PART II

SPECIAL MORAL THEOLOGY

743. In the First Part of this work, the means to man’s Last End were

spoken of in a general way; the features that are common to all good

acts--that they be human, morally deserving, directed according to law

and conscience--were treated. In the present Part the means to the Last

End will be discussed in particular, and we shall consider in turn the

kinds of duties that are owed by all men and those owed by persons in

special states of life.

Question I

THE DUTIES OF ALL CLASSES OF MEN

744. Good habits, specifically different, are all reducible to seven

most general virtues (see 150, 151), and hence in studying these seven

virtues, we shall at the same time study all the common duties of man.

745. The properties of the seven infused virtues are chiefly four:

(a) In the first place, these virtues may be increased: “This I pray,

that your charity may more and more abound” (Phil, i. 9). The increase

takes place _ex opere operato_ through the Sacraments, or _ex opere

operantis_ through meritorious works--that is, whenever sanctifying

grace, their root, is increased.

(b) A second property of the infused virtues is that they may be lost:

“I have somewhat against thee, because thou hast left thy first

charity” (Apoc., ii. 4); “Some have made shipwreck concerning the

faith” (I Tim., i. 19). The loss is caused by the contrary of the

virtue: faith is lost by disbelief, hope by despair; charity and the

moral virtues are lost by any mortal sin, for they are built on

sanctifying grace, which mortal sin destroys.

(c) A third property of the infused virtues is that they cannot be

diminished directly. If we leave out of consideration their opposites

(which, as just said, remove these virtues entirely), there is nothing

else that can act directly upon them. Mere failure to exercise them

cannot lessen them, since they are caused by divine infusion, not by

human exercise; venial sin cannot lessen them, since it does not lessen

grace on which they depend.

(d) A fourth property of the infused virtues is that they are

diminished indirectly. Failure to practise them or venial sin does

diminish the ease and fervor with which the acts of these virtues are

exercised; and thus indirectly--that is, by preparing the way for acts

that are directly contrary--neglect or venial sin diminishes the habits

themselves.

Art. 2: THE VIRTUE OF FAITH

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 1-9.)

746. The order of the theological virtues here followed is that given

by St. Paul in I Cor., xiii. 13--viz., faith, hope, charity. The order

of these virtues is twofold: (a) according to dignity the order is

charity, hope, faith; (b) according to time, the order is that of I

Cor., xiii. The habits of these three virtues are infused at the same

time (i.e., at the moment when grace is conferred), but their acts are

not simultaneous, and one must believe before one can hope or love.

747. Excellence of the Virtue of Faith.--(a) Faith is the beginning of

the supernatural life, the foundation and the root of justification,

without which it is impossible to please God and arrive at fellowship

with Him. (b) It is an anticipation of the end of the supernatural

life, for by faith we believe that which we shall behold in the

beatific vision: “All these died according to faith, not having

received the promises, but beholding them afar off, and saluting them

and confessing that they are pilgrims and strangers on the earth”

(Heb., xi. 13).

748. Utility of Faith for the Individual.--(a) Through faith the

intellect receives a new light, which discloses to it a higher

world--“the wisdom of God in a mystery” (I Cor., ii. 7)--and which

illuminates even this lower world with a heavenly brightness, that man

may know more quickly, more surely, and more perfectly the natural

truths that pertain to God and duty. (b) The will is strengthened to

perform duties valiantly through the motives and examples which faith

offers: the patriarchs of old “by faith conquered kingdoms, wrought

justice, obtained promises, recovered strength from weakness” (Heb.,

xi. 33). In adversity faith is a stay and a consolation: “For what

things soever were written, were written for our learning, that through

patience and the comfort of the scriptures, we might have hope” (Rom.,

xv. 4).

749. Utility of Faith for Society.--(a) Domestic society is defended in

its security and happiness by faith, which teaches the sacramental

character of marriage, which offers the model of the Holy Family to

Christian homes, which never ceases to declare in the name of God the

duties of husbands and wives, parents and children. (b) Without faith

and religion civil society cannot be maintained in strength and

prosperity. It is faith in God more than laws or armies that gives

security to life, reputation, and property, with order and peace at

home and abroad.

750. The Meaning of Faith.--In Holy Scripture and other religious

writings the word _faith_ has various meanings.

(a) Sometimes it stands for a promise, or for the quality of being true

to one’s promises. Examples: St. Paul condemns widows who remarry

against their word, “because they have made void their first faith

(promise)” (I Tim., v. 12). Speaking of the unbelief of the Jews, he

says: “Shall their unbelief make the faith (i.e., fidelity to promise

or faithfulness) of God without effect? God forbid. But God is true”

(Rom, iii. 3, 4).

(b) Sometimes the term _faith_ stands for good reputation, or for

confidence in another. Examples: “He that discloseth the secret of a

friend loseth his faith (credit, reputation), and shall never find a

friend to his mind” (Ecclus., xxvii. 17); “O thou of little faith

(trust, confidence), why didst thou doubt?” (Matt., xiv. 31).

(c) Sometimes _faith_ stands for truths or doctrines offered for one’s

belief, or for the assent of the mind to the judgment of conscience or

to the revelation of God. Examples: “Thou has not denied My faith”

(that is, “the truths revealed by Me,” Apoc. ii. 13); “All that is not

of faith (i.e., from the firm conviction of conscience) is sin” (Rom,

xiv. 23); “Without faith (i.e., assent to the unseen on the word of

God) it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must

believe” (Heb., xi. 6).

751. It is faith only in the last sense that is known as the

theological virtue of faith, and hence with it alone we are here

concerned. St. Paul describes this faith as follows: “Faith is the

substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear

not” (Heb., xi. 1). This verse is variously interpreted. (a) According

to St. Chrysostom, the meaning is: Faith is the subsistence or

anticipated existence in the soul of future blessings that are hoped

for, through the firm confidence it gives; it is the conviction of the

reality of the unseen. (b) According to St. Thomas, the meaning is:

Faith is the substance or basis on which is built the hope of

blessedness, or on which rests as on its foundation the whole work of

justification; it is an argument producing certainty of that which is

not seen. The elements of St. Thomas’ interpretation have been

incorporated into the Vatican Council’s definition: “The Catholic

Church professes that this faith which is the beginning of human

salvation is a supernatural virtue by which we, with the aid and

inspiration of the grace of God, believe that the things revealed by

Him are true, not because the intrinsic truth of these things has been

perceived by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority

of God Himself revealing, who can neither deceive nor be deceived”

(Sess. 3, chap. 3, Denz. 1789).

752. Thus, faith is an intellectual habit and act, but it differs from

all other intellectual habits and acts as follows: (a) it differs from

science, vision, understanding, for its object is “the things that

appear not”; (b) it differs from opinion, doubt, suspicion, for it is a

firm “substance,” a certain “evidence”; (c) it differs from human faith

or belief resting on man’s word and promises, for it is the pledge,

beginning and cornerstone of the happiness promised by God Himself.

753. Faith will now be considered according to two aspects: (a)

objectively, as regards the things that are believed by him who has

faith; (b) subjectively, as regards the habit and act of the believer

which put him in contact with these truths of the unseen world.

754. The Object of Faith.--There is a twofold object of faith, viz.,

material and formal.

(a) The material object, or the truth that is believed, includes all

that is contained in the Word of God, whether written or handed down by

tradition. The principal material object is God Himself as the Deity,

or Supreme Truth in Being (_prima veritas in essendo_); the secondary

material object embraces all other revealed truths.

(b) The formal object of faith, or the motive that prompts one to give

assent to the material object, is the authority of God, who is Supreme

Truth in Knowing and Speaking (_prima veritas in cognoscendo et

dicendo_), and hence He can neither be deceived nor deceive.

755. The material object of faith includes all truths revealed by God;

but, since it belongs to the Church to teach those truths, there is a

distinction of truths that are revealed by God but not defined by the

Church, and truths that are revealed by God and defined by the Church

as revealed. Thus: (a) divine faith is belief in revealed truth that

has not been declared by the Church as revealed; (b) divine and

Catholic faith is belief in a revealed truth that has been proposed as

such by the Church, either solemnly or ordinarily. Example: Dogmas

contained in creeds, definitions of Popes or general councils. The

Vatican Council has determined the object of this faith: By divine and

Catholic faith all those things must be believed which are contained in

the written word of God and in tradition, and which are proposed by the

Church, either by a solemn pronouncement or by her ordinary and

universal magisterium, to be believed as divinely revealed (Ibid., Denz.

1792).

756. The formal object of faith extends to all truths that have been

revealed and to no others. Theologians discuss the status of certain

truths connected with revelation concerning which the Church is

guaranteed infallibility on account of her teaching office. Special

difficulties arise in relation to: a) dogmatic facts, that is,

definitions concerning particular facts closely related to dogma (e.g.,

that Anglican orders are invalid; that a particular book contains a

sense contrary to revelation; that this Supreme Pontiff, legitimately

elected, is the successor of St. Peter in the primacy and consequently

infallible); b) theological conclusions, that is, deductions drawn from

revealed truth.

Many theologians teach that both dogmatic facts and theological

conclusions when defined by the Church constitute a special object of

faith distinct from divine and Catholic faith, namely, ecclesiastical

faith. Accordingly, for them, ecclesiastical faith is the internal

assent given to truths connected with revelation and defined by the

Church as true, the motive of assent being the infallibility of the

Church in her teaching office.

Others deny the existence of such faith and insist a) that dogmatic

facts are contained in revealed doctrine implicitly as singulars in

universals and hence are believed before definition by divine faith

implicitly, and after definition by divine and Catholic faith, b) that

theological conclusions before definition are held by theological

assent, afterwards by divine and Catholic faith. Some also have

maintained that before definition such conclusions belong to divine

faith. (For a summary of the various teachings on this problem see

Reginaldo-Maria Schultes, O.P., _Introductio in Historiam Dogmatum_,

pp. 46 ff.; Marin-Sola, O.P., _L’Evolution homogene du Dogme

Catholique_).

757. Private revelations, even when approved by the Church, are not an

object of divine and Catholic faith, for they form no part of the

revelation given to the whole human race that was closed with the death

of the Apostles and committed to the Church. Hence: (a) if they are

negatively approved by the Church, the approval means only that such

revelations contain nothing contrary to faith and morals, and are

useful and edifying; (b) if they are approved positively (as is the

case with the revelations of St. Hildegarde, St. Brigit, and St.

Catherine of Siena), the approval means that they appear to be true

divine revelations and may be prudently accepted as such.

758. The assent to be given to private revelations, therefore, is as

follows:

(a) Such revelations should receive the assent of divine faith, if it

is certain that they are genuine. This applies to those to whom and for

whom they were given, and probably to others also. It rarely happens,

however, that the genuineness of a private revelation can be critically

established, and the Church does not require that such revelations be

accepted by all the faithful. To refuse assent, therefore, to a private

revelation is not generally an offense against divine faith.

(b) Private revelations cannot receive the assent of Catholic faith,

since, even when approved by the Church, they are not proposed as a

part of the Christian revelation committed to her care. To dissent from

them, therefore, is not a sin against Catholic faith, unless in

rejecting them one would also reject defined dogma (e.g., by denying

the possibility of revelation).

(c) Private revelations are not offered for the assent of

ecclesiastical faith, since in approving them the Church does not

propose them as necessarily connected with the exercise of her teaching

office or under guarantee of infallibility. To dissent from them,

therefore, is not a sin against ecclesiastical faith, unless other

errors (e.g., against the authority of the Church in matters connected

with revelation) are also involved.

