487. Cessation of Obligation.--The ordin_Moral theology

to be obligatory for an individual are: (a) on the part of the subject,

that he ceases to be subject to the law (exemption), or is unable to

observe it (excuse); (b) on the part of the lawgiver, that he removes

the obligation for the individual (dispensation).

488. As to exemption from Church laws note: (a) he who ceases to

be subject to the law (e.g., one who has received a privilege of

exemption, or who has departed from the place where the law is in

force), is of course not obliged by the law; (b) neither is he guilty

of any fault if he brought about his freedom only just before the law

became effective and with the sole purpose of being exempt; for the law

does not oblige that one remain subject to it.

489. Excuses from the law are reduced to two, namely, ignorance and

impossibility.

(a) Ignorance excuses from the guilt of non-observance, if it is

inculpable (see 24 sqq.). The question now is whether or not and when

it excuses from legal consequences, such as invalidity, penalty,

reservation of sin, etc.

(b) Impossibility excuses from both obligation and guilt.

490. Ignorance of ecclesiastical law or of a penalty attached to the

law has the following effects determined in the law: (a) No kind of

ignorance excuses from irritating or inhabilitating laws, unless the

contrary is expressly provided for in the law itself (Canon 16, Sec.

1). Thus a person who contracts marriage, while ignorant that he and

the other person are first cousins, is invalidly married.

(b) Affected ignorance of ecclesiastical law or of the penalty alone

does not excuse from any penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229,

Sec.1).

fuerit, scienter, studiose, temerarie, consulto egerit_, or others

similar to them which require full knowledge and deliberation, any

diminution of imputability on the part of either the intellect or the

will exempts the delinquent from penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon

2229, Sec.2). (d) If the law does not contain such words, crass or

supine ignorance of the law or even of only the penalty does not exempt

from any penalty _latae sententiae_; ignorance that is not crass or

supine exempts from medicinal penalties, but not from vindicative

penalties _latae sententiae_ (Canon 2229, Sec.3, 1).

491. Other specific determinations of the law include: (a) Inculpable

ignorance of the law itself excludes moral imputability (Canon 2202,

Sec.1); actual inculpable inadvertence or error in regard to the law

has the same effect (Canon 2202, Sec.3). (b) Culpable ignorance, or

culpable inadvertence, or error concerning the law or concerning

the fact diminish imputability more or less in proportion to the

culpability of the ignorance (Canon 2202, Sec.1). (c) If the ignorance,

even inculpable, affects only the fact of the existence of the penalty,

it does not exclude imputability of the delict, but it does diminish it

(Canon 2202, Sec.2).

492. Absolute or physical impossibility (i.e., the want of the power

or of the means of complying with a law), of course, excuses from its

observance; for no one is bound to what is impossible. This applies to

divine law, and hence much more to human law. Example: He who is unable

to leave the house is not obliged to go to Mass.

493. Moral impossibility--that is, the inability to comply with the law

without extraordinary labor, or the imminent danger of losing a notable

good or of incurring a great evil--does not excuse from the observance

of ecclesiastical law when this law receives through circumstances

the added force of the negative law of nature. This happens when the

evil that will result through the observance of the law bears no

proportion to the evil that will result from its violation, the former

being private or temporal or human, the latter public or spiritual or

divine; for the law of nature forbids that the common welfare, or the

salvation of a soul, or the honor of God be sacrificed for the benefit

of an individual, or for the life of the body, or for the welfare of a

creature. Example: The command to abstain from meat on Friday obliges,

if one has been ordered to violate it as a sign of contempt of God or

of religion, even though death is threatened for refusal.

494. Moral impossibility excuses from the observance of a human law in

the following cases:

(a) One is excused when a considerable loss in health, reputation,

spiritual advantage, property, etc., or a grave inconvenience will

result from observing a law which is not a prohibition of nature in

the sense of the previous paragraph; for the legislator cannot impose

obligations that are needlessly heavy, and hence positive law does not

oblige in case of such moral impossibility. Example: Our Lord reproved

the inhuman rigor of the Pharisees, who insisted that their regulations

must be observed, whatever the difficulty or cost.

(b) One is excused when a lower or less urgent law is in conflict

with a law that is higher or more urgent. In such a case the greater

obligation prevails, and the lesser obligation disappears. Examples:

The divine laws that one must preserve one’s life or administer Baptism

to a dying person prevail over the human law of attendance at church.

The less urgent law of fasting yields to the more urgent law of

devoting oneself to duties required by one’s state of life, if there is

a conflict between the two laws.

495. The loss, evil or inconvenience that constitutes moral

impossibility with respect to a law, must bear a proportion to the

law itself; and hence the higher or the more imperative the law, the

greater must be the reason that suffices to excuse from it.

496. Only a learned and prudent man can determine whether moral

impossibility exists with reference to a particular case, and hence it

would be dangerous for those who are not theologians to decide, either

for themselves or for others. The points that have to be considered

in judging are: (a) whether or not the difficulty is of a gravity

proportionate to the importance of the law (e.g., a graver reason is

required to excuse from a law that obliges under mortal sin than to

excuse from a law that binds under light sin); (b) whether or not the

difficulty is grave in relation to the person concerned (e.g., an

obligation that is easy for a healthy person may be very difficult for

one who is infirm).

497. It is never lawful to bring about either physical or moral

impossibility of observing a law, if this be done with the sole or

principal purpose of escaping one’s duty. Example: To go away on

Saturday in order to avoid Mass on Sunday.

498. It is lawful to cause impossibility of observing a law, if there

be some sufficient reason for doing this; for it is lawful to do

something from which two effects, one good and the other bad, result,

if the good effect is the one intended, and there is a sufficient

reason for permitting the evil effect (102 sqq.). Example: It is

sometimes lawful to do some extra work that is very useful, even if the

labor makes one unable to observe a fast.

499. The sufficient reason spoken of in the last paragraph is one that

is proportionate to the urgency and importance of the command and to

the frequency of the non-observance. Examples: A greater reason is

required to take up some work which will make it impossible to keep the

fast, if this be done on the fast day itself, than if it be done the

day before. A far greater reason is required to take up some work that

makes the observance of the fast impossible, if this happens frequently

or habitually, than if it happens only once or twice.

500. Cessation of Law.--A law ceases in two ways.

(a) It ceases from without (i.e., from the act of the legislator),

when he abolishes it, by total or partial revocation (abrogation,

derogation), or by the institution of a new law directly contrary to it

(obrogation). In the new Code of Canon Law there are many instances of

revocation or obrogation of older legislation (see Canons 22, 23), as

in the matter of censures and matrimonial impediments. Examples: In the

diocese of X a minor feast was made a holyday of obligation. This law

was abrogated, if later on it was decreed that neither the prohibition

against servile works nor the precept of hearing Mass was obligatory

for that feast; it was derogated from, if later it was decreed that

servile works were permitted, but Mass was obligatory for that day; it

was obrogated, if a later law included the minor feast in a list of

special days of devotion for which the hearing of Mass was recommended.

(b) A law ceases from within (i.e., of itself), when through change of

conditions the purpose for which it was made no longer exists, or is no

longer served by the law.

501. The purpose for which a law was made ceases to be served by the

law in two cases.

(a) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been a benefit,

it has become a detriment, inasmuch as its observance now would be

wicked, or impossible, or too burdensome. In this case the law ceases,

since it is now contrary to the supreme law that the common welfare be

promoted. Example: A particular law forbade the use of fat or grease

in the preparation of food on days of abstinence. Later, it became

impossible to procure the substitutes previously used.

(b) A law no longer serves its purpose, if, from having been useful, it

has become useless, inasmuch as it is no longer necessary for the end

intended by the lawgiver. In this case the law ceases, for regulations

should not be imposed needlessly. Example: The Council of Jerusalem

made a law that the faithful should abstain from using as food animals

that had been strangled (Acts, xv. 20). The purpose of the law was to

avoid offense to the Jewish converts, who at that time formed a large

part of the Christian community and who had a religious abhorrence for

such food. But shortly afterwards, the Gentile element having become

stronger in the Church, no attention was paid to ceremonial rules of

Judaism.

502. A law ceases to serve its purpose also as follows:

(a) The law becomes harmful or useless with reference to the purpose

of the lawgiver generally and permanently, if the changed conditions

affect the whole community or the great majority, and are lasting. In

this case the law ceases; for, since it is made for the community as

a whole and as a lasting ordinance, it cannot endure, if it becomes

permanently unserviceable to the community. Examples are given in the

previous paragraph.

(b) The law becomes harmful or useless with reference to the lawgiver’s

purpose privately or temporarily, if the harm or uselessness affects

only individuals, or is not lasting. In this case the law continues to

be an instrument of public welfare, or is only momentarily deprived

of its beneficial character. Hence it endures; but for temporary

inconvenience to the public a remedy is had in suspension of the

law, for inconvenience to individuals in dispensation. Example: If

the use of fats or grease were forbidden on days of abstinence, and

if for a time only it were impossible to obtain the substitutes for

the preparation of the food, the law would not cease, but would be

suspended until such time as substitutes could be obtained.

503. The inconvenience caused to individuals from the fact that a law

does not serve its purpose in a case before them, does not always

justify the use of _epieikeia_.

(a) If the observance of the law would be detrimental to the purpose

intended by the lawgiver, _epieikeia_ might be used; for the lawgiver

does not intend that his law should be an obstacle to what he has in

view as its end. Example: Caius needs to read a book placed on the

Index in order to defend the Faith against attacks, but he is unable

to request the general faculty to read forbidden works. Obedience to

the law in this case would defeat the purpose of the law, which is the

protection of faith, and hence Caius may use epieikeia.

(b) If the observance of the law would be unnecessary, but not

detrimental as regards the purpose of the lawgiver, _epieikeia_ may not

be used; else the law would lose its force through the judgments of

individuals in their own favor, and the common welfare would suffer.

Examples: Titus has an opportunity to read a book placed on the Index,

but has not the time to apply for permission. The work was condemned

as dangerous to faith; but Titus is strong in faith, and wishes only

to study the literary qualities of the writer. Sempronius, a parish

priest, is requested to officiate at a marriage immediately, without

proclaiming the banns or seeking a dispensation from proclamation. The

purpose of the law of banns is that impediments may be detected and

invalid marriages avoided, and Sempronius is absolutely certain that

there is no impediment in the case before him. Titus and Sempronius

must observe the law, and the same must be said as regards every actual

case in which there is the possibility of self-deception and peril

to the common good. The theoretical case, in which neither of these

inconveniences would be present, need not be considered.

504. The purpose of the law ceases to exist as follows:

(a) adequately, when all the reasons on account of which it was made

are no longer in existence; in such a case the law itself ceases, for

the lawgiver is not considered as intending to oblige when the reason

for obligation has ceased. Example: If the bishop orders prayers to be

said for rain, the prayers cease to be obligatory when rain has come;

(b) inadequately, when the reason for the law has ceased partially,

but not entirely. In such a case the law does not cease, for it still

remains useful. Example: If the bishop orders prayers for peace and

rain, the prayers are obligatory until both requests have been obtained.

