851. There are two cases in which the use of writings forbidden by the

Church is only a venial sin. (a) When a writing, which in itself is

not dangerous or only slightly dangerous, is forbidden, not on account

of its contents, but only on account of its lack of ecclesiastical

approval, it is not ordinarily regarded as forbidden under grave sin

(e.g., Catholic Translations of scripture that have not received the

Imprimatur). (b) When a writing has been condemned on account of its

contents or manner of presentation, one does not sin mortally, if the

use one makes of it is only slight.

852. What constitutes notable use of forbidden matter is not determined

by law, but recent moralists, bearing in mind the character of the law

and what would prove proximately dangerous to faith for the generality

today, offer the following rules: (a) notable matter in reading a book

is three or four pages from the more dangerous parts, from thirty to

sixty pages from the slightly dangerous parts; (b) notable matter in

reading a paper or periodical is habitual use of it, or even one very

bitter article; (c) notable matter in retention of forbidden writings

is a period in excess of the reasonable time (say, a month) for

securing permission or for delivering the writings to those who have a

right to have them.

853. It is more difficult to decide what is notable matter, when a book

has been condemned on account of its general tendency. (a) Under the

natural law, of course, even a page or less is notable matter, if it

places an individual in proximate danger; (b) under the positive law,

perhaps anything in excess of one-tenth of the book would place one in

proximate danger. But, as we are dealing now with the general tendency

of a writing, this may have its effect on the reader before he has read

one-tenth, if the book is large, or the treatment is very seductive.

Hence, “one-tenth” is an approximation, rather than a rule.

854. The kinds of printed matter forbidden by the Code (Canon 1399) are

as follows: (a) the prohibition extends to books, to other published

matter (such as magazines and newspapers), and to illustrations that

attack religion and what are called “holy pictures” (i.e., images of

our Lord and the Saints), if opposed to the mind of the Church; (b)

the prohibition extends to published matter dangerous to faith, and

therefore to the following; to writings or caricatures that attack the

existence of God, miracles or other foundations of natural or revealed

religion, Catholic dogma, worship or discipline, the ecclesiastical

hierarchy as such, or the clerical or religious state; to those that

defend heresy, schism, superstition, condemned errors, subversive

societies, or suicide, duelling, divorce; to non-Catholic publications

of the Bible and to non-Catholic works on religion that are not clearly

free from opposition to Catholic faith; to liturgical works that do

not agree with the authentic texts; to books that publish apocryphal

indulgences and to printed images of holy persons that would be the

occasion of error (e.g., the representation of the Holy Ghost in human

form).

855. The mere presence, however, of condemned matter in a writing does

not cause it to fall under prohibition.

(a) Some works are not forbidden unless the author’s purpose to teach

error or attack the truth is known. Hence, books on religion written

by non-Catholics which contain errors against the Catholic Faith are

not forbidden, unless they deal with religion _ex professo_ (i.e., not

incidentally or cursorily, but clearly for the purpose of teaching).

It is not necessary, however, that religion be the main theme of the

book, Similarly, books that attack religion are forbidden, not when

attacks are casual or by the way, but when they are made purposely;

and the same is true as regards books that insult the clerical state.

The purpose is recognized from the declaration of the author, from the

nature of the work, from the systematic treatment, length or frequency

of argumentation or attack, etc.

(b) Other works are not forbidden, unless they contain not only

agreement with error, but also argument in defense of error. Thus,

books in favor of heresy, schism, suicide, duelling, divorce,

Freemasonry, etc., are forbidden when they champion wrong causes by

disputing in their behalf.

(c) Other works are forbidden, not because they state, but because

they approve of error. Such are books that attack or ridicule the

foundations of religion or the dogmas of faith, those that disparage

worship, those that are subversive of discipline, those that defend

proscribed propositions, those that teach and favor superstition, etc.

856. Books that deal with religion _ex professo_ (i.e., of set

purpose), or _obiter_ (i.e., incidentally), are as follows: (a) Books

that are _ex professo_ religious are manuals of theology, works of

sermons, treatises on the Bible, instructions on religious duties,

works of piety, text-books of church history. Works of a profane

character, such as scientific books, may also teach religion _ex

professo_, but it is not easy as a rule to perceive the intention of

teaching religion in works of this kind. (b) Books that deal with

religion only _obiter_ are works of a profane character, in which

the subject of religion is introduced only briefly (e.g., by way of

illustration).

857. Books dealing _ex professo_ with religion and written by

non-Catholics are: (a) forbidden, if they contain matter contrary to

Catholic faith; (b) not forbidden, if it is clear to one (e.g., from a

competent review) that they contain nothing contrary to Catholic faith.

858. How is one to know in a particular case whether a book falls under

one of the foregoing classes forbidden by the Code? (a) If the Holy

See has made a declaration, the matter is of course clear; (b) if no

declaration has been made, and one is competent to judge for oneself,

one may read as much as is necessary to decide whether the book is one

of those proscribed by the Code; but if a person has not received the

education that would fit him for judging, he should consult some person

more skilled than himself, such as his parish priest or confessor.

859. Is it lawful to read newspapers, magazines, or reference works

(such as encyclopedias), which contain some articles contrary to faith,

and others that are good or indifferent, if these papers or books have

not been condemned? (a) If the reading or consultation, on account of

one’s individual character, will subject one to grave temptations,

then according to natural law it should be avoided. (b) If there is no

serious danger or temptation, but the policy of the works or journals

in question is anti-religious or anti-Catholic, as appears from the

space given to hostile attack, their frequency or bitterness of spirit,

then, according to the law of the Code just mentioned, one should avoid

such reading matter. Examples of this kind of literature are papers

devoted to atheistic or bolshevistic propaganda, anti-Catholic sheets,

etc. (c) If there is no danger to the individual, and the editorial

policy is not hostile, one may use such matter as is good and useful,

while passing over any elaborate or systematic attack on truth or

defense of error.

860. Individual books are forbidden by name to all Catholics by the

Holy See and to their own subjects by Ordinaries and other local or

particular councils (Canon 1395). Books condemned by the Apostolic See

must be considered as forbidden everywhere and in whatsoever language

they may be translated into (Canon 1396).

(a) If a book is forbidden, one may not read even the harmless parts of

it, for there is the danger that, if one part is read, the other parts

will also be read. But, if the part that occasioned the prohibition be

removed, the prohibition ceases as regards the remainder of the book.

(b) If a work is forbidden, one may not read any volume, if all the

volumes deal with the same subject. But, if the volumes treat of

different subjects or of one subject that is divisible (e.g., universal

history), one may read such volumes as do not contain the danger that

occasioned the prohibition.

(c) If all the works of an author are condemned, the prohibition is

understood to apply only to books (i.e., not to smaller works), and

only to books dealing with religion, unless it appears that the other

kinds of writings are also included; but the prohibition is to be

presumed to include works that appear after the condemnation, unless

the contrary is manifest.

861. Some outstanding works that have been condemned are the following:

(a) In English: _Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire_ (Gibbons);

_Myth, Ritual, and Religion_ (Andrew Lang); _History of England_

(Goldsmith); _The Roman Popes_ (Ranke); _The Life and Pontificate

of Leo X_ (Roscoe); _Constitutional History of England_ (Hallam);

_Political Economy_ (Mill); _Happiness in Hell_ (Mivart); _History

of English Literature_ (Taine); _Reign of Charles V_ (Robertson);

_Zoonomia_, or The Laws of Organic Life (Darwin).

(b) In French: _Notre Dame de Paris_ (Hugo); _Life of Jesus_ and

eighteen other works of Renan; all the works of Anatole France; _The

Social Contract_ and four works of Rousseau; nearly all the works

of Voltaire; _The Gospel and the Church, Gospel Studies, The Fourth

Gospel, Apropos of a Little Book, The Religion of Israel_ (Loisy); all

the works of Jean Paul Sartre; _La Deuxieme Sexe_ and _Les Mandarins_

by Simone de Beauvoir.

862. What is meant by “use” of forbidden writings? (a) In the first

place, those “use” a writing who read it--that is, who go over it

with their eyes, understanding the meaning therein contained. Hence,

a person does not violate the church law against forbidden books if

he merely listens to another read; although he might sin against the

natural law, and even against the church law, if he induced the other

to read to him; neither does a person violate the church law, if he

merely glances at the characters, without understanding the sense

expressed. Example: Titus, a professor of theology, has permission to

read forbidden books, and he sometimes reads to his class doctrinal

passages from works on the Index in order to explain and refute errors.

Balbus examines very carefully the pages of a beautifully printed copy

of a forbidden work, but he understands hardly a word of it, since it

is in a foreign language. Neither Titus’ class nor Balbus are guilty of

reading as forbidden by the Church, for strict interpretation is given

to penal laws (see 485).

(b) In the second place, those “use” a forbidden writing who retain

it--that is, who keep it in their home as belonging to themselves or

borrowed from another, or who give it for safekeeping to another,

even though they are not able to read it. Hence, a librarian who has

forbidden books on his shelves does not break the law, since the books

are not his property, nor are they kept in his home. A bookbinder

also who receives forbidden books is considered as excused through

_epieikeia_ for the time the books are in his shop, especially if his

customer has the permission to read those books. Example: Sempronius

bought an expensive work and then discovered that it is on the Index.

Is he obliged to destroy it? No, if he does not wish to destroy it, he

may, if he does not delay beyond a month, either give it to someone who

has permission to keep it, or obtain that permission for himself.

(c) In the third place, those “use” a forbidden writing who communicate

it to others--for example, those who make presents of works that are on

the Index, who lend such books to others, or place them where others

will read them, who read to others passages or write out excerpts for

them. It is lawful, however, for professors in theological and other

classes of sacred science to read from forbidden works to their student

body, if a suitable explanation and refutation exclude all danger.

(d) Lastly, those fall under the law as violators who co-operate in

the production or distribution of forbidden literature--for example,

publishers, owners, authors, translators, booksellers, printers, etc.

(cfr. 976 sqq., on cooperation in Worship).

863. The church law on forbidden literature affects all Catholics not

excepted by law, no matter how learned they may be, what position they

may hold, or how immune from danger they may seem, unless they obtain

permission to read such literature from the Holy See, the Ordinary,

or their regular Superior (Canon 1402). Those excepted by law and

who do not need to seek such permission are certain prelates and

students. (a) Cardinals, Bishops, and other Ordinaries (Canon 1401),

and likewise major superiors in exempt clerical orders (Canon 198,

Sec. 1) are not bound by the church prohibition of books dangerous to

faith; (b) those who are pursuing theological or biblical studies may

use forbidden editions of scripture, provided these are correct and

complete as to the text, and contain no attacks on Catholic teaching in

the introductions and annotations (Canon 1400). This permission extends

not only to seminarians, but also to lay students; not only to those

who are at school, but also to those who are really studying outside

of school, such as professors, writers and those who are preparing

lectures or dissertations.

864. When the necessity of reading a forbidden book is urgent, and

the opportunity of asking permission from the Holy See or Ordinary

is lacking, a person whose duties call for acquaintance with such a

book may consider that the law does not bind in his particular case

(see 411-417 on _epieikeia_). (a) A professor, editor, critic, etc.,

who had not yet received permission might read a forbidden book, if,

being called upon to criticize it, he could not await the permission;

(b) a confessor, pastor, etc., in similar circumstances could read a

forbidden book in order to be able to refute it.

