Don Pedro Manuel de Arandia, [97] a native of Ceuta and of Vizcayan
ancestry, took possession of his government in July, 1754. As soon
as he arrived in Manila, he undertook to organize the troops, and to
place the military force on a regular footing and in conformity with
the ordinances which are observed in España. From the royal troops that
were in the islands he formed the "king's regiment" of two battalions;
he reorganized the body of artillerists, placing it in the condition
in which we now see it; and he assigned to both the soldiers and the
officers pay with which they could decently support themselves and meet
their obligations, without being harassed to seek in some other way
what was necessary for life. He was very diligent to put in order the
arsenal at Cavite, and whatever depended upon the royal officials--in
which he did not fail to suffer annoyances, and to incur the dislike of
many persons who did not enjoy so much reform and so great zeal. [98]
At the beginning of his government, in the month of December, occurred
the terrible eruption of the volcano of Taal, which lies in the middle
of Lake Bombon, in the province of Batangas. So heavy was the shower
of ashes that it destroyed four villages which were on the shore of
the lake, and it was necessary to remove them a legua inland. There
were many and severe earthquake shocks, and a noise as of squadrons
engaged in battle; and the atmosphere was darkened with the quantities
of sand and ashes which issued from the volcano--so that in Manila,
which is distant twenty leguas, but little could be seen at noonday;
and in Cavite, which is somewhat nearer, that time of day seemed
like a dark night. [99] I have ascended with Señor Alava [100] to
the summit of this volcano, and only a lake was seen, about half a
legua in diameter; it was very deep, and its waters were dark green.
The armada which Señor Obando had sent against the Moros met so poor
success that the governor was obliged to take away its command from
Don Miguel Valdés, who had been sent as its chief officer; and it
was conferred on Father Ducos, a Jesuit, from whom he expected better
results. In fact, that father was fitted for the post, and acted with
such valor and discretion that he took from the enemies more than a
hundred and fifty vessels, destroyed three of their villages, killed
their inhabitants, and made captive innumerable people; and he checked
the onset of those barbarians, who were devastating everything. [101]
These happy tidings arrived at Manila in January, 1755; Señor Arandia
gave orders that the Te Deum should be sung by way of thanksgiving,
and confirmed Father Ducos in his command of the naval squadron;
he had great esteem for the father because the latter was the son
of a colonel who was the governor's intimate friend, and because he
seemed to have inherited his father's valor.
Señor Arandia treated the king of Joló with much kindness, and allowed
him his liberty, although the king voluntarily continued to live in
the fort of Santiago; the governor gave him a monthly allowance of
fifty pesos and six cavans of rice for his support, and prevailed upon
the archbishop to grant him permission to hear mass and receive the
sacraments, of which he had been deprived. The king desired to marry
as his second wife a woman who had been his concubine but was now
a Christian; [102] the archbishop would not permit this, and Señor
Arandia not only smoothed away all the difficulties, but gave the
king the use of his palace in order that in it he might celebrate
the marriage with more pomp and solemnity. He did not gain these
dispensations without some dispute with his most illustrious Lordship,
to which was added another, which, although of less importance, was
sufficient to alienate feeling and cause resentment in Philipinas. The
governor complained of the archbishop because the bells were not rung
for the former when he entered or left any church, as ought to be done
on account of his being vice-patron, especially when he went [thither]
as president of the [ecclesiastical] tribunals. His most illustrious
Lordship declared that he had no order from the king for doing so;
but these formalities, together with the attacks of illness which
the most illustrious Señor Trinidad suffered, caused his death; this
occurred on May 29, 1755. Señor Arandia continued to favor the king of
Joló, for he thought that by this means he could end the war with the
Moros. He sent to Joló all the princes and princesses, the datos, and
all the women, who were detained in Manila, leaving the king alone--who
acknowledged his vassalage [hizo pleito homenaje] and took the oath
of fidelity, until a decision [of his case] should arrive from the
court of España, which had been informed of his detention. The princes
and princesses arrived at Joló on October 5 of this year; they were
graciously received by Bantilan, who, grateful for the generosity of
the governor, promised to observe faithfully the treaty of peace which
his ambassador and his brother had signed at Manila. It was necessary,
in order to extricate ourselves entirely from the war, to make an
agreement with the men of Mindanao; the governor undertook this, and
sent ambassadors to them; but the petty rulers who are in that island
are so numerous and so treacherous that it is impossible to establish
a permanent peace with them. Even assuming that all the petty kings
of the Moros may desire to observe the peace with the Spaniards, they
will never succeed in it, because they possess so little authority
over their vassals that they have never been able to restrain them,
[103] and they never will prevent them from going out to plunder and to
seize captives throughout our islands, for they have given themselves
up to this kind of life; and only the spiritual conquest of their
provinces is adequate to deliver us from these troublesome enemies.
During this government was undertaken the reëstablishment of the
missions in the islands of Batanes, which lie to the north of
Cagayan. From early times the Dominican fathers maintained in the
islands of Babuyanes religious ministers, who gave instruction to
their inhabitants; but in the year 1690 they removed these people to
Cagayan. The king having decreed that they should go back to their
own land, the religious who directed them established a mission in
the islands of the Batanes, [104] distant some thirty leguas from
Cagayan; and after his death his companion withdrew, leaving the
mission abandoned until the year 1718. It was then reëstablished
by another Dominican religious, who fixed his headquarters in the
island of Calayan, in which place he attempted to make the Indians
in the other islands settle, in order that, brought together there,
they might be instructed in the Christian religion. Great as was the
desire of the Batanes to enter the bosom of the church, only a hundred
and fifty persons took the resolution to change their place of abode;
and half of these died in a short time. That island offered few means
of comfort, for which reason the father missionary became sick; and,
although he had a successor, the mission was entirely abandoned. [105]
In the year 1754, two religious were sent, of whom one died and
the other retired to Cagayan, seriously ill; but he returned in the
following year with another companion. In order to ameliorate the
destitution which they had suffered in the preceding year, they
determined to take with them a carpenter, a lay brother of their
order, in order that he might, as soon as they reached the place,
put together a house, which was to go in the vessel, in pieces. Their
zeal did not permit them to wait until the work was finished; and,
fearing that the monsoon would pass away, they embarked without their
little house. Hardly had they reached Calayan when the two fell sick;
other fathers went to succor them, and all became sick; accordingly,
they returned [to the mainland] one after another, and it was necessary
to abandon the mission after the Dominican fathers had incurred large
expenses for it. Afterward, this conquest was again undertaken,
by Señor Basco in 1783; and this effort has been successful in
maintaining there the Dominican fathers, converting those islanders
to the faith. A commandant was stationed there with his garrison,
which caused much expense, because it was necessary to send them
all their supplies from Philipinas; for in all those islands the only
produce is camotes and such other eatable things as grow in the country
itself. There is no doubt that other articles would be produced, but so
numerous are the rats, which consume everything, and so frequent the
baguios or hurricanes, that one may rest assured that these plagues
would devastate the fields before the crops could mature. Every year
a bark was sent to carry succor to the islands, but, as the baguios
are so frequent in those seas, many of these vessels were wrecked;
it has therefore been recognized that the maintenance of that post is
impossible, and the result is, that only the Dominican fathers remain
there with a small guard, who must be succored from Cagayan. For this
enterprise Señor Basco was granted the title of Conde de la Conquista;
but I assert that if half of what he spent in Batanes had been expended
in placing missionaries in Ylocos, Pangasinan, and Cagayan, he would
have gained more vassals for the king of España, and with less risk.
I am astonished that we should have left the beaten track of the
conquest or pacification of the Indians, and taken up another which
is more dangerous and more costly, only because it makes more noise
and a more showy appearance, that is, [the conquest] by arms, which
always has produced bad effects--as occurred at this time, in the
hill-country of the Igorrots. In the year of 1740, the Augustinian
fathers handed over to the Dominicans the missions of Ytuy, or Ysinay,
in order that, these being joined to the missions of Panique which they
had established in the preceding year, the provinces of Pangasinan and
Cagayan might be united on their southern borders. [106] The Indians,
both Christians and unbelievers, resented this change of missionaries,
from which resulted a species of civil wars among them; and it was
necessary for the auditor Don Ygnacio Arzadun y Rebolledo, who was
then making official visitation of the province of Pangasinan, to send
troops [to Ytuy] to silence the malcontents. Our men fought a battle
with them, in which the natives were defeated and pacified; but a few
years later they again became restless, and finally, in the year 1756,
many Christians apostatized; and these, united with the unbelievers,
raised a furious tempest. They burned some churches, slew many of the
people who remained faithful, and, losing reverence for the missionary
fathers, searched for them to take their lives. On account of this,
Señor Arandia despatched an expedition to this mission and to the
hill-country of the Ygorrots, which had very little effect; for it
accomplished nothing save to frighten the Indians and make them flee to
the hills, to come down again as soon as the soldiers should go away.
