"should at least be treated as a basis for discussion and
pause,"
and asked that the German Government should urge this at Vienna, but the
German Secretary of State on July 27 replied that such a conference "was
not practicable," and that it "would practically amount to a court of
arbitration," and could not, in his opinion, be called together "except
at the request of Austria and Russia."
[English "White Paper," Nos. 43 and 46.]
That this was a mere evasion is perfectly plain. Germany already knew
that Austria would not ask for such a conference, for Austria had
already refused Russia's request for an extension of time and had
actually commenced its military operations. Germany's attitude is best
indicated by the letter of the Russian Minister in Germany to the
Russian Foreign Office in which he states that on July 27 he called at
the German Foreign Office and asked it
"to urge upon Vienna in a more pressing fashion to take up
this line of conciliation. Jagow replied that he could not
advise Austria to yield."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 38.]
Why not? Russia had advised Servia to yield, and Servia had conceded
nearly every claim. Why could not the German Foreign Office advise
Vienna to meet conciliation by conciliation, if its desire for peace
were sincere? All that Russia and England desired was that a little time
and consideration should be given, without prejudice to the rights or
claims of Austria, before the peace of the world was hopelessly
shattered.
Before this interview took place the French Ambassador had called at the
German Foreign Office on a similar errand and urged the English
suggestion that action should at once be taken by England, Germany,
Russia, and France at St. Petersburg and Vienna, to the effect that
Austria and Servia
"should abstain from any act which might aggravate the
situation at the present hour."
By this was meant that there should be, pending further parleys, no
invasion of Servia by Austria and none of Austria by Russia. _To this
the German Foreign Minister opposed a categorical refusal._
On the same day the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had "a long and earnest
conversation" with the Austrian Under Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs. He expressed the earnest hope that
"something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.
Baron Machio replied that this would now be difficult, as a
skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the
Servians had been aggressors."
The Russian Ambassador then said that his country would do all it could
to keep the Servians quiet,
"and even to fall back before an Austrian advance in order to
gain time."
He urged that the Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburg should be
furnished with full powers to continue discussions with the Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
"who was very willing to advise Servia to yield all that could
be fairly asked of her as an independent power."
The only reply to this reasonable suggestion was that it would be
submitted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.
[English "White Paper," No. 56.]
On the same day the German Ambassador at Paris called upon the French
Foreign Office and strongly insisted on the "_exclusion of all
possibility of mediation or of conference_," and yet contemporaneously
the Imperial German Chancellor was advising London that he had
"started the efforts toward mediation in Vienna, immediately
in the way desired by Sir Edward Grey, and had further
communicated to the Austrian Foreign Minister the wish of the
Russian Foreign Minister for a direct talk in Vienna."
What hypocrisy! In the formal German defense, the official apologist for
that country, after stating his conviction
"that an act of mediation could not take into consideration
the Austro-Servian conflict, which was purely an
Austro-Hungarian affair,"
claimed that Germany had transmitted Sir Edward Grey's further
suggestion to Vienna, in which Austria-Hungary was urged
"either to agree to accept the Servian answer as sufficient or
to look upon it as a basis for further conversations";
but the Austro-Hungarian Government--playing the rôle of the wicked
partner of the combination--"in full appreciation of our mediatory
activity," (so says the German "White Paper" with sardonic humor,)
replied to this proposition that, coming as it did after the opening of
hostilities, "_it was too late_."
Does any reasonable man question for a moment that, if Germany had done
something more than merely "transmit" these wise and pacific
suggestions, Austria would have complied with the suggestions of its
powerful ally or that Austria would have suspended its military
operations if Germany had given any intimation of such a wish?
On the following day, July 28, the door was further closed on any
possibility of compromise when the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs
"said, quietly but firmly, _that no discussion could be
accepted on the basis of the Servian note_; that war would be
declared today, and that the well-known pacific character of
the Emperor, as well as, he might add, his own, might be
accepted as a guarantee that the war was both just and
inevitable; that this was a matter that must be settled
directly between the two parties immediately concerned."
To this arrogant and unreasonable contention that Europe must accept the
guarantee of the Austrian Foreign Minister as to the righteousness of
Austria's quarrel the British Ambassador suggested "the larger aspect of
the question," namely, the peace of Europe, and to this "larger aspect,"
which should have given any reasonable official some ground for pause,
the Austrian Foreign Minister replied that he
"had it also in mind, but thought that Russia ought not to
oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at
territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be
postponed."
[English "White Paper," No. 62.]
The private conversations between Russia and Austria having thus failed,
Russia returned to the proposition of a European conference to preserve
its peace. Its Ambassador in Vienna on July 28 had a conference with
Berchtold and pointed to the dangers to the peace of Europe and the
desirability of good relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia.
To this Count Berchtold replied that he understood perfectly well the
seriousness of the situation and the advantages of a frank explanation
with the Cabinet at St. Petersburg.