865. Those who have received permission to read books forbidden as

generally dangerous to faith, may also read papers and periodicals

of the same character, and they may use the permission given them

anywhere, since it is a personal indult (see 446). The following

restrictions, however, are understood in the grant of permission:

(a) Permission to read, no matter by whom granted, does not make it

lawful to read what is really a danger to one’s faith, for this (as

explained above in 849-850) is contrary to natural law. Moreover, those

who have received an apostolic indult may not read or retain books

proscribed by their Ordinaries, unless the indult extends even to this.

(b) Permission to retain does not make it lawful to keep forbidden

books in such a way that they will fall into the hands of those

who have no right to read them. On the contrary, there is a grave

obligation arising from the natural law to prevent such a thing from

happening. Hence, those who have permission to keep writings dangerous

to faith should not place them on shelves to which there is general

access, or else they should label them as dangerous and forbidden (see

Canons 1405, Sec.1, and 1403, Sec.2).

866. According to Canon 2318, the following censures are incurred

through the use of forbidden books:

(a) Excommunication specially reserved to the Apostolic See is incurred

_ipso facto_ by those who offer to the public books, even of a

non-religious character, written by apostates, schismatics, or heretics

in systematic defense of heresy or schism. This censure applies, first,

to the chief causes of publicity of the work--i.e., to the author who

offers it for publication, and to the publisher and printer (owner or

manager of the press) who accept it for that purpose--not, however,

to remote cooperators or helpers; secondly, to such chief causes as

understand the character of the book, either from the word of the

author or from the contents. It is not incurred, if the work is not

published (i.e., if it remains in manuscript, or is circulated only

privately), or if it is published in other than book form (e.g., as a

pamphlet, leaflet or article). Ignorance, if not crass or supine (see

27), excuses from this censure (Canon 2229, Sec.3, n. 1).

(b) The same censure is incurred by those who defend the aforementioned

books, either materially (e.g., by saving them from destruction) or

morally (e.g., by defending, praising, or recommending them). Ignorance

excuses here as in the case of publishers.

(c) The same censure is incurred by those who defend books of any

author condemned by name through Apostolic letters. Hence, the censure

does not apply to books condemned by a pontifical congregation nor to

books condemned in a Papal Letter, if their title is not mentioned.

Ignorance excuses here as in the previous case.

(d) The same censure is incurred by those who knowingly keep or read

any of the forbidden books mentioned so far in this paragraph. The

sense to be attached to the words “keep or read” has been given above

(see 862). Even crass and supine ignorance of law or penalty, provided

it be not affected, as well as other causes that lessen imputability

(see 40), excuse from this censure (Canon 2229, Sec.Sec.1, 2).

(e) Excommunication not reserved is incurred _ipso facto_ by authors

and publishers who are responsible for the printing without due

authorization of books of Holy Writ, or of notes or commentaries on the

Bible, even though the text be correct and the explanation orthodox.

This censure is not incurred by those who are not responsible for the

printing done, such as typesetters and readers. Ignorance, if not crass

and supine, excuses here (Canon 2229, Sec.3).

867. Dangerous Schools.--With reference to their danger to faith,

schools are of three kinds:

(a) sectarian schools, in which heresy or infidelity is prescribed

as part of the curriculum, and assistance at non-Catholic rites

is required. Examples are colleges and universities supported by

Protestant denominations, sectarian Sunday schools, Bible classes;

(b) neutral schools (i.e., schools in which all religious teaching

is forbidden and no recognition given to any denomination) whose

spirit and teaching in secular branches is anti-religious or

anti-Catholic. Examples are non-sectarian colleges or universities in

which materialism is incidentally taught, or in which the faculty are

freethinkers or bigots;

(c) neutral schools in which no positive offense is given to religion

or the Church. Examples are public schools in which only the profane

sciences are taught, and care is exercised that neither the text-books

nor the teachers shall be irreligious or interfere with the religious

beliefs of others. Reducible to this category are mixed schools, that

is, those which are open also to non-Catholics (Canon 1374).

868. The danger of the foregoing kinds of schools to the faith of

pupils is as follows:

(a) in the sectarian schools there is danger of heresy or infidelity,

since the pupils are obliged to hear the defense of false doctrine and

to join in the services of a false religion;

(b) in the neutral schools of an anti-religious spirit the danger

is the same, for the pupils must attend courses in which the

interpretations given to history, science, philosophy, letters, etc.,

are unfriendly to the faith;

(c) in the neutral schools whose spirit is not anti-religious, there

is a danger of Indifferentism that arises from the system itself; for

the very fact that religion is slighted tends to impress the students

with the idea that it is unimportant or unrelated to other matters of

life, and this prepares the way for doubt and scepticism. Moreover,

since example teaches more effectively than the printed or spoken word,

the neglect or contempt of religion by professors and fellow-pupils in

mixed schools is a danger to faith.

869. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of attending or patronizing schools

dangerous to faith must be decided according to the principles given

above on the occasions of sin (see 263 sqq.).

(a) If the danger to faith is voluntary, the use of such schools is not

lawful, for those who are able are bound to seek or provide religious

education both in elementary and higher schooling (see Canon 1373).

Example: In the town of X there are good parochial and Catholic high

schools. Sempronius could easily send his children to these schools,

but he thinks that certain select schools offer greater social and

financial advantages, and so he chooses them. His conduct is not lawful.

(b) If the danger to faith is necessary, the use of such schools is

lawful, provided the needed precautions are duly observed. Example: In

the country district of Y there is no school except the public school,

and therefore Balbus sends his children to that school. His conduct is

lawful, but he must see that his children receive religious instruction

outside of school.

870. The danger to faith is necessary when there is no Catholic school,

or none that is sufficient for the needs of individual students, and

their parents are unable to send them elsewhere. In such a case it

is lawful to attend a school that is neutral, but means must be used

to make the proximate danger remote. Such means are the following:

(a) religious instruction must be taken outside of school, as in

special week-day classes, Sunday school, home study, etc.; (b) special

attention must be given to the strengthening of faith on those points

that are attacked or slighted in the neutral school; (c) parents,

guardians, or others responsible must see that the reading and the

associates of their wards in the neutral schools are good, and that

they are faithful to their religious duties.

871. Is attendance at non-Catholic schools sometimes unlawful, even

when there are serious reasons in its favor?

(a) It is unlawful, if the schools are sectarian, and then no

excuse can justify such attendance; for, in addition to scandal and

cooperation in false worship, there is present a proximate danger to

faith that is not made remote. Parents or guardians who knowingly send

their children to schools for education in a non-Catholic religion are

suspected of heresy and incur excommunication _ipso facto_, reserved

to the Ordinary (see Canon 2319). Example: Titus sends his daughter to

a sectarian academy because it is nearer and cheaper than the Catholic

academy. He claims that she is old enough not to lose her religion,

that opposition will make her faith stronger, etc. Titus’ arguments are

fallacious and his conduct gravely sinful.

(b) Attendance at non-Catholic schools is unlawful, if the schools are

neutral in theory, but so dangerous in practice that loss of faith is

practically certain if one attends. Example: Balbus sends his son to an

undenominational university which is regarded as a hotbed of atheism,

and whose students practically to a man lose all religion.

872. Absolution should be denied in some cases to those who send their

children to non-Catholic schools, if they refuse to change.

(a) Absolution should be denied on account of lack of faith in the

parents themselves, if they send their children to non-Catholic schools

on account of their own ideas that are contrary to the teachings of the

Church. Example: Sempronius refuses to send his children to parochial

schools, because he thinks each one should judge about religion for

himself, and not receive it from instructors.

(b) Absolution should be denied on account of the danger caused to the

faith of the children, when the children are sent to sectarian schools,

or when they are sent to neutral schools and sufficient efforts are not

used to counteract the evil influence there felt.

(c) Absolution should be refused on account of scandal or cooperation

in evil, if, while the parents themselves are sound in faith and

prevent all danger of perversion of their children, they send them

to non-Catholic schools without sufficient reason, to the grave

disedification of others, or the great assistance of unchristian

education.

873. Absolution should not be denied in the following cases: (a) when

the parents have a sufficient reason for sending their children to

non-Catholic schools (i.e., a reason approved by the local Ordinary

as sufficient). It belongs only to the Ordinary to decide in what

circumstances and with what precautions attendance at such schools is

allowable (Canon 1374; for application to the United States, see Holy

Office, 24 Nov., 1875; Council of Baltimore, III, n. 199, in regard

to elementary and high schools. As to colleges and universities, see

_S.C.Prop.Fid_., 7 Apr., 1860; _Fontes_, n. 4649, Vol VII, p. 381;

n.4868, Vol. VII, p.405; also S.C.Prop.Fid., 6 Aug., 1867); (b) when

the parents have no sufficient reason, but there is no lack of faith on

their part, no danger of perversion of the children, no grave scandal

or sinful co-operation in evil.

874. The presence of Catholics as teachers in non-Catholic schools

is beneficial, since it lessens to some extent the evil influence of

such schools; but there is also the danger that it may cause scandal

or create the impression that attendance at Catholic schools is not

necessary. Hence, it has been permitted by the Church in certain cases

but only when danger of scandal or wrong impression is absent. (a)

The secular sciences may be taught by laymen in non-Catholic schools

of higher or lower education, if there is no scandal, no unlawful

cooperation, and no immediate danger of perversion. (b) Christian

doctrine may be taught by priests to Catholic students of neutral

schools, either in the school building or elsewhere (as in a church),

and certain priests may be appointed as chaplains for this work (Sacred

Congregation of the Holy Office to Bishops of Switzerland, March 26,

1866).

875. Dangerous Marriages.--The following kinds of marriage are

dangerous to the faith of Catholics: (a) marriage with non-Catholics,

unbaptized or bigoted persons (mixed marriages); (b) marriage with

fallen-away Catholics (that is, with those who have given up the

Catholic religion, although they have not joined another), or with

those who belong to societies forbidden by the Church.

876. The danger to faith in the aforesaid kinds of marriage are serious

and proximate, and hence such unions are forbidden by divine law, as

long as the danger is not removed or made remote through the use of

precautions. The dangers are for the Catholic party and the children.

(a) The Catholic party is in serious danger of losing the faith

(i.e., of joining the religion or sharing the ideas of the other

party), or of doubting the truth of the Church, or of taking refuge in

Indifferentism. For, if domestic life is peaceful, the Catholic may

easily be led in time to regard with favor the other party’s religion

or views; if it is not peaceful, the Catholic through fear or annoyance

may make compromises or sacrifices in matters of faith, or else suffer

temptations that could have been avoided.

(b) The children born are in serious danger of being deprived of the

faith (i.e., of not being brought up as Catholics), or of having their

faith weakened by the example of parents who do not agree in the matter

of religion. If the non-Catholic or fallen-away Catholic interferes

with the religion of the children, their baptism, religious education,

attendance at church, etc., will be forbidden or impeded; if that

party does not interfere, there will be at least the example during

impressionable years of one parent who does not accept the Catholic

faith or who disregards its requirements. Statistics indicate that one

of the chief sources of leakage in the Church today is mixed marriages.

