. The divine precept of profession of faith, since it is

affirmative, does not call for fulfillment at every moment. It obliges

only at those times when the honor of God, the Revealer of Truth, or

the needs of our neighbor, who is called to the truth, demand that one

declare externally one’s internal belief. (a) The honor of God demands

a confession of faith, when a refusal to give it signifies that one

does not accept the truths revealed by God, that revelation contains

error, etc. (b) The needs of our neighbor demand a confession of faith,

when a refusal to give it will prevent another from embracing the

faith, or will cause him to lose it or give up its practices, etc.

991. The honor of God or the good of the neighbor calls for an external

profession of faith at the following times: (a) when a person is

joining the Church or returning to it, for the Church is a visible

society and membership in it should be visible; (b) when a Catholic is

interrogated about his faith, for here the honor of God and the good of

others require that he be not ashamed of Christ or His Words (Luke, ix.

26), and that he should cause his light to shine before men (Matt., v.

16); (c) when a Catholic is in the company of others who are ridiculing

or calumniating the faith, and a protest is looked for from him on

account of his authority, knowledge, etc.

992. The profession of faith made by one who is joining the Church must

be external, but the same publicity is not necessary for every case.

(a) Secret profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert

is known only to himself and the priest who received him. This is

permitted only in grave necessity, when the spiritual good of the

convert requires it, and no injury is done to the honor of God or the

Welfare of the neighbor. Example: Titus is dying and wishes to be

baptized, but for an important reason he is unwilling to have the fact

of his conversion disclosed. Father Balbus, therefore, baptizes without

witnesses.

(b) Private profession of faith is made when the reception of a convert

is made before the priest and two witnesses, but the fact of the

conversion is not made known to others on account of circumstances.

This is permitted only for a short time and for serious reasons (see

932, 993), as the task of concealing one’s faith for a long time is

most difficult and is dangerous to faith itself. Example: Caius is a

pagan who wishes to become a Catholic, but is kept back on account of

dangers from his fellow-pagans, who will persecute him as an apostate.

He, therefore, asks to be received as a secret Christian, with liberty

to profess no religion externally. This may be permitted for a time,

until Caius can move to some other place, but it cannot be permitted

permanently.

is made before the priest and two witnesses, and the convert thereafter

makes it known that he is a Catholic by attending Mass, receiving

the Sacraments, etc. This kind of profession of faith is ordinarily

required, but there is no law making it necessary for a convert to

publish the news of his conversion.

993. A difficult case occurs when one who wishes to become a convert

is unable to make public profession of Catholicity without suffering

very great detriment, and is unable to make private profession without

continuing in external practices of the non-Catholic religion. An

example of this would be a non-Catholic girl who is threatened with

destitution by her parents if she becomes a Catholic openly, and who

knows that she will be forced to go to church with them if she becomes

a Catholic privately. There are three courses in such a case: (a)

public profession of Catholicism at once could be advised if the party

showed signs of a special divine call and of a heroism equal to the

difficulties the public profession would entail; (b) private profession

of Catholicism could be tolerated for a time, if the party was of such

age and circumstances as to appear able to cope successfully with the

temptations and perplexities that beset this course; (c) delay of

Baptism until things take a better turn would be the most prudent plan,

if the deprivation of spiritual advantages would in the long run prove

a lesser evil than the inconveniences of public or private profession

of Catholicism.

994. Examination about one’s religious status refers either to one’s

faith, or to something not necessarily connected with faith. (a) When

a person is examined about his faith (e.g., whether he is a Catholic,

whether he believes in the doctrine of the Real Presence, or in Papal

Infallibility), profession of faith is obligatory, if its omission

is equivalent to denial. (b) When he is examined about something

not necessarily connected with faith, denial or concealment of the

truth would not be denial of faith, and concealment might be lawful,

if the question were unfair. Evasion would be sinful, if the denial

or concealment contained a lie or caused scandal. Examples: If a

missionary in England or Ireland in the sixteenth century had refused

to admit that he was a priest or religious, or a layman had refused to

confess that he had harbored a priest in his house or had assisted at

Mass, these denials would not necessarily contain a denial of the faith.

995. Examination about one’s faith is made either by a private person

or by public authority.

(a) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by a private

person, he is not bound by reason of the question itself to make a

profession of his faith, for a private person has no authority to

call upon one in the capacity of a solemn and public witness; but he

is bound to make a profession of faith by reason of circumstances, if

the honor of God or the good of his neighbor requires that he declare

his belief. Examples: Titius is known as a very iniquisitive and

meddlesome character, who is continually asking others about their

personal affairs and putting silly questions. Wherefore, those who know

him are accustomed to pay no attention to his questions, or to tell

him to mind his business, or to give him some humorous reply. One day

Titius asked Balbus, whom he knew very well to be a Catholic: “What

is your religion?” Balbus retorted: “What is yours?” and left him.

Caius is studying Christianity with a view to embracing it, and asks

Sempronius’ opinion on miracles. Sempronius, fearing the ridicule of

some others present if he admits belief in miracles, says that he knows

nothing about that subject. Balbus had a right to deny an answer to his

questioner; but Sempronius should have replied for the edification of

Caius and the honor of God.

(b) When a person is questioned about his religious belief by public

authority, his obligation to make a profession of faith is certain, if

the questioner has the right according to law to ask the question, and

if it is made to one individually and out of hatred of the faith; for

to this case apply the words of Christ: “You shall be brought before

governors and kings for My sake, for a testimony to them and to the

Gentiles” (Matt., x. 18).

996. In the following cases, one is not bound to confession of faith on

account of the public authority that puts the question, although one

may be bound on account of the circumstances:

(a) When the question is not put to an individual, but to a whole

community, by a law which requires them in time of persecution

to deliver themselves up as Christians or Catholics, there is no

obligation to comply with this law, since it is unjust, and neither the

honor of God nor the good of others requires one to make the profession

of faith it demands (see 377, 552).

(b) When the question is put to an individual by one in authority but

contrary to the law of the land, there is no obligation to answer.

Thus, if according to civil law the magistrates have no right to

examine about matters of conscience and one of them should nevertheless

do so, the party questioned could treat the question as out of order

and deny any answer.

from hatred of the faith, one is not obliged positively to profess

one’s faith, unless the omission would seem to those present to be a

denial of faith. Thus, a person might remain silent, or say that he

did not wish to answer, that he did not wish to say what his belief

was, etc., and in the circumstances it would seem that he would not be

denying his faith, but merely for some reason refusing to discuss it

when he thought there was no necessity.

