HOUSE OF LORDS, FEBRUARY 1, 1742-3.

The order of the day for taking into consideration the several

estimates of the charge of the forces in the pay of Great Britain was

read, upon which lord STANHOPE rose up, and spoke in substance as

follows:--

My lords, I have always understood, that the peculiar happiness of the

British nation consists in this, that nothing of importance can be

undertaken by the government, without the consent of the people as

represented by the other house, and that of your lordships, whose

large possessions, and the merits either of your ancestors or

yourselves, have given you the privilege of voting in your own right

in national consultations.

The advantages of this constitution, the security which it confers

upon the nation, and the restraint which it lays upon corrupt

ministers, or ambitious princes, are in themselves too obvious to

admit of explanation, and too well known in this great assembly, by

whose ancestors they were originally obtained, and preserved at the

frequent hazard of life and fortune, for me to imagine, that I can

make them either more esteemed or better understood.

My intention, my lords, is not to teach others the regard which the

constitution of our government, or the happiness of the nation demands

from them, but to show how much I regard them myself, by endeavouring

to preserve and defend them at a time when I think them invaded and

endangered.

Upon the examination of the estimates now before us, I cannot but

think it necessary, my lords, that every man who values liberty,

should exert that spirit by which it was first established; that every

man should rouse from his security, and awaken all his vigilance and

all his zeal, lest the bold attempt that has been now made should, if

it be not vigorously repressed, be an encouragement to the more

dangerous encroachments; and lest that fabrick of power should be

destroyed, which has been erected at such expense and with such

labour; at which one generation has toiled after another, and of which

the wisdom of the most experienced and penetrating statesmen have been

employed to perfect its symmetry, and the industry of the most

virtuous patriots to repair its decays.

The first object which the estimates force upon our observation is a

numerous body of foreign troops, for the levy and payment of which a

very large sum is demanded; and demanded at a time when the nation is

to the last degree embarrassed and oppressed, when it is engaged in a

war with a powerful empire, and almost overwhelmed with the debts that

were contracted in former confederacies; when it is engaged in a war,

not for the recovery of forgotten claims, or for the gratification of

restless ambition, not for the consumption of exuberant wealth, or for

the discharge of superfluous inhabitants; but a war, in which the most

important interests are set to hazard, and by which the freedom of

navigation must be either established or lost; a war which must

determine the sovereignty of the ocean, the rights of commerce, and

the state of our colonies; a war, in which we may, indeed, be

victorious without any increase of our reputation; but in which we

cannot be defeated without losing all our influence upon foreign

powers, and becoming subject to the insolence of petty princes.

When foreign troops are hired, at a time like this, it is natural to

expect that they have been procured by contracts uncommonly frugal;

because no nation can be supposed to be lavish in a time of distress.

It is natural, my lords, to expect that they should be employed in

expeditions of the utmost importance; because no trifling advantage

ought to incite a people overburdened with taxes, to oppress

themselves with any new expense; and it may be justly supposed, that

these troops were hired by the advice of the senate; because no

minister can be supposed so hardened in defiance of his country, in

contempt of the laws, and in disregard of the publick happiness, as to

dare to introduce foreigners into the publick service, in prosecution

of his own private schemes, or to rob the nation which he professes to

serve, that he may increase the wealth of another.

But upon consideration of this estimate, my lords, all these

expectations, however reasonable in themselves, however consistent

with the declarations of the wisest statesmen, and the practice of

former times, will be disappointed; for it will be found that the

troops, of which we are now to ratify the provisions for their

payment, are raised at an expense never known on the like occasion

before, when the nation was far more able to support it; that they

have yet been employed in no expedition, that they have neither fought

a battle, nor besieged a town, nor undertaken any design, nor hindered

any that has been formed by those against whom they are pretended to

have been raised; that they have not yet drawn a sword but at a

review, nor heard the report of fire-arms but upon a festival; that

they have not yet seen an enemy, and that they are posted where no

enemy is likely to approach them.

But this, my lords, is not the circumstance which ought, in my

opinion, most strongly to affect us; troops may be raised without

being employed, and money expended without effect; but such measures,

though they ought to be censured and rectified, may be borne without

any extraordinary degree of indignation. While our constitution

remains unviolated, temporary losses may be easily repaired, and

accidental misconduct speedily retrieved; but when the publick rights

are infringed, when the ministry assume the power of giving away the

properties of the people, it is then necessary to exert an uncommon

degree of vigour and resentment; it is as necessary to stop, the

encroachments of lawless power, as to oppose the torrent of a deluge;

which may be, perhaps, resisted at first, but from which, the country

that is once overwhelmed by it, cannot be recovered.

To raise this ardour, my lords, to excite this laudable resentment, I

believe it will be only necessary to observe, that those troops were

raised without the advice or the consent of the senate; that this new

burden has been laid upon the nation by the despotick will of the

ministers, and that the demands made for their support may be said to

be a tax laid upon the people, not by the senate, but by the court.

The motives upon which the ministry have acted on this occasion are,

so far as they can be discovered, and, indeed, there appears very

little care to conceal them, such as no subject of this crown ever

dared to proceed upon before; they are such as the act of settlement,

that act to which our sovereign owes his title to this throne, ought

for ever to have excluded from British councils.

I should proceed, my lords, to explain this new method of

impoverishing our country, and endeavour to show the principles from

which it arises, and the end which it must promote. But some sudden

indisposition obliges me to contract my plan, and conclude much sooner

than I intended, with moving, "that an humble address be presented to

his majesty, to beseech and advise his majesty, that considering the

excessive and grievous expenses, incurred by the great number of

foreign troops now in the pay of Great Britain, (expenses so increased

by the extraordinary manner, as we apprehend, of making the estimates

relating thereunto, and which do not appear to us conducive to the end

proposed,) his majesty will be graciously pleased, in compassion to

his people, loaded already with such numerous and heavy taxes, such

large and growing debts, and greater annual expenses than this nation,

at any time, ever before sustained, to exonerate his subjects of the

charge and burden of those mercenaries who were taken into our service

last year, without the advice or consent of parliament."

Lord SANDWICH spoke next in support of the motion to the following

effect:--My lords, though I heard the noble lord with so much

pleasure, that I could not but wish he had been able to deliver his

sentiments more fully upon this important affair; yet I think the

motion so reasonable and just, that though he might have set it yet

more beyond the danger of opposition, though he might have produced

many arguments in defence of it, which, perhaps, will not occur to any

other lords; yet I shall be able to justify it in such a manner, as

may secure the approbation of the unprejudiced and disinterested; and,

therefore, I rise up to second it with that confidence, which always

arises from a consciousness of honest intentions, and of an impartial

inquiry after truth.

The measures, my lords, which have given occasion to this motion, have

been for some time the subject of my reflections; I have endeavoured

to examine them in their full extent, to recollect the previous

occurrences by which the ministry might have been influenced to engage

in them, and to discover the certain and the probable consequences

which they may either immediately, or more remotely produce; I have

laboured to collect from those who are supposed to be most acquainted

with the state of Europe, and the scheme of British policy which is at

present pursued, the arguments which can be offered in favour of these

new engagements; and have compared them with the conduct of former

ages upon the like occasions; but the result of all my searches into

history, all my conversation with politicians of every party, and all

my private meditations, has been only, that I am every hour confirmed,

by some new evidence, in the opinion which I had first formed; and now

imagined myself to know what I at first believed, that we are

entangled in a labyrinth of which no end is to be seen, and in which

no certain path has yet been discovered; that we are pursuing schemes

which are in no degree necessary to the prosperity of our country, by

means which are apparently contrary to law, to policy, and to justice;

and that we are involved in a foreign quarrel only to waste that

blood, and exhaust that treasure, which might be employed in

recovering the rights of commerce, and regaining the dominion of the

sea.

To prosecute the war against Spain with that vigour which interest and

resentment might be expected to produce, to repress that insolence by

which our navigation has been confined, and to punish that rapacity by

which our merchants have been plundered, and that cruelty by which our

fellow-subjects have been enslaved, tortured, and murdered, had been

an attempt in which every honest man would readily have concurred, and

to which all those who had sense to discern their own interest, or

virtue to promote the publick happiness, would cheerfully have

contributed, however loaded with taxes, oppressed with a standing

army, and plundered by the vultures of a court: nor is the ancient

spirit of the British nation so much depressed, but that when Spain

had been subdued, when our rights had been publickly acknowledged, our

losses repaired, and our colonies secured; when our ships had again

sailed in security, and our flag awed the ocean of America, we might

then have extended our views to foreign countries, might have assumed,

once more, the guardianship of the liberties of Europe, have given law

to the powers of the continent, and superintended the happiness of

mankind. But in the present situation of our affairs, when we have

made war for years without advantage, while our most important rights

are yet subject to the chance of battle, why we should engage in the

defence of other princes more than our stipulations require, I am not

able to discover; nor can I conceive what motive can incite us, after

having suffered so much from a weak enemy to irritate a stronger.

