628. Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous_Moral theology

Duties.--(a) The scrupulous person should be instructed that positive

laws, divine as well as human, do not oblige in case of moral

impossibility (i.e., when their observance is too burdensome); that the

matter about which he has scruples has become too difficult for him,

and hence that he is not obliged to it as others are.

(b) The scrupulous person should be commanded to leave undone what his

vain fear calls on him to do; and, if this does not suffice, he should

be told that he is not bound by the duty which causes him such anxiety.

Example: Titus is scrupulous about the performance of obligatory

prayers, so much so that he is not satisfied until he has repeated them

several times, lest some syllable may have been omitted or hurried

over, or the intention or attention may have been lost sight of at some

part of the prayer, or the devotional posture may not have been

observed throughout. If Titus cannot learn to say these prayers without

making senseless repetitions, he should be told that the obligation has

ceased until such time as he is able to fulfill it without torture to

himself or others.

629. Of course, if harm is done to another by the incomplete

performance of a duty, even a scrupulous person cannot be dispensed

from repetition. Example: If a priest has not pronounced a sacramental

form correctly, the fact that he is scrupulous does not excuse him from

repeating the form correctly.

630. Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about the Commission Of

Sin.--(a) The scrupulous person should be told that he is scrupulous,

that his scrupulosity is not a conscience that he is obliged to follow,

but a vain fear which he is obliged to struggle against by observing

the directions given him.

(b) He should be directed not to deliberate long before acting, but to

do what seems right to him at first; not to conclude after acting that

he has committed sin, unless this appears certain and evident. Since

the scrupulous are over-careful, the presumption is in their favor, and

they can act and judge prudently by disregarding their fears and

doubts. If by deciding offhand they sometimes sin or fail to recognize

sin in a past act, this will come from invincible ignorance, and they

will be excused from responsibility.

631. Since a disease is best cured by removing its cause, the

confessor, when he has diagnosed a case of scruples, should prescribe

remedies that are opposed to the source of the trouble.

(a) If scrupulosity seems to come from God, the penitent should be

encouraged to regard it as a means of satisfaction for past negligences

or as an occasion of virtue and progress, to pray incessantly for light

and assistance, and to follow the guidance which God has provided. (b)

If scrupulosity appears to be the result of diabolical obsession, and

exorcism seems to be called for, the sufferer should not be told this.

should avoid these occasions, and cultivate the companionship of

persons or books that are cheerful and that give a hopeful outlook on

one’s duty and destiny.

632. Remedies for Scruples That Are Mental in Origin.--(a) Those who

suffer from fixed ideas, phobias, and delusions, should not be reproved

harshly and told that their fears are insane, but should be treated

with kindness and firmness. In ministering to these troubled minds, the

best course seems to be kind assurance that they have nothing to fear,

along with insistence that they imitate the example of the generality

of good people, avoid singular practices of piety, discuss their

anxieties only with their director, and give themselves to some

occupation that will distract their attention from their manias.

(b) Those whose minds are over-active and given to doubts and

objections must avoid introspection and the study of moral problems

that are too difficult for them; they must take a proper amount of

suitable recreation, think and plan how they may help others who are in

need, and avoid idleness.

633. Remedies for Scruples Whose Origin is Moral.--(a) If scruples

arise from a stubbornness of character, the penitent must be told that

the confessor is better fitted to judge the case, and that it is the

height of rashness and presumption for a scrupulous person to prefer

his ideas to those of the priest.

(b) If a melancholy or timid nature accounts for the existence of

scruples, confidence and cheerfulness should be inculcated, and the

penitent should be encouraged to meditate frequently on the goodness of

God, and to remember always that God is not a harsh taskmaster, but a

kind Father.

easily moved by every suggestion or imagination, need to cultivate

seriousness, and to hold strongly to their judgments and resolves

deliberately formed. Obedience to their director will be of more

lasting benefit to these and other psychical scrupulants than

psychiatric treatments through hypnotism, mental suggestion, and

psychoanalysis; observance of the rules prescribed is an excellent

cultivation of will-power, and it is sustained and perfected by the

motives and helps which religion alone can supply.

634. Remedies for scrupulosity Whose Cause Is Physical.--(a) The

physician is the proper person to care for bodily ills; hence, a

scrupulous person who is troubled with headaches, dizziness,

sleeplessness, loss of appetite, nervousness, hallucinations, etc.,

should go to a competent and conscientious specialist in the healing

art. Removal of the causes of hurry and worry, moderate but sufficient

diet, fresh air and exercise, and especially congenial occupation and

surroundings are by general consent included among the best natural

cures.

(b) The confessor, if he perceives that illness is the cause of

scruples, should forbid any spiritual practices that cause or aggravate

the malady. Example: scrupulous penitents should not be permitted to

practise mortification by depriving themselves of necessary sleep,

food, exercise or fresh air, or to use devotions or austerities for

which they are physically unfit.

635. Persons who are scrupulous and lax at the same time need to be

directed so as to overcome both spiritual maladies.

(a) If they are more scrupulous than lax, the case is less difficult,

as they incline rather to the safer side, and it will suffice to apply

the remedies indicated above for laxity and scrupulosity, as they are

needed. Example: Titus, on account of scrupulosity, spends too much

time at his prayers, and thus neglects the exercise and recreation

which are necessary for his health. He should be instructed to limit

his devotions, to have a regular time for them each day, and to realize

that he has an obligation to take proper care of his health.

(b) If persons are more lax than scrupulous, the case is difficult, as

they incline more to evil; indeed, if the trouble is Pharisaism, it is

well-nigh incurable, on account of the pride and blindness that oppose

resistance to every effort to cure. These persons need to be treated

with severity, since nothing else will make any impression; they should

be told in plain language how they stand and what is in store for them,

unless they repent. Examples: Caius is extremely careful not to be

guilty of sins of commission, but he thinks nothing of sins of

omission; he would not take a postage stamp without express permission

of the owner, but he neglects from year to year to pay bills, and sees

nothing wrong in this. Titus thinks himself a saint because he worships

the letter of the law, when it is to be applied to others; but he cares

nothing about its spirit, and, though indulgent to self, is a tyrant

with others. Both these men need to be told that, far from being good,

they are very bad; that, far from being secure, they are in great

danger. If insensible to reproofs, they should be reminded of the woes

that await the wilfully blind (Matt., xxiii. 13 sqq.).

636. Practical Conclusions.--An instrument is called good when it

produces with sufficient exactness the effects for which it was

intended; it is bad, if it fails to produce those effects. Thus, a

timepiece, a compass, or a thermometer is good if it indicates

accurately, and bad if it indicates inaccurately. But, as it would be

harmful to guide oneself by an unreliable instrument (e.g., by a watch

with a defective mainspring, or which runs fast or slow), one naturally

corrects the defects and regulates the working of the mechanism. Now,

from what has been said above in this article, we see that conscience

can be a deceptive indicator, and that its accuracy can be improved.

Hence, the need of correcting a bad conscience and of cultivating a

good conscience.

637. Remedies for a bad conscience and means for cultivating a good

conscience are as follows:

(a) The remote causes of a bad conscience are in the will itself. A

person judges wrongly often because he is wrong in himself, wrong in

his intentions and purposes with regard to life as a whole, wrong in

his attitude towards a particular line of duty, wrong in his lack of

sincerity with himself. Hence, the correctives needed are a sincere

love of God and of virtue, courage to wish the truth, and an honest

examination of motives and actions: “The sensual man perceiveth not the

things that are of the Spirit of God, but the spiritual man judgeth all

things” (I Cor., ii. 14, 15).

(b) The immediate causes of a bad conscience are in the intellect. One

judges wrongly because one clings in time of doubt to erroneous ideas

or principles. The remedy, therefore, is to seek diligently for light

through prayer, to study the lives and conduct of those who are models,

to consult with the prudent and the conscientious. The bad conscience

says to God: “Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways”

(Job, xxi. 14); but the good one says: “Teach me Thy justifications.

Thy testimonies are my delight, and Thy justifications my counsel” (Ps.

cxviii. 12, 24).

638. Signs of a Good Conscience.--(a) Extraordinary holiness is not

necessary before one may consider one’s conscience good, for there are

degrees of goodness. If, therefore, a person’s external life is

directed by the duties of his state, and his internal life, as far as

he can judge, is free from serious guilt and guided by love of God and

hatred of sin, he may safely regard his will as good. If sometimes he

sins venially, this is not because he lacks a good conscience, but

because he does not always follow it.

(b) Extraordinary diligence in studying one’s duties is not necessary

before one may regard one’s conscience as good, for otherwise a heavier

burden would be imposed than we can suppose God to intend. A person who

is using all the means for obtaining religious instruction that are

used by others in his position and who are conscientious, may safely

regard himself as free from voluntary error. If sometimes he judges

wrongly, the mistake will be involuntary and not due to a bad

conscience. Of course, one whose conscience is not in vincible error

may sin even mortally, not because his conscience is bad, but because

he does not follow it.

639. The following are means for preserving and maintaining a good

conscience: (a) we should judge our motives frequently with the

severity with which we judge the motives of another (Rom., ii. 1), and

as before God (I Cor., ii. 10); (b) we should measure our actions, not

by the standards of the world, its maxims and examples, but by those of

Christ (I John, ii. 15-17; III John, 11).

Art. 3: A CERTAIN CONSCIENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 57, a. 5; II-II, q. 47, a. 9.)

640. As was said above, only that conscience is a safe guide which is

not only good--that is, in agreement, as far as one’s efforts can

secure this, with the external law--but also certain. A certain

conscience is one which, without any prudent fear of erring, judges

that a particular act is obligatory or unlawful, and hence here and now

to be done or omitted.

641. Necessity of Certitude.--We must be sure we are right before we

act; otherwise, we expose ourselves to the danger of sinning, and

therefore commit sin (see 582). Hence, it is necessary to act with a

certain conscience, and unlawful to act with an uncertain conscience.

“If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to

the battle?” (I Cor., xiv. 8) may be accommodated to conscience. In

Rom., xiv. 22, 23, the Apostle declares that he who acts with

conviction is blessed, whereas he who acts in uncertainty is condemned.

Examples: Sempronia doubts whether it is sinful to sew on Sunday; she

is not sure, but has grave suspicions that sewing is servile work; if

she goes ahead, she will be guilty of violating the law, as being

willing to take the risk, and therefore the responsibility. Titus

offers another a drink, being uncertain whether it has poison in it or

not; he is guilty of sin, since he has no right to expose himself to

sin and his neighbor to the danger of death.

642. Those persons who act with a doubtful conscience, and later

discover that what they feared might be wrong was not wrong, or not so

bad as they suspected, must bear in mind: (a) that their past conduct

is not to be judged by their newly acquired knowledge, for that conduct

must be judged by the knowledge had at the time. Example: Sempronia

does some work on Sunday, doubting whether she is committing a grave or

a slight sin. Later she discovers that it was really only a venial sin,

and she congratulates herself that she did not sin seriously. Her

judgment is wrong, because she did not know at the time of the work

that it was not a grave sin; (b) that they must guide themselves in

future acts by their newly acquired knowledge.

643. Kinds of Certitude.--Judgments may be certain in a greater or less

degree.