In order to know how to pacify the Indians, it is necessary to
understand their character. Whether because of their naturally
superstitious disposition, or because God has thus ordained it,
they are very affectionate to the missionary fathers, and have much
reverence for them; but there are not lacking some who dare to plan
some perfidy against the fathers, and for this reason they need
escorts to protect them from audacious attempts of that sort. At
times the natives become heated and rise against authority, and the
multitude come out against the fathers, unless there is some check to
restrain them; such a check, is in the military posts, which ought to
be near the missions, so that the Indians may have respect for these,
and fear lest they will be immediately punished if they commit any
insolent act. With these measures of precaution the islands were
conquered, and the same are observed at the present time; but the
missionaries are very few, from which it results that they are so
widely separated that they have to make a day's journey to visit one
another, when they need to be confessed or on other occasions, and
they are very poorly paid. For what is a hundred pesos and two hundred
cavans of rice for a Spaniard to maintain himself with decency in
the missions? [Even] this small stipend they sometimes cannot collect
without a thousand annoyances and vexations which are occasioned to
them by the alcaldes-mayor, who seek various pretexts for not paying
them, and compel them to go from the mission to the [provincial]
capital to collect it, as I have seen. So wretchedly do these poor
religious live that there are occasions in which they find themselves
obliged to use for their own support what was given to them for their
guards; and they live without these, preferring to remain exposed
to the affronts of the heathens rather than perish with hunger. The
military posts are also few in number, and the Indians in them are
unable to impose respect on their countrymen. If the money that has
been spent in useless expeditions could have been employed in these
sure means of pacification, that undertaking would have made much
greater progress. It is true, we shall never see the rapid advances
made by our ancestors in the conquest [of the islands], because the
Indians have their eyes more open; the Christians themselves persuade
the others not to be baptized, in order that the tribute and other
taxes may not be imposed on them. Moreover, they themselves have a
custom which greatly hinders their civilization, and consequently their
conversion. If any one commits a murder in another village, its people
do not rest until they have avenged the crime; the consequence is,
that the weaker villages are obliged to remove from the district,
or to league themselves with other villages. In either case, the
Christian church suffers much, because those who are baptized must
follow the infidels of their own village and separate themselves
from the [missionary] fathers, or else must enter into the general
hostilities. Nevertheless, gradually they would all be converted;
for if in the neighboring villages many unbelievers are continually
being baptized, who leave their own lands and are held in less regard
than are the oldtime Christians, how many more would not be baptized
if they could remain in their own homes, honored and courted by their
old acquaintances? Christian morality is very holy, and attracts all
hearts in which vice has not become deeply rooted.
On May 15, 1757, the holy Congregation [i.e., of Propaganda] at Rome
issued the decree which put an end to the controversies which the
discalced Augustinians (or Recollects) sent out by the Propaganda
had in the kingdom of Tungquin with the Dominican missionary fathers
from Philipinas over the administration of certain districts, and
in regard to the [association called the] "Lovers of the Cross"
[Amatrices de la Cruz]. [107] The Dominicans had received into their
missions various priests sent out by the Propaganda, who--for lack of
ministers, or on account of the persecutions--had ministered to some
villages in the Dominican territory. On this account his Lordship
Fray Hilario de Jesus, bishop of Coriza, asked from the Dominicans a
residence for a Recollect (as the latter belonged to his own order);
and soon after that he asked for the entire district, which was granted
to him during the lifetime of that religious. When the bishop saw
the Dominicans so compliant, he did not delay in demanding another
district for his discalced fathers. The Dominicans did not accede
to this demand, and his illustrious Lordship, availing himself
of various pretexts, introduced into that district a Recollect
religious; from this resulted a sort of schism, in which papers
were written on both sides, insulting remarks were made, and neither
party would yield. Like altercations occurred in other districts,
because the Recollects tried to thrust themselves into the missions
of the Dominicans. The "Lovers of the Cross" were a sort of beatas,
who lived in a community, and, although they did not take the vow
of chastity, observed the [rules of the] religious life; some of
them belonged to the Tertiary Order of St. Dominic, and others to
the discalced religious women of St. Augustine. It was made evident
that these beaterios ought to be subject to the parish priests; but,
bringing forward various pretexts, the Dominicans and Recollects
disputed over the direction of these beatas.
In order to stop the scandals which resulted from these disputes,
the bishop of Coriza assembled a [diocesan] synod in the village of
Luctuy; it was the second synod held in Tungquin, and held its first
session on June 24, 1753. Among the other points that were settled,
action was taken on the "Lovers of the Cross," and on the distribution
of districts. As the bishop was a Recollect, and the rest of those
who attended the council were his confederates, everything was decided
against the Dominicans; Father Hernandez, therefore, who was the only
member of his order who attended the synod, protested against all its
decrees, appealed to the Apostolic See, and went out of the meeting
before it was ended. After the synod closed, the Dominicans, seeing
that a Recollect was going to Rome to secure approbation for the acts
of the council, sent another envoy, a Dominican, to prevent this. When
the whole matter was examined in the holy Congregation, two districts
were set aside for the Recollect fathers, and the rest were continued
in charge of the Dominicans, the beaterios of the "Lovers of the Cross"
were left subject to their respective parish priests. In regard to the
[acts of the] second council of Tungquin, it was ordained that they
should not be carried into effect until the holy Congregation should,
after a thorough examination, agree to confirm them.
Returning to Manila, one of the good things which Señor Arandia
did in his term of office was the expulsion of the Chinese. He
sent away all the heathen to their own country, and, in order that
hereafter they might not remain in Philipinas, he founded the market
[alcayseria] of San Fernando, [108] in which all the Sangleys who
come here to trade must dwell until the time for the departure of
their champans arrives; and then all must embark in their vessels
except the Christians, who have permission to live in the islands,
provided they devote themselves to the cultivation of the soil. The
Spaniards who were interested in the residence of the Sangleys in
Manila persuaded him that, if he expelled them, there would not
be people enough to carry on the internal trade; and, in order to
counteract this frivolous pretext, he established a [commercial]
company of Spaniards and mestizos. This lasted only one year, [109]
because there was little need of it in some islands where there
are more than enough to carry on this sort of traffic. The Asiatics
are naturally slothful, and consequently enjoy greatly the kind of
life--since it gives them food without labor--which they secure by
buying and selling the commodities which are consumed in the country;
and, even if some are unsuccessful, every one has a very moderate
[amount of] trade; but there is hardly any one among them who does not
carry it on very steadily. This abundance of petty traders makes their
wares much dearer, since they pass through many hands before they reach
the last buyer; and each trader, since he operates with little capital,
must make large gains in order to support himself. From this it must be
inferred that the Sangleys, far from being necessary to this commerce,
greatly injure it; and it should have been considered desirable to
lessen, in place of increasing, the number of these traders or dealers.
Notwithstanding the wisdom of this measure, Señor Arandia lost much
in popular esteem by it; and this, added to others of his actions,
brought upon him the hatred of the community. In virtue of the ample
powers which he brought from the court, he drew up instructions for
the alcaldes-mayor and the government of the provinces, in which
he openly declared himself against the regulars. At the beginning,
he had treated these religious bodies with respect; but, resenting
some acts of disrespect manifested toward him by certain individuals,
in these instructions he deprived the orders of the kitchen-boys who
had been furnished to them by the king since the conquest, and the
servants granted them by the crown for sacristans. Not content with
causing them these losses, [110] he made various remonstrances against
them to his Majesty, in which he spoke of them with little civility;
and in the instructions he spared no means of injuring them, seeking
opportunity to speak ill of them even in those sections of that
document which have no connection with the religious. The blame for
all this was laid on his favorite, Don Santiago Orendain, [111] who
was the declared enemy of the ecclesiastics; but this could not excuse
Señor Arandia for issuing directions which the king had the goodness to
censure as soon as he saw them, for depriving the ecclesiastics of the
groves of nipa palms which they held in La Hermita and Bagunbayan, for
stirring up several groundless controversies with them, for imposing
taxes on the goods which the religious in the provinces were sending
to their convents, [112] and for expressing his [unfavorable] opinion
of them in public. He had a dispute with the royal Audiencia because
he was not willing to render military honors to them when they went
in a formal body, on occasions when he did not preside over their
sessions. He imprisoned the treasurer and auditor of accounts of the
royal exchequer, and caused them great suffering, because they had
sent information to the court of some things that was contrary to the
explanations given by him in his reports. Unwearied in the government,
he conceived many projects which he considered necessary for the
proper government of the islands. He talked of removing the arsenal
from Cavite to the port of Lampon; and he ordered a ship to be built
in the kingdom of Siam, which had such ill-fortune that in bringing it
over to Manila it was driven to port in China three times, and once to
Batavia, causing enormous expenses to the royal treasury. [113] The
governor made reports to the king, and proposed to him various plans
for the promotion of [operations in] the mines of iron and gold. He
abolished the corregidorship of Mariveles, annexing Marigondon and
the other little villages of that shore to the district of Cavite,
and forming from the villages on the opposite shore and from others
which belonged to Pampanga the alcaldía which we call Batan. [114]
He made regulations for the soldiery, the royal exchequer, and the
Acapulco ship [115]--on all occasions giving many proofs of his
zeal for the royal service, by which he was aroused to enthusiasm;
but this disposition, ill directed by Orendain, was the cause for
his being abhorred by every one. It was so wearing upon him that he
reached the point of feeling a distaste for every kind of business,
and experienced so great a failure of his vital powers that in the
night of May 31, 1759, it was known that he was dying; and, after
receiving all the sacraments, he expired at two o'clock in the morning
of the following day. [116] He left by his will two hundred and fifty
thousand pesoty and one cannot guess how he gained them in the less
than five years during which his term of office lasted; but at the
hour of death he distributed them in a pious and Christian manner.