877. Dangerous marriages are also forbidden by the law of the Church.

(a) Lack of baptism in the non-Catholic party causes the diriment

impediment of disparity of worship (Canon 1070); (b) membership of the

non-Catholic party in an heretical or schismatical sect causes the

prohibitive impediment of mixed religion (Canon 1060); (c) unworthiness

of one of the parties, on account of notorious apostasy or affiliation

with forbidden societies (see 945 sqq.), prevents the pastor from

assisting at the marriage without permission from the Ordinary (Canon

1065).

878. No one may enter into any of the dangerous marriages here

considered, unless the requirements of the natural and ecclesiastical

laws be complied with. (a) The natural law requires under pain of grave

sin that the danger of perversion be removed, that no non-Catholic

ceremony take place, and that the Catholic spouse work prudently for

the conversion of the other party. (b) The ecclesiastical law requires

under grave sin that guarantees be given that the requirements of the

natural law shall be fulfilled (Canons 1061, 1071); that there be grave

and urgent reasons for the marriage (ibid.); that dispensations from

the impediments be obtained, or permission, in the case of unworthiness

of one of the parties, to assist at the marriage be granted by the

Ordinary (Canons 1036, 1065).

879. The canonical consequences of dangerous marriages illegally

contracted are as follows: (a) Those who knowingly contract a mixed

marriage without dispensation are _ipso facto_ excluded from legitimate

ecclesiastical acts, (e.g., the office of godparent), and from the

use of sacramentals, until a dispensation has been obtained from the

Ordinary (Canon 2375). Marriage contracted with the impediment of

disparity of worship is invalid, whether the parties are in ignorance

or not (Canon 1070, Sec.16). (b) Catholics who enter into marriage

before a non-Catholic minister acting in a religious capacity or who

contract marriage with the implicit or explicit understanding that

any or all of the children will be educated outside the Church incur

excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the Ordinary (Canon

2319).

880. The prenuptial guarantees required by church law in case of mixed

or other dangerous marriages are as follows: (a) According to the

Code, no dispensation for mixed marriages will be granted unless the

non-Catholic party gives a guarantee that the danger of perversion

for the Catholic party shall be removed, and both parties promise

that all the children shall be baptized and brought up only in the

Catholic faith. There must be moral certainty that the promises will be

kept, and as a rule they should be demanded in writing (Canons 1061,

1071). The permission for marriage with fallen-away Catholics is not

granted until the Ordinary has satisfied himself that the danger to the

Catholic and the children has been removed (Canon 1065, Sec.2). (b) The

pre-Code legislation further required that both parties promise that

there would be no non-Catholic ceremony and that the Catholic promise

to work for the conversion of the other party. Canons 1062-1063 speak

of these obligations, but do not exact promises.

881. Remedies against mixed and other dangerous marriages are the

following: (a) Before engagement Catholics should be instructed and

encouraged to marry those of their own faith. Thus, confessors can

discourage company-keeping with non-Catholics, parents can provide

their children with opportunities for meeting suitable Catholics, and,

above all, pastors should frequently speak and preach to old and young

on the evils of mixed marriages. (b) After engagement to a non-Catholic

has been made, the non-Catholic should be persuaded to accept the

Catholic religion, if he or she can do this with sincerity; otherwise,

the Catholic should be warned of the danger of the marriage, and the

pastor should refuse to seek a dispensation unless there is a really

serious cause (see Canon 1064; II Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 336;

III Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 133).

882. Dangerous Communication.--Mixed marriages are mentioned specially

among the communications with non-Catholic that are dangerous to faith,

because marriage is a lifelong and intimate association. But there

are other communications with unbelievers that can easily corrupt

faith, the less dangerous being communication in matters that are not

religious, and the more dangerous being communication in religious

matters. (a) Non-religious or civil communication is association with

non-Catholics in secular affairs, such as business, social life,

education, politics. (b) Religious communication is association with

non-Catholics in sacred services or divine worship.

883. Non-religious communication is sinful as follows: (a) It is sinful

according to natural law, when in a particular case it would be a

proximate danger of perversion freely chosen, or an involuntary danger

against which one does not employ sufficient precaution. Examples:

Titus chooses infidels and freethinkers for his friends and intimates,

understanding their character and bad influence. Balba on account of

her poverty is obliged to work in a place where all her companions are

unbelievers who scoff at religion and try in every way to win her over

to their errors; yet she is not concerned to arm herself more strongly

in faith.

(b) According to ecclesiastical law, civil communication is forbidden

with those who have been excommunicated as persons to be avoided (Canon

2267). Such persons are those who lay violent hands on the Roman

Pontiff (Canon 2343), or who have been excommunicated by individual

name and as persons to be avoided through public decree or sentence of

the Apostolic See (Canon 2258). Exception is made, however, for husband

and wife, children, servants, subjects, and for others in case of

necessity.

884. Religious communication is sinful on account of danger in the

following cases:

(a) If it is a proximate and voluntary occasion of sin against faith.

Examples: Sempronius goes to a non-Catholic church to hear a minister

who attacks the divinity of Christ and other articles of the Creed.

The purpose of Sempronius is to benefit himself as a public speaker,

but he knows that his faith suffers, because he admires the orator.

Balbus chooses to listen over the radio to attacks on religion and

Christianity, which cause serious temptations to him.

(b) If it is a necessary occasion of sin and one does not employ

sufficient precautions against it, religious communication becomes

sinful. Example: Titus, a prisoner, has to listen at times to a jail

chaplain, who teaches that there are errors in the Bible, that man

evolved from the ape, etc. Titus feels himself drawn sympathetically to

these teachings, but makes no effort to strengthen his faith.

885. Communication with unbelievers that is a remote occasion of sin,

is not sinful, for “otherwise one must needs go out of this world” (I

Cor., v. 9). On the contrary, reasons of justice or charity frequently

make it necessary and commendable to have friendly dealings with

those of other or no religious conviction. (a) Reasons of justice.

It is necessary to cooperate with non-Catholic fellow-citizens in

what pertains to the welfare of our common country, state, city, and

neighborhood; to be just and fair in business relations with those

outside the Church, etc. (b) Reasons of charity. Catholics should be

courteous and kind to all (Heb., xii. 14), and be willing to assist,

temporarily and spiritually, those outside the Church. Thus, St. Paul,

without sacrificing principle or doctrine, made himself all things to

all men, in order to gain all (I Cor., ix. 19). Indeed, the mission

of the Church would suffer, if Catholics today kept aloof from all

that goes on about them. The Church must teach, by example as well as

precept, must be a salt, a light, a leaven, an example of the Gospel in

practice; and surely this ministry will be weakened if her children aim

at complete isolation and exclusivism.

886. Societies that are purely civil or profane--e.g., social clubs,

charitable organizations, temperance societies, labor unions, that

are not identified with any church and are neutral in religion--may

be dangerous to faith. (a) There may be danger on account of the

membership, even when the nature of the society is purely indifferent

or good. Example: It would be dangerous to faith to join a convivial

society whose members were mostly aggressive infidels, even though

the purpose of the organization was only recreation. (b) There may be

danger to faith on account of certain methods or principles of the

society. Example: A Boys’ or Girls’ Club whose purpose is to train

young people for good citizenship is dangerous to faith, if it acts

as though the natural virtues were sufficient, or as though moral

education belonged to itself exclusively or principally.

887. The Sin of Blasphemy.--So far we have spoken of the sins of

unbelief that are contrary to the internal act of faith. We now come

to the sins that are contrary to the external act, or profession of

faith. These sins are of two kinds: (a) The less serious sin is that of

ordinary denial of the faith, that is, the assertion that some article

of faith is false, or that some contrary error is true. This sin will

be treated below in 913 sqq. on the commandments of faith. (b) The more

serious sin is blasphemy, that is, the denial to God of something that

is His; or the ascription to God of what does not belong to Him. Of

this sin we shall speak now.

888. Blasphemy etymologically is from the Greek, and signifies damage

done to reputation or character; theologically, it is applied only to

insults or calumnies offered to God, and is threefold according to

the three stages of sin described above (see 168). (a) Blasphemy of

the heart is internal, committed only in thought and will. So “the

wicked man said in his heart: There is no God” (Ps. xviii. 1), and the

demons and lost souls blasphemed God without words (Apoc., xvi. 9).

(b) Blasphemy of the mouth is external, committed in spoken words, or

in their written or printed representations. (c) Blasphemy of deeds is

also external, committed by acts or gestures. The action of Julian the

Apostate in casting his blood towards heaven was intended as a sign of

contempt for Christ.

889. Internal blasphemy does not differ from unbelief or disrespect for

God. We are concerned here, therefore, only with external blasphemy,

which is contrary to the external profession of faith. External

blasphemy is opposed to faith either directly (by denying what is of

faith) or indirectly (by showing disrespect to what is of faith), and

hence it is either heretical or non-heretical.

(a) Heretical blasphemy affirms about God something false, or denies

about Him something true. The false affirmation is made directly, when

some created imperfection is attributed to God, or indirectly, when

some divine perfection is attributed to a creature. Example: It is

heretical blasphemy to affirm that God is a tyrant or the cause of sin,

or that man is able to overcome God. It is also heretical blasphemy to

deny that God is able to perform miracles, that His testimony is true,

etc.

(b) Non-heretical blasphemy affirms or denies something about God

according to truth, but in a mocking or blaming way. This sin is

opposed, therefore, to reverence rather than to faith, and will be

treated later among the sins against the virtue of religion (see Vol.

II). Example: A person in anger at God says scornfully: “God is good!”

890. The nature of heretical blasphemy will better appear, if we

compare it with other kinds of speech disrespectful to God.

(a) It differs from maledictions or curses, (e.g., “May God destroy

you!”), because the one directly offended in blasphemy is God Himself,

while in a curse it is some creature of God.

(b) It differs from non-heretical blasphemy, from perjury and disregard

of vow, from vain use of the name of God, because none of these

necessarily proceeds from a lack of faith, as does heretical blasphemy.

Non-heretical blasphemy proceeds from hatred or contempt of God,

perjury from presumption, disregard of vow from disobedience, vain use

of the Divine Name from irreverence.

(c) Heretical blasphemy differs from temptation of God (e.g., “God

must help me now if He can,” said by one who exposes himself rashly to

danger), for, while temptation of God implies doubt, it is directly an

act of irreverence by which one presumes to put God Himself to proof,

whereas heretical blasphemy is directly an act of denial of truth.

891. Heretical blasphemy calumniates God, either in His own attributes

and perfections, or in those created persons or things that are

specially His by reason of friendship or consecration. Thus, we have:

(a) blasphemy that attacks the Divine Being Himself, as was explained

above; (b) blasphemy that attacks what is especially dear to God, which

consists in remarks or acts derogatory to the Blessed Virgin, the

Saints, the Sacraments, the crucifix, the Bible, etc.

892. Unlike God, creatures are subject to imperfections, moral or

physical, and thus it is not always erroneous or blasphemous to

attribute imperfections to the Saints or sacred things.

(a) If sacred persons or things are spoken ill of precisely on account

of their relation to God, or in such a way that the evil said of

them reverts on God Himself, blasphemy is committed. Example: It is

blasphemous to say that the Mother of God was not a Virgin, that St.

Peter was a reprobate, that St. Anthony and St. Simeon Stylites were

snobbish or eccentric, that the Sacraments are nonsense, that relics

are an imposture, etc.