(d) Private revelations are offered for the assent of human faith,

since the Church proposes them to the faithful, if approved, as matters

of pious opinion, which are according to the rules of prudence truly

probable on account of traditions in their favor, supported by suitable

testimony and documents (Benedict XIV, _De Canonizatione Sanctorum_,

lib. II, cap. 23; III, cap. ult.; Sacred Cong. Rites, May 12, 1877, n.

3419, ad 2). The Church permits, but does not exact belief in these

revelations. One would not be excused, however, who rejected them

through pride or contempt, or without sufficient reason.

759. Similarly, although the Church offers for human faith alone

certain particular facts of history, one who rejects them may easily be

guilty of contempt or temerity. Such particular facts are: (a)

apparitions of heavenly beings in post-Biblical times, such as the

appearance of the Archangel Michael in Monte Gargano about 525 and the

appearance of the Blessed Virgin at Lourdes in 1858, for which the

Church has instituted feasts; (b) deeds related in the legends of the

Saints, such as the victory of St. Catherine of Alexandria over the

pagan philosophers and the carrying of her body to Mt. Sinai by Angels,

which the Church inserts in the Breviary lessons; (c) the authenticity

of relics. In granting certificates of genuineness, the Church

guarantees only that there is sufficient historical evidence or

probability for the belief that particular bones or other objects

belonged to a particular Saint.

760. Many tenets of the Church, indeed, have not the prerogative of

infallibility--for example, decrees of the Popes not given _ex

cathedra_, decisions of Congregations made with Papal approval,

teachings of Bishops to particular members of the Church, doctrines

commonly held by Catholics as theological truths or certain

conclusions. These decrees, decisions, etc., receive not the assent of

Catholic faith, but what is called religious assent, which includes two

things, viz., external and internal assent.

(a) External assent should be given such teachings--that is, the homage

of respectful silence due to public authority. This does not forbid the

submission of difficulties to the teaching authority, or the scientific

examination of objections that seem very strong.

(b) Internal assent should be given such teaching--that is, the

submission of the judgment of the individual to the judgment of the

teacher who has the authority from Christ and assistance from the Holy

Spirit. This internal assent differs, however, from the assent of

faith, inasmuch as it excludes fear of error, but not of the

possibility of error, and it may later on be suspended, called into

doubt, or even revoked. Pope Pius X in his _Motu proprio_, “Praestantia

scripturae Sacrae” (Nov. 18, 1907), indicated the binding force of the

decrees both of the Pontifical Biblical Commission and of all doctrinal

decrees: All are bound in conscience to submit to the decisions of the

Biblical Commission which have been given in the past and which shall

be given in the future, in the same way as to the decrees which

appertain to doctrine, issued by the Sacred Congregations and approved

by the Supreme Pontiff; nor can they escape the stigma both of

disobedience and temerity, nor be free from grave guilt as often as

they impugn their decisions either in word or writing; and this over

and above the scandal which they give and the sins of which they may be

the cause before God by making other statements on these matters which

are very frequently both rash and false. (Reaffirmed by the Biblical

Commission on Feb. 27, 1934.)

761. The objects, therefore, which formally or reductively pertain to

the virtue of faith, are as follows:

(a) Divine faith has for its object all the truths revealed by God as

contained in the Canonical scriptures approved by the Church, and in

the teachings received by the Apostles from Christ or the Holy Spirit

and handed down to the Church as Tradition. Private revelations in

exceptional cases may also be the object of divine faith.

(b) Catholic faith has for its object all the truths formally revealed

in scripture and Tradition that have been defined as such by the

Church. The definitions of the Church are either solemn (e.g., those

given in the Creeds, _ex cathedra_ definitions of the Popes, decisions

of Ecumenical Councils) or ordinary (e.g., those contained in the

universal preaching, practice or belief of the Church, encyclical

letters [see _Humani Generis_, n.20]). Equivalent to definitions are

the condemnations of error opposed to revealed truths.

(c) According to some theologians ecclesiastical faith has for its

object all infallible decisions of the Church about matters not

revealed, but connected with revelation, or necessary for the exercise

of the teaching office of the Church. Such are: (i) definitions, that

is, definitive declarations of theological conclusions or of dogmatic

facts, disciplinary laws made for the entire Church, canonization of

the saints, solemn approbation of religious Orders, express or special

recognition of Doctors of the Church, declaration of the relation of

private revelations to the public revelation; and (ii) censures, that

is, condemnations of teachings, on account of falsity, as heretical,

near to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, rash, etc.; on account

of their expression, as equivocal, ambiguous, presumptuous, captious,

suspected, ill-sounding, offensive to pious ears, etc.; on account of

their tendency, as scandalous, schismatical, seditious, unsafe, etc.

Examples: The definitions concerning the sense of the book

_Augustinus_, the suitability of the terms “consubstantial” and

“transubstantiation,” the agreement of the Vulgate with the original

scriptures, the lawfulness of the insertion of the _Filioque_.

(d) Religious assent has for its object all doctrinal pronouncements of

the Church that are not infallible, but are yet official and

authoritative. Examples are ordinary instructions and condemnations

given by Pontifical Congregations and Commissions. The Syllabus of

Modern Errors issued by Pius IX was most likely not an infallible or

definitive document, although many of the errors it rejects are

contrary to dogma, and hence, even apart from the Syllabus, they are to

be rejected as opposed to Catholic faith. Likewise, many of its tenets

are drawn from encyclical letters. Papal allocutions, radio addresses,

and the doctrinal parts of Apostolic Constitutions, in themselves, are

in this class.

(e) Respect is due to the judgment of the Church even in non-doctrinal

matters and where no obligation is imposed by her, on account of her

position and the careful examination given before decision. Example: It

would be disrespectful to reject without good reason a pious belief

which the Church after mature deliberation has permitted to be held.

762. Though the truths of faiths are many, the duty of believing

imposes no great burden on the believer. Thus: (a) it is not required

that explicit belief be given to all the teachings of faith; (b) it is

not required that one distinguish the particular kind of assent in case

of uncertainty, but it suffices to yield assent according to the mind

and intention of the Church. Example: When a group of propositions is

condemned under various censures, no indication being made of the

censure that applies to particular propositions, it suffices to hold

that all of them are false, and that to each of them applies one or

more of the censures listed.

763. Faith is divided into explicit and implicit, according as the

object believed is unfolded or not to the mind.

(a) Faith is explicit regarding any truth, when assent is given to that

truth as known in itself and expressed in terms proper to itself.

Example: He has explicit faith in the Eucharist who has been instructed

concerning the meaning of the mystery, and who assents to it according

to that distinct knowledge.

(b) Faith is implicit regarding any truth, when that truth is not known

or not accepted in itself, but is accepted in another truth. Example:

He has implicit faith in the Eucharist who has not yet heard of it, but

who accepts all the teachings of the Church, even those he does not

know.

764. Faith is implicit as follows:

(a) Improperly, faith is implicit, if one does not give assent, but is

prepared to give it, if necessary, or wishes to give it. These pious

dispositions are not the act of faith itself, but they are its

beginnings, or preparations leading up to it; they are good, but not

sufficient. Example: A pagan who says he would accept the Christian

creed, if he thought it were true, or who wishes that he could believe

it.

(b) Properly, faith is implicit, if one gives assent to a truth by

accepting another in which it is contained, as a particular is

contained in a universal (e.g., he who explicitly accepts all the

truths of Christianity, implicitly accepts the Eucharist, even when in

good faith he thinks it is not revealed), or as an instrument is

involved in its principal cause (e.g., he who explicitly believes in

the Redemption implicity believes in Baptism, which is the instrument

by which Redemption is applied), or as means are contained in their end

(e.g., he who explicitly believes that eternal life is a reward,

implicitly believes that good works must be performed as a means to

that end), or as the reality is expressed in the figure (e.g., those in

the Old Testament who explicitly believed in the Paschal Lamb,

implicitly believed in the sacrifice of Christ of which the Paschal

Lamb was the figure), or as the assent of the disciple is bound up with

the assent of the teacher (e.g., the child who explicitly accepts as

true the doctrines of faith taught by his pastor, implicitly believes

the sense and implications contained in the latter’s instructions).

765. The points about which explicit faith is required can be reduced

to four heads (see Catechism of the Council of Trent). These heads are:

(a) The things to be believed: “Preach the Gospel to every creature. He

that believeth shall be saved” (Mark, xvi. 15). The Gospel doctrine is

summarized in the Apostles’ Creed;

(b) The things to be done: “Teach them to observe all things whatsoever

I have commanded you” (Matt., xxviii. 20). The Ten Commandments (see

Vol. II) are called the epitome of the whole law;

(c) The ordinances to be observed; “Baptize them in the name of the

Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost” (Matt, xxviii. 19). The

Seven Sacraments are the sacred instruments through which the merits of

the Passion of Christ are applied to the soul;

(d) The petitions to be made to God: “Thus shall you pray: Our Father,

etc.” (Matt., vi. 9). The prayer (see Vol. II) given us by Christ

teaches us both the manner of prayer and the requests that should be

offered.

766. Faith in the revelation given by God is necessary for salvation

(Heb., xi. 6), but in the usual providence of God faith cannot be had or

safeguarded without short formulas of its principal doctrines.

(a) Faith cannot be received without such formulas, because, its

doctrines being many and frequently difficult and the study of all

scripture and Tradition being impossible for most persons, a list of

short and clear propositions of revealed truths (Creed) is needed that

the faith may be proposed and accepted.

(b) Faith cannot be retained without such formulas, because, being

unchanging in itself and yet for all times and places, its doctrines

would be easily corrupted if there were not an official standard

(Symbol) by which both truth and error could be at once recognized (I

Cor., i. 10; II Tim., i. 13).

767. The formulas of Christian teaching as summarized in the Creeds,

since they must be brief and orderly, are divided into short and

connected propositions, which are therefore known as articles. Brevity

being the character of Creeds, not all revealed truths are expressed in

them as articles, but only those that have the following

characteristics:

(a) An article of the Creed deals with one of the two main objects of

belief, namely, the end of man, which is eternal life (Heb., xi. 1), and

the means thereto, which is Jesus Christ (John, xvii. 3). Other things,

which are proposed for faith, not for their own sake, but only on

account of their relation to these two main objects (e.g., the

wandering of the Israelites in the desert, the details of the journeys

of St. Paul, etc.), are not mentioned in the Creeds.

(b) An article of the Creed deals only with those doctrines concerning

eternal life and Christ which are in a special manner unseen or

difficult, for faith is “the evidence of things that appear not” (Heb.,

xi. 1). Other doctrines which have no special difficulty of their own

are considered as implicit in those that express the general mysteries,

and hence they are not mentioned. Thus, the three Persons of the

Trinity are given distinct articles, because the mysteriousness of the

Triune God cannot be reduced to any more general mystery, whereas the

Eucharist is not mentioned, as having no mystery that is not implied in

the articles on the divine omnipotence and the sanctification of man

through Christ.

768. Has there been an increase in the articles of faith?

(a) If by increase is meant the addition through new revelation of main

beliefs not contained in the primitive revelation, there has never been

an increase in the articles of faith; for from the beginning God made

known His own being, which includes the eternal things of God and the

end or happiness of man, and His providence, which includes the

temporal dispensations of God and the means for the salvation of man

(Heb., xi. 6).

