It has been, indeed, insinuated, that all their consultations tend

only to place garrisons in those towns from which the queen of Hungary

has withdrawn her forces; but this supposition, my lords, as it is

without any support from facts, is, likewise, without probability. For

to garrison the barrier towns requires no previous debates nor

deliberations; since it never was opposed even by those by whom the

assistance of the queen of Hungary has been most retarded. Nor have

even the deputies of Dort, whose obstinacy has been most remarkable,

denied the necessity of securing the confines of their country, by

possessing with their own troops those places which the Austrians are

obliged to forsake. Their present disputes, my lords, must be,

therefore, on some other question; and what question can be now before

them which can produce any difficulties, but that which regards the

support of the Pragmatick sanction?

If these deliberations should be so far influenced by the arrival of

the army in the pay of Britain, as to end in a resolution to send a

sufficient number of forces into Germany, it will not be denied, that

the troops which give occasion for this debate, have really been

useful to the common cause; nor will his majesty lose the affections

of any of his subjects, by the false accounts which have been spread

of an invidious preference given to the troops of Hanover.

That every government ought to endeavour to gain the esteem and

confidence of the people, I suppose we are all equally convinced; but

I, for my part, am very far from thinking that measures ought only to

be pursued or rejected, as they are immediately favoured or disliked

by the populace. For as they cannot know either the causes or the end

of publick transactions, they can judge only from fallacious

appearances, or the information of those whose interest it may perhaps

be to lead them away from the truth. That monarch will be most

certainly and most permanently popular, who steadily pursues the good

of his people, even in opposition to their own prejudices and

clamours; who disregards calumnies, which, though they may prevail for

a day, time will sufficiently confute, and slights objections which he

knows may be answered, and answered beyond reply.

Such, my lords, are the objections which have been hitherto raised

against the troops of Hanover, of which many arise from ignorance, and

many from prejudice; and some may be supposed to be made only for the

sake of giving way to invectives, and indulging a petulant inclination

of speaking contemptuously of Hanover.

With this view, my lords, it has been asked, why the Hanoverians are

preferred to all other nations? why they have been selected from all

other troops, to fight, against France, the cause of Europe? They were

chosen, my lords, because they were most easily to be procured. Of the

other nations from whom forces have usually been hired, some were

engaged in the care of protecting, or the design of extending their

own dominions, and others had no troops levied, nor could, therefore,

furnish them with speed enough for the exigence that demanded them.

It has been asked with an air of triumph, as a question to which no

answer could be given, why an equal number of Britons was not sent,

since their valour might be esteemed at least equal to that of

Hanoverians? I am far, my lords, from intending to diminish the

reputation of the British courage, or detract from that praise which

has been gained by such gallant enterprises, and preserved by a long

succession of dangers, and of victories; nor do I expect that any

nation will ever form a just claim to superiority. The reason,

therefore, my lords, for which the troops of Hanover were hired, was

not that the bravery of our countrymen was doubted, but that the

transportation of such numbers might leave us naked to the insults of

an enemy. For though the noble lord has declared, that after having

sent sixteen thousand into Flanders, we should still have reserved for

our defence a body of seven thousand, equal to that to which the

protection of this kingdom was intrusted in the late war, his opinion

will upon examination be found to have arisen only from the

enumeration of the names of our regiments, many of which are far from

being complete, and some almost merely nominal; so that, perhaps, if a

body of sixteen thousand more had been sent, there would not have

remained a single regiment to have repelled the crew of any daring

privateer that should have landed to burn our villages, and ravage the

defenceless country.

It was desired, my lords, by the queen of Hungary, that a British army

might appear on the continent in her favour, for she knew the

reputation and terrour of our arms; and as her demand was equitable in

itself, and honourable to the nation, it was complied with; and as

many of our native troops were sent, as it was thought convenient to

spare, the rest were necessarily to be hired; and it is the business

of those lords who defend the motion, to show from whence they could

be called more properly than from Hanover.

It has been urged with great warmth, that the contract made for these

troops has not been laid before the senate, a charge which the noble

lord who spoke last but one, has shown to be ill grounded; because the

former determinations of the senate enabled the crown to garrison the

frontier towns without any new deliberations, but which may be,

perhaps, more satisfactorily confuted by showing, that it is an

accusation of neglecting that which was in reality not possible to be

performed, or which at least could not be performed without subjecting

the government to imputations yet more dangerous than those which it

now suffers.

The accounts, my lords, by which the ministry were determined to send

the army into Flanders, arrived only fifteen days before the recess of

the senate; nor was the resolution formed, as it may easily be

imagined, till several days after; so that there was very little time

for senatorial deliberations, nor was it, perhaps, convenient to

publish at that time the whole scheme of our designs.

But let us suppose, my lords, that the senate had, a few days before

they rose, been consulted, and that a vote of credit had been required

to enable the crown to hire forces during the interval of the

sessions, what would those by whom this motion is supported have urged

against it? Would they not with great appearance of reason have

alleged the impropriety of such an application to the thin remains of

a senate, from which almost all those had retired, whom their

employments did not retain in the neighbourhood of the court? Would it

not have been echoed from one corner of these kingdoms to another,

that the ministry had betrayed their country by a contract which they

durst not lay before a full senate, and of which they would trust the

examination only to those whom they had hired to approve it. Would not

this have been generally asserted, and generally believed? Would not

those who distinguished themselves as the opponents of the court, have

urged, that the king ought to exert his prerogative, and trust the

equity of the senate for the approbation of his measures, and the

payment of the troops which he had retained for the support of the

common cause, the cause for which so much zeal had been expressed, and

for which it could not with justice be suspected, that any reasonable

demands would be denied? Would not the solicitation of a grant of

power without limits, to be exerted wholly at the discretion of the

ministry, be censured as a precedent of the utmost danger, which it

was the business of every man to oppose, who had not lost all regard

to the constitution of his country?

These insinuations, my lords, were foreseen and allowed by the

ministry to be specious, and, therefore, they determined to avoid them

by pursuing their schemes at their own hazard, without any other

security than the consciousness of the rectitude of their own designs;

and to trust to the equity of the senate when they should be laid

before them, at a time when part of their effects might be discovered,

and when, therefore, no false representations could be used to mislead

their judgment. They knew the zeal of the commons for the great cause

of universal liberty; they knew that their measures had no other

tendency than the promotion of that cause, and, therefore, they

confidently formed those expectations which have not deceived them,

that the pay of the troops would be readily granted, and ordered them,

therefore, to march; though if the commons had disapproved their plan,

they must have returned into their own country, or have been supported

at the expense of the electorate.

The objections raised against these troops, have apparently had no

influence in the other house, because supplies have been granted for

their pay; and I believe they will, upon examination, be found by your

lordships not to deserve much regard.

It is asserted, that they cannot act against the emperour, established

and acknowledged by the diet, without subjecting their country to an

interdict; and it was, therefore, suspected, that they would in

reality be of no use. This suspicion, my lords, I suppose, it is now

not necessary to censure, since you have heard from his majesty, that

they are preparing to march; and as the consequences of their conduct

can only affect the electorate, its propriety or legality with regard

to the constitution of the empire, falls not properly under our

consideration.

How his majesty's measures may be defended, even in this view, I

suppose I need not inform any of this assembly. It is well known, that

the emperour was chosen not by the free consent of the diet, in which

every elector voted according to his own sense, but by a diet in which

one vote of the empire was suspended without any regard to law or

justice, and in which the rest were extorted by a French army, which

threatened immediate ruin to him who should refuse his consent. The

emperour thus chosen, was likewise afterwards recognised by the same

powers, upon the same motives, and the aid was granted as the votes

were given by the influence of the armies of France.

For this reason, my lords, the queen of Hungary still refuses to give

the elector of Bavaria the style and honours which belong to the

imperial dignity; she considers the throne as still vacant, and

requires that it should be filled by an uninfluenced election.

It has been observed, my lords, that his majesty gave his vote to the

elector of Bavaria; and it has been, therefore, represented as an

inconsistency in his conduct, that he should make war against him.

But, my lords, it will by no means follow, that because he voted for

him he thinks him lawfully elected, nor that it is unjust to

dispossess him; though it is to be observed, that we are not making

war to dethrone the emperour, however elected, but to support the

Pragmatick sanction.

This observation, though somewhat foreign from the present debate, I

have thought it not improper to lay before your lordships, that no

scruples might remain in the most delicate and scrupulous, and to show

that the measures of his majesty cannot be justly charged with

inconsistency.

But this, my lords, is not the only, nor the greatest benefit which

the queen of Hungary has received from these troops; for it is highly

probable, that the states will be induced to concur in the common

cause, when they find that they are not incited to a mock confederacy,

when they perceive that we really intend to act vigorously, that we

decline neither expense nor danger, and that a compliance with our

demands will not expose them to stand alone and unassisted against the

power of France, elated by success, and exasperated by opposition.