(b) If sacred persons or things are criticized precisely on account

of their human or finite imperfections, real or alleged, the sin of

irreverence is committed, when the criticism is prompted by malice

or levity. No sin at all is committed, if one is stating facts with

due respect for the character of the persons or things spoken of.

Examples: To call a Doctor of the Church an ignoramus out of anger at a

theological opinion defended by him, would be of itself a serious sin

of disrespect. To speak of a Saint as a dirty tramp or idle visionary,

if the intention is to insult, is also a serious sin of disrespect.

But, if one were to say in joke that St. Peter was a baldhead, St.

Charles Borromeo a big nose, the sin of irreverence would be only

slight. No sin would be committed, if one, describing a religious

painting from the artistic standpoint, called it an abomination.

893. Heretical blasphemy is expressed not only by sentences that

are complete and in the indicative mood, but also by phrases or

interjections, by wishes, commands, or even signs.

(a) Blasphemy is expressed optatively, imperatively, or

interrogatively. Examples: “Away with God!” is equivalent to the

assertion that God is not eternal. “Come down from the cross, if Thou

be the Son of God” (Matt., xxvii. 40), is equivalent to the statement

that Christ is not the Son of God. The question put to the Psalmist,

“Where is thy God?” (Ps. xli. 4.), meant in the mouth of the Psalmist’s

enemies that Jehovah did not exist, or was powerless.

(b) Blasphemy is expressed even by short words, or by a grunt or snort

of contempt. Example: To utter the name of our Lord in a contumelious

way signifies that one regards Him as of no account. The word

“hocus-pocus” is sometimes used in derision of the Mass or other sacred

rites.

(c) Blasphemy is expressed by acts that signify disbelief and dishonor,

for example, to spit or shake one’s fist at heaven, to turn up the nose

or make a wry face at the mention of God, to trample in the dust a

crucifix, etc.

894. Rules for Interpreting Cases of Doubtful Blasphemy.--(a)

Custom or usage is a better guide than etymology or grammar in

discovering whether a blasphemous meaning is contained in certain

common expressions of an ambiguous character. Examples: According to

signification the phrase, “Sacred Name of God,” is harmless and might

be a pious ejaculation, but according to the sense in which it is taken

in French it curses God and is blasphemous. According to signification,

the expression “Ye gods” in English, “Thousand names of God” in French,

“Thousand Sacraments” in German, are blasphemous; but according to

the sense in which they are used by the people they merely express

surprise, and are at most a venial sin of irreverence. The English

language as a whole is singularly free from blasphemous expressions,

just as English classic literature as a whole is singularly free from

obscenity.

(b) The dispositions or feelings of the user are a better index of the

presence or absence of blasphemy than the mere words, if the latter

are capable of various senses. If doubt persists about the sense of an

ambiguous expression that could be blasphemous, it may be held that

no blasphemy was intended. Examples: Titus, a good man, is so annoyed

trying to correct his children that he exclaims: “Why did the Lord

ever send me such pests?” Balbus, who is a hater of religion, answers

him: “Who is to blame if they are pests?” Since Titus is habitually

religious and Balbus habitually irreligious, the question of the former

sounds like irritation, the question of the latter like blasphemy.

Claudius is a very religious-minded man, but he meets with a series

of calamities which so stun him that he exclaims: “I must be only a

step-child of God. Certainly, He cares little for me. Why did He ever

create me?” The sentiment seems to be one of grief and wonder rather

than of insult to God. Balbus is very devoted to his mother, and often

addresses her in hyperbolic language, saying that he adores her, that

she is the goddess at Whose shrine he worships, his supreme beatitude,

etc. Taken literally, these expressions are blasphemous, but as used by

Balbus they are harmless.

895. The Sinfulness of Blasphemy.--(a) From its very nature (i.e., from

the importance of the rights it attacks and the goods it injures),

blasphemy is a mortal sin, since it outrages the Majesty of God, and

destroys the virtues of religion, love of God, and frequently faith

itself. In the Old Testament it was punished with death (Lev., xxiv. 15

sqq.), and Canon 2323 of the Code prescribes that blasphemy be punished

as the Ordinary shall decide. It is also a crime at common law and

generally by statute, as tending to a breach of the peace and being a

public nuisance or destructive of the foundations of civil society;

when printed, it is a libel.

(b) Unbelief is the greatest of sins after hatred of God (see 820). But

blasphemy is the greatest of the sins against faith, since to inner

unbelief it adds external denial and insult.

(c) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of the smallness

of the matter involved, for even slight slander or scorn becomes great

when its object is God Himself. Example: It is blasphemous to say

that our Lord was not above small or venial imperfections, or to show

contempt for even one of the least of the Saints as such.

(d) Blasphemy cannot become a venial sin on account of unpremeditation,

if at the time it is committed one is aware of its character, just as

murder does not become a venial sin, because one killed another in a

sudden fit of anger. Example: Sempronius has the habit when driving his

refractory mules of shouting at them: “You creatures of the devil!” A

priest on hearing this admonishes Sempronius that the expression is

blasphemous. But Sempronius continues to use it whenever the mules

irritate him, making no effort to improve.

896. There are some cases in which blasphemy is only a venial sin or no

sin on account of the lack of deliberation.

(a) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the act

itself, the blasphemy pronounced, unless it be voluntary in its cause

(see 102, 196), is not a mortal sin. In the former case, there is no

sin at all, for the act is not human (see 33); in the latter case

there cannot be mortal sin, for there is no full reflection on the

deed (see 175). Example: Balbus now and then catches himself humming

blasphemous songs that he heard years ago, but he always stops as soon

as he thinks of what he is saying. Titus, coming out of the ether after

an operation, makes a few blasphemous remarks, but he is so dazed

that he hardly knows who is speaking. Sempronius makes himself drunk,

foreseeing that he will blaspheme while out of his senses. Balbus

commits no sin, Titus may be guilty of venial sin, but Sempronius is

guilty of mortal sin in blaspheming.

(b) If there is no advertence or only semi-advertence to the malice of

the act, the blasphemy pronounced, if it is not voluntary in its cause,

is not a mortal sin; for one is not responsible for more than one

knows or should know (see 99-100, on imputability). Examples: Titus, a

foreigner, has been taught to repeat certain blasphemous phrases, whose

real meaning he does not suspect. Balbus has the habit when angry of

blaspheming at his mules, but he is doing his best to use more suitable

language. Sempronius unawares gets into a tipsy condition in which he

realizes his acts, but is confused about moral distinctions, and hence

uses blasphemous expressions which he would abhor if he were in his

normal state. Caius, a boy, blasphemes, thinking that he is committing

only a venial sin of “cussing.”

897. Different kinds of blasphemy must be noted with reference to the

duty of confession.

[a] There are three distinct species of blasphemy--non-heretical, which

is opposed to the virtue of religion; heretical, which is opposed to

religion and faith; diabolical, which is opposed to religion, faith

and the precept to love God. These species should be distinguished

in confession. Examples: Titus, angered because his Patron Saint did

not obtain a favor for him, ironically turns the Saint’s picture to

the wall, saying: “You have great influence with God!” (non-heretical

blasphemy). Balbus in similar circumstances said: “I have lost all

faith in Saints” (heretical blasphemy). Sempronia, Whose child has just

died, rebels against God and calls Him a cruel monster (diabolical

blasphemy).

(b) Circumstances may aggravate the malice of blasphemy. Blasphemy that

is directly against God Himself is worse than blasphemy against the

Saints; blasphemy against the Blessed Virgin is worse than blasphemy

against other friends of God; blasphemy that ascribes evil to God is

greater than blasphemy that denies Him some perfection; blasphemy

that excuses itself or boasts is worse than blasphemy that is more

concealed; blasphemy that expressly intends to dishonor God is graver

than blasphemy that only implicitly intends this. Some authors require

that aggravating circumstances be mentioned in confession, but others

say this is not necessary (see Vol. II).

898. According to the causes from which they proceed (see 250),

blasphemies are divided into three kinds: (a) blasphemy against the

Father, which is contumely spoken against God out of passion or

weakness, as when one being annoyed uses what he knows to be blasphemy;

(b) blasphemy against the Son, which is contumely against God spoken

out of ignorance. Thus, St. Paul said of himself that he had been a

blasphemer, and a persecutor, and contumelious, but that he obtained

mercy, because he did it ignorantly in unbelief (I Tim., i. 12, 13);

(c) blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, which is contumely against

God spoken out of sheer malice. Such was the sin of the Jews, who

attributed the divine works of Christ to the prince of demons (Matt,

xii. 31).

899. To the Holy Ghost are appropriated the supernatural gifts of

God that prevent or remove sin; and, as these can be reduced to six,

there are also six sins against the Holy Ghost (i.e., six kinds of

contemptuous disregard of spiritual life). The expression of this inner

contempt is a blasphemy.

(a) Man is kept from sin by the hope mingled with fear which the

thought of God, as both merciful and just, excites in him. Hence,

despair and presumption which remove these divine preventives of sin

are blasphemies against the Holy Ghost.

(b) Man is kept from sin, next, by the light God gives him to know the

truth and by the grace He diffuses that all may perform good. Hence,

resistance to the known truth and displeasure at the progress of God’s

kingdom are also sins against the Spirit of truth and holiness.

(c) Man is kept from sin by the shamefulness of sin itself and the

nothingness of the passing satisfaction it affords; for the former

inclines him to be ashamed of sin committed, or to repent, while the

latter tends to make him tire of sin and give it up. Hence, the resolve

not to grieve over sin and obstinate adherence to such a resolve are

also sins against the Holy Ghost.

900. There is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in this

life. How then does our Lord say that the blasphemy against the Holy

Spirit shall not be forgiven, neither in this world nor in the world to

come (Matt., xii. 31)?

(a) The sins against the Holy Ghost are unpardonable according to

their nature, just as some diseases are incurable according to their

nature, because not only do they set up an evil condition, but they

also remove or resist those things that could lead to betterment. Thus,

if one despairs, or presumes, or resists truth or good, or determines

not to abandon error or evil, one shuts out the remedy of repentance,

which is necessary for pardon; whereas, if one sins through passion or

ignorance, faith and hope remain and help one to repentance.

(b) The sins against the Holy Ghost are not unpardonable, if we

consider the omnipotence of God. Just as God can cure miraculously

a disease that is humanly incurable, so can He pardon a sin which,

according to its nature, is unpardonable; for He is able to bring hope

and repentance to those who were in despair, for example. Hence, we

repeat, there is no sin which, if repented of, cannot be forgiven in

this life.

901. Does one arrive at the state of malicious sin or blasphemy

suddenly or gradually? (a) Malice in sin (i.e., the willing choice of

evil by one who is not weakened by ignorance or passion) is sometimes

due to a disorder in the will itself which has a strong inclination

towards wrong, as when long-continued habit has made sin attractive. It

is clear that in such cases one does not arrive at blasphemy suddenly,

Example: Titus blasphemes with readiness and without remorse. This

argues that he is an adept and not a beginner, for readiness and strong

attachment are signs of practice. (b) Malice in sin is sometimes due to

the fact that the will has lost certain protections against sin, and

hence chooses sin readily and gladly, as happens when a sin against the

Holy Ghost has been committed. Generally, the contempt of God’s gifts

contained in sins against the Holy Ghost does not come suddenly, but

follows as the climax of a progressive deterioration (Prov., xviii. 3);

but, since man is free and sin very alluring, it is not impossible that

one should suddenly become a blasphemer, especially if one had not been

careful before in other matters. It is next to impossible, however,

that a religious-minded man should all at once become a blasphemer or

malicious sinner.

