to Johnson, in which he says : “His remains are interred in the
Cathedral of Christ Church, and next week a monument to his memory
will be erected with an inscription by Dr. Markham, a Student of
this College.” As the son was present at, and superintended the
arrangements for his father’s funeral, it can be no stretch of
credulity to believe that he knew where his father was buried. It
may be added that Berkeley himself had provided in his Will “that my
body be buried in the churchyard of the parish in which I die.” The
Will, dated July 31, 1752, is given _in extenso_ in my _Life and
Letters_ of Berkeley, p. 345. We have also the record of burial in
the Register of Christ Church Cathedral, which shews that “on
January ye 20th 1753, ye Right Reverend John (_sic_) Berkley, Ld
Bishop of Cloyne, was buryed” there. This disposes of the statement
on p. 17 of Diprose’s _Account of the Parish of Saint Clement Danes_
(1868), that Berkeley was buried in that church.
I may add that a beautiful memorial of Berkeley has lately been
placed in the Cathedral of Cloyne, by subscriptions in this country
and largely in America.
M1 I.
46 “General ideas,” i.e. _abstract_ general ideas, distinguished, in
Berkeley’s nominalism, from _concrete_ general ideas, or from
general names, which are signs of any one of an indefinite number of
individual objects. Cf. _Principles,_ Introduction, sect. 16.
47 Introduction to the _Principles of Human Knowledge_.
M2 N.
48 “co-existing ideas,” i.e. phenomena presented in uniform order to
the senses.
M3 M. P.
M4 M. P.
M5 M.
49 Newton postulates a world of matter and motion, governed
mechanically by laws within itself: Berkeley finds himself charged
with New Principles, demanded by reason, with which Newton’s
postulate is inconsistent.
M6 E.
50 He attempts this in many parts of the _Principles_ and _Dialogues_.
He recognises the difficulty of reconciling his New Principles with
the _identity_ and _permanence_ of sensible things.
M7 M.
M8 E.
51 He contemplated thus early applications of his New Principles to
Mathematics, afterwards made in his book of _Principles_, sect.
118-32.
52 What Berkeley calls _ideas_ are either perceptible by the senses or
imagined: either way they are concrete: _abstract ideas_ are empty
words.
M9 S.
M10 M. P.
53 i.e. the existence of bodies and qualities independently of—in
abstraction from—all percipient mind. While the spiritual theism of
Descartes is acceptable, he rejects his mechanical conception of the
material world.
M11 M.
54 But a “house” or a “church” includes more than _visible_ ideas, so
that we cannot, strictly speaking, be said to see it. We see
immediately only visible signs of its invisible qualities.
M12 E.
55 This is added in the margin.
M13 N.
M14 N.
M15 N.
56 The total impotence of Matter, and the omnipotence of Mind or Spirit
in Nature, is thus early becoming the dominant thought with
Berkeley.
M16 N.
M17 N.
57 This refers to an objection to the New Principles that is apparently
reinforced by recent discoveries in geology. But if these contradict
the Principles, so does the existence of a table while I am only
seeing it.
M18 E.
58 Existence, in short, can be realised only in the form of living
percipient mind.
59 Berkeley hardly distinguishes uncontingent mathematical _relations_,
to which the sensible ideas or phenomena in which the relations are
concretely manifested must conform.
60 M. T. = matter tangible; M. V. = matter visible; M. . = matter
sensible. The distinctions n question were made prominent in the
_Essay on Vision_. See sect. 1, 121-45.
M19 P.
61 Which the common supposition regarding primary qualities seems to
contradict.
62 [That need not have been blotted out—’tis good sense, if we do but
determine wt we mean by _thing_ and _idea_.]—AUTHOR, on blank page
of the MS.
M20 P.
M21 N.
63 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. III. ch. 4, § 8, where he criticises
attempts to define motion, as involving a _petitio_.
M22 P.
M23 N.
M24 N.
64 George Cheyne, the physician (known afterwards as author of the
_English Malady_), published in 1705 a work on Fluxions, which
procured him admission to the Royal Society. He was born in 1670.
65 This reminds us of Hume, and inclines towards the empirical notion
of Causation, as merely constancy in sequence—not even continuous
metamorphosis.
66 This is Berkeley’s objection to abstract, i.e. unperceived,
quantities and infinitesimals—important in the sequel.