If this, my lords, should be the consequence of our measures, and this

consequence is, perhaps, not far distant, it will no longer be, I

hope, asserted, that these mercenaries are an useless burden to the

nation, that they are of no advantage to the common cause, or that the

people have been betrayed by the ministry into expenses, merely that

Hanover might be enriched. When the grand _confederacy_ is once

revived, and revived by any universal conviction of the destructive

measures, the insatiable ambition, and the outrageous cruelty of the

French, what may not the friends of liberty presume to expect? May

they not hope, my lords, that those haughty troops which have been so

long employed in conquests and invasions, that have laid waste the

neighbouring countries with slaughters and devastations, will be soon

compelled to retire to their own frontiers, and be content to guard

the verge of their native provinces? May we not hope, that they will

soon be driven from their posts; that they will be forced to retreat

to a more defensible station, and admit the armies of their enemies

into their dominions; and that they will be pursued from fortress to

fortress, and from one intrenchment to another, till they shall be

reduced to petition for peace, and purchase it by the alienation of

part of their territories.

I hope, my lords, it may be yet safely asserted that the French,

however powerful, are not invincible; that their armies may be

destroyed, and their treasures exhausted; that they may, therefore, be

reduced to narrow limits, and disabled from being any longer the

disturbers of the peace of the universe.

It is well known, my lords, that their wealth is not the product of

their own country; that gold is not dug out of their mountains, or

rolled down their rivers; but that it is gained by an extensive and

successful commerce, carried on in many parts of the world, to the

diminution of our own. It is known, likewise, that trade cannot be

continued in war, without the protection of naval armaments; and that

our fleet is at present superiour in strength to those of the greatest

part of the universe united. It is, therefore, reasonably to be hoped,

that though by assisting the house of Austria we should provoke the

French to declare war against us, their hostilities would produce none

of those calamities which seem to be dreaded by part of this assembly;

and that such a confederacy might be formed as would be able to retort

all the machinations of France upon herself, as would tear her

provinces from her, and annex them to other sovereignties.

It has been urged, that no such success can be expected from the

conduct which we have lately pursued; that we, who are thus daring the

resentment of the most formidable power in the universe, have long

suffered ourselves to be insulted by an enemy of far inferiour force;

that we have been defeated in all our enterprises, and have at present

appeared to desist from any design of hostilities; that the Spaniards

scarcely perceive that they have an enemy, or feel, any of the

calamities or inconveniencies of war; and that they are every day

enriched with the plunder of Britain, without danger, and without

labour.

That the war against Spain has not hitherto been remarkably

successful, must be confessed; and though the Spaniards cannot boast

of any other advantages than the defence of their own dominions, yet

they may, perhaps, be somewhat elated, as they have been able to hold

out against an enemy superiour to themselves. But, my lords, I am far

from believing, that they consider the war against us as an advantage,

or that they do not lament it as one of the heaviest calamities that

could fall upon them. If it be asked, in what part of their dominions

they feel any effects of our hostility, I shall answer with great

confidence, that they feel them in every part which is exposed to the

evils of a naval war; that they are in pain wherever they are

sensible; that they are wounded wherever they are not sheltered from

our blows, by the interposition of the nations of the continent.

If we examine, my lords, the influence of our European armaments, we

shall find that their ships of war are shut up in the harbour of

France, and that the fleets of both nations are happily blocked up

together, so that they can neither extricate each other by concerted

motions, in which our attention might be distracted, and our force

divided, nor by their united force break through the bars by which

they are shut up from the use of the ocean.

But this, my lords, however important with respect to us, is perhaps

the smallest inconvenience which the Spaniards feel from our naval

superiority. They have an army, my lords, in Italy, exposed to all the

miseries of famine, while our fleet prohibits the transportation of

those provisions which have been stored in vessels for their supply,

and which must be probably soon made defenceless by the want of

ammunition, and fall into the hands of their enemies without the

honour of a battle.

But what to the pride of a Spaniard must be yet a more severe

affliction, they have on the same continent a natural confederate, who

is yet so intimidated by the British fleets, that he dares neither

afford them refuge in his dominions, nor send his troops to their

assistance. The queen, amidst all the schemes which her unbounded

ambition forms for the exaltation of her family, finds her own son,

after having received a kingdom from her kindness, restrained from

supporting her, and reduced to preserve those territories which she

has bestowed upon him, by abandoning her from whom he received them.

These, my lords, are the inconveniencies which the Spaniards feel from

our fleets in the Mediterranean; and even these, however embarrassing,

however depressing, are lighter than those which our American navy

produces. It is apparent, that money is equivalent to strength, a

proposition of which, if it could be doubted, the Spanish monarchy

would afford sufficient proof, as it has been for a long time

supported only by the power of riches. It is, therefore, impossible to

weaken Spain more speedily or more certainly, than by intercepting or

obstructing the annual supplies of gold and silver which she receives

from her American provinces, by which she was once enabled to threaten

slavery to all the neighbouring nations, and incited to begin, with

the subjection of this island, her mighty scheme of universal

monarchy, and by which she has still continued to exalt herself to an

equality with the most powerful nations, to erect new kingdoms, and

set at defiance the Austrian power.

These supplies, my lords, are now, if not wholly, yet in a great

measure, withheld; and by all the efforts which the Spaniards now

make, they are exhausting their vitals, and wasting the natural

strength of their native country. While they made war with

adventitious treasures, and only squandered one year what another

would repay them, it was not easy to foresee how long their pride

would incline them to hold out against superiour strength. While they

were only engaged in a naval war, they might have persisted for a long

time in a kind of passive obstinacy; and while they were engaged in no

foreign enterprises, might have supported that trade with each other

which is necessary for the support of life, upon the credit of those

treasures which are annually heaped up in their storehouses, though

they are not received; and by which, upon the termination of the war,

all their debts might at once be paid, and all their funds be

reestablished.

But at present, my lords, their condition is far different; they have

been tempted by the prospect of enlarging their dominions to raise

armies for distant expeditions, which must be supported in a foreign

country, and can be supported only by regular remittances of treasure,

and have formed these projects at a time when the means of pursuing

them are cut off. They have by one war increased their expenses, when

their receipts are obstructed by another.

In this state, my lords, I am certain the Spaniards are very far from

thinking the hostility of Britain merely nominal, and from inquiring

in what part of the world their enemies are to be found. The troops in

Italy see them sailing in triumph over the Mediterranean, intercepting

their provisions, and prohibiting those succours which they expected

from their confederate of Sicily. In Spain their taxes and their

poverty, poverty which every day increases, inform them that the seas

of America are possessed by the fleets of Britain, by whom their mines

are made useless, and their wealthy dominions reduced to an empty

sound. They may, indeed, comfort themselves in their distresses with

the advantages which their troops have gained over the king of

Sardinia, and with the entrance which they have forced into his

dominions; but this can afford them no long satisfaction, since they

will, probably, never be able to break through the passes at which

they have arrived, or to force their way into Italy; and must perish

at the feet of inaccessible rocks, where they are now supported at

such an expense that they are more burdensome to their own master than

to the king of Sardinia.

Of this prince, I know not why, it has been asserted that he will

probably violate his engagements to Britain and Austria; that he will

purchase peace by perfidy, and grant a passage to the army of Spain.

His conduct has certainly given, hitherto, no reason for such an

imputation; he has opposed them with fortitude, and vigour, and

address; nor has he failed in any of the duties required of a general

or an ally; he has exposed his person to the most urgent dangers, and

his dominions to the ravages of war; he has rejected all the

solicitations of France, and set her menaces at defiance; and surely,

my lords, if no private man ought to be censured without just reason,

even in familiar discourse, we ought still to be more cautious of

injuring the reputation of princes by publick reproaches in the solemn

debates of national assemblies.

The same licentiousness of speech has not, indeed, been extended to

all the princes mentioned in this debate. The emperour has been

treated with remarkable decency as the lawful sovereign of Germany, as

one who cannot be opposed without rebellion, and against whom we,

therefore, cannot expect that the troops of Hanover should presume to

act, since they must expose their country to the severities of the

imperial interdict.

The noble lords who have thus ardently asserted the rights of the

emperour, who have represented in such strong language the crime of

violating the German constitutions, and have commended the neutrality

of the king of Prussia, as proper to be imitated by all the rest of

the princes 'of the empire, have forgotten, or hoped that others Would

forget, the injustice and violence by which he exalted himself to the

throne, from which they appear to think it a sacrilegious attempt to

endeavour to thrust him down. They forget that one of the votes was

illegally suspended, and that the rest were extorted by the terrour of

an army. They forget that he invited the French into the empire, and

that he is guilty of all the ravages which have been committed and all

the blood that has been shed, since the death of the emperour, in the

defence of the Pragmatick sanction which he invaded, though ratified

by the solemn consent of the imperial diet.

