THE NAVY LOSE A CHANCE
When describing the repulse of the blockers on the night of May 2,
I essayed to bring forward the importance of the work done by the
guard-ships, and now a word as to the destruction of the Japanese
battleship _Hatsuse_. From the beginning of the blockade Admiral
Loschinsky and the Captain of the _Amur_ had studied the usual course
of the enemy's ships, with a view to laying mines along it. This was
impossible for some time, owing to the fog and the number of ships,
especially destroyers, cruising about. At last, on May 14, during a
council held at Admiral Witgeft's, at which Loschinsky was present,
the Captain of the _Amur_ asked permission to set to work. Loschinsky
turned to Witgeft, as his senior, and asked permission to start this
important but risky work. 'As you like; it is entirely your business
and you are responsible,' was the reply. Loschinsky then turned to the
Captain of the _Amur_. 'The enemy is not visible; there is scarcely any
fog, and what there is will only help us. Go, and God be with you! Lay
not less than fifty mines, and none nearer than ten miles.' The Admiral
himself did not go on this trip, as the meeting had only just begun
and was a very important one. The _Amur_ left at three and returned
after five, no one at all suspecting what an invaluable service to the
besieged place she had done that day. At eleven o'clock next morning,
in sight of the whole Fortress, the Japanese battleship _Hatsuse_
struck a mine and perished even more quickly than the _Petropalovsk_;
the _Fuji_ also was badly damaged. Thus did the _Amur_ avenge the
_Petropalovsk_.
Loschinsky and several others were at the moment with the naval
Commander-in-Chief. As the tide was at the flood, those who were
present advised Witgeft to take advantage of the favourable conditions,
and at once to send out three battleships, all five cruisers, and the
destroyers to capture the damaged battleship and its escort of three.
'Everything will be done in its own good time,' was the answer. Even
when Balashoff, the Master of the Hunt,[11] hurried up to point out
with great earnestness the necessity for the fleet putting out in
order to make an end of the Japanese on the sea, Witgeft repeated:
'Wait; everything will be done in its own good time.' Only at 12.30
were orders given to the cruiser division and the destroyers to get
up steam. The former could not put out at all, for, being a holiday,
their crews were ashore, and it was two o'clock before the destroyers
got under way. The _Novik_, which happened by chance to be under steam,
joined them. Out they went at full speed, and, regardless of danger,
tried to approach the wounded battleship in broad daylight--but the
psychological moment had passed: the enemy had carried out repairs,
and opened such a fire that it was impossible to get near, for every
destroyer was valuable, and there was no object in throwing them away.
They returned.
The garrison and inhabitants were disgusted. The navy had again made a
mess of it. Had Witgeft been a man of decision, had he kept his fleet
ready for battle, the picture would have been different. For had the
fleet gone out at once, the _Fuji_ and the battleship and two cruisers
with her would undoubtedly have been destroyed. This would have so
weakened the enemy's fleet that the fight on July 11 would have had
another result. All the same, the destruction of the _Hatsuse_ greatly
influenced the defence afterwards, in particular during the strict
blockade. From the moment she was destroyed not a single big ship
except the _Nisshin_ and _Kasuga_, which stood at long range, and threw
some 10-inch shells on to Cross Hill, ventured near Port Arthur. The
Fortress was thus ensured from the dreadful prospect of being bombarded
from the sea, and therefore all the big guns on the sea-front, from the
6-inch up to the 11-inch howitzers, were turned towards the land, and
gave invaluable help in the land defence to the end.
After the blowing up of the _Hatsuse_, the sweeping, blocking, and
defence of the Roads was made over to the officer in command of the
cruiser division, and the hunt for mines went on day and night. The
cruisers went out by turns at night into the outer Roads. This almost
invariably called forth an attack by the enemy's destroyers, which,
covered by the confusion of the fight, laid mines. Our destroyers were
ordered by Witgeft to lie in pairs in Takhe and White Wolf's Bays.
Despite Loschinsky's energetic protests that it was the duty of the
fortress artillery and guard-ships to wage war against mine-layers, and
not the work of the destroyers, which ran great risk of being blown up,
Witgeft was immovable. But the wisdom of Loschinsky's advice was proved
later, for on one dark, foggy night the _Lieutenant Burakoff_ and the
_Boevoy_ were rendered _hors de combat_ by Japanese torpedo-boats,
which crept up to them unawares in Takhe Bay. In the middle of May
Witgeft gave orders that mines should be laid by junks near Inchenzy
and Melankhe, which was done. When the _Amur_ was laying mines west of
Liao-tieh-shan she ran on to the mast of a sunken blocker, and damaged
herself badly. It was impossible to dock her, as the only dock was
occupied, and we had to make use of the _Bogatir_ and afterwards the
_Reshitelny_ for this work.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 11: A Court title.--A.B.L.]