perceived by me _can_ be also perceived by other persons; and if
not, how I can discover that “other persons” exist, or that any
finite person except myself is cognizant of the ideal cosmos—if the
sort of _sameness_ that Berkeley advocates is all that can be
predicated of concrete ideas; which are thus only _similar_, or
generically the same. Unless the ideas are _numerically_ the same,
can different persons make signs to one another through them?
907 Omitted in author’s last edition.
908 This seems to imply that intercourse between finite persons is
maintained through ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, under
a tacit faith in divinely guaranteed correspondence between the
phenomena of which I am conscious, and the phenomena of which my
neighbour is conscious; so that they are _practically_ “the same.”
If we are living in a fundamentally divine, and therefore absolutely
trustworthy, universe, the phenomena presented to my senses, which I
attribute to the agency of another person, are so attributed
rightly. For if not, the so-called cosmos is adapted to mislead me.
909 This explanation is often overlooked by Berkeley’s critics.
910 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 82-84.
911 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its wholly subjective and
popular meaning.
912 i.e. if you take the term _idea_ in its objective meaning.
913 “philosophic,” i.e. _pseudo_-philosophic, against which he argues.
914 Had this their relative existence—this realisation of the material
world through finite percipient and volitional life—any beginning?
May not God have been eternally presenting phenomena to the senses
of percipient beings in cosmical order, if not on this planet yet
elsewhere, perhaps under other conditions? Has there been any
beginning in the succession of finite persons?
915 In the first and second editions only.
916 Is “creation” by us distinguishable from continuous evolution,
unbeginning and unending, in divinely constituted order; and is
there a distinction between creation or evolution of _things_ and
creation or evolution of _persons_?
917 Cf. _Siris_, sect. 347-349.
918 “Matter,” i.e. Matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the
word.
919 Thus Origen in the early Church. That “Matter” is co-eternal with
God would mean that God is eternally making things real in the
percipient experience of persons.
920 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 85-156, in which the religious and
scientific advantages of the new conception of matter and the
material cosmos are illustrated, when it is rightly understood and
applied.
921 “substance and accident”—“subjects and adjuncts,”—in the first and
the second edition.
922 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 28-42. In _Siris_, sect. 294-297, 300-318,
335, 359-365, we have glimpses of thought more allied to Platonism,
if not to Hegelianism.
923 “Matter,” i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, finite or Divine.
924 These two propositions are a summary of Berkeley’s conception of the
material world. With him, the _immediate_ objects of sense, realise
in _perception_, are independent of the _will_ of the percipient,
and are thus external to his proper personality. Berkeley’s
“material world” of enlightened Common Sense, resulting from two
factors, Divine and human, is independent of each finite mind; but
not independent of all living Mind.
925 “voces male intellectæ.” Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_,
“Introduction,” sect. 6, 23-25, on the abuse of language, especially
by abstraction.
926 “veterum philosophorum.” The history of ancient speculations about
motion, from the paradoxes of Zeno downwards, is, in some sort, a
history of ancient metaphysics. It involves Space, Time, and the
material world, with the ultimate causal relation of Nature to
Spirit.
927 “hujus ævi philosophos.” As in Bacon on motion, and in the questions
raised by Newton, Borelli, Leibniz, and others, discussed in the
following sections.
928 Sect. 3-42 are concerned with the principle of Causality,
exemplified in the motion, or change of place and state, that is
continually going on in the material world, and which was supposed
by some to explain all the phenomena of the universe.
929 “vis.” The assumption that _active power_ is an immediate datum of
sense is the example here offered of the abase of abstract words. He
proceeds to dissolve the assumption by shewing that it is
meaningless.
930 “principio”—the ultimate explanation or originating cause. Cf. sect.
36. Metaphors, or indeed empty words, are accepted for explanations,
it is argued, when _bodily_ power or force, in any form, e.g.
gravitation, is taken as the real cause of motion. To call these
“occult causes” is to say nothing that is intelligible. The
perceived sensible effects and their customary sequences are all we
know. Physicists are still deluded by words and metaphors.
931 Cf. sect. 53, where _sense_, _imagination_, and _intelligence_ are
distinguished.