67 The “lines and figures” of pure mathematics, that is to say; which
he rejects as meaningless, in his horror unrealisable abstractions.
M25 I.
M26 I.
M27 M. E.
M28 E.
68 Things really exist, that is to say, in degrees, e.g. in a lesser
degree, when they are imagined than when they are actually perceived
by our senses; but, in this wide meaning of existence, they may in
both cases be said to exist.
M29 E.
69 Added on blank page of the MS.
70 In Berkeley’s limitation of the term _idea_ to what is presented
objectively in sense, or represented concretely in imagination.
Accordingly “an infinite idea” would be an idea which transcends
ideation—an express contradiction.
M30 M.
M31 M.
M32 M.
M33 S.
71 Does the _human_ spirit depend on _sensible_ ideas as much as they
depend on spirit? Other orders of spiritual beings may be percipient
of other sorts of phenomena than those presented in those few senses
to which man is confined, although self-conscious activity
abstracted from _all_ sorts of presented phenomena seems impossible.
But a self-conscious spirit is not necessarily dependent on _our_
material world or _our_ sense experience.
M34 S.
M35 S.
72 [This I do not altogether approve of.]—AUTHOR, on margin.
M36 M.
M37 S.
73 He afterwards guarded the difference, by contrasting _notion_ and
_idea_, confining the latter to phenomena presented objectively to
our senses, or represented in sensuous imagination, and applying the
former to intellectual apprehension of “operations of the mind,” and
of “relations” among ideas.
M38 E.
74 See _Principles_, sect. 89.
75 Is thought, then, independent of language? Can we realise thought
worthy of the name without use of words? This is Berkeley’s
excessive juvenile reaction against verbal abstractions.
76 Every general notion is _ideally realisable_ in one or other of its
possible concrete or individual applications.
M39 N.
M40 S.
77 This is the germ of Berkeley’s notion of the objectivity of the
material world to individual percipients and so of the rise of
individual self-consciousness.
M41 S.
78 Added by Berkeley on blank page of the MS.
79 Cf. p. 420, note 2. Bishop Sprat’s _History of the Royal Society_
appeared in 1667.
80 Much need; for what he means by _idea_ has not been attended to by
his critics.
M42 I. Mo.
81 What “Second Book” is this? Does he refer to the “Second Part” of
the _Principles_, which never appeared? God is the culmination of
his philosophy, in _Siris_.
M43 M.
82 This is Berkeley’s material substance. Individual material
substances are for him, steady aggregates of sense-given phenomena,
having the efficient and final cause of their aggregation in
eternally active Mind—active mind, human and Divine, being essential
to their realisation for man.
M44 I.
83 Cf. Introduction to the _Principles_, especially sect. 18-25.
M45 M.
84 Stillingfleet charges Locke with “discarding substance out of the
reasonable part of the world.”
M46 M.
85 The philosophers supposed the real things to exist behind our ideas,
in concealment: Berkeley was now beginning to think that the
objective ideas or phenomena presented to the senses, the existence
of which needs no proof, were _themselves_ the significant and
interpretable realities of physical science.
M47 I.
M48 M.
M49 S.
M50 I.
M51 N.
M52 P.
M53 M.
M54 N.
M55 M.
86 If the material world can be _real_ only in and through a percipient
intelligence, as the realising factor.
M56 S.
M57 Mo.
M58 Mo.
M59 Mo.
M60 I.
87 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 13, 119-122, which deny the possibility of
an idea or mental picture corresponding to abstract number.
M61 M. P.
88 “Præcedaneous,” i.e. precedent.
M62 S.
89 Who refunds human as well as natural causation into Divine agency.
M63 Mo.
90 In which Locke treats “Of the Reality of Knowledge,” including
questions apt to lead Berkeley to inquire, Whether we could in
reason suppose reality in the absence of all realising mind.
M64 M.
M65 M.
M66 E.
M67 M.
M68 Mo.
M69 I.
M70 I.
M71 I.
91 Locke’s “abstract idea” is misconceived and caricatured by Berkeley
in his impetuosity.
M72 M.
92 This and other passages refer to the scepticism, that is founded on
the impossibility of our comparing our ideas of things with
unperceived real things; so that we can never escape from the circle
of subjectivity. Berkeley intended to refute this scepticism.