To the measures which are now pursued, were there no other arguments

to be alleged against them, I should think it, my lords, a sufficient

objection that they are unnecessary, and that this is not a time for

political experiments, or for wanton expenses. I should think, that

the present distresses of the publick ought to restrain your lordships

from approving any steps by which our burdens may be made more heavy,

burdens under which we are already sinking, and which a peace of more

than twenty years has not contributed to lighten.

But that they are unnecessary, my lords, is the weakest allegation

that can be offered; for they are such as tend not only to obstruct

the advancement of more advantageous designs, but to bring upon us the

heaviest calamities; they will not only hinder us from increasing our

strength, but will sink us to the greatest degree of weakness; they

will not only impoverish us for the present, which may be sometimes

the effect of useful and beneficial designs, but may depress us below

a possibility of recovery, and reduce us to receive laws from some

foreign power.

This is, indeed, a dreadful prospect; but what other can arise to us

from a war with France, with the most wealthy empire of the universe,

of which we were sufficiently shown the strength in the late war, by

the resistance which all the surrounding nations found it able to make

against their united efforts, and which the debts that they then

contracted, and the towns that were then destroyed, will not easily

suffer them to forget. Of this empire, my lords, thus powerful, thus

formidable, neither the dominions are contracted, nor the trade

impaired, nor the inhabitants diminished. The French armies are no

less numerous than under their late mighty monarch, their territories

are increased by new acquisitions, their trade has long been promoted

by the destruction of ours, and their wealth has been, by consequence,

increased. They have not, my lords, like this unhappy nation, been

exhausted by temporary expedients and useless armaments; they have not

harassed their merchants to aggrandize the court, nor thrown away the

opportunities which this interval of quiet has afforded them, in the

struggles of faction; they have not been multiplying officers to

betray the people, and taxing the people to support their oppressors;

but have with equal policy, diligence, and success, recovered the

losses which they then sustained, and enabled themselves to make

another stand against a general confederacy.

Against this empire, my lords, are we now to be engaged in a war,

without trade, and without money, loaded with debts, and harassed with

exactions; for what consequences can be expected from sending our

troops into the frontier towns, but that the French will charge us

with beginning hostilities, and declare war against us, or attack us

without a declaration; and that we shall be obliged to stand alone

against the whole power of the house of Bourbon, while all our ancient

allies stand at a distance spiritless and intimidated, or, perhaps,

secretly incite our enemies against us, in hopes of sharing our

plunder, or of rising on our ruin.

I know it has been alleged, and alleged with such a degree of

confidence, as it is reasonable to hope nothing could produce but a

consciousness of truth, that the Dutch have already consented to

assist us; nor is it without regret, that I find myself obliged to

declare, that this assertion is nothing more than one of those

transient visions with which it has been for a long time the custom of

British ministers to delude the people, to pacify their clamours, and

lull them in security; one of those artifices from which nothing more

is expected, than that it shall operate upon the nation, till the

circumstances of our affairs furnish out another, which is likewise,

in a short time, to be exploded only to make way for new falsehoods in

a perpetual succession.

Such, my lords, is the art of government discovered by the wonderful

sagacity of modern statesmen; who have found out, that it is easier to

palliate than to cure; and that the people maybe quieted by political

soporificks, while diseases are preying upon them, while their

strength decays, and their vitals are consumed.

That these falsehoods prevail upon mankind, and that after the

discovery of one cheat, another equally gross is patiently borne,

cannot but raise the wonder of a man who views the world at a

distance, and who has not opportunities of inquiring into the various

motives of action or belief. Such an one would be inclined to think us

a nation of fools, that must be stilled with rattles, or amused with

baubles; and would readily conclude, that our ministers were obliged

to practise such fallacies, because they could not prevail upon us by

motives adapted to reasonable beings.

But if we reflect, my lords, upon the different principles upon which

reports like these are propagated and opposed, it will easily be

discovered that their success is not to be imputed either to superiour

art on one side, or uncommon weakness on the other. It is well known

that they are promoted by men hired for that purpose with large

salaries, or beneficial employments, and that they can be opposed only

from a desire of detecting falsehood, and advancing the publick

happiness: it is apparent that those who invent, those who circulate,

and, perhaps, part of those who counterfeit belief of them, are

incited by the prospect of private advantage, and immediate profit;

and that those who stop them in their career by contradiction and

objections, can propose no other benefit to themselves, than that

which they shall receive in common with every other member of the

community; and, therefore, whoever has sufficiently observed mankind,

to discover the reason for which self-interest has in almost all ages

prevailed over publick spirit, will be able to see why reports like

these are not always suppressed by seasonable detections.

A minister ought not to flatter himself that he has always deceived

those who appear to credit his representations; their silence is not

so often the effect of credulity, as of cowardice or indolence. Many

are overborne by the pomp of great offices, and others who distinguish

more clearly, and judge with greater freedom, are contented to enjoy

their own reflections, without reproving those whom they despair to

reform.

This report of the engagement of the Dutch in our measures, shall,

however, furnish our ministers with no opportunity of boasting their

address, nor shall it pass any longer without contradiction; for I

shall, without any scruple, affirm in the presence of this august

assembly, that the Dutch have hitherto appeared absolutely neutral;

that they have not shown any approbation of our measures, nor any

inclination to assist us in them. I know, my lords, how disagreeable

this assertion may be to those, whose interest it is that mankind

should believe them of no less importance in the eyes of foreign

powers than in their own, and should imagine that the remotest nations

of the world are influenced by their motions, and directed by their

counsels; but however they may resent this declaration, I defy them to

confute it, and now call upon them to show that the Dutch have engaged

in any measure for the support of the queen of Hungary.

The late augmentation of twenty thousand men, which may possibly be

mentioned as a proof of their intention, shows nothing but that they

pursue their own interest with their usual prudence and attention, and

with such as it is to be wished that our ministers would condescend to

learn from them; and that they are too wise to suffer the towns from

which the Austrians have, by our persuasions, withdrawn their troops

to fall into the hands of the French. They have, therefore,

substituted new garrisons, but seem to have no regard to the interest

of the queen of Hungary, nor any other view than that of providing for

their own security, waiting the event of the war, and laying hold of

any advantage that may accidentally be offered them.

It may be urged farther by those who are desirous to deceive others,

or willing to be deceived themselves, that the province of Holland has

passed a vote for assisting the queen of Hungary with twenty thousand

men; but if it be remembered, my lords, that this must be the general

act of the United States, and that every province has its own

particular views to gratify, and its own interest to reconcile with

the general good, it may be very reasonably suspected, that this

assistance is yet rather the object of hope than expectation; it may

justly be feared, that before so many various dispositions will unite,

and such different schemes will be made consistent, the house of

Austria may be extinguished, that our forces may be destroyed, and

Germany enslaved by the French. Then, my lords, what will remain, but

that we shall curse that folly that involved us in distant quarrels,

and that temerity which sent us out to oppose a power which we could

not withstand; and which incited us to waste that treasure in foreign

countries, which we may quickly want for the defence of our own?

It must be, indeed, confessed, that if an estimate is to be made of

our condition, from the conduct of our ministers, the fear of

exhausting our treasure must be merely panick, and the precepts of

frugality which other states have grown great by observing, are to be

absolutely unnecessary. It may reasonably be imagined that we have

some secret mine, or hidden repository of gold, which no degree of

extravagance can drain, and which may for ever supply the most lavish

expenses without diminution.

For upon what other supposition, my lords, can any man attempt a

defence of the contract, by which we have obtained for one campaign

the service of the troops of Hanover? What but the confidence of

funds that can never be deficient, could influence them to conclude a

stipulation, by which levy-money is to be paid for troops of which not

a single regiment was raised for our service, or on the present

occasion; which were established for the security of the electorate of

Hanover, and would have been maintained, though we had not engaged in

the affairs of the continent.

What were the reasons which induced our ministry to employ the forces

of Hanover, it is, perhaps, not necessary to inquire. The only motive

that ought to have influenced them, was the prospect of obtaining them

upon cheap terms; for, my lords, if the troops of Hanover cannot be

obtained, but at the same expense with those of Britain, I am not able

to discover why they should be preferred. I have never heard, my

lords, any uncommon instances of Hanoverian courage, that should

incline us to trust the cause of Europe rather to that nation than to

our own; and am inclined to believe, that Britain is able to produce

men equal in all military virtues to any native of that happy country;

a country which, though it was thought worthy to be secured by a

neutrality, when all the neighbouring provinces were exposed to the

ravages of war, I have never heard celebrated for any peculiar

excellencies; and of which I cannot but observe, that it was indebted

for its security rather to the precaution of its prince, than the

bravery of its inhabitants.