Through the death of Señor Arandia, the bishop of Zebu, Señor Espeleta,
assumed the government. Soon afterward, the new archbishop of Manila
arrived here, Don Manuel Roxo, [117] a native of Tala [sc. Tula] in
the kingdom of Nueva España; his Majesty had taken him from the post
of canon and provisor at Mexico, for this see, giving him permission
to be consecrated in Nueva España. He took possession of his church
on July 22, 1759, and immediately claimed that he should be put in
possession of the military government, which it seems belonged to him
by the royal orders. The four auditors were divided in opinion, Señors
Calderón and Davila deciding that the archbishop should assume the
governorship, and Señors Villacorta and Galban that no change ought
to be made. While they were in session in their hall, discussing
this question, his illustrious Lordship Espeleta entered; he spoke
with decision, and, in order to intimidate them more, made ready the
artillery and placed the troops under arms; at these preparations
the auditors and the archbishop gave way, and the bishop of Zebu
remained in peaceable possession [of the government]. The first
thing that he did was to revoke the ordinances of Señor Arandia,
and to make some preparations against the Moros, who since the year
fifty-four had been ravaging our provinces; but the event which made
most noise in his time was the lawsuit against Doctor Orendain. Every
one placed on him the blame for the actions of Señor Arandia; and
the fiscal of the king, Señor Viana, believed that he had been placed
under arrest in his own house by the favorite's suggestion. Orendain,
either because his conscience stung him, or because reports had been
spread that some design was formed against his person, took refuge
in the Augustinian convent at Tondo. The fiscal made it a pretext for
claiming Orendain from this asylum, that he should be arrested because
he was treasurer for the Crusade, and, by his voluntary withdrawal
[to asylum], indicated that he might prove to be a debtor to the royal
treasury. He then left his refuge, and was imprisoned in the fort
of Santiago, the authorities commissioning Señor Villacorta to bring
legal proceedings against Orendain. It was found that he had hidden
various jewels in the convents, and, while these investigations were
being pursued, he made his escape from the fortress in the dress of
a woman, going away in a coach, without the guard recognizing him,
and took refuge in the convent of the Recollects. The auditor thus
commissioned had recourse to the provisor, in order that the latter
might give orders for Orendain's removal thence; but, as the provisor
did not accede to this after three demands, the auditor sent a notary
with soldiers, and removed Orendain by force from the sanctuary. The
provisor declared Señor Villacorta publicly excommunicated, and his
name was placed on the list. That gentleman had recourse to the royal
Audiencia, which ordered the provisor to absolve the auditor; this was
done through the cura of the cathedral, but ad reincidentiam, and for
the period of thirty days--that is, if the accused did not return to
the church within the thirty days, he would incur excommunication the
second time. Señor Villacorta challenged the provisor, and this lawsuit
became so tangled that various judges were challenged by one side and
the other, and even Señors Calderon and Davila were challenged by the
king's fiscal, who had taken part in the dispute; and there was no one
who could give judgment in the suit, because some refused to take the
responsibility, and others were challenged by one or the other party.
In such condition was the Orendain affair, when a decree arrived from
his Majesty in which he appointed the archbishop as governor ad interim
on account of the death of Señor Arandia. He assumed the authority in
the year 1761, and put an end to this clamorous lawsuit by commanding
that Orendain should leave the fort, and all his property be returned
to him, with [his giving] security for all that he owed to the Holy
Crusade; he also imposed on all persons perpetual silence during the
time until his Majesty (whom he informed of his proceedings) should
make some other decision. His most illustrious Lordship continued
to rule the islands in much peace, fulfilling rather the office of
father than that of governor, conciliating those who were turbulent,
and extending his charity to the king of Joló, who was living in the
fort with much lack of comfort. The governor quartered him in a house
in Manila, decently furnished, with a coach and with menials enough for
his service. He wished, besides this, to restore him to his kingdom,
and after listening to the opinions of the leading persons in Manila,
it was decided that the king Don Fernando and his son Israel should
be sent back to Joló, and that they should take with them a guard of
Spaniards, in order that the chiefs in that island should not compel
him to abjure the Catholic religion which he had embraced. When
they were ready to carry out this undertaking the English arrived
[at Manila], the war with whom it is necessary to relate in separate
chapters. [118]
MEMORIAL OF 1765
By Francisco Leandro de Viana. MS. dated February 10, 1765.
Source: This document is translated from a MS.--apparently
a duplicate copy of the first original, and bearing Viana's
autograph signature--in the possession of Edward E. Ayer, Chicago.
Translation: This is made by Emma Helen Blair.
VIANA'S MEMORIAL OF 1765
Part I
In which is shown the deplorable condition of the Philipinas Islands;
the necessity of preserving them, with respectable forces; and the
method for attaining this, without the costs which hitherto [have
been incurred], and with increase to the royal exchequer.
Chapter First: Of the present unhappy condition of these islands [119]
1. There is no greater misfortune in the world than poverty; all have a
contempt for it, and all regard it with displeasure. No one honors the
poor man, however heroic and eminent he may be; his subordinates serve
him unwillingly, and readily show him insolence. He has no success,
for lack of money; and, in fine, every undertaking costs him immense
labors, fatigues, vigilance, and sorrow.
2. It is literally this which is occurring in these islands. The Moros
deride us, and display their superiority compared to our weakness,
which certainly is ignominious to the Catholic arms, and to the
reputation of the [Spanish] nation. When we had forces for punishing
them, they were curbed and humiliated; since they have seen us poor
and weak they have displayed their perfidy and boldness, and are
treating us with the greatest insolence ever seen--for they invade
even the villages along this bay, without there being, on our side,
any means to prevent this.
3. The vassals of his Majesty, both Spaniards and natives, live in
the sorrow which is aroused in them by their melancholy reflections
on our poor and miserable condition. The Indians, who are civil only
when they fear some punishment, regard their sovereign with little
respect, and the Spanish nation with disgust at seeing it humiliated
by the English, the Dutch, the French, and even the Moros; and they
judge that the Spaniards are somewhat more than the Indians, but
much less than the other nations. And, although they are confounded
at the glorious successes which our armies have gained against the
English since the capture of this military post, and at the heroic
valor with which the unfaithful provinces have been punished, when
they become aware of our actual poverty that will be enough to destroy
their reverence and respect for the acts of the superior government,
and to make them bold to commit any insolence, for our lack of means
to restrain them from it.
4. For this same reason, nothing can be undertaken that will avail
against the Moros who harass us, [120] or against the Indians who
refuse obedience to the commands laid on them. The consequence of this
is, that the scanty funds in the royal treasury are being consumed;
that it is deprived of the receipts which it could have if we were
in a respectable condition; and that a zealous governor of these
islands labors and watches, in weariness and grief, to procure the
remedy for so many evils, under the impossibility of finding it.
5. If we look at the condition of this fort and of that at Cavite,
we shall lament, as is natural, the necessity of repairing their
fortifications and building some new ones, of clearing out the ditches,
of tearing down buildings, and of other works which will be deemed
indispensable. If we turn our view to the artillery, we shall find
it so defective, and part of it so useless, that for the defense of
these forts it will be necessary to spend many thousands of pesos. If
the gun-carriages which are needed and are actually lacking are built;
if the forts are supplied with the gunpowder, balls, grapeshot, bombs,
grenades, and other implements of war, and with iron, nails, mantelets,
cordage, and oil, and, in short, with everything which ought to abound
in the [royal] storehouses: the cost of all these things, which are
necessary, will be enormous. If attention is given to the need of ships
for transporting [hither] the situado, and of other smaller vessels
for sending aid to the military posts, providing them with supplies,
driving away the Moros, and transporting property from the provinces,
one will be astounded at the contemplation of these expenses. And,
after all, he will draw the conclusion that nothing of what I have
mentioned can be undertaken, for lack of money; that the Moros will
keep us in a state of continual fear; and the Indians will act as
caprice leads them; that at the first outbreak of war the forts will
be found entirely defenseless; that the military posts will be exposed
to destruction; and, in one word, that the lack of troops and money
places these islands in imminent risk of their total destruction, by
various paths, and our sovereign and the Spanish nation in grievous
danger of losing their honor, reputation, and influence--which must
be averted by such means as are possible; and one of these is, the
abandonment of these domains.
6. If, then, they produce nothing; if to maintain them must cost so
much that it weakens the royal exchequer, to the injury of other
and more important domains; if for lack of money the honor of the
Catholic arms cannot be maintained in these distant regions; if we
are exposed to being the plaything of all the nations; if we cannot
resist or confront the feeblest enemy who may attack us; and finally,
if we must endure the ignominy of being discreditably deprived of
these faithful vassals, with the loss of all that they have: it is
better to anticipate these losses in good time, to abandon or sell
these regions, and allow to all [their inhabitants] free opportunity
to make their property secure and take refuge in other dominions, where
the power of our beloved kings and lords may shield and defend them.