M73 I.
M74 I.
M75 I.
M76 Mo.
93 Probably Samuel Madden, who afterwards edited the _Querist_.
M77 M.
94 This “First Book” seems to be “Part I” of the projected
_Principles_—the only Part ever published. Here he inclines to
“perception or thought in general,” in the language of Descartes;
but in the end he approximates to Locke’s “sensation and
reflection.” See _Principles_, sect. 1, and notes.
M78 I.
M79 E.
M80 S.
M81 S.
95 Does he mean, like Hume afterwards, that ideas or phenomena
constitute the ego, so that I am only the transitory conscious state
of each moment?
M82 S.
96 “Consciousness”—a term rarely used by Berkeley or his
contemporaries.
97 This too, if strictly interpreted, looks like an anticipation of
Hume’s reduction of the ego into successive “impressions”—“nothing
but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed
one another with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux
and movement.” See Hume’s _Treatise_, Part IV. sect. 6.
M83 S.
M84 M.
98 What “Third Book” is here projected? Was a “Third Part” of the
_Principles_ then in embryo?
M85 S.
99 This is scarcely done in the “Introduction” to the _Principles_.
M86 S.
M87 E.
100 Berkeley, as we find in the _Commonplace Book_, is fond of
conjecturing how a man all alone in the world, freed from the
abstractions of language, would apprehend the realities of
existence, which he must then face directly, without the use or
abuse of verbal symbols.
M88 E.
M89 T.
M90 I.
M91 I.
M92 E.
M93 I.
M94 I.
101 This “N. B.” is expanded in the Introduction to the _Principles_.
M95 M.
M96 S.
M97 I.
M98 M.
M99 I.
M100 M.
102 Cf. _Essay on Vision_, sect. 4.
M101 E.
M102 M.
103 What is immediately realised in our percipient experience must be
presumed or trusted in as real, if we have any hold of reality, or
the moral right to postulate that our universe is fundamentally
trustworthy.
M103 I.
M104 S.
104 But he distinguishes, in the _Principles_ and elsewhere, between an
idea of sense and a percipient ego.
M105 S.
M106 S.
M107 S.
M108 S.
M109 S.
M110 S.
M111 N.
105 They reappear in _Siris_.
M112 M.
106 In one of Berkeley’s letters to Johnson, a quarter of a century
after the _Commonplace Book_, when he was in America, he observes
that “the mechanical philosophers pretend to demonstrate that matter
is proportional to gravity. But their argument concludes nothing,
and is a mere circle”—as he proceeds to show.
107 In the _Principles_, sect. 1-33, he seeks to fulfil the expository
part of this intention; in sect. 33-84, also in the _Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous_, he is “particular in answering
objections.”
M113 S.
M114 M.
108 If Matter is arbitrarily credited with omnipotence.
M115 S.
M116 S.
M117 S.
M118 S.
M119 S.
M120 S.
109 On freedom as implied in a moral and responsible agent, cf. _Siris_,
sect. 257 and note.
M121 N.
110 Is not this one way of expressing the Universal Providence and
constant uniting agency of God in the material world?
111 Here _idea_ seems to be used in its wider signification, including
_notion_.
M122 G.
112 “infinitely greater”—Does infinity admit of imaginable degrees?
M123 G.
113 ’embrangled’—perplexed—involved in disputes.
114 See _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 24.
M124 S.
115 “homonymy,” i.e. equivocation.
116 Voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense,
nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination. He uses “thing” in
the wide meaning which comprehends persons.
M125 S.
117 Voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense,
nor can it be realised in sensuous imagination. He uses “thing” in
the wide meaning which comprehends persons.
M126 S.
M127 E.
M128 T.
M129 S.
118 Is this consistent with other entries?
M130 S.
_ 119 Essay_, Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 9-19.
M131 S.
120 This is one way of meeting the difficulty of supposed interruptions
of conscious or percipient activity.
M132 S.
M133 S.
121 This seems to imply that voluntary action is mysteriously
self-originated.
M134 S.
M135 N.
M136 T.
M137 S.
122 “perception.” He does not include the percipient.
123 “without,” i.e. unrealised by any percipient.
M138 M.
124 This would make _idea_ the term only for what is imagined, as
distinguished from what is perceived in sense.