932 Cf. _Principles_, Introd. 16, 20, 21; also _Alciphron_, Dial. VII.
sect. 8, 17.
933 [La Materia altro non è che un vaso di Circe incantato, il quale
serve per ricettacolo della forza et de’ momenti dell’ impeto. La
forzae l’impeti sono astratti tanto sottili, sono quintessenze tanto
spiritose, che in altre ampolle non si possono racchiudere, fuor che
nell’ intima corpulenza de’ solidi naturali, Vide _Lezioni
Accademiche_.]—AUTHOR. Torricelli (1608-47), the eminent Italian
physicist, and professor of mathematics at Florence, who invented
the barometer.
934 Borelli (1608-79), Italian professor of mathematics at Pisa, and
then of medicine at Florence; see his _De Vi Percussionis_, cap.
XXIV. prop. 88, and cap. XXVII.
935 “per effectum,” i.e. by its sensible effects—real power or active
force not being a datum of the senses, but found in the spiritual
efficacy, of which we have an example in our personal agency.
936 “vim mortuam.” The only power we can find is the living power of
Mind. Reason is perpetually active in the universe, imperceptible
through the senses, and revealed to _them_ only in its sensible
effects. “Power,” e.g. “gravitation,” in things, _per se_, is
distinguished from perceived “motion” only through illusion due to
misleading abstraction. There is no _physical_ power, intermediate
between spiritual agency, on the one hand, and the sensible changes
we see, on the other. Cf. sect. 11.
937 “meditatione subigenda sunt.” Cf. _Theory of Vision Vindicated_,
sect. 35, 70.
938 “distingui.” It is here argued that so-called power within the
things of sense is not distinguishable from the sensibly perceived
sequences. To the meaningless supposition that it is, he attributes
the frivolous verbal controversies among the learned mentioned in
the following section. The province of natural philosophy, according
to Berkeley, is to inquire what the rules are under which sensible
effects are uniformly manifested. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 236, 247, 249.
_ 939 Principia Math._ Def. III.
_ 940 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. I.
941 “utiles.” Such words as “force,” “power,” “gravity,” “attraction,”
are held to be convenient in physical reasonings about the
_phenomena_ of motion, but worthless as philosophical expressions of
the _cause_ of motion, which transcends sense and mechanical
science. Cf. _Siris_, sect. 234, 235.
942 Cf. sect. 67.
943 “candem.” So in recent discussions on the conservation of force.
944 [Borellus.]—AUTHOR. See _De Vi Percussionis_, cap. XXIII.
945 [Leibnitius.]—AUTHOR.
946 On Berkeley’s reasoning all terms which involve the assumption that
real causality is something presentable to the senses are a cover
for meaninglessness. Only through self-conscious experience of
personal activity does real meaning enter into the portion of
language which deals with active causation. This is argued in detail
in sect. 21-35.
947 Our concrete experience is assumed to be confined to (_a_) _bodies_,
i.e. the data of the senses, and (_b_) _mind_ or _spirit_—sentient,
intelligent, active—revealed by internal consciousness. Cf.
_Principles_, sect. 1, 2, in which experience is resolved into
_ideas_ and the _active intelligence_ which they presuppose. Here
the word idea disappears, but, in accordance with its signification,
“bodies” is still regarded as aggregates of external phenomena, the
passive subjects of changes of place and state: the idealisation of
the material world is tacitly implied, but not obtruded.
948 “nihilque,” &c. Cf. _Principles of Human Knowledge_, e.g. sect. 26,
65, 66. where the essential passivity of the _ideas_ presented to
the senses, i.e. the material world, is maintained as a cardinal
principle—on the positive ground of our percipient experience of
sensible things. To speak of the cause of motion as _something
sensible_, he argues (sect. 24), is merely to shew that we know
nothing about it. Cf. sect. 28, 29, infra.
949 The phenomena that can be presented to the senses are taken as the
measure of what can be attributed to the material world; and as the
senses present _only_ conditioned change of place in bodies, we must
look for the active cause in the invisible world which internal
consciousness presents to us.
950 “_genus rerum cogitantium._” Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2.