This demand of levy-money shocks every Briton yet more strongly, on

considering by whom it is required; required by that family whom we

have raised from a petty dominion, for which homage was paid to a

superiour power; and which was, perhaps, only suffered to retain the

appearance of a separate sovereignty, because it was not worth the

labour and expense of an invasion; because it would neither increase

riches nor titles, nor gratify either avarice or ambition; by a family

whom, from want and weakness, we have exalted to a throne, from

whence, with virtue equal to their power, they may issue their

mandates to the remotest parts of the earth, may prescribe the course

of war in distant empires, and dictate terms of peace to half the

monarchs of the globe.

I should imagine, my lords, that when a king of the house of Hanover

surveys his navies, reviews his troops, or examines his revenue,

beholds the splendour of his court, or contemplates the extent of his

dominions, he cannot but sometimes, however unwillingly, compare his

present state with that of his ancestors; and that when he gives

audience to the ambassadours of princes, who, perhaps, never heard of

Hanover, and directs the payment of sums, by the smallest of which all

his ancient inheritance would be dearly purchased; and reflects, as

surely he sometimes will, that all these honours and riches, this

reverence from foreign powers, and his domestick splendour, are the

gratuitous and voluntary gifts of the mighty people of Britain, he

should find his heart overflowing with unlimited gratitude, and should

be ready to sacrifice to the happiness of his benefactors, not only

every petty interest, or accidental inclination, but even his repose,

his safety, or his life; that he should be ready to ease them of every

burden before they complained, and to aid them with all his power

before they requested his assistance; that he should consider his

little territories as only a contemptible province to his British

empire, a kind of nursery for troops to be employed without harassing

his more valuable subjects.

It might be at least hoped, my lords, that the princes of the house of

Hanover might have the same regard to this nation as to kings from

whom they never received any benefit, and whom they ought in reality

always to have considered as enemies, yet even from such levy-money

was not always required; or if required, was not always received.

There was once a time, my lords, before any of this race wore the

crown of Britain; when the great French monarch, Lewis the fourteenth,

being under a necessity of hiring auxiliary troops, applied to the

duke of Hanover, as a prince whose necessities would naturally incline

him to set the lives of his subjects at a cheap rate. The duke,

pleased with an opportunity of trafficking with so wealthy a monarch,

readily promised a supply of troops; and demanded levy-money to be

paid him, that he might be enabled to raise them. But Hanoverian

reputation was not then raised so high, as that the French king should

trust him with his money. Lewis suspected, and made no scruple of

declaring his suspicion, that the demand of levy-money was only a

pretence to obtain a sum which would never afterwards be repaid, and

for which no troops would be obtained; and therefore, with his usual

prudence insisted, that the troops should first march, and then be

paid. Thus for some time the treaty was at a stand; but the king being

equally in want of men, as the duke of money, and perceiving, perhaps,

that it was really impracticable for so indigent a prince to raise

troops without some pecuniary assistance, offered him at length a

small sum, which was gladly accepted, though much below the original

demand. The troops were engaged in the service of France; and the duke

of Hanover thought himself happy in being able to amuse himself at his

leisure with the rattle of money.

Such, my lords, were the conditions on which the troops of Hanover

were furnished in former times; and surely what could then be produced

by the love of money, or the awe of a superiour power, might now be

expected as the effect of gratitude and kindness.

But not to dwell any longer, my lords, upon particular circumstances

of measures, of which the whole scheme is contrary to the apparent

interest of this empire, I shall not inquire farther, why auxiliaries

are employed on this occasion rather than Britons, rather than those

whose bravery is celebrated to the most distant corners of the earth;

why, if mercenaries are necessary, those of Hanover are preferred to

others: or why, if they are, indeed, preferable, they are now to be

hired at a higher rate than at any former time? It appears to me of

far more importance to undermine the foundation, than to batter the

superstructure of our present system of politicks; and of greater use

to inquire, why we have engaged in a war on the continent, than why we

carry it on with ridiculous profusion.

It appears to me, my lords, that there are many reasons which, with

the same circumstances, would have withheld any nation but this from

such a dangerous interposition. The Dutch, we see, are content to look

on without action, though they are more interested in the event, and

less embarrassed on any other side. We are already engaged in a war,

of which no man can foresee the conclusion; but which cannot be ended

unsuccessfully, without the utmost danger to our most important

interests; and which yet has hitherto produced only losses and

disgrace, has impoverished our merchants, and intimidated our

soldiers. Whether these losses are the effects of weakness or

treachery, is a question which I am not ambitious of endeavouring to

decide, and of which the decision is, indeed, by no means necessary in

the present debate; since if we are too weak to struggle with Spain,

unassisted as she is, and embarrassed with different views, I need not

say what will be our condition, when the whole house of Bourbon shall

be combined against us; when that nation which stood alone for so many

years against the united efforts of Europe, shall attack us, exhausted

with taxes, enervated with corruption, and disunited from all allies.

Whether the troops of Hanover will assist us at that time, I cannot

determine. Perhaps, in the destruction of the British dominions, it

may be thought expedient to secure a more valuable and important

country by a timely neutrality; but if we have any auxiliaries from

thence, we must then necessarily obtain them upon cheaper terms.

If our inactivity in the European seas, and our ill success in those

of America be, as it is generally suspected, the consequence of

perfidious counsels, and private machinations; if our fleets are sent

out with orders to make no attempt against our enemies, or our

admirals commanded to retreat before them; surely no higher degree of

madness can be imagined, than that of provoking new enemies before we

have experienced a change of counsels, and found reason to place in

our ministers and statesmen that confidence which war absolutely

requires.

This is the conduct, my lords, which I should think most rational,

even though we were attacked in some of our real rights, and though

the quarrel about which we were debating was our own; I should think

the nearest danger the greatest, and should advise patience under

foreign insults, till we had redressed our domestick grievances; till

we had driven treachery from the court, and corruption from the

senate. But much more proper do I think this conduct, when we are

invited only to engage in distant war, in a dispute about the dominion

of princes, in the bowels of the continent; of princes, of whom it is

not certain, that we shall receive either advantage or security from

their greatness, or that we should suffer any loss or injury by their

fall.

But, my lords, I know it will be answered, that the queen of Hungary

has a right by treaty to our assistance; and that in becoming

guarantees of the Pragmatick sanction, we engaged to support her in

the dominions of her ancestors. This, my lords, is an answer of which

I do not deny the justness, and of which I will not attempt to

invalidate the strength. I allow that such a stipulation was made, and

that treaties ought to be observed, at whatever hazard, with

unviolated faith. It has been, indeed, objected, that many nations

engaged with us in the same treaty, whom interest or cowardice have

inclined to neglect it; and that we ought not to become the standing

garrison of Europe, or to defend alone those territories, to the

preservation of which so many states are obliged to contribute equally

with ourselves. But this, my lords, appears to me an argument of which

the ill consequences can never be fully discovered; an argument which

dissolves all the obligations of contracts, destroys the foundation of

moral justice, and lays society open to all the mischiefs of perfidy,

by making the validity of oaths and contracts dependant upon chance,

and regulating the duties of one man by the conduct of another. I

pretend not, my lords, to long experience, and, therefore, in

discussing intricate questions, may be easily mistaken. But as, in my

opinion, my lords, morality is seldom difficult, but when it is

clouded with an intention to deceive others or ourselves, I shall

venture to declare with more confidence, that in proportion as one man

neglects his duty, another is more strictly obliged to practise his

own, that his example may not help forward the general corruption, and

that those who are injured by the perfidy of others, may from his

sincerity have a prospect of relief.

I believe all politicks that are not founded on morality will be found

fallacious and destructive, if not immediately, to those who practise

them; yet, consequentially, by their general tendency to disturb

society, and weaken those obligations which maintain the order of the

world. I shall, therefore, allow, that what justice requires from a

private man, becomes, in parallel circumstances, the duty of a nation;

and shall, therefore, never advise the violation of a solemn treaty.

The stipulations in which we engaged, when we became guarantees of the

Pragmatick sanction, are, doubtless, to be observed; and it is,

therefore, one of the strongest objections against the measures which

we are now pursuing, that we shall be perfidious at a greater expense

than fidelity would have required, and shall exhaust the treasure of

the nation without assisting the queen of Hungary.

To explain this assertion, my lords, it is necessary to take a view of

the constitution of the German body, which consists of a great number

of separate governments independent on each other, but subject, in

some degree, to the emperour as the general head. The subjects of each

state are governed by their prince, and owe no allegiance to any other

sovereign; but the prince performs homage to the emperour, and having

thereby acknowledged himself his feudatory, or dependant, may be

punished for rebellion against him. The title of the emperour, and

consequently his claim to this allegiance, and the right of issuing

the ban against those who shall refuse it, is confirmed by many solemn

acknowledgments of the diet, and, amongst others, by the grant of a

pecuniary aid; this the present emperour has indisputably received, an

aid having been already granted him in the diet, of a subsidy for

eighteen months; and, therefore, none of the troops of Germany can now

be employed against him, without subjecting the prince to whom they

belong to the censure of the ban, a kind of civil excommunication.