M139 S.
M140 S.
125 In a strict use of words, only _persons_ exercise will—not _things_.
M141 S.
M142 S.
126 As we must do in imagination, which (unlike sense) is
representative; for the mental images represent original data of
sense-perception.
M143 S.
M144 S.
M145 S.
M146 I.
M147 S.
M148 Mo.
M149 Mo.
127 Does he not allow that we have _meaning_, if not _ideas_, when we
use the terms virtue and vice and moral action?
128 As Locke says we are.
M150 E.
129 “_Existence_ and _unity_ are ideas that are suggested to the
understanding by every object without and every idea within. When
ideas are in our minds, we consider that _they_ exist.” Locke’s
_Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. 7.
M151 E.
130 i.e. of Existence in the abstract—unperceived and
unperceiving—realised neither in percipient life nor in moral
action.
M152 S.
M153 S.
M154 S.
M155 S. E.
M156 G.
131 This suggests that God knows sensible things without being sentient
of any.
M157 N. Mo.
M158 Mo.
M159 I.
M160 I.
132 Cf. _Principles_, Introd., sect. 1-5.
M161 I.
133 Cf. Preface to _Principles_; also to _Dialogues_.
M162 S.
M163 I.
M164 Mo.
134 i.e. that ethics was a science of phenomena or ideas.
M165 S.
M166 I.
135 i.e. of the _independent_ existence of Matter.
M167 M.
136 ’bodies’—i.e. sensible things—not unrealised Matter.
M168 I. &c.
137 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 13.
M169 I.
138 Locke died in October, 1704.
M170 S.
139 “without the mind,” i.e. abstracted from all active percipient life.
M171 Mo.
M172 Mo.
M173 P. S.
140 e.g. secondary qualities of sensible things, in which pleasure and
pain are prominent.
141 e.g. primary qualities, in which pleasure and pain are latent.
M174 I.
M175 Mo.
M176 M.
142 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 13. § 21, ch. 17. § 4; also Bk. IV.
ch. 3. § 6; also his controversy with Bishop Stillingfleet regarding
the possibility of Matter thinking. With Berkeley real space is a
finite creature, dependent for realisation on living percipient
Spirit.
M177 I.
M178 Mo.
M179 Mo.
M180 S.
143 But what of the origination of the volition itself?
M181 M. S.
_ 144 Essay_, Bk. I. ch. iv. § 18. See also Locke’s _Letters_ to
Stillingfleet.
M182 M. S.
145 It is, according to Berkeley, the steady union or co-existence of a
group of sense-phenomena.
M183 I.
M184 I.
M185 S.
_ 146 Essay_, Bk. II. ch. i. § 10—where he argues for interruptions of
consciousness. “Men think not always.”
M186 Mo.
M187 S.
M188 S.
M189 S.
M190 S.
M191 S.
M192 S.
M193 S.
147 In other words, the material world is wholly impotent: all activity
in the universe is spiritual.
M194 I.
148 On the order of its four books and the structure of Locke’s _Essay_,
see the Prolegomena in my edition of the _Essay_, pp. liv-lviii.
M195 M.
149 i.e. independent imperceptible Matter.
M196 I.
M197 M.
150 What of the earliest geological periods, asks Ueberweg? But is there
greater difficulty in such instances than in explaining the
existence of a table or a house, while one is merely seeing, without
touching?
M198 M.
151 Locke explains “substance” as “an uncertain supposition of we know
not what.” _Essay_, Bk. I. ch. 4. § 18.
M199 E.
M200 I.
M201 Mo.
M202 Mo.
152 Locke makes certainty consist in the agreement of “our ideas with
the reality of things.” See _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 4. § 18. Here the
sceptical difficulty arises, which Berkeley meets under his
Principle. If we have no perception of reality, we cannot compare
our ideas with it, and so cannot have any criterion of reality.
M203 Mo.
M204 Mo.
153 [This seems wrong. Certainty, real certainty, is of sensible ideas.
I may be certain without affirmation or negation.—AUTHOR.] This
needs further explanation.
M205 Mo.
M206 Mo.
M207 Mo.
M208 I.
154 This entry and the preceding tends to resolve all judgments which
are not what Kant calls analytical into contingent.
M209 I.
M210 I.
M211 E.
M212 N. Mo.