505. A law ceases, therefore, in greater or less degree, according to

circumstances. (a) It ceases entirely or partially, according as it

is revoked or as it becomes useless as to all its provisions, or only

as to one or more of them; (b) it ceases permanently or temporarily,

according as the revocation or cessation is only for a time, or for

good.

506. Custom.--In Canon Law custom can interpret, abrogate or introduce

law, provided: (a) it has the qualities of legitimate custom, and (b)

its existence is proved juridically, or is notorious.

507. According to their extension, customs are of various kinds.

(a) Universal customs are those that prevail in the entire Church;

(b) particular customs are those that are confined to a territorial

portion of the Church (e.g., a province of the Church or of an

Order); (c) special customs are those that are followed in societies

that are smaller, but capable of having their own laws (e.g.,

independent monasteries); (d) most special customs are those observed

by individuals, or by communities not capable of having their own

legislation (e.g., parishes). At the most, customs of this last class

have only the force of privilege (Canon 26).

508. Custom is formed as follows. (a) As to origin, it arises from

the practice of the people, when this practice is followed with the

purpose of making or unmaking a law. Hence, the habitual way of acting

of an individual, even if he be the superior, does not give rise to a

custom. By “people” here is meant a community capable of having its own

law (Canon 26). (b) As to legal force, custom arises solely from the

consent of the Pope or other prelate, when this consent is expressed by

the law or lawgiver, or tacitly admitted by him. Hence, a custom not

approved by the superior has no legal force (Canon 25).

509. A custom can introduce or abrogate any kind of ecclesiastical law

or other custom--penal, prohibitive, irritant--if it is reasonable and

has lasted the prescribed time (Canons 27, 28). Examples: A law that

forbids contrary customs can be abrogated, according to the Code, by

such customs when they are immemorial, or a century old (Canon 27, Sec.

1). The impediment of disparity of worship became diriment through

custom; it was custom that introduced the obligation of the Divine

Office, and that mitigated the early law of fast.

510. A custom expressly disapproved of in law is not reasonable or

legitimate, and cannot derogate from an existing law, nor establish a

new law (Canons 27, 28).

511. The time prescribed by the Code of Canon Law for the acquisition

of legal force by customs that have not the personal consent of the

lawgiver is as follows: (a) forty continuous and complete years are

required to unmake an ordinary law; one hundred years to unmake a law

that forbids future contrary custom (Canon 27, Sec. 1); (b) forty

continuous and complete years are likewise required to make a new law

(Canon 28).

512. The effect of the Code on customs previously existing was

considered above under 421.

513. Like the written law, custom ceases: (a) from within, when its

purpose has ceased entirely; (b) from without, when it is abrogated by

desuetude, or by a contrary law or custom (Canon 30).

514. Laws in a Wide Sense.--In addition to laws strictly so-called,

there are laws in a wide sense, commands or provisions made by

ecclesiastical superiors that have not all the conditions given above

(see 285) for law. Such are: (a) precepts, which differ from law,

because they are given not to the community or permanently, but to

individuals or temporarily; (b) rescripts, which are given with regard

to particular cases and without the solemnity of law; (c) privileges,

which are not obligatory; (d) dispensations, which are relaxations of

law granted to individuals.

515. A precept is a command given to individuals, or for an individual

case, by a competent superior.

(a) It is a command obliging in conscience, and so differs from

counsel, desire, exhortation.

(b) It is given to individuals, and thus differs from law, which has

the character of universality and stability. A precept may be imposed

on a community, but even then it is particular, as being given only for

an individual case or for a certain length of time--for a month or a

year, or during the lifetime of the superior.

from law, since laws can be made only by one who has jurisdictional or

public authority (see above, 285), while precepts may be given also

by those who have only dominative or private authority (as parents,

heads of families, husbands, employers, abbesses). In canonical matters

precepts may be given by religious superiors, parish priests, rectors

of seminaries, and for the court of conscience by the confessor.

516. Precept is similar to law: (a) as to its object, which must be

just, good, and possible of observance; (b) as to its binding force,

since it can be imposed even on those who are unwilling.

517. Precepts are personal (i.e., they affect the person to whom they

are given wherever he may be), unless they are given as territorial

(Canon 24). Hence: (a) a precept given by one who has no territorial

authority (e.g., a religious superior) is personal; (b) a precept

given by the Pope, whose authority includes every territory, is also

personal; (c) a precept given by the bishop is personal, if given to

an individual; it is personal or territorial if given to a community,

according to the nature of the case or the wording of the precept.

Example: The precept not to go to theatres during a journey, imposed by

a bishop under pain of suspension, obliges everywhere, both as to fault

and as to penalty.

518. As to the force of precepts: (a) morally or as to fault, they

oblige, so that the violator is guilty of disobedience and of sin

against any particular virtue the superior willed to impose under

precept; (b) juridically or as to the penalty prescribed, they do

not oblige, unless the precept was given legally--i.e., by a written

document, or in the presence of two witnesses, etc. (Canon 24).

Example: If a precept was given under the penalty of loss of office,

but without the legal formalities, the canonical process and sentence

of deprivation could not be resorted to.

519. A precept expires of itself with the expiration of the authority

that gave it (e.g., at the death or cessation of office of the

superior), unless the precept was given by document or before witnesses

(Canon 24).

520. A rescript is a written reply made by the Holy See or the

Ordinary to a request, statement, or consultation. Replies of this

kind are employed in reference to the concession of benefices and to

dispositions to be made concerning litigation and judicial procedure.

Usually they grant favors, either transitory--e.g., a dispensation--or

permanent--e.g., a privilege (Canons 36-62).

521. A privilege is a special and permanent right granted by a ruler to

an individual or community to act contrary to or beyond the law.

(a) It is a permanent right, and so resembles law, which is also stable

and forbids interference with what it grants.

(b) It is a special right, and so it differs from law, which is general

and imposes obligation. It is sometimes styled “private law.” Moreover,

law requires promulgation, privilege requires only acceptance.

legislator), and thus it differs from permission granted by a simple

superior.

(d) It is granted to a person, that is, to an individual (Titus, Caius,

Balbus, etc.) or to a congregation or community; for, if granted to

all, it would not be special.

(e) A privilege gives the right to act contrary to the general law

(e.g., by exempting from a tax) or beyond the general law (e.g., by

granting the power to dispense). Thus, a privilege differs also from

prerogatives that are set down in the Code itself (e.g., the special

rights and faculties of Cardinals, bishops, regulars, etc.), all of

which are laws and not privileges in the strict sense.

522. The rules for interpretation of privileges are similar to those

for the interpretation of law (see 483 sqq.). They should be neither

extended nor restricted, but should be understood according to the

meaning of the words themselves (Canon 67), yet so that the party

receiving the privilege will seem to have obtained a favor (Canon 68).

If the meaning intended is doubtful, the following rules of the Code

(Canons 50, 68) should be followed: (a) wide interpretation is to be

given to the privileges that are beyond or outside of the law and that

are not prejudicial to others, as well as to privileges that were

given as a reward of merit; (b) strict interpretation is to be given

to privileges that are contrary to law (saving the cases of privileges

granted to pious causes or in favor of a community), to privileges

granted because of an agreement made, and to privileges that are

prejudicial to third parties.

523. A privilege is a favor, and hence does not as such impose the duty

of acceptance or use; but obligations owed to others often make it

necessary to avail oneself of a privilege (Canon 69).

(a) Prerogatives granted in the law cannot be renounced by individuals,

since their preservation is required by the common good. Example: A

cleric has no right to abandon an immunity which the law gives to his

state.

(b) Privileges granted to a community can be renounced by the

community, but not by its individual members. An individual member is

not bound, however, to use the privilege, unless there be accidental

reasons, such as the command of a superior, that require him to do so.

there be accidental reasons that call on one to use a privilege.

Example: A priest who has the privilege of a private oratory is not

bound to establish such an oratory; but a priest who has the privilege

of absolving from reserved cases is bound in charity to use it, if a

penitent would otherwise suffer.

524. Dispensation differs from privilege: (a) because the former from

its nature is temporary, the latter permanent; (b) because the former

is always contrary to the law, whereas the latter may be only beyond

the law.

525. The Pope can dispense as follows: (a) in all ecclesiastical laws

he can grant a dispensation strictly so-called (Canon 81); (b) in

divine laws in which the obligation depends on an act of the human will

(such as the laws of oaths, vows, contracts, etc.), he can grant a

dispensation improperly so-called (see above, 313 sqq., 357), In other

divine laws, he can interpret or declare, but he cannot dispense.

526. The Ordinary can dispense as follows: (a) in the general law of

the Church when he has an explicit or implicit faculty from the Pope or

from the law (Canon 81); (b) in diocesan laws and, in particular cases,

also in laws of provincial and plenary councils, when there is just

reason (Canon 82); (c) in papal laws made for a particular territory,

when faculty has been given explicitly or implicitly, or recourse to

the Holy See is difficult (Canon 82); (d) in all ecclesiastical laws

that are dispensable, when there is doubt of fact (Canon 15).

527. The pastor can dispense as follows: (a) from the general law

concerning feasts of obligation and from the laws of fast and

abstinence. The dispensation can be granted either to his own subjects

or to strangers, but only for a just reason, in individual instances

and for particular individuals or families. The bishop may dispense the

whole diocese, but the pastor cannot dispense the whole parish (Canon

1245). (b) When there is danger of death, the pastor can dispense from

matrimonial impediments as provided in Canon 1044.

528. Religious superiors, local superiors included, can dispense in the

laws and statutes of their own institutes, except where this is

forbidden. In clerical and exempt institutes the superiors can also

dispense the subjects and all who live day and night in the religious

house (such as students, guests and servants) from the general laws of

the Church, as follows:

(a) The higher superiors, such as abbots, generals, provincials, have

the same authority in this respect as the bishop has with reference to

his own diocese. Hence, they can dispense in all ecclesiastical laws

in which the Pope dispenses, when there is doubt of fact, or recourse

to the Holy See is difficult (Canons 15, 81); in case of necessity,

they can dispense from the laws of abstinence individuals, or an entire

convent, or an entire province (Canon 1245, Sec. 2); they can dispense

in irregularities as provided in Canon 990, Sec. 1.

(b) The other superiors, local superiors included, can dispense their

subjects from the laws of fast and abstinence in the same manner as

pastors are able to dispense their parishioners (Canon 1245, Sec. 3),

Religious superiors are also able to dispense the private non-reserved

vows of their subjects (Canons 1313, Sec. 2, 1314).

529. Confessors, when delegated, can dispense as follows: (a) with

ordinary faculties, from impediments, irregularities and penalties, as

provided in Canons 1044, 1045, 985, 990, 2290; (b) with privileged

faculties, from simple vows not reserved to the Pope, if no injury is

done to the rights of a third party; and from occult irregularity

produced by delinquency, that from homicide excepted. (In the internal

sacramental forum the confessor can dispense from the impediments

indicated in Canons 1043-1045.)

530. Priests that assist at marriages can dispense from impediments as

provided in Canons 1043-1045.

531. The manner of seeking dispensations is as follows: (a) for the

usual dispensations (e.g., those from fast, abstinence, observance of

feasts, and the vows that may be dispensed by confessors) no particular

procedure is required; (b) for the dispensation that must be sought

from the Holy See, if the matter belongs to the internal forum, the

petition is sent to the Sacred Penitentiary through the Confessor or

Ordinary; if it belongs to the external forum, it is sent to the

competent Congregation through the parish priest or Ordinary.