902. Remedies Against Blasphemy.--(a) Those who blaspheme maliciously

should be admonished of the enormity of their sin, as well as the

absurdity of defying the Almighty (Ps. ii. 1, 4). Prayers and

ejaculations in praise of God are a suitable penance for them. (b)

Those who blaspheme through habit or out of sudden anger or passion

should be told that at least they cause great scandal, and make

themselves ridiculous. A good practice for overcoming habit or sudden

outbursts is that some mortification or almsdeed or litany should be

performed each time blasphemy is uttered.

903. Absolution of Blasphemers.--(a) If blasphemy is not heretical, no

censure or reservation is incurred under the general law, and every

confessor may absolve; (b) if blasphemy is heretical, excommunication

is incurred under the conditions given above in 834, and absolution may

be granted as explained there.

904. Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness.--After the sins against

faith itself come the sins against the Gifts of the Holy Ghost that

serve faith (see 808): (a) against the Gift of Knowledge is the sin

of ignorance; (b) against the Gift of Understanding are the sins of

blindness of heart and dullness of understanding.

905. Ignorance (as explained in 28 and 249) is a cause of sin--of

material sin, if the ignorance is antecedent, of formal sin, if the

ignorance is consequent. But ignorance is also a sin itself, in the

sense now to be explained.

(a) Ignorance may be considered in itself (i.e., precisely as it is the

absence of knowledge), and in this sense it is not called a sin, since

under this aspect it is not opposed to moral virtue, but to knowledge,

the perfection of the intellect.

(b) Ignorance may be considered in relation to the will (i.e.,

precisely as it is a voluntary defect), and in this sense it is a sin,

since under this aspect it is opposed to the moral virtue of studiosity

(i.e., the part of temperance which moderates the desire of learning

and keeps the golden mean between curiosity and negligence). This

sin of ignorance pertains to neglect, and is twofold; it is called

affected ignorance, if the will is strongly desirous of the lack of

due knowledge, and is called careless ignorance, if the will is remiss

in desiring due knowledge. Affected ignorance is a sin of commission,

careless ignorance a sin of omission.

(c) Ignorance may be considered in relation to obligatory acts (i.e.,

precisely as it makes one voluntarily incapable of fulfilling one’s

duties), and in this sense it partakes of various kinds of sinfulness,

inasmuch as he who is voluntarily ignorant of his duty is responsible

for the mistakes he will make. Thus, he who is sinfully ignorant in

matters of faith, will fail against the precepts of that virtue; he who

does not know what his state of life as judge, lawyer, physician, etc.,

requires, will fail against justice; he who does not know what charity

demands of him, will sin against charity.

906. The malice of the sin of ignorance in matters of faith is as

follows: (a) Vincible ignorance of the truths one is obliged to know,

whether the obligation be of means or of precept (see 360, 786 sqq.),

is a grave sin, for faith in these truths is commanded under pain of

losing salvation (Mark, xvi. 15, 16). (b) The sin committed is but

one sin, regardless of length of time, and is incurred at the time

one omits due diligence in acquiring knowledge, as is the case with

other sins of omission. Hence, he who remains in culpable ignorance of

Christian doctrine for a year commits one sin, but the length of time

is an aggravating circumstance.

907. Culpable ignorance regarding truths of faith, as a distinct sin,

is as follows:

(a) It is not distinct from its cause (i.e., negligence), for

ignorance is not a sin at all, except in so far as it proceeds from

negligence. Hence, one would not be obliged to accuse oneself of the

sins of omission in regard to instruction in Christian doctrine and of

ignorance in Christian doctrine, for these are but one sin.

(b) Culpable ignorance is not distinct from its effect (i.e., from

a sin committed on account of the ignorance), if the truth one is

ignorant of has to be known only on account of some passing duty that

must be performed here and now; for in such a case the knowledge is

required, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the duty. Hence,

ignorance of fact or of a particular law is not distinct as a sin from

the sin that results from it. Examples: Titus knows that he should not

take money that belongs to another; but through his own carelessness he

is ignorant of the fact that the money before him belongs to another,

and takes the money. Balbus knows that the precept of the Church on

fasting is obligatory; but through his own negligence he is unaware

that today is a fast day, and does not fast. Titus and Balbus committed

one sin apiece.

(c) Culpable ignorance is distinct from its effect, if the truth one

is ignorant of has to be known for its own sake; for in such a case

one sins against the virtue of studiosity (see 905) by not knowing

something which one should know habitually, and also against some other

virtue by violating its precepts as a result of one’s sinful ignorance.

Truths one is obliged to know for their own sake are the mysteries of

faith, the Commandments of the Decalogue, the Precepts of the Church,

and the duties of one’s own state. Examples: Sempronius through his own

carelessness does not know the mystery of the Incarnation, and as a

result blasphemes Christ. Titus does not know that stealing is a sin,

and therefore he steals. In both cases two sins are committed, the sin

of ignorance and the sin that resulted from ignorance.

908. Cases in which ignorance in matters of faith is not culpable are

the following: (a) if one has used sufficient diligence to acquire

knowledge, one is not responsible for one’s ignorance; (b) if one

has not used sufficient diligence to acquire knowledge, one is not

responsible for one’s ignorance, if the lack of diligence is not one’s

fault.

909. Sufficient diligence is a broad term and has to be understood with

relation to the mental ability of the person and the importance and

difficulty of the truth in question. What is sufficient diligence in

an illiterate person, or with regard to a matter of minor importance,

would be insufficient in a learned person, or in a matter of greater

importance. However, the following general rules can be given:

(a) To be sufficient, diligence need not be as a rule supreme (i.e.,

it is not necessary that one employ every possible means to acquire

instruction), for even the most conscientious persons feel they have

used sufficient diligence when they have employed the usual means for

obtaining religious instruction;

(b) To be sufficient, diligence should equal that which is employed by

good people in similar circumstances. Thus, the unlearned who consult

the learned or frequent the instructions provided for them, the learned

who devote themselves to study as ordered and who seek assistance in

doubts, are sufficiently diligent.

910. One who has not used sufficient diligence is sometimes

responsible, sometimes not responsible.

(a) A person is not responsible for his ignorance and lack of

sufficient diligence, if he conscientiously desires to have the proper

amount of instruction, and has not even a suspicion that his studies

and knowledge are not sufficient. Example: Titus, having gone through

a very small catechism, thought that he understood Christian doctrine

sufficiently and had done all that was required. But some years later

he discovered, when examined, that he was ignorant of many important

matters, and had entirely misunderstood others.

(b) A person is responsible for his lack of diligence and knowledge, if

at heart he does not care to know, even though no fears or doubts about

his ignorance disturb him. Examples: Balbus always felt religion a

bore. At Sunday school he was daydreaming; now during sermons on Sunday

he falls asleep. The result is that he has many infidel ideas, but

doesn’t know it, and is not much concerned. Caius secured for himself

an office, for which he is unfitted on account of his ignorance.

But he enjoys his position so much, and cares so little about its

responsibilities, that he does not even dream of his incompetence, and

would not try to change things if he did.

911. Similar to negligence about the truths of faith itself is

negligence about truths connected with faith. (a) An unbeliever is

guilty of negligence when against conscience he fails to pray for light

and to inquire or inform himself about the credentials of religion,

revelation, and the Church; (b) a believer is guilty of negligence if

he fails to seek answers to objections against faith, when thrown much

in the company of objectors.

912. Like to sins of ignorance are the two sins opposed to the Gift

of Understanding. (a) Dullness of understanding is a weakness of mind

as regards spiritual things which makes it very difficult for one to

consider or understand them. It is sinful inasmuch as it arises from

over-affection for carnal things, especially the delights of eating

and drinking. (b) Blindness of mind is a complete lack of knowledge of

divine things due to the fact that one refuses to consider them lest

one feel obligated to do good, or to the fact that one is so wedded to

passion that one gives it all one’s attention (Ps. xxv. 4). Blindness

is sometimes a punishment (Is., vi. 10; Wis., ii. 21); it is a sin when

it is voluntary--that is, when carnal delights, especially lust, make

one disgusted or negligent as to the things of faith. Abstinence and

chastity are two means that greatly aid spiritual understanding, as is

seen in the example of Daniel and his companions (Dan. i. 17).

Art. 3: THE COMMANDMENTS OF FAITH

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, q. 16.)

913. Unlike the commandments of justice, which are summed up in the

Decalogue, the commandments of faith are not given in any one place

of scripture; but they may be reduced to three: (a) one must acquire

knowledge and understanding of one’s faith according to one’s state in

life and duties; (b) one must believe internally the truths of faith;

(c) one must profess externally one’s belief.

914. The Commandment of Knowledge.--The first of the foregoing

commandments includes three things. (a) The doctrines of faith must be

taught and must be listened to--“These words thou shalt tell to thy

children” (Deut., vi. 6), “Teach ye all nations” (Matt, xxviii. 19),

“He that heareth you heareth Me, and he that despiseth you despiseth

Me” (Luke, x. 16). (b) One must apply oneself to understand what one

hears--“Thou shalt meditate on these words, sitting in thy house, and

walking on thy journey, sleeping and rising” (Deut., vi. 7), “Meditate

upon these things, be wholly in these things. Take heed to thyself

and doctrine” (I Tim., iv, 15, 16). (c) One must retain what one has

learned--“Thou shalt bind the words of the law as a sign on thy hand,

and they shall be and shall move between thy eyes. And thou shalt write

them in the entry and on the doors of thy house” (Deut., vi. 8, 9);

“Have in mind in what manner thou hast received and heard” (Apoc., iii.

3).

915. The means of communicating a knowledge of the faith to unbelievers

are as follows:

(a) The remote means is to get a hearing from those who have not the

true faith, and this supposes that one secure their good will through

edifying example and charity towards them: “Be without offense to the

Jews and the Gentiles, and to the church of God; as I also in all

things please all men, not seeking that which is profitable to myself,

but to many that they may be saved” (I Cor., x. 32, 33); “Let us work

good to all men” (Gal., vi. 10).

(b) The proximate means of communicating a knowledge of faith is the

declaration of the faith to non-Catholics who are willing to hear,

through missionaries sent to foreign countries, Catholic literature

given to those who are well-disposed, invitations to Catholic

instructions, public lectures on the faith, the question box at

missions, etc. (see Canons 1350, 1351). cooperation with Catholic

schools and publications, foreign and home missions, etc., makes one a

sharer in the work of the apostles who are bearing the burden of the

day.

916. The means appointed by the Church for communicating the doctrines

of faith to Catholics are as follows:

(a) For the Laity.--From childhood religious and moral training

should have the first place in education, and should not be confined

to elementary schools, but continued in secondary and higher schools

(Canons 1372, 1373). Pastors are obliged to give catechetical

instructions, and parents must see that their children attend them

(Canons 1329-1336).

(b) For the Clergy.--Aspirants to the priesthood must follow the

courses prescribed for preparatory and higher seminaries or houses

of studies (Canons 1352-1371, 587-592), and no one is admitted to

Orders who has not passed canonical examinations (Canons 996, 997,

389, Sec.2). The faculties for hearing confessions and preaching

also presuppose examinations (Canons 1340, 877), and no one is to be

promoted to ecclesiastical offices, such as that of parish priest,

unless he is judged competent in knowledge (Canons 459, 149). The

clergy are encouraged to take university studies and degrees (Canons

1380, 1378).