(a) They are metaphysically certain, when error is absolutely

impossible, the opposite of what is held by the mind being a

contradiction in terms which omnipotence itself could not make true.

Example: The judgments that the same, identical act cannot be both good

and bad, that good is to be done and evil to be avoided, that God is to

be honored, are metaphysically certain, since they result immediately

from the very concepts of being, of goodness, and of God.

(b) Judgments are physically certain, when error is impossible

according to the laws of nature, the opposite of what is held by the

mind being unrealizable except through intervention of another cause.

Example: The judgments that he who takes poison will destroy life, that

he who applies fire to a house will destroy property, are physically

certain. because natural agencies, like poison and fire, act infallibly

when applied to suitable matters and under suitable conditions and left

to their course, unless they are overruled by superior power.

to what is customary among mankind, the opposite of what is held by the

mind being so unlikely that it would be imprudent to be moved by it.

Examples: One is morally certain that what a reputedly truthful and

competent person relates to one is true. A person is morally certain

that a conclusion he has drawn about his duty in a particular instance

is correct, if he believes that he has overlooked no means of reaching

the truth. Testimony and inference, since they come from free and

fallible agencies, may lead into error; but, when they appear to have

the requisite qualities indicative of truth, they are for the most part

reliable and in practical life have to be considered as such.

644. As to the certainty that is required in the judgment of

conscience, the following points must be noted:

(a) Metaphysical certainty is not required, since conscience does not

deal with primary propositions, but with deductions about particular

acts. The first moral principles, which are the object of synderesis,

and at least some of the general conclusions, which are the object of

moral science, are metaphysically certain (see above 145, 300), as they

are based on necessary relations; but the particular conclusions, which

are the object of conscience, are concerned with the contingent and the

individual.

(b) Physical certainty is not required for the judgment of conscience,

since conscience is not concerned with the activities of natural

agents, but with the activities of moral agents that act with freedom

and responsibility.

by conscience. That a higher kind of certitude is not necessary should

not surprise us, for it would be unreasonable to expect that the same

degree of assent be given to judgments that are concerned with

particular and contingent cases as to those that are concerned with

universal and necessary principles.

645. Moral certitude is of two kinds: (a) certitude in the strict

sense, which excludes not only the fear of error, but every doubt,

prudent and imprudent, great and small, Example: Titus thinks of a way

in which he could easily make money dishonestly; but his conscience

sees that the thing is manifestly wrong and decides without the

slightest fear or doubt that it must not be done; (b) certitude in the

wide sense, which excludes all fear of error and every serious or

prudent doubt, but not one or other slight and imprudent doubt.

Example: Caius was baptized by an excellent priest, but the date was

omitted in the register. The doubt occurs to Caius that perhaps

something essential was also omitted, and that it may be his duty to

seek another Baptism. His doubt is unreasonable.

646. Moral certitude in the wide sense is sufficient for a safe

conscience, even in matters of great importance, since it is frequently

the only kind of certitude one can have, and he who would strive to be

free from every slight and baseless suspicion would be soon involved in

a maze of scruples and perplexities. Example: If the Caius above

referred to were to yield to his doubt and be rebaptized, a similar

doubt about the second Baptism might easily arise in his mind, and he

would be no more contented than before.

647. From the point of view of its object, certitude is twofold. (a)

Speculative certitude refers to a judgment considered as a general law,

abstraction being made from particular circumstances. Example: It is

speculatively certain that farm work on a holyday is a forbidden kind

of work, and that clerics are obliged to say the Divine Office. (b)

Practical certitude refers to a judgment which is an application of a

general law to a particular case, consideration being given to all the

pertinent circumstances. Example: It is practically certain that Titus

may make hay on a holyday, if otherwise he will suffer great loss; and

that a cleric is excused from the Divine Office, if his physician has

warned him that he is physically or mentally unable to perform it.

648. Speculative certainty is not sufficient for conscience, but

practical certitude is required, since conscience refers not to

abstract laws but to concrete cases--not to what is right if only the

object of the act is considered, but to what is right when one

considers the object, the motive, and all the circumstances here and

now present.

649. From the point of view of the arguments on which it is based,

certitude is of two kinds. (a) Demonstrative certitude is the assent

that rests on a conclusion logically drawn from certainly true

premises. Example: Caius argues that he is obliged to go to Mass on

Sunday, because the law is certain, and it is also certain that the law

applies to him. (b) Probable certitude, which is the assent that rests

on a conclusion, whose premises, though not certain, seem to be true,

and against which there is no counter conclusion, or none that cannot

be readily answered (see 703). Example: Caius is pretty sure that he is

seriously ill, because he perceives a number of alarming symptoms; the

possibility that these may be due to imagination is excluded by the

fact that they are new and sudden. Caius, therefore, concludes that he

may hold himself excused from attendance at Mass.

650. Probable certitude is sufficient for conscience, for in moral

matters it is impossible to have at all times reasons that amount to a

demonstration, and hence a person acts prudently in following a

decision that is solidly probable and unopposed by any contrary serious

probability. What is called “probable certitude” here is very different

from probable opinion, about which there will be question below (662

sqq.)

651. From the point of view of the manner in which it is obtained,

certitude is again twofold. (a) Direct certitude is that which is

obtained from principles that are intrinsic to the case by applying to

the matter the law concerning it. Examples: A judge who decides

according to the evidence and proofs given in court that an accused is

guilty, and a son who concludes from the Fourth Commandment that he is

bound to help his parents in necessity, have direct certainty in their

judgments, because they argued from principles that deal with the

question before them. (b) Indirect certitude is that which is obtained

from principles that are extrinsic to the case by applying to the

matter in hand reflex principles (i.e., rules that direct how one

should act in doubt) or the principle of authority (i.e., the argument

drawn from the opinion of those who are acknowledged as competent to

decide). Examples; If a judge is not able to form a certain judgment

from intrinsic reasons concerning an accused, because strong arguments

have been given both for guilt and for innocence, he has recourse to

principles that have reference to his own state of doubt, and which

declare that he must acquit when he is not certain of guilt. If a man

is not able to decide whether the Fourth Commandment obliges him to

keep his grandparents or mother-in-law in his home, when they upset his

family and are able to take care of themselves, he can have recourse to

the external principle of authority by consulting his confessor.

652. Direct certitude is not necessary for the judgment of conscience,

for often, as in the cases just mentioned, it is not possible.

Moreover, indirect certitude suffices to give one who is in doubt such

practical assurance that one’s fears become unimportant and one is able

to act prudently in spite of them.

(a) The principle of authority--that “in doubt we can safely follow the

advice of those who are experts and truthful”--is reliable, as both the

conditions required for authority (viz., knowledge and truthfulness)

and also daily experience show.

(b) Reflex principles likewise, although they do not prove what is

deduced from them, are well founded, and point so clearly the side to

be taken when judgment is suspended between alternatives that they

enable one to act with all the certitude that prudence demands.

Example: The principle that “in doubt decision should be given in favor

of the accused,” is based on the fact that a man’s right to his life

and liberty is so certain that he does not forfeit that right unless it

is proved convincingly that he is guilty.

653. Examples of uncertain and certain consciences are the following:

(a) Uncertain conscience: It is lawful to make a just contract (major

premise certain); but this contract is just (minor premise a matter of

doubt or opinion); therefore, this contract is lawful (conclusion a

matter of doubt or opinion).

(b) Conscience directly certain: It is lawful to make a just contract

(certain); but this contract is just (certain); therefore, I may make

this contract (certain).

advice or a moral system approved by the Church (certain); but a

competent spiritual adviser or an approved system of Moral Theology

holds that this kind of contract is lawful (certain); therefore, it is

lawful for me to make this contract (certain).

654. An Uncertain Conscience.--Uncertainty of conscience can be

understood in two senses.

(a) Conscience is uncertain in a more strict sense, if the verdict of

the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that

no decision can be given either way, either because there are no

reasons of importance on either side (negative doubt), or because the

opposing reasons balance so perfectly that it is impossible to choose

between them (positive doubt). Examples: Titus, wishing to do some

drawing on Sundays, asks himself whether drawing is servile work. Not

knowing the definition of “servile,” he can only reply to his doubt

that he has no reasons either for affirmation or for negation. Caius

reads moral authors on the same question, and the pros and cons seem to

him so equally strong that he cannot pronounce for either side.

(b) Conscience is uncertain in a less strict sense, if the verdict of

the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that

the mind inclines to one side more than the other, but cannot decide in

its favor (suspicion), or that it decides for one side, while

perceiving that the arguments for the contrary are not to be despised

(opinion). Example: Titus decides to spend a good part of Sunday taking

photographs. Caius argues that this is unlawful; Sempronius, that it is

lawful. Titus thinks the arguments of both are strong, but is better

pleased with those of Sempronius. If he feels he cannot act on either

opinion, his state of mind is what we called suspicion; if he feels

that the opinion of Sempronius has prevailed, his state of mind is one

of opinion.

655. From what was said above concerning the certitude requisite for

conscience (see 641 sqq.), it follows that: (a) when the state of mind

is positive or negative doubt, one is not allowed to act; for a person

who is ignorant of what he should do, or who is fluctuating between

opposites, runs the risk of sin and its consequences, if he acts

blindly; (b) when the state of mind is suspicion, one is not allowed to

act, for conscience must be more than conjecture or inclination; (e)

when the state of mind is opinion, one is or is not allowed to act,

according as the opinion has or has not the qualities required for

certitude that is moral and practical (as explained above in 643 sqq.).

656. Doubt and Suspicion.--The following are the duties of a person

whose state of mind about his obligation is one of doubt or suspicion:

(a) If he has no time to resolve his hesitation but must decide at

once, he should follow the rules given for a perplexed conscience (see

above, 611 sqq.). Example; Sempronius is ordered by his father to go on

an errand; by his mother, to remain at home. He does not know whom he

should obey, but argues that there can be no harm in performing the

errand, since he feels that he is forced anyway. Sempronius’ impromptu

decision proceeds from a sense of moral responsibility; it is good, and

as certain as he is able to make it.

(b) If a person has time to resolve his hesitation, he should not trust

to common sense, but should consult moral theology, if he is competent

to understand and apply it, or should have recourse to his confessor,

if he is not a theologian. The attention given to his problem should be

proportionate to the gravity of the duty in question, its importance

for third parties, etc. (see below, 667 Sqq.). Example: If a layman is

uncertain whether a practice he follows in his business is dishonest,

he should consult a priest; if the priest is uncertain, he should refer

to his theology and study the matter until he is able to give a

well-founded, morally certain judgment.

657. Reflex principles by the aid of which a negative doubt may be

solved, when the question is about the existence or non-existence of

some fact connected with obligation, are the following:

(a) If the fact at issue is one about which presumption may be had from

general or personal experience, the doubt may be settled by the

principle: “In uncertainty decide according to what usually happens.”

Examples: Titus is uncertain whether his boy of seven years has the use

of reason and is bound to go to Mass. As a rule, children attain

discretion at the age of seven; and hence Titus should take his boy to

Mass. Fr. Caius is uncertain whether he has said Terce. His experience

is that such uncertainties on his part have always been baseless in the

past; hence, he may consider that he has said Terce as usual.