997. The third case mentioned above (see 991), in which one is obliged

to profess one’s faith publicly, is when the faith is. being attacked

in one’s presence. The honor of God and the good of the neighbor then

require one to speak out. (a) Thus, if the doctrines of the faith are

being blasphemed or ridiculed, one should defend them, if one is able.

Otherwise, one should protest or leave the company, if this will be

advantageous to religion. (b) If sacred things are being profaned, one

should resist physically, if one is able to prevent what is going on.

998. Debates on religion between Catholics and non-Catholics are not in

themselves wrong, but as a rule they are useless and inexpedient.

(a) That such debates are not essentially wrong, is clear from the

fact that a suitable defender of the faith is able by argumentation

to show the misconceptions that are entertained about the faith and

the fallacious objections that are made against it. This is honorable

to God and profitable to the neighbor: “Saul confounded the Jews that

dwelt at Damascus, affirming that this is the Christ .... He spoke also

to the Gentiles and disputed with the Greeks” (Acts, ix. 22, 29).

(b) That controversy is generally unprofitable is a matter of

experience. Religious debates often lead to bitterness, and seldom

effect conversions. There is, moreover, an ever-present danger that the

sophistry or eloquence of an adversary may give him the appearance of

victory to the discredit of the faith, for even a foolish person can

raise difficulties which only a wise man can answer.

999. Consequently the rule governing religious disputations is that

they should be avoided, unless ecclesiastical authority deems them

useful at times. (a) If no provocation is offered, or if no good seems

likely to result from a debate, it should be avoided. (b) If one is

attacked and it seems that the honor of God and the good of souls will

be served by a debate, then capable and prudent speakers are permitted

by the Church to defend the faith, provided permission is secured from

the Holy See, or, in case of urgency, from the local Ordinary (Canon

1325, Sec.3). The prescriptions of this Canon were reaffirmed recently

by the Holy Office and applied especially to “ecumenical” conventions

convoked to promote church unity. Catholics, both lay and clerical, may

in no way be present at such meetings without the previous consent of

the Holy See (Holy Office, Monitum, June 5, 1948). See Appendix II.

1000. The divine precept of profession of faith so far considered

obliges on account of the virtue of faith itself, that is, on account

of the external honor or service due to the Word of God. There is

also a divine precept of profession of faith which obliges on account

of other virtues that may require such a profession of faith to be

made (e.g., on account of charity or justice). The omission of the

profession of faith in these cases, however, is not a sin against

faith, but against the other virtues, and should be confessed as such.

(a) Justice requires a profession of faith when, by reason of his

office, a person has the duty of teaching others in the faith, for to

teach the faith is to manifest one’s own belief in it. Hence, bishops

and other pastors are obliged to preach: “Woe is unto me, if I preach

not the Gospel” (I Cor., ix. 16); and their teaching is a manifestation

of faith: “Having the same spirit of faith, as it is written: I

believed, for which cause I have spoken; we also believe, and therefore

we speak also” (II Cor., iv., 13).

(b) Charity requires a profession of faith when a person has not the

office of teacher, but has a suitable opportunity to impart instruction

to one who is in great ignorance about religion. For, as charity

requires one to perform corporal works of mercy for the suffering and

destitute, so it requires one to perform spiritual works of mercy

for the spiritually indigent, such as to instruct the ignorant, to

counsel the doubtful. Thus, a lay person who can prudently do so (the

circumstances of time, place, person, etc., being duly considered),

ought in charity to instruct in faith and morals the neglected children

around him.

1001. One is not bound to give instruction about matters of

faith or morals when this would lead to more harm than good; but

misrepresentation must be avoided.

(a) The purpose of instruction is to fulfill the will of God and

to benefit others; therefore, if these ends are not obtained but

rather defeated by an instruction, it should be omitted. The truth

is always good in itself, but its communication may not be expedient

on account of the recipient, who, being immature, may be harmed by

the wrong impression he will receive, or who, being badly disposed,

may use knowledge as a means to wrongdoing. Strong meat should not be

given to infants (Heb., vi. 11-14); pearls should not be cast before

swine (Matt., vii. 6). Examples: The mysteries of the faith (e.g.,

transubstantiation), should be explained with caution to those who are

not well instructed, lest they be overwhelmed with the brightness and

misunderstand. Difficult matters (such as predestination) or dangerous

subjects (such as sex duties) should not be discussed indiscriminately

with all kinds of persons. It is not right to instruct those who are in

ignorance of their duty, if this is not absolutely necessary and one

foresees that instruction will not prevent them from continuing in evil

ways but will only add to their guilt. It is wrong to put the Bible

into the hands of those who will use it for bad purposes.

(b) Misrepresentation or suppression is a lie, and in matters of

doctrine a denial of faith; hence, it is never lawful. The rule to be

followed, therefore, in teaching the faith is that one communicate the

same doctrine to all, but according to the capacity of his hearers--to

some in outline and to others more fully. This was the method of

Christ, who “with many parables spoke to them the word, according as

they were able to hear” (Mark, iv. 33).

1002. The Church has the duty not only of keeping the faith untarnished

among Catholics, but also of spreading it among non-Catholics,

Protestants, Jews and infidels, as far as circumstances will allow.

For God “Will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge

of the truth” (I Tim., ii. 4). Those, therefore, who assist missionary

work for unbelievers at home or abroad, do a work thrice blest, for

(a) it is a thanksgiving offering to God, testifying our appreciation

of the gift of faith which we have received from Him, (b) it is a work

of charity to ourselves, for by helping others to receive the faith

we strengthen our own faith, and (c) it is an act of supreme mercy to

those who are sitting in darkness and the shadow of death.

1003, In addition to the divine precepts, there are also ecclesiastical

laws prescribing profession of faith.

(a) Ecclesiastical precepts of profession of faith for various

officials are contained in Canon 1406 and in the _Sacrorum Antistitum_

of Pius X (September 1, 1910), and Canon 2403 decrees that those who

contumaciously refuse to make the profession of faith of Canon 1406 may

be deprived of their office. Converts to the faith who are received

without absolute Baptism make an abjuration (Holy Office, July 20,

1859), and persons who have incurred excommunication on account of

apostasy, heresy or schism are absolved in the external forum after

juridical abjuration (Canon 2314).