To what purpose, then, my lords, are we to hire, at a rate never paid,

or perhaps demanded before, troops which cannot serve us without

subjecting their prince to the charge of rebellion? Or how shall we

assist the queen of Hungary, by collecting forces which dare not act

against the only enemy which she has now to fear? Or in what new

difficulties shall we be engaged, should the inestimable dominions of

Hanover be subjected to the imperial interdiction.

These, my lords, are questions to which, I hope, we shall hear a more

satisfactory answer than I am able to conceive; for, indeed, I do not

see what remains, but to confess, that these troops are hired only for

a military show, to amuse this nation with a false appearance of zeal

for the preservation of Europe, and to increase the treasures of

Hanover at the expense of Britain.

These are designs, my lords, which no man will avow, and yet these are

the only designs which I can yet discover; and, therefore, I shall

oppose all the measures that tend to their execution. If the heat of

indignation, or the asperity of resentment, or the wantonness of

contempt, have betrayed me into any expressions unworthy of the

dignity of this house, I hope they will be forgiven by your lordships;

for any other degree of freedom I shall make no apology, having, as a

peer, a right to deliver my opinion, and as a Briton, to assert the

independence of my native country, when I see, or imagine myself to

see, that it is ignominiously and illegally subjected to the promotion

of the petty interest of the province of Hanover.

Lord CARTERET then rose, and made answer to the following effect:--My

lords, as I doubt not but I shall be able to justify the measures

which are now pursued, in such a manner as may entitle them to the

approbation of your lordships, I proposed to hear all the objections

that should be made, before I attempted a vindication, that the debate

might be shortened, and that the arguments on both sides might be

considered as placed in the full strength of opposition; and that it

might be discerned how objections, however specious in themselves,

would vanish before the light of reason and truth.

But the noble lord has made it necessary for me to alter my design, by

a speech which I will not applaud, because it has, in my opinion, an

ill tendency; nor censure, because it wanted neither the splendour of

eloquence, nor the arts of reasoning; and had no other defect than

that which must always be produced by a bad cause, fallacy in the

arguments, and errours in the assertions.

This speech I am obliged to answer, because his lordship has been

pleased to call out for any lord who will assert, that the Dutch have

agreed to concur with us in assisting the queen of Hungary. That all

the provinces of that republick have agreed to assist us, is indeed

not true; nor do I know, my lords, by whom or upon what authority it

was asserted; but the concurrence of the province of Holland, the most

important of all, and whose example the rest seldom delay to follow,

has been obtained, which is sufficient to encourage us to vigorous

resolutions, by which the rest may be animated to a speedy compliance.

The concurrence of this province has been already the consequence of

the measures which have been lately pursued; measures from which,

though just and successful, the ministry cannot claim much applause;

because all choice was denied, and they were obliged either to remain

passive spectators of the ruin of Europe, and, by consequence, of

Britain, or to do what they have done. And surely, my lords, that

necessity which deprives them of all claim to panegyrick, will be,

likewise, a sufficient security from censure. There is, indeed, no

reason to fear censure from judges so candid and experienced as your

lordships, to whom it may without difficulty be proved, that the

balance of Europe has already changed its position, and the house of

Bourbon is now not able to preponderate against the other powers.

By entering into an alliance with Sardinia, we have taken from the

crown of Spain all the weight of the territories of Italy, of which

the Austrian forces are now in possession, without fear or danger of

being interrupted; while the passes of the ocean are shut by the

fleets of Britain, and those of the mountains by the troops of

Sardinia.

Those unhappy forces which were transported by the Spanish fleet, are

not only lost to their native country, but exposed without provision,

without ammunition, without retreat, and without hope: nor can any

human prospect discover how they can escape destruction, either by the

fatigue of marches, or the want of necessaries, or the superiour force

of an army well supplied and elated with success.

This, my lords, is an embarrassment from which the Spaniards would

gladly be freed at any expense, from which they would bribe us to

relieve them, by permitting the demolition of new fortresses, or

restoring the army which we lost at Carthagena.

Of this alliance the queen of Hungary already finds the advantage, as

it preserves countries in her possession, which, if once lost, it

might be impossible to recover; and sets her free from the necessity

of dividing her army for the protection of distant territories.

Thus, my lords, the Spaniards are obstructed and distrusted; of their

armies, one is condemned to waste away at the feet of impassable

mountains, only to hear of the destruction of their countrymen whom

they are endeavouring to relieve, and the establishment of peace in

these regions of which they had projected the conquest; and the other,

yet more unfortunate, has been successfully transported, only to see

that fleet which permitted their passage preclude their supplies, and

hinder their retreat.

Nor do we, my lords, after having thus efficaciously opposed one of

the princes of the house of Bourbon, fear or shun the resentment of

the other; we doubt not to show, that Britain is still able to retard

the arms of the haughty French, and to drive them back from the

invasion of other kingdoms to the defence of their own. The time is at

hand, my lords, in which it will appear, that however the power of

France has been exaggerated, with whatever servility her protection

has been courted, and with whatever meanness her insolence has been

borne, this nation has not yet lost its influence or its strength,

that it is yet able to fill the continent with armies, to afford

protection to its allies, and strike terrour into those who have

hitherto trampled under foot the faith of treaties and rights of

sovereigns, and ranged over the dominions of the neighbouring princes,

with the security of lawful possessors, and the pride of conquerors.

It has been objected by the noble lord, that this change is not to be

expected from an army composed of auxiliary troops from any of the

provinces of the German empire, because they cannot act against the

general head. I can easily, my lords, solve this difficulty, from my

long acquaintance with the constitution of the empire, which I

understood before the noble lord, who has entertained you with a

discourse upon it, was in being; but I will not engross your time, or

retard your determination by a superfluous disquisition, which may be

now safely omitted; since I am allowed by his majesty to assure your

lordships, that the Hessian and Hanoverian troops shall be employed in

assisting the queen of Hungary, and that they have already received

orders to make the preparations necessary for marching into the

empire.

After this declaration, my lords, the most formidable objection

against the present measures will, I hope, be no more heard in this

debate; for it will be by no means proper for any lord to renew it by

inquiring, whether his majesty's resolution is not a breach of the

imperial constitution, or whether it will not expose his electoral

dominions to danger. For it is not our province to judge of the laws

of other nations, to examine when they are violated, or to enforce the

observation of them; nor is it necessary, since the interests of

Britain and Hanover are irreconcilably opposite, to endeavour the

preservation of dominions which their own sovereign is inclined to

hazard.

Thus, my lords, I hope it appears, that the common interest of Britain

and Europe is steadily pursued; that the Spaniards feel the effects of

a war with Britain by their distress and embarrassment; that the queen

of Hungary discovers, that the ancient allies of her family have not

deserted her; and that France, amidst her boasts and her projects,

perceives the determined opposers of her grandeur again setting her at

defiance.

The duke of BEDFORD spoke to the following effect:--My lords, the

assurance which the noble lord who spoke last declares himself to have

conceived of being able to demonstrate the propriety of the present

measures, must surely arise from some intelligence which has been

hitherto suppressed, or some knowledge of future events peculiar to

himself; for I cannot discover any force in the arguments which he has

been pleased to use, that could produce in him such confidence of

success, nor any circumstances in the present appearance of Europe,

that do not seem to demand a different conduct.

The reasonableness of our measures at this time, as at all others,

must be evinced by arguments drawn from an attentive review of the

state of our own country, compared with that of the neighbouring

nations; for no man will deny, that those methods of proceeding which

are at one time useful, may at another be pernicious; and that either

a gradual rotation of power, or a casual variation of interest, may

very properly produce changes in the counsels of the most steady and

vigorous administration.

It is therefore proper, in the examination of this question, to

consider what is the state of our own nation, and what is to be hoped

or feared from the condition of those kingdoms, which are most enabled

by their situation to benefit or to hurt us: and in inquiry, my lords,

an inquiry that can give little pleasure to an honest and benevolent

mind, it immediately occurs, that we are a nation exhausted by a long

war, and impoverished by the diminution of our commerce; and the

result, therefore, of this first consideration is, that those measures

are most eligible which are most frugal; and that to waste the publick

treasure in unnecessary expenses, or to load the people with new taxes

only to display a mockery of war on the continent, or to amuse

ourselves, our allies, or our enemies, with the idle ostentation of

unnecessary numbers, is to drain from the nation the last remains of

its ancient vigour, instead of assisting its recovery from its present

languors.