(b) If by increase is meant the addition of new revelations that

brought out more clearly and definitely things contained in previous

revelation, there was an increase in the articles of faith from the

beginning of revelations down to the end of the Apostolic age. Thus,

the nature of God and His purpose as regards the redemption of humanity

were brought out ever more distinctly by new revelations in Old

Testament times (Exod., vi. 2), and were given in final and complete

form by the revelation of Christ (Heb., i. 1; Eph., iii. 5; Heb., xii.

27, 28; II Tim., i. 13).

(c) If by increase is meant a clearer and fuller explanation of the

revelation once delivered to the Saints, there has been and always can

be an increase of articles of faith. Thus, in the Council of Nicaea the

Apostles’ Creed was amplified; in the Council of Constantinople the

Creed of Nicaea was added to, and similarly today or tomorrow the Pope

could add new explanations or developments to the Creed, if new

heresies or necessities required that the true sense of revelation

already given should be brought out more clearly or fully.

769. There are three principal Creeds used by the Church:

(a) the Apostles’ Creed, which according to an early tradition was

composed by the Apostles themselves before they separated to preach the

Gospel. It was in use from the first centuries in the Roman Church,

which required that the catechumens learn and recite it before

receiving Baptism. It is divided into twelve articles;

(b) the Nicene Creed, which is used in the Mass and was drawn up at the

Council of Nicaea (325) against the Arian denial of the divinity of

Christ, and was revised by the Council of Constantinople (381) against

the Macedonians, who refused to acknowledge the divinity of the Holy

Ghost;

(c) the Athanasian Creed, which is used in the Office of Prime and is a

resume of the teaching of St. Athanasius on the Trinity and

Incarnation. It was composed in the West some time after the beginning

of the fifth century.

770. Summary of the teaching of the First Article of the Creed: “I

believe in God, the Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth.”--(a)

“I believe,” i.e., I give unhesitating assent to God revealing His

mysterious truths; (b) “in God,” i.e., the Supreme Being, one in nature

and three in persons; (c) “the Father,” i.e., our Maker and Provider,

from whom also we receive the spirit of adoption of sons; (d)

“almighty,” i.e., all-powerful, and therefore all-wise and endowed with

every other perfection in the highest degree; (e) “Creator,” i.e., who

freely produced the world out of nothing, without external model or

effort of any sort, and who preserves, rules and moves all creatures;

(f) “of heaven and earth,” i.e., of the world of pure spirits, of

matter, and of man, who is at the confines of matter and spirit--in

other words, of all finite things, visible and invisible.

771. Summary of the Second Article: “And in Jesus Christ, His only Son,

our Lord.”--(a) “Jesus,” a name given by command of God and meaning

“Saviour”; (b) “Christ,” i.e., “the anointed,” because He was King,

Priest, and Prophet; (c) “His only Son,” i.e., born of the Father before

all ages, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten

not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made;

(d) “our Lord,” for as God He shares all the perfections of the divine

nature, as man He has redeemed us and thus deservedly acquired the

title of Lord over us, while as the God-man He is the Lord of all

created things. It should be noted that there is nothing imperfect or

carnal in the generation of the Son, or in the procession of the Holy

Ghost, for God is a spirit and all-perfect.

772. Summary of the Third Article: “Who was conceived by the Holy

Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary.”--(a) “Who was conceived.” The

Only-begotten Son, the second Person of the Trinity, for us men and for

our salvation, became incarnate and was made man. Thus, the same Divine

Person is in both the divine and human natures, and the union preserves

the properties and the actions of both natures. (b) “By the Holy

Ghost.” At the moment when Mary consented to the announcement of the

angel, the body of Christ was formed in her womb from her flesh, the

rational soul was infused, and the divine and human natures were united

in the Person of the Word. Thus, Mary is truly the Mother of God. This

conception was miraculous, accomplished without the aid of man, through

the sole operation of the three Persons of the Trinity. Being an

external work of God in which love towards us is especially manifested,

the Incarnation is attributed to the Holy Ghost, who in the internal

life of the Deity proceeds as the mutual love of Father and Son. (c)

“Born of the Virgin Mary.” Mary was ever a virgin, before, during, and

after childbirth; immaculate and holy in soul; the spiritual Mother of

whom Christians are born in holiness.

773. Summary of the Fourth Article: “Suffered under Pontius Pilate, was

crucified, dead and buried.”--(a) The effect of that which is contained

in this article is expressed in the words of the Nicene Creed, “for

us.” The passion and death of Christ, willed by Himself, accomplished

our salvation, as satisfaction, sacrifice and redemption; (b) The

manner in which this was brought about is declared in the words above

quoted. In His human nature Christ suffered agony and pain of body; He

was sentenced to death by the Roman governor and nailed to the cross.

His soul and body were separated in death, although the Divinity never

departed from either, and His dead body was laid in the tomb.

774. Summary of the Fifth Article: “He descended into hell; the third

day He rose again from the dead.”--(a) “He descended.” After His death

the soul of Christ went to the abode of the departed, to liberate those

who were there. (b) “Into hell.” The name hell is applied in a wide

sense to all those secret abodes in which are detained the souls of

those who have not obtained the happiness of heaven--viz., the hell of

the damned, in which the impenitent suffer eternal pain of loss and

sense; purgatory, in which the souls of just men are cleansed by

temporary punishments; limbo, where the fathers of the Old Testament

awaited in peaceful repose the coming of Christ. It was this last abode

into which the soul of Christ entered. (c) “The third day”--i.e., on

Sunday morning, the third day after His burial. (d) “He rose again.” As

He had laid down His life by His own power, so He took it up again by

His own power. (e) “From the dead.” Christ not only returned to life,

He also conquered death; He rose to die no more, and thus He is first

in the final resurrection. (f) “According to the scriptures.” These

words are added in the Creed of Constantinople, to call attention to

the fact that the resurrection is the attestation of the truth of our

Lord’s claims and doctrine (I Cor., xv. 14, 17; Matt., xii. 39, 40).

775. Summary of the Sixth Article: “He ascended into heaven, sitteth at

the right hand of God, the Father almighty.”--(a) “He ascended.” By His

own power as God and man Christ ascended into heaven. (b) “Into

heaven.” As God, He never forsook heaven, the Divinity being

omnipresent; but as man, body and soul, He ascended to the abode of

glory forty days after the resurrection. (c) “Sitteth at the right hand

of God the Father Almighty.” Christ is said to stand at the right hand

of God, inasmuch as He is our Mediator with the Father (Acts, vii. 55;

Heb., vii. 25; John, xiv. 2); He is said to sit at the right hand of

the Father to express the permanent possession of royal and supreme

power and glory (Eph., i. 20-22; Heb., i. 13).

776. Summary of the Seventh Article: “From thence He shall come to

judge the living and the dead.”--There is a particular judgment at

death; at the end of the World, of which the time is uncertain, there

will be a general judgment, both of the living and the dead. Christ

will come a second time, and as Judge will pass sentence either of

eternal loss and pain or of eternal happiness.

777. Summary of the Eighth Article: “I believe in the Holy Ghost.”--The

Third Person of the Trinity is equal to the Father and the Son,

proceeds from them both as their mutual love, and is spoken of,

therefore, by appropriation, as the Author of works of grace and

sanctification, in which especially the charity of God is manifested:

“The Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the

Father and the Son, who together with the Father and the Son is adored

and glorified, who spoke by the prophets” (Creed of Constantinople).

778. Summary of the Ninth Article: “I believe the Holy Catholic Church;

the Communion of Saints.”--(a) The Church pertains to the material, not

the formal object of divine faith (see 754), and hence it is not said:

“I believe in the Church.” We believe of the Church that she is the

visible society made up of the faithful scattered throughout the world,

called also the house of God (I Tim., iii. 15), the flock of Christ,

the spouse of Christ (II Cor., xi. 2), the body of Christ (Eph., i. 23;

Col., i. 24); that besides the Church militant on earth, composed of

both the good and the bad, and outside of which are unbelievers and the

excommunicated, there is the Church triumphant in heaven and the Church

suffering in purgatory; that there are four marks by which the true

Church may be recognized--viz., that she is one, holy, Catholic, and

Apostolic; that she is divine in her origin and possesses divinely

given powers. (b) “The Communion of Saints.” The members of the Church

have different offices, but there is among them a community of

spiritual goods, the Sacraments being a bond of union, and each one

profiting according to his condition in the good works done by others,

The Church suffering is assisted by our suffrages, while we in turn are

helped by the intercessions of the Church triumphant.

779. Summary of the Tenth Article: “The forgiveness of sins.”--God

forgives all sins, when they are truly repented of, either through

Baptism (in case of sins before Baptism) or through the due exercise of

the power of the keys given the Church (in case of sins after Baptism).

Venial sins may be forgiven by private repentance.

780. Summary of the Eleventh Article: “The resurrection of the

body.”--The soul is immortal, the body mortal. But at the end of the

world the bodies of all the dead, even though corrupted, shall be

restored and reunited with their principle of life--i.e., the soul to

which they belonged. Substantially, the risen body will be identical

with the mortal body, but it will have certain new qualities

corresponding to its new state.

781. Summary of the Twelfth Article: “Life everlasting.”--Those who die

in the friendship of God will be received into unending happiness, in

which they will be exempted from all evil and enjoy the beatific vision

and other divine gifts.

782. The Acts of Faith.--According to St. Paul, there are two acts of

faith, one internal, the other external: “With the heart we believe

unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation”

(Rom., x. 10). (a) The internal act of faith is the firm and constant

judgment of the intellect assenting to divine revelation (II Cor., x.

5), but freely and under the command of the will (Mark, xvi. 16), being

moved thereto by divine grace (Eph., ii. 5). (b) The external act of

faith is the profession before the world by signs, such as words or

deeds, of the internal assent given to divine revelation.

783. The internal act of faith is one, but it has a threefold

relationship: (a) it believes about God, if we consider the intellect

as assenting to the material object; (b) it believes God, if we

consider the intellect as assenting to the formal object; (c) it

believes in God, if we consider the will as moving the intellect to

assent, and tending towards God as the Last End.

784. The truths to which the assent of faith is given are either

supernatural or natural. (a) Supernatural truths or mysteries (e.g.,

the Trinity of Persons in God) are revealed for faith, that man may

know, desire and work for the supernatural destiny to which he has been

raised. (b) Natural truths (e.g., the Oneness of God) are revealed for

faith, so that mankind may obtain more quickly, more generally, and

more certainly the knowledge of divine things which reason can afford.

It is impossible, however, that an act of faith and an act of knowledge

should coexist in the same individual about the same truth, for faith

is of things that appear not.

785. The act of faith is a necessary preliminary to other supernatural

acts, for we do not tend towards the supernatural, unless we first

accept it by belief; hence, faith is necessary. But the act of faith

may also be made after other supernatural acts, like those of hope and

charity; and so it may be meritorious. (a) The act of faith is

necessary, both as a means and as a precept (see 360). The necessity of

means will be treated now, the necessity of precept later, when we

speak of the commandments of faith (see 913 sqq.). (b) The act of faith

before justification is meritorious congruously and in a wide sense;

but after justification it has condign merit (see 110).

786. For all adults the act of faith is necessary for salvation as a

necessity of means (see 360), for the Apostle says: “Without faith it

is impossible to please God” (Heb., xi. 6). The truths which must be

believed under necessity of means are of two kinds. (a) One must

believe with implicit faith all revealed truths which one does not know

and is not bound to know. An act of implicit faith is contained in the

formula: “O my God, I firmly believe all the truths the Catholic Church

teaches, because Thou hast revealed them.” (b) One must believe with

explicit faith all the truths which one is bound to know. An act of

explicit faith in all the truths necessary by necessity of means is

contained in the Apostles’ Creed. Other truths that must be explicitly

believed on account of a necessity of precept will be discussed in 918,

920.