In defence of the Pragmatick sanction, my lords, which all the princes

of the empire, except his majesty, saw violated without concern, are

we now required to exert our force; we are required only to perform

what we promised by the most solemn treaties, which, though they have

been broken by the cowardice or ambition of other powers, it will be

our greatest honour to observe with exemplary fidelity.

With this view, as your lordships have already been informed, the

Hanoverian troops will march into the empire; nor has their march been

hitherto delayed, either because there was yet no regular scheme

projected, or because they were obliged to wait for the permission of

the king of Prussia, or because they intended only to amuse Europe

with an empty show: they were detained, my lords, in Flanders, because

it was believed that they were more useful there than they would be in

any other place, because they at once encouraged the states, alarmed

the French, defended the Low Countries, and kept the communication

open between the queen's dominions and those of her allies. Nor were

these advantages, my lords, chimerical, and such as are only suggested

by a warm imagination; for it is evident that by keeping their station

in those countries they have changed the state of the war, that they

have protected the queen of Hungary from being oppressed by a new army

of French, and given her an opportunity of establishing herself in the

possession of Bavaria; that the French forces, instead of being sent

either to the assistance of the king of Spain against the king of

Sardinia, or of the emperour, for the recovery of those dominions

which he has lost by an implicit confidence in their alliance, have

been necessarily drawn down to the opposite extremity of their

dominions, where they are of no use either to their own country, or to

their confederates. The united troops of Britain and Hanover,

therefore, carried on the war, by living at ease in their quarters in

Flanders, more efficaciously than if they had marched immediately into

Bavaria or Bohemia.

Thus, my lords, I have endeavoured to show the justice of our designs,

and the usefulness of the measures by which we have endeavoured to

execute them; and doubt not but your lordships will, upon considering

the arguments which have been urged on either side, and those which

your own reflections will suggest, allow that it was not only just but

necessary to take into our pay the troops of Hanover, for the support

of the Pragmatick sanction, and the preservation of the house of

Austria; and that since the same reasons which induced the government

to hire them, still make it necessary to retain them, you will prefer

the general happiness of Europe, the observation of publick faith, and

the security of our own liberties and those of our posterity, to a

small alleviation of our present expenses, and unanimously reject a

motion, which has no other tendency than to resign the world into the

hands of the French, and purchase a short and dependant tranquillity

by the loss of all those blessings which make life desirable.

Lord LONSDALE spoke next to the following effect:--My lords,

notwithstanding the confidence with which the late measures of the

government have been defended by their authors, I am not yet set free

from the scruples which my own observations had raised, and which have

been strengthened by the assertions of those noble lords, who have

spoken in vindication of the motion.

Many of the objections which have been raised and enforced with all

the power of argument, have yet remained unanswered, or those answers

which have been offered are such as leave the argument in its full

strength. Many of the assertions which have been produced seem the

effects of hope rather than conviction, and we are rather told what we

are to hope from future measures, than what advantages we have

received from the past.

I am, indeed, one of those whom it will be difficult to convince of

the propriety of engaging in a new war, when we are unsuccessful in

that which we have already undertaken, and of provoking a more

powerful enemy, when all our attempts are baffled by a weaker; and

cannot yet set myself free from the apprehension of new defeats and

new disgraces from the arms of France, after having long seen how

little we are able to punish the insolence of Spain. I cannot but fear

that by an ill-timed and useless opposition to schemes which, however

destructive or unjust, we cannot obviate, we shall subject ourselves

to numberless calamities, that the ocean will be covered with new

fleets of privateers, that our commerce will be interrupted in every

part of the world, and that we shall only provoke France to seize what

she would at least have spared some time longer.

But, my lords, if it be granted, that the Pragmatick sanction is

obligatory to us, though it is violated by every other power; that we

should labour to reduce the powers of Europe to an equipoise, whenever

accident or folly produces any alteration of the balance; and that we

are now not to preserve the house of Austria from falling, but raise

it from the dust, and restore it to its ancient splendour, even at the

hazard of a war with that power which now gives laws to all the

western nations; yet it will not surely be asserted, that we ought to

be without limits, that we ought to preserve the house of Austria, not

only by the danger of our own country, but by its certain ruin, and

endeavour to avert the possibility of slavery, by subjecting ourselves

to miseries more severe than the utmost arrogance of conquest, or the

most cruel wantonness of tyranny, would inflict upon us.

I have observed, that many lords have expressed in this debate an

uncommon ardour for the support of the queen of Hungary; nor is it

without pleasure, that I see the most laudable of all motives, justice

and compassion, operate in this great assembly with so much force. May

your lordships always continue to stand the great advocates for

publick faith, and the patrons of true greatness in distress; may

magnanimity always gain your regard, and calamity find shelter under

your protection.

I, likewise, my lords, desire to be remembered among those who

reverence the virtues and pity the miseries of this illustrious

princess, who look with detestation on those who have invaded the

dominions which they had obliged themselves by solemn treaties to

defend, and who have taken advantage of the general confederacy

against her, to enrich themselves with her spoils, who have insulted

her distress and aggravated her misfortunes.

But, my lords, while I feel all these sentiments of compassion for the

queen of Hungary, I have not yet been able to forget, that my own

country claims a nearer regard; that I am obliged both by interest and

duty to preserve myself and my posterity, and my fellow-subjects, from

those miseries which I lament; when they happen to others, however

distant, I cannot but remember, that I am not to save another from

destruction by destroying myself, nor to rescue Austria by the ruin of

Britain.

Though I am, therefore, my lords, not unwilling to assist the queen of

Hungary, I think it necessary to fix the limits of our regard, to

inquire how far we may proceed with safety, and what expenses the

nation can bear, and how those expenses may be best employed. The

danger of the queen of Hungary ought not to have an effect which would

be reproachful, even if the danger was our own. It ought not so far to

engross our faculties as to hinder us from attending to every other

object. The man who runs into a greater evil to avoid a less,

evidently shows that he is defective either in prudence or in courage;

that either he wants the natural power of distinguishing, or that his

dread of an approaching, or his impatience of a present evil, has

taken it away.

Let us, therefore, examine, my lords, the measures with which those

who are intrusted with the administration of publick affairs, would

persuade us to concur, and inquire whether they are such as can be

approved by us without danger to our country. Let us consider, my

lords, yet more nearly, whether they are not such as we ourselves

could not be prevailed upon even to regard as the object of

deliberation, were we not dazzled on one part by glaring prospects of

triumphs and honours, of the reduction of France, and the rescue of

the world; of the propagation of liberty, and the defence of religion;

and intimidated on the other by the view of approaching calamities,

the cruelties of persecution, and the hardships of slavery.

All the arts of exaggeration, my lords, have been practised to

reconcile us to the measures which are now proposed, and, indeed, all

are necessary; for the expenses to which we are about to condemn this

nation, are such as it is not able to bear, and to which no lord in

this house would consent, were he calm enough to number the sums.

To prove the truth of this assertion, one question is necessary. Is

any lord in this assembly willing to assist the queen of Hungary at

the expense of sixteen hundred thousand a year? I think the universal

silence of this assembly is a sufficient proof, that no one is

willing; I will, however, repeat my question. Is any lord in this

assembly willing that this nation should assist the queen of Hungary

at the annual expense of sixteen hundred thousand pounds? The house

is, as I expected, still silent, and, therefore, I may now safely

proceed upon the supposition of an unanimous negative. Nor does any

thing remain in order to evince the impropriety of the measures which

we are about to pursue, but that every lord may reckon up the sum

required for the support of those troops. Let him take a view of our

military estimates, and he will quickly be convinced, how much we are

condemned to suffer in this cause. He will find, that we are about not

only to remit yearly into a foreign country more than a million and a

half of money, but to hazard the lives of multitudes of our

fellow-subjects, in a quarrel which at most affects us but remotely;

that we are about to incur as auxiliaries an expense greater than that

which the principals sustain.

The sum which I have mentioned, my lords, enormous as it may appear,

is by no means exaggerated beyond the truth. Whoever shall examine the

common military estimates, will easily be convinced, that the forces

which we now maintain upon the continent cannot be supported at less

expense; and that we are, therefore, about to exhaust our country in a

distant quarrel, and to lavish our blood and treasure with useless

profusion.

This profusion, my lords, is useless, at least useless to any other

end, than an ostentatious display of our forces, and our riches; not

because the balance of power is irrecoverably destroyed, not because

it is contrary to the natural interest of an island to engage in wars

on the continent, nor because we shall lose more by the diminution of

our commerce, than we shall gain by an annual victory. It is useless,

not because the power of France has by long negligence been suffered

to swell beyond all opposition, nor because the queen of Hungary ought

not to be assisted at the hazard of this kingdom, though all these

reasons are of importance enough to claim our consideration. It is

useless, my lords, because the queen of Hungary may be assisted more

powerfully, at less charge; because a third part of this sum will

enable her to raise, and to maintain, a greater body of men than have

now been sent her.