But money, however valuable, however necessary, has sometimes been

imprudently and unseasonably spared; and an ill-timed parsimony has

been known to hasten calamities, by which those have been deprived of

all who would not endeavour to preserve it by the loss of part. It is

therefore to be considered, whether measures less expensive would not

have been more dangerous; and whether we have not, by hiring foreign

troops, though at a very high rate, at a rate which would have been

demanded from no other nation, purchased an exemption from distresses,

insults, and invasions.

The only nations, my lords, whom we have any reason to suspect of a

design to invade us, or that have power to put any such design in

execution, are well known to be the French and Spaniards; from these,

indeed, it may justly be expected, that they will omit no opportunity

of gratifying that hatred which difference of religion and contrariety

of interest cannot fail to continue from age to age; and therefore we

ought never to imagine ourselves safe, while it is in their power to

endanger us. But of these two nations, my lords, the one is already

disarmed by the navies of Britain, which confine her fleets to their

harbours, and, as we have been just now informed, preclude her armies

from supplies: the other is without a fleet able to transport an army,

her troops are dispersed in different countries, and her treasures

exhausted by expeditions or negotiations equally expensive.

There is, therefore, my lords, no danger of an invasion, even though

we had no forces by which it could be opposed; but much less is it to

be feared, when it is remembered, that the sea is covered with our

ships of war, and that all the coasts of Europe are awed and alarmed

by the navies of Britain.

This then, my lords, is surely the time, when we ought not to have

sacrificed any immediate and apparent interest to the fear of attempts

from Spain or France; when we might without danger have assisted our

allies with our national troops, and have spared that money which we

have so lavishly bestowed upon auxiliaries; when we might securely

have shown the powers of the continent how much the British valour is

yet to be feared, and how little our late losses or disgraces are to

be imputed to the decline of our courage or our strength.

I suppose, my lords, no man will confess, that foreign troops have

been hired as more to be trusted for their skill or bravery than our

own. To dispute the palm of courage with any nation would be a

reproach to the British name; and if our soldiers are not at least

equally disciplined with those of other countries, it must be owned,

that taxes have been long paid to little purpose, that the glitter of

reviews has been justly ridiculed as an empty show, and that we have

long been flattered by our ministers and generals with false security.

But though I am far from believing, that the army has been supported

only for the defence of our country; and though I know, that their

officers are frequently engaged in employments more important in the

opinion of their directors, than that of regulating the discipline of

their regiments, and teaching the use of arms and the science of war;

yet, as I believe the courage of Britons such as may often supply the

want of skill, I cannot but conclude, that they are at least as

formidable as the troops of other countries, especially when I

remember, that they enter the field incited and supported by the

reputation of their country.

Why then, my lords, is the nation condemned to support, at once, a

double burden; to pay at home an army which can be of no use, and to

hire auxiliaries, perhaps, equally unactive; to make war, if any war

be intended, at an unnecessary expense, and to pay, at once, a fleet

which only floats upon the ocean, an army which only awes the villages

from which it is supported, and a body of mercenaries, of which no man

can yet conjecture with what design they have been retained.

That they are intended for the support of the queen of Hungary has

been, indeed, asserted; and this contract has been produced as an

instance of the zeal of our ministers for the assertion of the

Pragmatick sanction, the preservation of the liberties of Europe, and

the suppression of the ambitious enterprises of the house of Bourbon;

but surely, my lords, had the assistance of that illustrious princess

been their sole or principal intention, had they in reality dedicated

the sum which is to be received by the troops of Hanover, to the

sacred cause of publick faith and universal liberty, they might have

found methods of promoting it much more efficaciously at no greater

expense. Had they remitted that money to the queen, she would have

been enabled to call nations to her standard, to fill the plains of

Germany with the hardy inhabitants of the mountains and the deserts,

and have deluged the empire of France with multitudes equally daring

and rapacious, who would have descended upon a fruitful country like

vultures on their prey, and have laid those provinces in ruin which

now smile at the devastation of neighbouring countries, secure in the

protection of their mighty monarch.

By this method of carrying on the war, we might have secured our ally

from danger which I cannot but think imminent and formidable, though

it seems, at present, not to be feared. By so large an addition to her

troops, she would have been enabled to frustrate those designs, which

her success may incline the king of Prussia to form against her; for

with whatever tranquillity he may now seem to look upon this general

commotion, his conduct gives us no reason to imagine, that he has

changed his maxims, that he is now forgetful or negligent of his own

interest, or that he will not snatch the first opportunity of

aggrandizing himself by new pretensions to the queen of Hungary's

dominions.

At least, my lords, it may without scruple be asserted, that the hopes

which some either form or affect of engaging him in a confederacy for

the support of the Pragmatick sanction, are merely chimerical. He who

has hitherto considered no interest but his own, he who has perhaps

endangered himself by attempting to weaken the only power to which he,

as well as the other princes of the empire, can have recourse for

protection from the ambition of France, and has, therefore, broken the

rules of policy only to gratify a favourite passion, will scarcely

concur in the exaltation of that family which he has so lately

endeavoured to depress, and which he has so much exasperated against

him. If he is at length, my lords, alarmed at the ambition of the

house of Bourbon, and has learned not to facilitate those designs

which are in reality formed against himself, it cannot be doubted,

that he looks with equal fear on the house of Austria, that he knows

his safety to consist only in the weakness of both, and that in any

contest between them, the utmost that can be hoped from him is

neutrality.

But, my lords, he whose security depends only on a supposition that

men will not deviate from right reason or true policy, is in a state

which can afford him very little tranquillity or confidence: whatever

is necessarily to be preserved, ought to be defended, not only from

certain and constant danger, but from casual and possible injuries;

and amongst the rest, from those which may proceed from the mutability

of will, or the depravation of understanding; nor shall we

sufficiently establish the house of Austria, if we leave it liable to

be shaken whenever the king of Prussia shall feel his ambition

rekindled, or his malevolence excited; we must not leave it dependant

on the friendship or policy of the neighbouring powers, but must

enable it once more to awe the empire, and set at defiance the malice

of its enemies.

This, my lords, might have been done by a liberal subsidy, by which

armies might have been levied, garrisons established, and cities

fortified; and why any other method was pursued, what reason can be

assigned? what, but an inclination to aggrandize and enrich a

contemptible province, and to deck with the plunder of Britain the

electorate of Hanover?

It has been suspected, my lords, (nor has the suspicion been without

foundation,) that our measures have long been regulated by the

interest of his majesty's electoral territories; these have been long

considered as a gulf into which the treasures of this nation have been

thrown; and it has been observed, that the state of the country has,

since the accession of its princes to this throne, been changed

without any visible cause; affluence has begun to wanton in their

towns, and gold to glitter in their cottages, without the discovery of

mines, or the increase of their trade; and new dominions have been

purchased, of which it can scarcely be imagined, that the value was

paid out of the revenues of Hanover.

This, my lords, is unpopular, illegal, and unjust; yet this might be

borne, in consideration of great advantages, of the protection of our

trade, and the support of our honour. But there are men who dare to

whisper, and who, perhaps, if their suspicions receive new

confirmation, will publickly declare, that for the preservation of

Hanover, our commerce has been neglected, and our honour impaired;

that to secure Hanover from invasion, the house of Bourbon has been

courted, and the family of Austria embarrassed and depressed. These

men assert, without hesitation, that when we entered into a league

with France against the emperour and the Spaniards, in the reign of

the late emperour, no part of the British dominions were in danger;

and that the alarm which was raised to reconcile the nation to

measures so contrary to those which former ages had pursued, was a

fictitious detestable artifice of wicked policy, by which Britain was

engaged in the defence of dominions to which we owe no regard, as we

can receive no real advantage from them.

It were to be wished, that no late instance could be produced of

conduct regulated by the same principles; and that this shameful, this

pernicious partiality had been universally allowed to have ceased with

the late reign; but it has never yet been shown, that the late

neutrality, by which Hanover was preserved, did not restrain the arms

of Britain; nor when it has been asked, why the Spanish army was, when

within reach of the cannon of the British navy, peaceably transported

to Italy, has any other reason been assigned, than that the transports

could not be destroyed without a breach of the neutrality of Hanover?

This, my lords, is a subject on which I could have only been induced

to dwell, by my zeal for the present establishment, and my personal

affection for his majesty. It is universally allowed, that not only

the honour and prosperity, but the safety of a British monarch,

depends upon the affections of his subjects; and that neither splendid

levees, nor large revenues, nor standing armies, can secure his

happiness or his power any longer than the people are convinced of his

tenderness and regard, of his attention to their complaints, and his

zeal for their interest. If, therefore, it should ever be generally

believed, that our king considers this nation only as appendent to his

electoral dominions, that he promotes the interest of his former

subjects at the expense of those by whom he has been exalted to this

awful throne, and that our commerce, our treasures, and our lives, are

sacrificed to the safety, or to the enlargement of distant

territories, what can be expected? what but murmurs, disaffection, and

distrust, and their natural consequences, insurrection and rebellion;

rebellion, of which no man can foresee the event, and by which that

man may perhaps be placed upon the throne, whom we have so wisely

excluded and so solemnly abjured.