7. This is the method of saving expenses, and employing those funds
for other and more useful purposes, and averting the ignominies to
which we are exposed--with danger not only to our property but to
our lives. For we are surrounded by ferocious and inhuman enemies,
such as are the English--who, warned by the events of the late war,
will give no quarter if they return to these islands, on account of
not exposing themselves to remain as prisoners within the walls of
Manila and Cavite--the Moros, who will come to the aid of the said
English, or alone by themselves if they see us very weak (and in every
way those people are terrible, for they know not what humanity is);
the Sangleys or Chinese, who are equally barbarous and bloodthirsty;
and even the Indians, who also are cruel and ferocious.
8. The recent example of Pangasinan is the most melancholy
warning. What obstinacy and blindness! what insolence and aversion
toward the Spaniards! What treasons and apostasies! What murders, so
inhuman and cruel! It is certain that the Indians desire to throw off
the mild yoke of the Spaniards; that they are Christians, and vassals
of our king, simply through fear, and fail to be either Christians
or vassals when they consider us weak; and that they neither respect
nor obey any one, when they find an opportunity for resistance.
9. The revolted Indians in the island of Bohol solemnize weddings
among themselves, confer baptism, and perform other functions of the
Catholics, for which purpose they have some persons who perform the
duties of the father ministers in the villages; and this mockery,
this scorn, this contumely they display for what is most sacred in
our religion. They have fled from the villages, and live in their
freedom in the hills; yet for this conduct they have experienced
only kind treatment and promises of pardon, to which they do not,
and never will, pay any attention. If we had troops and money, those
insurgents would be reduced; they would be good Christians and vassals,
and the royal treasury would possess the receipts from their tributes;
for only the fear of punishment is adequate to subject the Indians,
and draw them toward what is right.
10. More recent is the case of Pangasinan, whose natives had just
been making the same mockery of our Catholic religion, and showing
the same contempt for it; but chastisement has reduced them to being
Christians and vassals to our king. It is argued from this that, so
long as we have not the forces for coercing the Indians, they will
be our greatest and most terrible enemies--from whom we cannot free
ourselves, save by the measure of abandoning the islands, in case we
do not maintain them with respectable forces.
Chapter Second: Of the difficulties which will result from abandoning
these islands
1. Not many years had passed after their conquest when it was
recognized in España that, in order to support them, it was necessary
to expend much money; and the question arose whether it was more
expedient to maintain these new domains, or to abandon them. Opinions
were expressed on both sides: some urged that but little advantage
had resulted to the crown from spending immense sums of money in this
country, so distant from its sovereign--who, besides the fact that
it did not promise him much profit, could not render it assistance
with the promptness which was necessary. Others, on the contrary,
urged that under no circumstances ought these islands to be abandoned,
which were conferring such glory on our arms, victorious in the four
quarters of the world, in which resounded the power of our sovereign,
and his royal and Catholic zeal for the salvation of so many souls.
2. Our king and sovereign Don Phelipe the Second, of glorious
memory, embraced this latter opinion, with that apostolic and heroic
resolution, so celebrated in our histories, that "for the sake of one
single soul that might be saved, he would consider well employed the
moneys that were being spent in these islands."
3. I believe that to this religious motive others were added, of
policy and state, for maintaining these islands, which, although at
the beginning they would consume much money--as occurs in every new
colonizing enterprise, which [sort of work] is not done for nothing--at
the same time promised great advantages, on account of the valuable
products which they yielded, and the great number of people who were
conquered. Efforts in this enterprise were made for several years,
with the greatest ardor; the chimerical projects of Terrenate and
the Molucas were begun, which cost us infinite expense; and, on the
other hand, we were harassed by the Moros, with the Dutch, who were
aiding them as enemies to this conquest, which they feared would be
their ruin--an indication that we had a better opportunity than they
to aggrandize ourselves with the commerce of all India, which would
have yielded to us the very profits which they feared to lose. And
we, occupied in defending ourselves from so many enemies, have not
thought of making any progress, but only of leaving everything as the
famous Legaspi established it--and yet continually with new burdens,
on account of the creation of new offices, the increase of missions,
and other expenses, which exceeded the income of this royal treasury,
and were made up from that of Mexico.
4. Freed at last from the aforesaid enemies, [a time of] serenity and
calm began in these islands, and much progress might have been made,
to the benefit of the royal exchequer; with its forlorn condition,
and the interested motives of those who were managing it, the zealous
and disinterested governor Don Fausto Cruzat promptly made himself
acquainted. He collected much money which had been regarded as lost;
he erected or rebuilt very costly works, as the galleon "San Joseph,"
the palace, the halls of the royal Audiencia and the accountancy,
with prisons, storehouses, etc.; he left much money in the royal
treasury; he prevented the remittance of large sums which were
due from the Mexican treasury; and he practiced economies which
were very considerable, and suited to his own example of interest,
zeal, application, and ability. But the reduction which he made in
the military force, in pay, and in the royal situado, was not the
best idea for the security of these islands, and for supplying their
urgent necessities--especially as no increase of the royal revenue was
established in place of the said reduction. For as a consequence--and
the receipts of the royal treasury having been diminished, when they
might have been increased--and with the necessity of holding the Moros
in check, with costly expeditions and the construction and equipment
of some military posts, our expenses were increased; and since these
were greater than the incomes, the islands have not retrieved their
condition since that time. They have had but few troops, and this
government has not been able to make itself respected, or to restrain
the invasions of the Moros. Nor is it able to undertake enterprises
that would be useful in the provinces, in order that these might
produce for the royal revenues the great increase which they bid
fair to yield, and for which plans would be made, [if the support
of the government could be given], by those who were of opinion that
these islands should be preserved. As is admitted by [those of] all
nations, these islands are the most fertile, abundant, and rich, and
the country the most delightful, in all India; and no other region is
so well suited for [the center of] a flourishing commerce, on account
of their situation. [For they lie midway] between the empire of China,
the kingdoms of Siam and Cochinchina, the islands of Celebes and
Molucas, the kingdom of Borney, Vengala, the coasts of Coromandel and
Malavar, Goa, Persia, and other populous regions which have made the
[mercantile] companies of Olanda and Inglaterra rich. With greater
reason would they be able to increase the wealth of España, if in these
islands were cultivated their many valuable products, which are greatly
esteemed in the aforesaid colonies, and if these products found there
the market which foreign goods now enjoy. The whole matter consists
in restoring our commerce with the same courage and perseverance
which the foreigners display, for which design the abandonment of
these islands would be very pernicious--even laying aside religious
motives, which are powerful to the Catholic zeal of the Spaniards.
5. I find another and greater objection to the abandonment of these
islands; that is, that the English would securely establish themselves
therein, for they have shown themselves eager and greedy for the
advantages which the islands present. In that case, they would
easily carry on, by way of the Southern Sea, an illicit commerce
with Nueva España--where they could land wherever they might please,
and without difficulty make themselves masters of the Californias,
in order to continue, with this advantage, the discoveries by which
they have sought to find a passage to the Eastern Indias by the
[route] northwest from Hudson's Bay (called thus from the name of an
English captain). With this object there was formed, at the beginning
of the eighteenth century, a company of English merchants, who, as
a result of their latest enterprises (in the years 1746 and 1747),
[121] have reasonable expectations of finding a way of communication
between the Northern and the Southern Seas, according to the critical
account of a modern geographer.
6. West of Canada and of the Misisipi River is the great gulf of the
Western Sea, [122] which falls [into the ocean] above [i.e., north of]
Cape Mendocino; it was discovered by the Spaniard Martin de Aguilar,
and it is judiciously conjectured that it extends a considerable
distance toward the lands of the northern region in which is situated
the strait of Anian, according to the discoveries of the Russians in
1728, 1731, and 1741--which have a certain agreement with those of
the aforesaid Aguilar, and especially with those which our admiral Don
Bartholome Fuente and his captain Pedro Bernarda made in the year 1640,
[123] north of California and northwest from Canada.
7. The former navigated along the coast of California four hundred
and ninety-six leguas to the north-northwest, as far as the lake
which is called Lake de los Reyes [i.e., "of the Kings"], and reached
Canoset; he crossed a lake, and by a river--to which he gave the name
Parmentier, which was that of his Spanish interpreter--he arrived
at another lake, which he named Fuente; it is one hundred and sixty
leguas long and sixty wide. From this point he passed to another lake,
called Ronquillo (from the name of a captain in that squadron), and in
one of the villages there he learned that at a little distance toward
the east there was a ship, in which it was supposed that there were
Spaniards; they found an English ship, which had reached that place
by the current from Bafin's Bay, or else that of Hudson's Bay.
