PREPARATIONS ON THE KINCHOU POSITION
After much hesitation, opposition, many quarrels, alterations, and
frequent fresh orders, a column consisting of two regiments and
three batteries was formed on May 15, on which evening it moved out
of Nangalin station to take the field. The advance-guard, under the
general command of Lieutenant-Colonel Laperoff, was composed of the
battalions of the 13th Regiment and the 3rd Battery of the 4th East
Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade. At daybreak on the 16th the column
got near the Shanshihlipu heights, where, as soon as it was light, the
advance-guard heard firing in front. This altogether puzzled Laperoff,
for he knew that none of our guns were ahead of him. It turned out
that, owing to ignorance of the country, the main body had lost its
way, got in front of its advance-guard, and had attempted to occupy
these heights, without having reconnoitred them or even despatched
scouts in advance. Fock, commanding the 4th Division, had trusted
to luck, and we paid the price, especially the 3rd Battery, under
Romanovsky, for the enemy had occupied the position before us, and
opened a heavy fire on this battery as it came up, almost destroying it.
This battery was admirably supported by, and only got away out of
action with the assistance of, the 'bullock battery,' under Lieutenant
Sadikoff. On the initiative of this young officer, whom our gunners
afterwards dubbed the 'Guardian Angel,' some old Chinese guns had
been collected and formed into a battery drawn by bullocks. Laperoff
did not know what to do with his advance-guard under the peculiar
circumstances, for it was no longer in advance, he received no orders,
and the fire was getting hotter. Briefly, the result was that our force
had, after heavy casualties, to retire to Nangalin without effecting
anything. As soon as the withdrawal began General Fock who had hitherto
been with the rear guard, suddenly turned up. When Laperoff reported
the mistake and its disastrous result, he began to excuse himself,
saying that he had never given the orders, and complained of the
inactivity and idleness of his Chief of the Staff. 'Traitors! they are
all traitors! They never obey my verbal orders; they only obey written
ones.'
This fight showed the superiority of the enemy in artillery
preparation, in fire control, and in knowledge of how to use the
ground. After taking Shanshihlipu they were able to mask their guns
perfectly, but we, not understanding the value of ground, exposed
ourselves needlessly, and suffered much. While they, after a tedious
sea-voyage, victoriously advanced, we, on our own ground, with every
chance of selecting and fortifying the best positions beforehand, only
tried to occupy them after the enemy had already done it. So, after the
first brush, we withdrew rapidly and with much loss to the celebrated
but worthless position at Kinchou.
After carefully watching everything that happened throughout the whole
campaign, and thus getting to know and appreciate the Russian soldier
under service conditions, I have come to the conclusion that he was
not only a hero, but a Titan, and I must say I had never dreamed that
he would exhibit the moral and physical strength that he always did.
Possessing such qualities, had he only received proper training, and
been well led by the more senior of his officers, we would never
have witnessed that pitiable slaughter--for which General Fock, with
the approval of the Officer Commanding the District--at Kinchou was
responsible. The first fight at Shanshihlipu, its failure, and the
rapid retreat had a disastrous effect on the _moral_ of the men. They
lost that confidence which counts for so much in war.
From the moment of the withdrawal from Shanshihlipu up till May 26
the ground lying in front of Kinchou was never properly reconnoitred.
I would lay particular stress on this absence of any regular and
well-organized intelligence work, because, operating as we did with our
eyes shut, we always allowed the enemy, who was energetic, insistent,
and cunning, to take us unawares.
And now to the Kinchou position. The fortification of it was still
being carried on solely by the labour of the 5th Regiment, which
gallant corps did not belong to General Fock's division, and so was not
spared. As has been already mentioned, Colonel Tretiakoff, commanding
the regiment and nominally in command of the position, knew well that
it was anything but ready even for a temporary defence. As before,
so now, especially after Shanshihlipu, he recognized the absolute
necessity of masking the guns, which were standing exposed on the
highest points, without any attempt at concealment. He fully realized
that durable splinter-proofs, and not mere 'hen-coops,' were necessary,
that the infantry trenches should be made deeper, and that all the
communications should be greatly improved; but his representations
still met with little success. Though Fock continued to talk much, he
no longer said that he would destroy the whole Japanese army here. On
the contrary, he turned round and declared, in self-contradiction,
that to attempt to hold the place long would be a crime.