Dispensation from public marriage impediments must be sent through the

Ordinary.

532. The manner of preparing a petition for dispensation is as follows:

(a) the name of the penitent must not be given in petitions to the

Sacred Penitentiary, but the name and address of the party to whom the

reply is to be sent should be clearly given; (b) the petition should be

sent by letter. It may be written in any language, and should state the

case with its circumstances, the favor that is asked, and the true

reason for asking it.

533. A dispensation is invalidated as follows: (a) through defect of

the petition, if it contains a substantial error, and the dispensation

is given on condition of substantial truth (Canon 40); (b) through

defect of the petitioner, if he is incapable of receiving the favor

asked (Canon 46); (c) through defect of the dispensation, as when the

requisite signature or seal is omitted; (d) through defect of the

dispenser, as when he lacks jurisdiction, or grants without a just and

proportionate reason a dispensation for which he has only delegated

power (Canon 84).

534. If a dispensation is unjustly refused, note the following: (a)

ordinarily, the subject has not the right to hold himself free from the

law; (b) in extraordinary circumstances, when the law ceases, or no

longer obliges (see 487 sqq.), the subject is free.

535. The faculty of dispensing should be interpreted as follows: (a)

widely, when it was granted for cases in general (Canon 200, Sec.1); (b)

strictly, when it is granted for a particular case (Canon 85).

536. A dispensation itself should be interpreted strictly in the

following cases: (a) when the dispensation has an odious side, as when

it is contrary to law and advantageous to private interest or is

detrimental to a third party; (b) when wide interpretation is

dangerous, as favoring injustice, promoting ambition, etc. (Canons 50,

85).

537. A dispensation ceases intrinsically in the following ways: (a) by

the lapse of the period of time for which it was granted; (b) by the

entire and certain cessation of the motive of the dispensation, if the

effect of the dispensation is divisible--that is, if the motive for

dispensation has to be existent each time that the law calls for an act

or omission (Canon 86). Example: If one is dispensed from the fast or

Office on account of ill-health, and later recovers, the dispensation

ceases.

538. A dispensation ceases extrinsically in the following ways: (a) by

the act of the one who dispensed, if he validly recalls the

dispensation, or by his cessation from office, if he limited the

dispensation to his own term of authority (Canons 86, 73); (b) by the

act of the one who was dispensed, if he renounces the dispensation

without detriment to any third party, and with the consent of the

superior (Canons 86, 72).

539. A dispensation does not cease in the following cases through the

cessation of the motive for which it was given:

(a) If the motive ceases only partially or doubtfully, even though the

effect of the dispensation be divisible--that is, requiring the

existence of the motive for the grant each time the dispensation is

used. For, if the dispensation ceased in such cases, its benefit would

frequently be in great part lost on account of the worry and scruple to

which the persons dispensed would be exposed. Example: Balbus has been

dispensed from fast on account of poor health. Later on he improves,

but has not recovered his strength entirely, or at least is not certain

of his recovery. He may continue still to use the dispensation.

(b) A dispensation does not cease if the motive ceases entirely and

certainly, but the effect of the dispensation is indivisible--that is,

removing the entire obligation once for all.

Example: Titus is a widower with several young children. He wishes to

marry in order to have a home for the children, and this wish is the

motive of a dispensation given him from an impediment of affinity to

the marriage he contemplates. But before the marriage takes place, the

children die, The dispensation still holds good.

540. A dispensation does not cease by reason of the grantor in the

following cases:

(a) It does not cease through the grantor’s cessation from authority,

if it was given independently of his term of office. Example:

Sempronius received a dispensation “valid until recall,” but never made

use of it. Although now the grantor has died, the dispensation

continues in force.

(b) It does not cease, if the grantor invalidly recalls the

dispensation, as when he dispenses from delegated power and his

authority ceases with the act of dispensation. Example: Balbus, a

confessor, dispensed Caius from the law of abstinence, but now wishes

to recall the dispensation. The dispensation remains.

541. A dispensation does not cease on account of the person dispensed

in the following cases:

(a) It does not cease when he leaves the territory of the dispenser, if

the dispensation was personal. Example: A person dispensed from the

general law of fast by indult granted to his diocese cannot use that

dispensation outside the diocese; but if he has a personal

dispensation, he is dispensed everywhere.

(b) It does not cease when the grantee fails to use it, or acts

contrary to it, if there is no renunciation on his part. Examples:

Sempronius has been dispensed from the fast of Lent, but he fasts on

some days. This non-use of the dispensation on some days does not renew

the obligation. Balbus has received a dispensation to marry Sempronia,

but he changes his mind and marries Claudia. This act contrary to the

dispensation does not take away its force, and, if Claudia dies, he

will be free to marry Sempronia.

Art. 6: CIVIL LAW

542. Meaning.--Just as the Church has the right and duty to make laws

which will promote the spiritual welfare of her members, so has the

State the power and obligation to legislate for the temporal happiness

of its citizens: “There is no power but from God and those that are,

are ordained of God. He (the ruler) is God’s minister to thee for good”

(Rom., xiii. 1, 4).

543. Origin.--The authority to make civil laws resides in that person

or body to whom according to the constitution of the State the

legislative function belongs. (a) In an absolute monarchy, the

legislative authority is vested in the prince; (b) in a state that has

an appointed or hereditary aristocracy, the legislative power may be

entrusted, at least in part, to a body of nobles; (c) in a limited

monarchy or republic the lawmaking function belongs to the people, who

exercise it either directly or (as is the case in most modern states)

indirectly through elected representatives.

544. The acceptance of civil law by the people is not necessary for its

obligation, for obedience to higher powers is commanded (Rom., xiii,

5), and, if law has no authority, the common welfare is defeated.

Several points must, however, be noted.

(a) The foregoing principle is to be understood of law in itself, for,

if there is question of the form of government or of him who exercises

the powers of sovereignty, acceptance by the people may be said to be

necessary in the sense that the multitude may set up the particular

system of rule which it prefers, and may designate the individuals who

are to wield authority under the constitution adopted.

(b) The principle given above is to be accepted regularly speaking, for

there may be cases in which the acceptance of the people is required by

law itself. Example: Under former civil constitutions, if in a certain

place a lawful custom was in force, a contrary law which did not

expressly abolish the custom did not oblige unless accepted. But this

example is theoretical, for modern civil codes do not recognize the

derogatory force of custom. If the constitution of the state calls for

a referendum or plebiscite (i.e., submission to the electors for

ratification), then the bill passed by the legislature or a measure

proposed by the initiative body lacks force until accepted. This

illustrates acceptance of a proposed law, but the acceptance is

supplemented by some ministerial act.

of a law, for the continuance of a law may depend on the acceptance of

the people in the sense that a contrary custom of the people is able to

abrogate law, if the superior consents (see 500 sqq.). Few codes of

modern states give legal force to popular custom; they suppose that, if

a law is not satisfactory to the people, the way is open to its repeal

through exercise of the suffrage. But, morally speaking, there is no

obligation to obey a law that has fallen into desuetude.

545. As to laws made by one who has no lawful authority, we should

note: (a) of themselves, they have no binding force, since law is an

act of authority; (b) from the necessities of the case, they are

obligatory, if, being otherwise just, they are accepted by the great

body of the people; for to resist them then would be prejudicial to

public order.

546. Subject-Matter.--The objects or classes of temporal goods that

fall under the regulation of civil law are many:

(a) external goods, or goods of fortune, which should have the

protection of the State; and the laws regarding them should promote

agriculture, commerce, industry, the arts, etc.;

(b) the goods of the body, which are more important still, and hence

the law should favor the family and the increase of its members, and

should provide for the health and well-being of the citizens by

sanitary regulations and measures of relief for the needy, the

unemployed, the orphans, and the aged;

happiness, and hence the law should provide the means for instruction

in the secular arts and sciences and for the general diffusion of

useful knowledge;

(d) the goods of the will (i.e., virtue and morality), which are most

important both to the individual and the community, and hence the law

must safeguard public decency and sobriety, and restrain and punish the

opposite crimes and vices;

(e) the social goods of the people, which are promoted by wise

legislation concerning the form and administration of government, the

mutual duties and rights of citizens, the protection of the State and

of its members, etc.

547. The relation of civil law to natural law is as follows:

(a) The State has no power to make laws that are opposed to nature,

for, since law is an ordinance according to reason, any human command

that is contrary to nature and therefore to reason is not law, but the

corruption of law. No sin, not even a venial sin, can be made

obligatory by law. Example: The rule of Sparta that sickly infants were

to be put to death was not law but legalized murder.

(b) The State has the power to declare and enforce by suitable

sanctions the conclusions that are derived from the general principles

of the law of nature; for many people might be ignorant of these

conclusions or inclined to disregard them, unless they were promulgated

and confirmed by human law. Example: The natural law requires that

parents provide for their young children, and that children assist

their needy parents; the civil law adopts these natural principles,

compels their observance, and punishes transgressors.

provisions of the natural law that are abstract or general. Example:

The natural law decrees that some form of government be set up, that

the people contribute to the support of the government, that crimes be

punished, that the general welfare be served, etc.; the civil law

determines the special form of government, the manner in which the

revenues are to be obtained, the specific penalties for each crime, the

public measures that are best suited to the circumstances, etc.

548. The relation of the civil law to divine and ecclesiastical law is

as follows:

(a) In matters purely spiritual the State has no power to legislate,

since its end and authority are confined to things temporal; and hence

the State has no right to interfere with the faith, worship and

government of the Church. But, since morality promotes the prosperity

of the State, and since the end of the individual is spiritual, the

civil law should respect and favor religion.

(b) In matters that are partly spiritual, partly temporal, the State

has the power to legislate on those aspects that are temporal, yet so

as not to infringe on divine or ecclesiastical right. Example: Civil

laws on education have the right to regulate non-religious subjects,

courses, standards, etc.; but they have no right to proscribe religious

training, or to prescribe the teaching of irreligion or immorality,

State laws on marriage may require registration, settle the civil

effects of marriage, etc., but they have no right to interfere with the

unity of marriage or the sanctity of the marriage bond.

549. The State is for the individual, and not the individual for the

State; hence, civil law should not interfere with human liberties,

except where this is necessary for the common peace and safety or the

lawful opportunity of the people as a whole. Hence:

(a) Human liberties that are not inalienable may be limited by the law,

when the public good or the welfare of individuals requires this (see

292). Examples: The State has the right to regulate the acts of those

who are unable to take care of themselves in matters of importance; to

forbid what is detrimental to the common interest (such as hunting and

fishing at certain seasons), to protect the public when it neglects to

protect itself, etc. Uncalled-for interference by government with the

personal and private affairs of individuals--paternalism in

government--is of course to be avoided, for restriction of liberty is

something disagreeable and should not be resorted to without necessity.

(b) Human rights that are fundamental (such as the rights to live, to

marry, to rear a family, to be free, to pursue happiness) should not be

trespassed on by civil law. Thus, the State has no right to forbid

marriage to the poor, but on the contrary it has the duty to remove

conditions that cause poverty. But, when the common welfare demands the

sacrifice, the State has the right to call on citizens to expose even

life and fortune in its defense.