Of this unreasonable regard to the interest of Hanover, the contract

which we are now considering exhibits, if not a proof too apparent to

be denied, yet such an appearance as we ought for our own sakes and

that of his majesty to obviate; and therefore I think the, address

which is now proposed in the highest degree reasonable; and am

convinced, that by complying with our request, his majesty will regain

the affections of many of his subjects, whom a long train of

pernicious measures have filled with discontent; and preserve the

loyalty of many others, who, by artful representations of the motives

and consequences of this contract, may be alienated and perverted.

Lord BATHURST replied to the following purport:--My lords, as I have

no reason to doubt of the noble duke's affection to the present royal

family, I am convinced, that the ardour of his expressions is the

effect of his zeal, and that the force of his representations proceeds

only from the strength of his conviction; and, therefore, I am far

from intending to censure any accidental negligence of language, or

any seeming asperity of sentiment. I know, that the openness and

dignity of mind which has incited him to declare his opinion with so

much freedom, will induce him likewise to retract it, when he shall be

convinced, that he has been deceived by false representations, or that

he has formed his conclusions too hastily, without an attentive

examination of the question in its whole extent.

I shall, therefore, endeavour to explain the motives upon which all

these measures have been formed which we have heard so warmly

censured; and show, that they were the consequences not of haste and

negligence, but of vigilance and circumspection; that they were formed

upon a deliberate survey of the complicated interests of the European

powers, and dictated not by a partiality to Hanover, but a faithful

attention to the interest of Britain.

It has been already observed by a noble lord, that there was no choice

allowed us; that the state of Europe required that we should not sit

unactive; and that yet there was no other method of acting, by which

we could benefit our allies, or injure our enemies; and that,

therefore, though our interposition had not produced all the effects

which our zeal might incline us to wish, yet our conduct ought not to

be condemned; because, though we did not press forward through the

nearest path to the great object of our pursuit, we exerted our utmost

speed in the only way that was left open. This, my lords, is, in my

opinion, a very just apology; nor do I see, that this vindication can

be confuted or invalidated, otherwise than by showing, that some

different measures, measures equally reasonable, were equally in our

power.

But because the plea of necessity may, perhaps, be evaded; and because

it is, at least, pleasing to discover, that what was necessary was

likewise convenient, I shall endeavour to show, that our measures have

produced already such effects as have sufficiently rewarded our

expenses; and that we may yet reasonably hope, that greater advantages

will arise from them.

There are, indeed, some whom it will not be easy to satisfy, some who

declare not against the manner in which the war is prosecuted, but

against the war itself; who think the power of France too formidable

to be opposed, and the British people too much exhausted or enervated

to hold any longer the balance of the continent.

I have, indeed, my lords, always declared myself of a different

opinion, and have frequently endeavoured to rouse others from a kind

of indolent despair and tame acquiescence in the attempts of the

French, by representations of the wealth and force, the influence and

alliances of our own nation. I have often asserted, that I did not

doubt but her conquests might be stopped by vigorous opposition, and

that the current of her power, which had by artificial machines of

policy been raised higher than its source, would subside and stagnate,

when its course was no longer assisted by cowardice, and its way

levelled by submission.

These, my lords, were my sentiments, and this was my language, at a

time when all the powers of Europe conspired to flatter the pride of

France by falling at her feet, when her nod was solicitously watched

by all the princes of the empire, when there was no safety but by her

protection, nor any enterprise but by her permission; when her wealth

influenced the councils of nations, when war was declared at her

command in the remotest corners of Europe, and every contest was

submitted to her arbitration.

Even at this time, my lords, was I sufficiently confident of the power

of my own country, to set at defiance, in my own mind, this gigantick

state. I considered all additions to its greatness rather as the

tumour of disease than the shootings of vigour, and thought that its

nerves grew weaker as its corpulence increased. Of my own nation I

saw, that neither its numbers nor its courage were diminished; I had

no reason to believe our soldiers or our sailors less brave than their

fathers; and, therefore, imagined that whenever they should be led out

against the same enemies, they would fight with the same superiority

and the same success.

But for these hopes, my lords, I was sometimes pitied by those who

thought themselves better acquainted with the state of Europe than

myself, and sometimes ridiculed by those who had been long accustomed

to depress their own country, and to represent Britain as only the

shadow of what it once was; to deride our armies and our fleets, and

describe us impoverished and corrupted, sunk into cowardice, and

delighted with slavery.

That my opinion is now likely to be justified, and that those who have

hitherto so confidently opposed me, will soon be obliged to

acknowledge their mistake, is of very small importance; nor is my

self-love so predominant as to incline me to reckon the confirmation

of my predictions, or the vindication of my sagacity among the

benefits which we are now about to receive. We are now soon to be

convinced that France is not irresistible, nor irresistible to

Britain. We are now to see the embroilers of the universe entangled in

their own schemes, and the depopulators of kingdoms destroyed in those

fields which they have so wantonly laid waste. We shall see justice

triumphant over oppression, and insolence trampled by those whom she

has despised. We shall see the powers of Europe once more equally

balanced, and the balance placed again in the hands of Britain.

If it be required upon what events these expectations are founded; and

if it be alleged, that we have no such resolutions to hope from the

measures that have been hitherto pursued; it has been affirmed by a

noble lord, that our armies in Flanders are useless, and that our

motions have given neither courage nor strength to any other powers;

that the queen of Hungary is yet equally distressed, and that the

French still pursue their schemes without any interruption from us or

our allies, I shall hope by an impartial account of the present state

of the continent to show, that his assertions are groundless, and his

opinion erroneous.

The inactivity of our army in Flanders has, indeed, furnished a

popular topick of declamation and ridicule. It is well known how

little the bulk of mankind are acquainted, either with arts of policy,

or of war; how imperfectly they must always understand the conduct of

ministers or generals, and with what partiality they always determine

in favour of their own nation. Ignorance, my lords, conjoined with

partiality, must always produce expectations which no address nor

courage can gratify; and it is scarcely, therefore, to be hoped, that

the people will be satisfied with any account of the conduct of our

generals, which does not inform them of sieges and battles, slaughter

and devastation. They expect that a British army should overrun the

continent in a summer, that towns should surrender at their summons,

and legions retire at their shout; that they should drive nations

before them, and conquer empires by marching over them.

Such, my lords, are the effects which the people of Britain expect;

and as they have hitherto been disappointed, their disappointment

inclines them to complain. They think an army useless which gains no

victories, and ask to what purpose the sword is drawn, if the blood of

their enemies is not to be shed? But these are not the sentiments of

your lordships, whose acquaintance with publick affairs informs you,

that victories are often gained where no standards are taken, nor

newspapers filled with lists of the slain; and that by drawing the

sword opportunely, the necessity of striking is often prevented. You

know, that the army which hovers over a country, and draws the forces

which defend it to one part, may destroy it without invading it, by

exposing it to the invasion of another; and that he who withholds an

army from action, is not less useful to his ally than he that defeats

it.

This, my lords, is the present use of our troops in Flanders; the

French are kept in continual terrour, and are obliged to detach to

that frontier those troops which, had they not been thus diverted,

would have been employed in the empire; and, surely, an army is not

unactive which withholds a double number from prosecuting their

design.

That our motions have not encouraged other powers to fulfil their

engagements, or to unite in the defence of the general liberty of

Europe, cannot truly be asserted. The Dutch apparently waken from

their slumber; whether it was real or affected, they at least discover

less fear of the French, and have already given such proofs of their

inclination to join with us, as may encourage us to expect, that they

will, in a short time, form with us another confederacy, and employ

their utmost efforts in the common cause.

What they have already offered will at least enable us to assist the

queen of Hungary with greater numbers, and her to employ her troops

where she is most pressed; for they have engaged to garrison the towns

of Flanders, which, since they cannot be evacuated, is in effect an

offer of auxiliary troops; since, if those forces had been added to

the Austrian army, an equal number of Austrians must have been

subducted to garrison the frontier.

It is, therefore, without reason, that narrow-minded censurers charge

us with becoming the slaves of the Dutch, with fighting their battles

and defending their barrier, while they pursue their commerce in

tranquillity, enjoy peace at the expense of British blood, and grow

rich by the profusion of British treasure. It appears, that they

concur in the preservation of themselves and of Europe, though with

delays and caution; since, though they do not send forces into the

field, they supply the place of those which are sent, and enable

others to destroy those whom they are not yet persuaded to attack

themselves.