"He told me that, on the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian
Government, which had only reluctantly decided upon the
energetic measures which it had taken against Servia, _could
now neither withdraw nor enter upon any discussion of the
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."_
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 45.]
On the same day, July 28, the German Imperial Chancellor sent for the
English Ambassador and excused his failure to accept the proposal of
conference of the neutral powers, on the ground that he did not think it
would be effective,
"because such a conference would in his opinion have the
appearance of an 'Areopagus' consisting of two powers of each
group sitting in judgment upon the two remaining powers."
After engaging in this pitiful and insincere quibble, and when reminded
of Servia's conciliatory reply, amounting to a virtual surrender,
"his Excellency said that he did not wish to discuss the
Servian note, but that Austria's standpoint, and in this he
agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian
concern, _with which Russia had nothing to do_."
[English "White Paper," No. 71.]
At this point the rules of the countries intervened in the dispute. The
Kaiser, having returned from Norway, telegraphed the Czar, under date of
July 28, that he was
"exerting all my influence to endeavor to make Austria-Hungary
come to an open and satisfying understanding with Russia,"
and invoked the Czar's aid.
[German "White Paper," Annex 20.]
If the Kaiser were sincere, and he may have been, _his attitude was not
that of his Foreign Office_. Upon the face of the record we have only
his own assurance that he was doing everything to preserve peace, but
the steps that he took or the communications he made to influence
Austria _are not found in the formal defense which the German Government
has given to the world_. The Kaiser can only convince the world of his
innocence of the crime of his Potsdam camarilla by giving the world _the
text_ of any advice he gave the Austrian officials. He has produced his
telegrams to the Czar. _Where are those he presumably sent to Francis
Joseph or Count Berchtold? Where are the instructions he gave his own
Ambassadors or Foreign Minister?_
It is significant that on the same day Sazonof telegraphed to Count
Benckendorff:
"My conversations with the German Ambassador confirm my
impression that Germany is rather favorable to the
uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria,"
and he adds, and history will vindicate him in the conclusion, that
"the Berlin Cabinet, which might have been able to arrest the
whole development of this crisis, seems to exercise no action
on its ally."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 43.]
On July 29 Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that he had
that night seen the German Chancellor, who had "just returned from
Potsdam," where he had presumably seen the Kaiser. The German Chancellor
then showed clearly how the wind was blowing in making the suggestion to
Sir Edward Goschen that if England would remain neutral, Germany would
agree to guarantee that she would not take any French territory. When
asked about the French colonies, no assurance was given.
[English "White Paper," No. 85.]
Later in the day the German Chancellor again saw the English Ambassador,
and expressed regret
"that events had marched too rapidly, and that it was
therefore too late to act upon your [Sir Edward Grey's]
suggestion that the Servian reply might form the basis of
discussion."
[English "White Paper," No. 75.]
On the same day the Ambassador for Germany at St. Petersburg called upon
Sazonof and expressed himself in favor of further explanations between
Vienna and St. Petersburg, to which Sazonof assented. [Russian "Orange
Paper," No. 49.] On the same day Sir Edward Grey asked the German
Government
"_to suggest any form of procedure_ under which the idea of
mediation between Austria and Russia, already accepted by the
German Government in principle, _could be applied_."
To which the German Foreign Office replied that it could not act for
fear that if they made to their ally any suggestion that looked like
pressure it might "_cause them [Austria] to precipitate matter and
present a fait accompli_." [See letter of Sir Edward Goschen to Sir
Edward Grey, July 29--English "White Paper," No. 70.]
This was the last and worst of the quibbles put forth to gain time while
Austria was making progress toward Belgrade. It assumes that Austria
might not only fail to respect the wish in a matter of common concern of
its more powerful ally, but that it might act in disregard of Germany's
wish. This strains human credulity to the breaking point. Did the German
Secretary of State keep a straight face when he uttered this sardonic
pleasantry? It may be the duty of a diplomat to lie on occasion, but is
it ever necessary to utter such a stupid falsehood? The German Secretary
of State sardonically added in the same conversation that he was not
sure that the effort for peace had not hastened the declaration of war,
as though the declaration of war against Servia had not been planned and
expected from the first.
As a final effort to meet quibbles, the British Ambassador at Berlin
then suggested that after Austria had satisfied her military prestige,
the moment might then be favorable for four disinterested powers to
discuss the situation and come forward with suggestions for preventing
graver complications.
To this proposal the German Secretary of State seemingly acquiesced,
but, as usual, _nothing whatever was done_. [English "White Paper," No.
76.] It is true that on July 29 Sir Edward Grey was assured by the
German Ambassador that the German Foreign Office was
"endeavoring to make Vienna explain in a satisfactory form at
St. Petersburg the scope and extension of Austrian proceedings
in Servia,"
but again the communications which the German Foreign Office sent to
Vienna on this point _have never yet been disclosed to the world_.
[English "White Paper," No. 84.]