Whether we shall now engage in this design; whether we shall, for the

defence of the Pragmatick sanction, begin another war on the

continent, of which the duration cannot be determined, the expense

estimated, or the event foreseen; whether we shall contend at once

with all the princes of the house of Bourbon, and entangle ourselves

in a labyrinth of different schemes; whether we shall provoke France

to interrupt our commerce, and invade our colonies, and stand without

the assistance of a single ally, against those powers that lately set

almost all Europe at defiance, is now to be determined by your

lordships.

It can scarcely be expected, that the French will treat us only as

auxiliaries, and satisfy themselves with attacking us only where they

find themselves opposed by us: they will undoubtedly, my lords,

consider us as principals, since they can suffer little more by

declaring war against us.

These, my lords, are the dangers to be feared from the measures which

we are now persuaded to pursue; but persuaded by arguments which, in

my opinion, ought to have very little influence upon us, and which

have not yet been able, however artfully or zealously enforced, to

prevail upon the Dutch to unite with us.

It has, indeed, been asserted, that the Dutch appear inclined to

assist us: but of that inclination stronger proofs ought surely to be

produced, before we take auxiliaries into pay, and transport troops

into another country, which has been so often represented to have been

raised for the defence of their own, or collect money from the publick

by the propagation of wickedness.

Of this favourable inclination in the Dutch I am the more doubtful,

because it is contrary to the expectations of all mankind, and to the

maxims by which they have generally regulated their conduct. There

have been many late instances of their patient submission to the

invasion of privileges to which they have thought themselves entitled,

and of their preference of peace, though sometimes purchased with the

loss of honour; or, what may be supposed to touch a Dutchman much more

nearly, of profit, to the devastation and expense and hazards of war;

and it can hardly be supposed by any who know their character, that

they will be more zealous for the rights of others than for their own;

or that they will, for the support of the queen of Hungary, sacrifice

that security and tranquillity which they have preferred at the

expense of their commerce at one time, and by passive submission to

insults at another.

That a nation like this, my lords, will in the quarrel of another

engage in any but moderate measures, is not to be expected: it is not

improbable, that they may endeavour by embassies and negotiations to

adjust the present disputes, or offer their mediation to the

contending powers; but I am very far from imagining, that they will

find in themselves any disposition to raise armies, or equip fleets,

that they will endanger the barrier which has been so dearly

purchased, or expose themselves to the hazards and terrours of a

French war; and am, therefore, inclined to believe, that if any

tendency towards such measures now appears, it is only the effect of

the present heat of some vehement declaimers, or the secret

machination of some artful projectors among them, who have formed

chimerical plans of a new system of Europe, and have, in their

imaginations, regulated the distribution of dominion and power, or

who, perhaps, have diminished their patrimonies by negligence and

extravagance, and hope to repair them in times of confusion, and to

glean part of that harvest of treasure which the publick must be

obliged to yield in time of war. I am still inclined to believe, that

the true interest of the republick will be consulted, that policy will

prevail over intrigue, and that only moderate measures will be pursued

by the general council of the states.

Moderate measures, my lords, if not always the most honourable in the

opinion of minds vitiated by false notions of grandeur, are, at least,

always the most safe; and are, therefore, eligible at least, till the

scene of affairs begins to open, and the success of a more vigorous

conduct may with some degree of certainty be foreknown; and it must at

least be thought imprudent for those to hazard much who can gain

nothing, and therefore it will not be easy to assign any reason that

may justify our conduct on the present occasion.

It is not improbable, my lords, that those who have now obtained the

direction of our affairs, may be influenced by the general

disapprobation which the British people showed of the pacifick conduct

of the late ministry, and may have resolved to endeavour after

applause, by showing more spirit and activity. But, my lords, of two

opposite schemes it is not impossible that both may be wrong, and that

the middle way only may be safe; nor is it uncommon for those who are

precipitately flying from one extreme, to rush blindly upon another.

But our ministry, my lords, have found out a method of complicating

errours which none of their predecessors, however stigmatized for

ignorance and absurdity, have hitherto been able to attain; they have

been able to reconcile the extremes of folly, and to endanger the

publick interest at the same time, by inactivity and romantick

temerity.

No accusation against the late ministry was more general, more

atrocious, or more adapted to incense the people, than that of

neglecting the war against Spain: this was the subject of all the

invectives which were vented against them in the senate, or dispersed

among the people; for this they were charged with a secret confederacy

against their country, with disregard of its commerce and its arms,

and with a design to ruin the nation for no other end than to punish

the merchants.

To this accusation, my lords, diligently propagated, willingly

received, and, to confess the truth, confirmed by some appearances, do

those owe their power, who now preside over the affairs of the nation;

and it might, therefore, have been hoped, that by their promotion, one

of our grievances would have been taken away, and that at least the

war against Spain would have been vigorously prosecuted.

But this ministry, my lords, have only furnished a new instance of the

credulity of mankind, of the delusion of outward appearances, and of

the folly of hoping with too great ardour for any event, and of

trusting any man with too great confidence. No sooner were they

possessed of the power to which their ambition had so long aspired,

and of the salaries which had with so much eagerness been coveted by

their avarice, than they forgot the complaints of the merchants, the

value of commerce, the honour of the British flag, the danger of our

American territories, and the great importance of the war with Spain,

and contented themselves with ordering convoys for our merchants,

instead of destroying the enemy by whom they are molested.

The fleets which are floating from one coast to another in the

Mediterranean, and which sometimes strike terrour into the harmless

inhabitants of an open coast, or threaten, but only threaten,

destruction to an unfortified town, I am very far from considering as

armaments fitted out against the Spaniards, who neither feel nor fear

any great injury from them: their trade may be, indeed, somewhat

impeded; but that inconvenience is amply compensated by their

depredations upon our merchants: their navies may be confined to their

own ports, or to those of France; but these navies are not very

necessary to them, since they are not sufficiently powerful to oppose

us on the ocean; and therefore they who are thus confined, suffer less

than those who confine them. We have, indeed, the empty pleasure of

seeing ourselves lords of the sea, and of shaking the coasts with

volleys of our cannon; but we purchase the triumph at a very high

price, and shall find ourselves in time weakened by a useless

ostentation of superiority.

The only parts of the Spanish dominions in which they can receive any

hurt from our forces, are those countries which they possess in

America, and from which they receive the gold and silver which inflame

their pride, and incite them to insult nations more powerful than

themselves. By seizing any part of those wealthy regions, we shall

stop the fountain of their treasure, reduce them to immediate penury,

and compel them to solicit peace upon any conditions that we shall

condescend to offer them.

The necessity of invading these countries, my lords, was perfectly

understood, and very distinctly explained, when the forces destined

for that expedition were delayed, and when the attempt at Carthagena

miscarried; nothing was more pathetical than the complaints of the

patriots, who spared no labour to inform either the senate or the

nation of the advantages which success would have procured. But what

measures have been taken to repair our losses, or to regain our

honour; or what new schemes have been formed for making an attack more

forcible upon some weaker part?

Every one can remember, that the miscarriage of that enterprise was

imputed, not to its difficulty, nor to the courage of the Spaniards,

nor to the strength of their works, but to the unskilfulness of our

officers, and the impropriety of the season; and it was, therefore,

without doubt thought not impossible to attack the Spanish colonies

with success; but why then, my lords, have they hitherto suffered the

Spaniards to discipline their troops, and strengthen their works at.

leisure, that at length they may securely set us at defiance, and

plunder our merchants without fear of vengeance?

Thus, my lords, has our real interest been neglected in pursuit not of

any other scheme of equal advantage, but of the empty title of the

arbiters of Europe; we have suffered our trade to be destroyed, and

our country impoverished for the sake of holding the _balance of

power_; that variable balance, in which folly and ambition are

perpetually changing the weights, and which neither policy nor

strength could yet preserve steady for a single year.

In the prosecution of this idle scheme, we are about to violate all

the maxims of wisdom, and perhaps of justice; we are about to destroy

the end by the means which we make use of to promote it, to endanger

our country more by attempting to hinder the changes which are

projected in Europe, than their accomplishment will endanger it, and

to deliver up ourselves to France before she makes any demand of

submission from us.

If any excuse could be made for expeditions so likely to end in ruin,

it must be that justice required them; and that if we suffer, we at

least suffer in support of right, and in an honest endeavour to

promote the execution of the great laws of moral equity; that if we

fail of success, we shall always have the consolation of having meant

well, and of having deserved those victories which we could not gain.

But, upon an impartial survey of the cause in which we are going to

engage, and on which we are about to hazard our own happiness, and

that of our posterity, I can discover no such apparent justice on the

side of the queen of Hungary, as ought to incite distant nations to

espouse her quarrel, to raise armies in her favour, to consider her

cause as that of human nature, and to prosecute those that invade her

territories, as the enemies of general society.