8. Captain Bernarda, who had directed his course to the north, arrived
at Minhaset, a village of America; he entered a lake four hundred
and thirty-six leguas long (which he named Velasco), the extremity of
which extends northeastward, as far as 77 degrees of latitude, and by
a river which flows from the said lake to the southwest he came out
at the sea. Again going to the north, he continued his navigation
to the northeast in the sea of Tartaria, as far as 79 degrees of
latitude, always following the coasts. He sent ashore a Spaniard,
and he assured him that he had seen the extremity of the gulf of
Davis's Strait, or of Bafin's Bay; and that in that place there was
a freshwater lake at the latitude of 80 degrees, and mountains of ice
toward the north and northwest. From this the said captain concluded
that there was no passage or communication between the said strait
and the Southern Sea; but the English regard these relations as the
effect of the Spanish policy, which hides the actual discoveries of
Admiral Fuente. As if there were not a similar refutation of error in
the voyage which the merchants of Zelandia undertook in the year 1592,
as Samuel Ricard [124] relates, with the idea of passing over to China
by way of the coasts of Tartaria! On the contrary, the English suspect
that there is a passage to the Southern Sea by way of Hudson's Bay;
and they are continually searching for it, with the greatest ardor and
perseverance--for which enterprise they will have, without any doubt,
motives which encourage their expectations. It is enough for my purpose
to show how substantial is the advantage that would result to the said
English from being masters of these islands, in order that they may
establish themselves in the coasts of the Californias, and thus render
easy the illicit commerce and the discoveries that I have mentioned.
9. Even without these suspicions, it cannot be doubted that in case
of war breaking out the English could attack our domains in the
two Americas from these islands, by the coast of the South [Sea];
and from Europe, by the opposite coast--diverting our forces in one
direction, in order to strike a blow in security, where it may be
most to their advantage; and to this risk we expose ourselves by
abandoning these islands. But, notwithstanding this, I conclude
that if we must ignominiously lose them, by not maintaining them
with respectable forces, it would be better for us to abandon them
rather than to encounter such a calamity. This, in my opinion, would
be accomplished in the first hostilities [that might break out],
since the English, who are arrogantly establishing their factory
in Joló to secure the profits of their commerce in that kingdom,
will much more willingly establish themselves in Manila, whenever an
opportunity is afforded them; and they will profit by whatever now
benefits the Spaniards--and much more, on account of their greater
application and industry, which regards the entire circuit of the
world as narrow for the extension of their commerce.
10. The dominions ceded to the English by España and Francia in North
America, as far as the Misisipi River, furnish to that nation the
means for continuing the discoveries which I point out; and it cannot
be doubted that, at the same time, they are seeking for a connection
between the two seas--to which the inquisitive disposition of the
English will devote itself, with the energy which hitherto [they
have displayed]. They can open a route, by land if not by water,
to the Californias, where any settlement [by them] would be very
injurious to us, but very advantageous to them if they possess
these islands. But without them the English could not maintain
such a settlement, except at great cost in sending to it supplies
in ships, which would have to navigate either by way of Cape Horn,
[125] in order to go along the coast of the South--without fear of
encountering resistance from the Spaniards, since a dozen Englishmen,
and half as many Indians to guide them, will make the crossing,
and fortify themselves in any part of the southern [i.e., Pacific]
coast of America--or by the Cape of Good Hope [Buena Esperanza], the
Gulf of India, and the Straits of Malacca, in order to cross over from
there, by way of these islands, and afterward make the same voyage as
do the ships of this [Acapulco] line. These voyages, so protracted,
will hold back the English from any settlement on the southern coast
of America. However, if these islands belonged to them, they would
immediately execute that project, in order to secure the advantages of
this great commerce and of the illicit traffic which they would carry
on in Nueva España--just as now they are conducting it from Jamayca
and Honduras among all the Windward Islands [Islas de Barlovento]
and in part of the Americas, with notable injury to the commerce
of España and to the royal duties, of which they are depriving his
Majesty with so many illicit importations [of foreign goods].
11. Many other difficulties which would ensue from the abandonment
of these islands can be seen in the Extracto historial [126] of the
commerce of Philipinas, to which I refer--contenting myself, lastly,
with calling attention to what we have lost by the Dutch having
made themselves masters of the Molucas, the commerce of which has
compensated them for the enormous expenses which they incurred. This
subject also is treated by the said Extracto historial, and by the
chronicles or histories of these islands. It is sufficient to say
that the Dutch have enriched themselves with the cloves and spices
of the Molucas, from which the Spaniards obtained nothing but great
expenses, with no mercantile advantage; that with the said products
they have drained the silver from our dominions; and that with this
money they have waged most cruel war against us.
12. Let a computation be made of the expense which the Molucas caused
us, and of the loss which we have experienced from abandoning them;
and even he who is least versed [in such matters] will concede
that the latter is vastly greater than the former. For ten years'
expenditures for preserving the Molucas are not equal to the increase
of strength which we have given every year to our enemies since they
gained possession of those islands. I assert that we would not have
abandoned that valuable piece of territory if our Spaniards had been as
industrious and assiduous in trading as are the Dutch; or if they had
realized what they lost, which has been the immense treasures which
the Dutch have gained. But ours is the singular misfortune that we
regard the land as useless that does not abound in silver; nor will
we consent to be convinced that commerce is the most safe of mines,
if the products which our provinces yield are promoted, cultivated,
and worked up.
13. The importance of the Molucas was not thoroughly understood until
we lost them; nor will the loss resulting from the abandonment of
the Philipinas be realized until they are in the power of some other
nation, less indolent and negligent than ours. Then their exceedingly
rich products--cinnamon, cloves, pepper, nutmegs, cotton, gold, iron,
and the others which are yielded in great abundance (as will be said
in its place)--will be cultivated and gathered up; those foreigners
will sell us these very fruits, which now we cannot appreciate, and
with them will take away our money; and in any war we shall be ruined
by the gains which our abandonment [of the islands] will produce to
those [who possess them].
14. I believe that in view of these reflections, and of what I am going
to explain, every good Spaniard will be convinced of the necessity of
preserving these islands--even though it shall be at greater expense,
and without the powerful incentive of religion--on account of the
great benefit which can result to the monarchy if we open our eyes to
avail ourselves of the advantages which these dominions offer to us,
as I attempt to demonstrate in this writing.
Chapter Third: Upon maintaining the islands with respectable forces
1. Assuming the difficulties which would follow from abandoning them,
which is the first measure proposed, the second seems indispensable--to
place these forts not only in a condition of ordinary defense, but in
one of entire security, in order to avert the ignominy and discredit
of our arms, and to render worthy of respect the name of our king
and sovereign, and that of the Spanish nation, which certainly have
lost much of their honor in this part of the world, at seeing the
derision which the Moros have repeatedly cast at us. And it has been a
special providence of God that since the shameful loss of Manila our
arms should regain the reputation which they had lost in the siege
of this fort, by some glorious successes--so complete that they were
extolled by the enemies themselves, and caused admiration throughout
India--in order to show that the loyalty of the Spaniards, even when
their forces were most feeble, could conquer the strongest enemy and
avenge their injuries. But this glorious and heroic example of fidelity
and valor--by which all the people distinguished themselves, under the
orders cf their commander, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar--ought not to
lull us into living in excessive confidence that, in another invasion
(which may God not permit), we shall be able to accomplish the same
results; for the hand of God is not always ready to work miracles,
and He desires that men shall aid themselves, in order that He may
aid them.
2. I say, then, that it is very easy to make these fortified places so
worthy of respect that there will be no forces in this part of India
able to capture them. With the same ease any person can begin to form,
in his imagination, a basis of brave soldiers, of fortifications, etc.;
but he will strike on a reef from not knowing how the increased expense
which must necessarily burden this undertaking can be supported. For
this end, I will propose some measures, after showing the way by
which to make ourselves respected.
3. The towns of Manila and Cavite ought to be placed [in a condition
of defense] with the plan of fortifications in the modern style which
shall be furnished by the engineers who may be consulted, or may come
from España, for this purpose. This expense will be very great, as is
naturally obvious; and perhaps with the same expenditure the entrance
of the bay could be fortified to prevent the entrance of ships and
leave this place in a condition conformable thereto--devoting all
attention to the said entrance and to the port of Cavite (in which
the courts, the [royal] offices, the storehouses, etc, ought to
be), because its situation, aided by art, will make the said port
impregnable, and its maintenance less costly and more secure.
4. The town of Manila is of no use without the port of Cavite; and
the latter, without the former, is more useful and less costly. Any
enemy who attempts to capture this town [of Manila] can secure
the same advantages by seizing other lands on the shores of the
bay, because all is alike, but useless, without the said port;
and the expedient of abandoning this town (which, on account of
its uselessness, does not merit the expenditure of so much money),
and employing the same expense in fortifying, if that can be done,
the entrance of Mariveles, is more advantageous and safe, and less
costly. It is more advantageous, because then no vessel can enter
the bay, to invade the villages along its shore, as the Moros now do;
more safe, because while any [hostile] squadron would be wasting time
in opening a passage by which to find entrance into the bay and lay
siege to Cavite, opportunity would thus be given for various military
measures which would render difficult the capture of the said port;
and less costly, because not so many soldiers are necessary to guard
the fortifications of the said entrance and port as to man the great
extent of the walls of Manila--which, according to intelligent persons,
needs a garrison of at least three thousand men. [127]
5. There is a sort of flat boats which are called "floating bastions"
[baluartes en el agua]; they are of shallow keel, but of a strength
which can support artillery of large caliber. This is a most admirable
invention for defending the entrances of ports; those who understand
the subject will give more minute information regarding these vessels,
which, added to the fortification of the aforesaid entrance [of
Mariveles], will make it impossible for hostile ships to enter the bay.