951 “experientia didicimus.” Can the merely empirical data even of
internal consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition
and bodily motions, without the venture of theistic faith?
952 “a primo et universali Principio” i.e. God, or the Universal Spirit,
in whom the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation; in a
way which Berkeley does not attempt to unfold articulately and
exhaustively in philosophical system.
_ 953 Phys._ θ. 4. 255 a 5-7.
_ 954 Princip. Math._ Def. III.
955 “resistentia.” Our muscular _sensation_ of resistance is apt to be
accepted empirically as itself _active power in the concrete_,
entering very much, as has been said, into the often inaccurate idea
of power which is formed. See Editor’s Preface.
956 “nec incommode.” Cf. sect. 17, and note.
957 “hypothesis mathematica.” Cf. sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also
_Siris_, sect. 250-251.
958 “nihil.” This section sums up Berkeley’s objections to crediting
_matter_ with real power; the senses being taken as the test of what
is contained in matter. It may be compared with David Hume, Thomas
Brown, and J.S. Mill on Causation. Berkeley differs from them in
recognising active power in spirit, while with them he resolves
causation among bodies into invariable sequence.
959 Can the data presented to us reveal more than sequence, in the
relation between our volitions and the corresponding movements of
our bodies? Is not the difference found in the moral presupposition,
which _supernaturalises_ man in his voluntary or morally responsible
activity? This obliges us to see _ourselves_ as absolutely original
causes of all bodily and mental states for which we can be morally
approved or blamed.
960 “novumque genus.” Cf. sect. 21. We have here Berkeley’s antithesis
of mind and matter—spirits and external phenomena presented to the
senses—persons in contrast to passive ideas.
_ 961 De Anima_, I. ii. 13, 22, 24.
962 “Cartesius.” The antithesis of extended things and thinking things
pervades Descartes; but not, as with Berkeley, on the foundation of
the new conception of what is truly meant by matter or sensible
things. See e.g. _Principia_, P. I. §§ 63, 64.
963 “alii.” Does he refer to Locke, who suggests the possibility of
matter thinking?
964 See Aristotle, _De Anima_, I. ii. 5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI.
i. 6.
_ 965 Nat. Ausc._ VIII. 15; also _De Anima_, III, x. 7.
966 Hardly any passage in the _Timæus_ exactly corresponds to this. The
following is, perhaps, the most pertinent:—Κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπένειμεν
αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκείαν, τῶν ἑπτὰ τὴν περὶ νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν
μάλιστα οὖσαν (p. 34 a). Aristotle quotes the _Timæus_ in the same
connexion, _De Anima_, I. iii. ii.
967 “philosophi Cartesiani.” Secundum Cartesium causa generalis omnium
motuum et quietum est Deus.—Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix. 30.
_ 968 Principia Mathematica_—Scholium Generale.
969 “naturam naturantem esse Deum”—as we might say, God considered as
imminent cause in the universe. See St. Thomas Aquinas, _Opera_,
vol. XXII. Quest. 6, p. 27.
970 “juxta certam et constantem rationem.” While all changes in Nature
are determined by Will, it is not capricious but rational Will. The
so-called arbitrariness of the Language of Nature is relative to us,
and from our point of view. In itself, the universe of reality
expresses Perfect Reason.
971 “permaneret.” Cf. sect. 51.
972 “spectat potius ad philosophiam primam.” The drift of the _De Motu_
is to distinguish the physical sequences of molecular motion, which
the physical sciences articulate, from the Power with which
metaphysics and theology are concerned, and which we approach
through consciousness.
973 “regulas.” Cf. _Siris_, sect. 231-235.
974 Having, in the preceding sections, contrasted perceived motions and
their immanent originating Power—matter and mind—physics and
metaphysics—he proceeds in this and the seven following sections to
explain more fully what ha means by _principium_ and also the two
meanings (metaphysical and mechanical) of _solutio_. By
_principium_, in philosophy, he understands universally efficient
supersensible Power. In natural philosophy the term is applied to
the orderly sequences manifested to our senses, not to the active
cause of the order.
975 “ratiocinio ... redditæ universales.” Relations of the data of sense
to universalising reason are here recognised.
