"urged that the _German Government should suggest any method_
by which the influence of the four powers could be used
together to prevent war between Austria and Russia. France
agreed, Italy agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating
influence was ready to be put into operation _by any method
that Germany could suggest_ if mine were not acceptable. In
fact, mediation was ready to come into operation by any method
that Germany thought possible, if only Germany would 'press
the button' in the interests of peace."
[English "White Paper," No. 84.]
The difficulty was, however, that Germany never "pressed the button,"
although obviously it would have been easy for her to do so, as the
stronger and more influential member of the Double Alliance.
On the same day the Austrian Government left a memorandum with Sir
Edward Grey to the effect that Count Mensdorff said that the war with
Servia must proceed.
On the night of July 29 the British Ambassador at Berlin was informed
that the German Foreign Office "_had not had time to send an answer
yet_" to the proposal that Germany suggest the form of mediation, but
that the question had been referred to the Austro-Hungarian Government
with a request as to "what would satisfy them."
[English "White Paper," No. 107.]
On the following day the German Ambassador informed Sir Edward Grey that
the German Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking
Belgrade and Servian territory in the region of the frontier, to promise
not to advance further, while the powers endeavored to arrange that
Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria, but if
Germany ever exercised any such pressure upon Vienna, _no evidence of it
has ever been given to the world_. Certainly it was not very effective,
and for the reasons mentioned it is impossible to conclude that the
advice of Germany, if in good faith, would not have been followed by its
weaker ally.
From all that appears in the record, Austria made no reply to this most
conciliatory suggestion of England, but, in the meantime, the
irrepressible Kaiser made the crisis more acute by cabling to the Czar
that the mobilization of Russia to meet the mobilization of Austria was
affecting his position of mediator, to which the Czar made a
conciliatory reply, stating that Russia's mobilization was only for a
defense against Austria.
The Czar, to put at rest any anxiety of the Kaiser as to Russia's
intentions with respect to Germany, added:
"I thank you cordially for your mediation which permits the
hope that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically
impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have
been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far
from us to want war. _As long as the negotiations between
Austria and Servia continue, my troops will undertake no
provocative action. I give you my solemn word thereon._ I
confide with all my faith in the grace of God, and I hope for
the success of your mediation in Vienna for the welfare of our
countries and the peace of Europe."
What more could Russia do? If Austria continued to mobilize, why not
Russia?
On this day, July 30, the German Ambassador had two interviews at St.
Petersburg with Sazonof, and it was then that Sazonof drew up the
following formula as a basis for peace:
"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Servia has
assumed character of question of European interest, declares
herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum the points which
violate principle of sovereignty of Servia, _Russia engages to
stop all military preparations_."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 60.]