6. There is no doubt that Manila, as I have said, is unnecessary if
Cavite is well fortified; but it is also certain that at Manila it is
easier to bring in supplies, and for all the troops and the citizens
to remove, with their property, to the provinces, where the enemy
cannot attack them. These reflections, and the difficulties which
there may be in fortifying the entrance to the bay, will be better
foreseen by those who understand the subject.
7. Besides the two ships, which are necessary for the trade with
Nueva España, there ought to be at Cavite two others in reserve,
which could serve in any outbreak of war for the guard and defense
of our fortifications, and even could be sent out for capturing
the ships of our enemies which might come from Europa and from the
coasts [of India] to trade at Canton, for the latter pass in sight
of the coasts of Ilocos and Cagayan, and visit without fail Pulaor,
Pulicondor, and Pulizapato. These ships [at Cavite] ought to have
competent naval officers; and even in time of peace they will be very
useful for keeping the coasts clear [of enemies], for transporting
troops to the military posts, for any expedition against the Moros,
and for reconnoitering and surveying the lands, and the shoals
and dangerous places of our islands and seas, and discovering new
routes. The navy, shipyard, and arsenal of Cavite should be placed
under such regulations as shall be considered most suitable; and as
warden of the said port there should be appointed a competent naval
officer, or some one of the builders of ships, with the title of
superintendent of the arsenal and shipyard, in order that affairs
may progress in proportion to his ability.
8. The expense of the two ships which must sail to Acapulco is paid
for by the same royal duties which have been hitherto paid, for there
have always been at least two galleons for this purpose. As for the
additional two ships, and some fragatas besides, it can be estimated
that they will cost one hundred thousand pesos a year, besides their
construction; this can be carried on in various parts of these islands,
with evident saving of expense on account of the exceeding abundance
of timber and the low wages of the workmen.
9. The principal defense and security of these islands consists in
the troops. In every province there ought to be fifty soldiers, with
their officers, at the disposal of the alcaldes-mayor. In this way
the reduction of the villages would be made easier, without which all
the rest is absolutely idle and useless. As fast as the villages are
reduced, they offer greater advantages for both spiritual and temporal
things; and thus could be established what would be very beneficial
to the Indians and to the royal exchequer, as will be explained later.
10. With a thousand soldiers distributed in the provinces--and these
in time of war could retreat to the forts--and with three thousand
who may be permanently stationed in the forts, the port of Cavite
and the forts which may be erected at the entrance of the bay will be
impregnable. Or, [if it be a question] of not undertaking this work
but of maintaining the fortified post of Manila, the said number of
troops will likewise be sufficient; for the Dutch, the English, and
the French, who are the powers that we can fear in India, have not
the facilities for coming to conquer our towns with so many marines
as there would be soldiers in our garrisons aforesaid; and, on the
other hand, they may fear lest we invade them with part of the said
military force and of the militia (which, disciplined on the plan that
I propose in my memorandum of suggestions, will exceed six thousand
men, besides the veterans). With that force, and with the enormous
number of men who could be obtained from these islands for [making]
earthworks [para faginas] and for other construction, the name of our
sovereign and of the Spanish nation would command so much respect in
this part of the world that no one would dare to invade us.
11. The permanent garrison of Manila and Cavite, according to the
regulation by Señor Arandia, contains two thousand men, divided into
twenty companies; and the plan which I propose for the security of
the said towns and of the provinces calls for another two thousand
men. From these can be formed another twenty companies, of a hundred
men each; and, since usually these companies are at no time complete,
it will be necessary, in order to keep them full, to increase the
said plan by another thousand men, in order that the [regular]
footing of four thousand men may always be maintained. They can
easily be recruited in Nueva España, and [sent over] by every ship
to replace those who may die; for we have learned by experience
that the Americans, if they are well disciplined, are remarkably
well fitted for soldiers. They are barbarians in courage, and are
daring and resolute; they fling themselves into the greatest danger
as joyously as into a dance; and whether on the march or in guard
duty, in heat or in rain, and in the most distressing fatigues, they
are always gay, contented, and good-humored. With the same aspect
they endure poor food, a scanty supper, a hard bed; and, finally,
they are very obedient, and their virile powers are quite spent
[son de potencias mui despejadas] usually--so much so that on this
account they usually have all the vices which are natural to man. But
strict discipline and punishment are a great restraint on them; and,
with the example of four or five hundred veteran soldiers who might
come from España, a very respectable military force could be trained
here--with the additional consideration that they are better able
than are the Europeans to endure heat and rain, and other hardships,
which ruin the latter and make no impression on the former. But it
is indispensable that some officers of rank should come from España,
to lay good foundations for this edifice, for in no other way can it
be permanent.
12. In order that this force may serve willingly, and be reliable,
it is necessary to increase their pay. It is impossible to have
good officers unless they have sufficient pay to support themselves
decently, and it is certain that they do not have it; the same thing
is true of the soldiers, relatively; and on this account it is found
that both officers and men serve by compulsion, for, by leaving the
service, they make a better living, and are more highly esteemed. A
captain with [a salary of] twenty-five pesos, a lieutenant with
eighteen, and an alférez with fourteen, cannot feed, clothe, and house
themselves; and in order to appear on the streets neat and clean,
they are forced to practice a thousand stratagems and deceits, which
cast discredit on the body of officers and injure their reputation
among the citizens. The honorable officer who does not conform to this
[sort of] life, or who has means to support himself in some other way,
or who adds to his income by trading, escapes by leaving the service;
and the soldier deserts, and takes refuge in one of the provinces,
where he lives better and has more comforts. Therefore, in order
that they may serve the king with affection, willingness, and honor,
both officers and men should receive a corresponding rate of pay.
13. This, it seems to me, ought to be fixed at the rate of fifty
pesos for the captain's pay, forty for the lieutenant, thirty for the
alférez, ten for the sergeant, eight for the corporal, and five for
the private soldier; and in this proportion for the sargentos-mayor,
the adjutants, and others. With these salaries all the military could
support themselves decently, and the service would be desirable;
young men of good standing would devote themselves to it; there
would be emulation among the officers, and, if these were competent,
among the soldiers also--who, with such pay, would not be so eager
to desert the service.
14. Computing the annual expense of the aforesaid forty companies,
according to the proposed schedule of pay, it would amount to very
nearly the sum of three hundred and twenty thousand pesos; and adding
thirty thousand pesos more, for the pay of the corps of artillerists
whom we ought to have, the annual expense would be about three
hundred and fifty thousand pesos. [With that force,] there would be
men for the detachments which we may need to send on special service,
for the expeditions that may be necessary, for proceeding wherever
necessity may call for aid, and for the ships and the galleys; and,
above all, for rendering ourselves respected and feared, in times of
either peace or war.
15. This increase of troops and pay, compared with the pay and troops
stated in Señor Arandia's regulations, amounts to the half more;
and I reckon it, with that of the artillery, at two hundred thousand
pesos more of expense; this, with the hundred thousand applied for
the navy alone, will make three hundred thousand pesos of increase
to be charged to this royal treasury. Computing the cost not by the
said regulations, but by the plan which I have just proposed, the
entire cost of army, navy, and corps of artillery amounts to four
hundred and fifty thousand pesos annually.
Chapter Fourth: On the facility with which these islands can produce
for the royal exchequer more than what it needs for the said expenses.
1. Having constituted the aforesaid military force--or half of it, in
order that the expense may be less at first--the reduction of all the
Indian villages ought to be resolutely undertaken, as a matter that is
absolutely essential, without which all the rest will be useless. This
reduction made (which can be accomplished in less than a year),
enumeration will be made of the tribute-payers in all the provinces;
after the reduction their numbers will be greatly increased, because
the heads of barangay will not be able to hide the tributes as easily
as they now do, or to commit thefts and dishonorable acts, as they have
hitherto done. The ordinances will be made duly effective, especially
in regard to plantations, and other measures will be adopted that are
beneficial for the better government, both economic and civil, of the
villages; government buildings will be erected in the chief towns,
at least, that may serve to shelter the alcalde-mayor and the troops
that he will have; also a storehouse, in which to keep the property
of the royal exchequer. Good schoolmasters will be employed for the
instruction of the Indians, and for teaching them our language; and
the matters in which the father ministers should have the right to
intervene, and those in which they ought to forbear, will be strictly
regulated, without any dispensation. The cultivation of the land will
be conducted with the utmost care; and, finally, the tribute will be
increased, to the rate of two pesos a head each year. Although this
is a very moderate impost, and is profitable not only to the king but
to the Indians, in order to draw them out from their continual and
pernicious slothfulness, this branch of revenue will produce annually
one million, six hundred thousand pesos. This addition to the royal
treasury, even when some deduction is made, as is ordinary, will not
only support the expenses of my plan for army, artillery, and navy, but
a considerable amount of silver will be left for other allotments from
the royal exchequer, and for indemnifying the expenses with which the
islands have been burdened, from the time of their conquest until now.