(b) The purpose of these ecclesiastical laws is to prevent the

acceptance of spiritual or temporal jurisdiction or authority in the

Church, or the commission of teaching or the benefits of membership by

those who are unbelievers. Hence, the purpose is grave, and the laws

themselves are held to bind under grave sin.

ecclesiastics and laymen, namely, those who are about to be received

into or reconciled with the Church, and those who are about to be

admitted to some dignity, order, office or function (such as candidates

for the ranks of Cardinal, bishop, canon, parish priest, religious

superior, professor, preacher, confessor, doctor, etc).

(d) The form of the profession of faith is the Tridentine or Pian given

in the Bull of Pius IV, _Injunctum Nobis_, of November 13, 1564, with

additions referring to the Vatican Council. The oath against Modernism

prescribed in the _Sacrorum Antistitum_ of Pius X, of September 1,

1910, is also obligatory.

(e) The times when these professions of faith must be made are at

admission into the Church and at the reception or renewal of an office.

1004. The affirmative precepts of profession of faith, divine and

ecclesiastical, oblige only at the proper time and place, and therefore

on other occasions one is not obliged to make profession of faith. (a)

Hence, one may avoid a profession of faith by evading interrogation in

time of persecution--for example, through the payment of money to be

exempted from examination, or through flight. As these acts indicate

that the person is unwilling to deny his faith, but has reasons for

wishing to preserve his life or to avoid the danger of apostasy, they

are not of themselves unlawful, and may be a duty. (b) One may omit a

profession of faith by concealing one’s religion, when prudence calls

for concealment rather than publication.

1005. Flight in time of persecution is lawful or unlawful according

to circumstances, since in itself it is something indifferent, being

simply the act of moving from one place to another.

(a) Flight is unlawful, if one’s circumstances are such that one will

do an injury to justice or charity by departure. Hence, a pastor would

sin against justice if he fled in time of persecution, leaving his

flock who stood in need of his presence: “The good shepherd giveth his

life for his sheep. But the hireling and he that is not the shepherd,

seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth the sheep and flieth” (John, x. 11,

12). Hence also, one who has no care of souls but whose presence is

necessary to a persecuted community should prefer out of charity their

spiritual good to his own bodily safety: “We ought to lay down our

lives for the brethren” (I John, iii. 16).

(b) Flight is necessary, if one’s circumstances are such that one will

do an injury to justice or charity by remaining. Hence, if a pastor’s

life is necessary for his flock, while his absence can be supplied by

others who will take his place, justice to his subjects requires that

he save his life for their sake. Thus, for the good of souls St. Peter

escaped from prison (Acts, xii. 17 sqq.); St. Paul fled from Damascus

(Acts, ix. 24, 25); our Lord Himself hid when the Jews took up stones

to cast at Him (John, viii. 59). Similarly, if a person is very fearful

lest his courage may fail him if he is brought before the persecutors,

charity to self requires that he take flight so as to escape the danger

of apostasy.

depart: “When they shall persecute you in this city, flee into another”

(Matt., x. 23). Hence, if one’s presence is useful but not necessary

in time of persecution, it is lawful for one to flee. Some authorities

hold that the desertion of Jesus by the disciples during the Passion

was not sinful flight.

1006. To refuse to flee when flight is permissible, is usually not

advisable, for this is dangerous for most persons. It would be

advisable, however, if a person had strong and prudent confidence of

his victory, had the right intention, and used the means to prepare

himself for the struggle.

1007. Concealment of one’s faith is lawful, if the requisite conditions

are present.

(a) Thus, it is not lawful to conceal one’s faith at times when a

profession of it is called for by divine or ecclesiastical law (see

991, 1003); at other times it is lawful. Example: Titus is travelling

in a country where there are no Catholic churches, and where no one

ever asks him about his religion. He never tells anyone what he is.

(b) It is not lawful to conceal one’s faith from a dishonest motive.

Example: If Titus conceals his religion in order not to be unjustly

discriminated against, his motive is good; but if he wishes to be taken

for a non-Catholic, his motive is evil.

If the means of concealment employed by Titus imply deception or denial

of the faith (such as lying about his origin and active participation

in non-Catholic worship), he is guilty of sinful concealment. But, if

the means employed are permissible (such as silence about himself,

omission of grace before and after meals, eating meat on Fridays in

virtue of dispensation, etc.), his method of concealment is not sinful.

1008. Generally speaking, concealment of one’s religion is not

advisable. (a) The reasons for concealment are often imaginary, rather

than real. We see that Catholics who are not ashamed of their religion,

or afraid to have it known that they practise it, are respected for

their sincerity and conscientiousness even in bigoted regions, while on

the contrary those who are apologetic or who do not live up to their

religion are looked down on as cowards or hypocrites. (b) The means

employed for concealment will cause endless doubts and scruples, for it

is often difficult to decide what means are lawful and what unlawful.

Art. 4: THE VIRTUE OF HOPE

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 17-22.)

1009. Definition.--The word “hope” is variously used. (a) In a wide and

improper sense, it signifies the expectation of some wished-for evil,

or desire without expectation. Hence, colloquially one hopes for

misfortune to another (hope of a future evil), or that another has

succeeded or is in good health (hope of past or present good), or that

some unlooked-for fortune will turn up (hope without expectation). (b)

In its strict and proper sense, hope signifies the expectation of some

desired good in the future. Thus, one hopes to pass an examination, or

to recover from illness.

1010. Hope, strictly understood, is of various kinds. (a) It is an

emotion or an affection, according as it proceeds from the sensitive or

the rational appetite. The emotion of hope is an inclination of the

irascible appetite to possess some object known through the senses and

apprehended as good and attainable, and is found both in man and in the

brutes. The affection of hope is a spiritual inclination, tending to

good as known through the reason.

(b) Hope is either natural or supernatural, according as it tends

either to goods that are temporal and within the power of man to

acquire, or to goods that are eternal and above the unaided powers of

creatures. It is in this latter sense that hope is now taken.