(b) If the fact at issue is one about which no presumption is afforded,

either from general or personal experience, recourse may be had to the

principle: “A fact should not be taken for granted, but must be

proved.” Examples: Sempronia doubts whether her practice of saying the

Rosary daily was the result of a vow; but, as there is no proof or

circumstantial evidence of a vow, it may be held that her practice

originated in a resolution. Caius, a stranger, claims that Titus owes

him for an unpaid debt of his father. Titus knows nothing of the

alleged debt, and the only substantiation for its existence is the word

of the stranger. Titus is not obliged to pay.

658. Presumption of a fact is of three kinds according to Weight:

(a) Violent presumption is based on indications so significant or

numerous that it leaves only slight room for evasion. This kind of

presumption suffices, but is not essential in solving doubts. Example:

Caius has no direct proof or disproof that he paid Titus in a certain

business transaction, because all the papers have been lost. But he

remembers distinctly that he drew the money and went personally to the

office of Titus on the day payment was to be made, and that the latter,

up to the time of his death several months later, always acted as if

full settlement had been made.

(b) Strong presumption is based on circumstances or signs so moving

that they permit one to infer a fact as being their natural or usual

accompaniment or result. This kind of presumption suffices in solving

the doubts we are considering. Example: If Caius, spoken of above, has

no individual recollection of any circumstances bearing on the payment

of his debt to Titus, but knows that it was his invariable custom to

pay all his debts promptly, the presumption that he paid this debt is

strong.

hardly ever suffice to permit us to infer a given fact from them.

Example: If we suppose that Caius was dilatory in paying debts, and

that he has no better indication of payment having been made than the

fact that Titus gave him a cigar about the time of their business

transaction, there is little presumption that the debt was paid.

659. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative doubts about

the quality of an act performed are the following:

(a) If there is an individual presumption, the quality of the act may

be inferred from what usually happens. Example: Sempronius cannot

remember whether a certain good work he undertook was prompted by zeal

or ambition. But, as he usually tried to keep his motives pure, it may

be concluded that the work in question proceeded from a right intention.

(b) If there is no individual presumption, the quality of an act may be

settled from general presumptions or principles. When the act was

according to law, and the doubt concerns its validity or sufficiency,

one may take it that all was rightly done; for it usually happens that

he who complies with the substance, also complies with what is

accessory. Moreover, the welfare of the public and of individuals

require that an act done outwardly according to law should be deemed as

rightly performed unless the contrary can be proved. Hence the rules:

“In doubt decide for the validity of what was done”; “What has been

done is presumed to have been rightly done.” Examples: Caia cannot

remember whether she really consented when she married Titus.

Sempronius cannot remember whether he had sufficient attention in

hearing Mass on Sunday. The presumptions are that Caia married validly

and that Sempronius heard Mass properly, if they acted in good faith.

660. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative and

invincible doubts concerning law or obligation are the following:

(a) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove the

existence of a law, or its gravity or application to a present case,

use may be made of the principle: “Invincible ignorance of the law

excuses from sin.” Example: Titus on an ember day consults all the

sources of information he has to discover whether it is a fast day; but

all he can learn is that some vigils are fast days, others are not.

(b) If no serious reasons can be found to prove or disprove that a law

bears a certain meaning, recourse may be had to such principles as the

following: “A law obliges only in so far as it is knowable”; “The

interpretation may be made against the legislator who could have spoken

more clearly”; “Things burdensome to the subjects of the law should be

construed narrowly; things favorable, broadly.” Example: Caius, who

supervises workingmen, has no notion regarding the meaning of the word

“workingman” as used in an indult on fasting--viz., whether it applies

to supervisors of work or exclusively to laborers.

that a certain law has ceased or been abrogated, the principle to be

followed is: “In doubt decide for that which has the presumption.” In

this case the presumption is for the continuance of the law, since it

was certainly made, and there is no probability for its

non-continuance. Example: Sempronius learns that certain mitigations

have been made in the law of fasting, and wonders whether the same is

true as regards the law of abstinence; but he has no reason to think

that any change has been made on this latter point.

661. In the above cases negative doubt was solved generally in favor of

non-obligation as against obligation. But there are two cases in which

negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, according to the

rule: “In doubt follow that which is safer.” The two cases are:

(a) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation, when the

doubt is about a matter of such importance that it does not permit the

taking of risks in its performance, as when there is question of laws

that safeguard the supreme rights of man, or of laws that prescribe the

essentials to be used in the administration of the Sacraments. Example:

Sempronius adopts a newly-born infant abandoned at his door. As there

is nothing to indicate whether the baby has been baptized or not,

Sempronius takes the safer course and has it baptized.

(b) Negative doubt must be settled in favor of obligation when it

persists because no reflex principle is found, or none that seems to be

suitable for the case. Example: Titus wavers between uncertainties

about the existence of a law; he can discover no reasons pro or con,

and he knows no principle or presumption to guide himself by in his

difficulty. He does not know or even think that he may act as if the

law were non-existent, and hence he must inquire further, or else act

as if the law did exist.

662. Opinion.--The duty of one whose state of mind is opinion is as

follows:

(a) If he is able to remove every objection against his judgment or to

make unimportant such objection or objections as remain, his opinion

has become moral certainty (see above, 644 Sqq.), and he may follow it

as a safe guide. Example: Caius promises to marry Sempronia, but his

parents forbid the marriage. Caius opines that he should keep his

promise, but to be sure he consults his pastor. The latter shows him

that the opposition to his marriage is unreasonable, and thus sets at

rest the difficulties of Caius.

(b) If a person is not able to remove one or more important objections

against his judgment, his opinion has not become moral certitude, and

he may not follow it as a safe guide. Example: If Caius’ pastor holds

that the parents are right and Caius wrong in the question of marriage

with Scmpronia, so that Caius, while still thinking he should keep his

promise, has serious fears that it would be a wrong step, the young man

should not follow his own view.

663. Those who act when their state of mind is doubt, suspicion, or

uncertain opinion are: (a) guilty of sin, for they do not act in good

faith (Rom, xiv. 22, 23), and they are imprudent and lovers of danger

(Ecclus., iii. 27); (b) guilty of the species and gravity of sin which

they fear may be in their act; for they interpretatively wish that to

which they expose themselves. Example: If Titus takes an oath, fearing

that his act is perjury, he is guilty of perjury before God, even

though what he says is true.

664. Fears or objections against an opinion are unimportant as follows:

(a) if they have only a slight probability (e.g., Titus opines that he

is not obliged to say the second lessons, because he knows that he

began them, and therefore must have said them; but he fears he may be

obliged to say them, because he cannot remember the details of the

lessons, and hence has probably not said them); (b) if they are

improbable (e.g., Caius fears that he may have omitted Sext, although

he recalls going to choir to chant at the regular times.)

665. Fears against an opinion are important, when they are not merely

possible, but have such an appearance of truth that even a prudent man

would consider them as worthy of support.

(a) Intrinsic signs of this solid probability are the good arguments by

which the fear, or contrary of an opinion, is supported. Example: Titus

after careful examination of conscience decides that he is not obliged

to mention a theft in confession, because it happened just before his

last confession; yet, he fears that he is obliged, because he does not

remember having thought of restitution.

(b) Extrinsic signs of solid probability are the good authorities by

whom the contrary of the opinion is defended. Example: Caius opines

that he is not obliged to confess a calumny, because he is not certain

that it is unconfessed; he fears that he is obliged, because St.

Alphonsus, whose authority is great in Moral Theology, teaches that a

grave sin must be confessed unless it is certain that it has been

confessed already.

666. He who is moved by unimportant fears or difficulties is

scrupulous, but not so he who hesitates in the face of an important

difficulty. Examples: Balbus fears he may be guilty of murder, because

he left a sick person for a moment and the latter unexpectedly died in

his absence (scrupulous conscience). Sempronius fears he may be bound

to restitution, because by his ridicule he made Titus lose his means of

livelihood (disturbed conscience).

667. What is to be done by one who holds an opinion as to what he may

or may not do here and now, but who has a serious fear that his opinion

is wrong?

(a) If the fear persists as serious, when the means to remove it (such

as consideration and consultation) have been duly resorted to, he

should delay, if this is possible, or follow the safer course, if delay

is not possible. Example: Titus must go to confession now, but he

cannot recall whether or not a past theft was ever confessed; he thinks

he is not obliged to mention it now, but is far from feeling certain

about this, because of a serious doubt which he cannot resolve. The

thing for him to do is to resolve to confess the theft as one that was

perhaps unconfessed before.

(b) If the fear is removed or made unimportant, by direct means (such

as theological argument from moral principles) or by indirect means

(such as consultation or the use of reflex principles), the opinion may

be followed. Example: If Titus, mentioned above, learns from his

confessor or deduces from reliable reflex principles that he is not

obliged to confess the theft, he may act with a safe conscience in

following this decision.

668. The authority that may be safely followed by a lay person who

holds an opinion, but fears that the opposite may be true, is that of

anyone whom he knows to be pious, instructed and prudent; for, as it is

impossible for him either to settle the question for himself or to

remain in perpetual uncertainty, he must acquire certainty here as in

other important affairs by consulting those who are expert and

reliable. Hence, if the conscience is merely opinionative, a dependable

adviser should be conferred with to make it certain.

(a) In the case of an accusing or excusing conscience, it is at least

advisable that the doubtful sin be mentioned in confession, and

especially by those who are not strict in their lives and who are

inclined to judge their own acts and motives with leniency.

(b) In case of a forbidding or permitting conscience, it is necessary

that one seek reliable information where it can be had, as from parents

or teachers, and if these cannot give it, from a pastor or confessor or

other priest. Example: Sempronius thinks he has a right to drink a

glass of wine now and then to be sociable; but he fears he has no right

to do so, as the drink occasions excitement or foolish remarks, and

sometimes makes it difficult for him to get to his home safely.

669. The authority that may be safely followed by confessors and other

priests in resolving important doubts against a moral judgment is as

follows:

(a) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by all or nearly all

of the approved text-books on moral teaching, it may be followed; for

surely there would not be such unanimity, if the objections were really

formidable.

(b) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by a goodly number

(say, six or seven) of those who are considered as preeminent in Moral

Theology, and who independently arrived at the same conclusion, it may

be followed; for the judgment of many is better than that of one, and

the certainty of authorities should prevail over the doubt of one who

has not the same authority.

it may be followed without further investigation, if he has received

special mention from the Church as an authority and a safe guide. Thus,

the Holy See has expressly declared that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus

may be safely followed by confessors, and the approbation given to St.

Thomas Aquinas as Universal Doctor makes his word more convincing than

a contrary argument based on one’s own reasoning. Of course, this does

not mean that these or any other private Doctors are infallible in

their judgments, or that one should not depart from their teaching in a

point where the Church has decided against them, or where there is a

manifest reason for doing so; it simply means that they are so

conspicuous among moralists for the correctness of their teaching that

one who is in doubt may safely follow them unless the contrary is known

to him.