Nor will the troops which she may be thus enabled to raise, my lords,

be only more numerous, but more likely to prosecute the war with

ardour; and to conclude it, therefore, with success. They will fight

for the preservation of their own country, they will draw their swords

to defend their houses and their estates, their wives and their

children from the rage of tyrants and invaders; they will enter the

field as men who cannot leave it to their enemies, without resigning

all that makes life valuable; and who will, therefore, more willingly

die than turn their backs.

It may reasonably be imagined, my lords, that the queen will place

more confidence in such forces, than in troops which are to fight only

for honour or for pay; and that she will expect from the affection of

her own subjects, a degree of zeal and constancy which she cannot hope

to excite in foreigners; and that she will think herself more secure

in the protection of those whose fidelity she may secure by the

solemnity of an oath, than those who have no particular regard for her

person, nor any obligations to support her government.

It is no inconsiderable motive to this method of assisting our ally,

that we shall entirely take away from France all pretences of

hostilities or resentment, since we shall not attack her troops or

invade her frontiers, but only furnish the queen of Hungary with

money, without directing her how to apply it. I am far, my lords, from

being so much intimidated by the late increase of the French

greatness, as to imagine, that no limits can be set to their ambition.

I am far from despairing, that the queen of Hungary alone, supported

by us with pecuniary assistance, may be able to reduce them to

solicitations for peace by driving them out of her dominions, and

pursuing them into their own. But as the chance of war is always

uncertain, it is surely most prudent to choose such a conduct as may

exempt us from danger in all events; and since we are not certain of

conquering the French, it is, in my opinion, most eligible not to

provoke them, because we cannot be conquered without ruin.

This method is yet eligible on another account; by proceeding with

frugality, we shall gain time to observe the progress of the war, and

watch the appearance of any favourable opportunity, without exhausting

ourselves so far as to be made unable to improve them.

The time, my lords, at which we shall be thus exhausted, at which we

shall be reduced to an absolute inability to raise an army or equip a

fleet, is not at a great distance. If our late profusion be for a

short time continued, we shall quickly have drained the last remains

of the wealth of our country. We have long gone on from year to year,

raising taxes and contracting debts; and unless the riches of Britain

are absolutely unlimited, must in a short time reduce them to nothing.

Our expenses are not all, indeed, equally destructive; some, though

the method of raising them be vexatious and oppressive, do not much

impoverish the nation, because they are refunded by the extravagance

and luxury of those who are retained in the pay of the court; but

foreign wars threaten immediate destruction, since the money that is

spent in distant countries can never fall back into its former

channels, but is dissipated on the continent, and irrecoverably lost.

When this consideration is present to my mind, and, on this occasion,

no man who has any regard for himself or his posterity can omit it, I

cannot but think with horrour on a vote by which such prodigious sums

are wafted into another region: I cannot but tremble at the sound of a

tax for the support of a foreign war, and think a French army landed

on our coasts not much more to be dreaded than the annual payment to

which we appear now to be condemned, and from which nothing can

preserve us but the address which is now proposed.

By what arguments the commons were persuaded, or by what motives

incited to vote a supply for the support of this mercenary force, I

have not yet heard; nor, as a member of this house, my lords, was it

necessary for me to inquire. Their authority, though mentioned with so

much solemnity on this occasion, is to have no influence on our

determinations. If they are mistaken, it is more necessary for us to

inquire with uncommon caution. If they are corrupt, it is more

necessary for us to preserve our integrity. If we are to comply

blindly with their decisions, our knowledge and experience are of no

benefit to our country, we only waste time in useless solemnities, and

may be once more declared useless to the publick.

The commons, my lords, do not imagine themselves, nor are imagined by

the nation, to constitute the legislature. The people, when any

uncommon heat prevails in the other house, disturbs their debates, and

overrules their determinations, have been long accustomed to expect

redress and security from our calmer counsels; and have considered

this house as the place where reason and justice may be heard, when,

by clamour and uproar, they are driven from the other. On this

occasion, my lords, every Briton fixes his eye upon us, and every man

who has sagacity enough to discover the dismal approach of publick

poverty, now supplicates your lordships, by agreeing to this address,

to preserve him from it.

Then the SPEAKER spoke to the following purport:--My lords, having

very attentively observed the whole progress of this important debate,

and considered with the utmost impartiality the arguments which have

been made use of on each side, I cannot think the question before us

doubtful or difficult; and hope that I may promote a speedy decision

of it by recapitulating what has been already urged, that the debate

may be considered at one view, and by adding some observations which

have arisen to my own thoughts on this occasion.

At the first view of the question before us, in its present state, no

man can find any reasons for prejudice in favour of the address

proposed. This house is, indeed, yet divided, and many lords have

spoken on each side with great force and with great address; but the

authority of the other house, added to the numbers which have already

declared in this for the support of the foreign troops, is sufficient

to turn the balance, in the opinion of any man who contents himself to

judge by the first appearance of things; and must incline him to

imagine that position at least more probable, which is ratified by the

determination of one house, and yet undecided by the other.

I know, my lords, what may be objected to these observations on the

other house, and readily agree with the noble lord, that our

determinations ought not to be influenced by theirs. But on this

occasion, I introduce their decision not as the decrees of

legislators, but as the result of the consideration of wise men; and

in this sense it may be no less reasonable to quote the determination

of the commons, than to introduce the opinion of any private man whose

knowledge or experience give his opinion a claim to our regard.

Nor do I mention the weight of authority on one side as sufficient to

influence the private determination of any in this great assembly. It

is the privilege and the duty of every man, who possesses a seat in

the highest council of his country, to make use of his own eyes and

his own understanding, to reject those arguments of which he cannot

find the force, whatever effect they may have upon others, and to

discharge the great trust conferred upon him by consulting no

conscience but his own.

Yet, though we are by no means to suffer the determinations of other

men to repress our inquiries, we may certainly make use of them to

assist them; we may very properly, therefore, inquire the reasons that

induced the other house to approve those bills which are brought

before them, since it is not likely that their consent was obtained

without arguments, at least probable, though they are not to be by us

considered as conclusive upon their authority. The chief advantage

which the publick receives from a legislature formed of several

distinct powers, is, that all laws must pass through many

deliberations of assemblies independent on each other, of which, if

the one be agitated by faction or distracted by divisions, it may be

hoped that the other will be calm and united, and of which it can

hardly be feared that they can at any time concur in measures

apparently destructive to the commonwealth.

But these inquiries, my lords, however proper or necessary, are to be

made by us not in solemn assemblies but in our private characters; and

therefore I shall not now lay before your lordships what I have heard

from those whom I have consulted for the sake of obtaining information

on this important question, or shall at least not offer it as the

opinion of the commons, or pretend to add to it any influence

different from that of reason and truth.

The arguments which have been offered in this debate for the motion,

are, indeed, such as do not make any uncommon expedients necessary;

they will not drive the advocates for the late measures to seek a

refuge in authority instead of reason. They require, in my opinion,

only to be considered with a calm attention, and their force will

immediately be at an end.

The most plausible objection, my lords, is, that the measures to which

your approbation is now desired, were concerted and executed without

the concurrence of the senate; and it is, therefore, urged, that they

cannot now deserve our approbation, because it was not asked at the

proper time.

In order to answer this objection, my lords, it is necessary to

consider it more distinctly than those who made it appear to have

done, that we may not suffer ourselves to confound questions real and

personal, to mistake one object for another, or to be confounded by

different views.

That the consent of the senate was not asked, my lords, supposing it a

neglect, and a neglect of a criminal kind, of a tendency to weaken our

authority, and shake the foundations of our constitution, which is the

utmost that the most ardent imagination, or the most hyperbolical

rhetorick can utter or suggest, may be, indeed, a just reason for

invective against the ministers, but is of no force if urged against

the measures. To take auxiliaries into our pay may be right, though it

might be wrong to hire them without applying to the senate; as it is

proper to throw water upon a fire, though it was conveyed to the place

without the leave of those from whose well it was drawn, or over whose

ground it was carried.

If the liberties of Europe be really in danger, if our treaties oblige

us to assist the queen of Hungary against the invaders of her

dominions, if the ambition of France requires to be repressed, and the

powers of Germany to be animated against her by the certain prospect

of a vigorous support, I cannot discover the propriety of this motion,

even supposing that we have not found from the ministers all the

respect that we have a right to demand. As a lawful authority may do

wrong, so right may be sometimes done by an unlawful power; and

surely, though usurpation ought to be punished, the benefits which

have been procured by it, are not to be thrown away. We may retain the

troops that have been hired, if they are useful, though we should

censure the ministry for taking them into pay.