1011. Supernatural hope is understood, sometimes in a wide sense,

sometimes in a strict sense. (a) In a wide sense, it is used

objectively to designate the object, material or formal, of hope. Thus,

St. Paul is speaking of the material object of hope (i.e., of the

things hoped for), when he says: “Hope that is seen is not hope” (Rom.,

viii. 24), “Looking for the blessed hope” (Tit., ii. 13); while the

Psalmist is speaking of the formal object of hope (i.e., the motive of

hope), when he says: “Thou hast been my hope, a tower of strength

against the face of the enemy” (Ps. lx. 4). (b) In a strict sense, hope

is used subjectively to designate the act or habit of hope. The act of

hope is spoken of in the following texts: “We are saved by hope” (Rom.,

viii. 24); “Rejoicing in hope” (Rom., vii. 12). The habit of hope is

indicated in these verses from Job and St. Paul: “This my hope is laid

up in my bosom” (Job, xix. 27); “There remain faith, hope, charity,

these three” (I Cor., xiii. 13). Hope is now taken in the strict sense,

as a virtue or infused habit, from which proceed supernatural acts.

1012. The virtue of hope is defined: “An infused habit, by which we

confidently expect to obtain, through the help of God, the reward of

everlasting life.”

(a) It is “an infused habit.” These words express the genus to which

hope belongs, and they set it apart from the emotion and the affection

of hope, as well as from any acquired habit of hoping for purely

natural goods. A natural virtue of hope, strengthening the will with

reference to natural happiness, is not necessary in any state of man,

fallen or unfallen, for the will does not stand in need of a superadded

virtue with respect to those things that fall within its proper sphere

of action.

(b) Hope is a habit “by which we expect, etc.” These words express the

specific subjective elements of hope, that is, the powers of the soul

in which it resides and the kinds of acts it performs.

motive of hope.

(d) “The rewards of eternal life.” These words express the material

object of hope, that is, the thing that is hoped for.

1013. There is a general similarity between the virtue of hope and

natural hope as regards their objects and acts.

(a) Natural hope is the result of a love of some good, and so differs

from fear, which is the dread of some evil. Similarly, the virtue of

hope springs from a love of heavenly goods (Rom., viii. 24, 25).

(b) Natural hope has to do with a good that is absent, and it is

therefore desire, not enjoyment. Similarly, the virtue of hope looks

forward to goods not as yet attained: “We hope for that which we see

not, we wait for it with patience” (Rom, viii. 25).

not certain or easy, and hence it presupposes courage. Similarly, the

virtue of hope demands strength of soul: “Do ye manfully and let your

heart be strengthened, all ye that hope in the Lord” (Ps. xxx. 25).

(d) Natural hope tends towards an objective, which, while difficult, is

not impossible; hence, it expects with confidence, for, when an object

of desire is impossible, one does not hope for it, but despairs. The

virtue of hope also is confident: “Hold fast the glory and confidence

of hope unto the end” (Heb. iii. 6).

1014. Christian hope is superior to natural hope, because it is a

supernatural virtue.

(a) It is a virtue, since its acts are commanded by God, and through it

the will is directed to its beatitude and the secure means of realizing

its lofty aspirations: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy

justifications for ever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112); “Trust in

the Lord, and do good” (Ps, xxxvi. 3).

(b) Christian hope is a supernatural virtue, since through it man is

sanctified and saved: “I (Wisdom) am the mother of holy hope” (Ecclus.,

xxiv. 24); God “hath regenerated us into a lively hope” (I Pet., i. 3);

“We are saved by hope” (Rom., viii. 24); “Everyone that hath this hope

in Him sanctifieth himself” (I John, iii. 3).

1015. Though hope seeks its own reward, it is not therefore mercenary

or egotistic. Experience shows that hope produces idealism and

self-sacrifice, while the lack of it leads to engrossment in the things

of time and sense and to selfishness. (a) Thus, the hope of the just

man is not separated from charity, and hence he loves God above all,

and his neighbor as himself: “I have inclined my heart to do Thy

justifications forever, for the reward” (Ps. cxviii. 112). (b) The hope

of the sinner is a preparation for charity, since he must desire

charity as a means to the beatitude he wishes: “He that hopeth in the

Lord shall be healed” (Prov., xxviii. 25).

1016. Just as faith is divided into living and dead faith, so hope is

divided into animated and inanimated hope. (a) Animated hope is that to

which is joined the state of grace and charity, and which is thereby

perfect as a virtue and meritorious. This hope is stronger, because we

hope more confidently from friends. An act of animated hope is more

perfect when commanded by the virtue of charity, less perfect when not

so commanded--that is, he who makes an act of hope out of love of God

performs a better work than he who makes an act of hope out of some

other motive (such as self-encouragement). (b) Inanimated hope is that

to which the state of grace and charity is not joined, and which

therefore is an imperfect virtue and not meritorious.

1017. The following divisions of hope made by the Quietists are not

admissible:

(a) The division of hope into natural hope (which seeks its own good,

and which is permitted to the ordinary faithful) and supernatural hope

(which is entirely disinterested, and which is necessary for the

perfect) contains Rigorism; for since natural hope is of no avail

towards justification or for merit, it would follow that without

disinterested love of God one could not obtain forgiveness, nor could

an act be meritorious.

(b) The division of hope into two supernatural species, the one

disinterested (which desires heavenly goods for the glory of God alone)

and the other interested (which desires heavenly goods for the

advantage of self), is useless; for acts of disinterested love belong

to charity, not to hope (Denz., 1327-1349).

1018. The Object of Hope.--By the object of hope we mean three things:

(a) the good that is hoped for (material object, the end which is

intended); (b) the person for whom that good is hoped (the end for

whom); (c) the ground or foundation of hope (formal object).

1019. The material object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary

object, which is desired for its own sake, and the secondary, which is

desired on account of the primary object.

(a) The primary object of hope is God Himself, the infinite good,

considered as our Last End and Beatitude (Ps. lxxii. 25). Connoted in

this object is the beatific vision, the finite act by means of which

the creature attains to the possession of God. The primary object of

our hope is the imperishable crown (I Cor., ix. 25), glory (Col., i.

27), the glory of the children of God (Rom., v. 2), salvation (I

Thess., v. 8), eternal life (Tit., i. 2), entrance into the holy of

holies (Heli, x. 19, 23), the inheritance incorruptible and undefiled

that cannot fade, reserved in heaven (I Pet., i. 4), the vision of God

(I John, iii. 3). It is this object especially that distinguishes

supernatural from natural hope (I Cor., xv. 19). “From God,” says St.

Thomas (II-II, q. 17, a. 2), “we should expect nothing less than God

Himself.”

(b) The secondary object of hope embraces all those created things that

assist one to attain one’s Last End. We may hope for all those things

for which we may pray, as St. Augustine remarks.