670. But one may be unable to settle one’s difficulty by appeal to

authority, as such, as in the following instances: (a) when the

particular case to be decided is not considered at all in text-books,

or is not considered under the circumstances that exist; (b) when the

authorities speak hesitatingly about the question, and say that the

opinion in question is at most probable, etc.; (c) when the authorities

are about equally divided, as when a few great names are opposed to

many names of inferior rank, or when those who are equal in knowledge

so disagree that half are on one side, half on the other. In counting

authorities, however, it is not always easy to decide who should be

included, as a writer may himself be arguing from the authority of an

individual or of a school, and thus he is not a distinct witness in

favor of what he holds.

671. When a priest or other person sufficiently instructed in theology

is not able to change through recourse to authority an opinionative or

doubtful conscience into a certain conscience, he can still obtain

certitude: (a) directly, by reexamining the question diligently and

with entire impartiality, until he has discovered reasons strong enough

to settle it convincingly one way or the other; (b) indirectly, by

submitting the question to the arbitrament of a reflex principle that

really appears true to him, and permitting it to decide between the

opinion and the objection, or between the contending doubts.

672. The Moral Systems.--There are two general systems regarding reflex

moral principles:

(a) Tutiorism, which teaches that the only principle which can change

uncertainty into certainty is: “When one is undecided between the safer

and the less safe, he must always choose the safer,” because only what

is safer excludes the uncertainty of sinning;

(b) Anti-tutiorism, which teaches that the principle given above is

true in a few exceptional cases on account of special reasons, but

untrue as a rule. The general principle which it substitutes for that

of Tutiorism is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less

safe, one may choose the less safe if it is morally certain.”

673. Of two moral judgments that are compared, it must be noted:

(a) that one is safer which departs more from the danger of sin by

deciding for the stricter side. Example: In doubt whether a law exists,

whether it obliges in a present case, whether its obligation is grave,

the safer opinion is that which holds for the affirmative;

(b) that moral judgment is more likely which is supported by stronger

arguments. Example: That a law has ceased, or does not apply in a

certain case, or does not oblige under sin, is a more likely opinion if

the arguments in its favor outweigh those against it.

674. Thus, it may happen that an opinion which is safer is less likely.

Example: The opinion that the precept of repentance obliges under pain

of new sin from the moment a sin is committed is safer, but less likely

than the opposite opinion.

675. Danger of sin is twofold. (a) Danger of formal sin (see 249, 258)

is a risk taken which involves, not only that an act may be unlawful,

but that the doing of it may be unlawful. Example: Caius eats meat,

doubting whether the day is one of abstinence and whether he is obliged

to abstain or not. (b) Danger of material sin (see 249, 258) is the

danger that an act may be unlawful, not in the concrete or as to its

performance, but in the abstract as to itself. Example: Titus is unable

to discover whether this is a day of abstinence, but he is of the

opinion that it is not. Hence, he takes meat, arguing that, while this

may be a violation of the law, he himself is not guilty of sin, since

he feels that he has a right to eat meat under the circumstances.

676. Tutiorism.--This system has been condemned by the Church, and with

good reason, for the following motives:

(a) If by that which is safer, Tutiorism intends that which is better,

it contradicts the Gospel, which distinguishes between counsel and

precept (see 364 sqq.), commanding what is good, but only recommending

what is better.

(b) If by that which is safer Tutiorism means that which favors law

against liberty, it imposes an intolerable yoke on the consciences of

men; for, while law obliges only in so far as it is promulgated and

known, Tutiorism would bind one to observe, not only what was not known

to be obligatory, but what was held to be most probably not obligatory.

677. A modified form of Tutiorism taught: “When one is undecided

between the safer and the less safe, one must choose the safer, unless

the less safe is most probable.” This system has not been censured by

the Church, but Catholic theologians with hardly an exception have

rejected it, for the following reasons:

(a) Most probable, as understood by the defenders of this system, is

that which has such likelihood and such appearance of truth as to

remove every probable danger of even material sin. Thus, in reality

this system requires absolute certitude and agrees with the rigorous

tenet of Tutiorism that even a most probable opinion against the law

may not be followed.

(b) Most probable, as commonly understood, is that side of a question

which so far excels the other side that no answer can be given to any

of its arguments, while all the arguments of the other side can be

answered. To require this in moral difficulties is to require the

impossible, for even the greatest theologians have to be content at

times with less.

678. We are obliged always to follow a safe course, that is, not to

expose ourselves to the danger of formal sin (see 249, 258); but

Tutiorism errs when it teaches that we are also obliged always to

follow the safer or safest course, that is, never to expose ourselves

even to the danger of material sin. There are cases, however, when we

are obliged (because some law requires it) to follow a safer course,

that is, not to expose ourselves or others to some great harm. Thus, we

must follow the safer side in the following cases:

(a) when there is question concerning something essential for the

salvation of ourselves or of others, for the law of charity forbids

that any risk be taken in this supremely important matter. Example:

Titus instructs the dying Caius only concerning the existence of God

and of the future life. He should also instruct him about the Trinity

and the Incarnation, which is the safer course, since it is more

probable that an explicit faith in these two mysteries is a condition

of salvation;

(b) when there is question of some great spiritual loss or gain for

ourselves or others, for justice or charity forbids that we take

chances in such affairs. Examples: Sempronia doubts whether she is

excused from the law of abstinence, and whether she will be guilty of

sin if she eats meat. Caius doubts whether attendance at a certain

school will do harm to the religion of his son. Balba doubts whether

she is bound to inquire about the truth of her sect. As long as their

serious doubts remain, these persons should follow the safer course;

Sacrament, for the virtue of religion requires that the Sacraments be

administered with fidelity, and be not exposed to the peril of nullity.

Example: It is not lawful to consecrate matter that has probably been

substantially adulterated;

(d) when there is question of some temporal good or evil to oneself or

another, and one is certainly obliged to promote the former or prevent

the latter. Examples: Caius suspects that a drink before him is deadly

poison; Titus suspects that an object at which he is preparing to shoot

is a human being. Neither may disregard his suspicion, even if its

contrary is more probable, because the safer side must here be taken.

The Fifth Commandment forbids one needlessly to imperil one’s own or

another’s life.

679. In emergency one may expose a Sacrament to nullity by taking a

course that is less safe for the Sacrament, but safer for the subject,

relying on the axiom that the Sacraments are for men, and not men for

the Sacraments. Example: Titus is called to baptize the dying Caius. No

water can be procured except rose water, whose sufficiency is doubtful.

Titus not only may, but should, use the doubtful matter, since no other

can be had.

680. Laxism.--The extreme opposite of Tutiorism is Laxism, whose

principle is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less

safe, one may choose the less safe, if it is only slightly or

uncertainly probable,” because whatever seems at all probable may be

prudently followed, and so forms a certain conscience. Example:

According to Laxism, one would be justified in following an opinion,

because it was defended by one theologian, even though he was of little

authority.

681. This system has been condemned by the Church for the following

reasons:

(a) It is contrary to the teaching of the Gospels and of the Fathers,

which requires one to observe the laws of God with understanding and

diligence;

(b) It leads to corruption of morals. The Laxists of the seventeenth

century were called in derision those “who take away the sins of the

world,” and it was against their loose teachings that Pascal inveighed;

he should follow what was only slightly above the improbable, or that a

law should be deemed uncertain because an opinion of uncertain

probability could be quoted against it.

682. The true system of reflex principles will lie between the extremes

of Tutiorism and Laxism. As already said, these two doctrines have been

censured by the Church; but there are other systems that are moderate,

and that are permitted by the Church and defended by theologians. These

systems are:

(a) Probabiliorism, whose principle is: “When one is undecided between

the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safc only when it

is more probable”;

(b) Equiprobabilism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between

the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe only when it

affirms the non-existence of the law, and is at least equally probable

with the opposite”;

safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it is

certainly and solidly probable”;

(d) Compensationism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between

the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it

is certainly and solidly probable, and there is a proportionate reason

to compensate for the risk taken.”

683. Probabiliorism.--The arguments in favor of Probabiliorism are as

follows:

(a) extrinsic or from authority. This system is more ancient, and, when

the controversy over systems began in the seventeenth century, this was

the one that was most favored by the Church and theologians;

(b) intrinsic and direct. An essential note of certitude is that it

should exclude all doubt, for as long as doubt remains there is only

opinion. But one who is undecided cannot exclude all doubt, unless the

arguments against the doubts not only balance, but outweigh the latter

(i.e., unless one has greater probability on one’s side). Hence, he who

acts against the safer, which is always certain enough, when his own

opinion is not more probable, acts with an uncertain conscience;

if he assents to that which is less safe and less probable. Thus, in

things speculative no scholar would think of accepting a theory which

to his knowledge was further removed from the truth; in things

practical no man of common sense would prefer a road that seemed less

likely to lead to his destination. But we should not be less prudent

about the good than we are about the true and the useful. Hence, in

doubt we should always decide in favor of the law, unless the arguments

for liberty are more convincing.

684. The answers given to the above arguments are:

(a) Probabiliorism is not more ancient as a system, since none of the

moral systems were formulated before the sixteenth century; if

Patristic and medieval authorities can be quoted who decided cases

probabilioristically, others who were contemporary can be named who

decided according to milder principles. Moreover, the passages cited

are frequently obscure, and do not necessarily bear a Probabilioristic

sense. That Probabiliorism enjoyed more favor at the beginning of the

controversy is not wonderful, since other systems were more or less

identified with Laxism, and the question at issue had not been studied

thoroughly. Today Probabiliorism has few defenders.

(b) That which is more probable by far, or most probable, does overcome

all doubt, and is even speculatively certain; but he who would require

the more probable in this sense does not differ from the Tutiorists

spoken of above. That which is more probable, but not to a notable

extent, does not exclude all doubt, for the very definition of the more

probable is “that judgment which appears more likely to be true than

another, but which does not exclude all fear that the other may be

true.” Hence, if Probabiliorism calls for the notably more probable, it

does not differ from Tutiorism; if it calls for the moderately more

probable, it wrongly claims that there is no probability on the

opposite side.

which conduces to the obtaining of an end, the good that which is in

conformity with law. Certainly, a man is not a prudent seeker of truth

if he arbitrarily prefers the less to the more true-seeming, nor a

prudent seeker of the useful if he chooses the less safe way of

obtaining what is a necessary end; but a man can be a prudent seeker of

the good, even though he prefers the less safe and less probable, when

the law itself, the norm of good, does not demand more from him. Hence,

one who makes a judgment according to the anti-Probabiliorist systems

does not feel that he is yielding assent to what is speculatively less

probable; but that he is making a decision that is practically certain;

not that he is choosing a perilous way, but one that is absolutely safe.

685. Arguments against Probabiliorism.--(a) Theoretical Objection.--The

principle of Probabiliorism that it is lawful to act against the safer

side when the less safe side is more probable, cannot be justified

except on the ground that invincible ignorance of obligation exists,

and hence that the law does not oblige. But the same argument can be

used in favor of milder systems; for even if the less safe side is only

probable, it makes one invincibly ignorant that one is obliged. Hence,

the basis of Probabiliorism is fatal to its own claims.