787. What specifically are the truths just referred to that all are

bound to know as a necessary means? (a) Theologians generally agree

that it has always been necessary for adults to know and accept two

basic mysteries--God’s existence, as the supernatural End or happiness

of man, and His providence as exercised in supplying the means

necessary for supernatural salvation (see 768). Without such belief,

supernatural hope and charity, at all times necessary, are impossible.

(b) A majority of theologians hold, and with greater probability it

seems, that since the promulgation of the Gospel it is necessary for

adults to know and accept the two basic mysteries of Chrisitanity--

viz., that in God, who is our beatitude, there are three persons (the

Trinity), and that the way to our beatitude is through Christ our

Redeemer (the Incarnation).

788. Even before the Gospel, it was always necessary as a means that

one believe explicitly in God as our supernatural happiness and as the

provider of the means thereto. Thus, the Apostle, speaking of the

ancient patriarchs, says: “He that cometh to God, must believe that He

is, and is a rewarder to them that seek Him” (Heb., xi. 6). He that

would come to God (i.e., be saved), must believe in God as the Author

of glory and of grace. Hence, one must believe: (a) that God exists,

who is not ashamed to be called our God, and who prepares for us a

better, that is, a heavenly country (Heb., xi. 6); (b) that God is a

remunerator, from whom must be expected the working out of His promises

and the helps to attain the reward, as well as the meting out of

justice. In this faith is included implicitly a faith in Christ, and

thus in the Old Testament a belief, at least implicit, in the Messiah

to come was always necessary: “Man is not justified by the works of the

law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ” (Gal., ii. 16).

789. Since the promulgation of the Gospel (see 342, 354), it is also

necessary as a means that one believe explicitly in the mysteries of

the Trinity and Incarnation. For he who does not accept these, does not

accept the Gospel, whereas Christ says: “Go ye into the whole world,

and preach the Gospel to every creature. He that believeth not shall be

condemned” (Mark, xvi. 15, 16).

(a) Theoretically, this opinion seems more probable than the opposite

opinion; but chiefly on account of the difficulty about negative

infidels, which is discussed in dogmatic treatises on Predestination

and Grace, many theologians either reject it (e.g., those who say that

belief in the two great Christian mysteries is necessary only as a

precept, or that implicit faith suffices), or modify it (e.g., those

who say that belief in these two mysteries is not necessary as a means

for justification, but only for glorification, and those who say that

regularly such faith is a necessary means, but that an exception is

allowed for invincible ignorance, or for the insufficient promulgation

of the Gospel in many regions).

(b) Practically, this opinion is safer, and hence all theologians, even

Probabilists, hold that one must act as if it were true and certain,

whenever it is possible to give instruction on the Trinity and

Incarnation.

790. Knowledge about the mysteries of faith is either substantial (by

which one knows the essentials of a mystery) or scientific (by which

one knows also its circumstances and details, and is able to give a

more profound explanation of it). Scientific knowledge is required, on

account of their office, in those who are bound to teach the faith, but

substantial knowledge suffices for salvation. Hence, for an adult to be

saved, it suffices that he have the following kind of knowledge about

the four great mysteries:

(a) There is a God who has spoken to us, promising freely that He will

take us to Himself as our reward. It is not necessary that one

understand such theological concepts as the essence of deity, the

definition of supernaturality, the formal and material objects of

beatitude, etc.; for many persons are incapable of understanding them.

(b) This God, who will be our reward, is one, but there are three

divine Persons--the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, really distinct

and equal. It is not necessary that one understand the distinction

between nature and person, nor subtle questions about the processions

and properties.

(c) God provides for us, giving us the helps we need, and also, if we

serve Him, the reward He has promised. It is not necessary that one

understand the theology of providence, grace, and merit.

(d) Jesus Christ, who is God the Son, became man, suffered and died for

us, thus saving us from sin and winning back for us the right to

heaven. It is not necessary that one understand scientifically that in

Christ there are two natures united hypostatically in the one Person of

the Word.

791. Since Baptism is fruitless without due faith in the recipient, it

is not lawful as a rule to baptize those who lack substantial knowledge

of the four mysteries just mentioned. (a) Outside of danger of death,

it is never lawful to baptize a person, adult in mind, who is in

substantial ignorance of any of these four mysteries. Such a person

must first receive instruction. (b) In danger of death, when

instruction cannot be given, an adult in substantial ignorance about

the Trinity and the Incarnation may be baptized conditionally; for it

is probable that explicit knowledge of those two mysteries is not a

necessity of means (see 789; Canon 752, Sec.2).

792. Since absolution is invalid if the person absolved is incapable of

receiving grace, and since acts of faith in the four chief mysteries

are an essential means to justification in adults, absolution given to

one who is in substantial ignorance about one of the four mysteries

above mentioned is certainly or probably invalid, as the case may be.

Absolution certainly invalid is never lawful, but absolution probably

valid may in certain cases be regarded as lawful before administration,

and as valid after administration. Hence, the following cases must be

distinguished:

(a) Outside of danger of death, it is not lawful to absolve one who is

in substantial ignorance about any of those four mysteries. Such a

person should be sent away for further instruction, or given a brief

instruction then and there, if there is time.

(b) In danger of death, when instruction cannot be given, an adult in

substantial ignorance about the Trinity and Incarnation may be absolved

conditionally, for the reason given in the similar case of Baptism.

(c) After the fact, absolution given to one who was in substantial

ignorance of the Trinity and Incarnation, may be regarded as valid,

since the opinion that explicit knowledge of these mysteries is not a

necessary means, is at least probable. Hence, according to the

principles of Probabilism a penitent who made confessions While

ignorant of those two mysteries is not obliged to repeat his

confessions, since he has probably satisfied his obligation.

793. In the following cases (which would be rare, it seems) Baptism or

absolution cannot be administered, even to the dying who are unable to

receive instruction: (a) when it is certain that the dying person is

substantially ignorant about the existence of God, the Author of grace

and glory; (b) when it is certain that the dying person is

substantially ignorant of the Trinity and Incarnation through his own

fault, and is unwilling to hear about them.

794. Practical rules for granting the Sacraments in case of doubt or

urgency to those who seem to be indisposed on account of substantial

ignorance are the following:

(a) In danger of death, when instruction is out of the question, if

there is doubt about his ignorance, the dying person should be given

the benefit of the doubt.

(b) In danger of death, and when instruction is impossible, if there is

doubt about the mental ability of the dying person and his obligation

to have explicit faith, he should receive the benefit of the doubt.

(c) In danger of death or other urgent necessity, when instruction is

needed and possible, it should be given briefly as follows: “Let us say

the act of faith: I believe in one God, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost,

who has promised to take to Himself after this life all those that love

Him, and who punishes the wicked. I hope to have the happiness of being

received into His companionship through the help of Jesus Christ, the

Son of God, who became man and died for my salvation.” This or a

similar instruction should be given by the priest or lay person present

in baptizing an adult who is about to die. When there is not immediate

danger of death, a person who is baptized or absolved after short

instruction on account of emergency, should be admonished of the duty

of receiving fuller instruction later on.

795. Faith is the free exercise of the free assent of the intellect

to the unseen, an acceptance of obligations and tasks hard to human

nature. It is, therefore, an act of homage to the authority of God, and

is meritorious: “By faith the ancient patriarchs obtained the promises”

(Heb., xi. 33). Is the freedom and meritoriousness of this act of

faith lessened if one seeks for other arguments than the authority of

God in giving one’s assent to revelation? (a) The merit of the act of

faith is not lessened, when one seeks human arguments for the assent

of credibility which is prior to the assent of faith; for it is only

the part of prudence that one should first assure oneself of the fact

that a revelation has been made, before one assents on faith to the

doctrines contained in that revelation. Now, the arguments by which

one assures oneself of the fact of a revelation are human arguments,

such as proofs that revelation is possible and suitable, that there are

miracles, prophecies and other signs to guarantee the divine mission of

those who delivered the revelation, etc.

(b) The merit of the act of faith is not lessened if one seeks human

arguments for the preambles of faith, that is, for those divine truths

that can be established by natural reason (such as the existence

of God, His infinite knowledge and truthfulness). The person who

demonstrates these preambles by philosophical proofs, has knowledge,

not belief, about them; but the merit of faith is not lost, if,

while knowing these truths, he remains willing to accept them on the

authority of revelation.

(c) The merit of faith is not lessened, if one seeks human arguments

for the mysteries of faith, that is, for those truths of revelation

that are above human reason (such as the Trinity and the Incarnation),

provided these arguments are sought not for the demonstration, but for

the confirmation or defense of dogma. Nay, a person ought, in so far as

he is able, to use his reason in the service of faith, and to do so is

a sign, not of little, but of great faith. “Be ready always,” says St.

Peter (I Peter, iii. 15), “to satisfy everyone that asketh you a reason

of that hope which is in you.” And St. Anselm says: “It appears to me a

sign of carelessness, if, having been confirmed in the faith, we do not

take pains to understand what we believe.” St. Thomas writes: “When a

man is willing to believe, he loves the truth, meditates upon it, and

takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and

with regard to this, human reason does not exclude the merit of faith,

but is a sign of greater merit.”

(d) The merit of faith is lessened if one seeks human arguments as the

formal object, that is, as the motive on which faith is grounded; for

then one does not wish to believe, or to believe so readily, on the

word of God alone, but feels one must call in other testimony to

support it.

The attempt to understand mysteries or to establish them by natural

reason is opposed to the humble assent of faith: “He that is a

searcher of majesty, shall be overwhelmed by glory” (Prov., xxv. 27);

“Seek not the things that are too high for thee, and search not into

things above thy ability” (Ecclus., iii. 22); “Faith loses its merit,

if it is put to the test of reason” (St. Gregory the Great, Hom. xxvi).

796. Besides the internal act of acceptance of revealed truth, faith

has also external acts. (a) It commands the external acts of the other

virtues, that is, acts directed to the specific ends of those virtues.

Hence, one who fasts exercises an external act of the virtue of

temperance, but it is his faith in the virtue that commands the fast.

(b) Faith elicits the external act of profession of faith as its own

proper external act directed to its own specific end: “I believed, for

which cause I have spoken” (Ps. cxv. 10; II Cor., iv. 13). External

profession of faith, therefore, is not an act proceeding from faith; it

is an act of faith. The necessity of this act will be considered below

in the article about the commandments of faith.

797. The Habit of Faith.--Faith is not only an act that passes, but it

is also a permanent quality or habit conferred by God, one of the “most

great and perfect promises” which man must make use of (II Peter, i. 3

sqq.), a charism that is not for a time but for all this life, just

like hope and charity (I Cor., xiii. 13). God, who does all things

sweetly (Wis., viii. 1), and who has provided for His natural creatures

internal powers by which they incline and move themselves towards the

ends of their activities, has not done less for those whom He moves to

a supernatural destiny; and, in justifying the sinner, He infuses along

with grace the supernatural virtues of faith, hope and charity (Council

of Trent, Sess. VI, Cap. 6).

798. The virtue of faith is thus defined by the Council of the Vatican:

“Faith is a supernatural virtue, by which, with the help of God’s

grace, we believe the truths revealed by Him, not on account of an

intrinsic evidence of the truths themselves, perceived by natural

reason, but on account of the authority of God who revealed them.”