1020. The primary object of hope includes: (a) essential beatitude,

that is, the beatific vision; (b) accessory beatitude, that is, all

resultant joys, such as glory of soul and body, the companionship of

the Saints, security from harm, and the like.

1021. The secondary object of hope includes: (a) spiritual goods, such

as graces; (b) temporal goods, such as health and the means that will

enable us, at least indirectly, to work for the life to come and

acquire merit; (c) deliverance from evils that would hinder spiritual

goods; (d) all that promotes one’s salvation, such as labors for God.

1022. The person for whom eternal life is hoped may be either oneself

or one’s neighbor. (a) Absolutely speaking (i.e., apart from the

supposition of friendship towards a neighbor), a person can hope only

for himself; for the salvation of others is not attained by him, but by

them; and thus, if there is no bond of affection, it cannot arouse in

him that feeling of courageous confidence which belongs to hope. (b)

Accidentally (i.e., on the supposition of friendship or charity towards

others), one can hope for them; for love makes a person regard the good

of others as his own. Thus, St. Paul is hopeful for the perseverance of

the Philippians (Phil., i. 6), and he labors for the Corinthians that

his hope for them may be steadfast (II Cor., i. 7).

1023. The formal object of hope is twofold, namely, the primary object,

which is the principal cause that effects our salvation, and the

secondary object, which is a secondary or instrumental cause of

salvation. (a) The primary motive of hope is God Himself, the Author of

salvation, and hence it is said: “Cursed be the man that trusteth in

man” (Jer, xvii. 5). (b) The secondary motive of hope are creatures by

whom one is assisted in obtaining the means for salvation (such as the

Saints, who aid us by their intercessions). Thus, in the _Salve

Regina_, our Lady is addressed as “our hope.” The merits of Christ and

our own merits, since they are instruments used by God, are motives of

hope.

1024. On what divine attribute is the virtue of hope based?

(a) Essentially, hope is based on God’s character of omnipotent helper;

for the specific and differentiating note of this virtue is its

courageous confidence, and this, in view of the surpassing height one

expects to attain and the feebleness of all created efforts, must rely

on the assistance of One who is equal to the task: “The Lord is my rock

and my strength. God is my strong One, in Him will I trust” (II Kings,

xxii. 2, 3); “You have hoped in the Lord Mighty forever” (Is., xxvi.

4); “The name of the Lord is a strong tower; the just runneth to it and

shall be exalted” (Prov. xviii. 10).

(b) Secondary (i.e., as regards acts that it presupposes, or that are

connected with it), hope is concerned with other divine attributes.

Thus, a person does not hope unless he first believes that God has

promised beatitude and that He is true to His promises, unless he

regards beatitude as something desirable; and so he who hopes has

placed his dependence on the loyalty of God to His given word, and on

the desirability of God as the prize of life’s efforts: “Let us hold

fast the confession of our hope without wavering, for He is faithful

that hath promised” (Heb., x. 23); “Unto the hope of life everlasting,

which God, who lieth not, hath promised before the times of the world”

(Tit., i. 2); “The Lord is my portion, therefore will I wait for Him”

(Lam., iii. 24); “Fear not, I am thy reward, exceeding great” (Gen.,

xv. 1). Just as faith presupposes a beginning of belief and a pious

inclination towards it, so does hope presuppose faith and the love of

God, as He is our beatitude.

1025. Omnipotent divine help as the foundation of hope can be

understood in two senses:

(a) It may be taken for some created help, that is, for some gift of

God possessed by us (such as habitual or actual grace, merits, virtues,

etc). It is not in this sense that divine help is called the motive of

hope; for even a sinner can and should hope, and the just man’s merits,

while they are dispositions for beatitude, are not a principal cause

that will conduct him to it.

(b) This divine help may be taken for uncreated help, that is, for the

act by which God confers His gifts upon us. In this sense only is

divine aid the basis of hope. For if a person is asked why he is

confident of salvation, he will not answer, “Because I am in the state

of grace and do good works,” but “Because I know that God will help me.”

1026. The divine perfections included in the title of helper now given

to God are:

(a) essentially, the almighty power of God; for this is the immediate

and sufficient reason for the confident expectation that one will at

last possess the same object of felicity as God Himself. The higher and

more difficult the goal one sets before oneself, the greater must be

the resources on which one counts for success;

(b) secondarily, these perfections include the infinite kindness of

God; for it is the goodness of God that prompts Him to employ His

omnipotence in assisting creatures to attain their Last End. Man has

hope, therefore, of attaining supreme felicity, because he relies on

supreme power to aid him, while this supreme power aids him, because it

is directed by infinite goodness and mercy. Thus, the Psalmist says: “I

have trusted in Thy mercy” (Ps. xii. 6). Just as faith rests

proximately on the reliability of God and remotely on His perfection of

being, so hope rests proximately on God’s almighty power and radically

on His goodness and perfection.

1027. The Excellence of Hope.--Hope is a theological virtue, and is

therefore superior to the moral virtues.

(a) It is a theological virtue, inasmuch as it tends immediately to God

Himself. As was said above (see 1019, 1023), we hope for God and we

hope in God: “In God is my salvation and my glory. He is the God of my

help, and my hope is in God” (Ps. lxi. 8); “What is my hope? Is it not

the Lord?” (Ps. xxxviii. 8); “In Thee, O Lord, have I hoped” (Ps. xxx.

1). Hence, the Apostle numbers hope along with the other theological

virtues (I Cor., xiii. 13). “By faith the house of God receives its

foundations, by hope it is reared, by charity it is completed” (St.

Augustine, Serm. xxvii., 1).

(b) The two moral virtues that most resemble hope are longsuffering and

magnanimity, for the former is the expectation of good that is distant,

while the latter is the readiness to encounter difficulties in the

quest of high ideals. But these two virtues belong to courage, rather

than to hope; for the goods they seek are finite, and the difficulty

they encounter is external struggle, whereas the good which hope seeks

is infinite, and the difficulty lies in the very greatness of that good.

1028. There are various points of view from which virtues may be

compared one with another.

(a) One virtue is prior to another in duration, when it precedes the

latter in time. Thus, the natural virtues that pagans have before their

conversion are prior in duration to the supernatural virtues that are

received in Baptism.