(b) Practical Objection.--A system for the direction of conscience

should be so simple that it can be easily applied in the everyday

affairs of life. Abstract questions may receive attention from

moralists for days and months, but concrete cases have to be decided as

a rule without delay. But Probabiliorism is such a complicated system

that it is unsuited to everyday life. St. Alphonsus declares that he

found by the experience of many years that this system cannot be

profitably used in the guidance of souls, for it imposes an intolerable

burden on both confessors and penitents. And how few are so skilled as

to be able to decide quickly, without scruples, and correctly about the

relative degrees of probability in opposite opinions!

686. Answers of the Probabiliorists.--(a) A probable opinion against

the existence of obligation does not create invincible ignorance, but

only doubt; nor does a more probable opinion against obligation create

invincible ignorance, since it excludes the less probable opinion for

obligation, and makes one assent unwaveringly and in good faith, even

though erroneously, to the judgment that one is not bound.

(b) It is no more difficult to decide what is more probable than to

decide what is equally probable, or truly and solidly probable; nor is

the same skill and attention expected in all persons and cases, but

each person must judge according to the best light he has, and each

case must receive the measure of attention its importance calls for. If

Probabiliorists may become scrupulous, may not Probabilists become lax?

687. The debate between Probabiliorism and its adversaries is not often

heard today, as most modern moralists give their allegiance either to

Equiprobabilism (a modified Probabiliorism) or to Probabilism.

688. Equiprobabilism.--The doctrine of Equiprobabilism is a middle way

between Probabiliorism and Probabilism. Thus: (a) it agrees with

Probabiliorism in holding that it is not lawful to follow the less

safe, if the safer is more probable, or if the safer is equally

probable, and the question is about the cessation of the law; (b) it

agrees with Probabilism in holding that it is lawful to follow the less

safe, if the safer is only equally probable, and the question is about

the existence of the law.

689. The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe, if

the safer is equally probable and the question is about the cessation

of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should decide in favor of that side which is

possession. But, when doubt is about the cessation of a law, the law is

in possession; for there is no question that it was made. Therefore, in

such a doubt we should decide for the safer side, that is, that the law

has not ceased.

(b) A certain obligation is not complied with by a doubtful

fulfillment. But doubts about the cessation of the obligation of law

usually arise from a probability that one has already fulfilled the

law. Therefore in such cases we should decide that the law has not been

fulfilled--that is, that its obligation has not ceased.

690. The Probabilists reply that: (a) it is not true that, in

equiprobability about the cessation of law, the law is in possession;

for liberty is naturally prior to law, and hence has possession in

doubt; (b) nor is it true that an obligation that has probably been

complied with or removed is certain.

691. The Equiprobabilists answer: (a) liberty was in possession, until

it was dispossessed by the making of the law; (b) an obligation that

certainly existed must be held as certainly in existence, until the

contrary is proved; whereas a fact, such as dispensation, abrogation,

or fulfillment, is not proved if it is only probable.

692. The principle that “it is lawful to follow the less safe side, if

the safer is only equally probable and the question is about the

existence of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should favor the side that is in possession. But

when doubt is about the existence of a law, liberty is in possession;

for liberty is prior to law. Therefore, in such doubt we may decide

that there is no obligation.

(b) An uncertain law does not oblige, if one is invincibly ignorant of

its existence. But, when there are equiprobable reasons against the

existence of a law, one is invincibly ignorant of its existence.

Therefore, in such cases one is not obliged.

693. The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe side

if the safer side is more probable,” is defended as follows by

Equiprobabilists:

(a) In doubt improperly so called--that is, in that condition of mind

in which there is no fluctuation between equal arguments, but only some

indecision between the more and the less probable--we should decide in

favor of the more probable, as being morally certain. Hence, it is not

lawful to follow what is less safe and less probable.

(b) A law sufficiently promulgated obliges. But, when it is more

probable that a law was made or is in force, such law is sufficiently

promulgated to the conscience. Hence, the safer side must be followed,

if it is more probable.

694. Probabilist Criticism of the Foregoing Arguments.

(a) If the excess of the more probable over the less probable is so

great that the latter is only slightly or doubtfully probable, the more

probable is equivalent to certitude; for certitude is assent without

fear of the opposite, and the fear of the opposite in such a case would

be so slight that it may be considered as non-existent. If the excess

is not so great, the less probable remains solidly and certainly

probable, and the more probable is not certitude, but opinion (that is,

assent with fear of the opposite). The Equiprobabilists are speaking of

greater probability in the second sense, and hence they are wrong when

they identify it with certitude (see above, 654).

(b) A law must be so promulgated to the conscience that one knows the

law or could know it with sufficient diligence; it does not suffice

that one can get no further than opinion. It would be unreasonable to

oblige one to observe not only what is the law, but also what seems to

be the law. Now, he who has only more probable opinion that he is bound

by some law, does not know that such obligation exists; he only knows

that it seems to exist.

695. Reply of the Equiprobabilists.-(a) The more probable always

removes the appearance of truth from the less probable. Hence, he who

recognizes an opinion as more probable can assent to it without any

fear of error.

(b) One who holds it as more probable that he is obliged by a certain

law, does not know for certain that he is obliged by reason of that

law; but he does know for certain that he is obliged by reason of a

higher law. Superior to every particular law is the general law that

nothing may be done that will deprive law of its efficacy. But law

loses its efficacy if each one is free to decide that he is not bound

even when the greater weight of probability is to the contrary.

696. General Arguments in Favor of Equiprobabilism.--(a) From

Authority.--St. Alphonsus Liguori, who holds a unique place in the

Church as a moralist, preferred Equiprobabilism to every other moral

system; and his views are followed not only by his own Congregation,

the Redemptorists, but by many others.

(b) From Comparison with Other Systems.--Truth lies midway between

extremes; for truth is lost either by exaggeration or by defect. But

Equiprobabilism is a happy medium between Probabiliorism inclining to

Rigorism, and Probabilism inclining towards Laxism. Hence, the relation

of Equiprobabilism to other systems is in its favor.

justice universally admitted as true, a judge should pronounce sentence

in favor of the more probable when there is evidence of unequal weight

and in favor of that which is in possession when there is evidence of

equal weight. But these principles ought to be of universal

application. Therefore, Equiprobabilism does right in making these the

guiding principles for the court of conscience.

697. Probabilist Criticism of these Arguments.--(a) St. Alphonsus is

one of the greatest moral theologians of the Church. Whether in his

later years (1762-1787) he taught Equiprobabilism, is a matter of

dispute among those who are familiar with his writings. But there is no

doubt that in his mature age (1749-1762), when he wrote his Moral

Theology, he was a Probabilist.

(b) Probabilism can likewise claim that it stands midway between the

extremes of Rigorism (represented by Probabiliorism and

Equiprobabilism), on the one side, and of Laxism, on the other side.

matters of justice, because there is a presumption that he who holds

property has a right to it, and also because human laws must favor him

who is in possession, lest property rights be left uncertain and

disputes be multiplied. The principle of possession does not apply,

however, to other matters; if the law obliged one yesterday, how can

that create a presumption that it obliges one today, if one has good

reasons for thinking the obligation has ceased? And as for human

ordinances, while they have jurisdiction over external goods and may

award them in case of doubt to the possessor, they have not, and have

never claimed, the right to make the principle of possession a rule for

solving all difficulties about duty.

The principle of Probabiliorism for which the Equiprobabilists claim

the authority of judicial practice certainly does not apply to criminal

cases, for in these preponderance of evidence against an accused is not

to be followed if there is a reasonable doubt. In civil cases judges

apply the principle of probabiliorism, but it does not follow that

conscience should do the same, for the circumstances are different. The

judge is seeking to decide which of two litigants has the more likely

claim, and hence he is bound to declare for the side that has stronger

evidence. Conscience is seeking to decide whether an obligation is

certain or uncertain, and hence it is not obliged to decide for

obligation when this is more probable, but still not certain.

698. Answer of Equiprobabilists to this Criticism.--(a) Granted that

St. Alphonsus once held Probabilism, he rejected it later emphatically,

and when dying declared that his former defense of Probabilism was the

only thing that gave him anxiety.

(b) Equiprobabilism is further removed from Rigorism than Probabilism

is from Laxism. It hears both sides of the question--that for liberty

and that for law--before it decides. Probabilism is satisfied to hear

one side, that for liberty; or at least it does not compare the two

sides.

justice; for, since justice implies a more exact equality and a more

rigorous right than other virtues (see 154), disputes in matters of

justice demand stronger proofs. But every virtue renders to someone his

due, and hence there is no reason why principles applicable to justice

should not be applicable to other virtues also. The principle of

Probabiliorism, likewise, is just as applicable to the court of

conscience as to the civil court, since in both courts the aim is to

get the truth as nearly as possible.

699. General Arguments Against Equiprobabilism.--(a) Theoretical

Objection.--If we judge Equiprobabilism by its arguments, we find it

unconvincing, for that which is old in it does not agree with that

which is new, and that which is new argues equally well for

Probabilism. Thus, the old arguments for Probabiliorism mean in the

last analysis that the greater probability deprives the opposite side

of all solid probability; logically, then, one should conclude that

equal probability deprives both sides of all solid probability, since

one neutralizes the other. The new arguments are drawn from the

principles that in doubt one should decide in favor of the side in

possession, that a doubtful law does not oblige, etc.--all of which

principles, as we shall see, favor Probabilism.

(b) Practical Objection.--If we judge Equiprobabilism by its

adaptibility for use, we find it wanting. A moral system should be one

that can be easily understood and applied, otherwise it is unworkable

and useless. But Equiprobabilism is so complicated and abstruse that

even the professional theologians who hold it are often at a loss how

to apply it, and are found to give inconsistent decisions. How can it

be expected, then, that anyone else will be able to decide whether the

law or liberty is possession, whether the degree of probability on

one side is greater than or equal to that on the other, whether the

question has to do with the existence of the law or its cessation, etc.?

700. Replies of the Equiprobabilists.--(a) The old (i.e.,

probabilioristic) principles of Equiprobabilism are not contrary to the

new. A more probable opinion not only balances the opposition by its

equal arguments, and thus puts away doubt, but it also wins assent by

the surplus in its favor, and thus certitude is had. When the two

opposites are equally probable, there is a state of true doubt, but

certitude is had by recourse to the principles of possession and

doubtful law. These principles proper to Equiprobabilism do not favor

Probabilism, if one is impartial in one’s use of them, and willing to

use them against as well as for liberty.

(b) Equiprobabilism is not more difficult in its application than

Probabilism. It does not require that one determine minutely and

exactly the greater or equal probability of the arguments for law and

for liberty, or that one devote extraordinary diligence to the solution

of the problem. All it requires is that one consider the matter

seriously, weigh the arguments on both sides impartially, and decide to

the best of one’s ability which side appears to be more probable or to

have the presumption in its favor.

701. Probabilism.--The meaning of Probabilism can be seen from a

comparison with the opposite systems. (a) Unlike Probabiliorism and

Equiprobabilism, Probabilism does not require a greater or equal

probability, but permits one to follow what is less probable; (b)

unlike Laxism, it does not allow one to follow what is only slightly or

uncertainly probable, or to apply the system to all cases of doubt.

702. A judgment is probable when it is supported by arguments that make

it seem true, although there may remain reasons for doubt. Examples are

conclusions based on analogy, on hypothesis, on the opinions of others,

or on the calculus of probabilities.

