The German Ambassadors in the three capitals were instructed

"to lay particular stress on the view that the above question

is one the settlement of which devolves solely upon

Austria-Hungary and Servia, and one which the powers should

earnestly strive to confine to the two countries concerned,"

and he added that Germany strongly desired

"that the dispute be localized, since any intervention of

another power, on account of the various alliance obligations,

would bring consequences impossible to measure."

This is one of the most significant documents in the whole

correspondence. If Germany were as ignorant as her Ambassador at London

affected to be of the Austrian policy and ultimatum, and if Germany was

not then instigating and supporting Austria in its perilous course, why

should the German Chancellor have served this threatening notice upon

England, France, and Russia, that Austria must be left free to make war

upon Servia, and that any attempt to intervene in behalf of the weaker

nation would "bring consequences impossible to measure"?

[German "White Paper," Annex 1B.]

A few days later the Imperial Chancellor sent to the Confederated

Governments of Germany a _confidential communication_ in which he

recognized the possibility that Russia might feel it a duty "to take the

part of Servia in her dispute with Austria-Hungary." Why, again, if

Austria's case was so clearly justified? The Imperial Chancellor added

that

"if Russia feels constrained to take sides with Servia in this

conflict, she certainly has a right to do it,"

but added that if Russia did this it would in effect challenge the

integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and that Russia would

therefore alone--

"bear the responsibility if a European war arises from the

Austro-Servian question, _which all the rest of the great

European powers wish to localize_."

In this significant confidential communication the German Chancellor

declares the strong interest which Germany had in the punishment of

Servia by Austria. He says "_our closest interests therefore summon us

to the side of Austria-Hungary_," and he adds that

"if contrary to hope, the trouble should spread, owing to the

intervention of Russia, then, true to our duty as an ally, we

should have to support the neighboring monarchy with the

entire might of the German Empire."

[German "White Paper," Annex 2.]

In reaching its conclusion our imaginary court would pay little

attention to mere professions of a desire for peace. A nation, like an

individual, can covertly stab the peace of another while saying, "Art

thou in health, my brother?" and even the peace of civilization can be

betrayed by a Judas kiss. Professions of peace belong to the cant of

diplomacy and have always characterized the most bellicose of nations.

No war in modern times has been begun without the aggressor pretending

that his nation wished nothing but peace and invoking Divine aid for its

murderous policy. To paraphrase the words of Lady Teazle on a noted

occasion when Sir Joseph Surface talked much of "honor," it might be as

well in such instances to leave the name of God out of the question.

Let us, then, analyze the record as already made up; and for the sake of

clearness the events which preceded the war will be considered

chronologically.

Immediately upon the receipt of the ultimatum in St. Petersburg on July

24, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a formal communication

to Austria-Hungary, suggested that the abrupt time limit "leaves to the

powers a delay entirely insufficient to undertake any useful steps

whatever for the straightening out of the complications that have

arisen," and added:

"To prevent the incalculable consequences, equally disastrous

for all the powers, which can follow the method of action of

the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems indispensable to us

that, above all, the delay given to Servia to reply should be

extended."

Sazonof further suggested that time should be given for the powers to

examine the results of the inquiry that the Austro-Hungarian Government

had made in the matter of the Serajevo assassination, and stated that if

the powers were convinced

"of the well-groundedness of certain of the Austrian demands

they would find themselves in a position to send to the

Servian Government consequential advice."

The New York Times Current History of the European War, Vol. 1, January 9, 1915 What Americans Say to Europe · 第 6 / 146 题