WHAT WE DID WHILE THE ENEMY WERE ADVANCING
On the 5th the Viceroy left for Mukden, having handed over the command
of the fleet to Rear-Admiral Witgeft. A worse choice could not have
been made. That Witgeft expiated his shortcomings as a fleet commander
by his gallant death in the execution of his duty does not alter the
fact that it was wrong to appoint a shore admiral to the command of a
fleet before which lay such a tremendous task. The main duty of the
fleet in Port Arthur was to co-operate with the army and to prevent a
landing on the peninsula. This was entirely appreciated by Smirnoff and
Makharoff, who worked together and settled many questions in regard
to future combined operations. Fate, however, decided against their
execution, for Smirnoff became subordinate to Stössel, and Makharoff
was struck off the roll of the living.
The enemy, who had landed at Petsiwo without opposition, attacked on
the 6th our weak advanced posts of Frontier Guards and compelled them
to retire, after cutting the railway near the station of Pulienten.
Telegram after telegram came in urging energetic measures. Even the
station-master at Kinchou made a report as to the landing, but was
reprimanded, and ordered not to talk nonsense, for Stössel saw no
urgency. The only opposition to the enemy's disembarkation was made
by about fifty scouts of the Frontier Guard, under the command of
Lieutenant Sirotko, who, after making an obstinate resistance, were
obliged to withdraw before the enemy's advanced troops, which were
nearly twenty times as strong. Although everything was ready at the
station of Nangalin for the despatch of a train full of reserves, it
was not sent, and the Frontier Guards were not reinforced.
On May 8 the last train, loaded with ammunition, came in from the
north. She brought the news that north of Pulienten the telegraph had
been destroyed and the railway damaged by the Frontier Guards retiring
to Wafangtien. What some had known must happen, but of which others had
doubted the possibility, did happen--Port Arthur was actually cut off,
and henceforth upon its garrison lay the serious task of attracting and
retaining a whole army, and so decreasing the enemy's concentration
against our forces in the north.
The evacuation of Dalny is a good example of the ill-informed and
over-centralized control of our General Officer Commanding the
District. The peaceful inhabitants of this town were first disturbed on
the 3rd and 5th of May by the news of the enemy's landing at Petsiwo.
They began to flee, but only a few got away. On the 6th the railway was
cut, and steps were taken to repair it; but Stössel's order, No. 168,
of May 8--
'The inhabitants of Dalny and Talienwan are to remain quietly in
their houses, as they are not in the least in danger from the enemy'--
somehow did not produce the expected feeling of security. Afterwards,
on the 11th, when the rail had been again cut, a train full of
civilians was, by Stössel's permission, sent off. It was met by the
enemy, fired on, and sent back to Dalny.
Now that we were isolated, the blockade by sea became stricter, while
to the north the disembarkation of the besieging army was permitted
to take place without opposition. The second phase of the military
operations in the Kwantun Peninsula had commenced, for we were now
absolutely dependent on our own resources. This is my excuse for again
referring to the vital question of supply. What had been done on the
whole? From February 8 till May 8 Port Arthur had been connected by
rail with Siberia, and only blockaded by sea in a half-hearted manner,
and during that time all necessaries could have been poured into the
town. Nevertheless, now that we were cut off, we found ourselves very
badly off for provisions. It had evidently been forgotten that, for
a successful defence of a fortress one of the chief essentials, in
addition to troops, guns, and ammunition, is an ample supply of food
and a rational organization of the sanitary department. It is necessary
to emphasize these points in order to show up all the factors which led
to Port Arthur's fall. By the orders published, which I do not quote,
it is clear that even in May some anxiety was felt by the authorities,
especially the Commandant, as to the food-supply. From the beginning
of that month the troops were put on short rations. When one considers
the exceptional conditions of service and the continued arduous work
carried on at high pressure in the Fortress and district, it appears
that, to last out, the men should rather have had increased rations.
But it could not be done, and they had to carry on for eight months on
insufficient food. Yet, though the rail had not been used as it might
have been to bring in food, that mountain of packing-cases near the
station showed that it had not been idle. This mound, which served
as a landmark--a sort of a triumphal arch by the entrance to the Old
Town--was composed entirely of--vodka! We might lack food in Arthur,
but never drink. Can a more hopeless state of things be imagined?