The navy had given us two long-range Canet guns, which had been got
into position on the left flank, under the idea that the attack would
develop there, which, as a matter of fact, it did. A great deal of
labour and time had been expended on doing this, and the guns were
splendidly masked. But a few days before the battle General Fock
insisted on their being dismounted, taken down, and dragged off to a
position on the right. He was told that this flank on Lime Hill was
not important, and that the enemy would never attempt to advance that
side (which was justified by the event); but he would not reconsider
his order. The guns were taken down; there was no time to remount them
again, and so they fell, unused and uninjured, with two waggon-loads of
ammunition, into the enemy's hands.
The batteries on this most important position, called in the highest
military circles the 'key to Arthur,' were commanded by Lieutenants
and Sub-Lieutenants, and the command of the artillery was given to a
very young officer, one Captain Visokikh. He continually reported that
he had not enough ammunition, asked for projectors to light up the
Kinchou Valley, and begged for sand-bags, sleepers, rails, beams, etc.,
for thickening the cover and making the buildings splinter-proof, but
without result. I know for a fact that his brother, commanding the 7th
Sector in Port Arthur, so well appreciated his helpless position that
he, quite illegally, upon his own authority, sent ammunition to him.
Tretiakoff, finding that even Stössel would do nothing to assist him,
at last went direct to Smirnoff, and telling him everything, asked
his help. The latter did everything that he was able so as to delay
the fall of Kinchou, if only for a few days; but what he could do was
little, for his powers did not extend beyond the Fortress glacis. When
some of the necessary materials did arrive, the men worked like slaves
to improve the defences, the Fortress artillerymen assisting the men
of the 5th Regiment, under the supervision of Colonel Tretiakoff and
Captain Schwartz. But it was too late.
Now, shortly before the battle the state of affairs in the district
was, to put it mildly, slightly mixed. If the staff issued an order,
the General, instead of at once carrying it out, wrote long-winded
memoranda and proceeded to do the opposite. Trains stood in the
stations ready to start day and night, and, as can be seen from the
orders, the wretched 15th Regiment spent its time entraining and
detraining, being taken out one day and brought back the next. The
authorities seemed to have lost their heads, and orders were only
issued to be at once cancelled. The day before the battle was a
nightmare of confusion: no one knew what was being done or why it
was done. Men were worn out by being 'messed about' uselessly from
one place to another, and were never long enough in any place to get
to know it. The work on the position which had for a short time been
proceeding again had to cease for want of materials. For instance,
the frontal battery on Lime Hill, under the command of Lieutenant
Solomonoff, to a certain degree important as being able to fire on the
approaches to the right flank, was armed with four old Chinese guns.
It had no traverses, and no bullet-proof shelter for the gunners or
ammunition, and was not connected by telephone with the Commandant.
This was the state of the Kinchou position.
In Port Arthur, after the Viceroy's departure and the assumption of
command of the fleet by Witgeft, there was a lull in naval operations;
but rapid progress was being made with the repairing of the lame ducks.
The battleships and cruisers--too precious to use--lay motionless in
the inner Roads, the destroyers, gunboats, and the _Novik_ were alone
active. The latter were kept with steam up, and were always cruising
about, protecting the mine-trawlers, laying mines, or doing short or
long reconnaissances, which were called by the men 'adventures'--a very
suitable name. Complete ignorance of the coast generally, pointless
tasks, lack of speed, bad engines, absence of well-thought-out plans, a
numerous, keen, and powerful enemy, who always operated systematically
and cleverly, rendered these expeditions abortive of any result except
fatigue, waste of coal, and loss of vessels.
Having served all his time ashore, Witgeft naturally could not give
an example of useful activity; moreover, the very weak line he took
with junior officers undoubtedly greatly undermined his own authority
and naval discipline generally. The attitude of the younger officers
towards him and other seniors was deplorable, and noticeable even to
outsiders; the juniors not only saw the defects, and the incompetence
of their seniors, but they publicly criticized them. At the same time,
a great gulf grew between army and navy, and scarcely a day passed
without a conflict between the officers of the two services; they
insulted each other in the streets. And the position of the sailors was
a difficult one, because they themselves were not to blame: it was not
their fault that they did little cruising and were generally in port in
peace-time; that they had not been taught how to shoot and know their
ships; that the only thing required of them was spittle and polish.
Like the infantry, the naval officers were not trained for war.
General Stössel, instead of endeavouring to get the two services to
pull together, made matters worse, and in his effort to gain personal
popularity amongst the younger army officers did not even refrain from
making fun of the Officer Commanding the Fleet. However, later on,
when soldiers and sailors fought together and were struck down side by
side in the trenches, all differences vanished--men recognized men.
On May 20 we had another sea attack, carried out by seven ships and two
destroyers. It lasted from shortly after midnight to 2 a.m. The result
was immaterial.