But the motion to which our concurrence is now required, is a motion

by which we are to punish ourselves for the crime of the ministers, by

which we are about to leave ourselves defenceless, because we have

been armed without our consent, and to resign up all our rights and

privileges to France, because we suspect that they have not been

sufficiently regarded on this occasion by our ministers.

Those noble lords who have dwelt with the greatest ardour on this

omission, have made no proposition for censuring those whom they

condemn as the authors of it, though this objection must terminate in

an inquiry into their conduct, and has no real relation to the true

question now before us, which is, whether the auxiliaries be of any

use? If they are useless, they ought to be discharged without any

other reason; if they are necessary, they ought to be retained,

whatever censure may fall upon the ministry.

I am, indeed, far from thinking, that when your lordships have

sufficiently examined the affair, you will think your privileges

invaded, or the publick trepanned by artifice into expensive measures;

since it will appear that the ministry in reality preferred the most

honest to the safest methods of proceeding, and chose rather to hazard

themselves, than to practice or appear to practice any fraud upon

their country.

When it was resolved in council to take the troops of Hanover into the

pay of Britain, a resolution which, as your lordships have already

been informed, was made only a few days before the senate rose, it was

natural to consider, whether the consent of the senate should not be

demanded; but when it appeared upon reflection, that to bring an

affair of so great importance before the last remnant of a house of

commons, after far the greater part had retired to the care of their

own affairs, would be suspected as fraudulent, and might give the

nation reason to fear, that such measures were intended as the

ministers were afraid of laying before a full senate. It was thought

more proper to defer the application to the next session, and to

venture upon the measures that were formed, upon a full conviction of

their necessity.

This conduct, my lords, was exactly conformable to the demands of

those by whom the court has hitherto been opposed, and who have

signalized themselves as the most watchful guardians of liberty. Among

these men, votes of credit have never been mentioned but with

detestation, as acts of implicit confidence, by which the riches of

the nation are thrown down at the feet of the ministry to be

squandered at pleasure. When it has been urged, that emergencies may

arise, during the recess of the senate, which may produce a necessity

of expenses, and that, therefore, some credit ought to be given which

may enable the crown to provide against accidents, it has been

answered, that the expenses which are incurred during the recess of

the senate, will be either necessary or not; that if they are

necessary, the ministry have no reason to distrust the approbation of

the senate, but if they are useless, they ought not to expect it. And

that, instead of desiring to be exempted from any subsequent censures,

and to be secured in exactions or prodigality by a previous vote, they

ought willingly to administer the publick affairs at their own hazard,

and await the judgment of the senate, when the time shall come, in

which their proceedings are laid before it.

Such have hitherto been the sentiments of the most zealous advocates

for the rights of the people; nor did I expect from any man who

desired to appear under that character, that he would censure the

ministry for having thrown themselves upon the judgment of the senate,

and neglected to secure themselves by any previous applications, for

having trusted in their own integrity, and exposed their conduct to an

open examination without subterfuges and without precautions. I did

not imagine, my lords, that a senate, upon whose decision all the

measures which have been taken, so apparently depend, would have been

styled a senate convened only to register the determinations of the

ministry; or that any of your lordships would think his privileges

diminished, because money was not demanded before the use of it was

fully known. If we lay aside, my lords, all inquiries into precedents,

and, without regard to any political considerations, examine this

affair only by the light of reason, it will surely appear that the

ministry could not, by any other method of proceeding, have shown

equal regard to the senate, or equal confidence in their justice and

their wisdom. Had they desired a vote of credit, it might have been

justly objected that they required to be trusted with the publick

money, without declaring, or being able to declare, how it was to be

employed; that either they questioned the wisdom or honesty of the

senate; and, therefore, durst undertake nothing till they were secure

of the supplies necessary for the execution of it. Had they informed

both houses of their whole scheme, they might have been still charged,

and charged with great appearance of justice, with having preferred

their own safety to that of the publick, and having rather discovered

their designs to the enemy, than trusted to the judgment of the

senate; nor could any excuse have been made for a conduct so contrary

to all the rules of war, but such as must have dis-honoured either the

ministers or the senate, such as must have implied either that the

measures intended were unworthy of approbation, or that they were by

no means certain, that even the best conduct would not be censured.

These objections they foresaw, and allowed to be valid; and,

therefore, generously determined to pursue the end which every man was

supposed to approve, by the best means which they could discover, and

to refer their conduct to a full senate, in which they did not doubt

but their integrity, and, perhaps, their success, would find them

vindicators. Instead of applying, therefore, to the remains of the

commons, a few days before the general recess; instead of assembling

their friends by private intimations, at a time when most of those

from whom they might have dreaded opposition, had retired, they

determined to attempt, at their own hazard, whatever they judged

necessary for the promotion of the common cause, and to refer their

measures to the senate, when it should be again assembled.

The manner in which one of the noble lords, who have spoken in support

of the address, has thought it necessary that they should have applied

to us, is, indeed, somewhat extraordinary, such as is certainly

without precedent, and such as is not very consistent with the

constituent rights of the different powers of the legislature. His

lordship has been pleased to remark, that the crown has entered into a

treaty, and to ask why that treaty was not previously laid before the

senate for its approbation.

I know not, my lords, with what propriety this contract for the troops

of Hanover can be termed a treaty. It is well known that no power in

this kingdom can enter into a treaty with a foreign state, except the

king; and it is equally certain, that, with regard to Hanover, the

same right is limited to the elector. This treaty, therefore, my

lords, is a treaty of the same person with himself, a treaty of which

the two counterparts are to receive their ratification from being

signed with the same hand. This, surely, is a treaty of a new kind,

such as no national assembly has yet considered. Had any other power

of Britain than its king, or in Hanover any other than the elector,

the right of entering into publick engagements, a treaty might have

been made; but as the constitution of both nations is formed, the

treaty is merely chimerical and absolutely impossible.

Had such a treaty, as is thus vainly imagined, been really made, it

would yet be as inconsistent with the fundamental establishment of the

empire, to require that before it was ratified it should have been

laid before the senate. To make treaties, as to make war, is the

acknowledged and established prerogative of the crown. When war is

declared, the senate is, indeed, to consider whether it ought to be

carried on at the expense of the nation; and if treaties require any

supplies to put them in execution, they likewise fall properly, at

that time, under senatorial cognizance: but to require that treaties

shall not be transacted without our previous concurrence, is almost to

annihilate the power of the crown, and to expose all our designs to

the opposition of our enemies, before they can be completed.

If, therefore, the troops of Hanover can be of use for the performance

of our stipulations, if they can contribute to the support of the

house of Austria, the ministry cannot, in my opinion, be censured for

having taken them into British pay; nor can we refuse our concurrence

with the commons in providing for their support, unless it shall

appear that the design for which all our preparations have been made

is such as cannot be executed, or such as ought not to be pursued.

Several arguments have been offered to prove both these positions; one

noble lord has asserted, that it is by no means for the advantage

either of ourselves or any other nation, to restore the house of

Austria to its ancient elevation; another, that it is, by the imperial

constitutions, unlawful for any of the princes of Germany to make war

upon the emperour solemnly acknowledged by the diet. They have

endeavoured to intimidate us, by turning our view to the difficulties

by which our attempts are obstructed; difficulties which they affect

to represent as insuperable, at least to this nation in its present

state. With this design, my lords, has the greatness of the French

power been exaggerated, the faith of the king of Sardinia questioned,

and the king of Prussia represented as determined to support the

pretensions of the emperour; with this view has our natural strength

been depreciated, and all our measures and hopes have been ridiculed,

with wantonness, not very consistent with the character of a British

patriot.

Most of these arguments, my lords, have been already answered, and

answered in such a manner as has, I believe, not failed of convincing

every lord of their insufficiency, unless, perhaps, those are to be

excepted ty whom they were offered. It has with great propriety been

observed, that the inconsistency imputed to his majesty in opposing

the emperour for whom he voted, is merely imaginary; since it is not a

necessary consequence, that he for whom he voted is, therefore,

lawfully elected; and because his majesty does not engage in this war

for the sake of dethroning the emperour, but of supporting the

Pragmatick sanction; nor does he oppose him as the head of the German

body, but as the invader of the dominions of Austria.

With regard to the propriety of maintaining the Austrian family in its

present possessions, and of raising it, if our arms should be

prosperous, to its ancient greatness, it has been shown, that no other

power is able to defend Europe either against the Turks on one part,

or the French on the other; two powers equally professing the

destructive intention of extending their dominions without limits, and

of trampling upon the privileges and liberties of all the rest of

mankind.

It has been shown, that the general scheme of policy uniformly pursued

by our ancestors in every period of time, since the increase of the

French greatness, has been to preserve an equipoise of power, by which

all the smaller states are preserved in security. It is apparent, that

by this scheme alone can the happiness of mankind be preserved, and

that no other family but that of Austria is able to balance the house

of Bourbon.