The Pragmatick sanction, my lords, by which she claims all the

hereditary dominions of her family, cannot change the nature of right

and wrong, nor invalidate any claim before subsisting, unless by the

consent of the prince by whom it was made. The elector of Bavaria may,

therefore, urge in his own defence, that by the elder sister he has a

clear and indisputable right, a right from which he never receded, as

he never concurred in the Pragmatiok sanction; he may, therefore,

charge this illustrious princess, for whom so many troops are raised,

and for whom so much blood is about to be shed, with usurpation, with

detention of the dominions of other potentates, and with an obstinate

assertion of a false title.

That the Pragmatick sanction is generally understood to be unjust,

appears sufficiently from the conduct of those powers who, though

engaged by solemn stipulations to support it, yet look unconcerned on

the violation of it, and appear convinced, that the princes who are

now dividing among themselves the Austrian dominions, produce claims

which cannot be opposed without a manifest disregard of justice.

The pretensions of these princes ought, indeed, to have been more

attentively considered, when this guaranty was first demanded; for it

is evident, that either no such compact ought to have been made, or

that it ought now to be observed; and that those who now justify the

neglect of it, by urging its injustice, ought to have refused

accession to it for the same reason. But it is probable, that they

will urge in their defence, what cannot easily be confuted, that their

consent was obtained by misrepresentations; and that he who has

promised to do any thing on the supposition that it is right, is not

bound by that promise, when he has discovered it to be wrong.

But though justice may, my lords, be pretended, I am far from doubting

that policy has, in reality, supplied the motives upon which these

powers proceed. Since the world is evidently governed more by interest

than virtue, I think it not unreasonable to imagine, that they form

their measures according to their own expectations of advantage; and

as I do not believe our countrymen distinguished from the rest of

mankind by any peculiar disregard of themselves, it may not be

improper to examine, even in this place, whether by restoring the

house of Austria to its ancient greatness, we shall promote our own

happiness, or that of the empire, or of the rest of Europe.

To ourselves, my lords, I do not see what assistance can be given in

time of danger by this house, however powerful, or however friendly;

for, I suppose, we shall never suffer it to grow powerful by sea as

well as by land, and by sea only can we receive benefits or injuries.

What advantages the rest of Europe may promise themselves from the

restoration of the Austrian power, may be learned, my lords, from the

history of the great emperour, Charles the fifth, who for many years

kept the world in continual alarms, ranged from nation to nation with

incessant and insatiable ambition, made war only for the extinction of

the protestant religion, and employed his power and his abilities in

harassing the neighbouring princes, and disturbing the tranquillity of

mankind.

Nor did his successours, my lords, though weakened by the division of

his dominions, enjoy their power with greater moderation, or exert it

to better purposes. It is well known, that they endeavoured the

subversion of both the liberties and religion of the subordinate

states of the empire, and that the great king of Sweden was called

into Germany, as well for the preservation of the protestant religion,

as of the rights of the electors.

This, my lords, is so generally known and confessed, that Puffendorf,

the best writer on the German constitution, has declared it

disadvantageous to the empire to place at its head a prince too

powerful by his hereditary dominions, since they will always furnish

him with force to oppress the weaker princes; and it is not often

found, that he who has the power to oppress, is restrained by

principles of justice.

It appears, therefore, to me, my lords, that the late election of an

emperour was made with sufficient regard to the general good; and

that, therefore, neither policy nor equity oblige us to act in a

manner different from the other powers who are joined in the same

engagements, of whom I do not learn, by any of the common channels of

intelligence, that any of them intend the support of the Pragmatick

sanction; for no newspaper or pamphlet has yet informed us, that any

of the other powers are hiring auxiliaries, or regulating the march of

their troops, or making any uncommon preparations, which may foretoken

an expedition against the emperour or his allies.

Yet, my lords, they are not restrained from attacking the emperour, by

so strong objections as may be made to the present design; for they

owe him no obedience as their sovereign, nor have contributed to the

acquisition of his honours; they have not, like his majesty, given

their votes for his exaltation to the imperial seat, nor have

acknowledged his right by granting him an aid. They might, therefore,

without charge of disloyalty or inconsistency, endeavour to dethrone

him; but how his majesty can engage in any such design, after having

zealously promoted his advancement, and confirmed his election by the

usual acknowledgment, I am not able to understand. It is evident, that

the king of Prussia believes himself restrained by his own acts, and

thinks it absurd to fight against an emperour, who obtained the throne

by his choice; he, therefore, has, with his usual wisdom, refused to

engage in the confederacy, nor have either promises or concessions

been able to obtain more from him than a bare neutrality.

Whether, indeed, any more than a neutrality be intended, even by this

pompous armament, for which we are now required to provide, I maybe

allowed to doubt; since the troops that are hired at so high a rate,

are such as cannot act against the enemies of the queen of Hungary,

without breach of the imperial constitutions.

It has been already justly observed in this debate, that when the

emperour has obtained from the diet an aid of fifty months, that act

is considered as an authentick recognition of his title; nor can any

of the German princes afterwards make war against him, without

subjecting his dominions to the imperial interdict, and losing the

privileges of his sovereignty.

That the present emperour has already received this acknowledgment,

and been confessed by his majesty, as elector of Hanover, to be

legally invested with the imperial dignity, is well known; and,

therefore, I cannot by any method of reasoning discover, nor have yet

found any man able to inform me, why the troops of Hanover are chosen

before those of any other nation, for a design which they cannot

execute, without ruining their sovereign if they fail; and infringing

the constitution of the empire, if they should happen to succeed?

I should, therefore, have imagined, that the assistance of the queen

of Hungary was only pretended, and that the forces were only designed

to breathe the air of the continent, and to display their scarlet at

the expense of Britain, had not the noble lord who spoke third in this

debate informed us, that they will in reality march into Germany; a

design, my lords, so romantick, unseasonable, and dangerous, that

though I cannot doubt it after such assurances, I should not have

believed it on any other; a design which I hope every man, who regards

the welfare of this kingdom, will indefatigably oppose, and which

every Briton must wish that some lucky accident may frustrate.

To send an army into Germany, my lords, is to hazard our native

country without necessity, without temptation, without prospect or

possibility of advantage; it is to engage in a quarrel which has no

relation to our dominions, or rights, or commerce; a quarrel from

which, however it be decided, we can neither hope for any increase of

our wealth, our force, or our influence; but which may involve us in a

war without end, in which it will be difficult to obtain the victory,

and in which we must yet either conquer or be undone.

Surely, my lords, an expedition like this was never undertaken before,

without consulting the senate, and declaring the motives on which it

was designed; surely never was any supply of this nature demanded,

without some previous discoveries to this house of the importance of

the service for which they were required to provide. On this occasion,

my lords, all the councils of the government are covered by a cloud of

affected secrecy, nor is any knowledge of our affairs to be gained,

but from papers which are not to be regarded here, the printed votes

of the other house.

I am always, my lords, inclined to suspect unusual secrecy, and to

imagine, that men either conceal their measures, because they cannot

defend them, or affect an appearance of concealing them, when in

reality they have yet projected nothing, and draw the veil with

uncommon care, only lest it should be discovered that there is nothing

behind it; as when palaces are shown, those apartments which are

empty, are carefully locked up.

To confess my opinion without reserve, I am not so much inclined to

believe, that our ministers' designs are bad, as that they design

nothing; and suspect that this mighty army, so lavishly paid, and

collected from such distant parts, is to regulate its motions by

accident, and to wait without action, till some change in the state of

Europe shall make it more easy for our ministers to form their scheme.

I hope, my lords, that by some accident more favourable than we have

at present reason to expect, our German expedition will be retarded,

till our ministers shall awaken from their present dream of delivering

Europe from the French ambition, and of restoring the ancient

greatness of the house of Austria. I hope every day, as it adds to

their experience, will diminish that ardour which is generally the

effect of imperfect views, which is commonly raised by partial

considerations, and ends in inconsiderate undertakings. I hope they

will in time think it no advantage to their fellow-subjects to be

doomed to fight the battles of other nations, and to be called out

into every field, where they shall happen to hear that blood is to be

shed. I hope they will be taught, that the only business of Britain is

commerce; and that while our ships pass unmolested, we may sit at

ease, whatever be the designs or actions of the potentates on the

continent; that none but naval power can endanger our safety, and that

it is not necessary for us to inquire, how foreign territories are

distributed, what family approaches to its extinction, or where a

successour will be found to any other crown than that of Britain.

If these maxims were once generally understood, from how much

perplexity would our councils be set free? how many thousands of our

fellow-subjects would be preserved from slaughter? and how much would

our wealth be increased, by saving those sums which are yearly

squandered in idle expeditions, or in negotiations equally useless,

and, perhaps, equally expensive? Had these principles been received by

our forefathers, we might now have given laws to the world, and,

perhaps, our posterity will, with equal reason, say, How happy, how

great and formidable they should have been, had not we attempted to

fix and to hold the balance of power, and neglected the interest of

our country for the preservation of the house of Austria!

Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to explain and enforce my opinion

of the measures in which our ministers have engaged the nation; and

hope that I shall not be accused of being influenced in my

determinations by personal prejudices, nor of having changed my

opinions with regard to publick affairs, in consequence of any change

of the persons by whom they are conducted. For if my sentiments have

ever been thought important enough to be retained in memory, I can,

with the utmost confidence, appeal to all those who can recollect what

I have formerly said, when the reestablishment of the house of Austria

was the subject of our consultations; and defy the most rigorous and

attentive examiner of my conduct, to prove, that there ever was a time

in which I thought it necessary or expedient for the British nation to

be entangled in disputes on the continent, or to employ her arms in

regulating the pretensions of contending powers.

I was always of opinion, my lords, that peace is the most eligible

state, and that the ease of security is to be preferred to the honour

of victory. I always thought peace particularly necessary to a trading

people; and as I have yet found no reason to alter my sentiments, and

as auxiliaries cannot be of any use but in time of war, I shall

endeavour to promote peace by joining in the motion.

Lord CHOLMONDELEY spoke to this effect:--My lords, notwithstanding the

atrocious charges which have been urged with so much vehemence against

the ministry; notwithstanding the folly and absurdity which some lords

have imagined themselves to have discovered in the present measures, I

cannot yet prevail upon myself, whatever may be my veneration for

their integrity, or my confidence in their abilities, to approve the

motion for which they so earnestly contend.

To comply with this motion, my lords, would be, in my opinion, to

betray the general cause of mankind, to interrupt the success of the

assertors of liberty, to give up all the continent, at once, to the

house of Bourbon, to defeat all the measures of our ancestors and

ourselves, and to invite the oppressors of mankind to extend their

claims of universal dominion to the island of Britain.

Of the measures which we are now to consider, I think the defence at

once obvious and unanswerable; and should advise, that instead of

exerting an useless sagacity in uncertain conjectures on future

events, or displaying unseasonable knowledge by the citation of

authorities, or the recollection of ancient facts, every lord should

attentively compare the state into which Europe was reduced soon after

the death of the late emperour, with that in which it now appears; and

inquire to what causes such sudden and important changes are to be

ascribed. He will then easily discover the efficacy of the British

measures; and be convinced, that nothing has been omitted which the

interest of this nation required.

When I hear it asked by the noble lords, what effects have been

produced by our armaments and expenses? For what end auxiliaries are

hired, and why our armies are transported into Flanders? I cannot but

suspect, my lords, that this affectation of ignorance is only intended

to irritate their opponents; that they suppress facts with which they

are well acquainted, only that they may have an opportunity of giving

vent to their passions, of displaying their imagination in artful

reproaches, and exercising their eloquence in splendid declamations. I

believe they hide what they know where to find, only to oblige others

to the labour of producing it; and ask questions, not because they

want or desire information, but because they hope to weary those whose

stations condemn them to the task of answering them.

The effects, my lords, which the assistance given by us to the queen

of Hungary have already produced, are the recovery of one kingdom, and

the safety of the rest; the exclusion of the Spaniards from Italy on

the one part, and on the other the confinement of them in it, without

either the supplies for war, or the necessaries of life.

These, my lords, are surely great advantages; but these are not the

greatest which we have reason to hope. Our vigour and resolution have

at last animated the Dutch to suspend for a time their attention to

trade and money, and to consider what they seldom much regard, the

state of other nations; the most rich and powerful of their provinces

have already determined to concur in the reestablishment of the house

of Austria; and if the approbation of the rest be necessary, it is

likely to be obtained by the same method of proceeding.

Thus, my lords, we have a prospect of doing that which the ministers

of queen Anne, whose fidelity, wisdom, and address, have been so often

and so invidiously commended, thought their greatest honour, and the

strongest proof of their abilities. We may soon form another

confederacy against the house of Bourbon, at a time when Louis the

fourteenth is not at its head, at a time when it is exhausted by

expensive projects; and when, therefore, it cannot make the same

resistance as when it was before attacked.

By pursuing the scheme which is now formed, with steadiness and

ardour, we may, perhaps, reinstate all those nations in their

liberties, whom cowardice, or negligence, or credulity have, during

the last century, delivered up to the ambition of France; we may

confine that swelling monarchy, which has from year to year torn down

the boundaries of its neighbours, within its ancient limits, and

disable it for ages from giving any new alarms to mankind, and from

making any other efforts for the acquisition of universal dominion; we

may reestablish the house of Austria as the great barrier of the

world, by which it is preserved on one part from being laid waste by

the barbarity of the Turks, and on the other from being enslaved by

politer tyrants, and overrun by the ambition of France.

Elevated with such success, and encouraged by such prospects, we ought

surely, my lords, to press forward in a path, where we have hitherto

found no difficulties, and which leads directly to solid peace and

happiness, which no dangers or terrours can hereafter interrupt: we

ought, instead of relaxing, to redouble our efforts; and to remember,

that by exerting all our strength and all our influence for a short

time, we shall not only secure ourselves and our posterity from

insolence and oppression, but shall establish the tranquillity of the

world, and promote the general felicity of the human species.

For these great purposes, my lords, are those auxiliaries retained, of

which some lords now require the dismission; and those armies

transported, which part of the nation is by false reports inclined to

recall; but I hope that such unreasonable demands will not be

gratified, and that the faith of treaties, the ties of friendship, the

call of justice, and the expectations of our allies, will easily

prevail upon your lordships to despise the murmurs of prejudice, and

the outcries of faction.

Lord BATH replied to the following effect:--My lords, as I am far from

thinking, that my advice or opinion can be of any use in this

illustrious assembly, I should have listened in silence to this

debate, important as it is, had I not thought it my duty to defend

here what I approved in the council; and considered it as an act of

cowardice and meanness to fall passively down the stream of

popularity, and to suffer my reason and my integrity to be overborne

by the noise of vulgar clamours, which have been raised against the

measures of the government by the low arts of exaggeration, fallacious

reasonings, and partial representations. It is not without concern, my

lords, that even in this house I observe some inclination to gratify

the prejudices of the people, and to confirm them in their contempt of

the foreign troops, by the poor artifice of contemptuous language. To

dispute about words, is, indeed, seldom useful; and when questions so

weighty as these are before us, may be justly censured as improper. I

shall, therefore, only observe that the term mercenaries, which is in

the motion applied to the forces of Hanover, seems designed rather to

affect the passions than influence the reason, and intended only to

express a partiality which cannot be justified.

But it is far more necessary, my lords, to consider upon what motives

the troops of Hanover were hired, than by what denomination they may

most properly be called; and therefore I shall endeavour to explain

the reasons which induced the ministry to retain them, and which, I

suppose, have prevailed upon the commons to provide for their support.

It has been asked, why the troops of Hanover were preferred to those

of any other nation? And it has been insinuated, that our

determination was influenced by motives very different from that

regard which every Briton owes to the interest of his native country.

But to this imputation, however specious, and however popular, it may

be with great security replied, that there was no preference, because

there was no choice; that there was a necessity for hiring troops, and

that no other troops were to be obtained; and whoever shall endeavour

to invalidate this defence, must engage in an undertaking of which I

can boldly affirm, that he will find it very difficult. He must show

what power would have been able or willing to have furnished us with

troops on this occasion; and I am confident, that whoever shall, with

this design, take a deliberate survey of the several kingdoms and

states of Europe, will find, that there is no other prince to whom we

could have applied on this occasion, without greater inconveniencies

than can reasonably be feared from the present stipulation with

Hanover.

The reasons, indeed, for which this stipulation was made, appeared so

strong, when it was considered in the council, that it was unanimously

determined necessary; nor was the conclusion hastily made in an

assembly of particular persons, who might be suspected of favouring it

from private views, and of being convened on purpose to put it in

execution: it was debated by a great number with great solemnity; nor

can any man say, that he only yielded to what he found it in vain to

oppose; for the consent given was not a tacit acquiescence, but a

verbal approbation. So far was this part of our measures from being

the advice of any single man, or transacted with that solicitous

secrecy which is the usual refuge of bad designs.

It has been asserted, likewise, my lords, and with much greater

appearance of justice, that this whole design has been formed and

conducted without the concurrence or approbation of the senate; and

that, therefore, it can be considered only as a private scheme to be

executed at the publick expense, as a plan formed by the ministry to

aggrandize or ingratiate themselves at the hazard of the nation.

But even this, my lords, is a misrepresentation, though a

misrepresentation more artful, and more difficult to defeat; because,

in order to the justification of our measures, it is necessary to take

a review of past transactions, and to consider what was necessarily

implied by former determinations of the senate.