703. Probability is of various kinds. (a) It is absolute or relative,

according as the supporting reasons are grave, either when considered

alone, or when compared with the objections. Even the Probabiliorists

admit that an opinion that is merely probable may be followed, if it is

solidly probable and there is no argument against it (see 649). (b) We

have solid or slight probability, according as the supporting motives

are or are not such as would move, if not convince, a prudent man--that

is, a man who shows good judgment in most things. (c) We have certain

or uncertain probability, according as a person is sure or not, after

reasonable consideration, that the arguments seem valid and the opinion

likely. (d) Probability is internal or external, according as the

arguments are drawn from the matter at issue itself (i.e., from its

nature, properties, causes, effects, etc.) or from the authority of the

doctors who have defended an opinion.

704. Relative probability according to logicians remains even when a

lesser is compared with a greater probability. (a) If the opposing

arguments are drawn from different sources, the more probable does not

attack the less probable, and hence does not weaken its probability.

Example: An intrinsic argument has more weight than a mere appeal to

authority, but it does not attack the opposite argument, and hence does

not diminish its probability. (b) If the opposing arguments are drawn

from the same source, each one weakens the opposite, since there is

direct opposition. But the more probable does not destroy the less

probable, since, in spite of the greater appearance of truth on the one

side, there still remains room for the possibility that the other side

may be true.

705. A moral judgment is solidly probable when the following conditions

are present:

(a) For the judgment there must be an intrinsic or extrinsic argument

that would be considered weighty by a prudent man. Example: An opinion

that has the support of a universally acknowledged authority is

strongly probable, whereas, if it has only the support of one obscure

writer, it is only slightly probable.

(b) Against the judgment there must be no decisive argument from

authority or reason. Example; The judgment that a certain course of

action is lawful because St. Alphonsus permits it, is ordinarily

solidly probable; it is not probable, however, if the opinion of St.

Alphonsus (e.g., that Catholics may act as sponsors in non-Catholic

baptisms) has been disallowed by the Church, or if the argument he uses

(e.g., that concerning the amount that constitutes grave matter in

theft, which reasons from conditions in his day) is not strong.

they are set over against the arguments for the opposite. Manifestly,

if the arguments are all satisfactorily answered by the opposite side,

the judgment based on them ceases to retain the appearance of truth.

Probabilism does not require, however, that one determine the relative

degrees of probability in opposite opinions.

706. It is not sufficient according to the Probabilists that another be

certain of the probability of an opinion; but the person who follows

the opinion must himself be certain that it is solidly probable.

707. Regarding the kind of authority necessary to make an opinion

solidly probable from external evidence, Probabilism teaches:

(a) that absolute probability (that is, such a weight of authority as

would appear strong even to the most learned) ought to be estimated by

quality rather than quantity--by the learning, prudence, impartiality,

and independent study of the authors, rather than by their numbers. If

five distinguished moralists arrive by separate study at the same

conclusion (i.e., that an opinion is probable), or if one of special

reputation in a matter under question supports the probability of an

opinion, the argument from authority is strong;

(b) that relative probability (that is, such a weight of authority as

suffices for one who is unlearned, such as a child, a halfwit, an

uneducated person) is had sufficiently through the word of only one

person who is looked up to as a guide or instructor, such as a parent,

confessor, or teacher.

708. Probabilism supposes that one regards the opinion one follows as

truly probable, and that one is convinced that it is lawful to follow

such an opinion. Hence, the system does not apply in certain cases.

(a) It does not apply to cases in which there is no probability on

either side--that is, to cases of negative doubt (see 656 sqq.),

whether the doubt be of law or of fact.

(b) Probabilism does not apply to cases in which there is only slight

or uncertain probability for the less safe side. Example: Caius has

heard that a certain novel opinion is defended by a recent author, but

he is uncertain of the author’s standing as a theologian, and he

realizes that the fact that a man has written a book does not make his

ideas solidly probable.

probability for the less safe side, but one doubts whether one can

lawfully follow it; for it is always sinful to act with a doubtful

conscience (see 641 sqq.). Example: Caius has read in a reliable work

of theology that a person in certain circumstances, which are his own,

is probably excused from Mass. But the word “probably” makes him

uncertain whether he can follow this opinion.

709. For the above-mentioned cases, to which their principle does not

apply, Probabilists refer to the rules for a doubtful conscience (see

656 sqq.). The following special rules are given for cases of negative

doubt:

(a) If the doubt is one of law and insoluble, one is free to act; for

it is a general principle that an act may be considered lawful, as long

as there is no serious reason to the contrary. Example: Sempronius goes

out into the country on Sunday afternoon. An opportunity to fish

presents itself, but Sempronius begins to doubt whether there is or is

not a church law against fishing on Sundays. As no argument for either

side is known to him, he may act on the general principle that what is

not forbidden is lawful.

(b) If the doubt is one of fact and insoluble, and a prohibitory law is

involved, one is free to act; for it is commonly admitted that

legislators do not intend their prohibitions, which are restrictions of

liberty, to be interpreted with the utmost rigor. Example: Titus is

eating a chicken dinner late on Thursday night when his watch stops. As

he has no way of discovering the time, he does not know whether Friday

or the end of the dinner will arrive first. He may continue the meal,

making no undue delays.

one must take reasonable precautions to settle the doubt; for the

lawgiver wills that those who are subject to the law should make use of

the ordinary means to learn the facts on which obligation depends (see

above, 384). If the doubt remains insoluble, one may decide in favor of

liberty; for it may reasonably be presumed that the legislator does not

intend to obligate those whose obligation remains uncertain. Example:

Caius doubts whether he has reached the age of sixty, when the

obligation of fasting ends. He should try to discover his real age;

but, if he can find no real proofs either for or against the age of

sixty, he may decide in favor of sixty, if there are some indications

that he is of that age.

710. The solutions given above for cases of negative doubt suppose that

there is no other or higher law that forbids one to take the risk of

deciding in favor of liberty. Hence, in the following instances one

must decide against liberty:

(a) in negative doubts when the validity of acts is at stake. Example:

Titus is uncertain whether the law requires the age of fourteen for a

valid contract of marriage; he is also uncertain whether he is fourteen

years old. The doubt of law and of fact does not excuse Titus from the

law, if he wishes to marry. He must clear up the doubts, and if

necessary he must secure a dispensation.

(b) in negative doubts when reasons of charity or justice forbid one to

take risks. Example: Caius is uncertain whether he paid Sempronius for

work done for him. He is bound to make inquiries about the matter.

711. Probabilism cannot be applied, therefore, when the mental state of

the subject is doubt, weakly founded opinion, or practical uncertainty.

But, even when one holds an opinion as solidly and certainly probable,

one may not follow it as a moral guide, if there is something in the

nature of the object or matter itself which forbids this.

(a) A probability of law favoring liberty may not be followed in those

matters in which some natural, divine or human law requires one to

follow the safer side (see cases enumerated above, 678, 661). Example:

The following opinions are probable; that instruction regarding the

Trinity and the Incarnation is not indispensable for salvation; that

rye-bread is valid matter for the Eucharist. But in practice it would

be unlawful to take the risk of following these opinions, except in

cases of extreme necessity, when nothing else can be done.

(b) A probability of fact favoring liberty may not be followed so long

as there remains nothing more than probability of fact; for, while the

will of the lawgiver may on account of probability of non-obligation

change one’s relation to the law from obligation to non-obligation, it

does not change facts. Examples: On Friday Titus doubts whether a dish

before him is meat or fish; probably it is meat on account of its

appearance, probably it is fish on account of its odor. At night Fr.

Caius is much fatigued, and doubts whether he has said Vespers.

Probably he did not, because he cannot recall what feast will be

celebrated tomorrow; probably he did, because he remembers having said

Compline.

712. For probabilities of fact, to which as such their system does not

apply, Probabilists offer the following solutions:

(a) In certain cases one may take from the doubt of fact its bearing on

obligation, by recourse to the manifest will of the legislator as

declared in the law itself or expressed through dispensation. Examples:

While hearing confessions, Sempronius doubts whether his jurisdiction

has already expired. He cannot recall the date of expiration, but,

thinking the matter over, he sees that probably the date has not

arrived. His difficulty is therefore solved, for the Code (Canon 209)

supplies jurisdiction in cases of probability of fact. Titus and Caia

wish to marry. There is a doubt whether or not they are first cousins,

but it seems that probably they are not so related. Their difficulty is

solved by obtaining a dispensation.

(b) In other cases one may change the probability of fact into a

probability of law by recourse to a probable opinion or argument that

under the existing doubt of fact the legislator does not wish the law

to oblige. Examples: Titus, who has what is probably lawful food before

him, argues with himself that it is not likely that the Church wills to

put him to the expense, trouble, and loss of time required to order

other food. Fr. Titus, who has probably said Vespers, argues that

theologians of authority teach that, when there is a serious reason for

thinking one has performed such an obligation, it may be presumed that

the Church does not require more.

713. If a case of probability of fact on which obligation hinges cannot

be solved by recourse to the expressed or inferred will of the

lawgiver, one has no choice but to follow the safer side, for then,

though it is probable that a certain thing is a fact, it is not

probable that one has a right to act. Example: Sempronius, while

hunting, sees an object moving in the bushes. The probabilities are

that it is not a human being, but it is not probable that Sempronius

has the right to risk homicide by firing at it.

714. Not all Probabilists use the principle of the presumptive will of

the lawgiver for all cases of negative doubt; some employ different

principles for different kinds of doubt, and sometimes arrive at other

decisions than those given in the preceding paragraphs. Thus, they give

such rules as the following:

(a) In negative doubt of law regarding the lawfulness of an act, use

the principle that law or liberty should be followed according as one

or the other is in possession (see 660). Example: He who has only

slight reasons for thinking that a law exists, or that it is of grave

obligation, or that it extends to his case, etc., may decide against

the law. But he who has only slight reasons for thinking that a law has

been abrogated, or that a dispensation has been granted, etc., must

decide for obligation.

(b) In negative doubt of law regarding the validity of a past act, use

the principle _that what was done is to be held as rightly done_.

Example: He who has no reasons, or only trifling ones, for thinking

that a Sacrament was not administered validly or received validly,

should decide for validity.

judge according to what usually happens, or that facts must not be

taken for granted but must be established, or that presumption favors

that which has possession. Examples: If there is no good reason to

think that a conscientious person gave consent to a temptation, one may

decide for the negative, since that would usually be true. If there is

no good reason to think that one has made a vow, one may decide for the

negative, since the burden of proof is with the other side. If, in a

question about fast and abstinence, it is uncertain whether or not a

person has reached twenty-one years, or whether Friday has commenced,

the presumption is for the negative, since liberty has been in

possession; but if it is uncertain whether a person has reached the age

of sixty or whether Friday has ended, the presumption is for the

negative, since the law has been in possession.

715. Having discussed the cases to which Probabilism is not extended,

we pass on to the cases to which it is applied. Probabilism is used in

any and every case where speculative certainty as to what is lawful or

unlawful is not had, but where there is only speculative probability

against an opposite probability.

(a) Probabilism is used not only in probability of law, but also in

probability of fact that can be reduced to probability of law, as was

explained above (see 712).