(b) One virtue is prior to another by nature, or in the order of

generation, when it is the necessary preparation or disposition for

that other, which essentially presupposes it. Thus, the intellectual

virtues are naturally prior to justice, for a man cannot will to give

others their due, unless he first knows that this is his duty.

when it has an object that is more elevated and comprehensive, and when

it is fitted to be the guide of the other virtue. For the standard of

comparison of habits must be taken from the objects to which they tend,

and from which they derive their specific character (see 134). Thus,

the habit of philosophizing is in itself more noble than the habit of

accumulating wealth, for truth is better than money.

(d) One virtue is prior to another in excellence according to the

general concept of virtue, when it does more to set the will right. For

the standard of comparison then is to be taken from the influence

exercised on one’s acts (as the word “virtue” or “power” intimates),

and the will is the motor power that sets the other faculties in

motion. Thus, for one who has debts to pay, it is better that he give

his time to earning money than to storing his mind with the lore of

scientists; justice has more of a claim on him than knowledge.

1029. Comparison of Hope with Faith.--(a) These virtues are not the

same, for, while faith makes us cling to God as the giver of truth and

assent to what is obscure to us, hope makes up turn to Him as the

author of beatitude and strive for that which is difficult for us.

(b) Faith and hope are normally equal in duration, since as a rule they

are infused at the same time (as in Baptism). Accidentally, however,

faith may precede hope, as when one who preserves his faith loses hope

on account of despair, and later recovers it.

hope, since both glory and grace--the objects of hope--must be known

through faith (Heb., xi. 6).

(d) They are unequal in their excellence as habits, faith being

superior to hope, as the intellectual habits are superior to the moral;

for faith is regulative and directive of hope, and has an object more

abstract and universal.

(e) They are unequal in their excellence according to the general

concept of virtue, hope being superior to faith, as the moral virtues

are superior to the intellectual (see 156). For hope includes a

rightness of the will towards God that is not included in the concept

of faith, which is chiefly intellectual, and it is the will that moves

the other powers to action.

1030. Comparison of Hope with Charity.--(a) These virtues are not the

same, for, while faith and hope adhere to God as the principle from

which one derives truth or goodness, charity adheres to God for His own

sake. Hope tends towards God as our good, from whom beatitude and the

means thereto are to be expected; but charity unites us to God so that

we live for God rather than for self.

(b) Hope and charity are normally equal as to duration, but

accidentally hope may precede charity, as when one commits a mortal

sin, but retains his hope of salvation, and later recovers charity.

There is question now only of the habits, because the acts of the

sinner leading up to charity--faith, fear, hope, contrition, etc.--are

for the most part successive, although in a sudden conversion hope may

be virtually included in charity.

charity, for, just as fear naturally leads to interested love such as

is contained in hope, so does this interested love prepare one for a

higher love that is disinterested: “The end of the commandment is

charity from a pure heart” (I Tim., i. 5). We speak here of hope

unanimated by charity; for animated or living hope trusts in God as a

friend, and hence presupposes charity.

(d) They are unequal in excellence, for hope proceeds from imperfect

love, which desires God for the sake of the one who loves, while

charity is perfect love and desires God for His sake.

1031. Hope, as said above (see 1015-1017), is good and virtuous even

when separated from charity, or when exercised without the actual

motive of charity. But imperfect or less perfect hope must not be

confused with the following acts, which have only the appearance of

hope: (a) acts that remove the material object of hope, which are such

as look for all beatitude in something different from God (e.g., in

secondary joys of heaven); (b) acts that do injury to the objects of

hope, such as those that subordinate them to lesser goods (e.g., hope

which puts self above God or delight above virtue).

1082. Three types of the latter kind of pseudo-hope may be

distinguished:

(a) Egotistical hope is that which places the end for which beatitude

is hoped (i.e., self, as was said in 1022) above the end which is

beatitude (i.e., God the Last End, as was said in 1019 sqq.), or which

places subjective beatitude (i.e., the act of intuitive vision by which

beatitude is attained) above objective beatitude (i.e., God as the

object in which beatitude consists). Just as the intellect is in error

when it mistakes the conclusion for the premise, so is the will in

disorder when it takes a means for the end. Hence, while there is

nothing inordinate in a man’s hoping for food on account of eating and

in his eating on account of health (since in reality health is the

purpose of eating, and eating the purpose of food), it is extremely

inordinate to hope for God on account of the beatific vision or on

account of self, since God is the End of all, and the beatific vision

is only the condition for attaining to this Last End, and self merely

the subject to whom God and the beatific vision are to be given for its

perfection through them.

(b) Epicurean hope is that which places pleasure above the other

elements that pertain to subjective beatitude. The subjective happiness

of man consists essentially in the act that is highest and distinctly

human--namely, in the act of the intellect seeing God intuitively;

hence, pleasure--even the chief spiritual pleasures-should be esteemed

as something secondary and consequent.

the latter were merely a means, as when one says: “If there were no

heaven, I would practise no virtue.” There are three kinds of good: (i)

useful good, or that which is desirable only because it serves as a

means to something else (e.g., bitter medicine, which is wished, not

for its own sake, but for the sake of health); (ii) moral good, or that

which is desired for its own sake, as being agreeable to the rational

nature of man (such as virtue); (iii) delightful good, that is, the

repose or satisfaction of the will in possession of that which is

desirable for its own sake. It is a mistake, therefore, to regard

virtue as merely a useful good, something that is disagreeable in

itself and cannot be practised on account of its inherent goodness. It

is also a mistake to consider heaven as something above and apart from

virtue; for eternal life is the perfect flowering and fruitage of the

moral life that has been planted and developed here on earth. The

things of this world are only means to virtue, and virtue reaches its

climax in the beatific vision. The delights of heaven are results of

that vision, not its end.

1033. Hope, therefore, must seek God as the chief good; it must not

prefer the lesser to the greater, and it must not hold virtue as good

only in view of the reward. But, on the other hand, hope seeks God as

its own good, and it need not be joined to disinterested love, in order

to be a true virtue.

(a) Hence, it is not necessary that one hope with the proviso that, in

the impossible hypothesis that God were unwilling to reward virtue, the

reward would not be expected; for it is not necessary to consider

chimerical cases.

(b) It is not necessary that hope be elicited by the act of charity

(i.e., that one always direct one’s desire of salvation to the end that

God may be glorified), for thus the motive of hope would cease to be

active, and the lesser virtue would be absorbed in charity.