799. Hence, the virtue of faith has the following properties:

(a) It is supernatural, not only because its object and motive are

supernatural, but because it proceeds from a supernatural principle,

i.e., grace (John, vi, 29; Eph., ii. 8).

(b) It is obscure, because the believer assents to that which has no

intrinsic evidence for him. He does not see its truth as the blessed

see God, for “we see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then

face to face” (I Cor., xiii. 12). He does not know its truth as he

knows evident or naturally demonstrated propositions, for faith is

about truths that surpass reason--things “that appear not.” This, of

course, does not mean that faith is not rightly called a new light

added to the mind, and that the motives which call for the acceptance

of faith are not evidently credible.

(c) It is free, because, although one cannot dissent from that which is

evident intrinsically (e.g., that two and two make four), one is able

to dissent from that which is obscure.

(d) It is not a process of reasoning, but a simple act of assent, in

which one accepts at the same time the authority of the Revealer and

the truth of His revelation. “Jesus said to her (Martha): I am the

resurrection and the life .... Believest thou this? She saith to Him:

Yea, Lord, I have believed that Thou art the Christ, etc.” (John, xi.

25-27).

(e) It is firm and unshaken in a far higher degree than the assent of

understanding and science, since it rests on the infallible authority

of God (I Thess., ii. 13).

800. Before justification, faith exists, it seems, only as an act

performed under the influence of actual or transitory grace. After the

infusion of habitual grace, faith is a habit or infused virtue. But

there are two modes of existence characteristic of this one habit, and

hence the distinction of living and dead faith (Gal., v. 6; James, ii.

26).

(a) Living faith is that which is informed or animated by charity. This

latter virtue is called the soul of all the other virtues, inasmuch as

it directs them to their supreme end, divine friendship, and gives

meritorious value to their works. All those have living faith who join

to belief a life in agreement with belief--that is, the state of grace,

love of God and good works.

(b) Dead faith is that which is separated from charity. It is a true

virtue, because it directs the assent of the intellect to its proper

end; but it is an imperfect virtue, because its acts are not directed

to the Last End, and are not meritorious of eternal life. All those who

believe, but who do not live up to their belief in matters of

importance, who neglect serious duties to God or others, have dead

faith. Examples are those who call themselves Catholics, but neglect

attendance at church and the reception of the Sacraments.

801. Those who have, or who had faith, are the following:

(a) the Angels in the state of probation and our first parents in

Paradise, for faith is necessary as a means in every condition short of

the beatific vision (see 785, 158); (b) those in this life who are in

the friendship of God, and also those believers who are not in the

friendship of God, the former having living, and the latter dead faith

(see 800); (c) the souls in purgatory, the ancient patriarchs in limbo.

802. Those who have not faith are the following: (a) those who have

vision of the truths of faith, that is, the Saints in heaven and Christ

while on earth (I Cor., xiii. 10); (b) those who reject obstinately

even one doctrine of faith, for, if individual judgment is put above

the authority of God even in one point, the motive or keystone of

faith, and therefore faith itself, is no longer assented to; (c) the

lost, for, being cut off entirely from grace, these possess no virtue

infused by God. “The devils believe and tremble” (James, ii. 19), but

their belief is not supernatural or free, but natural and unwilling.

803. Of those who have faith, some have greater, and some less faith.

Thus, our Lord reproved St. Peter for his little faith (Matt., xiv.

31), and praised the Woman of Canaan for her great faith (Matt., xv.

28). But since all are obliged to have supreme confidence in God and to

accept all He teaches, how is there room for different degrees of faith?

(a) Faith must be supreme appreciatively, that is, all must put the

formal object of faith, the motive of its assent, above every other

motive of assent, for the First Truth speaking deserves more adherence

than any other authority. In this respect, therefore, and in the

exclusion of every doubt, the faith of all is equal. But faith need not

be supreme intensively, that is, it is not required that the intellect

should feel the assent of faith more than the assent given to natural

truth, or that the will must experience the highest alacrity, devotion

and confidence; for the truths that are nearer to us move us more

vehemently than do higher and invisible truths. Hence, in this respect

the faith of one may be more firm or fervent than the faith of another,

according as one is more childlike, more loving, more intense in his

acceptance of God’s Word than another.

(b) Faith must be universal, that is, we must accept the entire

material object of revelation, and none may pick and choose according

to his likes or fancies, for all of revelation has God for its Author.

In this respect the faith of all is equal, all believers accepting

twelve articles, while those who accept eleven or six or one or none,

are not believers. But faith need not be explicit as to all its

doctrines, and hence, while one believer who is not thoroughly

instructed may know only the twelve articles of the Creed, another

believer who is better instructed may know the hundreds of other truths

that are contained in the articles. In this way the faith of one is

greater extensively.

804. Can faith grow or decline in the same person? (a) If there is

question of acts of faith, the later acts can be more or less firm or

fervent than those that preceded, in the way explained in the previous

paragraph. In this sense we may understand the Apostles to have asked

of our Lord a higher degree of faith, that they might work miracles in

His name (Luke, xvii. 5). (b) If there is question of the habit of

faith, it itself is increased at every increase of sanctifying grace

(see 745). St. Paul writes to the Corinthians (II Cor., x. 15) that he

has hope of their “increasing faith.” Moreover, by repeated acts of

faith the ease and delight with which the habit is exercised increases,

as is the case with acquired habits. But the habit of faith is not

diminished directly as was explained regarding the infused virtues in

general (see 745).

805. The means of growing in faith are: (a) prayer to the Father of

lights: “Lord, increase our faith” (Luke, xvii. 5); (b) reading of the

scriptures, the Lives of the Saints and other similar works, and

attendance at spiritual instructions; (c) frequent acts of faith in the

world we see not and its coming rewards; (d) exercise of faith, by

directing our thoughts, words, and actions according to the teaching of

faith, rather than according to the maxims of the world; for “the just

man liveth by faith” (Heb., x. 38), and “faith without works is dead”

(James, ii. 20).

806. The cause of faith is God. (a) It is God who directly through

revelation, or indirectly through the Church, the evangelists,

preachers, etc., “brings the message before man” (Rom., x. 15); (b) it

is God who “causes the mind of man to assent” to His message. No matter

how persuasive the teacher or how well disposed or learned the hearer

may be, faith will not come unless the light of grace leads the way

(Eph., ii. 8).

807. The effects of faith are fear of God and purification of the

heart. (a) Dead faith causes one to fear the penalties of divine

justice, that is, to have servile fear (James, ii. 19): living faith

causes one to fear sin itself, that is, to have filial fear. (b) Faith,

by elevating man to higher things, purifies his soul from the

defilements of lower things (Acts, xv. 9): if faith is dead, it at

least purifies the intellect from error; if it is living, it also

purifies the will from evil.

808. The Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge.--As was said above (see

159), the Gifts of the Holy Ghost are intended as means for perfecting

the theological virtues. There are two Gifts that serve the virtue of

faith, namely, the Gifts of Understanding and Knowledge.

(a) Faith, being assent, must have a right idea of what is proposed for

acceptance; but, as it is obscure (see 799), and as there are things

apart from faith that may corrupt our notion of it, the Gift of

Understanding is conferred, a simple perception and divine intuition

through which one receives a correct notion of the mysteries of faith.

(b) Faith, being the starting point of all supernatural activities,

must be the norm by which we judge of what we should think and do in

the affairs of life; but, as it is a simple act of assent (see 799) and

as the creatures of the world are a temptation and a snare (Wis., xiv.

11), the Gift of Knowledge is given, through which one receives a

correct judgment about the things of this world. These then take on a

new and fuller significance in the light of the teachings of faith.

809. The Gift of Understanding must not be confused with the Beatific

Vision. (a) A perfect penetration of the mysteries, which enables one

to perceive their essence and causes (e.g., the how and the why of the

Trinity), is given by the Beatific Vision; but such understanding

removes all obscurity, and is therefore insociable with faith. (b) An

imperfect penetration of the teachings of faith, which does not take

away the obscurity and mysteriousness, is given by the Gift of

Understanding, and is therefore sociable with faith. The effects of

this Gift are: it distinguishes the truths of faith from false

doctrines; it conveys a clear view of the credibility of the mystery of

faith against all difficulties and objections; it gives knowledge of

the supernatural import of the secondary truths of faith, that is, of

those revealed happenings and facts that are not themselves

supernatural (Luke, xxiv. 32); it gives understanding of the practical

aspect of a mystery--for example, that the intratrinitarian relations

of the Divine Persons are a model for the regulation of the Christian

life, in knowledge and love of divine things.

810. The Gift of Knowledge, which like the other Gifts is had by all

the just, must not be confused with sacred knowledge or theology, nor

with the extraordinary gifts of infused knowledge and the charism of

knowledge.

(a) The Gift of Knowledge resembles theology in that it reproduces

objectively what reason does when it argues from the visible world to

the invisible Creator; but, while subjectively theology is the result

of study in which one passes successively from premise to conclusion.

Knowledge is the result of a divine light that may be found even in the

illiterate, and it takes in at a glance all that is contained in a

process of argumentation. Through this Gift the wonders of nature, the

events of history, the arguments of philosophy, lead one firmly and

spontaneously to the Last End and the supernatural realities of faith.

(b) Infused knowledge may have for its object things purely natural

(such as truths of philosophy and the ability to speak foreign

languages), while the Gift of Knowledge is concerned only with faith,

judging what is to be believed or done according to faith.

(c) The charism of knowledge (I Cor., xii. 8) is a grace given one for

the benefit of others, by which one is able to communicate to them

successfully the teachings of faith; the Gift of Knowledge, on the

contrary, proceeds from the habit of sanctifying grace, and is intended

for the benefit of its recipient.

811. To each of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost correspond Beatitudes and

Fruits (see 159).

(a) To the Gift of Understanding corresponds the Sixth Beatitude:

“Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God.” For by

Understanding the mind is pure from wrong ideas of truth, and sees that

God is above all that the intellect can comprehend. The two fruits that

proceed from Understanding are faith (i.e., conviction about revealed

truth) and ultimately joy, in union with God through charity. (b) To

the Gift of Knowledge corresponds the Third Beatitude: “Blessed are

they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.” For by Knowledge one

judges rightly about created things, grieves over the wrong use made of

them, and is comforted when they are turned to their proper end.

Art. 2: THE SINS AGAINST FAITH

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 10-15.)

812. The sins against faith can all be reduced to four heads: (a) sins

of unbelief (see 813-886), which are opposed to the internal act of

faith; (b) sins of blasphemy (see 887-903), which are opposed to the

external act of faith; (c) sins of ignorance (see 904-911), which are

opposed to the Gift of Knowledge; (d) sins of blindness and dullness

(912), which are opposed to the Gift of Understanding.

813. The Sin of Unbelief.--Unbelief in general is a want of faith. It

is of two kinds, negative and positive.

(a) Negative unbelief is the absence of faith in a person who has never

heard of it at all, or only insufficiently. Thus, the Indians in

America before the coming of Christian missionaries were negative

unbelievers. This kind of unbelief is a punishment, since it results

from original sin; but it is not a sin itself, and those who die in

negative unbelief are lost, not on account of this, but on account of

sins against the natural law (John, xv. 22; Rom., x. 14). With this

kind of unbelief we are not here concerned.