This equipoise of power has by some lords been imagined an airy

scheme, a pleasing speculation which, however it may amuse the

imagination, can never be reduced to practice. It has been asserted,

that the state of nations is always variable, that dominion is every

day transferred by ambition or by casualties, that inheritances fall

by want of heirs into other hands, and that kingdoms are by one

accident divided at one time, and at other times consolidated by a

different event; that to be the guardians of all those whose credulity

or folly may betray them to concur with the ambition of an artful

neighbour, and to promote the oppression of themselves, is an endless

task; and that to obviate all the accidents by which provinces may

change their masters, is an undertaking to which no human foresight is

equal; that we have not a right to hinder the course of succession for

our own interest, nor to obstruct those contracts which independent

princes are persuaded to make, however contrary to their own interest,

or to the general advantage of mankind. And it has been concluded by

those reasoners, that we should show the highest degree of wisdom, and

the truest, though not the most refined policy, by attending steadily

to our own interest, by improving the dissensions of our neighbours to

our own advantage, by extending our commerce, and increasing our

riches, without any regard to the happiness or misery, freedom or

slavery of the rest of mankind.

I believe I need not very laboriously collect arguments to prove to

your lordships that this scheme of selfish negligence, of supine

tranquillity, is equally imprudent and ungenerous; since, if we

examine the history of the last century, we shall easily discover,

that if this nation had not interposed, the French had now been

masters of more than half Europe; and it cannot be imagined that they

would have suffered us to set them at defiance in the midst of their

greatness, that they would have spared us out of tenderness, or

forborne to attack us out of fear. What the Spaniards attempted,

though unsuccessfully, from a more distant part of the world, in the

pride of their American affluence, would certainly have been once more

endeavoured by France, with far greater advantages, and as it may be

imagined, with a different event.

That it would have been endeavoured, cannot be doubted, because the

endeavour would not have been hazardous; by once defeating our fleet,

they might land their forces, which might be wafted over in a very

short time, and by a single victory they might conquer all the island,

or that part of it, at least, which is most worth the labour of

conquest; and though they should be unsuccessful, they could suffer

nothing but the mortification of their pride, and would be in a short

time enabled to make a new attempt.

Thus, my lords, if we could preserve our liberty in the general

subjection of the western part of the world, we should do it only by

turning our island into a garrison, by laying aside all other

employment than the study of war, and by making it our only care to

watch our coasts: a state which surely ought to be avoided at almost

any expense and at any hazard.

To think that we could extend our trade or increase our riches in this

state of the continent, is to forget the effects of universal empire.

The French, my lords, would then be in possession of all the trade of

those provinces which they had conquered, they would be masters of all

their ports and of all their shipping; and your lordships may easily

conceive with what security we should venture upon the ocean, in a

state of war, when all the harbours of the continent afforded shelter

to our enemies. If the French privateers from a few obscure creeks,

unsupported by a fleet of war, or at least not supported by a navy

equal to our own, could make such devastations in our trade as enabled

their country to hold out against the confederacy of almost all the

neighbouring powers; what, my lords, might not be dreaded by us, when

every ship upon the ocean should be an enemy; when we should be at

once overborne by the wealth and the numbers of our adversaries; when

the trade of the world should be in their hands, and their navies no

less numerous than their troops.

I have made this digression, my lords, I hope not wholly without

necessity, to show that the advantages of preserving the equipoise of

Europe are not, as they have been sometimes conceived, empty sounds,

or idle notions; but that by the balance of one nation against

another, both the safety of other countries and of our own is

preserved; and that, therefore, it requires all our vigilance and all

our resolution to establish and maintain it.

That there may come a time in which this scheme will be no longer

practicable, when a coalition of dominions may be inevitable, and when

one power will be necessarily exalted above the rest, is, indeed, not

absolutely impossible, and, therefore, not to be peremptorily denied.

But it is not to be inferred, that our care is vain at present,

because, perhaps, it may some time be vain hereafter; or that we ought

now to sink into slavery without a struggle, because the time may

come, when our strongest efforts will be ineffectual.

It has, indeed, been almost asserted, that the fatal hour is now

arrived, and that it is to no purpose that we endeavour to raise any

farther opposition to the universal monarchy projected by France. We

are told, that the nation is exhausted and dispirited; that we have

neither influence, nor riches, nor courage remaining; that we shall be

left to stand alone against the united house of Bourbon; that the

Austrians cannot, and that the Dutch will not, assist us; that the

king of Sardinia will desert his alliance; that the king of Prussia

has declared against us; and, therefore, that by engaging in the

support of the Pragmatick sanction, we are about to draw upon

ourselves that ruin which every other power has foreseen and shunned.

I am far from denying, my lords, that the power of France is great and

dangerous; but can draw no consequence from that position, but that

this force is to be opposed before it is still greater, and this

danger to be obviated while it is yet surmountable, and surmountable I

still believe it by unanimity and courage.

If our wealth, my lords, is diminished, it is time to confine the

commerce of that nation by which we have been driven out of the

markets of the continent, by destroying their shipping, and

intercepting their merchants. If our courage is depressed, it is

depressed not by any change in the nature of the inhabitants of this

island, but by a long course of inglorious compliance with the

demands, and of mean submission to the insults, of other nations, to

which it is necessary to put an end by vigorous resolutions.

If our allies are timorous and wavering, it is necessary to encourage

them by vigorous measures; for as fear, so courage, is produced by

example: the bravery of a single man may withhold an army from flight,

and other nations will be ashamed to discover any dread of that power

which France along sets at defiance. They will be less afraid to

declare their intentions, when they are convinced that we intend to

support them; and if there be, in reality, any prince who does not

favour our design, he will be at least less inclined to obstruct it,

as he finds the opposition, which he must encounter, more formidable.

For this reason, my lords, I am far from discovering the justness of

the opinion which has prevailed very much in the nation, on this

occasion, that we are not to act without allies, because allies are

most easily to be procured by acting, and because it is reasonable and

necessary for us to perform our part, however other powers may neglect

theirs.

The advice which the senate has often repeated to his majesty, has

been to oppose the progress of France; and though it should be

allowed, that he has been advised to proceed in concert _with his

allies_, yet it must be understood to suppose such allies as may be

found to have courage and honesty enough to concur with him. It cannot

be intended, that he should delay his assistance till corruption is

reclaimed, or till cowardice is animated; for to promise the queen of

Hungary assistance on such terms, would be to insult her calamities,

and to withhold our succours till she was irrecoverably ruined. The

senate could not insist that we should stand neuter, till all those,

who were engaged by treaty to support the Pragmatick sanction, should

appear willing to fulfil their stipulations; for even France is to be

numbered among those who have promised to support the house of Austria

in its possessions, however she may now endeavour to take them away.

Even with regard to that power from which most assistance may be

reasonably expected, nothing would be more imprudent than to declare

that we determine not to act without them; for what then would be

necessary, but that the French influence one town in their provinces,

or one deputy in their assemblies, and ruin the house of Austria in

security and at leisure, without any other expense than that of a

bribe.

It was, therefore, necessary to transport our troops into Flanders, to

show the world that we were no longer inclined to stand idle

spectators of the troubles of Europe; that we no longer intended to

amuse ourselves, or our confederates, with negotiations which might

produce no treaties, or with treaties which might be broken whenever

the violation of them afforded any prospect of that advantage; we were

now resolved to sacrifice the pleasures of neutrality, and the profits

of peaceful traffick, to the security of the liberties of Europe, and

the observation of publick faith.

This necessity was so generally allowed, that when the first body of

troops was sent over, no objection was made by those who found

themselves inclined to censure the conduct of our affairs, but that

they were not sufficiently numerous to defend themselves, and would be

taken prisoners by a French detachment; the ministry were therefore

asked, why they did not send a larger force, why they engaged in

hostilities, which could only raise the laughter of our enemies, and

why, if they intended war, they did not raise an army sufficient to

prosecute it?

An army, my lords, an army truly formidable, is now raised, and

assembled on the frontiers of France, ready to assist our ally, and to

put a stop to the violence of invasions. We now see ourselves once

again united with the house of Austria, and may hope once more to

drive the oppressors of mankind before us. But now, my lords, a

clamour is propagated through the nation, that these measures, which

have been so long desired, are pernicious and treacherous; that we are

armed, not against France, but against ourselves; that our armies are

sent over either not to fight, or to fight in a quarrel in which we

have no concern; to gain victories from which this nation will receive

no advantage, or to bring new dishonour upon their country by a

shameful inactivity.

This clamour, which if it had been confined to the vulgar, had been,

perhaps, of no great importance, nor could have promoted any of the

designs of those by whom it was raised, has been mentioned in this

house as an argument in favour of the motion which is now under the

consideration of your lordships; and it has been urged that these

measures cannot be proper, because all measures, by which his

majesty's government is made unpopular, must in the end be destructive

to the nation.