The period, my lords, to which this consideration will necessarily

carry us back, is the time at which, after the late tedious war, a

peace was, on whatever terms, concluded with France. It is well known,

that the confederates demanded, among other advantages, a cession of

that part of Flanders, which had been for many years in the possession

of Spain, and which opened a way by which the ambition of the house of

Bourbon might make inroads at pleasure into the dominions of either

the Austrians or Dutch. This they were immediately interested in

preventing; and as we knew the necessity of preserving the equipoise

of power, we likewise were remotely engaged to promote any measures by

which it might be secured. In this demand, therefore, all the

confederate powers naturally united, and by their united influence

enforced compliance. But though it was easy, with no great profundity

of political knowledge, to discover from whom these provinces should

be taken away, to whom they should be given, was a question of more

difficulty; since they might add to the power that had opportunities

of improving them, such an increase of commerce and wealth as might

defeat the end for which they were demanded, and destroy the balance

of power, by transferring too much weight into another scale. And

mankind has learned, my lords, by experience, that exorbitant power

will always produce exorbitant pride; that very few, when they can

oppress with security, will be contained within the bounds of equity

by the restraints of morality or of religion; and that, therefore, the

only method of establishing a lasting peace is to divide power so

equally, that no party may have any certain prospect of advantage by

making war upon another.

For this reason, my lords, it was apparently contrary to our interest

to grant those provinces to those to whom, by their situation, they

might have been most useful. Such countries, and such manufactures in

the hands of a people versed, perhaps, beyond all others, both in the

science and the stratagems of trade, and always watchful to improve

every opportunity of increasing their riches, would have enabled them

in a short time to purchase an interest in the councils of all the

monarchs of the world, to have maintained fleets that might have

covered the ocean, and to have obtained that universal dominion to

which the French have so long aspired, and which it is, perhaps, more

for the interest of mankind, that if slavery cannot be prevented, they

should obtain, as they would, perhaps, use their power with more

generosity.

The same reason, my lords, naturally made the Dutch unwilling to put

these provinces in the hands of Britain; for we, likewise, make a

profession of trade, though we do not pursue it with the same ardour,

or, to confess the truth, with the same success: it was not, however,

to be imagined, that there would not be found among us some men of

sagacity to discern, and of industry to improve the opportunities

which the new dominions would have put into our hands of vending our

manufactures in parts where, at present, they are very little known.

Nor was this the only danger to be feared from such an increase of

dominion: the Dutch have not yet forgotten, that though we at first

rescued them from slavery, patronised the infancy of their state, and

continued our guardianship till it was grown up to maturity, and

enabled to support itself by its own strength, yet we afterwards made

very vigorous attempts to reduce it to its original weakness, and to

sink it into pupillage again; that we attempted to invade the most

essential part of its rights, and to prescribe the number of ships

that it should maintain. They know, likewise, my lords, that by the

natural rotation of human affairs, the same counsels may in some

future reign be again pursued, or that some unavoidable conflict of

interest may produce a contest that can be decided only by the sword;

and then it may easily be perceived how much they would be endangered,

by the neighbourhood of British garrisons, and of countries, where we

might maintain numerous armies at a very small expense. It is,

therefore, no subject of wonder, that a nation much less subtile than

the Dutch should find out how much it was their interest, that we

should be confined within the limits of our own island; and that we

should not have it in our power to attack them with armies as well as

fleets, and at once to obstruct their commerce and invade their

country.

There remained, therefore, my lords, no power but the emperour to whom

these provinces could be consigned; and to him, therefore, they were

given, but given only in trust for the joint advantage of the whole

confederacy; he, indeed, enjoys their revenues on condition that he

shall support the garrisons necessary to their defence; but he cannot

transfer them to any other power, or alienate them to the detriment of

those nations who concurred in acquiring them.

It may not be improper, my lords, to observe, that on this contract

depends the justice of our conduct with regard to the company

established at Ostend for carrying on a trade to the East Indies.

These provinces were granted to the confederate powers, and consigned

to the emperour to be enjoyed by him for the common benefit: it was,

therefore, plainly intended by this contract, that he should use none

of the advantages which these new dominions afforded him, to the

detriment of those powers by whose gift he enjoyed them; nor could it

be supposed that the Dutch and Britons debarred each other from those

opportunities of trade only to enable the emperour to rival them both.

The towns, therefore, my lords, were at this time determined by the

senate to be the general property of all the confederate powers,

acquired by their united arms, and to be preserved for their common

advantage, as the pledge of peace, and the palladium of Europe. If,

therefore, it should at any time happen, that they should be

endangered either by the weakness or neglect of any one of those

powers, the rest are to exert their right, and endeavour their

preservation and security; nor is there any new stipulation or law

necessary for this; since, with respect to the confederates, it is

implied in the original stipulation, and with regard to the senate of

Britain, in the approbation which was bestowed upon that contract,

when it was made.

The time, my lords, in which this common right is to be exerted, is

now arrived; the queen of Hungary, invaded in her hereditary

dominions, and pressed on every side by a general combination of

almost all the surrounding princes, declares herself no longer able to

support the garrisons of the barrier, and informs us, that she intends

to recall her troops for the defence of their own country. What, then,

is more apparent, my lords, than that either these towns must fall

again into the hands of the French, and that we shall be obliged to

recover them, if they can ever be recovered, at the expense of another

ten years' war, or that either we or the Dutch must send troops to

supply the place of those which the necessities of their sovereign

oblige her to withdraw.

That the towns of Flanders should be resigned gratuitously to France,

that the enemies of mankind should be put in possession of the

strongest bulwarks in the world, surrounded by fields and pastures

able to maintain their garrisons without expense, will not be proposed

by any of this assembly. But it may easily and naturally be objected,

that the Dutch ought to garrison these towns, as more nearly

interested in their preservation, and more commodiously situated for

their defence; nor can it be, indeed, denied, that the Dutch may be

justly censured for their neglect, as they appear to leave the common

cause to our protection, and to prefer their commerce and their ease

to their own safety and the happiness of the world.

This, my lords, has been very warmly asserted in their own assemblies,

nor have there been wanting men of spirit and integrity amongst them

who have despised the gold and promises, and detected the artifices of

France; who have endeavoured by all the arts of argument and

persuasion to rouse their countrymen to remembrance of their former

danger, and to an inquiry into their real interest; who have advised

the levy of new forces, and the establishment of a new confederacy;

who have called upon the state to face danger while it is yet distant,

and to secure their own country by pouring their garrisons into the

towns and citadels by which their frontiers are protected. If their

arguments, however just, have not yet attained their end, it is to be

imputed to the constitution, embarrassed by the combination of

different interests, which must be reconciled, before any resolution

can be formed. A single town, my lords, can, by refusing its consent,

put a stand to the most necessary designs, and it is easily to be

imagined, that by a monarch equally crafty and rich, a single town may

sometimes be bribed into measures contrary to the publick interest.

But, my lords, the negligence of the Dutch is a motive which ought to

incite us to vigour and despatch; since it is not for the sake of the

Dutch but ourselves, that we desire the suppression of France. If the

Dutch are at length convinced of the ease of slavery, and think

liberty no longer worth the labour of preserving it,--if they are

tired with the task of labouring for the happiness of others, and have

forsaken the stand on which they were placed, as the general watch of

the world, to indulge themselves in tranquillity and slumber,--let not

us, my lords, give way to the same infatuation; let not us look with

neglect on the deluge that rolls towards us till it has advanced too

far to be resisted. Let us remember, that we are to owe our

preservation only to ourselves, and redouble our efforts in proportion

as others neglect their duty. Let us show mankind, that we are neither

afraid to stand up alone in defence of justice and of freedom, nor

unable to maintain the cause that we have undertaken to assert.

But if it should be thought by any of this noble assembly, that the

concurrence of the Dutch is absolutely necessary to a prospect of

success, it may be reasonably answered, that by engaging in measures

which can leave no doubt of either our power or our sincerity, the

concurrence of the Dutch is most likely to be obtained. By this method

of proceeding, my lords, was formed the last mighty confederacy by

which the house of Bourbon was almost shaken into ruins. The Dutch

then, as now, were slow in their determinations, and perhaps equally

diffident of their own strength and our firmness; nor did they agree

to declare war against France, till we had transported ten thousand

men into Flanders, and convinced them that we were not inviting them

to a mock alliance; but that we really intended the reduction of that

empire which had so long extended itself without interruption, and

threatened in a short time to swallow up all the western nations.

Thus, my lords, it appears, that the measures which have been pursued

are just, politick, and legal; that they have been prescribed by the

decrees of former senates, and therefore cannot be censured as

arbitrary; and that they have a tendency to the preservation of those

territories which it was once thought so much honour to acquire: and

it may be yet farther urged, that though they are to be considered

only as the first tendencies to secure greater designs, they have

already produced effects apparently to the advantage of the common

cause, and have obliged the French to desist from their pursuit of the

queen of Hungary, and rather to inquire how they shall return home

than how they shall proceed to farther conquests.

