"a refusal to extend the terms of the ultimatum ... would be
in contradiction with the very bases of international
relations."
[Russian "Orange Paper," No. 4.]
Could any court question the justice of this contention? The peace of
the world was at stake. Time only was asked to see what could be done to
preserve that peace and satisfy Austria's grievances to the uttermost
farthing.
Concurrently with Sazonof's plea for a little time to preserve the peace
of the world, Sir Edward Grey had seen the German Ambassador on July 24
and had suggested to him that the only method of preventing the
catastrophe was
"that the four powers, Germany, France, Italy, and ourselves,
(England,) should work together simultaneously at Vienna and
St. Petersburg."
[English "White Paper," No. 11.]
Germany had only to intimate to Austria that "a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind," as well as common courtesy to great and friendly
nations, required that sufficient time be given not only to Servia, but
to the other nations, to concert for the common good, especially as the
period was one of Summer dullness and many of the leading rulers and
statesmen were absent from their respective capitals.
Under these circumstances was it not natural that Russia should announce
on July 24
"that any action taken by Austria to humiliate Servia would
not leave Russia indifferent,"
and that on the same day the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna
suggested to the Austrian Foreign Office
"that the Austrian note was drawn up in a form rendering it
impossible of acceptance as it stood, and that it was both
unusual and peremptory in its terms"?
To which the only reply of the Austrian Foreign Minister was that their
representative in Servia
"was under instructions to leave Belgrade unless Austrian
demands were accepted in their integrity by 4 P.M. tomorrow."
[English "White Paper," No. 7.]
Austria's only concession then or subsequently to the cause of peace was
the assurance that Austria would not _after its conquest_ of Servia
demand any territory.
The action of Germany on this day, July 24, is most significant. Its
Ambassador in England communicated a note to Sir Edward Grey in which it
justified Austro-Hungarian grievances and ultimatum by saying that
"under these circumstances the course of procedure and demands
of the Austro-Hungarian Government can only be regarded as
equitable and moderate."
The note added:
"The Imperial Government [Germany] want to emphasize their
opinion that in the present case there is only question of a
matter to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and
Servia, and that the great powers ought seriously to endeavor
to reserve it to those two immediately concerned."
[English "White Paper," No. 9.]
On July 25, probably to the great surprise of both Germany and Austria,
which had definitely calculated upon Servians non-compliance with the
ultimatum, the latter country, under the conciliatory advice of Russia
and England, made a reply in which, at some sacrifice of its
self-respect as a sovereign State, it substantially accepted all but one
of the demands of Austria, and as to that it did not, in terms, refuse
it, but expressed its willingness to refer it either to arbitration or
to a conference of the powers.
[English "White Paper," No. 39.]
No court would question for a moment the conclusion that the reply was a
substantial acquiescence in the extreme Austrian demands, nor indeed did
either Germany or Austria seriously contend that it was not. They
contented themselves with impeaching the sincerity of the assurances,
calling the concessions "shams," and of this it is enough to say that if
Germany and Austria had accepted Servians reply as sufficient, and
Servia had subsequently failed to fulfill its promises thus made in the
utmost good faith, there would have been little sympathy for Servia, and
no general war. Indeed, both Russia and England pledged their influence
to compel Servia, if necessary, to meet fully any reasonable demand of
Austria. The outstanding question, which Servia agreed to arbitrate or
leave to the powers, was the participation of Austrian officials in the
Servian courts. This did not present a difficult problem. Austria's
professed desire for an impartial investigation could have been easily
attained by having the neutral powers appoint a commission of jurists to
make such investigation.
On July 24 Sir Edward Grey also had asked the German Ambassador to use
his good influences at Vienna to secure an extension of time. To this
most reasonable request the answer and action of the German Government
was disingenuous in the extreme. They agreed to "pass on" the
suggestion, but the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs added
that as the Austrian Prime Minister was away from Vienna there would be
delay and difficulty in getting the time limit extended, and
"he admitted quite freely that the Austro-Hungarian Government
_wished to give the Servians a lesson and that they meant to
take military action. He also admitted that the Servian
Government could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian
demands_."
He added that Germany did not want a general war and "he would do all in
his power to prevent such a calamity."
[English "White Paper," Nos. 11 and 18.]
Immediately on the issuance of the ultimatum the Austrian Foreign
Minister, Count Berchtold, had most inopportunely taken himself to
Ischl, where he remained until after the expiration of the time limit.
Access to him proved difficult, and the Russian Chargé at Vienna, having
lodged a pacific protest with the Acting Foreign Minister in order to
take no chances, telegraphed it to Berchtold at Ischl. Nevertheless,
Berchtold's apparently designed absence from the capital was Germany's
excuse for its failure to get the time limit extended.
If Germany made any communication to Austria in the interests of peace
the text has yet to be disclosed to the world. A word from Berlin to
Vienna would have given the additional time which, with sincerely
pacific intentions, might have resulted in the preservation of peace.
Germany, so far as the record discloses, never spoke that word.
Contrast this attitude with that of Russia, whose Foreign Minister on
the morning of July 25 offered
"to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of
England, France, Germany, and Italy."
[English "White Paper," No. 17.]
As Russia was the member of the Triple Entente most interested in the
fate of Servia, what proposal could have been more conciliatory or
magnanimous?