(b) Probabilism is used in probability of law, whether or not the

question be about the existence or the cessation of the law. There is

probability against existence of law, when one has good reason to think

that a law was not made or not promulgated, or that the time when it

goes into force has not arrived, or that it does not apply to certain

persons or circumstances, etc.; there is probability for cessation of

law, when it is certain that a law did exist, but one has good reason

to think that it ceased or was abrogated, that one is excused or

dispensed from it.

question be natural, divine or human--that is, in every case of law

where invincible ignorance is possible (see 319 sqq., 356).

716. The claim of Probabilism is that, in all the cases given above, he

who follows an opinion excusing him from obligation, may act with a

practically certain conscience and be free of all moral guilt, if the

opinion is theoretically and seriously probable. The arguments for this

thesis are of two kinds: (a) extrinsic proofs, from the approval given

Probabilism by the Church and the favor it has enjoyed among moralists;

(b) intrinsic proofs, from the nature of law and obligation, and the

superiority of Probabilism in practice.

717. Extrinsic Arguments.--(a) The Church gave explicit approval to

Probabilism by praising the theological works of St. Alphonsus in which

Probabilism is defended; she gave and continues to give implicit

approval by the freedom she has granted to the teachers of this system

from the days of Bartholomew Medina, its first expounder (1527-1581),

down to the present. The Church even makes use of the principles of

Probabilism in interpreting her own laws, as is evidenced by such rules

of law as the following in the Decretals: “Things that are odious

should be understood strictly, things that are favorable widely” (Rule

15); “Where the law is doubtful, follow the minimum” (Rule 30); “Where

the lawgiver could have spoken more clearly, the interpretation should

be against him” (Rule 57); “The kinder interpretation should be given

penal laws” (Rule 89).

(b) In the Patristic and medieval periods Probabilism had not been

scientifically formulated, but many of the Fathers and early Doctors

solved cases probabilistically, and there are not a few passages in the

great theologians before the sixteenth century which enunciate the same

principles as those advocated by Probabilists. When the system was

formulated by Medina in 1577, it met with universal favor among

Catholic moralists, and, though it suffered an eclipse from the middle

of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, it has been

growing in influence since the days of St. Alphonsus, and appears today

to have recovered its former preeminence. Among its adherents are some

of the greatest names in the history of theology, and it is not

confined to any particular school or body.

718. Objections of Equiprobabilists.--(a) The praise given to St.

Alphonsus by the Church reflects no glory on Probabilism, since the

Saint rejected Probabilism and professed Equiprobabilism. Further, more

than one Pope, and especially Innocent XI (1676-1689), has expressed a

dislike for Probabilism, while the silence of others does not mean more

than toleration. The legal axioms used by canonists apply to the

external forum, and cannot be used equally in the forum of conscience.

(b) Probabiliorism had the field before Probabilism, having been

formulated and defended before Medina appeared, and it is that more

ancient system that is represented today in a milder form as

Equiprobabilism.

719. Answer of the Probabilists.--(a) St. Alphonsus teaches Probabilism

in his Moral Theology, which is his chief work; if later, in his old

age, he was an Equiprobabilist, it can be shown that the change was not

free, but under compulsion. As to Pope Innocent XI, he is the only Pope

who expressed disapproval of Probabilism, and even he refrained from

any official pronouncement. The fact that hundreds of works written by

Probabilists since the sixteenth century have not been censured or

forbidden by the Church authorities, indicates more than mere

toleration.

(b) Probabiliorism, as a systematized method, preceded Probabilism as a

systematized method only by a brief interval, if at all. Before the

16th century neither of these systems had been formulated, and neither

can make much of the argument of priority in time. As for

Equiprobabilism, it is first seen in the writings of Christopher

Rassler (about 1713) and of Eusebius Amort (1692-1775).

720. Intrinsic Arguments for Probabilism.--(a) Theoretical

Argument.--An uncertain law does not oblige. But a law is uncertain if

there is a solidly probable opinion against its existence, or for its

cessation, even though the other side be equally or more probable.

Therefore, he who follows such an opinion does not violate any

obligation.

(b) Practical Argument.--Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism impose on

confessors and the faithful impossible burdens, since, as was explained

above (see 683 sqq.), they require that one compare and weigh

probabilities, decide whether or not possession is had by the law or by

liberty, etc.; whereas Probabilism is simple and easily applied,

requiring only that one be convinced that one’s opinion is really

probable, and that one use it in good faith.

721. The proposition that an uncertain law does not oblige (saving

cases of validity, etc., as above, 678), is defended as follows:

(a) If the uncertainty arises from the law itself, because it has not

been clearly worded or sufficiently promulgated, the truth of the

proposition is manifest, for the very nature of law requires that it be

brought to the knowledge of those for whom it is made (see 285).

(b) If the uncertainty arises from the invincible ignorance of one who

is subject to the law, the proposition is true in the sense that no one

is a transgressor in the internal forum who fails against a law

unwittingly (see 327, 489 sqq.). But an act that transgresses no law is

lawful in conscience, for all that is not forbidden is lawful.

722. The adversaries of Probabilism offer the following criticism:

(a) As to the proposition that “an uncertain law does not oblige,” the

use of this principle by Probabilism may be considered as a begging of

the whole question; for what is in dispute is whether, in case a law is

uncertain, there is or is not a higher law that requires one to decide

for obligation. It can be shown, however, that there is such a higher

law; for the legislator cannot be willing that his ordinances be at the

mercy of every uncertainty or loophole which subtle minds can devise,

and God cannot be willing that those who are subject to laws should

expose themselves to sin by deciding against a law because it appears

to them to be of doubtful obligation.

(b) As to the proofs given for that proposition, they proceed from an

incomplete enumeration, for a law can be doubtful on account of

vincible ignorance, as well as for the reasons given. And no one will

maintain that vincible ignorance excuses.

723. The Probabilists reply: (a) The principle that “an uncertain law

does not oblige,” cannot render law nugatory, since there is question

here only of honest doubt, not of pretended or responsible ignorance.

Neither can that principle expose one to the danger of formal sin (see

249), since it is supposed that he who follows it is convinced that it

is true, and that he has the right to regulate his conduct by it. It

does expose to the danger of material sin (see 249), since the law

about which there is uncertainty may be existent; but we are not

obliged to avoid every danger of material sin, else we should be under

the intolerable necessity of fulfilling not only all certain, but all

uncertain duties. Moreover, the danger of material sin is not avoided

by any moral system except Tutiorism, since even equiprobable and more

probable opinions may be false.

(b) The enumeration of cases of doubtful law is sufficient; for, as

just remarked, only those cases are being considered in which one is

judging about one’s duty in good faith.

724. The second proposition used above as the Minor of the argument for

Probabilism--that “a law is uncertain whenever there is a solidly

probable opinion against its existence or for its cessation”--is

defended by the very definition of the term “uncertain.”

A thing is said to be accepted as certain when one yields it firm

assent and has no serious misgivings that it may be false; hence, the

uncertain is that which is not assented to firmly (the doubtful), or

that which does not exclude serious doubts about its truth (matter of

opinion). Now, a law whose existence or obligation seems likely, but

against which there militates a solidly probable argument, is not so

firmly established as to inhibit every prudent doubt. In other words,

such a law is uncertain.

725. Criticism of the Argument in the Preceding Paragraph.--(a) The

supposition on which the argument rests is false. It supposes that the

interpretation of the legal axiom that “a doubtful law does not

oblige,” should be drawn from the philosophical definition of the

terms, whereas it should be drawn from the sense given it by other

rules of law. Now, there are canonical rules which declare that in

doubt one should follow that which has possession, or that which seems

more probable. Hence, the axiom quoted by the Probabilists refers only

to cases of negative doubt; the other two rules refer to cases of doubt

in the wide sense, or to cases of opinion; otherwise, we should have to

admit that these legal maxims are contradictory, one to the other.

Thus, it appears that Probabilism is based on a principle formulated to

solve difficulties of an entirely different kind from those which the

system deals with.

(b) The argumentation itself is fallacious. It takes for granted that

an opinion is certainly and solidly probable, not only when it has no

opposite or when its opposite is less probable, but also when its

opposite is equally or more probable. This cannot be. Solid probability

on the other side of a question must create doubt about an opinion

held, and so make it at best uncertainly probable or probably probable;

while greater likelihood or presumption on the other side must make

one’s own opinion appear imprudent and unworthy of a rational being,

and therefore not solidly probable.

726. The Probabilists answer: (a) The two principles with reference to

doubtful law are understood and proved by Probabilism by an analysis of

the notions of obligation and incertitude (see 285, 654), and hence

they apply to every case that is restricted to the question of probable

lawfulness or unlawfulness.

The rules quoted against Probabilism--there are some that might also be

quoted against Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism--are opposed to it

only in appearance, since they deal with matters that are outside its

sphere (see 697). Thus, in civil cases when both ownership and

possession are doubtful, the decision must be given for the more

probable side, since the issue is not what is lawful, but what seems to

be true. As to the principle of possession, it is not, as supposed,

unfavorable, but favorable to Probabilism; since liberty, inasmuch as

it is presupposed by obligation (for only those who have freedom can

receive obligation), has priority and must be given the benefit of the

doubt, whenever a strictly probable reason in its favor cannot be

refuted.

(b) Solid probability for the law creates doubt of the truth of the

opinion for liberty, but it does not create doubt of its probability;

for truth is the agreement of one’s judgment with the facts,

probability the appearance of such agreement on account of the

arguments by which the judgment is supported. Hence, greater

probability for law does not make uncertain the probability there is

for liberty. Neither is it a sign of imprudence to accept the less

probable, if one has sincerely and diligently sought the truth; for

even the more probable may not be true, and the great majority of

moralists hold that one is not obliged to follow it.

727. Criticism of the Pragmatic Test Offered by

Probabilists.--Probabilism boasts of the ease with which it can be used

(see 700, 720); but the ease with which it can be misused is greater

still.

(a) Persons not inclined to piety must quickly fall into Laxism, if

they make use of this system, for they will accustom themselves to find

every sort of pretext to escape unwelcome duties by raising doubts and

dignifying them with the name of probable opinions; they will follow,

now one opinion, now its contrary, according as it suits their

interests; they will become stubborn in their own views, and unwilling

to change or accept instruction.

(b) Persons inclined to piety, if guided by Probabilist principles,

will soon lose all interest in what is higher and better, and content

themselves with the minimum; for in every case of uncertainty

Probabilism permits one to choose what is less safe and less probable.

728. General Answer of the Probabilists to the Objections of the

Preceding Paragraph.--(a) The history of Probabilism contradicts these

objections. From its beginning to the present day it has been defended

and followed by men noted for piety, who used kindness towards others,

but were severe with themselves. While the principles of stricter

systems have proved a torture both to confessors and penitents, no

detriment to holiness is observed from the use of Probabilism.

(b) The nature of Probabilism refutes the objections in question. There

is no system so good that it may not be perverted and turned to evil,

and stricter systems have been converted into Tutiorism or Rigorism.

But the logical and usual results of Probabilism are not a lowering of

moral standards. If these evils follow it, they do so only when it is

not rightly understood or not rightly applied.