In condemnation of these measures, my lords, it has indeed been urged,

that a moderate conduct is always eligible; and that nothing but ruin

and confusion can be expected from precipitation and temerity.

Moderation, my lords, is a very captivating sound; but I hope it will

have now no influence on this assembly; because on this occasion it

cannot properly be employed. I have always been taught, that

moderation is only useful in forming determinations or designs, but

that when once conviction is attained, zeal is to take place; and when

a design is planned, it ought to be executed with vigour.

The question is not now, my lords, whether we shall support the queen

of Hungary, but in what manner she shall be supported; and, therefore,

it cannot be doubted, but that such support should be granted her as

may be effectual; and I believe it will not be thought, that we can

assist her without exerting an uncommon degree of vigour, and showing,

that we consider ourselves as engaged in a cause which cannot be

abandoned without disgrace and ruin.

If the noble lord had, before he entered upon his encomium on

moderation, considered what effects could be promised from his

favourite virtue, he would have had no inclination to display his

eloquence upon it. By moderation, my lords, uninterrupted moderation

of more than twenty years, have we become the scorn of mankind, and

exposed ourselves to the insults of almost every nation in the world.

By moderation have we betrayed our allies, and suffered our friendship

to lose all its value; by moderation have we given up commerce to the

rapacity of an enemy, formidable only for his perseverance, and

suffered our merchants to be ruined, and our sailors to be enslaved.

By moderation have we permitted the French to grasp again at general

dominion, to overrun Germany with their armies, and to endanger again

the liberties of mankind; and by continuing, for a very few years, the

same laudable moderation, we shall probably encourage them to shut up

our ships in our harbour, and demand a tribute for the use of the

Channel.

I need not observe to your lordships, that all the great actions that

have, in all ages, been achieved, have been the effects of resolution,

diligence, and daring activity, virtues wholly opposite to the

calmness of moderation. I need not observe, that the advantages

enjoyed at present by the French are the consequences of that vigour

and expedition, by which they are distinguished, and which the form of

their government enables them to exert. Had they, my lords, instead of

pouring armies into the Austrian dominions, and procuring, by the

terrour of their troops, the election of an emperour, pursued these

measures of moderation which have been so pathetically recommended,

how easily had their designs been defeated?

Had they lost time in persuading the queen of Hungary by a solemn

embassy to resign her dominions, or attempted to influence the diet by

amicable negotiations, armies had been levied, and the passes of

Germany had been shut against them; they had been opposed on the

frontiers of their own dominions, by troops equally numerous and

warlike with their own, and instead of imposing a sovereign on the

empire, had been, perhaps, pursued into their own country.

But, my lords, whether moderation was not recommended to them by such

powerful oratory as your lordships have heard, or whether its

advocates met with an audience not easily to be convinced, it is plain

that they seem to have acted upon very different principles, and I

wish their policy had not been so strongly justified by its success.

By sending an army into Germany, my lords, when there were no forces

ready to oppose them, they reduced all the petty princes to immediate

submission, and obliged those to welcome them as friends, who would

gladly have united against them as the inveterate enemies of the whole

German body; and who, had they been firmly joined by their neighbours,

under a general sense of their common danger, would have easily raised

an army able to have repelled them.

This, my lords, was the effect of vigour, an effect very different

from that which we had an opportunity of experiencing as the

consequence of moderation; it was to no purpose that we endeavoured to

alarm mankind by remonstrances, and to procure assistance by

entreaties and solicitations; the universal panick was not to be

removed by advice and exhortations, and the queen of Hungary must have

sunk under the weight of a general combination against her, had we not

at last risen up in her defence, and with our swords in our hands, set

an example to the nations of Europe, of courage and generosity.

It then quickly appeared, my lords, how little is to be expected from

cold persuasion, and how necessary it is, that he who would engage

others in a task of difficulty, should show himself willing to partake

the labour which he recommends. No sooner had we declared our

resolution to fulfil our stipulations, and ordered our troops to march

for the relief of the queen of Hungary, than other princes discovered

that they had the same dispositions, though they had hitherto thought

it prudent to conceal them; that they, equally with ourselves, hated

and feared the French; that they were desirous to repress their

insolence and oppose their conquests, and only waited for the motions

of some power who might stand at the head of the confederacy, and lead

them forwards against the common enemy. The liberal promises of

dominion made by the French, by which the sovereigns of Germany had

been tempted to concur in a design which they thought themselves

unable to oppose, were now no longer regarded; they were considered

only as the boasts of imaginary greatness, which would at last vanish

into air; and every one knew, that the ultimate design of Europe was

to oppress equally her enemies and friends; they wisely despised her

offers, and either desisted from the designs to which they had been

incited by her, or declared themselves ready to unite against her.

This, my lords, has been the consequence of assembling the army,

which, by the motion now under our consideration, some of your

lordships seem desirous to disband, an inclination of which I cannot

discover from whence it can arise.

For what, my lords, must be the consequence, if this motion should be

complied with? what but the total destruction of the whole system of

power which has been so laboriously formed and so strongly compacted?

what but the immediate ruin of the house of Austria, by which the

French ambition has been so long restrained? what but the subversion

of the liberties of Germany, and the erection of an universal empire,

to which all the nations of the earth must become vassals?

Should the auxiliary troops be disbanded, the queen of Hungary would

find what benefit she has received from them by the calamities which

the loss of them would immediately bring upon her. All the claims of

all the neighbouring princes, who are now awed into peace and silence,

would be revived, and every one would again believe, that nothing was

to be hoped or feared but from France. The French would again rush

forward to new invasions, and spread desolation over other countries,

and the house of Austria would be more weakened than by the loss of

many battles in its present state.

The support of the house of Austria appears not, indeed, much to

engage the attention of those by whom this motion is supported. It has

been represented as a house equally ambitious and perfidious with that

of Bourbon, and equally an enemy both to liberty and to true religion;

and a very celebrated author has been quoted to prove, that it is the

interest of the Germans themselves to see a prince at their head,

whose hereditary dominions may not incite him to exert the imperial

power to the disadvantage of the inferiour sovereigns.

In order to the consideration of these objections, it is necessary to

observe, my lords, that national alliances are not like leagues of

friendship, the consequences of an agreement of disposition, opinions,

and affections, but like associations of commerce, formed and

continued by no similitude of any thing but interest. It is not,

therefore, necessary to inquire what the house of Austria has deserved

from us or from mankind; because interest, not gratitude, engages us

to support it. It is useless to urge, that it is equally faithless and

cruel with the house of Bourbon, because the question is not whether

both shall be destroyed, but whether one should rage without control.

It is sufficient for us that their interest is opposite, and that

religion and liberty may be preserved by their mutual jealousy. And I

confess, my lords, that were the Austrians about to attain unlimited

power by the conquest or inheritance of France and Spain, it would be

no less proper to form confederacies against them.

The testimony which has been produced of the convenience of a weak

emperour, is to be considered, my lords, as the opinion of an author

whose birth and employment had tainted him with an inveterate hatred

of the house of Austria, and filled his imagination with an habitual

dread of the imperial power. He was born, my lords, in Sweden, a

country which had suffered much by a long war against the emperour; he

was a minister to the electors of Brandenburgh, who naturally looked

with envy on the superiority of Austria, and could not but wish to see

a weaker prince upon the imperial throne, that their own influence

might be greater; nor can we wonder, that a man thus born and thus

supported should adopt an opinion by which the pride of his master

would be flattered, and perhaps the interest of his own country

promoted.

It is likewise, my lords, to be remarked, that there was then no such

necessity for a powerful prince to stand at the head of the Germans,

and to defend them with his own forces till they could unite for their

own preservation. The power of France had not then arrived at its

present height, nor had their monarchs openly threatened to enslave

all the nations of Europe. The princes of the empire had then no

oppression to fear, but from the emperour; and it was no wonder, that

when he was their only enemy, they wished that his power was reduced.

How much the state of the continent is now changed, is not necessary

to mention, nor what alteration that change has introduced into the

politicks of all nations; those who formerly dreaded to be overwhelmed

by the imperial greatness, can now only hope to be secured by it from

the torrent of the power of France; and even those nations who have

formerly endeavoured the destruction of Austria, may now rejoice, that

they are sheltered by its interposition from tyrants more active and

more oppressive.

But, my lords, though it should be granted that the house of Austria

ought not to be supported, it will not, in my opinion, follow, that

this motion deserves our approbation; because it will reduce us to a

state of imbecility, and condemn us to stand as passive spectators of

the disturbances of the world, without power and without influence,

ready to admit the tyrant to whom chance shall allot us, and receive

those laws which the prevailing power shall vouchsafe to transmit.