On this occasion, my lords, it is necessary to consider the nature of

popularity, and to inquire how far it is to be considered in the

administration of publick affairs. If by popularity is meant only a

sudden shout of applause, obtained by a compliance with the present

inclination of the people, however excited, or of whatsoever tendency,

I shall without scruple declare, that popularity is to be despised; it

is to be despised, my lords, because it cannot be preserved without

abandoning much more valuable considerations. The inclinations of the

people have, in all ages, been too variable for regard. But if by

popularity be meant that settled confidence and lasting esteem, which

a good government may justly claim from the subject, I am far from

denying that it is truly desirable; and that no wise man ever

disregarded it. But this popularity, my lords, is very consistent with

contempt of riotous clamours, and of mistaken complaints; and is often

only to be obtained by an opposition, to the reigning opinions, and a

neglect of temporary discontents; opinions which may be inculcated

without difficulty by favourite orators, and discontents which the

eloquence of seditious writers may easily produce on ignorance and

inconstancy.

How easily the opinions of the vulgar may be regulated by those who

have obtained, by whatever methods, their esteem, the debate of this

day, my lords, may inform us; since, if the measures against which

this motion is intended, be really unpopular, as they have been

represented, it is evident that there has been lately a very

remarkable change in the sentiments of the nation; for it is yet a

very little time since the repression of the insolence of France, and

the relief of the queen of Hungary was so generally wished, and so

importunately demanded, that had measures like these been then formed,

it is not improbable that they might have reconciled the publick to

that man whom the united voice of the nation has long laboured to

overbear.

It is, indeed, urged with a degree of confidence, which ought, in my

opinion, to proceed from stronger proof than has yet been produced,

that no hostilities are intended; that our armaments on the continent

are an idle show, an inoffensive ostentation, and that the troops of

Hanover have been hired only to enrich the electorate, under the

appearance of assisting the queen of Hungary, whom in reality they

cannot succour without drawing upon their country the imperial

interdict.

It has been alleged, my lords,-that these measures have been concerted

wholly/or the advantage of Hanover; that this kingdom is to be

sacrificed to the electorate, and that we are in reality intended to

be made tributaries to a petty power.

In confirmation of these suggestions, advantage has been taken from

every circumstance that could admit of misrepresentation. The

constitution of the empire has been falsely quoted, to prove that they

cannot act against the emperour, and their inactivity in Flanders has

been produced as a proof, that they do not intend to enter Germany.

Whoever shall consult the constituent and fundamental pact by which

the German form of government is established, will find, my lords,

that it is not in the power of the emperour alone to lay any of the

states of Germany under the ban; and that the electors are independent

in their own dominions, so far as that they may enter into alliances

with foreign powers, and make war upon each other.

It appears, therefore, my lords, that no law prohibits the elector of

Hanover to send his troops to the assistance of the queen of Hungary;

he may, in consequence of treaties, march into Germany, and attack the

confederates of the emperour, or what is not now intended, even the

emperour himself, without any dread of the severities of the ban.

Nor does the continuance of the forces in Flanders show any

unwillingness to begin hostilities, or any dread of the power of

either Prussia, whose prohibition is merely imaginary, or of France,

who is not less perplexed by the neighbourhood of our army than by any

other method that could have been taken of attacking her; for being

obliged to have an equal force always in readiness to observe their

motions, she has not been able to send a new army against the

Austrians, but has been obliged to leave the emperour at their mercy,

and suffer them to recover Bohemia without bloodshed, and establish

themselves at leisure in Bavaria.

Nor is this, my lords, the only advantage which has been gained by

their residence in Flanders; for the United Provinces have been

animated to a concurrence in the common cause, and have consented so

far to depart from their darling neutrality, as to send twenty

thousand of their forces to garrison the barrier. Of which no man, I

suppose, will say that it is not of great importance to the queen of

Hungary, since it sets her free from the necessity of distracting her

views, and dividing her forces for the defence of the most distant

parts of her dominions at once; nor will it be affirmed, that this

advantage could have probably been gained, without convincing our

allies of our sincerity, by sending an army into the continent.

If it be asked, what is farther to be expected from these troops? it

ought to be remembered, my lords, with how little propriety our

ministers can be required to make publick a scheme of hostile

operations, and how much we should expose ourselves to our enemies,

should a precedent be established by which our generals would be

incapacitated to form any private designs, and an end would be for

ever put to military secrecy.

What necessity there can be for proposing arguments like these, I am

not, indeed, able to discover, since the objections which have been

made seem to proceed rather from obstinacy than conviction; and the

reflections that have been vented seem rather the product of wit

irritated by malevolence, than of reason enlightened by calm

consideration. The ministers have been reproached with Hanoverian

measures, without any proof that Hanover is to receive the least

advantage; and have been charged with betraying their country by those

who cannot show how their country is injured, nor can prove either

that interest or faith would allow us to sit inactive in the present

disturbance of Europe, or that we could have acted in any other manner

with equal efficacy.

It is so far from being either evident or true, my lords, that Britain

is sacrificed to Hanover, that Hanover is evidently hazarded by her

union with Britain. Had this electorate now any other sovereign than

the king of Great Britain, it might have been secure by a neutrality,

and have looked upon the miseries of the neighbouring provinces

without any diminution of its people, or disturbance of its

tranquillity; nor could any danger be dreaded, or any inconvenience be

felt, but from an open declaration in favour of the Pragmatick

sanction.

Why the hire of the troops of any particular country should be

considered as an act of submission to it, or of dependency upon it, I

cannot discover; nor can I conceive for what reason the troops of

Hanover should be more dangerous, or less popular, at this than at any

former time, or why the employment of them should be considered as any

particular regard. If any addition of dominion had been to be

purchased for the electorate by the united arms of the confederate

army, I should, perhaps, be inclined to censure the scheme, as

contrary to the interest of my native country; nor shall any lord more

warmly oppose designs that may tend to aggrandize another nation at

the expense of this. But to hire foreigners, of whatever country, only

to save the blood of Britons, is, in my opinion, an instance of

preference which ought to produce rather acknowledgments of gratitude

than sallies of indignation.

Upon the most exact survey of this debate, I will boldly affirm, that

I never heard in this house a question so untenable in itself, so

obstinately or so warmly debated; but hope that the sophistries which

have been used, however artful, and the declamations which have been

pronounced, however pathetick, will have no effect upon your

lordships. I hope, that as the other house has already agreed to

support the auxiliaries which have been retained, and which have been

proved in this debate to be retained for the strongest reasons, and

the most important purposes, your lordships will show, by rejecting

this motion, that you are not less willing to concur in the support of

publick faith, and that you will not suffer posterity to charge you

with the exaltation of France, and the ruin of Europe.

[The question was then put, and determined in the negative, by 90

against 35.]

After the conclusion of this long debate, the ministry did not yet

think their victory in repelling this censure sufficiently apparent,

unless a motion was admitted, which might imply a full and unlimited

approbation of their measures; and therefore the earl of SCARBOROUGH

rose, and spoke to the following effect:--My lords, it has been justly

observed in the debate of this day, that the opinions of the people of

Britain are regulated in a great measure by the determinations of this

house; that they consider this as the place where truth and reason

obtain a candid audience; as a place sacred to justice and to honour;

into which, passion, partiality, and faction have been very rarely

known to intrude; and that they, therefore, watch our decisions as the

great rules of policy, and standing maxims of right, and readily

believe these measures necessary in which we concur, and that conduct

unblameable which has gained our approbation.

This reputation, my lords, we ought diligently to preserve, by an

unwearied vigilance for the happiness of our fellow-subjects; and

while we possess it, we ought likewise to employ its influence to

beneficial purposes, that the cause and the effect may reciprocally

produce each other; that the people, when the prosperity which they

enjoy by our care, inclines them to repose in us an implicit

confidence, may find that confidence a new source of felicity; that

they may reverence us, because they are secure and happy; and be

secure and happy, because they reverence us.

This great end, my lords, it will not be very difficult to attain; the

foundation of this exalted authority may easily be laid, and the

superstructure raised in a short time; the one may be laid too deep to

be undermined, and the other built too firmly to be shaken; at least

they can be impaired only by ourselves, and may set all external

violence at defiance.

To preserve the confidence of the people, and, consequently, to govern

them without force, and without opposition, it is only necessary that

we never willingly deceive them; that we expose the publick affairs to

their view, so far as they ought to be made publick in their true

state; that we never suffer false reports to circulate under the

sanction of our authority, nor give the nation reason to think we are

satisfied, when we are, in reality, suspicious of illegal designs, or

that we suspect those measures of latent mischiefs with which we are,

in reality, completely satisfied.