2. The other increases and savings which the royal exchequer can make
in its various branches I have set forth to his Majesty and to the
superior government, and I will furnish a still more detailed account
whenever it shall be deemed necessary. It is sufficient [here] to
know that these can amount to some four hundred thousand pesos, and
that, when added to the income from the tributes, the two items will
amount to two millions of pesos annually; and even if half a million
be deducted for contingencies and losses, and another half-million be
spent in making payments, a million still remains as savings. Even
considering the matter as gloomily and distrustfully as possible,
there cannot fail to be an annual saving of half a million of pesos,
as any one will understand who is moderately acquainted with the
affairs of these islands.
3. With such receipts in the royal treasury, and with the aforesaid
soldiery and their pay, and with navy, artillerists, and military
supplies, what enterprises cannot be undertaken in these islands? Will
this not be the most considerable establishment in all India? Will
there be forces that can overcome us? Will the English, who have their
forts and factories, with the necessary garrisons, venture again to
invade this place? On the contrary, will they not fear, and with just
cause, that we, superior then in forces, will attack them in their own
colonies? I think that no one will doubt that the advantage is ours,
assuming that my plan for savings and increases in the royal revenues
is practicable; and I believe that, however numerous the difficulties
which may accumulate in carrying it out, all will admit the suitability
of these islands for attaining it, if only it be undertaken in earnest
and followed up persistently by all the governors; for if the military
forces be placed on the footing that I propose, all the rest will be
overcome without special difficulty; and I dare stake my head on it.
4. In order that the islands may enjoy the peace, tranquillity,
and comfort which they should have, with evident benefit to the royal
revenues, it is absolutely necessary to inflict exemplary punishment on
the Moros of Jolo and Mindanao, whose insolence, perfidy, cruelties,
piracies, seizing of captives, and deceitfulness have ruined these
wretched provinces, and will entirely annihilate them unless the
remedy be applied--and there is no other, than to attack them in their
own territories, and give them no quarter; to destroy them, or else
intimidate them so that they will never forget [their punishment]; and
to put a stop to their raids, by some small forts, which can keep them
in subjection--imposing on them a heavy tribute, which will indemnify
the expenses of the expedition and the costs of the said forts and
soldiers. The enterprise is easy and safe, when we have the men and
the money; and the advantage and even necessity is the greatest one
of these islands. Upon this I could expatiate at length, since this
is a matter upon which I have worked with considerable application;
but this point is sufficient, as being one of those most essential to
the prosperity of these islands, and to make it evident that at the
same time we can succeed in depriving the English of their factory in
Jolo. [128] This is another of the more important matters, since in
either peace or war they will entirely ruin these islands: in peace,
by frauds and commercial intrigues; and in war, with small forces.
5. For the execution of all the aforesaid, and in order that
the [military] establishment proposed may suffer no delay or
procrastination, it would be expedient for his Majesty to give
commission for this to the governors, and to the ministers of the
Audiencia, with the insistence which is merited by this project,
so assured and so beneficial; and the amplest powers should be
given them to proceed in such manner as they shall judge, by the
majority of votes [in councils of war], to be most expedient. For in
consulting his Majesty in regard to some uncertainties, and waiting
for his royal decisions, the delay of at least three years will be
experienced; and in so long a time the postponement of action cannot
fail to be injurious to the enterprise, and to cool interest in its
continuation, when it ought to be pursued with the greatest ardor,
zeal, and efficiency, deferring for this all other affairs, as being
less important.
6. The first thing which should be attempted is, that his Majesty
issue commands--provided he approve the project for making these
domains respected, and the plan for economies and increases in
the royal revenues--to the viceroy of Nueva España to send over
here money and soldiers, in order to serve as a foundation for the
work that is to be undertaken. For this is necessary to be done,
even if there were no such project; for in its present condition
the place is without defense, and the government without forces to
make itself obeyed; and there is no medium between the two extremes
above stated--to abandon this country, or to maintain it with honor;
and the latter cannot be secured without spending money, and without
having sufficient troops to garrison the forts.
7. If to these succors from Nueva España were added two ships and
five hundred soldiers from Europa, a corresponding force of officers,
and abundance of military supplies--which could come to these islands
by way of the Cape of Good Hope--great advantages would ensue. First,
all the vassals in these islands would rejoice at seeing such succor as
never before had been seen in them; second, the Indians would have some
idea of the power of our sovereign, since, as a people of material
ideas and little penetration, they do not consider or understand
more than what enters through their eyes; third, they would feel more
respect, fear, and dread, which is that which holds them in check, and
obliges them to be Christians and vassals of our king. Fourth, such aid
would serve as a terror to the Moros, and would allow the provinces,
overwhelmed by their invasions, to take breath; fifth, all the soldiery
would be disciplined and organized after the example of the said five
hundred veteran soldiers, and with the sergeants and corporals of the
latter a good corps of officers could be formed, filling vacant posts
with them in place of the untrained and inexperienced (to whom can be
given other appointments in the posts of alcalde-mayor, corregidor,
etc.). Sixth, in these neighboring provinces the reduction [of the
villages] and the increase of tribute could be immediately undertaken,
without risk of resistance on their part; and when the undertaking
was concluded in this region, where it is easier to carry out such
a measure, it would be continued in the other provinces, one after
another. Thus in a short time the benefits set down in this project
would be obtained, and with them the troops and their pay could be
increased, fortifications and ships built, supplies provided (which
could be done here), and the Moros who harass us destroyed.
Chapter Fifth: Of the arguments which justify the increase of tributes
1. As this matter is discussed with the greatest scruples by all
the authors, it has seemed to me desirable to explain, as briefly
as possible, the reasons which I consider just for the increase of
tributes which I mention in the preceding chapter. I see therein from
the start the obstacles and difficulties which this delicate question
will occasion; but I will bring together the considerations which
no author denies in this discussion; I will adapt their doctrines to
the Indians of these islands, in order that the justification of my
design may be evident; and I will conclude with touching upon some
objections which have been raised by the most learned persons whom
I have consulted on this point.
2. From the confusion and disorders of ancient times originated the
selection of kings, to whom and to their successors the respective
kingdoms entrusted the power of establishing laws; of forming towns,
and of maintaining them in peace, justice, and social order; of
appointing persons for government, civil, economic, and military; of
establishing tribunals; and, in fine, of providing their vassals with
all the means conducive to their greatest comfort and security. The
people bound themselves to contribute means for meeting these expenses,
with the tributes and regular charges which might be necessary. By
this mutual obligation between the kings and the vassals, the latter
must be protected, defended from enemies, and maintained in peace
and justice; and in return and acknowledgment they must also pay the
tributes, since these are employed for the common benefit, and secure
the stability and solidity of the state. If St. Paul counseled that
tributes be paid to the heathen princes, with how much more reason
ought they to be paid to our Catholic monarchs!
3. The payment of tributes is binding in the tribunal of conscience,
under [penalty of] mortal sin, and with the obligation to make
restitution when they are fraudulently withheld; and this opinion
no author questions. But, as it is not possible to determine the
quantity, opinions are divided, and many persons expand this matter,
urging that the excessive imposition of tribute exonerates from
the obligation to pay it, and establishing [the fact of] the said
excess on various arguments, although I know not whether these are
solid as is necessary. For, in order to speak with assurance on
this matter, neither theology nor jurisprudence is sufficient; but
it is necessary to know also the science of government and that of
administration--which are little understood by some who clamor against
excess in the tributes, without knowing whether or not there is any.
4. In matters of government, a statesman who is adorned with
superior talents will distinguish the expenditures which are
necessary from those which are needlessly incurred; he will know
whether the tributes are sufficient to meet the obligations of the
crown; and he will make a calculation of the incomes and expenses
of the royal exchequer. This neither the jurist nor the theologian
can do, without knowledge of these matters, which are remote from
their professions, and consequently they cannot be sure whether
the tributes are sufficient, or are extravagantly spent, in order
that they may establish the [charge of] excess in them, or the
[right of] relief from paying them, or the [justice of] scruples
at imposing them. But the theologian and the jurist who may have
the said information will doubtless declare with most correctness,
whether the tributes are excessive or moderate, and whether there
is obligation to diminish them or necessity for increasing them,
in order that sovereigns may not experience the aforesaid scruples,
or the vassals have cause for not paying the tributes.
5. It cannot be denied that in all the nations of Europe the tributes
have been increased in this century, as the Mercuries publish it;
and this is right, because continually new things are discovered
which render the old ones useless--for instance, a fortification
which formerly was considered impregnable is [now] regarded as very
frail and weak. On the other hand, the exertions which a power makes
oblige it to incur greater expenses, and all of the powers strive
to place themselves in a state of equilibrium which can render
their respective domains secure. The abundance of silver has raised
the prices of commodities, and, as everything costs much more than
formerly, and the necessity for expenditures is infinitely greater,
the increase of tributes cannot be avoided, nor can the vassals be
excused from the clear obligation to pay them, in proportion to the
[demands of the] times, which cannot be the same.