Whether we ought to support the house of Austria, to prevent its utter

subversion, or restore it to its former greatness, whatever may be my

private opinion, I think it not on this occasion necessary to assert;

it is sufficient to induce us to reject this motion, that we ought to

be at least in a condition that may enable us to improve those

opportunities that may be offered, and to hinder the execution of any

design that may threaten immediate danger to our commerce or our

liberty.

Another popular topick, my lords, which has been echoed on the present

occasion, is the happiness of peace, and the blessing of uninterrupted

commerce and undisturbed security. We are perpetually told of the

hazards of war, whatever may be the superiority of our skill or

courage; of the certainty of the expenses, the bloodshed, and the

hardships, and doubtfulness of the advantages which we may hope from

them; and it is daily urged with great vehemence, that peace upon the

hardest conditions is preferable to the honour of conquests, and the

festivity of triumphs.

These maxims, my lords, which are generally true in the sense which

their authors intended, may be very properly urged against the wild

designs of ambition, and the romantick undertakings of wanton

greatness; but have no place in the present inquiry, which relates to

a war not made by caprice, but forced upon us by necessity; a war to

which all the encomiums on peace, must in reality incite, because

peace alone is the end intended to be obtained by it.

Of the necessity of peace to a trading nation it is not possible, my

lords, to be ignorant; and therefore no man can be imagined to propose

a state of war as eligible in itself. War, my lords, is, in my

opinion, only to be chosen, when peace can be no longer enjoyed, and

to be continued only till a peace secure and equitable can be

attained. In the present state of the world, my lords, we fight not

for laurels, nor conquests, but for existence. Should the arms of

France prevail, and prevail they must, unless we oppose them, the

Britons may, in a short time, no longer be a nation, our liberties

will be taken away, our constitution destroyed, our religion

persecuted, and perhaps our name abolished.

For the prevention of calamities like these, not for the preservation

of the house of Austria, it is necessary, my lords, to collect an

army; for by an army only can our liberties be preserved, and such a

peace obtained, as may be enjoyed without the imputation of supineness

and stupidity.

Of this the other house appears to be sufficiently convinced, and has

therefore granted money for the support of the auxiliary troops; nor

do I doubt but your lordships will concur with them, when you shall

fully consider the motives upon which they may be supposed to have

proceeded, and reflect, that by dismissing these troops, we shall

sacrifice to the ambition of the French, the house of Austria, the

liberties of Europe, our own happiness, and that of our posterity; and

that, by resolving to exert our forces for a short time, we may place

the happiness of mankind beyond the reach of attacks and violation.

Lord CARTERET replied to the following effect:--My lords, the

considerations which were laid before you by the noble lords who made

and seconded the motion, are so important in themselves, and have been

urged with so much force and judgment, that I shall not endeavour to

add any new arguments; since, where those fail which have been already

offered, it is not likely that any will be effectual: but I shall

endeavour to preserve them in their full force by removing the

objections which have been made to them.

The first consideration that claims our attention is the reverence due

to the senate, to the great council of the nation, which ought always

to be consulted when any important design is formed, or any new

measures adopted; especially if they are such as cannot be defeated by

being made publick, and such as an uncommon degree of expense is

necessary to support.

These principles, my lords, which I suppose no man will contest, have

been so little regarded by the ministry on the present occasion, that

they seem to have endeavoured to discover, by a bold experiment, to

what degree of servility senates may be reduced, and what insults they

will be taught to bear without resentment; for they have, without the

least previous hint of their design, made a contract for a very

numerous body of mercenaries, nor did they condescend to inform the

senate, till they asked for money to pay them.

To execute measures first, and then to require the approbation of the

senate, instead of advice, is surely such a degree of contempt as has

not often been shown in the most arbitrary reigns, and such as would

once have provoked such indignation in the other house, that there

would have been no need in this of a motion like the present.

But, my lords, in proportion as the other house seems inclined to pay

an implicit submission to the dictates of the ministry, it is our duty

to increase our vigilance, and to convince our fellow-subjects, by a

steady opposition to all encroachments, that we are not, as we have

been sometimes styled, an useless assembly, but the last resort of

liberty, and the chief support of the constitution.

The present design of those, who have thus dared to trample upon our

privileges, appears to be nothing less than that of reducing the

senates of Britain to the same abject slavery with those of France; to

show the people that we are to be considered only as their agents, to

raise the supplies which they shall be pleased, under whatever

pretences, to demand, and to register such determinations as they

shall condescend to lay before us.

This invasion of our rights, my lords, is too flagrant to be borne,

though were the measures which we are thus tyrannically, required to

support, really conducive in themselves to the interest of Britain,

which, indeed, might reasonably have been expected; for what head can

be imagined so ill formed for politicks as not to know, that the first

acts of arbitrary power ought to be in themselves popular, that the

advantage of the effect may be a balance to the means by which it is

produced.

But these wonderful politicians, my lords, have heaped one blunder

upon another; they have disgusted the nation both by the means and the

end; and have insulted the senate with no other view than that of

plundering the people. They have ventured, without the consent of the

senate, to pursue measures, of which it is obvious that they were

only kept secret because they easily foresaw that they would not be

approved.

For that the hire of mercenaries from Hanover, my lords, would have

been rejected with general indignation; that the proposal would have

produced hisses rather than censures; and that the arguments which

have been hitherto used to support it, would, if personal regards did

not make them of some importance, produce laughter oftener than

replies, cannot surely be doubted.

It has been said in vindication of this wise scheme, that no other

troops could be obtained but those of Hanover; an assertion which I

hope I may be allowed to examine, because it is yet a bare assertion

without argument, and against probability; since it is generally

known, how willingly the princes of Germany have on all former

occasions sent out their subjects to destruction, that they might fill

their coffers with their pay; nor do I doubt, but that there is now in

the same country the usual superabundance of men, and the usual

scarcity of money. I make no question, my lords, that many a German

prince would gladly furnish us with men as a very cheap commodity, and

think himself sufficiently rewarded by a small subsidy. There could be

no objection to these troops from the constitution of the empire,

which is not of equal force against the forces of Hanover; nor do I

know why they should not rather have been employed, if they could have

been obtained at a cheaper price.

The absurdity of paying levy-money for troops regularly kept up, and

of hiring them at a higher rate than was ever paid for auxiliaries

before, has been so strongly urged, and so fully explained, that no

reply has been attempted by those who have hitherto opposed the

motion; having rather endeavoured to divert our attention to foreign

considerations, than to vindicate this part of the contract, which is,

indeed, too shameful to be palliated, and too gross to be overlooked.

It is, however, proper to repeat, my lords, that though it cannot be

confuted, it may be forgotten in the multitude of other objects, that

this nation, after having exalted the elector of Hanover from a state

of obscurity to the crown, is condemned to hire the troops of Hanover

to fight their own cause, to hire them at a rate which was never

demanded for them before, and to pay levy-money for them, though it is

known to all Europe, that they were not raised on this occasion.

Nor is this the only hardship or folly of this contract; for we are to

pay them a month before they march into our service; we are to pay

those for doing nothing, of whom it might have been, without any

unreasonable expectations, hoped, that they would have exerted their

utmost force without pay.

For it is apparent, my lords, that if the designs of France be such as

the noble lords who oppose the motion represent them, Hanover is much

nearer to danger than Britain; and, therefore, they only fight for

their own preservation; since, though they have for a single year been

blessed with a neutrality, it cannot be imagined, that the same favour

will be always granted them, or that the French, when they have

overrun all the rest of Germany, will not annex Hanover to their other

dominions.

Besides, my lords, it is well known, that Hanover is equally engaged

by treaty with Britain to maintain the Pragmatick sanction, and that a

certain proportion of troops are to be furnished. But, my lords, as to

the march of that body of forces, I have yet heard no account. Will

any lord say that they have marched? I, therefore, suppose, that the

wisdom and justice of our ministers has comprehended them in the

sixteen thousand who are to fatten upon British pay, and that Hanover

will support the Pragmatick sanction at the cost of this inexhaustible

nation.

The service which those troops have already done to the common cause,

has been urged with great pomp of exaggeration, of which what effect

it may have had upon others, I am not able to say; for my part, I am

convinced, that the great happiness of this kingdom is the security of

the established succession; and am, therefore, always of opinion, that

no measures can serve the common cause, the cause of liberty, or of

religion, or of general happiness, by which the royal family loses the

affections of the people. And I can with great confidence affirm, that

no attempt for many years has raised a greater heat of resentment, or

excited louder clamours of indignation, than the hire of Hanoverian

troops; nor is this discontent raised only by artful misrepresentations,

formed to inflame the passions, and perplex the understanding; it is a

settled and rational dislike, which every day contributes to confirm,

which will make all the measures of the government suspected, and may

in time, if not obviated, break out in sedition.