550. Those Subject to Civil Law.--Civil laws oblige all those who are

in any way subject to their authority.

(a) Citizens, when in the country, are bound by all the laws that

pertain to them; when outside the country, they are bound by some laws,

such as those that regulate their personal status and office, but not

by others, in particular such as are of a territorial character.

(b) Aliens are bound by the laws of the country that include them, such

as those that regulate public order and the making of contracts.

551. The Obligation of Civil Law.--Civil law, when it has all the

conditions of valid law, even if the legislator is non-religious or

anti-religious, is obligatory not only before the State, but also

before God (i.e., in conscience). This is; (a) by reason of the natural

law, of which it is a derivation (see above, 313); (b) by reason of

divine positive law, for it is frequently declared in scripture and in

the Church’s teaching and practice that lawful authority represents God

and must be obeyed for conscience’ sake: “Render to Caesar the things

that are Caesar’s” (Matt, xxii 21), “Be subject of necessity, not only

for wrath, but also for conscience’ sake” (Rom, xiii. 5).

552. Are subjects obliged to offer themselves for punishment prescribed

by law?

(a) If the fault committed was merely juridical (i.e., before the law),

the penalty is certainly not obligatory before sentence. Example:

Balbus through sheer accident, and without design or negligence, kills

a man. If involuntary homicide is punished by imprisonment, Balbus is

not bound to give himself up. English common law, it should be noted,

presumes a man innocent until proved guilty, and a man cannot be

convicted of any degree of homicide on his own confession alone. But he

may plead guilty to minor offenses.

(b) If the fault committed was theological (i.e., before God) and the

penalty is primitive (i.e., the loss of some right or privilege), the

penalty is obligatory in conscience. In Canon Law such penalties are

sometimes _ipso facto_, that is, before sentence (e.g., suspension of a

cleric); but the civil law, it seems, imposes penalties only after

judicial declaration. Example: Titus on account of bribery has

forfeited the right to vote; but he has not been declared guilty by

court, and hence may continue to use the right of suffrage.

(e.g., exile, imprisonment, fine), the penalty is not obligatory before

sentence; for it would demand too much of human nature to require that

one deliver oneself up to exile, accept confiscation, etc. The

apprehension and detention of the guilty is imposed by law as a duty on

the police and other officers, not on the guilty.

553. The kind of obligation imposed depends on the will of the

lawgiver: (a) he can oblige under pain of sin, or under pain of nullity

or punishment; (b) he can oblige under pain of grave sin, or under pain

of venial sin.

554. Generally speaking, the legislator is held to oblige under pain of

sin in the following cases: (a) when the law is a just determination of

the natural law (e.g., the laws that determine ownership); (b) when the

law is directly concerned with and necessary to the public good (e.g.,

laws on national defense in time of war, laws that impose necessary

taxation, etc.; see above, 379).

555. The legislator is held not to oblige under sin in the following

cases: (a) when the law is enacted as penal, or is prudently regarded

as such--as is the case with laws that are of minor importance or that

can be enforced without a moral obligation--laws useful rather than

necessary; (b) when the law is merely irritant or inhabilitating, the

subject is not obliged to omit the act invalidated, but only to suffer

the consequence of nullity before the law.

556. In doubt as to the obligation of a law, what is the duty of the

subject? (a) If there is doubt concerning its justice, the subject can

always observe it with a safe conscience. One may obey an unjust law,

until it is judicially declared unjust, if it is not manifestly opposed

to divine or human rights. (b) If there is doubt whether a law obliges

under sin or not, the subject does not sin directly by non-observance

(see 375, 376, 377, 561).

557. Special Kinds of Laws.--Laws that determine ownership are those

that define in distinct and explicit terms the rights of citizens as to

property, in such matters as goods lost or found, prescription,

inheritance, copyright, distribution of property of intestates, rights

of wives, capacity of minors, contracts, etc. It is commonly held that

these laws are obligatory under sin, even before judicial decision: (a)

because they are determinations of the natural law made by the

authority that represents God in matters temporal; (b) because they are

necessary for the peaceful existence of society.

558. Irritant or voiding laws are those that deprive certain acts of

legal value. The common welfare requires that certain acts, even if

valid naturally, may be made invalid by the State (e.g., contracts

entered into by minors, donations made under fear, wills devised

irregularly), and hence there is no doubt that the effect of

invalidation can be imposed under pain of sin.

(a) This holds even before judicial decision, if it is clear that the

lawgiver ought to intend and does intend to deprive an act of its moral

validity from the beginning. Example: If a lawsuit would put one party

(e.g., a minor) under great disadvantage, the law can irritate a

contract in conscience and before judgment is rendered.

(b) An irritant law does not oblige under sin before declaration of

nullity, if it is not clear that the legislator intended this; for it

can be presumed that the State is content with external means as long

as these are sufficient for its ends; and, since invalidation of acts

is odious, it calls for certain expression of his intention by the

lawgiver. But after sentence has been given, that which is civilly null

is also null morally. Hence, if the courts declare a will to be of no

effect, because it was not drawn legally, the decision is binding under

sin.

559. Civil lawgivers in modern times do not, as a rule, concern

themselves with moral or natural obligation as such, but rather

consider only what regulations will best promote the peaceful

intercourse of society. Hence, the question whether a civil irritation

obliges in conscience ipso facto (i.e., before judicial declaration of

a case) has to be decided generally, not from the words, but from the

purpose of the law.

(a) An irritant law should be regarded as obligatory _ipso facto_, when

the general purpose of law (viz., the common good) or the specific

purpose of this law requires that there should be obligation in

conscience even before a court decision. Examples are laws irritating

agreements to do what is illegal, laws whose purpose is to protect

minors or others who would be at a disadvantage in case of litigation,

or to lessen the number of cases before the courts.

(b) An irritant law should be regarded as not obligatory _ipso facto_,

when the end of the law does not clearly demand obligation before

judicial declaration; for, as remarked above, the invalidation of an

act is something odious, and hence not to be taken for granted. Thus,

laws that void an act, contract or instrument on account of lack of

some legal form, do not affect the natural rights or obligations before

sentence.

560. Though the civil lawgiver has the right to annul certain acts, and

thus to extinguish moral rights or obligations that would otherwise

exist, laws seemingly irritant frequently have a different intention.

(a) Laws that make a claim unenforceable in court do not destroy the

natural right of the claimant. Example: The Statute of Limitations in

modern states generally bars the right to pursue a debtor in court

after six years; nevertheless, the moral obligation of the debtor

remains.

(b) Laws that make an act or contract voidable do not nullify, but only

grant to the person concerned the right to attack validity before the

courts. Hence, if the conditions for valid contract required by natural

law are present (knowledge, consent, etc.), moral rights and

obligations are not voided. Example: Under the civil law some contracts

made by minors may be retracted by them. But, as long as such a

contract is not disavowed, the other party has a moral right to insist

on its execution; if it has been ratified after majority, the former

minor has no moral right to seek the benefit of the law by asking for

rescindment.

561. With reference to penalty, four kinds of laws can be distinguished.

(a) Purely preceptive laws are such as oblige under pain of sin, but

not under pain of punishment. There are church laws of this kind (such

as the command to assist at Mass on Sunday), and there are also some

civil laws that do not oblige under penalty (e.g., statutes governing

the age for legal marriage, for, if a couple misrepresented their age,

they might be prosecuted for the misrepresentation, but not for the act

of marriage).

(b) Purely penal laws are such as oblige under pain of juridical fault

and punishment, but not under pain of sin (e.g., a law that punishes

negligence in driving as defined by itself, even though there be no

moral culpability involved).

obey the law or to suffer the penalty (e.g., a law that commands one

either to get a license before fishing or hunting, or to pay a fine if

caught doing these things without a license).

(d) Mixed laws conjunctively are such as oblige under pain of both sin

and punishment (e.g., the laws that forbid injustice and command the

punishment of transgressors).

562. There is no question about the existence of laws of the first and

fourth classes just described, but some authorities argue against the

existence of the other two classes, maintaining that a law that does

not oblige in conscience is an impossibility. They argue: (a) the

teaching of scripture and of the Church supposes that all just laws

oblige in conscience; (b) the lawgiver holds the place of God, and

hence one cannot offend against the law of man without offending God;

higher law, obliges in conscience like the law on which it is based;

(d) directions of a superior that do not oblige under sin are counsels

rather than laws.

563. To these and similar arguments the defenders of the existence of

penal laws reply: (a) such laws do not oblige in conscience, under pain

of sin and of offense to God, to do or to omit as the law prescribes,

just as a vow which gives one the option of not playing cards, or else

of giving each time an alms, does not bind one in conscience not to

play cards; (b) but those laws do oblige one in conscience to respect

their juridical value, not to resist their enforcement, and to pay the

penalty of violation, just as the vow mentioned obliges one in

conscience to give an alms each time one plays cards. The Church

recognizes penal laws (see 450), and there is no reason why civil law

may not be penal.

564. Even when the transgression of a purely penal law is not sinful by

reason of the civil law, it will frequently, if not usually, be sinful

by reason of repugnance to the law of God. Thus: (a) the transgression

will be sinful, if there is a wrong intention (such as contempt for the

law) or wrong circumstances (such as culpable neglect or some

inordinate passion); (b) the transgression will be sinful, if one

foresees or should foresee evil consequences, such as scandal (see 96).

565. It is generally admitted that some civil laws are purely penal,

since they impose penalties for fault, negligence, or responsibility

that is only juridical at times. Examples: A law that imposes a fine on

all motorists caught driving over a certain speed limit, even though

they be free of moral guilt; or that makes the owner of a car pay

damages for injuries caused while it was used by his chauffeur.

566. Even these laws oblige under sin to some extent. (a) The

transgressor is morally bound to the penalty prescribed by law, after

sentence has been passed; and such penalties are just, for the common

good requires them. Example: The speed violator is held to pay the

lawful fine when it has been imposed. He may have been guiltless of

sin, but the fine makes him more careful the next time. (b) The

officers of the law are morally bound to apprehend and convict

transgressors.

567. Many civil laws are commonly regarded nowadays as disjunctively

preceptive or penal; and, since the custom of the prudent affords a

good norm of interpretation (see above, 484 sqq., 506 sqq.), this

common view is a safe guide, Example: Even conscientious persons do not

feel that they have committed a sin if now and then they run a car

without a license, or fish in a government reservation without the

permit required by law, when there is no danger or damage to anyone.

568. Whether most modern legislatures intend practically all or the

great majority of their laws that are not declarations of natural law

or provisions essential to public welfare to be purely penal or only

disjunctively preceptive, is a disputed question. For the affirmative

view it is argued:

(a) Moral obligation is not necessary, since the enforcement of the law

is well taken care of by the judiciary and the police;

(b) Moral obligation would be harmful, for the laws that are put on the

statute books every year, along with those already there, are so

numerous that, if all these obliged in conscience, an intolerable

burden would be placed on the people;

despise or disregard religious motives when framing laws; and so many

jurists today believe that the danger of incurring the penalty

prescribed by the law is the only obligation the lawgiver intends to

impose, or that moral obligation must come from conscience (i.e., be

self-imposed);

(d) Moral obligation is not admitted by custom, the best interpreter of

law, for most citizens today regard civil legislation as not binding

under sin.