The constitution of that republick is, indeed, such as makes its

alliance not valuable, on sudden emergencies, in proportion to its

wealth and power. The determinations of large assemblies are always

slow; because there are many opinions to be examined, many proposals

to be balanced, and many objections to be answered. But with much more

difficulty must any important resolution be formed, where it must be

the joint act of the whole assembly, where every individual has a

negative voice, and unanimity alone can make a decision obligatory.

Wherever this is the form of government, the state lies at the mercy

of every man who has a vote in its councils; and the corruption or

folly or obstinacy of one may retard or defeat the most important

designs, lay his country open to the inroads of an enemy, dissolve the

most solemn alliances, and involve a nation in misery.

This, my lords, I need not observe to be the Dutch constitution, nor

need I tell this assembly, that we are not always to judge of the

general inclination of that people by the procedure of their deputies,

since particular men may be influenced by private views, or corrupted

by secret promises or bribes; and those designs may be retarded by

their artifices which the honest and impartial universally approve.

This is, perhaps, the true reason of the present delays which have

furnished occasion to such loud complaints, complaints of which we may

hope quickly to have an end; since it can hardly be doubted, but the

general voice of the people will there, as in other places, at last

prevail, and the prejudices or passions of private men give way to the

interest of the publick.

That the queen of Hungary is now equally distressed, and that she has

received no advantage from the assistance, which we have, at so great

an expense, appeared to give her, is, likewise, very far from being

true. Let any man compare her present condition with that in which she

was before Britain engaged in her cause, and it will easily be

perceived how much she owes to the alliance of this nation. She was

then flying before her enemies, and reduced to seek for shelter in the

remotest part of her dominions, while her capital was fortified in

expectation of a siege. Those who then were distributing her

provinces, and who almost hovered over her only remaining kingdom, are

now retiring before her troops. The army by which it was intended that

her territories in Italy should be taken from her, is now starving in

the countries which it presumed to invade; and the troops which were

sent to its assistance are languishing at the feet of mountains which

they will never pass.

These are the effects, my lords, of those measures, which, for want of

being completely understood, or attentively considered, have been so

vehemently censured. These measures, my lords, however injudicious,

however unseasonable, have embarrassed the designs of France, and

given relief to the queen of Hungary; they have animated the Dutch to

action, and kindled in all the powers of Europe, who were intimidated

by the French armies, new hopes and new resolutions; they have,

indeed, made a general change in the state of Europe, and given a new

inclination to the balance of power. Not many months have elapsed,

since every man appeared to consider the sovereign of France as the

universal monarch, whose will was not to be opposed, and whose force

was not to be resisted. We now see his menaces despised and his

propositions rejected; every one now appears to hope rather than to

fear, though lately a general panick was spread over this part of the

globe, and fear had so engrossed mankind, that scarcely any man

presumed to hope.

But it is objected, my lords, that though our measures should be

allowed not to have been wholly ineffectual, and our money appear not

to have been squandered only to pay the troops of Hanover, yet our

conduct is very far from meriting either applause or approbation;

since much greater advantages might have been purchased at much less

expense, and by methods much less invidious and dangerous.

The queen of Hungary might, in the opinion of these censurers, have

raised an hundred thousand men with the money which we must expend in

hiring only sixteen thousand, and might have destroyed those enemies

whom we have hitherto not dared to attack.

Those who make this supposition the foundation of their censures,

appear not to remember, that the queen of Hungary's dominions, like

those of other princes, may, by war, be in time exhausted; that the

loss of inhabitants is not repaired in any country but by slow

degrees; and that there is no place yet discovered where money will

procure soldiers without end, or where new harvests of men rise up

annually, ready to fight those quarrels in which their predecessors

were swept away. If the money had, instead of being employed in hiring

auxiliaries, been remitted to the queen, it is not probable that she

could, at any rate, have brought a new army together. But it is

certain, that her new troops must have been without arms and without

discipline. It might have been found, perhaps, in this general

disturbance of the world, not easy to have supplied them with weapons;

and it is well known how long time is required to teach raw forces the

art of war, and enable them to stand before a veteran enemy.

It was, therefore, necessary to assist her rather with troops than

money; and since troops were necessarily to be hired, why should we

employ the forces of Hanover less willingly than those of any other

nation? To assert that they have more or less courage than others is

chimerical, nor can any man suppose them either more brave or timorous

than those of the neighbouring countries, without discovering the

meanest prejudices, and the narrowest conceptions; without showing

that he is wholly unacquainted with human nature, and that he is

influenced by the tales of nurses, and the boasts of children.

There was, therefore, no objection against the troops of Hanover, that

was not of equal strength against all foreign troops; and there was at

least one argument in their favour, that they were subjects of the

same prince; and that, therefore, we could have no reason to fear

their defection, or to suspect their fidelity.

The electorate of Hanover, with whatever contempt or indignation some

persons may affect to mention it, is to be considered, at least, as a

state in alliance with Britain, and to receive from us that support

which the terms of that alliance may demand.

Any other regard, my lords, indeed, it is not necessary to contend

for; since it cannot be proved, that in this transaction we have acted

otherwise than as with allies, or hired the troops on conditions which

those of any other nation would not have obtained, or on any which

they will not deserve; since your lordships have received assurances,

that they are ready to enter the field, and to march into Germany

against the common enemy. That we might have raised new troops in our

own nation, and have augmented our army with an equal number of men,

cannot be denied; nor do I doubt, my lords, but our countrymen would

be equally formidable with any other forces; but it must be

remembered, that an army is not to be levied in an instant, and that

our natives, however warlike, are not born with the knowledge of the

use of arms; and who knows, whether Europe might not have been

enslaved before a British army could have been raised and disciplined

for its deliverance?

Whether this account of our measures will satisfy those who have

hitherto condemned them, I am not able to foretel. There are, indeed,

some reasons for suspecting, that they blame not, because they

disapprove, but because they think it necessary either to the

character of discernment, or of probity, to censure the ministry,

whatever maxims are pursued. Of this disposition it is no slight

proof, that contrary measures have been sometimes condemned by the

same men with the same vehemence; and that even compliance with their

demands has not stilled their outcries. When the ministry appeared

unwilling to engage in the war of Germany, without the concurrence of

the other powers who had engaged to support the Pragmatick sanction,

they were hourly reproached with being the slaves of France, with

betraying the general cause of Europe, and with repressing that

generous ardour, by which our ancestors have been incited to stand

forth as the asserters of universal liberty, and to fight the quarrel

of mankind. They were marked out as either cowards or traitors, and

doomed to infamy as the accomplices of tyranny, engaged in a

conspiracy against their allies, their country, and their posterity.

At length the Britons have roused again, and again declared themselves

the supporters of right, whenever injured; they have again raised

their standards in the continent, and prepared to march again through

those regions where their victories are yet celebrated, and their

bravery yet reverenced. The hills of Germany will again sound with the

shouts of that people who once marched to her deliverance through all

the obstructions that art or power could form against them, and which

broke through the pass of Schellembourg, to rout the armies that were

ranged behind it.

Now it might be expected, my lords, that, at least, those who were

before dissatisfied, should declare their approbation; for surely

where peace or neutrality is improper, there is nothing left but war.

Yet experience shows us, that men resolved to blame will never want

pretences for venting their malignity; and where nothing but malignity

is the consequence of opposite measures, we must necessarily conclude,

that there is a fixed resolution to blame, and that all vindications

will be ineffectual.

Some have, indeed, found out a middle course between censure and

approbation, and declare, that they think these measures now

justifiable, because we have proceeded too far to retreat with honour;

and that though at first a better scheme might have been formed, yet

this, which has hitherto been pursued, ought not now to be changed.

I, my lords, though it is not of very great importance to confute an

opinion by which the measures of the government will not be

obstructed, cannot forbear to declare myself of different sentiments,

and to assert, in opposition to artful calumnies and violent

invectives, that the present measures were originally right, that they

were such as prudence would dictate, and experience approve, and such

as we ought again to take, if we have again the power of choice.

I am, indeed, far from doubting, but these measures will, in a short

time, be justified by success; a criterion by which, however unjustly,

the greatest part of mankind will always judge of the conduct of their

governours; for it is apparent, my lords, that howsoever the French

power, commerce, and wealth, have been exaggerated by those that

either love or fear them, they will not long be able to stand against

us; their funds will in a short time fail them, and their armies must

be disbanded, when they can no longer be paid, lest, instead of

protecting their country, they should be inclined to plunder it.