A jealousy of Hanover has, indeed, for a long time prevailed in the

nation. The frequent visits of our kings to their electoral dominions,

contrary to the original terms on which this crown was conferred upon

them, have inclined the people of Britain to suspect, that they have

only the second place in the affection of their sovereign; nor has

this suspicion been made less by the large accessions made to those

dominions by purchases, which the electors never appeared able to make

before their exaltation to the throne of Britain, and by some measures

which have been apparently taken only to aggrandize Hanover at the

expense of Britain.

These measures, my lords, I am very far from imputing to our sovereign

or his father; the wisdom of both is so well known, that they cannot

be imagined to have incurred, either by contempt or negligence, the

disaffection of their subjects. Those, my lords, are only to be

blamed, who concealed from them the sentiments of the nation, and for

the sake of promoting their own interest, betrayed them, by the most

detestable and pernicious flattery, into measures which could produce

no other effect than that of making their reign unquiet, and of

exasperating those who had concurred with the warmest zeal in

supporting them on the throne.

It is not without an uncommon degree of grief, that I hear it urged in

defence of this contract, that it was approved by a very numerous

council; for what can produce more sorrow in an honest and a loyal

breast, than to find that our sovereign is surrounded by counsellors,

who either do not know the desires and opinions of the people, or do

not regard them; who are either so negligent as not to examine how the

affections of the nation may be best preserved, or so rash as to

pursue those schemes by which they hope to gratify the king at

whatever hazard, and who for the sake of flattering him for a day,

will risk the safety of his government, and the repose of his life.

It has, with regard to these troops, been asked by the noble lord who

spoke last, what is the intent of this motion but to disband them?

What else, indeed, can be intended by it, and what intention can be

more worthy of this august assembly? By a steady pursuit of this

intention, my lords, we shall regain the esteem of the nation, which

this daring invasion of our privileges may be easily supposed to have

impaired. We shall give our sovereign an opportunity, by a gracious

condescension to our desires, to recover those affections of which the

pernicious advice of flatterers has deprived him; we shall obviate a

precedent which threatens destruction to our liberties, and shall set

the nation free from an universal alarm. Nor in our present state is

it to be mentioned as a trifling consideration, that we shall hinder

the wealth of the nation from being ravished from our merchants, our

farmers, and our manufacturers, to be squandered upon foreigners, and

foreigners from whom we can hope for no advantage.

But it may be asked, my lords, how the great cause of liberty is to be

supported, how the house of Austria is to be preserved from ruin, and

how the ambition of France is to be repressed? How all this is to be

effected, my lords, I am very far from conceiving myself qualified to

determine; but surely it will be very little hindered by the

dismission of troops, whose allegiance obliges them not to fight

against the emperour, and of whom, therefore, it does not easily

appear how they can be very useful allies to the queen of Hungary.

But whatever service is expected from them, it may surely, my lords,

be performed by the same number of British troops; and that number may

be sent to supply their place, without either delay or difficulty; I

will venture to say, without any hazard. If it be objected, as it has

often been, that by sending out our troops, we shall leave our country

naked to invasion, I hope I may be allowed to ask, who will invade us?

The French are well known to be the only people whom we can suspect of

any such design. They have no fleet on this side of their kingdom, and

their ships in the Mediterranean are blocked up in the harbour by the

navies of Britain. We shall still have at home a body of seven

thousand men, which was thought a sufficient security in the late war,

when the French had a fleet equal to our own. Why we should now be in

more danger from without, I cannot discover; and with regard to

intestine commotions, they will be prevented by compliance with the

present motion. For nothing can incite the people of Britain to oppose

those who have openly dismissed the troops of Hanover.

But, my lords, I am not yet at all convinced, that the end for which

those troops are said to be hired, ought to be pursued, or can be

attained by us; and if the end be in itself improper or impossible, it

certainly follows, that the means ought to be laid aside.

If we consider the present state of the continent, we shall find no

prospect by which we can be encouraged to hazard our forces or our

money. The king of Sardinia has, indeed, declared for us, and opposed

the passage of the Spaniards; but he appears either to be deficient in

courage, or in prudence, or in force; for instead of giving battle on

his frontiers, he has suffered them, with very little resistance, to

invade his territories, to plunder and insult his subjects, and to

live at his expense; and it may be suspected, that if he cannot drive

them out of his country, he will in time be content to purchase their

departure, by granting them a passage through it, and rather give up

the dominions of his ally to be ravaged, than preserve them at the

expense of his own.

If we turn our eyes towards the Dutch, we shall not be more encouraged

to engage in the wars on the continent; for whatever has been asserted

of their readiness to proceed in conjunction with us, they appear

hitherto to behold, with the most supine tranquillity, the subversion

of the German system, and to be satisfied with an undisturbed

enjoyment of their riches and their trade. Nor is there any

appearance, my lords, that their concurrence is withheld only by a

single town, as has been insinuated; for the vote of any single town,

except Amsterdam, may be overruled, and the resolution has passed the

necessary form, when it is opposed by only one voice.

If we take a view, my lords, of their late conduct, without suffering

our desires to mislead our understandings, we shall find no reason for

imagining, that they propose any sudden alteration of their conduct,

which has been hitherto consistent and steady, and appears to arise

from established principles, which nothing has lately happened to

incline them to forsake.

When they were solicited to become, like us, the guarantees of

Hanover, they made no scruple of returning, with whatever

unpoliteness, an absolute refusal; nor could they be prevailed upon to

grant, what we appear to think that we were honoured in being admitted

to bestow. When they were called upon to fulfil their stipulation, and

support the Pragmatick sanction, they evaded their own contract, till

all assistance would have been too late, had not a lucky discovery of

the French perfidy separated the king of Prussia from them; and what

reason, my lords, can be given, why they should now do what they

refused, when it might have been much more safely and more easily

effected? Did they suffer the queen of Hungary to be oppressed, only

to show their own power and affluence by relieving her? or can it be

imagined, that pity has prevailed over policy or cowardice? They, who

in contempt of their own treaties refused to engage in a cause while

it was yet doubtful, will certainly think themselves justified in

abandoning it when it is lost, and will urge, that no treaty can

oblige them to act like madmen, or to undertake impossibilities.

I am, therefore, convinced, my lords, that they will not enter into an

offensive treaty, and that they have only engaged to do what their own

interest required from them, without any new stipulation, to preserve

their own country from invasion by sending garrisons into the frontier

towns, which they may do without any offence to France, or any

interruption of their own tranquillity.

Many other treaties have been mentioned, my lords, and mentioned with

great ostentation, as the effects of consummate policy, which will, I

suspect, appear to be at least only defensive treaties, by which the

contracting powers promise little more than to take care of

themselves.

In this state of the world, my lords, when all the powers of the

continent appear benumbed by a lethargy, or shackled by a panick, to

what purpose should we lavish, in hiring and transporting troops, that

wealth which contests of nearer importance immediately require?

It is well known to our merchants, whose ships are every day seized by

privateers, that we are at war with Spain, and that our commerce is

every day impaired by the depredations of an enemy, whom only our own

negligence enables to resist us; but I doubt, my lords, whether it is

known in Spain, that their monarch is at war with Britain, otherwise

than by the riches of our nation, which are distributed among their

privateers, and the prisoners who in the towns on the coast are

wandering in the streets. For I know no inconvenience which they can

be supposed to feel from our hostilities, nor in what part of the

world the war against them is carried on. Before the war was declared,

it is well remembered by whom, and with how great vehemence, it was

every day repeated, that to end the war with honour we ought to _take

and hold_. What, my lords, do we _hold_, or what have we _taken_? What

has the war produced in its whole course from one year to another, but

defeats, losses, and ignominy? And how shall we regain our honour, or

retrieve our wealth, by engaging in another war more dangerous but

less necessary? We ought surely to humble Spain, before we presume to

attack France; and we may attack France with better prospects of

success, when we have no other enemy to divert our attention, or

divide our forces.

That we ought, indeed, to make any attempt upon France, I am far from

being convinced, because I do not now discover, that any of the

motives subsist which engaged us in the last confederacy. The house of

Austria, though overborne and distressed, was then powerful in itself,

and possessed of the imperial crown. It is now reduced almost below

the hopes of recovery, and we are therefore now to restore what we

were then only to support. But what, my lords, is in my opinion much

more to be considered, the nation was then unanimous in one general

resolution to repress the insolence of France; no hardships were

insupportable that conduced to this great end, nor any taxes grievous

that were applied to the support of the war. The account of a victory

was esteemed as an equivalent to excises and to publick debts; and the

possessions of us and our posterity were cheerfully mortgaged to

purchase a triumph over the common enemy. But, my lords, the

disposition of the nation with regard to the present war is very

different. They discover no danger threatening them, they are neither

invaded in their possessions by the armies, nor interrupted in their

commerce by the fleets of France; and therefore they are not able to

find out why they must be sacrificed to an enemy, by whom they have

been long pursued with the most implacable hatred, for the sake of

attacking a power from which they have hitherto felt no injury, and

which they believe cannot be provoked without danger, nor opposed

without such a profusion of expense as the publick is at present not

able to bear.