569. Opponents of the view just explained answer:

(a) The prevalence of crime and the ineffectiveness of the courts in so

many places prove the need of moral obligation of civil laws; and, even

if the laws are well enforced, this will scarcely continue, if respect

for them is lowered;

(b) Though there is an excess of legislation, it is not generally true

that the individual citizen is burdened in his daily life by a

multitude of laws;

whom the scriptures commanded obedience; and, even though they do not

themselves believe in religion or the obligation of conscience, they do

intend to give their laws every sanction that the common good requires,

and thus implicitly they impose a moral obligation wherever the

contrary is not manifest;

(d) The statement that the majority of the people in modern states

regard the civil legislation as a whole as not obligatory in conscience

may be passed over, as there is no proof for it. Moreover, the

customary interpretation of the citizens does not make penal the laws

which the elected representatives intended as preceptive, without the

consent of the latter (see 394).

570. Signs that a law is merely penal are the following:

(a) The express declaration of the lawgiver that it obliges only under

penalty. Examples: In the Dominican Constitutions it is declared that

they oblige, not under fault, but only under penalty (No. 32). The same

is true of the Franciscan, Redemptorist and most recent religious

Constitutions. Some civil laws, it is said, are formulated thus:

“Either do this, or pay the penalty on conviction.” Other laws define

punishable negligence in such a way that it does not ultimately suppose

sin.

(b) Another sign of a penal law is the implicit declaration of the

lawgiver. If a heavy penalty is prescribed for a transgression regarded

by all as very slight proportionately, the government implicitly

declares that it imposes no other obligation than that of penalty.

Blackstone, in his “Commentary on the Laws of England” (1769),

considers as purely penal all those laws in which the penalty inflicted

is an adequate compensation for the civil inconvenience supposed to

arise from the offense, such as the statutes for preserving game and

those forbidding the exercise of trades without serving an

apprenticeship thereto (Vol. I, Sect. 58).

Example: Practically all Catholic moralists, and the opinion of the

people generally, consider as penal some laws that are merely useful,

but not necessary (e.g., prohibitions against smoking or spitting in

certain public places, laws on permits for fishing, hunting, etc.).

571. Whatever may be said about legislatures in general, it cannot be

argued that in the United States they are indifferent or contemptuous

as regards the moral obligation of law; the public acts and speeches of

Congress and of the State Assemblies show that the elected

representatives of the people respect religion, and do not wish to

deprive themselves of its help in their deliberations and decisions.

Nevertheless, the opinion is very prevalent among lawyers that purely

positive law in the United States is not intended to oblige under sin.

572. In practice, the attitude of the citizen to civil law should be

one of respect and loyalty.

(a) If a law is good, even though the legislator did not impose a moral

obligation, it should be obeyed; for reason and experience show that

disregard for law is a source of scandal and of many public and private

evils.

(b) If a law is not good, every lawful means should be used to have it

repealed as soon as possible. But the principle that a bad law is

always best overcome by being rigidly enforced, is not borne out by

history, and sometimes the public good demands disregard for

unreasonable ordinances. The so-called “Blue Laws” are a case in point.

573. Other questions pertaining to civil law that will be found

elsewhere are: (a) the obligation of customs, taxation and military

duty; (b) the power of the State to inflict capital punishment.

Question IV

CONSCIENCE

574. In order that man many tend to his Last End, it is not sufficient

that the way be pointed out in a general manner (as is done by the

natural and positive laws), but these laws must be applied to each act

in particular by the practical reason or conscience, as it passes

judgment on the right or wrong of an action in the light of all the

circumstances.

Art. 1: THE LAW OF CONSCIENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, I, q. 79, aa. 11-13.)

575. Definition.--Conscience is an act of judgment on the part of the

practical reason deciding by inference from general principles the

moral goodness or malice of a particular act.

(a) It is an act, and as such it differs from moral knowledge and

intellectual virtues, which are not transitory but enduring. Moral

understanding (synderesis), by which everyone naturally perceives the

truth of general and self-evident principles of morality; moral

science, by which the theologian or ethician knows the body of

conclusions drawn from moral principles; prudence, by which the

virtuous man is able to make right applications of moral rules to

individual cases--all these are permanent states and are preparatory to

the act of conscience, in which one makes use of one’s knowledge to

judge of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an action in the concrete,

as attended by all its circumstances.

(b) Conscience is an act of judgment, and thus it differs from the

other acts employed by prudence--from counsel about the right means or

ways of action, and from command as to their use. Counsel inquires what

is the right thing to do, conscience gives the dictate or decision, the

moral command moves to action.

thus it differs from law, which is objective.

(d) Conscience is in the practical reason. Unlike other judgments,

which are speculative and deal not with action or only with theoretical

aspects of action (e.g., the judgment that God is perfect, that the

active faculties are distinct from the soul, etc.), conscience is

concerned with action from the view-point of its moral exercise.

(e) Conscience is the inference from general principles, and thus it

differs from moral understanding (synderesis). This latter is a habit

by which everyone who is mentally developed is able to perceive without

argument that certain more general propositions of morality must be

true, such as the axioms of the natural law (see above, 319 sqq.);

conscience draws conclusions from those axioms.

(f) Conscience judges concerning the morality of an act. Here lies the

difference between consciousness and conscience; consciousness is a

psychological faculty whose function is to perceive one’s own states

and acts; conscience is a moral judgment concerning the lawfulness or

unlawfulness of those states or acts. Thus, consciousness testifies

that one is considering the performance of a certain act, conscience

judges the morality, and permits or forbids; or consciousness testifies

that a certain thing was done or not done in the past, conscience

declares the morality--condemning, excusing, or approving what took

place.

(g) Conscience judges concerning a particular act--that is, it

considers an act that is to be done here and now (or was done), with

all the attendant circumstances. Conscience, thus, differs from moral

science, which, though it systematizes the body of conclusions drawn

from the natural and positive laws, is not able to make the

applications for the innumerable cases that arise. Even works

containing moral cases, which give solutions for concrete instances, do

not take the place of conscience in such instances, for it is still the

individual who judges about those solutions or about their

applicability to his particular circumstances.

576. Division.-Conscience is variously divided. (a) According as the

act judged is in the future or in the past, conscience is antecedent or

consequent. The antecedent conscience is a monitor which decides that a

future act will be lawful or unlawful; the consequent conscience is a

judge which causes peace or remorse for what has been done in the past.

(b) According to the kind of direction or decision it gives, antecedent

conscience is commanding, forbidding, permitting or counselling; while

consequent conscience is excusing, approving, or condemning (Rom., ii.

15).

577. According as it agrees or disagrees with the external divine or

human law, conscience is true or false. (a) A true conscience judges

that to be good and commanded which is really good and commanded.

Example: According to law, one may use money of which one has the

disposal. A sum of money before Balbus is really at his disposal.

Hence, his conscience is true if it decides that he may use this money.

(b) A false conscience judges the lawful to be unlawful, or vice versa:

“The hour cometh that whosoever killeth you will think that he doth a

service to God” (John, xvi. 2). Example: Balbus would have a false

conscience, if he decided that he had no right to use the money before

him. This would happen if he was mistaken about the general principle,

or about the fact that the money was at his disposal, or if he drew a

wrong inference from the premises.

578. According to its qualities and suitability as a guide of conduct,

conscience may be viewed either with reference to the will or to the

intellect. (a) With reference to the will, conscience is either good

(right) or bad (wrong), according as it does or does not proceed from a

well-meaning intention and a right disposition towards one’s end and

duties. Example: If the Balbus mentioned above decided that the money

was at his disposal because he wished to know the truth and had

investigated to the best of his ability, his conscience would be good.

But, if he decided this without sufficient investigation and only

because he was prejudiced in his own favor, his conscience would be bad.

(b) With reference to the intellect, conscience is either certain or

uncertain, according as the mind assents to its judgment without or

with fear of error. Examples: If Balbus decides that he has the right

to use the money, and is so firmly convinced that his judgment is true

that he has no fears or doubts, his conscience is certain. But, if

there remain solid difficulties or objections against his judgment

which he cannot satisfactorily answer so that he assents to his view

only with the fear that he may be wrong, his conscience is uncertain.

579. A conscience may have some and lack others of the qualities just

mentioned.

(a) The same conscience may be true and bad, or false and good--that

is, the judgment of the intellect may be in agreement with objective

facts, but at the same time it may be directed by a wrong will and

intention, or vice versa. Examples: Caius, through no fault of his own,

is convinced that he is bound to tell a lie to help Sempronius, because

Sempronius once helped him by lying. His conscience is false, but good.

Titus is really not bound to pay a sum of money demanded of him. But

the arguments by which he persuades himself that he is not bound are

not honest, since he has recourse to what he knows are hair-splitting

distinctions, quibbles and sophistical reasonings. His conscience is

true, but bad.

(b) The same conscience may be good and uncertain, or bad and certain.

Examples: If the Caius above-mentioned believes he is bound to lie, but

has some qualms or suspicions that such conduct might not be right

after all, his conscience would be good, seeing that he meant to do

what is right; but it would be uncertain, seeing that he is not sure he

is right. If the Titus above-mentioned had so habituated himself to

insincerity and illogical reasoning that he no longer had any fears

about his own judgments, and gave firm and unhesitating assent to his

decision that he was not bound to pay the money demanded, his

conscience, though bad, would be certain subjectively.

580. Obligation of Conscience.--Man is bound to be guided by

conscience, both negatively and positively--that is, he must neither

disobey when it forbids, nor refuse to obey when it commands.

(a) It obliges by reason of divine command, since it acts as the voice

or witness of God making known and promulgating. to us the moral law.

Hence “all that is not from conscience is sin” (Rom, xiv. 23).

(b) Conscience obliges from the nature of things, for, since the will

is a blind faculty, it must be guided by the judgment, of the

intellect, and must follow the inner light given it about the law.

Apart from revelation, there is no other way of learning what God

wishes one to do here and now.

581. The authority of conscience is not, however, unlimited.

(a) Conscience is not independent of external law and authority. It is

not autonomous morality of the reason or will, nor private inspiration

or interpretation; for its function is not to establish law or pass

judgment on it, but to apply the law as expounded by the Church to a

present case. Hence, conscience must aim to be true--that is, to agree

with and express the objective law.

(b) Conscience is not independent of the righteousness of the will. It

is not a speculative judgment, whose value depends solely on agreement

between the mind and the facts, as is the case with a conclusion of

pure science. It is a practical judgment, which has to guide all man’s

conduct, and thus its value depends on the relation of the means it

selects to the end towards which the means should be directed. Hence,

conscience must be good--that is, a judgment dictated by a will well

disposed towards the true end of life.

is a judgment formed, not by sentiment, emotion, or one’s own wishes,

but by evidence and firm conviction; for its office is to guide man

reliably in the most important of affairs. Hence, conscience must be

certain--that is, a judgment to which the intellect yields its

unhesitating assent.