(b) Positive unbelief is the absence of faith in one who has heard it

sufficiently, so that the lack of it is due to his own fault. This kind

of unbelief is, of course, a sin, for it supposes that one is acting

against the light one has received.

814. Positive unbelief is either a refusal or a renouncement of faith.

(a) Ordinary unbelief is a refusal of faith, that is, non-acceptance of

faith by one who has never had faith; (b) apostasy, or desertion, is

the abandonment of faith by one who formerly accepted it. This is not a

distinct kind of unbelief, since, like ordinary unbelief, it has for

its object or term the denial of revealed truth; but it is an

aggravating circumstance of unbelief (II Peter, ii. 21).

815. The sin of unbelief is, committed either directly or indirectly.

(a) It is committed directly, when one rejects what pertains to faith

(its acts, objects or motive); (b) it is committed indirectly, when one

guiltily places oneself or others in the occasion or danger of

unbelief. The dangers against faith will be considered after the sins

of unbelief (see 848-886).

816. Direct sins of unbelief are those opposed to the elements that

belong to the nature of faith and that are contained in its definition

(see 751, 798). (a) Opposed to the act of assent are sins of non-assent

or dissent (see 817-839); (b) opposed to the certitude and firmness of

assent are sins of doubt (840-846); (c) opposed to the right object of

faith are sins of credulity (847); (d) opposed to the motive of faith

is rationalism (847).

817. Sins of non-assent are those by which one omits to make an act of

faith when one should. This kind of sin will be treated when we come to

the commandments of faith as to its internal and external acts (see 925

sqq.)

818. Sins of dissent are sins of commission, and are of two kinds: (a)

privative unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard the

faith sufficiently and should realize the obligation of embracing it,

but who refuses to believe, although he makes no opposition to faith;

(b) contrary unbelief, which is the want of faith in one who has heard

the faith and its motives of credibility sufficiently to know the duty

of embracing it, and who not only refuses to believe, but even accepts

the errors opposed to faith.

819. What is the gravity of sins of dissent, doubt, and rationalism?

(a) From their nature, these sins are always mortal, for they refuse to

God the homage of the intellect and will that is due Him, deprive man

of the beginning of spiritual life, and lead to eternal condemnation

(Mark, xvi. 16). (b) From their circumstances, these and other sins

against faith may be venial (see 180-184). Thus, if a man refuses to

believe or accepts error, not having sufficient knowledge of his

obligation or not fully consenting to the sin, his fault is venial

subjectively or formally.

820. Are sins against faith more serious than all other kinds of sin?

(a) From their nature, sins against faith are worse than sins against

the moral virtues, for the former offend directly against God Himself,

but not so the latter. Hatred of God, however, is a greater sin than

sins of unbelief, as will be shown when we treat of sins against

charity. (b) From their circumstances, sins against faith may be less

serious than sins against the moral virtues. Example: A venial sin

against faith is less serious than a mortal sin against justice.

821. With regard to the effect of sins against faith on good acts it

should be noted: (a) an unbeliever is able to perform works that are

ethically or naturally good (Rom., ii. 14), and the Church has

condemned the opposite teaching of Baius (Denzinger, _Enchiridion_, n.

1025). (b) an unbeliever is not able to perform works that are

supernaturally good and meritorious (see 112).

822. Contrary unbelief (see 818), which not only refuses to believe but

also assents to contrary errors, has three degrees according to the

greater or less number of truths denied or errors admitted in these

three degrees. Some theologians see different species of unbelief,

while other theologians regard them as only accidental modes or

circumstances of the one species of sin.

(a) The most extensive denial of faith is found in infidelity, which

rejects both Christ and His revelation. To this form of unbelief belong

atheism, agnosticism, pantheism, paganism, polytheism, animism, and

denials of Christ and Christianity. The chief religious bodies today

that profess such errors are: Confucianism, Taoism and Shintoism

(founded in China and Japan), which are polytheistic and practise

idolatry and ancestor worship; Brahmanism (founded about 14 centuries

before Christ), which is polytheistic or animistic: Buddhism (founded

6th century B.C. in India), which is polytheistic and practises

idolatry; Zoroastrianism (founded in Persia about the 7th century

B.C.), which is dualistic; Mohammedanism (founded in Arabia in the

6th century A.D.), which makes Mohammed and his religion superior to

Christ and Christianity, and rejects the Trinity and the Incarnation.

(b) A less complete departure from faith is found when Christ and His

revelation are accepted as contained in the figures and prophecies of

the Old Testament, but rejected in their fulfillment and development in

Jesus and the New Testament. This is the error of Judaism, which today

has about 15 million adherents.

(c) A still smaller degree of rejection of faith exists when Christ

is recognized as leader and teacher, but not all of His revelation

is accepted. This kind of error is called heresy, and those bodies

which profess it are known as sects. The chief heresies in times past

were Gnosticism and Manicheism in the first centuries; Arianism and

Macedonianism in the fourth century; Nestorianism, Monophysism and

Pelagianism in the fifth century; Monothelism in the seventh century;

Iconoclasm in the eighth century; Photianism in the ninth century;

Albigensianism in the eleventh century; Waldensianism in the twelfth

century; Wicliffism in the fourteenth century; Hussism in the fifteenth

century; Protestantism in the sixteenth century, and Modernism in the

twentieth century. Today, the erring Christian groups outside the

Church are the Orientals, called Orthodox, and the Protestants.

823. Since error is not consistent, false teachings are found that

accept all the above-mentioned degrees of unbelief, or borrow

impartially from all.

(a) Indifferentism or Latitudinarianism holds that all forms of

religion are equally true, and that it makes no difference whether

one is Buddhist, Jew or Christian. In a modified form, Indifferentism

teaches that any form of Christian belief, provided it suits the

inclinations of the individual concerned, may be followed, and hence it

is left to each one to decide whether he prefers Catholicism or one of

the bodies of the Orthodox Church or of Protestantism. Many who profess

a denominational creed or confession are Indifferentists in belief.

(b) Syncretism holds that there are truths in all separate religions,

but that none of them has all the truth, and hence that one must select

what is good from each, rejecting the evil. Thus, the Judaizers of the

first century borrowed from Judaism, the Gnostics and Manicheans from

paganism, while today Freemasonry, Theosophy, Christian Science and

Spiritism accept, along with the Gospel, ancient pagan, Buddhistic,

Brahmanistic and Mohammedan theories; finally, Mormonism endeavors to

unite characteristics of the Old and the New Testament dispensations.

In a restricted form, religious Syncretism teaches the doctrine of

Pan-Christianism--that is, that truth is scattered among the various

Christian denominations, and that all should confederate as equals on

the basis of more important doctrines to be agreed on by all.

824. What is the order of gravity in unbelief, as between infidelity,

Judaism, heresy?

(a) The gravity of a sin against faith is to be determined primarily

from the subjective resistance made to faith, so that he sins more

against the light to whom greater light was given. The sin of unbelief

in one who has received the Gospel (heresy), is greater than the same

sin in one who has accepted only the Old Testament (Judaism); in one

who has received the revelation of the Old Testament (Judaism) the

sin of unbelief is more serious than the same sin in one who has not

received that revelation (infidelity).

(b) The gravity of unbelief is measured secondarily from the objective

opposition of error to truth, so that he is farther away from faith who

is farther away from Christ and the Gospel. Thus, a Buddhist denies

Christian truths more radically than a Jew, and a Jew more radically

than a Protestant. Hence, of three apostates, one to Protestantism,

another to Judaism and a third to Buddhism, the second sins more

grievously than the first, the third more grievously than the second.

825. If we leave out of consideration the radical truth of divine

revelation (formal object of faith), it is possible that a heretic,

in spite of his acceptance of Christ and the scriptures, should be

farther away objectively from faith than an infidel--that is, that he

should deny more revealed truths (material objects of faith). Thus, the

Manicheans called themselves followers and disciples of Christ, but

their teaching on God contains more errors than does the doctrine of

many pagans.

826. Heresy.--Heresy is defined as “an error manifestly opposed to

faith and assented to obstinately by one who had sincerely embraced the

faith of Christ.”

(a) It is called “error,” that is, positive assent given to error, or

dissent from truth. Hence, those who merely act or speak as if they do

not believe, but who internally do believe, are not heretics, although

in the external forum they may fall under the presumption of heresy.

Similarly, those who have doubts or difficulties in matters of faith,

but who do not allow these to sway their judgment, are not guilty of

heresy, since they give no positive assent to error (see 842 sqq.).

Examples: Titus is internally convinced of the truth of the Church’s

teaching; but he attends Protestant services, says he does not believe

the Trinity, refuses to make a profession of faith required by the

Church, separates himself from obedience to the authorities of the

Church, and calls himself an independent. By his former external acts

he makes himself guilty of disobedience and falls under the suspicion

of heresy, and by his last external act he incurs the guilt of schism;

but, since internally he does not disbelieve, he is not a heretic.

Balbus has doubts before his mind from his reading or conversation, but

he must immediately give his whole attention to a very pressing matter

of business, and so gives neither assent nor dissent to the doubts. He

is not guilty of heresy, since he formed no positive erroneous judgment.

(b) Heresy is “opposed to faith.” By faith here is understood divine

faith, especially divine and Catholic faith (see 755). Hence, an error

opposed to what one held to be a genuine private revelation, or to the

public revelation, especially when dogmatically defined by the Church,

is heretical. On the contrary, an error opposed to ecclesiastical faith

alone, to human faith, or to human science, is not of itself heretical.

Examples: The Saints who received special private revelations from

Christ with proofs of their genuineness would have been guilty of

heresy, had they refused to believe. Sempronius refuses to believe some

Biblical teachings about things not pertaining to faith and morals and

not expressly defined by the Church (e.g., chronological, physical,

geographical, statistical data). If he really believes that what he

denies is contained in the Bible, he is guilty of heresy. Balbus admits

the infallibility and authority of the Church, but he does not believe

that a certain Saint solemnly canonized is in heaven, that a certain

non-infallible decision of a Roman Congregation is true, that certain

second lessons of the Breviary or certain relics are genuine. He is

not a heretic, since, as supposed, he denies no revealed truth; but

in his first unbelief he sins against ecclesiastical faith; in his

second unbelief, if the contrary of the decision has not been clearly

established, he sins against the duty of religious assent; in his

third unbelief, he sins against prudence, if he has no good grounds

for his opinion, or against the respect due the Church, if he is moved

by contempt for its judgment. In a conversation between A, B, C, D

and E, the following opinions are defended. A thinks that any use of

natural knowledge with reference to matters of faith is wrong; B, that

the theologian should employ mathematics and physical science, but

avoid reasoning and philosophy; C, that the method and principles of

Scholasticism are not suited to our ago or to all peoples; D, that the

psychology and cosmology of the Scholastics should be remade entirely;

E, that many hypotheses of Aristotle in physics have been proved false.

The opinion of A contains heresies condemned in the Vatican Council

regarding the preambles of faith and the motives of credibility. The

opinions of B and C are at least contrary to the religious assent due

the authority of the Church (see Denzinger, Enchiridion, nn. 1652,

1680, 1713, Code of Canon Law, Canon 1366, Sec.2, _Humani Generis_, n.

11-14). The opinion of D, as it stands, contains a denial of several

doctrines of faith, such as the immortality of the soul and the

creation of the world, and is thus implicitly heretical. The opinion of

E is true and admitted by all.

(c) By “opposed” to faith is meant any judgment which, according to the

logical rules of opposition between propositions, is irreconcilable

with the truth of a formula of dogma or of a censure of heresy.