917. A person applies himself sufficiently to the understanding of

the teaching of faith when he takes care that, both extensively or in

quantity and intensively or in quality, his knowledge is all that is

required of him.

(a) Extensively, the knowledge should be such as to include at least

all those truths that have to be known, because explicit faith in

them is necessary; (b) intensively, the knowledge should be more or

less perfect according to the greater or less intelligence, rank or

responsibility of the person.

918. The truths that have to be known by all capable of the knowledge

are as follows:

(a) All must know, from the necessity of the case (necessity of means),

that they have a supernatural destiny and that Christ is the Way that

leads to it; for one cannot tend to a destination, if one is unaware

of its existence and of the road that will bring one there. Hence, all

must know the four basic truths: God our Last End, the Trinity, the

Incarnation, God the Remunerator (see 787).

(b) All must know, from the will of Christ (necessity of precept),

the other truths to which He wishes them expressly to assent, and the

duties, general or particular, that He wishes them to fulfill (Mark,

xvi. 16); that is, they must know the doctrine contained in the Creed,

the commandments and ordinances of Christ concerning the Sacraments and

prayer, and the special obligations of each one’s particular state or

office.

919. As to the degree of knowledge that one must possess intensively

(i.e., as to its quality and perfection), it is clear that knowledge

ought to be more perfect in those who are more intelligent or whose

duties call for a more excellent learning.

(a) Knowledge of the truths that should be known by all the faithful

ought to be of a more developed kind in those whose minds are more

mature. A scientific and theological understanding of religion is not

required in any lay person; nor should we expect the same knowledge

in a child as in an adult, or in a subnormal person as in one who is

normal mentally. Examples: No religious instruction is necessary for

an idiot (i.e., a grown-up person who has the mind of a two-year-old

child), for such a one cannot reason. A child of seven or an imbecile

(i.e., a grown-up person whose mentality is on a par with that of a

child of seven) may be received to Communion, after such a child or

imbecile has learned in a simple way that the God-Man is received in

the Eucharist and that it is not common food. A child who is between

ten and twelve and a moron (i.e., a grown-up who is not mentally such a

child’s superior) should receive more instruction than an imbecile.

(b) Knowledge of sacred doctrine naturally should be greater in priests

than in the laity; for in religious things priests are the teachers,

the people their pupils (Mal., ii. 7). A mediocre knowledge of theology

in a priest is not sufficient, especially in these days when the laity

are educated, when theological questions are debated on all sides, and

when so many outside the Church as well as in it are looking for help

and light. A profound knowledge of abstruse questions, however, is

not demanded of all priests in an equal degree: more is expected of a

bishop than of his parish priests, more of a parish priest than of one

who has not the care of souls or office of teaching, more of one who

has to speak to or write for the better educated than of one who has to

do these things for those who are less educated, etc. Knowledge should

include not only learning, but also prudence (i.e., good judgment and

practical ability to use learning well), for a priest learns, not for

his own sake alone, but also for the benefit of others.

920. Scientific or complete knowledge is not required of those who are

not theologians, as was said about the four basic truths (see 790). It

suffices for lay persons that they know in a simple way, according to

their age and capacity, the substance of the truths they must believe.

Thus, they should know:

(a) The Creed.--One should know about God, that He is but one and that

there are three divine Persons, Father, Son and Holy Ghost; that God is

the maker of the world, and that He will reward everyone according to

his deeds. One should know about Christ, that He is the Son of God and

God Himself; that He was miraculously born of the Blessed Virgin Mary;

that He suffered and died for our salvation; that He rose from the dead

and by His own power ascended into glory and will come again after the

general resurrection to judge all. One should know about the Church,

that it is the one true Church founded by Christ, in which are found

the communication of spiritual goods and the forgiveness of sins.

(b) The Decalogue.--One should know the general meaning of the

Commandments so as to be able to regulate one’s own conduct by them.

It is not necessary that a child should know all the kinds of crimes

and vices that are forbidden by the Commandments. In fact, it is better

for such not to know much about evil. Nor is it required that a layman

should know how to make correct applications of the Commandments to

complicated situations that require much previous study.

(c) The Virtues.--One should know enough to be able to apply to one’s

own life, for ordinary cases, what a virtuous life demands. It is not

necessary that a child should know the requirements of prudence as well

as an experienced person, or that a layman should be able to settle

doubts of conscience as well as a priest. But each should know enough

to fulfill what is required of one of his age and condition. Both old

and young should know in substance the acts of faith, hope, charity and

contrition; for to these all are bound. The young should know the laws

of the Church that apply to them (e.g., the law of abstinence); the

older people should understand the law of fasting which they are bound

to observe, etc.

(d) The Sacraments.--One should know substantially the doctrine of

the Sacraments that are necessary for all, namely, Baptism, Penance

and the Eucharist. Since all the faithful have the duty of baptizing

in case of necessity, all should know how to administer lay Baptism

properly and fruitfully. When the time comes for receiving a Sacrament,

the recipient should know enough to receive it validly, licitly, and

devoutly, although less knowledge is required in children and in the

dying who cannot be fully instructed (see Canons 752, 854, 1330, 1331,

1020).

(e) Special Duties.--One should know the essentials of one’s

condition or state of life and the right way to perform its ordinary

duties. Children should understand the obligations of pupils and

of subjects; the married, religious and priests should know the

duties of their respective states; citizens, the loyalty owed to the

community; officials, judges, lawyers, physicians, teachers, etc., the

responsibilities to the public which their own professions imply.

(f) The Lord’s Prayer.--The substance of this form of prayer should be

known by all, namely, that God is to be glorified, and that we should

ask of Him with confidence goods of soul and body and deliverance from

evil. Though Christ is the only necessary Mediator (I Tim., ii. 5),

it is most suitable that all should know substantially the Hail Mary,

namely, that we should ask the intercession of her who is the Mother of

God and our Mother (John, xix, 27).

921. Is a person guilty of sin who does not know what to do in some

manner that pertains to his state of life? (a) If he is blamably

ignorant of the nature of a state he has undertaken or of the ordinary

duties that it imposes, he is guilty of sin; for he is, in a sense,

unjust to himself by obligating himself to what he does not understand,

and to others by promising what he cannot fulfill. Examples: A young

person who marries without understanding the meaning of the contract,

or becomes a religious without knowing the meaning of the vows, would

be ignorant of the nature of the state embraced. A priest occupied

in the ministry, who does not know how to administer the Sacraments

validly, how to explain the Gospels correctly, how to judge usual

cases in confession rightly, etc., would be ignorant of the ordinary

duties of his office. A ruler who habitually acts beyond his authority,

a lawyer who regularly gives wrong advice, and a teacher who makes

mistakes in the elements of his specialty, would also be ignorant of

their ordinary duties.

(b) If a person understands the nature of his state and his everyday

duties, but is ignorant of recondite points or extraordinary cases, he

is not guilty; otherwise, no one could undertake with a safe conscience

the office of pastor, physician, judge, etc.; for, even when a person

has devoted a lifetime to a calling, he has to admit that he finds

difficulties or problems that he cannot solve offhand. Example: Father

Titus gave an incorrect solution about a case of restitution, because

he had to express an opinion at once, and there were so many angles and

circumstances that some of them were overlooked.

922. The means appointed by the Church for the retention of knowledge

in matters of faith are:

(a) For the Laity.--The course of Christian doctrine should not be

discontinued with the parochial school or Sunday school, but should

be continued in the higher schools (Canon 1373). Moreover, for adults

catechetical instruction is given on Sundays and feast days (Canon

1332), and the people are exhorted to attend sermons on matters

of faith and morals that are preached at parochial Masses (Canons

1337-1348).

(b) For the Clergy.--The clergy are admonished not to give up study

after ordination (Canon 129), and the law requires that the junior

clergy should take examinations annually during the first three or five

years after ordination to the priesthood (Canons 130, 590), and that

all the clergy should take part in theological conferences several

times a year (Canon 131).

923. What has been learned by heart is more easily retained in the

memory, and hence the common practice of committing the Catechism to

memory is to be recommended. Some believe that it is obligatory to

memorize the Creed and other points mentioned above (see 920); but this

is unlikely, since even the form of the Decalogue and of the Lord’s

Prayer is not identical in different parts of scripture. In the early

centuries the catechumens were obliged to learn the Creed and the

Lord’s Prayer by heart before Baptism, but there is no general law that

requires this at the present time.

(a) According to positive law, one is not obliged to memorize the words

and order of the Creed and other formulas, and it may be considered an

indication that a person has retained sufficiently what was learned,

if he is able to reply correctly to questions put to him (e.g., to

explain the first article of the Creed by stating the direct and simple

signification of its terms, and so on with the rest).

(b) According to natural law, one is obliged to learn by rote ithe

formulas of faith, if this is possible and there is danger of spiritual

detriment when it is not done. There is hardly anyone who cannot by

practice commit to memory the Our Father, the Apostles’ Creed, and

short forms of acts of faith, hope, charity, and contrition; and, if

none of them is thus known, it is practically certain that the grave

duty of prayer will be neglected. Hence, it seems that there is a

serious obligation of memorizing at least the Our Father. Feebleminded

persons are not obliged to memorize, or even to know, the truths of

faith, if they are incapable.

924. Confessors should examine in religion penitents who show signs of

ignorance (e.g., in the manner of making their confession), and should

grant or deny absolution according to the case.

(a) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary as a means

of justification (see 790), the penitents should be dealt with as

explained in 792.

(b) If the ignorance is about the truths that are necessary because

commanded and there is urgent need of absolution (e.g., on account of

mortal sin committed), the penitent may be absolved, if he is truly

contrite and promises to repair his negligence by studying his

religion, attending Sunday school, instructions, etc.

(c) If the ignorance is about the truths necessary because commanded,

and there is no urgent necessity of absolution, the penitents may be

sent away without absolution. Thus, children who have no serious sins

to confess and who do not know how to say the act of contrition or

other prayers, or who cannot answer simple questions of the Catechism,

should be sent away with a blessing and told to study these things and

return when they know them better.

925. The Commandment of Internal Acts of Faith.--The second commandment

of faith mentioned above (see 913) is both negative and affirmative.

(a) As negative, it forbids at any time disbelief or doubt concerning

that which God proposes for faith. This aspect has been treated above

in discussing the sins against faith (see 813 sqq., 840 sqq.). (b) As

affirmative, it commands that one at certain times should give assent

to the truths revealed by God. This aspect of the commandment will be

considered now.

926. The existence of the command that one should elicit a positive act

of assent to divine truth is taught in both Testaments. (a) In the Old

Testament, implicit faith in all scripture was required; for lawgivers,

prophets, and inspired writers spoke as delivering a message from God.

Moreover, explicit faith in God and His Providence was commanded (see

788). (b) In the New Testament, implicit faith in all revealed doctrine

is required, whether delivered in writing or as tradition (II Thess.,

ii. 15). Moreover, there is a command of explicit faith in the Gospel:

“This is His commandment that we should believe in the name of His Son,

Jesus Christ, and love one another, as He hath given commandment unto

us” (I John, iii. 23).