582. In order, therefore, that conscience may be the proper rule and

moderator of man’s moral life, it must have the following qualities:

(a) It must be good, and practically true--that is, in agreement with

the Last End of man and, as far as the efforts of the individual can

attain to such agreement, with the objective law--for the standard of

moral good is not each one’s wish or opinion, but God as the Last End

and the external natural and positive law as means to that End.

(b) It must be certain--that is, without fear that one is wrong; at

least, it must have that degree of certainty which is possible in moral

matters. For to act with the fear that one is committing sin, is to be

willing to do what may be sin, and is thus consent to sin.

583. Since conscience that has the requisite conditions is our

immediate guide in moral matters, it follows: (a) that a conscience

which is true objectively, good, and certain must be followed, whenever

it commands or forbids; (b) that a conscience which is in invincible

error (see 30), but seems to him who has it to be not only true but

certain, must also be followed when it forbids or commands. Examples:

If a child were told and believed that he was obliged to tell a lie to

prevent an evil, he would be bound to do this. If a person eats what he

wrongly thinks to be forbidden food, he is guilty of the violation he

apprehends.

584. Exception.--If invincible error results from lack of sufficient

intelligence to be capable of sin (see above, 249, 387), then the

failure to follow one’s conscience in such error does not make one

guilty. Example: If a person unable to walk were persuaded that he was

bound nevertheless to walk to church for Mass, his conscience would not

make his omission sinful. Conscience supposes sane judgment, but the

judgment we are now considering is not sane.

585. A conscience that has not the requisite conditions is not a safe

guide, and hence it cannot be followed.

(a) An erroneous conscience may not be followed, if the error is

vincible and there is danger of sin; neither may one act against it if

there be danger of sin. To follow such a conscience would be to do what

is wrong and to act in bad faith (i.e., to have a bad and erroneous

conscience); not to follow it, would be to act against one’s judgment,

wrongly formed though it was, and to do insincerely what is right

(i.e., to have a bad, though true conscience). Example: A person who

has made up his mind that dishonesty is necessary in his business, but

who realizes that his reasons are not convincing, sins against

sincerity if he follows his opinion; he sins against conviction, if he

does not follow his opinion. But his predicament is due to his own

sophistry or bad will, and the escape from it requires only that he be

honest enough with himself to inquire about the matter.

(b) A doubtful conscience may not be followed, if the doubt is such

that one is not reasonably sure that a certain act is lawful. Example:

If a man does not know whether a certain remedy will be helpful or

seriously harmful to another, his conscience is doubtful as to the

lawfulness of administering the remedy, and it may not be followed. If

in spite of this he makes use of the remedy, he is guilty of the harm

he foresaw, even though it does not happen.

586. Exception.--It is lawful to follow a vincibly erroneous

conscience, if there is no danger of sin in this. Example: If a person

has neglected inquiry about holydays of obligation, and through his own

neglect believes that Good Friday is a holyday, he does not sin by

attending the services that day.

587. The signs of a vincibly erroneous conscience are: (a) that in the

past one did not use the same diligence to inform oneself about one’s

religious duties as is employed by conscientious persons; (b) that in

the present one has fears, doubts or suspicions as to one’s own

sincerity of judgment.

588. Results of Conscience.--The results of following an erroneous

conscience are as follows:

(a) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or forbidding or

permitting, is not guilty of sin if his ignorance is invincible.

Example: A child who thinks he is obliged to lie because he has been

told to do this, is excused from sin on account of his ignorance.

(b) He who follows an erroneous conscience, commanding or permitting

evil, is guilty if his ignorance is vincible. Example: A grown person

who has persuaded himself that deception is lawful, obligatory or

advisable, or that truthfulness is forbidden, but who ought to know

better, is not excused by the conscience he has formed (see above, 97

sqq.).

589. The results of disobeying an erroneous conscience are as follows:

(a) He who disobeys an invincibly erroneous conscience, is guilty.

Example: The child who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought to

do so because it has been commanded, is guilty of disobedience.

(b) He who disobeys a vincibly erroneous conscience, is also guilty.

Example: Caius promises to tell a lie to help another party. The doubt

occurs whether or not this is lawful, and he takes no pains to settle

it correctly, but decides offhand that a promise must be kept. When the

time comes, Caius becomes alarmed and does not keep his promise, lest

he get into trouble. He is guilty.

590. If a conscience which was vincibly erroneous in its origin is here

and now invincibly erroneous, the acts that result from following such

a conscience are to be judged as follows:

(a) They are materially evil in themselves and formally evil in their

cause. Example: Titus, who intends to take a position in which he will

have to advise others, foresees that later on he may make mistakes

costly to others, as a result of his present lack of sufficient study.

He secures the position, and tries to make up for former neglect of

study, but on one occasion injures a patron by wrong advice which he

would not have given, had he worked more faithfully as a younger

student. The wrong advice is objectively sinful in itself, as being an

injury; it is subjectively sinful in its cause, as being the result of

negligence which foresaw what might happen.

(b) The acts in question are not formally evil in themselves. Example:

Titus was formally guilty of injury to others at the time he foresaw

what would happen on account of his negligence; he was not formally

guilty at the time he did the injury, because he had tried meanwhile to

repair his negligence and was not conscious of his ignorance.

591. The kinds of sin committed in consequence of an erroneous

conscience are as follows:

(a) Sin committed by following a vincibly erroneous conscience is of

the same gravity and species as the act for which the conscience is

responsible, but the ignorance is an extenuating circumstance. Example:

He who blinds his conscience so that it decides in favor of grave

calumny, is guilty of mortal sin against justice; but he is less guilty

than if he had sinned without any permission from conscience.

(b) Sin committed by disobeying an invincibly erroneous conscience is

of the gravity and species apprehended by the conscience. Example: A

person who tells a small lie, thinking it a mortal sin against charity,

is guilty of the malice he understands to be in his act.

the species that was perceived. Example: Caius who did not live up to

his promise of telling a lie, after he had decided that to keep his

word was the right thing to do, was guilty of a breach of promise. As

to the gravity of sin against a vincibly erroneous conscience, it is

always the same as that apprehended by the conscience, unless what is

seriously wrong is culpably mistaken for what is only slightly wrong.

Examples: If Caius, just referred to, thought that his desertion of his

friend inflicted a grave injury, he was guilty of grave sin. A person

who persuades himself by vain reasonings that complete intoxication

does not differ in gravity from incipient intoxication, is nevertheless

guilty of the greater malice, if he puts himself in the former state;

for his wrong opinion cannot change the fact, and his culpable

ignorance cannot excuse him.

592. An erroneous conscience may apprehend something not wrong as

wrong, but in an indeterminate manner.

(a) If the species of evil is not determinate before the conscience,

but an indifferent act is thought to be sinful without any definite

species of sin being thought of, he who acts against such a conscience

seems to commit a sin of disobedience. Example: A person who thinks

that smoking is a sin, of what kind he does not know, must have at

least vaguely the opinion that it is forbidden by the divine law; and

hence, if he smokes, he is guilty of disobedience.

(b) If the gravity of the putative sin is not determinate before the

conscience, but an act is thought to be sinful without the degree of

sinfulness being at all known or thought of, he who acts against such a

conscience commits a mortal or a venial sin according to his own

disposition with respect to sin. If he is so attached to the sin he

apprehends that he intends to commit it, whether it be great or small,

he is guilty of mortal sin, at least in so far as he exposes himself to

it. But if he is habitually resolved not to commit grave sin, it can be

presumed that he would not do that which he apprehends as sinful, if he

thought it was a grave offense, Example: If a person erroneously thinks

that it is a sin to read a certain book, and then reads it without

adverting at all to the gravity of the sin he apprehends, his greater

or less guilt will have to be judged by his character. If he is so

conscientious that he would stop reading at once if he feared the book

was seriously harmful, he sins only venially; but if he knows that he

is lax and is yet resolved to read the book at all costs, it seems that

he is guilty of grave sin.

Art. 2: A GOOD CONSCIENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 19, aa. 5, 6.)

593. As was explained in the previous article, conscience is not a

proper guide unless it is good. In this article we shall speak of the

good conscience and of its opposite the various kinds of bad conscience.

594. Definition.--The distinction of good and bad conscience is applied

both to consequent and antecedent conscience (see 576).

(a) The consequent conscience is good, and one is said to have a good

conscience, if it testifies that past acts were rightly performed, that

past sins were forgiven, that one is in the friendship of God, etc.;

“The end of the commandment is charity from a good conscience” (I Tim.,

i. 5); “War a good warfare, having faith and a good conscience” (ibid.,

19). The consequent conscience is bad if it testifies in a contrary

way: “Let us draw near with a true heart, having our hearts sprinkled

from an evil conscience” (Heb., x. 22).

(b) The antecedent conscience, with which we are now concerned, judges

about the morality of an act to be performed here and now, or in the

future. It is called good, if it is made by one who is in good

faith--that is, one who sincerely loves goodness and who decides

according to the truth as far as he is able to see it. It is called

bad, if it is the judgment of one who is in bad faith--that is, one who

is in error through his own fault, or who arrives at the truth by

reasonings that are not honest or not understood by him. Example:

Speaking of those who, though fearing that idol meats were forbidden,

yet ate of them because they saw others do this, St. Paul says: “There

is not knowledge in everyone. For some until this present, with

conscience of the idol, eat as a thing sacrificed to an idol, and their

conscience being weak is defiled” (I Cor., viii. 7).

595. Divisions.--By training and care a good conscience is developed

and becomes better. (a) A vigilant conscience is one that asserts

itself promptly and strongly under all circumstances. (b) A tender

conscience is one that inclines to a careful observance of all the

Commandments and to a purification of the inner workings of the soul. A

possessor of this kind of conscience is called conscientious. (c) A

timorous conscience moves one through filial fear to shun even the

slightest sins and imperfections, and to use all prudent efforts to

avoid occasions and dangers of sin. The possessor of this kind of

conscience is called God-fearing.

596. A bad conscience that is in vincible error is divided according to

its effects into the scrupulous and the lax conscience. (a) The lax

conscience errs on the side of liberty. It is moved by trivial reasons

to judge the unlawful to be lawful, the gravely sinful to be only

slightly evil, that which is commanded to be only counselled, and so on.

(b) The scrupulous conscience errs on the side of obligation. It is

moved by trivial reasons to judge that there is sin in something

lawful, grave sin in something venially wrong, and obligation in

something that is only counselled; it sees inhability or defect where

these do not exist, and so on.

597. The Lax Conscience.--According to the more or less control it has

over one, the lax conscience may be divided into the incipient and the

habitual. (a) It is incipient when one is becoming familiar with

careless decisions and less responsive to remorse about evil done. In

this state the conscience is said to be sleeping. (b) It is habitual

when through long-continued habit one has become enamored of a worldly,

frivolous conception of life, and is rarely visited by compunction. In

its worst state, when there is little hope of cure, a lax conscience is

said to be seared or cauterized (I Tim., iv. 2).

598. According to the greater or less responsibility of the one in

error, a lax conscience is either malicious or not malicious. (a) It is

malicious when it results from one’s own disregard for religious truth,

as in the case of the pagans who did not care to know God, and were

thus led into perverse conceptions of morality. St. Paul calls such a

conscience a reprobate sense (Rom., i. 28). (b) It is not malicious

when it results from some less blamable reason, as in the case of the

Christians at Corinth who thought that the eating of idol meats was

sinful, but that it was to be practised on account of the example of

others. St. Paul calls this a weak conscience (I Cor., viii. 10).