6. The pious feeling with which the Indians have been regarded has
rendered still more delicate the question of the tributes which
have been imposed upon them; nevertheless, all our authors agree in
justifying not only those which at first were laid upon them, but
those which for just reasons were afterward increased. Moreover, it
was decided by a council of very learned men whom the emperor Carlos
Fifth consulted that the Indians ought to pay the same tributes which
the other vassals were paying in España, appraising their value,
and moderating the tax according to the resources of the tributaries
and to what each province could carry and endure; [129] and from this
proceed to the laws which have been established, and the royal decrees
that have been issued, for this purpose. These ordinances are even
more benign than the aforesaid decision; for really the poverty of
the Indians has been exaggerated more than is just, and it has been
believed that by these moderate measures the conquest of the Indias,
both spiritual and temporal, would be more easily effected--which I do
not attribute to that, but to the great reverence which the reputation
and glorious achievements of the Spaniards occasioned in the Indians.
7. Taking for granted then, the moderation (as all admit) of the
tributes paid by the Indians, especially in these islands--where
they paid only at the rate of four reals for each tributary, and of
one real a head which was afterward imposed in addition, one entire
tribute finally paying ten reals, in accordance with ley 65, tit. 5,
lib. 6, of the Recopilación de Indias, without there being, from the
year 1602 until now, any further burden upon them--and assuming,
as an unquestioned fact, that there has been a continual increase
of new offices, new military posts, and many expenses in these
very islands; as also that the urgent needs of the crown are now
incomparably far greater than in the past century, it seems that by
an undeniable conclusion the increase of tributes ought to be lawful,
in proportion to the increase in the said expenses. For without the
tributes the king cannot fulfil his obligations as such, in regard
to his vassals; nor can the latter omit to contribute the means for
their own preservation and security, which is what the sovereign must
endeavor to obtain for them.
8. What reason will there be for the vassals in the peninsula of España
being the only ones to be laden with an increase in the tributes,
and for the vassals in the Indias not bearing the same increase? One
class is under the same obligation as the other to pay their share to
their king, for the necessary expenses of the monarchy. Let, then,
a survey be made of the taxes and imposts which have been increased
in España since the conquest of the Indias, and it will be seen what
increase of tributes has been imposed upon the Spaniards in order
to defray the expenses of the crown, while in the Indias hardly any
increase has been made--although it accords with equitable justice
that all should bear these burdens which conduce to the common welfare,
and assure the stability and permanence of all the dominions.
9. Even when the expenses of these islands were less, the tributes
were not sufficient; and every year the generosity of our sovereign
has sent and is sending the situado [130] from Nueva España--which,
[even] with the product of the tributes and of other royal taxes, is
not enough to satisfy all the obligations of this royal treasury. This
is an argument which demonstrates that these vassals do not contribute
to their king the amount which, in the opinion of all, they are
under obligation to pay; for they ought to pay that which his Majesty
spends for their comfort, for their spiritual and temporal government,
for the administration of justice, and in defense of their persons
and property. Besides all this, they ought to contribute to the
royal revenues for the expenses of the wars, and the maintenance of
troops and forts, of the navy, of state officials, and of the royal
household--which, as indispensable and general expenses, ought to be
exacted from all the vassals. But not only are these expenses never
exacted from the vassals here, but these islands have been supported
at the cost of the labors and fatigues of the other vassals, without
any reason being found why one class should enjoy more privileges
than the other while they receive equal benefits.
10. There are probably in all the world no vassals who are less
burdened than are the Indians of these islands. They eat and drink
without paying alcabala or any impost; the fabrics with which they
clothe themselves, if made in the islands, pay nothing, and if they
are of foreign make they bear no heavier burden than the light one of
the customs duties; in the polos and personal services to which the
king assigns them, he furnishes them with rations and pay according
to the tariffs and ordinances of the provinces; and, finally, each
Indian pays, at the end of the year, only five reals, from the age of
eighteen years to that of sixty. I agree that at the beginning it was
proper to proceed with this moderation, because the said tribute was
then considered sufficient for the expenses, and those of the monarchy
were also less in those times, on account of the scarcity of silver,
which caused all commodities to be cheaper than they are now; and,
finally, because they had not been conquered by wars occasioned by
their own perverse conduct, in order to impose on them heavy tributes
at the discretion of the conqueror, as is just in such cases. For they
submitted of their own accord, and our conquest was made not because
they had previously furnished us with causes for war, but for the
sake of their greater good, both spiritual and temporal; for this
reason their tribute ought to be more moderate, but not so much so
that, in order to relieve these vassals, it should be charged back
to the others (as it has been, unjustly), in order to support these
islands. For it does not accord with justice that exemption should
be granted to these Indians from their obligations, as vassals, to
pay their share toward the expenses of these dominions and of the
entire monarchy, in [due] proportion; and that this favor [to them]
should prove injurious to the rest of the vassals, who certainly are
more worthy of consideration [than these], since they are more useful.
11. "In the time of their heathendom, they ought to be considered as
slaves rather than as vassals of their tyrannical petty kings, to whom
they paid service as vassals. These tyrants employed them in their
grain-fields, and in gathering pearls, shells, gold, dyewood, amber,
and civet; in timber-cutting, and in the construction of vessels;
in a word, the people had nothing more than the labor appointed to
them by their tyrant masters" (thus I explained the matter to his
Majesty in a report of June 5, 1760, and [here] will copy exactly
the rest of its contents regarding the increase of tributes). "Your
Majesty conquered these dominions and these peoples, making rational
beings from brutes, Christians from heathens, and rich people from
poor ones. Your Majesty gave them the freedom of the sea, the rivers,
the lands, and the forests; established a governor, an Audiencia, and
other courts, in order that they might be defended from their enemies
and maintained in justice; formed bishoprics, with bishops and curas;
and, in fine, you completed these benefits with the many privileges
which are contained in the laws of the Indias, without further burden
to them than the payment by each Indian of five reals. At the same
time, they were able to pay much more, as it is just they should,
considering that every vassal ought to contribute to his king and
natural lord whatever is necessary to maintain the vassals in peace,
justice, and social order; but in these islands not only does your
Majesty not obtain what is needed to pay these expenses, but your
Majesty supplies, and has supplied, an immense amount of money. If
the rest of your vassals contributed in this proportion, your Majesty
could not maintain your dominions, for you spend vastly more than what
they yield to you; nor could the Indians of these islands, moreover,
be instructed and governed if your Majesty spent upon them no more
than you obtain from the fund of the tributes. Therefore, in order
that these obligations may be reciprocal--that of your Majesty to
maintain the Indians in social order, and theirs to contribute for
the same--it is necessary that the tribute be proportioned to the
expenses, and larger than what they are at present paying."
12. Let these reflections be prudently considered, for, even without
the constraint of the foregoing ones, they show the lawfulness of
increasing the tribute; and at greater length I have stated the
disposition of the Indians, as I also explained to his Majesty in
the said report: "They are a people who are given up to sloth; they
work one day for the food for the entire week, and the rest of the
time they are without occupation, and most often [spend that time] in
gambling or drinking. That is a very unusual Indian who takes pains
to have a comfortable house, and to accumulate some little property
for the comfort of his children; for he [usually] only works for
his food and for wretched clothing, for paying his tribute, and for
gambling. This is more usually the case; as also is it certain that
there are no vassals who have better opportunities for being rich,
or can do so more easily. Those who were exempted from going to cut
timber paid the overseer five pesos, three reals each, in order not to
be obliged to do this work for the period of one month; and in this
is evident the facility with which they make money when they choose,
and when necessity urges them."
13. Here comes in well what the governor has set forth in a memorandum
of suggestions regarding the increase of the tributes, and I will
extract from it what answers my purpose: "Among the numerous vices
which are occasioned by the incredible laziness of the Indians, one
is that of gambling. When they gamble on a cockfight, a multitude
of people assemble, and all of them carry ready money for this
purpose. The Indian women adorn themselves with many chains of gold,
with pendants, and with rosaries ornamented with gold; with rings
and bracelets of tumbac, and with many buttons of the said metals
on their chemises. The Indians are accustomed to use much silver,
and some gold and tumbac, on the said buttons and those on their
jackets; in rings and clasps; on their knife-belts [131] and weapons
ornamented with silver. For a burial they pay out twenty, forty,
or sixty pesos; they spend enormous amounts in the banquets at their
weddings, in the functions of gobernadorcillos, and in other things,
which prove that the Indian, notwithstanding his great slothfulness,
has money for everything except for the tribute."
14. There is no province which does not yield many and excellent
products, and, if the Indians were willing to apply themselves to
a very moderate [amount of] labor, they could pay a larger tribute,
and [yet] live with more comforts; for there are probably no vassals
in all the world who have such facilities and opportunities for
becoming rich as have the Indians of Filipinas. But this condition
is not attained when there is slothfulness; and what means have the
Spaniards used to banish this vice? None; for we are as languid and
negligent as the Indians, and have left them in their freedom without
seeking either their advancement or our own. The Spaniards do not go
out of Manila, where all are gentlemen; they regard it as unworthy
to devote themselves to any other pursuit than commerce; they employ
themselves in swindling and begging alms, rather than seek a living in
the provinces; and, more than all, they live in utter idleness. They
loiter about, divert themselves with gambling and other vices, and
become insolent in their licentious mode of speech, even that which
they do not understand. For this reason Manila is the commonwealth
most abominable for malicious tales, slanders, and factions, [132]
for sloth and licentiousness; for even the citizen of most wealth
and he who is most occupied will have at least ten months which he
does not know how to employ.