Examples: The Council of Trent defined that “all sins committed after

Baptism can be forgiven in the Sacrament of Penance.” It would be

heretical, therefore, to hold that “no sins committed after Baptism can

be pardoned in the Sacrament of Penance” (contrary opposition), or that

“some sins committed after Baptism cannot be absolved” (contradictory

opposition), Similarly, the Council of Trent (Sess. VI, Can. 7)

rejected the proposition that “all Works done before justification are

sinful,” and hence according to Logic the contradictory--viz., that

“some works before justification are not sinful”--is of faith, for two

contradictories cannot both be false; the contrary--viz., that “no

works before justification are sinful”--is not, however, defined, for

two contraries can both be false.

(d) Heresy is “manifestly opposed to faith.” He who denies what is

only probably a matter of faith, is not guilty of heresy. Example: The

Instruction of Eugenius IV on the matter of the Sacraments is held by

some authorities of note not to be a definition, and hence those who

accept opposite theories are not on that account heretical.

(e) Heresy is “assented to obstinately,” This is the distinctive note

of heresy, and hence those who assent to error through ignorance,

whether vincible or invincible, are not heretics, if they are willing

to accept the truth when known. A heretic, therefore, is one who

knowingly refuses to admit a truth proposed by the Church, whether his

motive be pride, desire of contradicting, or any other vice.

(f) Heresy is held “by one who had sincerely embraced the faith of

Christ.” This includes only catechumens and the baptized, for others

who deny the truths of faith are Jews or infidels, not heretics.

827. The sin of heresy (heresy before God), as just defined, differs

from the canonical crime of heresy (heresy before the Church), since

it is more inclusive. (a) These two differ as regards the error in the

intellect, for one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, even

without error--that is, if one denies what is really false, thinking

it to be defined doctrine; (b) they differ as regards the obstinacy in

the will, for one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, if one

is prepared in mind and purpose to deny a truth not yet defined, if it

is ever defined; (c) they differ as regards the truths rejected, for

one is guilty of the sin, but not of the crime, if one rejects divinely

revealed truths not defined as such by the Church; (d) they differ as

regards the person who denies, for not everyone who merely accepted the

faith of Christ can be guilty of the crime of heresy, but only those

who after Baptism retain the name of Christian (Canon 1325, Sec.2).

828. Various Kinds of Heresy.--(a) Heresy is positive when error is

accepted (e.g., the doctrine of consubstantiation); it is negative when

truth is denied (e.g., the doctrine of transubstantiation).

(b) Heresy is internal, when it is in the mind alone and not externally

professed. It is external, when expressed in an external way (i.e.,

by words, signs, acts or circumstances that clearly indicate present

heresy), if this is done not for a good purpose, such as that of asking

advice, but for the purpose of professing error.

(c) External heresy is occult, when it is made known to no one, or only

to a few; it is public or notorious, when it is made known before a

large number and cannot be concealed. Example: One who calls himself

a Catholic and is known as such, but who in conversation with a few

intimate friends declares himself a Modernist, is an occult heretic.

One who declares in public addresses or articles that he agrees with

Modernism, or who joins openly an heretical sect or has always belonged

to one, is a public heretic.

(d) Occult and public heresy may be either formal or material,

according as one is in good or bad faith. Heresy is formal, if its

malice is known and willed by the one in error; if its malice is not

known by him, it is material.

829. Heresy is not formal unless one pertinaciously rejects the truth,

knowing his error and consenting to it.

(a) One must know that one’s belief is opposed to divine revelation

or to Catholic faith. Hence, those who were born and brought up in

Protestantism, and who in good faith accept the confession of their

denomination, are not formal but material heretics. Even those who

are ignorant of their errors through grave fault and who hold to them

firmly, are guilty, not of formal heresy, but of sinful ignorance (see

904 sqq.)

(b) One must willingly consent to the error. But for formal heresy it

is not required that a person give his assent out of malice, or that

he continue in obstinate rejection for a long time, or that he refuse

to heed admonitions given him. Pertinacity here means true consent

to recognized error, and this can proceed from weakness (e.g., from

anger or other passion); it can be given in an instant, and does not

presuppose an admonition disregarded. Hence, if one sees the truth

of the Catholic Church, but fears that assent will involve many

obligations and out of weakness turns away from the truth, one then and

there pertinaciously consents to error.

830. Examples of material heresy are: (a) Catholics who deny certain

dogmas of faith, because they have not been well instructed, but who

are ready to correct their errors, whenever the Church’s teaching is

brought home to them; (b) non-Catholics who do not accept the Catholic

Church, but who have never had any misgivings about the tenets of their

own denomination, or who in doubts have searched for the truth to the

best of their ability.

831. The sinfulness of heresy is as follows: (a) formal heresy is a

grave sin, as was said above regarding unbelief in general (see 819;

Tit., iii. 10); (b) material heresy is no sin at all, if the ignorance

is invincible; it is a grave or a venial sin, according to the amount

of negligence, if the ignorance is vincible.

832. Circumstances of the sin of heresy are of various kinds. (a)

Circumstances that change the species. Most theologians hold that

the particular article denied, or the particular sect adhered to,

does not constitute a particular species of heresy, and hence that

in confession it suffices for one to accuse oneself generically of

heresy. (b) Circumstances that aggravate the sin. The facts that heresy

is external, that it is manifested to a large number, that it is

joined with apostasy and adhesion to an heretical sect, etc., increase

the accidental malice of this sin. (c) Circumstances that multiply

the number of sins. It seems that when several articles or defined

truths are denied at the same time, so many numerically distinct sins

are committed (see 219). Example: Titus says: “I do not accept the

Resurrection, either of Christ or of the dead.” The act is one, but two

sins are committed.

833. Various penalties and inhabilities are incurred through heresy,

for example, excommunication _latae sententiae_ reserved to the Pope

(Canon 2314), loss of the power of suffrage (Canon 167, Sec.1, n.4),

irregularity (Canon 984, n. 5; 985), inhability for the office of

sponsor (Canons 765, 795), deprivation of ecclesiastical burial (Canon

1240, Sec.1, n. 1). The excommunication which perhaps had been incurred

by those who now wish to join the Church is absolved according to the

form for the reception of converts prescribed by the Congregation of

the Holy Office, July 20, 1859, and found in rituals. Rituals published

after March, 1942, contain the formula of profession of faith and

abjuration approved by the Holy Office.

834. If a confessor should meet with a case of heresy, his procedure

will be as follows: (a) If the heresy was merely internal, no censure

was incurred, and every confessor has power to absolve from the sin,

no matter how serious it was. (b) If the heresy was external, but the

person was in good faith, or even in affected ignorance of the sin, or

inculpably ignorant of the penalty, no censure was incurred; for the

excommunication attaches only to formal heresy, and contumacity (Canon

2242). (c) If the heresy was external and formal, but not notorious

(i.e., the party did not publicly join an heretical sect), ordinarily

the case should be brought before the bishop for absolution in the

external or internal forum. But in urgent cases every confessor has

power to absolve as prescribed in Canon 2254. (d) If the heresy was

public and notorious (i.e., if the party joined officially an heretical

sect), absolution is regularly to be given in both the external and

internal forums. The case should be submitted first to the Ordinary,

unless there is urgency (Cfr. Canon 2254), or the confessor has special

powers from Rome. The Ordinary can absolve in the external forum.

Afterwards, the heretic can be absolved by any confessor in the forum

of conscience (see Canon 2314, Sec.2.)

835. Apostasy.--Apostasy (etymologically, desertion) has various

meanings in theology.

(a) In a special sense, it means the abandonment of the religious or

clerical state; but in its usual sense it means the abandonment of the

Christian religion.

(b) Apostasy from faith in a wide sense includes both partial

abandonment (heresy) and total abandonment; but, in the strict sense,

it means only total abandonment of Christianity.

Example: A Christian who denies one article of the Creed becomes a

heretic and an apostate in a wide sense; if he rejects the entire

Creed, he becomes an infidel and an apostate in the strict sense.

(c) Apostasy which extends to infidelity is also twofold: before God

and before the Church. The first kind is committed by any person

who really had faith, even though unbaptized or not a Catholic; the

second kind is committed only by those who were baptized and were

Catholics. Examples: A catechumen who accepted Christianity and asked

for Baptism, becomes an apostate before God if he abandons his belief

and purpose and goes back to paganism. Similarly, a person brought up

as a Lutheran becomes an apostate before God, if he abandons all belief

in Christianity. But the crime of apostasy of which the Church takes

cognizance is the desertion of Christianity by a baptized Catholic.

(d) A Catholic apostatizes from Christianity, either privatively (by

merely renouncing all belief in Christ), or contrarily (by taking up

some form of unbelief, such as indifferentism or free thought, or by

joining some infidel sect, such as Mohammedanism or Confucianism).

836. What was said above regarding the gravity, divisions, penalties

and absolution of heresy, can be applied also to apostasy.

887. As to the comparative gravity of sins of apostasy, the following

should be noted. (a) Apostasy is not a species of sin distinct from

heresy, since both are essentially the same in malice, being rejections

of the authority of divine revelation; but it is a circumstance that

aggravates the malice of unbelief, since it is more sweeping than

heresy (see 822, 824). (b) Apostasy into one form of infidelity is

not specifically different from apostasy into another, but the form

of infidelity is an aggravating or extenuating circumstance. Example:

Paganism is further from faith than Mohammedanism; atheism further than

paganism.

838. Could one ever have a just reason for abandoning the Catholic

Church or remaining outside its faith? (a) Objectively speaking, there

can never be a just cause for giving up Catholicism or for refusing

to embrace it. For the Catholic Church is the only true Church, and

it is the will of Christ that all should join it. (b) Subjectively

speaking, there may be a just cause for leaving or not entering the

Church, namely, the fact that a person, ignorant in this matter but

in good faith, believes that the Catholic Church is not the true

Church. For one is obliged to follow an erroneous conscience, and,

if the error is invincible, one is excused from sin (see 581-583).

Examples: A Protestant taught to believe that the teachings of the

Church are idolatrous, superstitious and absurd, is not blamed for not

accepting them. A Catholic, poorly instructed in religion and thrown

in with non-Catholic and anti-Catholic associates, might become really

persuaded, and without sinning against faith itself, that it was his

duty to become a Protestant.

839. Apostasy is committed not only by those who leave the Church and

join some contrary religion (e.g., Mormonism), but also by those who,

while professing to be Catholics, assent to the non-Catholic principles

of some society that claims to be philosophical, charitable, economic,

patriotic, etc. Much more are those apostates who join societies that

openly conspire against the Church. Such are: (a) Societies that are

really non-Catholic sects, because they have an infidel or heretical

creed--e.g., Freemasonry (which, according to its own authorities, is

a brotherhood based on Egyptian mysteries and claiming superiority to

Christianity), Theosophy (which is a conglomeration of nonsensical

ideas about the Deity, Christ and Redemption), the Red International,

whose aims are the destruction of property rights, etc; (b) Societies

that are anti-Catholic sects, because their creed is hatred of the

Church--e.g., the Orangemen’s Society, the Grand Orient, the Ku Klux

Klan, Junior Order, etc.

840. The Sin of Doubt.--Faith as explained above must be firm assent,

excluding doubt (see 752, 799), and hence the saying: “He who doubts

is an unbeliever.” The word “doubt,” however, has many meanings, and

in some of those meanings it is not opposed to firm assent, or has not

the voluntariness or acceptance of error that the unbelief of heresy or

infidelity includes. To begin with, doubt is either methodical or real.