It is not to be supposed, my lords, that the bulk of the British

people are affected with the distresses, or inflamed by the

magnanimity of the queen of Hungary. This illustrious daughter of

Austria, whose name has been so often echoed in these walls, and of

whom I am far from denying, that she deserves our admiration, our

compassion, and all the assistance which can be given her,

consistently with the regard due to the safety of our own country, is

to the greatest part of the people an imaginary princess, whose

sufferings or whose virtues make no other impression upon them, than

those which are recorded in fictitious narratives; nor can they easily

be persuaded to give up for her relief the produce of their lands, or

the profits of their commerce.

Some, indeed, there are, my lords, whose views are more extensive, and

whose sentiments are more exalted; for it is not to be supposed, that

either knowledge or generosity are confined to the senate or the

court: but these, my lords, though they perhaps may more readily

approve the end which the ministry pretends to pursue, are less

satisfied with the means by which they endeavour to attain it. By

these men it is easily discovered, that the hopes which some so

confidently express of prevailing upon the Dutch to unite with us for

the support of the Pragmatick sanction, are without foundation; they

see that their consent to place garrisons in the frontier towns,

however it may furnish a subject of exultation to those whose interest

it is to represent them as ready to concur with us, is only a new

proof of what was never doubted, their unvariable attention to their

own interest, since they must for their own security preserve their

own barrier from being seized by France. By this act they incur no new

expense, they provoke no enemies, nor give any assistance to the queen

of Hungary, by which they can raise either resentment in one part, or

gratitude in the other; and therefore it is not hard to perceive that,

whatever is pretended, the Dutch hitherto observe the most exact laws

of neutrality; and it is too evident, that if they refuse their

assistance, we have very little to hope from a war with France.

Nor is this the only objection against the present measures; for it is

generally, and not without sufficient reason suspected, that the real

assistance of the queen of Hungary is not intended, since the troops

which have been hired under that pretence, are such as cannot march

against the emperour. It is known, that the Hessians have absolutely

refused to infringe the constitution of the German body, by attacking

him who is by a legal grant acknowledged its head; nor is it easy to

conceive, why there should be a different law for Hanover than for the

other electorates.

The long stay of the troops in Flanders, a place where there is no

enemy to encounter, nor ally to assist, is a sufficient proof that

there is nothing more designed than that the troops of Hanover shall

loiter on the verge of war, and receive their pay for feasting in

their quarters, and showing their arms at a review; and that they in

reality design nothing but to return home with full pockets, and enjoy

the spoils of Britain.

There may, indeed, be another reason, my lords, which hinders the

progress of the united forces, and by which the Britons and

Hanoverians may be both affected, though not both in the same degree.

It is by no means unlikely, that the king of Prussia has forbidden

them to advance, and declared, that the king who was chosen by his

suffrage shall be supported by his arms; if this be his resolution, he

is well known to want neither spirit nor strength to avow and support

it; and there are reasons sufficient to convince us, that he has

declared it, and that our troops are now patiently waiting the event

of a negotiation by which we are endeavouring to persuade him to alter

his design, if, indeed, it be desired that he should alter it; for it

is not certain, that the elector of Hanover can desire the restoration

of the house of Austria to an hereditary enjoyment of the imperial

dignity; nor can it easily be shown why the politicks of one house,

should differ from those of all the other princes of the German

empire.

The other princes, my lords, have long wished for a king with whom

they might treat upon the level; a king who might owe his dignity only

to their votes, and who, therefore, would be willing to favour them in

gratitude for the benefit. They know, that the princes of the house of

Austria considered their advancement to the empire as the consequence

of their numerous forces and large dominions, and made use of their

exaltation only to tyrannise under the appearance of legal right, and

to oppress those as sovereigns, whom they would otherwise have

harassed as conquerors.

Before we can, therefore, hope for the concurrence of the princes of

the empire, we must inform them of our design, if any design has been

yet laid out. Is it your intention to restore the house of Austria to

the full enjoyment of its former greatness? This will certainly be

openly opposed by all those powers who are strong enough to make head

against it, and secretly obstructed by those, whose weakness makes

them afraid of publick declarations. Do you intend to support the

Pragmatick sanction? This can only be done by defeating the whole

power of France; and for this you must necessarily provide troops who

shall dare to act against the present king. So that it appears, my

lords, that we are attempting nothing, or attempting impossibilities;

that either we have no end in view, or that we have made use of an

absurd choice of means by which it cannot be attained.

Whatever be our design with regard to Germany, the war against Spain

is evidently neglected; and, indeed, one part of our conduct proves at

once, that we intend neither to assist the Austrians, nor to punish

the Spaniards; since we have in a great measure disabled ourselves

from either by the neutrality which captain Martin is said to have

granted, and by which we have allowed an asylum both to the troops of

Spain, which shall fly before the Austrians, and the privateers which

shall be chased by our ships in the Mediterranean.

I am, therefore, convinced, my lords, that our designs are not such as

they are represented, or that they will not be accomplished by the

measures taken. I am convinced in a particular manner, that the troops

of Hanover can be of no use, and that they will raise the resentment

of the nation, already overwhelmed with unnecessary burdens. I know,

likewise, that they have been taken into pay without the consent of

the senate, and am convinced, that if no other objection could be

raised, we ought not to ratify a treaty which the crown has made,

without laying it before us in the usual manner. I need not,

therefore, inform your lordships, that I think the motion now under

your consideration necessary and just; and that I hope, upon an

attentive examination of the reasons which have been offered, your

lordships will concur in it with that unanimity which evidence ought

to enforce, and that zeal which ought to be excited by publick danger.

To which the duke of NEWCASTLE made answer to the following

purport:--My lords, I know not by what imaginary appearances of

publick danger the noble lord is so much alarmed, nor what fears they

are which he endeavours with so much art and zeal to communicate to

this assembly. For my part, I can upon the most attentive survey of

our affairs, discover nothing to be feared but calumnies and

misrepresentations; and these I shall henceforward think more

formidable, since they have been able to impose upon an understanding

so penetrating as that of his lordship, and have prevailed upon him to

believe what is not only false, but without the appearance of truth,

and to believe it so firmly, as to assert it to your lordships.

One of the facts which he has thus implicitly received, and thus

publickly mentioned, is the neutrality supposed to have been granted

to the king of Sicily, from which he has amused himself and your

lordships with deducing very destructive consequences, that perhaps

need not to be allowed him, even upon supposition of the neutrality;

but which need not now be disputed, because no neutrality has been

granted. Captain Martin, when he treated with the king, very

cautiously declined any declarations of the intentions of the British

court on that particular, and confined himself to the subject of his

message, without giving any reason for hope, or despair of a

neutrality. So that if it shall be thought necessary, we are this hour

at liberty to declare war against the king of Sicily, and may pursue

the Spaniards with the same freedom on his coasts as on those of any

other power, and prohibit any assistance from being given by him to

their armies in Italy.

His lordship's notion of the interposition of the king of Prussia in

the king's favour, is another phantom raised by calumny to terrify

credulity; a phantom which will, I hope, be entirely dissipated, when

I have informed the house, that the whole suspicion is without

foundation, and that the king of Prussia has made no declaration of

any design to support the king, or of opposing us in the performance

of our treaties. This prince, my lords, however powerful, active, or

ambitious, appears to be satisfied with his acquisitions, and willing

to rest in an inoffensive neutrality.

Such, my lords, and so remote from truth are the representations which

the enemies of the government have with great zeal and industry

scattered over the nation, and by which they have endeavoured to

obviate those schemes which they would seem to favour; for by sinking

the nation to a despair of attaining those ends which they declare at

the same time necessary not only to our happiness, but to our

preservation, what do they less than tell us, that we must be content

to look unactive on the calamities that approach us, and prepare to be

crushed by that ruin which we cannot prevent?

From this cold dejection, my lords, arises that despair which so many

lords have expressed, of prevailing upon the Dutch to unite with us.

The determinations of that people are, indeed, always slow, and the

reason of their slowness has been already given; but I am informed,

that the general spirit which now reigns among them, is likely soon to

overrule the particular interests of single provinces, and can produce

letters by which it will appear, that had only one town opposed those

measures to which their concurrence is now solicited, it had been long

since overruled; for there want not among them men equally enamoured

of the magnanimity and firmness of the queen of Hungary, equally

zealous for the general good of mankind, equally zealous for the

liberties of Europe, and equally convinced of the perfidy, the

ambition, and the insolence of France, with any lord in this assembly.

These men, my lords, have long endeavoured to rouse their country from

the sloth of avarice, and the slumber of tranquillity, to a generous

and extensive regard for the universal happiness of mankind; and are

now labouring in the general assembly to communicate that ardour with

which they are themselves inflamed, and to excite that zeal for

publick faith, of which their superiour knowledge shows them the

necessity.