599. Laxity of conscience is either partial or entire. (a) A conscience

entirely lax takes an easy and indulgent view in all things. It is

careless both in little and great matters, both in directing self and

in directing others. (b) A conscience partially lax is too liberal in

some things, but not in others. Examples: Titus is very exacting with

his girls, and wishes to have them models of virtue; but he is too easy

with himself and his boys. Balbus is very loyal to friends, but has no

sense of justice as regards those who do not agree with him. Sempronius

tries to serve both God and mammon, being very faithful to church

duties, but at the same time dishonest in business matters.

600. A conscience partially lax may even combine scrupulosity and

laxism (see 610), becoming like a mirror that reflects large objects as

small and vice versa; or like a color-blind eye: “Woe to you that call

evil good and good evil, that put darkness for light and light for

darkness” (Is., V. 20). This kind of conscience is called pharisaical.

(a) One may be lax and scrupulous about the same kind of things.

Examples: Caius regards great disobedience in himself as a mote which

he doesn’t need to worry about, but small disobedience in his children

as a beam in the eye which he is seriously bound to extract (Matt, vii.

3-5). Titus is lax about almsgiving to those from whom he can expect

nothing, but scrupulous about almsgiving to those from whom he expects

a return later on.

(b) One may be scrupulous and lax about different things, straining at

gnats and swallowing camels. Example: The Pharisees were scrupulous

about external observances and minor things of the law, such as tithes;

but they were lax about inward justice and the weightier things of the

law, judgment, mercy and faith (Matt, xxiii. 13-31).

601. Causes of a Lax Conscience.--(a) If the laxity is inculpable but

habitual, it is caused generally by lack of Christian training in

childhood and the influence of evil principles and practices that are

widespread. In particular cases a lax decision of conscience may be due

to want of sufficient consideration or to a sudden storm of passion

that obscures the reason, when one has no time for deliberation; and

thus it is inculpable.

(b) If the laxity is culpable, its usual causes are an easy-going view

of God’s law and its obligation (Is, xliii. 24); or a self-love that

sees in one’s vices nothing but virtue or amiable weakness; or a

long-continued indulgence of sin that has destroyed all refinement of

conscience.

602. Special Dangers of a Lax Conscience.--(a) If the laxity is

inculpable, it is an occasion of demoralization to others and a

preparation for formal sin in him who has the conscience;

(b) if the laxity is culpable, it is the cause of formal sin; and if it

is not corrected, it naturally leads to moral blindness, hardness of

heart and impenitence: “There is a way that seemeth to man right, and

the ends thereof lead to death” (Proverbs, xvi. 25).

603. Since a lax conscience is a species of erroneous conscience, the

rules given above as to the kind of sins committed in consequence of an

erroneous conscience, apply also to the lax conscience (see above, 588

Sqq.).

(a) When the laxity is concerned with the existence of sin, the

conscience taking what is sinful for something lawful, he who follows

such a conscience is guilty or not guilty according as his ignorance is

culpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a good

conscience). Examples: The man who practises dishonesty, because he has

cheated his conscience by sophistry into deciding that dishonesty is

lawful; the child who uses profane language without realization of sin,

because he hears his elders use it. But if the lax conscience takes

what is sinful for a duty, he who disobeys it is guilty of sin.

Example: The person who refuses to tell a lie when he thinks he ought

to lie on account of a promise made.

(b) When the laxity is concerned with the gravity of sin, the

conscience taking what is mortal for venial sin, he who disobeys such a

conscience is guilty of mortal or venial sin, according as his

ignorance is culpable or inculpable (i.e., as he acts from a bad or a

good conscience). Examples: A child who thinks that calumny or missing

Mass is only a venial sin, because he sees grown up persons treat these

things lightly; a person that, to solace his conscience, advises with

lax associates who always approve of what he wishes to do or has done.

604. He who knows, or who has good reason to think, that his conscience

is lax, should guide himself by the following rules: (a) with reference

to the past, if there is a doubt whether or not sin was consented to or

was grave, the presumption is against him, for laxity willingly

contracted makes one responsible for what ensues; (b) with reference to

the future, a person must make use of the means prescribed for one who

is in danger of sin (see above, 258 sqq.), for a lax conscience places

one in danger of sin.

605. Remedies Recommended for a Lax Conscience.--(a) The defect of will

or character should be corrected. Example: The presumptuous should

reflect on the justice of God, and recall that the broad way leads to

perdition. Those in whom the wish is father to the lax judgment should

make war on the passion that leads them astray. Those who have become

lax through bad habits, should set about acquiring good habits, like

that of going to the Sacraments frequently. (b) The error of the

intellect should be corrected. Example: If a person’s religious

training has been neglected, he should do what he can to get correct

information and advice as to his duties. If one has been influenced by

lax ideas or conduct, one should change one’s reading or associations.

606. Is a lax person held responsible, if he does not know that he is

lax? (a) If his conscience is invincibly erroneous, he cannot know that

it is lax, and hence he is not responsible; (b) if his conscience is

vincibly erroneous, he ought to know that he is lax, and hence he is

responsible. Examples: The boy Caius keeps whatever he finds, because

he thinks he has a right to do this. The man Titus does not like

cheating, but he cheats habitually, because he thinks he has as much

right to do so as others. Both the boy and the man are lax, but neither

considers himself lax; the difference is that Titus can and ought to

know that he is lax.

607. The scrupulous Conscience.--This is a species of erroneous

judgment that sees sin where there is no sin, or grave sin where there

is only light sin, and whose reasons are trivial or absurd. (a) It

differs, therefore, from a strict or tender conscience, which, while it

does not exaggerate sin, judges that one should try to avoid even

slight sin and imperfection. This is the golden mean between a lax and

a scrupulous conscience. Persons with this sort of conscience are

sometimes called scrupulous or singular, because they are more exact

than the majority. More accurately they are to be called conscientious

or God-fearing.

(b) The scrupulous conscience differs also from scrupulosity, which is a

state of mind in which one whose judgment is not erroneous, is

nevertheless tormented by fears or doubts about his moral condition.

608. The rules given above (588 sqq.) for the erroneous conscience

apply also to the scrupulous conscience. (a) He who follows a

scrupulous conscience does not sin by this, even though he is vincibly

in error; for there is no danger of sin in doing more than is required.

Example: Caius is too lazy to make inquiries about his religious

duties, but he has the exaggerated notion that grace at meals obliges

under pain of grave sin. He does not sin by following his conscience,

for grace at meals is recommended to all. (b) He who disobeys a

scrupulous conscience commits the sin his conscience apprehends.

Example: If Caius omits grace, he is guilty of grave sin.

609. Special Dangers of a scrupulous Conscience.--(a) As to himself,

the scrupulous person suffers from his conscience; it makes him guilty

of sin where there should be no sin, and by its exaggerated strictness

it often drives him to the other extreme of laxity. (b) As to others,

the scrupulous person is an annoyance and a detriment; he tries to

impose his conscience on them, or at least he makes virtue appear

forbidding.

610. It is possible for a conscience to be scrupulous and lax at the

same time, over-indulgent on some points, over-severe on others (see

600). (a) It may be scrupulous as regards others, and lax as regards

self, or vice versa. Example; Parents sometimes are too lenient with

themselves, but rule their children with extreme severity; in other

cases they are meticulous as to their own conduct, but think they must

allow their children every indulgence.

(b) A conscience may be scrupulous in minor matters and lax in major

matters. Example: The Jewish leaders scrupled to take the money from

Judas or to enter the house of Pilate, but they did not hesitate to

condemn our Lord unjustly.

internals. Example: The Pharisees made much of bodily purifications,

but gave little thought to purity of mind and heart.

611. The Perplexed Conscience.--Like to the scrupulous conscience is

the perplexed conscience, which judges that in a particular instance

one cannot escape sin, whether one acts or does not act. Example: Titus

fears that, if he goes to church, he will sin by endangering his

health, which is feeble; that, if he does not go to church, he will sin

by disobeying the law. This seems to have been the conscience of Herod,

who thought he was confronted with the alternative of perjury or murder

when the head of John the Baptist was asked of him (Matt, xiv. 9).

612. St. Alphonsus gives the following directions to assist one who is

perplexed in conscience:

(a) If without serious inconvenience decision can be delayed, reliable

advice should be obtained (e.g., from the confessor).

(b) If decision cannot be delayed, the alternative that seems the

lesser evil should be chosen. Example: The natural law requires that

Titus should not expose his life to danger unnecessarily. The positive

law of the Church requires that he go to Mass on Sunday. It is a less

evil to omit what is required by the law of the Church than to omit

what is required by the law of God. Hence, Titus should decide that he

is not obliged in his circumstances to go to church.

lesser evil lies, he is free to choose either; for he is not bound to

the impossible.

613. If, in the supposition last mentioned, the perplexed person acts

with the feeling that he is committing sin through necessity, is he

really guilty or not?

(a) If by the feeling of guilt is meant, not a judgment of the mind,

but a scruple or doubt, he is not guilty, as we shall see below when we

speak of scrupulosity.

(b) If by the feeling of guilt is meant a judgment of the mind that he

has to sin and an intention to welcome the opportunity, he is guilty;

but his guilt is considerably diminished by the error and his difficult

circumstances. Example: Titus thinks that he sins whether he obeys or

disobeys an order to take a good dose of whiskey. He decides to take

the dose, and feels rather pleased at the thought that he will become

intoxicated.

accompanied by sorrow at the necessity, one is not guilty, if one

thinks the matter over to the best of one’s ability before acting;

there is some guilt, if the perplexity arises from previous culpable

negligence and no effort whatever is made to remedy this before acting.

Example: Gaia asks her mother if she may go for a ride. The mother

fears that, if she refuses, Gaia will become desperate; if she permits,

Gaia will meet unsuitable companions. If the mother’s perplexity is due

to the fact that she has never taken any interest in Gaia, she is

responsible if she carelessly makes a wrong decision; but if the

perplexity arises only from the difficult character of Gaia, the mother

is not responsible.

614. Scrupulosity.--Like to the scrupulous conscience is the state of

scrupulosity, which manifests itself in moral matters especially as a

vain fear or anxiety concerning the presence or magnitude of sin in

one’s act. A psychopathic state, scrupulosity is usually listed as a

form of psychasthenia which is characterized by weakness of soul,

inability to cope with problems, and a lack of psychic energy.

Clinically examined, the psychasthenic presents the following

characteristics: (1) physically, he is listless and always tired; (2)

intellectually, his tiredness makes it impossible for him to

concentrate for long periods of time; (c) psychologically, he is an

introvert concerned with himself as the center of his interests and

activities.

The more common manifestations of the psychasthenic’s difficulties

include: self-diffidence, uncertainty, hesitation, obsessions and

scruples. A species of psychasthenia, scrupulosity may be described as

an inordinate preoccupation with the moral and religious order, a

special type of worry directed toward the morality of actions.