On July 25 Sir Edward Grey proposed that the four powers (including
Germany) should unite
"in asking the Austrian and Russian Governments not to cross
the frontier and to give time for the four powers, acting at
Vienna and St. Petersburg, to try and arrange matters. If
Germany will adopt this view I feel strongly that France and
ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no doubt gladly
co-operate."
[English "White Paper," Nos. 24 and 25.]
To this reasonable request the Imperial German Chancellor replied:
"First and last, we take the ground that this question must be
localized _by the abstention of all the powers from
intervention in it_,"
but added that Germany would, if an Austro-Russian dispute arose,
"co-operate with the other great powers in mediation between
Russia and Austria."
[German "White Paper," Annex 13.]
This distinction is very hard to grasp. It attempts to measure the
difference between tweedledum and tweedledee. Russia's difference with
Austria was over the attempt of the latter to crush Servia. Germany
would not interfere in the latter, but would as an abstract proposition
mediate between Russia and Austria. For all practical purposes the two
things were indistinguishable.
How she "co-operated" we shall presently see.
All that Germany _did_ on July 25, so far as the record discloses, was
to "pass on" England's and Russia's requests for more time, but
subsequent events indicate that it was "passed on" without any
indorsement, for is it credible that Austria would have ignored its
ally's request for more time if it had ever been made?
The Austrian Foreign Minister, having launched the ultimatum, absented
himself from the capital, but the Russian Minister at Vienna, as already
stated, succeeded in submitting this most reasonable request verbally to
the Acting Foreign Minister, who simply said that he would submit it to
Count Berchtold, _but that he could predict with assurance a categorical
refusal_. Later on that day (July 25) Russia was definitely advised that
no time extension would be granted.
[Russian "Orange Paper," Nos. 11 and 12.]
Was ever the peace of the world shattered upon so slight a pretext? A
little time, a few days, even a few hours, might have sufficed to
preserve the world from present horrors, but no time could be granted.
A colossal snap judgment was to be taken by these pettifogging
diplomats. A timely word from the German Chancellor would have saved the
flower of the youth of Germany and Austria from perishing. It would be
difficult to find in recorded history a greater discourtesy to a
friendly power, for Austria was not at war with Russia.
Defeated in their effort to get an extension of time, England, France,
and Russia made further attempts to preserve peace by temporarily
arresting military proceedings until efforts toward conciliation could
be made. Sir Edward Grey proposed to Germany, France, Russia, and Italy
that they should unite in asking Austria and Servia not to cross the
frontier "until we had had time to try and arrange matters between
them," but the German Ambassador read Sir Edward Grey a telegram that he
had received from the German Foreign Office that "once she [Austria] had
launched that note [the ultimatum] Austria could not draw back."
[English "White Paper," No. 25.]
As we have seen, Germany never, so far as the record discloses, sought
in any way to influence Austria to make this or any concession. Its
attitude was shown by the declaration of its Ambassador at Paris to the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, while disclaiming that
Germany had countenanced the Austrian ultimatum, yet added that Germany
approved its point of view,
"and that certainly the arrow, once sent, Germany could not
allow herself to be guided except by her duty to her ally."
This seemed to be the fatal fallacy of Germany, that its duties to
civilization were so slight that it should support its ally, Austria,
whether the latter were right or wrong. Such was its policy, and it
carried it out with fatal consistency. To support its ally in actual war
may be defensible, but to support it in times of peace in an iniquitous
demand and a policy of gross discourtesy offends every sense of
international morality.
On the following day Russia proposed to Austria that they should enter
into an exchange of private views, with the object of an alteration in
common of some clauses of the Austrian note of July 23. _To this Austria
never even replied._ The Russian Minister communicated this suggestion
to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs and expressed the hope that he
would "find it possible to advise Vienna to meet our proposal," but this
did not accord with German policy, for on that day the German Ambassador
in Paris called upon the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and in
reply to a similar suggestion that Germany should suggest to Vienna to
meet Servia in the same conciliatory spirit which Servia had shown, the
Ambassador answered that that "was not possible in view of the
resolution taken not to interfere in the Austro-Servian conflict."
On the same day England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in
London for an immediate conference to preserve the peace of Europe, and
to this fruitful suggestion, which might have saved the peace of Europe,
the German Chancellor replied with the pitiful quibble that "it is
impossible to bring our ally before a European court in its difference
with Servia," although it affected to accept "in principle" the policy
of mediation.
Germany's acceptance "in principle" of a policy which she in practice
thwarted suggests the law-abiding tendencies of that Maine statesman who
was "for the Maine prohibition liquor law, but against its enforcement."
[English "White Paper," No. 46.]
Germany's refusal to have Servia's case submitted to the powers even for
their consideration is the more striking when it is recalled that the
German Ambassador at London quoted to Sir Edward Grey the German
Secretary of State as saying
"that there were some things in the Austrian note that Servia
could hardly be expected to accept,"
thus recognizing that Austria's ultimatum was, at least in part, unjust.
Sir Edward Grey then called the German Ambassador's attention to the
fact that if Austria refused the conciliatory reply of Servia and
marched into that country
"it meant that she was determined to crush Servia at all
costs, being reckless of the consequences that might be
involved."