(i.e., that one hope for salvation as one’s own good, only when a

previous act of charity has bidden that this be done as a mark of love

towards God), for to desire that which God wishes one to desire is in

itself good and laudable, and stands in need of no other act to justify

it.

1034. Discouragement and aridity occur even in the lives of great

Saints, and at such times, when pure love of God seems almost

impossible, hope comes to the rescue by offering encouragement and

spurring on to activity. Hence, the importance of this virtue in the

spiritual life; for (a) hope is an anchor of the soul in times of

tempest, since it offers reasons for patience and good cheer (Heb, vi.

19; Ecclus., iii. 9; Rom., xii. 12, viii 25; I Thess., v. 8); (b) hope

gives wings to the soul in times of weariness, since the motives it

presents are inducements to courage and good works (Is., xl. 31, xxx.

15; Ps. cxviii. 32; Heb., X. xi).

1035. The following means are recommended for growth in hope: (a) to

ask this from God: “Grant us, O Lord, an increase of faith, hope, and

charity” (Missal, 13th Sunday after Pentecost); (b) to meditate on the

rewards of heaven and the motives of hope, and to make corresponding

acts (II Cor., iv. 18; Ecclus., ii. 11-13); (c) to have recourse to God

in all our needs, casting all our care on Him (I Pet., v. 7); (d) to

work courageously for salvation and to preserve purity of conscience

(Ps. xxvi. 14; I John, iii. 21, 22).

1036. The Subject of Hope.--By the subject of hope we mean the power of

the soul to which this virtue belongs and also the persons who are

capable of hope. (a) The faculty of the soul in which hope resides is

the will, for this virtue seeks the good, not the true. (b) The persons

capable of hope are all those who have not yet received their final

reward or punishment.

1037. The virtue of hope does not remain in the blessed. (a) They

cannot hope for the principal object of bliss, since they already enjoy

it: “Hope that is seen is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he

hope for?” (Rom., viii. 24). (b) The blessed can desire secondary

objects, such as the continuance of their state, the glorification of

their bodies, the salvation of those who are still on earth, etc.; but

this desire belongs to the virtue of charity, since with the blessed

there is no longer the struggle and expectation of the future that is

contained in the desire of hope. Moreover, the desire of objects other

than God does not constitute the theological virtue of hope, which

tends directly to God.

1038. As to the departed who are not in heaven, we must distinguish

between those in hell and those in purgatory.

(a) Those who are in hell, whether demons or men, cannot hope; for it

is part of their punishment that they know their loss is eternal (Matt.,

xxv. 41; Prov., xi. 7). Dante expresses this truth when he says that on

the gates of hell it is written: “Hope abandon ye that enter here.”

Only in an improper sense can the lost be said to hope, inasmuch as

they desire evils, or things other than heaven. Unbaptized infants

either do not know their loss, or else are not tormented by the thought

that heaven is for them unattainable, realizing that its privation has

resulted from no personal fault of their own.

(b) Those who are in purgatory have hope; for, although they are

certain of their salvation, it still remains true that they must ascend

through difficulties to their reward. Hence, in the Mass the Church

prays for the departed “who sleep the sleep of peace”--that is, who are

secure about their salvation. The Fathers in limbo also had hope before

their introduction into heaven: “All these died according to faith,

not having received the promises, but beholding them afar off and

saluting them, and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on

the earth.... They desire a better, that is to say a heavenly country”

( Heb., xi. 13, 16).

1039. As to those who have not yet passed from this mortal life, some

have hope, others have it not.

(a) Those who have no hope are unbelievers and those believers who have

rejected hope. Unbelievers have no theological hope, since faith is

“the substance (i.e., basis) of things to be hoped for” (Heb., xi. 1).

Hence, even though one accepts the Article of the Creed, “I look for

the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come,” one’s

hope is not real, if one culpably rejects some other Article; for then

one expects the end without the necessary means (Heb. xi. 6). Believers

who despair of salvation, or who do not look to God for it, have not

the virtue of hope; for, just as faith is lost if its object or motive

is not accepted, so also hope perishes if its object is not expected or

its motive is not relied on.

(b) Those who have hope are all believers not guilty of a sin contrary

to hope. Sinners cannot expect to be saved if they continue in sin, but

they can expect through the grace of God to be freed from sin and to

merit eternal life; indeed, they are bound to believe that God wishes

their salvation and to hope for it.

1040. The certainty of hope does not exclude the uncertainty of fear;

on the contrary, man must both hope and fear, as regards his salvation.

(a) If a person looks to the motives of hope (i.e., God’s power and

mercy), he has the assurance of faith that God can and will help him to

attain salvation; and thus there arises in him a firm and unshaken

hope: “I know whom I have believed, and I am certain that He is able to

keep that which I have committed unto Him, against that day” (II Tim.,

i. 12; cfr. Heb., vi. 18; Ps. xxiv. 2; Ps. xxx. 2.; Rom., xiv. 4)

(b) But, if a person looks to his own frailty and remembers that others

have hoped and yet have been lost, he is not certain that he will

cooperate with God and be saved, and hence he must fear (Eccles., ix. 1

sqq.; I Cor., iv. 4, ix. 27). The Council of Trent declares that no one

can promise himself with absolute certainty that he will persevere

(Sess. VI, Cap. 13). Therefore, it is written: “He that thinketh

himself to stand, let him take heed lest he fall” (I Cor., x. 12);

“With fear and trembling, work out your salvation” (Phil., ii. 12).

1041. The Gift of Fear of the Lord.--The Gift of the Holy Ghost that

perfects the virtue of hope is Fear of the Lord (see 159 sqq.); for (a)

hope is the root from which the Gift of Fear is derived, since hope

joins the affections to God, and fear acts upon the soul that is thus

tending towards its beatitude--we fear to lose what we hope for; (b)

fear assists hope, since it makes us dread, not the loss of beatitude

or of divine help, but the lack of cooperation on our own part with the

assistance given by God.

1042. Not every kind of fear pertains to the Gift called Fear of

the Lord. In the first place, we must distinguish between physical

and moral fear. (a) Fear, physically considered, is the emotion

treated above (see 41 sqq., 120), which manifests itself in aversion,

bashfulness, shame, dismay, alarm, horror, etc. This kind of fear, like

the other passions (see 121), is morally indifferent in itself. (b)

Fear, morally considered, is a dread of imminent evil as leading one to

God or away from Him. In this sense fear is now discussed.