(a) scrupulosity must be distinguished, however, from the scrupulous

conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is not a judgment, but a fear that

accompanies one’s judgment. Example: A scrupulous person knows very

well that it is not a sin to omit grace, nor a grave sin to pray with

some voluntary distraction; but he worries over these things as if they

were sins, or grave sins.

(b) scrupulosity must be distinguished from the tender conscience,

inasmuch as scrupulosity is an exaggerated and harmful solicitude. A

person of tender conscience is careful even in smaller duties, but in a

quiet and recollected way, whereas the scrupulous person is all

excitement and distraction.

guilty conscience, inasmuch as scrupulosity is a baseless fear or

phobia. Examples: A person who has practised injustice for many years,

has good reason to be perturbed in conscience when he reflects that

restitution or reparation is a prerequisite to pardon; but a mother who

did all she could to train her children well, is scrupulous, if she is

constantly reproaching herself that she should have done better. A

person who makes a contract while fearing that it may be unlawful,

because good authorities hold its unlawfulness, acts with a doubtful

conscience; but if he fears that the contract is unlawful, in spite of

the fact that others regard it as lawful and that his only reason for

doubt is that they may be wrong, he is scrupulous. The Egyptians at the

time of the plagues could reasonably forecast grievous chastisements on

account of their wickedness (Wis., xvii. 10); but a good person who

worries constantly over the possibility of being damned must be

scrupulous.

615. Scruples may be divided in various ways, but the simplest division

seems to be by virtue of object, extension and duration. By reason of

object, scruples may center on only one or, at most, a few moral

activities, e.g., duties of charity, or sins against chastity, or they

may embrace the whole moral life of the individual. By reason of

extension, some scruples are limited to interior actions, others extend

to external manifestations. By reason of duration, scruples may be

classified as intermittent, or temporary, and quasi-permanent which is

characteristic of the constitutionally scrupulous person whose physical

and psychical disposition incline him to scrupulosity.

616. The signs or external manifestations of scrupulosity have been

variously divided, but a simplified division into intellectual, or

cognitive, affective, or volitional, and compulsive suffices for our

present purpose.

(a) Intellectual: habitual abulia, i.e., an inability to decide,

coupled with and interacting with constant doubt.

(b) Affective: closely allied to the intellectual state is the feeling

of insufficiency which extends to actions, to the individual’s own

personality, to his desire for higher goals, to his abilities, etc.

This fosters and strengthens the inability to decide. Inordinate fears,

anxieties and sadness contribute to the genesis and growth of the sense

of inadequacy.

cases of scrupulosity, e.g., obsessions, phobias, and compulsions

properly so called, which concern external actions or rituals.

Obsessions include irresistible, persistent and irrational ideas

accompanied by feelings of tension and fear. These ideas which plague

the individual are “discordant,” that is, out of harmony with his

habitual attitude, and “impulsive,” tending to reduce themselves

spontaneously to action. The scrupulous person is frightened and

flustered by the thought of doing a thing for which he has a positive

abhorrence and by his inability to get the thought out of his mind.

Phobias refer to habitual, irrational fears of a definite entity

associated with a high degree of anxiety and unwarranted by objective

reality. They are very intense fears, completely out of proportion to

their causes or objects.

Finally, compulsions strictly so called may be defined as irresistible,

unreasonable urges to perform actions to free the individual from an

obsessing idea. Tension and anxiety are associated if the act or

external ritual is not performed.

For the confessor, the recognition of a scrupulous person is not too

difficult. The penitent’s own difficulties present the first and most

obvious sign, e.g., irrational doubts about consent to temptation, as

to the gravity of a sin, etc., and undue concern about circumstances.

Concomitant signs confirming the judgment that a person is scrupulous

include:

(a) Obstinacy of judgment; Although the scrupulous person seeks advice,

frequently from many confessors, he tends to follow his own judgment.

He is inclined to think that the confessor has not understood him, that

he has not given a complete picture of his state of soul, etc.

(b) Inconstancy in acting owing to inability to judge rightly and the

consequent frequent changes of judgment for light reasons.

the sin in the maze of circumstances.

(d) External motions by which the individual tries to do away with the

fear, sin, or other difficulty.

617. Causes of a scrupulous Conscience.--Although the signs of

scrupulosity are easily recognizable, the causes are not clearly

defined, and authors are not entirely agreed in this matter. A listing

of probable causes would include internal causes:

(a) physical--the physical causes are virtually unknown. Most authors

admit a constitutional disposition to scrupulosity, just as there is

one to its quasi-genus, psychasthenia. Reductively this might involve

disorders in the vago-sympathetic nervous system and the

neuro-endocrine system. (b) psychical--the cause is attributed to too

low a psychic tension. The inability to cope with obsessions and the

attacks of phobias serve to exhaust the individual; (c) moral--perhaps

a suspicious and melancholy character, a disposition that is overly

impressionable and changeable, or a self-opinionated nature,

overconfident of its own ability.

618. The external causes of scrupulosity are: (a) the devil, who

excites vain fears in order to diminish devotion, to discourage the use

of prayer and of the Sacraments, to drive to tepidity and despair; (b)

the neighbor, who teaches scrupulosity by his words or example;

association with persons who are scrupulous; the reading of spiritual

books of a rigoristic character; assistance by persons of a timid

character at terrifying sermons on the divine justice; overly

protective and overly rigorous education.

619. Though God cannot be the cause of scrupulosity in the same way as

the evil spirits (who use it for man’s destruction), nor in the same

way as human agencies (which are unable to bring good out of the evil

they cause), He does in exceptional cases directly permit even saintly

persons to be vexed by scrupulosity that they may thereby satisfy for

sin, or exercise themselves in humility and patience, or shake off

spiritual torpor.

Scrupulosity that is supernatural in origin is much rarer than that

which has a natural source, and it can be usually recognized by certain

signs, like the following; (a) when it cannot be accounted for by

natural causes, and is generally short in duration; (b) if it is from

the evil spirits, it leaves the soul shaken or dismayed, if from God,

it is followed by light and peace.

620. Dangers of scrupulosity.--The evil results of indulged

scrupulosity are as follows: (a) temporal evils--the constant fears and

worries of the scrupulous affect the brain and nerves, break down the

bodily vigor, and lead to neurasthenia, hysteria, insanity or

monomania; (b) spiritual evils--time is wasted in useless regrets and

anxieties, prayer becomes a torture, confidence in God decreases, and,

seeing they do not find consolation in virtue, the scrupulous often end

in vice and despair.

621. Rules to be observed by the scrupulous.--(a) They must not yield

to their scruples. As was said above, scrupulosity is not a conscience,

but only the counterfeit appearance of a conscience; not a help to the

soul, but a grave drawback and danger. Hence, the scrupulous must learn

to despise their foolish fears and imaginations. (b) They must follow

blindly the commands of a prudent spiritual director. To attempt to

make decisions for themselves is a harrowing experience for scrupulous

persons, and one fraught with great peril. They must protect

themselves, therefore, by following the decisions made for them by one

who will guide them aright. Gradually, as their condition improves,

however, they must learn to take the initiative and thus prepare

themselves to act as responsible persons capable of forming a correct

judgment.

622. Not to follow their scruples means: (a) that scrupulous persons

should recognize their scruples for what they really are (i.e., for a

spiritual disorder), and that they should firmly resolve to use the

means to get rid of them; (b) that they will prevent scruples from

arising by keeping themselves occupied with external things, or by

interesting themselves with matters that will exclude the worrisome

thoughts; (c) that they will banish scruples at once, as they would a

temptation. The two key aims of the scrupulous individual is to

counteract his introversion by greater social activity and to re-train

his faculty so that he will be in control at all times.

623. Though the scrupulous are obliged not to heed their scruples, they

rarely sin by heeding them, because their condition is such that they

are not responsible. For, as was said above (40 sqq.), fear and other

passions lessen or remove deliberation and the voluntariness of acts.

624. To give absolute obedience to the spiritual director means: (a)

that scrupulous persons should recognize that it is wrong for them to

depend on their own prudence, whereas they are absolutely safe in

following the advice and precepts of the spiritual father who holds the

place of God; (b) that they should avoid changing directors, and should

adhere strictly to the rules prescribed for them.

625. Qualities required for a successful direction of the scrupulous

are:

(a) Knowledge. The spiritual physician must be able to distinguish

scrupulosity from spiritual diseases or conditions that are similar,

lest he prescribe what is not suitable for the case. Example: A person

of tender conscience should continue in that state, a person of

scrupulous conscience needs instruction that he may put aside his

erroneous views; a scrupulous person stands in need of special

guidance. He must also recognize that scrupulosity is a mental illness

that at times requires the expert treatment of a psychiatrist. Knowing

his own limitations and the need of expert therapy, he should not

hesitate to send the penitent to a competent doctor.

(b) Prudence. Some persons pretend scrupulosity in order to get a name

for holiness, or to make a good impression; needless to say, they must

be dealt with cautiously, as they often prove very unscrupulous. With a

person who is really scrupulous, the spiritual director must carefully

obtain all the knowledge necessary to ascertain the true state of soul,

prudently bring the individual to recognize that he is a sick person,

help to restore his confidence in himself, in his confessor, in God,

etc.

directors as they are to themselves; but they are heavily burdened and

are unable to help themselves. The law of charity applies. They have

the same right to charitable treatment as others who are physically

suffering and needy.

(d) Firmness. Disobedience will defeat every effort of a director to

help a scrupulous person. On this point, therefore, there must be no

leniency: the rules laid down must be insisted on, the reasons should

not be given, and no argument or discussion should be allowed. The

director should speak with certainty and authority; he should be brief,

and, if he must repeat, he will do well to use the same words.

(e) Good judgment. After deciding that a person is scrupulous, the

director must discover what is the particular form of scrupulosity in

the case, and must apply remedies that are suitable.

626. Rules Concerning Persons Scrupulous about Past Confessions.--(a)

For the first time the confessor may permit a general confession of the

past life, if the scrupulous penitent has fears about previous

confessions and has not already made such a general confession. Let the

individual relate his whole story at once, with all its details and

complications. This might perhaps take more than one confession to

complete, but the full recital is necessary if the scrupulous person is

to have confidence in his director’s knowledge of his exact state of

soul. (b) After this general confession, no mention of past confession

must be permitted, unless the scrupulous person is ready to swear

without hesitation that he is sure that a sin certainly grave was

committed by him and never rightly confessed.

627. Rules Concerning Persons scrupulous about Present

Confessions.--(a) Before confession, the penitent must be content with

a certain brief space of time appointed by the confessor for making his

examination of conscience and act of contrition. A longer time spent in

these preparations is useful to other penitents, but harmful to the

scrupulous.

(b) During confession only those sins need be mentioned which are seen

from a brief examen to be both certain and grave, and only those

circumstances whose declaration is absolutely necessary. If the

scrupulous penitent begins to speak of doubtful sins or irrelevant

details, the confessor must forbid him to go on; for though confessions

must be complete, whenever possible, doubts and details must not be

permitted in the case of such scrupulous persons (see Vol. II).

sufficient matter for absolution, he must not yield to the penitent’s

fears, but must assure him that he does not need absolution and that he

may go to the Sacraments Without it.

487. Cessation of Obligation.--The ordinary ways in which a law ceases