But it is not sufficient, my lords, that we publish ourselves no

fallacious representations of our counsels; it is necessary, likewise,

that we do not permit them to be published, that we obviate every

falsehood in its rise, and propagate truth with our utmost diligence.

For if we suffer the nation to be deceived, we are not much less

criminal than those who deceive it; at least we must be confessed no

longer to act as the guardians of the publick happiness, if we suffer

it to be interrupted by the dispersion of reports which we know to be

at once false and pernicious.

Of these principles, which I suppose will not be contested, an easy

application may be made to the business of the present day. A question

has been debated with great address, great ardour, and great

obstinacy, which is in itself, though not doubtful, yet very much

diffused; complicated with a great number of circumstances, and

extended to a multitude of relations; and is, therefore, a subject

upon which sophistry may very safely practise her arts, and which may

be shown in very different views to those whose intellectual light is

too much contracted to receive the whole object at once. It may easily

be asserted, by those who have long been accustomed to affirm, without

scruple, whatever they desire to obtain belief, that the arguments in

favour of the motion, which has now been rejected by your lordships,

were unanswerable; and it will be no hard task to lay before their

audience such reasons as, though they have been easily confuted by the

penetration and experience of your lordships, may, to men unacquainted

with politicks, and remote from the sources of intelligence, appear

very formidable.

It is, therefore, not sufficient that your lordships have rejected the

former motion, and shown that you do not absolutely disapprove the

measures of the government, since it may be asserted, and with some

appearance of reason, that barely not to admit a motion by which all

the measures of the last year would have been at once over-turned and

annihilated, is no proof that they have been fully justified, and

warmly confirmed, since many of the transactions might have been at

least doubtful, and yet this motion not have been proper.

In an affair of so great importance, my lords, an affair in which the

interest of all the western world is engaged, it is necessary to take

away all suspicions, when the nation is about to be involved in a war

for the security of ourselves and our posterity; in a war which,

however prosperous, must be at least expensive, and which is to be

carried on against an enemy who, though not invincible, is, in a very

high degree, powerful. It is surely proper to show, in the most

publick manner, our conviction, that neither prudence nor frugality

has been wanting; that the inconveniencies which will be always felt

in such contentions, are not brought upon us by wantonness or

negligence; and that no care is omitted by which they are alleviated,

and that they may be borne more patiently, because they cannot be

avoided.

This attestation, my lords, we can only give by a solemn address to

his majesty of a tendency contrary to that of the motion now rejected;

and by such an attestation only can we hope to revive the courage of

the nation, to unite those in the common cause of liberty whom false

reports have alienated or shaken, and to restore to his majesty that

confidence which all the subtilties of faction have been employed to

impair. I, therefore, move, that an humble address be presented to his

majesty, importing, "That in the unsettled and dangerous situation of

affairs in Europe, the sending a considerable body of British forces

into the Austrian Netherlands, and augmenting the same with sixteen

thousand of his majesty's electoral troops, and the Hessians in the

British pay, and thereby, in conjunction with the queen of Hungary's

troops in the Low Countries, forming a great army for the service of

the common cause, was a wise, useful, and necessary measure,

manifestly tending to the support and encouragement of his majesty's

allies, and the real and effectual assistance of the queen of Hungary,

and the restoring and maintaining the balance of power, and has

already produced very advantageous consequences."

The earl of OXFORD spoke next, to the following effect:--My lords, the

necessity of supporting our reputation, and of preserving the

confidence of the publick, I am by no means inclined to dispute, being

convinced, that from the instant in which we shall lose the credit

which our ancestors have delivered down to us, we shall be no longer

considered as a part of the legislature, but be treated by the people

only as an assembly of hirelings and dependants, convened at the

pleasure of the court to ratify its decisions without examination, to

extort taxes, promote slavery, and to share with the ministry the

crime and the infamy of cruelty and oppression.

For this reason, it is undoubtedly proper, that we avoid not only the

crime, but the appearance of dependence; and that every doubtful

question should be freely debated, and every pernicious position

publickly condemned; and that when our decisions are not agreeable to

the opinion or expectations of the people, we should at least show

them that they are not the effects of blind compliance with the

demands of the ministry, or of an implicit resignation to the

direction of a party. We ought to show, that we are unprejudiced, and

ready to hear truth; that our determinations are not dictated by any

foreign influence, and that it will not be vain to inform us, or

useless to petition us.

In these principles I agree with the noble lord who has made the

motion; but in the consequences which are on this occasion to be drawn

from them, I cannot but differ very widely from him; for, in my

opinion, nothing can so much impair our reputation, as an address like

that which is proposed; an address not founded either upon facts or

arguments, and from which the nation can collect only, that the

protection of this house is withdrawn from them, that they are given

up to ruin, and that they are to perish as a sacrifice to the interest

of Hanover.

Let us consider what we are now invited to assert, and it will easily

appear how well this motion is calculated to preserve and to advance

the reputation of this house. We are to assert, my lords, the

propriety of a new war against the most formidable power of the

universe, at a time when we have been defeated and disgraced in our

conquests with a kingdom of inferiour force. We are to declare our

readiness to pay and to raise new taxes, since no war can be carried

on without them, at a time when our commerce, the great source of

riches, is obstructed; when the interest of debts contracted during a

long war, and a peace almost equally expensive, is preying upon our

estates; when the profits of the trade of future ages, and the rents

of the inheritances of our latest descendants, are mortgaged; and what

ought yet more to affect us, at a time when the outcry of distress is

universal, when the miseries of hopeless poverty have sunk the nation

into despair, when industry scarcely retains spirit sufficient to

continue her labours, and all the lower ranks of mankind are

overwhelmed with the general calamity.

There may, perhaps, be some among your lordships who may think this

representation of the state of the publick exaggerated beyond the

truth. There are many in this house who see no other scenes than the

magnificence of feasts, the gaieties of balls, and the splendour of a

court; and it is not much to be wondered at, if they do not easily

believe what it is often their interest to doubt, that this luxury is

supported by the distress of millions, and that this magnificence

exposes multitudes to nakedness and famine. It is my custom, when the

business of the senate is over, to retire to my estate in the country,

where I live without noise, and without riot, and take a calm and

deliberate survey of the condition of those that inhabit the towns and

villages about me. I mingle in their conversation, and hear their

complaints; I enter their houses, and find by their condition that

their complaints are just; I discover that they are daily

impoverished, and that they are not able to struggle under the

enormous burdens of publick payments, of which I am convinced that

they cannot be levied another year without exhausting the people, and

spreading universal beggary over the nation.

What can be the opinion of the publick, when they see an address of

this house, by which new expenses are recommended? Will they not

think that their state is desperate, and that they are sold to

slavery, from which nothing but insurrections and bloodshed can

release them? If they retain any hopes of relief from this house, they

must soon be extinguished, when they find in the next clause, that we

are sunk to such a degree of servility, as to acknowledge benefits

which were never received, and to praise the invisible service of our

army in Flanders.

If it be necessary, my lords, to impose upon the publick, let us at

least endeavour to do it less grossly; let us not attempt to persuade

them that those forces have gained victories who have never seen an

enemy, or that we are benefited by the transportation of our money

into another country. If it be necessary to censure those noble lords

who have supported the former motion, and to punish them for daring to

use arguments which could not be confuted; for this is the apparent

tendency of the present motion; let us not lose all consideration of

ourselves, nor sacrifice the honour of the house to the resentment of

the ministry.

For my part, my lords, I shall continue to avow my opinion in defiance

of censures, motions and addresses; and as I struggled against the

former ministry, not because I envied or hated them, but because I

disapproved their conduct; I shall continue to oppose measures equally

destructive with equal zeal, by whomsoever they are projected, or by

whomsoever patronised.

Lord CARTERET spoke next, to the following purpose:--My lords, after

so full a defence of the former motion as the late debate has

produced, it is rather with indignation than surprise, that I hear

that which is now offered. It has been for a long time the practice of

those who are supported only by their numbers, to treat their

opponents with contempt, and when they cannot answer to insult them;

and motions have been made, not because they were thought right by

those who offered them, but because they would certainly be carried,

and would, by being carried, mortify their opponents.

This, my lords, is the only intent of the present motion which can

promote no useful purpose, and which, though it may flatter the court,

must be considered by the people as an insult; and therefore, though I

believe all opposition fruitless, I declare that I never will agree to

it.

And to show, my lords, that I do not oppose the ministry for the sake

of obstructing the publick counsels, or of irritating those whom I

despair to defeat; and that I am not afraid of trusting my conduct to

the impartial examination of posterity, I shall beg leave to enter,

with my protest, the reasons which have influenced me in this day's

deliberation, that they be considered when this question shall no

longer be a point of interest, and our present jealousies and

animosities are forgotten.

[It was carried in the affirmative, by 78 against 35.]