The abundance of our wealth, my lords, and the profit of our commerce,

are sufficiently apparent from the price of our stocks, which were

never before supported at the same height for so long a time; and of

the fall of which neither an actual war with Spain, nor the danger

which has been suggested of another with France, with France in the

full possession of all its boasted advantages, has yet been able to

produce any token. Another proof of the exuberance of our riches, and

the prosperity of our commerce, by which they are acquired, is the

facility with which the government can raise in an instant the

greatest sums, and the low interest at which they are obtained. If we

compare our state in this respect with that of France, the insuperable

difficulties under which they must contend with us, will sufficiently

discover themselves. It is well known, my lords, that we have lately

raised the money which the service of each year required, at the

interest of three for a hundred; nor is it likely that there will be

any necessity of larger interest, though our annual demands were to be

equal to those of the last war. But the French are well known to raise

the sums which their exigencies require on very different terms, and

to have paid ten for a hundred for all the money which their late

projects have required; projects which they cannot pursue long at such

enormous expense, and by which their country must in a short time be

ruined, even without opposition.

While we can, therefore, raise three millions for less than the French

can obtain one, and, by consequence, support three regiments at the

same expense as one is supported in their service, we have surely no

reason to dread the superiority of their numbers, or to fear that they

will conquer by exhausting us.

Thus, my lords, I have delivered my opinion with freedom and

impartiality; and shall patiently hearken to any objections that shall

arise against it, supported by the consciousness, that a confutation

will only show me that I have been mistaken; but will not deprive me

of the satisfaction of reflecting, that I have not been wanting to my

country; and that if I have approved or defended improper measures, I

at least consulted no other interest than that of Britain.

Lord HERVEY spoke next, to the following effect:--My lords, it is not

without that concern which every man ought to feel at the apparent

approach of publick calamities, that I have heard the measures which

are now the subject of our inquiry so weakly defended, when their

vindication is endeavoured with so much ardour, and laboured with so

much address.

The objections which press upon the mind, at the first and slightest

view of our proceedings, are such as require the closest attention,

such as cannot but alarm every man who has studied the interest of his

country, and who sincerely endeavours to promote it; and therefore it

might be hoped, that those who appear to have thought them

insufficient, are able to produce, in opposition to them, the

strongest arguments, and the clearest deductions.

When we attempt the consideration of our present condition, and

inquire by what means our prosperity may be secured, the first

reflection that occurs, is, that we are traders, that all our power is

the consequence of our wealth, and our wealth the product of our

trade. It is well known, that trade can only be pursued under the

security of peace; that a nation which has a larger commerce, must

make war on disadvantageous terms against one that has less; as of two

contiguous countries, the more fruitful has most to fear from an

invasion by its neighbour.

It is visible, likewise, to any man who considers the situation of

Britain, that there is no nation by which our trade can in time of war

be so much obstructed as by France, of which the coasts are opposite

to ours, and which can send out small vessels, and seize our merchants

in the mouths of our harbours, or in the Channel of which we boast the

sovereignty: and all those who have heard or read of the last war, in

which we gained so much honour, and so little advantage, know that the

privateers of France injured us more than its navies or its armies;

and that a thousand victories on the continent, where we were only

contending for the rights of others, were a very small recompense for

the obstruction of our commerce; nor can he feel much tenderness for

mankind, who would purchase by the ruin and distress of a thousand

families, industrious and innocent, the momentary festivity of a

triumph, or the idle glare of an illumination.

Yet, my lords, this nation, however zealous for its commerce, is about

to engage in a war, in a war with the only state by which our commerce

can be impaired; it is about to support new armies on the continent

without allies, and without treasure.

That we are without treasure, and that our trade, by which only our

funds can be supplied, has lately been very much diminished, is too

easy to prove in opposition to the specious display which the noble

lord, who spoke last, has been pleased to make of the exuberance of

our wealth.

If the abundance of our riches be such as it has been represented, why

are no measures formed for the payment of the publick debts? of which

no man will say, that they are not in themselves a calamity, and the

source of many calamities yet greater; of which it cannot be denied,

that they multiply dependence by which our constitution may sometimes

be endangered. Why are those debts not only unpaid, but increased by

annual additions to such a height, that the payment of them must soon

become desperate, and the publick sink under the burden?

That our trade, my lords, and by consequence our wealth, is of late

diminished, may be proved beyond controversy, even to those whose

interest it is not to believe it, and upon whom, therefore, it cannot

be expected, that arguments will have a great effect. The produce of

the customs was the last year less by half a million than the mean

revenue; and as our customs must always bear a certain proportion to

trade, we may form an indisputable estimate from them of its increase

or its decline.

The rise of our stocks, my lords, is such a proof of riches, as

dropsical tumours are of health; it shows not the circulation, but the

stagnation of our money; and though it may flatter us with a false

appearance of plenty for a time, will soon prove, that it is both the

effect and cause of poverty, and will end in weakness and destruction.

When commerce flourishes, when its profit is certain and secure, men

will employ their money in the exchange of commodities, by which

greater advantage may be gained, than by putting it into the hands of

brokers; but when every ship is in danger of being intercepted by

privateers, and the insurer divides the profit of every voyage with

the merchant, it is natural to choose a safer, though a less

profitable traffick; and rather to treasure money in the funds, than

expose it on the ocean.

But, my lords, the ministers themselves have sufficiently declared

their opinion of the state of the national wealth, by the method which

they have taken to raise those supplies of which they boast with how

great facility they are raised.

When they found that new expenses required new taxes, it was necessary

to examine what could be taxed, or upon which part of the nation any

other burdens could be laid without immediate ruin. They turned over

the catalogue of all our manufactures, and found, that scarcely any of

the conveniencies, or even the necessaries of life, were without an

impost. They examined all the classes of our traders, and readily

discovered, that the greatest number of those who endeavoured to

support themselves by honest industry, were struggling with poverty,

and scarcely able to provide to-day what would be necessary to-morrow.

They saw our prisons crowded with debtors, and our papers filled with

the names of bankrupts, of whom many may be supposed to have

miscarried without idleness, extravagance, or folly.

They saw, therefore, my lords, that industry must sink under any

addition to its load, a consideration which could afford no proof of

the abundance of our wealth. They saw that our commodities would be no

longer manufactured, if their taxes were increased; and, therefore, it

was necessary to raise money by some other method, since all those

which have been hitherto practised were precluded.

This, my lords, was no easy task; but however difficult, it has been

accomplished; and to those great politicians must posterity be

indebted for a new scheme of supplying the expenses of a war.

In the time of the late ministry it had been observed, that

drunkenness was become a vice almost universal among the common

people; and that as the liquor which they generally drank was such

that they could destroy their reason by a small quantity, and at a

small expense, the consequence of general drunkenness was general

idleness; since no man would work any longer than was necessary to lay

him asleep for the remaining part of the day. They remarked, likewise,

that the liquor which they generally drank was to the last degree

pernicious to health, and destructive of that corporeal vigour by

which the business of life is to be carried on; and a law was

therefore made, by which it was intended that this species of

debauchery, so peculiarly fatal, should be prevented.

Against the end of this law no man has hitherto made the least

objection; no one has dared to signalize himself as an open advocate

for vice, or attempted to prove that drunkenness was not injurious to

society, and contrary to the true ends of human being. The

encouragement of wickedness of this shameful kind, wickedness equally

contemptible and hateful, was reserved for the present ministry, who

are now about to supply those funds which they have exhausted by idle

projects and romantick expeditions, at the expense of health and

virtue; who have discovered a method of recruiting armies by the

destruction of their fellow-subjects; and while they boast themselves

the assertors of liberty, are endeavouring to enslave us by the

introduction of those vices, which in all countries, and in every age,

have made way for despotick power.

Even this expedient, my lords, must in a short time fail them; the

products of vice as well as of commerce must in time be exhausted; and

what will then remain? The honest and industrious must feel the weight

of some new imposition, which the sagacity of experienced oppression

may find means to lay upon them; they will then first find the benefit

of this new law, since they may, by the use of those liquors which are

indulged them, put a speedy end to that life which they made unable to

support.

The means by which the expenses of our present designs are to be

supported, such means, my lords, as were never yet practised by any

state, however exhausted, or however endangered, means which a wise

nation would scarcely use to repel an invader from the capital, or to

raise works to keep off a general inundation, raise yet stronger

motions of indignation, when it is considered for what designs these

expenses are required.

We are now, my lords, raising armies, and hiring auxiliaries, for an

expedition of which no necessity can be discovered, and from which

neither honour nor advantage can be expected; we are about to force

from the people the last remains of their property, and to harass with

exactions those who are already languishing with poverty; not for the

preservation of our liberty, or the defence of our country, but for

the support of the Pragmatick sanction, for the execution of a very

unjust scheme formed by the late king, to which he purchased at

different times, on different emergencies, the concurrence of other

powers; but to which he failed to put the last seal of confirmation,

perhaps in hopes of a male heir, and left the design, which he had so

long and so industriously laboured, to be at last completed by the

kindness of his allies; having, by an unsuccessful war against the

Turks, exhausted his treasure, and weakened his troops.