For of all places in the world where drink can do harm, a fortress
full of half-nourished men is the worst. Stössel's efforts to repress
drunkenness were beyond praise, but what could he do? The sale of
spirituous liquor was forbidden in all shops, stores, or public-houses;
but it could always be got for money, and all drank what they wanted
to. It was there.
All we knew of the enemy was that they continued to advance undisturbed
along the Mandarin road towards Kinchou. On the Kinchou position
everything was quiet. Work was being carried on by Colonel Tretiakoff
alone with the regiment under his command. General Fock occasionally
paid the place a visit, went round the works, joked with the soldiers,
gossiped with the officers, and went off to Dalny. The one point he
insisted on was the arming of the right flank and the construction of
a battery on Lime Hill. General Stössel sat in Port Arthur, and kept
all in a continual state of astonishment by his orders. In the Fortress
we had, up to now, placed a good deal of confidence in the Kinchou
position, for General Stössel had told every one that the Japanese
would never be allowed to come beyond it, and few except the Japanese
knew what was going to happen. On May 10 we read the following order:
'On account of the possible arrival (from Kinchou) of the whole
of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Division, the Commandant will make
arrangements for the building of field-ovens.'
Our Commander, without even having seen the enemy, was already looking
behind him! To many it was now evident that the stronghold at Kinchou
was not particularly to be relied on, and alarming rumours began to be
circulated about it. Every one at once declared that as a position it
was beneath contempt, but the Officer Commanding the District paid no
regard to such things, and continued to publish weighty orders, such as
that of May 12:
'I am always meeting private soldiers, particularly those of the
7th Reserve Battalion, wearing felt boots. This is irregular, and
it would be better that skins should be bought at the butchers' and
cured.'
As a detail, the men wore felt boots because during the whole siege
they had nothing else, because for six years the Fortress had never
been supplied with a sufficient quantity of leather boots.
Up to the present no serious steps had been taken at Kinchou; only a
few weak battalions had been thrown forward in advance of the position.
That was the real state of affairs, though other information was
invented for the inhabitants. At this time men who knew the ground and
could scout well, like some of the Frontier Guards, were invaluable,
and yet they were scarcely ever employed. For some reason they did not
find favour in the eyes of the Generals. Every one knew the splendid
qualities of these Frontier Guards, but they were ignored till they
came under the command of Kondratenko. Even when the enemy advanced and
seized the position near Shanshihlipu we did nothing. In Dalny Fock did
the 'dictator'; in Arthur we continued to write orders. For instance,
No. 187:
'To-day, near the church, I met two officers with a lady; she was
wearing an officer's rifle forage-cap. It appears that one of the
officers was Lieutenant Erben, and the lady his wife. I do not think
that I need dwell upon how out of place it seems for one of the
female sex to wear a military cap with a cockade, when even retired
officers and reserves are not allowed by regulation to wear them.'
In Dalny there were numerous buildings, docks, and the most splendid
breakwaters running out into the sea for a distance of one and a half
miles, but nothing had so far been done to destroy them in the event
of the town being abandoned. It was only by an order of May 14 that
a committee was appointed to settle which of the larger buildings
should be destroyed. The result was that the Japanese eventually
found the docks and quays untouched, and of the greatest service to
them when they used that place as a base. On the 14th also the fact
that the enemy had landed in force at Petsiwo was first mentioned in
Orders. This news was twice repeated in the paper--once as an official
_communiqué_ upon the doings of Fock's troops, and again as a true
account of the reconnaissance. As a matter of fact, they had by this
time occupied the village of Shanshihlipu, but of this the staffs of
both Generals Stössel and Fock were in complete ignorance till the
fight of May 16. That they did not know of it is proved by the fact
that the 3rd Battery of the 4th East Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade,
on occupying the southern heights at Shanshihlipu, was almost blown
out of existence by the enemy's artillery, which had already, somewhat
earlier, taken up a position on the northern hills opposite. On my
asking the Colonel how this had happened, he said:
'Everything was in such a muddle that it is a wonder any of us are
alive to tell the tale. Stössel gave one order and Fock another--every
hour brought fresh instructions.'
Fock, who had always declared that Kinchou was quite unassailable,
seeing that the enemy had landed and were advancing in earnest to the
attack, stated publicly that to give battle at Kinchou would be a
crime, that a division there would be merely destroyed. The 15th and
16th East Siberian Rifle Regiments were hurriedly entrained, and moved
backwards and forwards, first to Dalny and then back to Port Arthur.
The confusion boded ill.