927. This commandment obliges adults under grave sin as to all revealed

truths. (a) The primary truths of revelation, truths of faith and

morals to which all are commanded to give assent (i.e., to believe

explicitly), are so important that those who refuse to believe them

merit condemnation (Mark, xvi. 16). (b) The secondary truths of

revelation--i.e., those that were made known by God, not for their own

sake, but on account of their relation to the primary truths (e.g., the

names of the patriarchs, the size of Saul, the complexion of David and

thousands of similar facts)--need not be known by all, for that is

impossible. But all are seriously obliged to believe that everything

contained in the Word of God is true, and to be ready to give assent

even to the truths that are not known. Hence, the minor truths of

revelation must be believed under pain of grave sin--implicitly, if

they are not known, explicitly, when they become known.

928. The obligation of explicit faith in the primary truths or articles

of faith is not grave with reference to every detail contained in those

truths. (a) Some details, on account of their difficulty, oblige to

explicit faith only under venial sin. Such are (in the Creed) the

descent into Limbo, the procession of the Holy Ghost, the mode of the

Communion of Saints. (b) Other details, on account of less importance,

do not oblige to explicit faith under any sin. Such are the facts that

it was Pilate under whom Christ suffered, that it was the third day

when Christ rose from the dead.

929. An affirmative commandment “obliges at all times, but not for all

times” (see 371). Hence, the question: How often or when must one give

internal assent to the teachings of faith, in order to fulfill the law?

Before answering this question, let us distinguish three kinds of laws

that may oblige one to an act of faith: (a) the divine law expressly

prescribing an act of faith; (b) the divine law prescribing an act of

some other virtue, which presupposes an act of faith; (e) human law

prescribing something that at least presupposes or includes an act of

faith.

930. The divine law expressly prescribing an act of faith (about which

we spoke in 925), obliges in the following cases: (a) at the time when

the commandment is first presented to one, and one recognizes its

obligation: “Preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth and

is baptized shall be saved; he that believeth not shall be condemned”

(Mark, xvi. 16); (b) it also obliges at other times during life; for

“the just man liveth by faith” (Rom, i. 17). The Church has rejected

the Jansenistic teaching that an act of faith once in a lifetime

suffices (see Denzinger-Banwart, nn. 1101, 1167, 1215).

931. The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the

first time, either of one’s whole life or for the first time after loss

of faith, as follows:

(a) It is brought before a person for the first time in his life, when

he first hears the truths of faith, or first realizes his duty of

accepting them. Examples: A Catholic child who has just reached the age

of reason and has been told in Sunday school that he must believe the

Creed and other truths he has been taught; an adult Catholic who hears

for the first time of transubstantiation, or of some other dogma just

defined by the Church; a non-Catholic who has just perceived the truth

of the Catholic Church.

(b) The commandment of internal belief is brought before one for the

first time after loss of faith, as soon as the duty of returning to

belief occurs to the mind.

932. Does this commandment require that, as soon as the obligation of

faith dawns on one, one is obliged without an instant’s delay to make a

formal and explicit act of faith?

(a) As regards children, on account of the imperfection of their

understanding, it can easily happen that they do not perceive that the

obligation binds them there and then, or that it binds under sin, and

thus some time may elapse after the use of reason, or after knowledge

of the command of faith, before the omission of the act of belief would

become a sin. Practically every child of Catholic education complies

with the command when, having learned the truths that must be known, he

says devoutly the act of faith, either in his own words or according to

the form given in the Catechism.

(b) As regards adults, while the entrance of converts into the Church

admits of some delay for necessary preparation, the act of faith itself

should not be postponed for an instant, once the necessity of making it

is perceived as certain.

933. As to its frequency or the times when the act of faith should be

renewed, there are various opinions, but in actual life the question

presents no difficulty.

(a) As to theory, the theologians are divided, some holding that the

act of faith should be made at least once a year, others holding for

once a month, still others for all Sundays and holydays. There is no

solid support for any of these opinions, and it seems that the time and

frequency of acts of faith are not determined by divine law.

(b) As to practice, the theologians agree that one who fulfills the

usual religious duties of a Catholic, has also fulfilled the command to

renew the act of faith. Thus, those who attend Mass and receive the

Sacraments, as the law of the Church prescribes, make acts of faith in

doing so, which satisfy the divine law of faith.

934. Those who omit to make an act of faith in time of temptation

against faith, are also guilty of sin, if the omission is through

sinful neglect.

(a) If the act of faith is the only means by which the temptation can

be overcome (a rare contingency, outside the danger of death), one is

of course gravely bound to elicit the act. The sin committed by one who

would neglect the act of faith in such a circumstance is by some

considered as opposed to the negative command, that one do not dissent;

by others as opposed to the affirmative command, that one assent to

faith. Example: Caius is very much tempted to blasphemy, and finds that

the best remedy is an act of faith in the Majesty of God.

(b) If the act of faith would be harmful, as prolonging or intensifying

the temptation (a thing that is not infrequent), it is better to

struggle against the temptation indirectly by turning the attention to

other matters (see 257, 844).

935. Other cases in which one is obliged to make an internal act of

faith are as follows:

(a) By reason of a divine commandment of some virtue other than faith,

it is sometimes necessary to make an act of faith also. Examples: When

a sinner is preparing himself for the state of grace, of which faith is

the prerequisite; when one is tempted against hope, justice, etc., and

needs to call on faith to resist the tempter; when one is near to death

and must make an act of charity in preparing to meet God. In these

cases there are divine precepts of repentance, hope, justice, charity,

and virtually of faith, which is presupposed.

(b) One must at times make an internal act of faith by reason of a

human commandment enjoining some external act or virtue which supposes

faith. Examples: The command to swear on the Bible, or by some mystery

of religion, supposes an act of faith. The commands to receive

Communion at Easter (Canon 859), to make meditation and spiritual

retreats (Canons 125, 126, 595, 1001), to apply the intention of Mass

(Canons 339, Sec. 1, 466, Sec. 1), all include virtually the command

of an act of faith, for the things required (Communion, retreat, Mass)

cannot be rightly performed without such an act.

936. The act of faith is either formal or virtual, according as it is

made in itself, or in the act of another virtue that supposes it.

(a) The act of faith is formal, when one mentally accepts the truths

of revelation on account of divine authority, even though one does

not express the assent in words or according to any set formula. This

kind of act of faith is necessary when one passes from non-belief

or unbelief to belief, for none of the acts prior to faith contains

supernatural assent to revelation. Hence, the commandment of faith

requires in children or in converts from unbelief a formal act.

(b) The act of faith is virtual, when one elicits the act of some other

supernatural virtue without thinking expressly about faith; for faith

is presupposed by all other supernatural virtues, since one cannot

wish what one does not believe. Thus, the acts of hope, charity, and

contrition are virtually acts of faith. It seems that commandments of

other virtues and of the renewal of faith itself do not require that

one make a formal act of faith, although of course this would be the

better thing to do. Thus, to fulfill the Easter precept of yearly

Confession and Communion well, it is not required that one make a

formal act of faith before Confession, since faith is included in the

act of contrition. It is not necessary, then, that the penitent should

say: “I believe in the forgiveness of sins, etc.,” for in his purpose

to receive forgiveness he makes a virtual act of faith in the tenth

article of the Creed and in the Sacrament of Penance, as well as in the

other mysteries of faith.

937. Practically, there is no difficulty for confessors about the

violation of the commandment regarding internal acts of faith.

(a) If penitents are instructed and practical Catholics, they have made

at some time a formal act of faith, even though they do not remember

the time, for the act of faith precedes the acts of other virtues they

are exercising. True, this act of faith may not have been made as soon

as the age of reason was attained or the duty of faith perceived, but

invincible ignorance excuses those who were in good faith about the

matter. Regularity in prayer and other duties is an index that the act

of faith is being renewed in such a way as to comply with the

commandment. Hence, there is no necessity of questioning this class of

penitents about the act of faith.

(b) If penitents are very ignorant Catholics (e.g., young children), it

is clear that they have not made an act of faith as they should, for no

one believes what he does not know. They should, therefore, be

instructed that it is their duty to acquire more knowledge, and to make

an act of faith along with their other prayers. Regarding absolution,

see 924.

(c) If penitents are instructed but not practical, the confession that

they have neglected prayer, Mass, and the Sacraments, means that they

have also neglected the command of making acts of faith. It is not

necessary, therefore, that the confessor interrogate or instruct them

about this command, and he may absolve them, if they are resolved to

amend. It is well, however, to recommend daily acts of faith, hope,

charity and contrition to careless Catholics, especially to those who

cannot attend Mass or receive the Sacraments often.

938. The Commandment of External Profession of Faith.--The third

commandment of faith given above (see 913) is both negative and

affirmative: (a) as negative, it forbids denial of the faith or

profession of error opposed to faith; (b) as affirmative, it commands

that one make open profession of one’s faith.

939. The existence of a prohibition against denial of the faith or

profession of error is taught in scripture and the sinfulness of such

denial is clear from its nature. (a) “He that shall deny Me before men,

I will also deny him before My Father who is in Heaven” (Matt., x. 33).

Denial of Christ is a grievous sin, for it entails denial by Christ.

(b) He who denies the faith is a heretic or infidel, if he means what

he says; he lies, if he does not mean what he says, and his lie is a

grave injury to God, whose truth is called into question, and against

the neighbor, who is scandalized.

940. With reference to its voluntariness, denial of faith is either

direct or indirect. (a) It is direct, when one intends to deny the

faith; (b) it is indirect, when one does not intend to deny the faith,

but wills to use words, acts, etc., which either from their

signification or use, or from the meaning that will or may be given

them by others, will in the circumstances express a denial of the

faith. Examples: A convert from paganism conceals a crucifix in the

idol of a temple and then joins the pagans in their customary bows of

reverence, while intending only adoration to Christ crucified and

detesting the idol. Titus takes off his hat when passing any church, as

a mark of respect for the good they do. Balbus, a convert from

Nestorianism, recites the names of Nestorius and Dioscurus at Mass,

intending only to honor the patron Saints of those two heresiarchs.

941. There are three ways of denying the faith: (a) by words, spoken or

written, as when one says: “I am not a Catholic,” “I do not believe in

miracles”; (b) by acts, as when one dissuades persons of good faith

from entering the Church, or moves them to abandon it, or refuses to

genuflect before the Blessed Sacrament, or studiously excludes

scapulars, pictures and all religious symbols; (c) by omission, as when

one fails to answer calumnies against faith, which one could profitably

answer, or fails to protest when another speaks of oneself as a

non-Catholic.

942. There are various ways in which error opposed to faith is

professed: (a) by words, as when one says that one is a freethinker or

Christian Scientist; (b) by acts, as when one offers incense to an

idol, or receives the Lord’s Supper in a Lutheran church, or cheers an

anti-religious address; (c) by signs, as when one uses the Masonic

grip, wears the robes of a Buddhist bonze, takes a Mohammedan or pagan

name, etc., in order to pass oneself off as a non-Catholic; (d) by

omission, as when one is silent when introduced as a Rationalist, or

makes no protest when Indifferentism is being advocated by one’s

companions.