1043. The object of fear is always some evil, for the good does not

repel, but attracts. The motive of fear, however, is something good;

for one dreads evil on account of some good one wishes to obtain or

retain. By reason of the motive, then, fear may be divided into two

moral species, namely, fear of the world and fear of God.

(a) Fear of the world is that which dreads creatures more than God,

because it sets more store by the things of time than by those of

eternity. Thus, St. Peter’s denial of Christ was prompted by fear of

the world. When the object of this fear is loss of the esteem of men,

it is called human respect.

(b) Fear of God is that which dreads the Creator more than creatures,

because it prizes Him above all. Thus, St. Peter’s death for Christ

proceeded from his fear of God.

1044. Fear of the world is always sinful, because it makes one offend,

or be willing to offend, God for the sake of escaping some temporal

evil. It is forbidden by our Lord: “Fear ye not them that kill the body

and are not able to kill the soul, but rather fear Him that can destroy

both body and soul in hell” (Matt, x. 28). Elias (or Eliseus) is

praised because of his freedom from fear of the world: “In his days he

feared not the prince” (Ecclus., xlviii. 13). We should note, however,

the distinction between habitual fear, on the one hand, and actual or

virtual fear, on the other hand.

(a) Habitual worldly fear is a state, not an act--that is, the

condition of those who are in mortal sin, and have therefore preferred

self to God as the supreme end of life. It is a matter of faith that

not all the acts of sinners or unbelievers are bad, for they are able

to seek certain particular or natural goods.

(b) Actual fear of the world is a deliberate choice of sin out of fear

of some temporal evil; virtual fear is a deliberate act proceeding from

such a choice though without advertence to the choice or fear. In both

these kinds of fear there is sin, for actual fear commands evil,

virtual fear executes it. Examples: Sempronius internally resolves to

be guided by his fear of imprisonment rather than by the law of God

against perjury (actual fear). He then proceeds to perjure himself,

adverting to what he says, but not thinking about his previous fear

(virtual fear).

1045. The species of sin to which worldly fear belongs are as follows:

(a) The theological species of this sin depends on the disposition of

the person. He sins mortally, if on account of fear he is ready to

offend God seriously; he sins venially, if on account of fear he is

prepared to commit only a venial sin. Examples: Titus, in order to

escape imprisonment or exile, swears falsely. Balbus, having been

absent from his office without leave, tells a little lie to escape

reproof for this misdemeanor. Titus’ fear is a grave sin, that of

Balbus a venial sin.

(b) The moral species of worldly fear is, as a rule, the same as the

species of the sin to which it leads, so that but one sin is committed

and need be confessed. The reason is that generally the object of fear

is something that deserves to be dreaded, and that the aversion from it

is not wrong except in so far as it is carried to the extreme of using

sin as a means of escape. Example: Caius is wrongly suspected of theft.

To free his reputation he swears falsely about a circumstance that

appears incriminating. His fear of losing his good name is not a sin in

itself, and hence he is guilty of the one sin of perjury.

1046. There are exceptional cases when fear is a distinct sin from the

sin to which it leads.

(a) If the fear of losing some temporal good is so great that one is

prepared to commit any sin to escape the loss, and if later by reason

of this fear one swears falsely, two sins are committed--one against

charity, because a temporal good was preferred to God, and the other

against religion, because God was called on to witness to falsehood.

(b) If the fear is that one will not be able to commit one kind of sin,

and this induces one to commit another kind of sin, evidently two sins

are committed. Example: Balbus wishes to calumniate Caius, but is not

able to do so himself. Fearing that Caius will escape his vengeance, he

steals money and offers it to Sempronius as an inducement to calumniate

Caius. The two sins, calumny and theft, are committed.

1047. Not every fear of man or of temporal evil falls under worldly and

sinful fear. (a) To fear or reverence man in those things in which he

represents the authority of God is a duty: “Render to all men their

dues ... fear to whom fear, honor to whom honor” (Rom., xiii. 7). (b)

To fear temporal evils (such as loss of life, reputation, liberty,

property) in a moderate and reasonable manner, is good. Hence, our Lord

bids us pray for deliverance from evil.

1048. Fear of God is of two specifically distinct kinds, according as

the object one dreads is offense of God or punishments from God. (a)

Servile fear, that of a servant with regard to his master, dreads sin

because of the punishment it entails; (b) filial fear, that of a son

with regard to his father, dreads sin because of the offense to God

that is contained in it.

1049. Servile fear may be considered either as to its substance or as

to its accidents. (a) The substance or essence of servile fear is

derived from its object (see 71), that is, from the evil of penalty

which it entails; (b) the accidents of servile fear are its

circumstances (see 72), such as the state of the person who has the

fear, the manner in which he fears, etc.

1050. Servile fear in itself is good and supernatural.

(a) That servile fear is good, is a dogma of faith defined in the

Council of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 8; Sess. XXIV, Can. 5). Our Lord

recommends this fear when he says: “I will show you whom ye shall fear.

Fear ye Him who after He hath killed, hath power to cast into hell.

Yea, I say to you, fear Him” (Luke, xii. 5). the object of this fear is

penalty, which is an evil, and consequently something that ought to be

dreaded.

(b) That servile fear is supernatural, follows from the fact that its

acts are supernatural. It comes from the Holy Ghost that man may

prepare himself for grace; it is “the beginning of wisdom” (Ps. cx.

10), because through it the wisdom of faith first becomes effective as

a rule of action, causing man to depart from sin on account of the

justice of God which it makes known to him. Servile fear is thus far

superior to that natural fear of pain and suffering which all have.

1051. Though servile fear is good, useful and praiseworthy, it is not

perfect. (a) It is inferior to filial fear; for, while servile fear

looks upon God as a powerful master who cannot be offended with

impunity, filial fear regards Him as a loving Father whom one does not

wish to offend. Hence, the Old Law, given amid the thunder of Sinai and

with many threats against transgressions, is less perfect than the New

Law, which relies more on love than on fear (Rom., viii. 15; Heb., xii.

18-25; Gal., iv. 22 sqq.). (b) Servile fear, although it is regarded by

some theologians as an infused habit, is not a Gift of the Holy Ghost,

since it may coexist with mortal sin. It seems that it is not even a

virtue, since it turns man away, not from moral, but from physical

evil; but a number of authorities consider it as a secondary act of the

virtue of hope.

952. Procedure of the confessor with a penitent who has incurred