976 “natura motus.” Sect. 43-66 treat of the nature of the _effect_—i.e.
perceptible motion, as distinguished from its true causal origin
(_principium_) in mind or spirit. The origin of motion belongs to
metaphysics; its nature, as dependent on percipient experience,
belongs to physics. Is motion independent of a plurality of bodies;
or does it involve bodies in relation to other bodies, so that
absolute motion is meaningless? Cf. _Principles_, sect. 111-116.
977 “idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima.” The difficulty as to
definition of motion is attributed to abstractions, and the
inclination of the scholastic mind to prefer these to concrete
experience.
978 Motion is thus defined by Aristotle:—Διὸ ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια τοῦ
κινητοῦ, ᾗ κινητόν. Nat. Ausc. III. ii; see also i. and iii. Cf.
Derodon, _Physica_, I. ix.
979 Newton.
980 Cf. sect. 3-42.
981 Descartes, _Principia_, P. II. § 25; also Borellus, _De Vi
Percussionis_, p. 1.
982 “res faciles difficillimas.” Cf. _Principles_, “Introduction,” sect.
1.
983 Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δὴ χαλεπὸν αὐτὴν λαβεῖν τί ἐστίν. _Nat. Ausc._ III.
ii.
984 e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument against the possibility of motion,
referred to as a signal example of fallacy.
985 “de infinite, &c.” Cf. _Principles_, sect. 130-132, and the
_Analyst_ passim, for Berkeley’s treatment of infinitesimals.
986 “confundere.” Cf. sect. 3-42 for illustrations of this confusion.
987 The modern conception of the “conservation of force.”
988 Aristotle states the question in _Nat. Ausc._ VIII. cap. i, and
solves it in cap. iv.
989 “mutatio loci” is the effect, i.e. motion perceived by sense;
“vitale principium” the real cause, i.e. vital rational agency.
990 “moventis et moti,” i.e. as concauses.
991 “motum localem.” Sect. 52-65 discuss the reality of absolute or
empty space, in contrast with concrete space realised in perception
of the local relations of bodies. The meaninglessness of absolute
space and motion is argued. Cf. _Principles_, sect. 116, 117. See
Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, 15, 17; also _Papers which passed
between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in 1715-16_, pp. 55-59; 73-81;
97-103, &c. Leibniz calls absolute space “an ideal of some modern
Englishman.”
992 Newton’s _Principia_, Def. Sch. III. See also Derodon, _Physica_, P.
I. cap. vi. § 1.
993 Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and the “possibility of space existing
without matter,” _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13.
994 Note the account here given of _imagination_ and _intellect_, as
distinguished from _sense_, which may be compared with αἴσθησις,
φαντασία, and νοῦς in Aristotelian psychology.
995 “attributorum divinorum particeps.” See Samuel Clarke, in his
_Demonstration_, and in the _Papers between Clarke and Leibnitz_.
996 “nostrum,” sc. corpus. When we imagine space emptied of bodies, we
are apt to forget that our own bodies are part of the material
world.
997 [Vide quæ contra spatium absolutum disseruntur in libro _De
Principiis Cognitionis Humanæ_, idiomate anglicano decem abhine
annis edito.]—AUTHOR. He refers to sect. 116 of the _Principles_.
998 He treats absolute space as nothing, and relative space as dependent
on Perception and Will.
_ 999 Phys._ α. 5. 188a. 22, 23.
1000 See Locke, _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.
1001 Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed ejection of motion from the
striking body into the body struck. Is this only metaphorical? Is
the motion received by the latter to be supposed identical with, or
equivalent to, that given forth by the former?
_ 1002 Principia_, Def. IV.
_ 1003 Lezioni Accademiche._
_ 1004 De Vi Percussionis_, cap. IX.
1005 Newton’s third law of motion.
1006 Berkeley sees in motion only a link in the chain which connects the
sensible and intelligible worlds—a conception unfolded in his
_Siris_, more than twenty years later.
1007 “provincia sua.” The _De Motu_, so far as it treats of motion
perceptible to the senses, is assigned to physics; in contrast to
theology or metaphysics, alone concerned with active causation.