943. The following are not a denial of faith or profession of error:

(a) Words that deny, not one’s allegiance to religion, but one’s

acceptance of it as qualified by some calumnious designation. Examples:

Titus denies that he is a “Papist,” because he wishes his questioner to

use a term that is not intended to be an insult. Balbus, entering a

pagan region where the name Christian has the meaning of criminal or

enemy on account of crimes committed there by white men in past times,

says to the tribesmen that he is not a Christian, but a follower of

Jesus and a Catholic.

(b) Words that conceal one’s rank or state in the Church, are not

against faith, because one can hold the faith without being in a

certain rank or state in the Church, Thus, St. Peter’s denial that he

was a follower of Jesus, that he had ever known Him, etc., was,

according to some authorities, not a denial of the Divinity of Jesus or

of the truth of His teaching. Example: A Catholic who hides or denies

his character of priest or religious, his membership in a Catholic

family, organization, race, does not thereby necessarily deny his faith.

(c) Deeds that are contrary to practices of religion, but not to the

profession of faith, are not denial of belief; for one may be very much

attached to one’s religion, even ready to fight for it, but not willing

to follow its requirements. Example: Caius is careless about church

duties, misses Mass, eats meat on Fridays, and never goes to the

Sacraments; but he always calls himself a Catholic and wishes to be

considered one.

(d) Signs that have some association with non-Catholic religion, but do

not necessarily represent it (since they are indifferent in themselves

and have other and legitimate uses), do not deny the faith, when not

used as symbols of false religion. Similarly, the omission of signs

that are associated with Catholicity, but which are optional, is not a

denial of the faith. Examples: Titus, when travelling in the Orient,

makes use of the national salutation of the pagan peoples among whom he

lives. Balbus builds a church with architectural features borrowed from

pagan temples. Caius wears a fez or turban in Mohammedan regions where

it is not looked on as a religious headgear. Sempronius practises

circumcision as a hygienic measure. Claudius does not say grace at

meals when dining in public, and does not wear scapulars when bathing

at the seashore.

(e) Omission of profession of faith, when it is not obligatory, is not

a denial of faith; for no one is bound to make known his affairs and

convictions to every acquaintance. Example: Titus works in an office

where most of the clerks are non-Catholics. But no one ever speaks

about religion, and hence it is not known that he is a Catholic.

944. Dangers of Profession of Unbelief.--The principal dangers of

making external profession of false religion, if not of losing faith

itself, are the following: (a) membership in forbidden societies; (b)

communication in sectarian services; (c) cooperation in activities

whose tendency or principles are erroneous.

945. Forbidden Societies.--Societies are forbidden by the Church when

they are intrinsically or extrinsically evil. (a) A society is

intrinsically evil, when it has an evil purpose, or uses evil means to

obtain even an honest end. Thus, societies or parties that conspire

against Church or State, or that seek to undermine Christian doctrines

or morals, have an evil purpose; while those that demand absolute

secrecy or oaths of blind obedience to unknown persons, that favor

cremation, use a sectarian ritual, promote evil literature, etc., are

employing evil means, no matter what may be the end in view. (b) A

society is extrinsically evil, when its end and means are good, but

membership in it is dangerous to faith or morals on account of

circumstances (e.g., on account of the bad type of individuals who make

up the society or control it).

946. The Code (Canon 684) mentions the following kinds of societies as

banned for Catholics:

(a) secret societies, that is, those which demand of members that

certain things which the society considers secrets be told absolutely

to no one outside the society, or certain degrees of the society, not

even to those who may legitimately inquire about them, such as the

bishop or civil superior in the external forum, parents with regard to

their children not emancipated, pastors and confessors in the internal

forum. Those societies are also secret which demand blind and absolute

obedience to unknown leaders;

(b) condemned societies, that is, such as have been censured by the

Church, or simply forbidden. Canon 2335 decrees _ipso facto_

excommunication reserved to the Holy See against all those who join

Masonic or similar associations which plot against the Church or lawful

civil authority. Among the societies forbidden without censure are:

various Biblical societies, societies for the promotion of cremation,

the Knights of Pythias, the Odd Fellows, the Sons of Temperance, the

Independent Order of Good Templars, Theosophical societies, the

Y.M.C.A. Female societies affiliated with these are also condemned,

since they are branches of the main society--for example, the Rebeccas,

the Eastern Star, the Pythian Sisters.

Worthy of detailed consideration is the condemnation of the Communist

Party and the penalties attached to membership in, or defense, or

propagation of the Party. The following questions were asked of the

Holy Office:

1. Whether it is licit to join the Communist Party or to favor it.

Reply: In the negative; for Communism is materialistic and

anti-Christian; and the leaders of the Communists, although they

sometimes verbally profess that they are not attacking religion, in

fact, nevertheless, by doctrine and action show themselves to be

enemies of God and of the true religion and the Church of Christ.

2. Whether it is licit to publish, propagate, or read books,

periodicals, daily papers, or sheets which promote the doctrine or

action of Communists, or to write in them.

Reply: In the negative: for they are forbidden _ipso iure_ (see Canon

1399).

3. Whether the faithful who knowingly and freely do the acts mentioned

in 1 and 2 can be admitted to the sacraments.

Reply: In the negative, according to the ordinary principles governing

the refusal of the sacraments to those who are not properly disposed.

4. Whether the faithful who profess the materialistic and

anti-Christian doctrine of Communists, and especially those who defend

or propagate it, incur _ipso facto_ as apostates from the Catholic

faith the excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See.

Reply: In the affirmative (Decree of the Holy Office, July 1, 1949).

The sanction of excommunication specially reserved to the Holy See was

imposed also upon those who teach boys and girls in associations set up

by the Communists to imbue youth with principles and training which are

materialistic and contrary to Christian morality and faith. The

associations themselves are subject to the sanctions of the decree of

July 1, 1949. Moreover parents or guardians who send their children to

such associations, and the children themselves, as long as they have

part in these associations, cannot be admitted to the reception of the

sacraments (Monitum of the Holy Office, July 28, 1950).

(c) seditious societies, that is, those organizations, even though not

secret, which aim at the overthrow of family and property rights;

(d) suspect societies, that is, those whose principles or methods have

the appearance of being unsound. On January 11, 1951 the Holy Office in

response to the question: “Whether Catholics may join the ‘Rotary

Club’?” issued the following decree: “It is not licit for clerics to

join the Association ‘Rotary Club’ or to be present at its meetings;

the laypeople are to be urged to preserve the prescript of Canon 684.”

The decree seems to have taken many English-speaking people by

surprise, one paper describing it as “a bewildering document.” The

surprise flowed from personal experience of Rotary Clubs as social

clubs dedicated to bonhomie and community improvement. Nevertheless,

the decree was in accord with the general trend of Church policy in

regard to undenominational societies. They are not approved; they are

not condemned as Masonry has been condemned. What is their position?

The response that layfolk are to be exhorted to observe Canon 684 is

indicative of the attitude of the Church in regard to such societies.

The canon instructs them to “beware of secret, condemned, seditious and

suspect societies.” Since Rotary Clubs are seldom considered to be

secret and never as condemned nor as seditious, the implication is that

they are suspect. Such was the interpretation of the decree given in

the _Osservatore Romano_ of Jan. 27, 1951.

In regard to clerics, the effect of the decree was to make illicit what

was formerly simply inexpedient; for the Sacred Consistory had replied

on February 4th, 1929, that it was not expedient for Ordinaries to

permit clerics to join Rotary Clubs, or to take part in their meetings.

Moreover, as the _Osservatore_ article indicates, the prohibition is

limited to meetings of members only and does not extend to meetings at

which non-members may be present, provided the purpose of such meetings

befits priestly activity.

The exhortation to layfolk in regard to “Rotary” simply reaffirms the

Church’s general attitude to all secular associations. As early as

November 5, 1920 the Holy Office, referring specifically to Y.M.C.A.,

warned the Ordinaries that the note of “suspicion” attaches to all

secular societies. Their efforts to promote good works and good moral

standards independent of religious authority tend to foster the spirit

of religious indifferentism and moral naturalism. Both the Spanish

hierarchy (1929) and the Dutch hierarchy (1930) have so judged Rotary.

However, the degree of suspicion to be attached to each Rotary Club is

a question of fact to be determined in specific instances by the proper

local Ordinary. Where evidence of suspicion is available, exhortatious

not to join the clubs must be made; in the lack of such evidence, the

ordinaries may maintain discreet silence.

(e) societies that aim to elude the lawful vigilance of religious

authority.

947. The following organizations fall under the censure against Masonic

societies:

(a) all varieties and degrees of Freemasonry, for all the Masonic sects

are included in the Canon. The fact that American, English and Irish

Masons have many excellent individuals in their ranks, and lack the

irreligious and revolutionary character of the Masonry of Continental

Europe or Latin countries, does not exempt them from the censure.

(b) all organizations similar to Masonry, that is, secret societies

that conspire against lawful authority. Such are societies like the

Carbonari, the Fenians, anarchists and nihilists.

948. The sin committed by membership in forbidden societies is grave,

since the purpose of the law--viz., the safeguarding of faith against

serious danger--is itself grave. Such membership is interpreted also as

a profession of false religion, when one joins oneself to a body which

in its branches or degrees has a false creed of its own. (a) Even

though the branch or degree to which one belongs does not require

assent to such a creed, membership expresses a fellowship with those

who do accept it; (b) similarly, participation in the ritual of the

lodges is a communication in ceremonies expressive of false religion;

for, though their externals may appear good or even Christian, the

internal meaning known to the adepts is anti-Catholic or anti-Christian.

949. Absolution of Those Who Belong to Forbidden Societies.--(a) The

sin cannot be absolved unless there is repentance, and hence absolution

cannot be granted those who without sufficient reason refuse to

withdraw from membership, or who refuse to discontinue participation in

false rites.

(b) The excommunication is not incurred by those who joined forbidden

societies in ignorance of the law or of the penalty, provided the

ignorance was not crass or supine. If the censure was actually

incurred, the mode of absolution will depend on the nature of the case:

if the case is occult (i.e., if it is not known and not likely to

become known that the penitent belonged to a society forbidden under

pain of excommunication), the Ordinary may absolve or grant faculties

to absolve (Canon 2237); if the case is a public one, and it would be

very inconvenient to await faculties from Rome, absolution is given

under the condition of recourse to the proper authority within a month

(Canon 2254). Many Ordinaries have by Indult faculties to absolve

members of secret societies.

950. Nominal membership and temporary attendance at meetings may be

permitted as an exception when there are sufficient reasons.

(a) Nominal membership means that one leaves one’s name on the roster

of the society and continues to pay its assessments, but does not

communicate with the society or attend its meetings. In 1896 the Holy

Office replied to the American Bishops that this kind of membership in

the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance and Knights of Pythias might be

permitted under certain conditions, if there was a sufficient reason

(viz., that grave material loss would be incurred by withdrawal). (b)

Temporary attendance at meetings means that for a short time, and not

for longer than absolutely necessary, one is present at gatherings of

the society, but takes no active part in its false cult.

951. The following conditions were laid down for permission of nominal

membership in the Odd Fellows, Sons of Temperance, etc.: (a) that the

penitent joined the society in good faith, before knowing that it was

condemned; (b) that there be no danger of scandal, or that it be

removed by the declaration that membership is only nominal and only for

the purpose of avoiding temporal losses; (c) that there be no danger of

perversion of the party himself or of his family, in case of sickness

or of death, and no danger of a non-Catholic funeral.

Moral theology · 第 9 / 31 章