(a) Methodical doubt in matters of faith is an inquiry into the motives

of credibility of religion and the reasons that support dogma, made

by one who has not the slightest fear that reason or science can ever

contradict faith, but who consults them for the purpose of clarifying

his knowledge and of strengthening his own faith or that of others.

This kind of doubt is employed by St. Thomas Aquinas, who questions

about each dogma in turn (e.g., “Whether God is good”), and examines

the objections of unbelievers against it; but unlike his namesake, the

doubting Apostle, he does not withhold assent until reason has answered

the objectors, but answers his own questions by an act of faith: “In

spite of all difficulties, God is good, for His Word says: ‘The Lord is

good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him’ (Lament,

iii. 25).”

(b) Real doubt, on the contrary, entertains fears that the teachings

of revelation or of the Church may be untrue, or that the opposite

teachings may be true.

841. Real doubt in matters of faith is always unjustifiable in itself,

for there is never any just reason for doubting God’s word; but it

is not always a sin of heresy or of infidelity. There are two kinds

of real doubt, viz., the involuntary and the voluntary. (a) Doubt is

involuntary, when it is without or contrary to the inclination of the

will, or when it proceeds from lack of knowledge (see 40-55 on the

Impediments to Voluntariness). Example: Indeliberate doubts, and doubts

that persist in spite of one, lack the inclination of the will, while

doubts that proceed from invincible ignorance lack knowledge. (b) Doubt

is voluntary, when it is according to inclination and with sufficient

knowledge.

842. Involuntary doubt in matters of faith is neither heretical nor

sinful, for an act is not sinful, unless it is willed (see 99).

(a) Indeliberate doubts arise in the mind before they are adverted to

and without any responsibility of one’s own for their appearance. From

what was said above on first motions of the soul (see 129), it is clear

that such doubts are not sinful.

(b) Unwelcome doubts persist in the mind after they have been adverted

to, and, since faith is obscure (see 752, 799), it is not possible to

exclude all conscious doubts, or even to prevent them from occurring

often or lasting a considerable time. From what was said above on

temptation (see 253 sqq.), it is clear that, if the person troubled

with unwished doubts makes prompt and sufficient resistance, he not

only does not sin, but gains merit. But, if his resistance is not all

it should be, and there is no danger of consent to the temptation, he

sins venially.

(c) Ignorant doubts occur in persons who have not received sufficient

religious instruction, through no fault of their own, and who therefore

regard the doctrines of faith as matters of opinion, or at least look

upon doubts as not sinful. From what was said above on invincible

ignorance (see 30), it is clear that such persons do not sin by their

doubts.

843. Voluntary doubt is entertained either in ignorance for which

one is responsible, or in full knowledge; in the former case it is

indirectly voluntary, in the latter, directly voluntary.

(a) The doubts of one who is responsible for them because he did not

use the means to instruct himself in the faith, are a sin of willful

ignorance proportionate to the negligence of which he was guilty; but,

if he is willing on better knowledge to put aside his doubts and accept

the teaching of the Church, he is not pertinacious, and hence not

guilty of heresy or infidelity.

(b) The doubts of one who is responsible for them, and not uninstructed

or ignorant in faith, are sometimes positive, sometimes negative.

Neither of these kinds of doubt is equivalent to heresy or infidelity

in every case.

844. Negative doubt is the state of mind in which one remains suspended

between the truth contained in an article of faith and its opposite,

without forming any positive judgment either of assent to or dissent

from the article, or its certainty or uncertainty.

(a) If this suspension of decision results from a wrong motive of

the will, which directs one not to give assent on the plea that the

intellect, while not judging, offers such formidable difficulties that

deception is possible, then it seems that the doubter is guilty of

implicit heresy, or at least puts himself in the immediate danger of

heresy.

(b) If this suspension of judgment results from some other motive of

the will (e.g., from the wish to give attention here and now to other

matters), the guilt of heresy is not incurred, for no positive judgment

is formed. Neither does it seem, apart from the danger of consent

to positive doubt or from the obligation of an affirmative precept

of faith then and there (see 925), that any serious sin in matters

of faith is committed by such a suspension of judgment. Examples:

Titus, being scandalized by the sinful conduct of certain Catholics,

is tempted to doubt the divinity of the Church. He does not yield to

the temptation by deciding that the divinity of the Church is really

doubtful, but the difficulty has so impressed him that he decides to

hold his judgment in abeyance. It seems that there is here an implicit

judgment (i.e., one contained in the motive of the doubt) in favor of

the uncertainty of the divinity of the Church. Balbus has the same

difficulty as Titus, and it prevents him from eliciting an act of

faith on various occasions. But the reason for this is that an urgent

business matter comes up and he turns his attention to it, or that he

does not wish at the time to weary his brain by considering such an

important question as that of faith, or that he thinks he can conquer a

temptation more easily by diverting his thoughts to other subjects (see

257), or that he puts off till a more favorable moment the rejection

of the difficulty. In these cases there is not heretical doubt,

since Balbus forms no positive judgment, even implicitly, but there

may be a sin against faith. Thus, Balbus would sin seriously if his

suspension of assent should place him in immediate danger of positive

doubt; he would sin venially, if that suspension be due to some slight

carelessness.

845. Positive doubt is the state of mind in which one decides, on

account of some difficulty against faith, that the latter is really

doubtful and uncertain, and that assent cannot be given to either

side. With regard to such a state of mind note: (a) If this judgment

is formed by a Catholic, it is heretical; for his faith, as he knows

and admits, is the true faith, revealed and proposed as absolutely

certain. Hence, although he does not deny the faith, he does positively

judge that what is revealed by God and proposed infallibly by the

Church as certain, is not certain, and thus in his intellect there is

pertinacious error.

(b) If this judgment is formed by a non-Catholic, it is likewise

heretical, if the truth doubted belongs to divine or Catholic faith,

for we are now considering the formal heretic who belongs to a

non-Catholic sect against conviction; but it is not heretical, if the

doctrine doubted belongs only to what is wrongly considered in his sect

as divine faith, or to what may be called Protestant faith (i.e., the

official confession of his religion), for he does not profess to accept

his church as an infallible interpreter.

846. The doubts We have been just discussing are the passing doubts

that come to those who are believers, or who consider themselves

believers. There are also doubts that are permanent, and that are held

by those who class themselves, not as believers, but as doubters or

agnostics. Some of these sceptics doubt all religious creeds, holding

that it is works and not beliefs that matter. This doctrine amounts to

infidelity, since it rejects Christian faith entirely. Others profess

Fundamentalism, which accepts a few Christian beliefs and considers the

others as optional, pretending that the true faith cannot be recognized

amid so much diversity of opinions. This doctrine is heretical, since

it accepts some and rejects others of the articles of faith.

847. Credulity and Rationalism.--Opposed in special ways to the

material and formal objects of faith are credulity and errors about the

existence and nature of revelation.

(a) Other sins against faith are opposed to its material object (i.e.,

the articles of belief), inasmuch as they subtract from it by denying

this or that article. Credulity, on the contrary, adds to the material

object of faith by accepting a doctrine as revealed when there is no

prudent reason for so doing, contrary to the teaching of scripture

that “he who is hasty to believe is light of heart” (Ecclus., xix. 4).

This sin is opposed rather to prudence, inasmuch as it causes one to

neglect the consideration of the reasons on which a prudent judgment

rests (see Vol. II), and hence it does not destroy the virtue of faith.

It is, nevertheless, injurious to faith, since it brings Christianity

into contempt, keeps others from embracing the teachings of the Church,

and leads to superstition, the “twin-sister of unbelief.” Examples:

Sempronia, who is not well educated, accepts as matters of faith every

pious legend, every marvellous report of miracle no matter from what

source it comes or how suspicious may be its appearance. Titus holds

many views considered by good authorities as improbable or false, or

as at best only opinions, but he gives them out as doctrines of the

Church that must be accepted, or as infallible or revealed teaching.

The credulity of Sempronia is excusable imprudence on account of her

ignorance, if she has not neglected instruction; but that of Titus is

blameworthy, for he ought to inform himself better before attempting to

instruct others.

(b) Other kinds of unbelief are opposed to the formal object of faith

(i.e., to the authority of revelation as the motive of belief); for

implicitly at least they substitute private judgment for authority. The

various systems of Naturalism, such as Deism, go farther and openly

attack supernatural revelation as the ground of belief. Some of these

systems deny the fact of revelation (e.g., Deism), others its character

(e.g., Modernism, which makes revelation to consist in the internal

experience of the believer), others its necessity (e.g., Rationalism).

These heterodox teachings pertain, some to infidelity (e.g., Deism),

some to heresy (c.g., Modernism). The great majority of Protestants

nowadays cannot be said to have faith, declares Cardinal Newman, since

they deduce from scripture, instead of believing a teacher. What looks

like faith is mere hereditary persuasion.

848. Dangers to Faith.--One becomes guilty of heresy, infidelity,

doubts against faith, etc., indirectly, by placing oneself in the

danger of those sins (see 258 sqq., on the Dangers of Sin). Dangers of

this kind are partly internal, partly external.

(a) Internal dangers to faith are especially the following:

intellectual pride or an excessive spirit of independence, which

makes one unwilling to accept authority; love of pleasure, which sets

one at odds with the precepts of faith; neglect of prayer and piety,

particularly in time of temptation.

(b) External dangers to faith are especially as follows: literature

opposed to religion; schools where unbelief is defended; mixed

marriages; association with unbelievers in religious matters; certain

societies.

849. Dangerous Reading.--There is a threefold prohibition against the

reading of literature dangerous to faith.

(a) The natural law forbids one to read or hear read written matter

of any description which one knows is dangerous to one’s faith, even

though it is not dangerous to others and not forbidden by the law of

the Church. For a similar reason one may not keep such material in

one’s possession. Example: Titus and Balbus read the letters of a

friend on Evolution. Titus finds nothing unsound in the letters, and

is not troubled by reading them; but they fill the mind of Balbus with

doubts and perplexities, as the subject is above him. This reading is

naturally dangerous for Balbus, but not for Titus.

(b) The law of the Church forbids the use of certain kinds of writings

or representations dangerous to faith (Canon 1399), as well as of those

individual writings that have been denounced to the Holy See and placed

on the Index, or forbidden by other ecclestiastical authorities. (See

Appendix I for Summary of Common Law on Prohibition of Books.)

(c) The law of the Church also pronounces ipso facto excommunication

against those who make use of works written by unbelievers in favor of

their errors (Canon 2318).

850. As regards the kind of sin committed by using writings dangerous

to faith, the following points must be noted:

(a) If a writing is dangerous and forbidden under natural law, the sin

committed is of itself grave whenever the danger itself is serious and

proximate; it is venial, when the danger is slight or remote. The sin

committed depends, therefore, not on the time spent in reading or the

number of pages covered, but on the danger (see 260-261, on the Dangers

of Sin). No sin at all is committed, if the danger is slight or remote,

and there is reason for reading the writing in question (e.g., the

defense of truth).

(b) If the writing is forbidden under ecclesiastical law, the sin

committed is of itself grave, even though the danger to an individual

is not serious or proximate, for the law is based on the presumption

of a common and great danger (see 460). The sin is not grave, however,

when the prohibition is generally regarded as not binding under grave

sin, or when the use made of the writing is inconsiderable. No sin at

all is committed, if one has obtained the necessary permission to read

forbidden works, and is not exposed to spiritual danger in using the

permission.