729. The charges of a tendency to Laxism are thus answered:

(a) Probabilism holds that only learned theologians are judges of

internal probability. Others must not decide for themselves, but must

seek instruction from their spiritual guides who have competent

knowledge. The moralists themselves must not be so wedded to their

opinions that they are not always ready to change when they find they

are wrong or learn that the Church does not admit their view.

(b) Probabilism permits one to use contrary probable opinions in

different instances (e.g., to use for one will or testament the opinion

that informality makes it invalid, and for another will the opinion

that informality does not make it invalid); but it does not permit

contrary opinions to be used in the same case for one’s advantage

(e.g., to use the opinion that an informal will is valid, in order to

secure an inheritance, and at the same time to use the opinion that it

is invalid, in order to escape the payment of legacies).

it has been examined without prejudice, and has been honestly judged to

be of certain and solid value (see 708 sqq.). Neither does it approve

of the conduct of those who put themselves voluntarily in a state of

doubt. On the contrary, it considers such conduct as sinful, and as

gravely so, if the matter be serious and if this occur frequently.

Example; Titus is uncertain whether three hours remain before Communion

time, and yet he takes some refreshment, and thus makes it doubtful

whether he has the right to receive Communion. The principle that a

doubtful law does not oblige will enable Titus to receive Communion,

but it does not excuse him from venial sin in putting himself without

cause in a state of doubt and in danger of material sin.

730. The charge of a tendency to minimism in spiritual matters is thus

answered: Probabilism deals only with what is lawful, not with what is

better; it aims to show only what one may do without sin, not what one

ought to do in order to become perfect. Hence, it is used when there is

question of imposing obligations, or of deciding whether a certain

course is lawful; for in these matters one must be kind, lest by

exceeding one’s authority one drive others to sin; but it is not used

when there is question of giving spiritual advice and direction, for

here all should be exhorted to seek after progress in holiness.

731. Compensationism.--Between 1850 and 1880 a number of theologians,

feeling that there were serious difficulties against all the systems up

to then considered, developed a reformed or restricted Probabilism,

which would not be open to the criticisms made against ordinary

Probabilism, and yet would have those good qualities that make it

preferable to the stricter systems. This new doctrine is called

Compensationism, because it permits one to follow a probable opinion

against the law only when there is present a sufficient reason to

compensate for this course of action.

732. The following rules are, therefore, given as restrictions on the

use of Probabilism: (a) the more serious or the more probable the

doubtful law, the greater the reason must be to justify one in acting

against it; (b) the higher and greater the good to be obtained from the

exercise of freedom against a doubtful law, the less the reason that

suffices for exercising freedom.

733. Illustrations of the Use of Compensationism.--(a) Titus, a poor

man, is in uncertainty, through no fault of his own, about two debts.

He thinks it more probable that he owes $10 to Sempronius, and 10 cents

to Caius; but he believes it is really probable that he has paid both

debts. He foresees that, if he offers the money to Sempronius, he will

be subjected to serious quarrels and vexations, or at least that very

bad use will be made of the money; while, if he offers to pay Caius,

the latter may take some slight offense. He decides that there are

proportionate reasons in each case to justify his following the less

probable opinion.

(b) Fr. Titus thinks that a penitent is more probably bound to ask

pardon of one whom he has offended. But he knows that, if he imposes

the obligation, the present good faith of the penitent will be changed

to bad faith, and he will refuse to do what is imposed. Fr. Titus

decides, therefore, that it will be more profitable for the penitent if

the less probable opinion--that there is no obligation--be followed.

734. The two chief arguments for Compensationism, which are also the

two chief objections it makes against ordinary Probabilism, are:

(a) The obligation of a law depends on the knowledge one has about it.

If one knows that the law exists, there is certain obligation; if one

knows that the law does not exist, there is no obligation; if one holds

it as probable that the law exists, there is probable obligation. Now,

since one may not be excused from obligation unless there is a reason

proportionate to the obligation itself (see 495), he who is under

probable or more probable obligation must have a graver reason for

using freedom than he who is under no obligation (against Probabilism),

but he need not have as grave a reason as one who is under a certain

obligation (against Probabiliorism). Hence, one may not act against a

probable law, unless by so doing there is some good secured that

compensates for the danger to which the right of the law is exposed.

(b) It is lawful to perform a good act from which an evil effect will

result, only if one has a proportionally grave cause for permitting the

evil effect (see 102 sqq.). But he who follows the opinion for liberty

against a more probable or equally probable opinion for law, performs

an act from which will probably result the evil of a material

transgression of law. Therefore, one may not use Probabilism unless by

so doing there is some good secured that compensates for the danger of

material sin to which one exposes oneself.

735. Criticisms from the Probabilists.--(a) The dictum that a doubtful

law obliges doubtfully cannot be applied, for in actual life there is

no middle way between decision for the law and decision for liberty,

unless it be indecision. The principle of Compensationism must mean,

then, that we must always decide for a doubtful law (which is

Tutiorism), or remain in suspense (which is no help to the one in

doubt).

(b) The supposition that there must always be some special reason of

good to offset the evil of the danger of material sin is not correct.

For there always exists a compensation proportionate to the danger,

namely, the exercise of liberty, a great gift of God, and the avoidance

of the burden of fulfilling all uncertain obligations.

736. Reply of the Compensationists.--(a) The principle that a doubtful

law obliges doubtfully means only that the reasons in favor of the law

deserve some consideration, and should not be put aside unless one has

some better reason than mere arbitrariness, self-will, or the intention

to take always the easier way. There is no question of either Tutiorism

or hesitation, but only of a prudent and honest facing of the fact that

there are two sides to one’s doubt.

(b) It is not true that the exercise of liberty and the escape from the

burden of uncertain obligations are always a sufficient compensation

for the danger of material sin. For material sin is not only an evil in

itself, as being a violation of law; it is also the source of many and

great evils both to the individual and society, such as wrong habits

acquired, scandal given, etc. Liberty is a great gift, but it should

not become a cloak for malice. Neither is the foregoing of liberty so

great an evil that one should not be willing to suffer it now and then

in order to prevent the greater evils spoken of just above.

737. Other Objections Against the System of Compensation.

(a) From Authority.--Compensationism is of very recent origin, and it

cannot be admitted that the right solution of moral difficulties was

unknown before this new system appeared.

(b) From Reason.--It runs counter to the principle commonly accepted in

the controversies of the systems, namely, that the decisive factor as

to obligation in doubt is knowledge. For it introduces a new factor,

that of sufficient reason or compensation.

should always have a suitable reason for adopting a probable opinion in

favor of liberty. But, when one attempts to apply this rule to actual

cases, difficulties innumerable arise (searchings of motives, comparison

of probabilities, measuring of consequences, etc.), so that for use

Compensationism is impossible, or impracticable.

738. Reply of Compensationists.--(a) Compensationism is an example of

doctrinal progression from the implicit to the explicit. The principles

on which it is based are found in the teaching and practice of the most

ancient authorities.

(b) Sufficient reason is not a new principle, since it is admitted by

all moralists for the case of double effect (see above, 102 Sqq.); its

application to the solution of doubts of conscience is not an

innovation, since the cases of doubt and of double effect are analogous.

who have not sufficient theological training, but as a guide for

moralists, directors and confessors. That it is not difficult, is clear

from the fact that it is only an application of the commonly accepted

principle of double effect, and that Probabilists themselves recommend

it and make very general use of it, as if they instinctively recognized

its necessity.

739. Practical Conclusions.--From the foregoing discussions one may

deduce three rules for the guidance of those who are not expert

theologians:

(a) If your state of conscience is certitude (i.e., if you are firmly

convinced which way your duty lies), entertain no fears or scrupulous

doubts, and, having done your part to understand your obligations, you

need not hesitate to follow your conscience.

(b) If your state of conscience is imprudent assent (i.e., the

acceptance of what you recognize as unlikely), or if it is suspended

assent (i.e., a wavering between opposites), do not act blindly, but

seek truth and decision.

what you regard as likely though uncertain), consult your confessor or

another competent theologian; if there is no time for this, decide for

any course that seems true and prudent (see on perplexed conscience,

611 sqq.).

740. Regarding the respective merits and the use of the rival systems

of conscience, the following conclusions may be drawn:

(a) If there is question of what is to be counselled, one should be a

“Meliorist,” for the better and more perfect is more advisable than

what is merely good or lawful. All Christians should be directed to

aspire after holiness, but, if one is unwilling to follow a counsel, it

should not be imposed on him as a precept. Naturally, of those in

higher station higher things are required.

(b) As between doubt and certitude regarding obligations, one must be a

“Certitudinist,” that is, one must resolve doubts or slight

probabilities into direct or indirect certitude (as was explained above

in 641 sqq.). If a doubt remains, one must for that case be a

Tutiorist, that is, one must follow the safer side (as explained in

661).

when some law requires this, as is the case when validity or supreme

rights are at stake (as explained in 678, 679).

(d) As between the more likely and the less likely, one must be a

Probabiliorist, when this is according to law, as is the case in civil

suits where the preponderance of evidence must be followed (see 697).

(e) One may not follow either Tutiorism (see above, 676) as a general

moral system, nor Laxism (see above, 681).

(f) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by no contrary

probable opinion or by none whose arguments cannot be overcome, one is

free to follow that opinion, as explained in 649, 703.

(g) If a probable opinion for liberty is opposed by an opinion that is

less, equally or more probable, one is free to act according to the

principles of Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism or

Compensationism, according to conviction.

741. As for the use of moral systems by confessors, the two following

rules are generally admitted:

(a) If a penitent has formed his conscience according to one moral

system, the confessor has no right to impose on him the opinion of a

different moral system; for the Church allows liberty.

(b) If a penitent has not formed his conscience according to any moral

system and seeks the answer to a moral doubt, the confessor should

decide, not necessarily for what his own system declares lawful, but

for what appears, all the circumstances being considered, to be most

advantageous spiritually for the penitent. Example: Fr. Titus is a

Probabilist, and he usually advises questioners to follow opinions that

are less probable; while Fr. Caius, who is a Probabiliorist, always

requires that such persons follow the more probable opinions. Both act

unwisely. For persons who are better disposed, it will often be more

profitable to follow what is more probable or favorable to obligation;

for those Whose dispositions are less good, milder opinions may be

recommended, lest the smoking flax of goodness that is in them be

entirely extinguished. Neither is it right to impose as certain an

obligation which the penitent, if he were acquainted with Moral

Theology, would see is controverted.

742. In case of disagreement between confessor and penitent as to

whether absolution may be given, whose opinion should prevail? (a) If

the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the confessor

himself has to judge (e.g., the disposition of the penitent, the

requisite matter for absolution, etc.), the opinion of the confessor

must prevail; for the act of judging is his own, and he must be guided

therefore by his own conviction.

(b) If the disagreement is concerned with matters about which the

confessor is not the judge (such as the controversies of schools and

theologians), the confessor may not refuse absolution to a

well-disposed penitent, just because the latter will not accept the

opinion of his school or system. If it be manifest that the penitent’s

opinion is false or improbable, absolution may be denied him, unless it

seems more prudent to leave him in good faith.

628. Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about the Performance of