155 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 1, §§ 3-7, and ch. 3. §§ 7-21. The
stress Berkeley lays on “co-existence” is significant.
M213 P.
156 i.e. we must not doubt the reality of the immediate data of sense
but accept it, as “the mob” do.
M214 I.
M215 S.
M216 S.
157 But is imagination different from actual perception only in _degree_
of reality?
M217 S.
M218 E.
158 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 13, 120; also Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch.
7. sect. 7.
M219 I.
159 Cf. _Principles_, Introduction, sect. 1.
M220 I.
160 Berkeley’s aim evidently is to deliver men from empty abstractions,
by a return to more reasonably interpreted common-sense.
M221 S.
161 The sort of _external_ world that is intelligible to us is that of
which _another person_ is percipient, and which is _objective_ to
me, in a percipient experience foreign to mine.
M222 S.
M223 Mo.
M224 S.
162 Cf. Berkeley’s _Arithmetica_ and _Miscellanea Mathematica_,
published while he was making his entries in this _Commonplace
Book_.
163 Minima sensibilia?
M225 Mo.
M226 E.
M227 Mo.
M228 Mo.
164 Pleasures, _quâ_ pleasures, are natural causes of correlative
desires, as pains or uneasinesses are of correlative aversions. This
is implied in the very nature of pleasure and pain.
M229 I.
M230 I.
165 Here we have his explanation of _idea_.
M231 M. S.
166 Absent things.
167 Here, as elsewhere, he resolves geometry, as strictly demonstrable,
into a reasoned system of analytical or verbal propositions.
M232 I. M.
168 Compare this with note 3, p. 34; also with the contrast between
Sense and Reason, in _Siris_. Is the statement consistent with
implied assumptions even in the _Principles_, apart from which they
could not cohere?
M233 S. G.
M234 E.
M235 G.
169 To have an _idea_ of God—as Berkeley uses idea—would imply that God
is an immediately perceptible, or at least an imaginable object.
M236 M. E.
170 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 89.
M237 I.
M238 M. S.
M239 S.
M240 Mo.
M241 S.
M242 M.
171 Ch. 11. § 5.
M243 S.
M244 E.
172 Why add—“or perception”?
M245 Mo.
M246 M.
173 Here we have Berkeley’s favourite thought of the divine
arbitrariness of the constitution of Nature, and of its laws of
change.
M247 M. S.
M248 S.
M249 S.
174 This suggests the puzzle, that the cause of every volition must be a
preceding volition, and so on _ad infinitum_.
M250 S.
M251 E. S.
M252 M. P. E.
_ 175 Recherche_, I. 19.
M253 P.
176 i.e. of his own individual mind.
M254 M. P.
177 i.e. to _a_ percipient mind, but not necessarily to _mine_; for
natural laws are independent of individual will, although the
individual participates in perception of the ordered changes.
178 Cf. the _Arithmetica_.
M255 M. N.
M256 G.
M257 S.
179 i.e. which are not phenomena. This recognition of originative Will
even then distinguished Berkeley.
M258 M.
180 Is this Part II of the _Principles_, which was lost in Italy?
M259 I. S.
M260 I. Mo.
M261 S.
181 The thought of articulate _relations_ to which real existence must
conform, was not then at least in Berkeley’s mind. Hence the
empiricism and sensationalism into which he occasionally seems to
rush in the _Commonplace Book_, in his repulsion from empty
abstractions.
M262 G. S.
182 This is the essence of Berkeley’s philosophy—“a blind agent is a
contradiction.”
M263 G.
M264 S.
M265 S.
M266 S. Mo.
M267 Mo. N.
M268 M.
183 This is the basis of Berkeley’s reasoning for the necessarily
_unrepresentative_ character of the ideas or phenomena that are
presented to our senses. _They_ are the originals.
M269 M. S.
M270 S.
M271 S.
M272 S.
M273 M.
M274 M.
M275 G.
184 Berkeley’s horror of abstract or unperceived space and atoms is
partly explained by dogmas in natural philosophy that are now
antiquated.
M276 I. E.
M277 G.
185 Ralph [?] Raphson, author of _Demonstratio de Deo_ (1710), and also
of _De Spatio Reali, seu ente Infinito: conamen
mathematico-metaphysicum_ (1697), to which Berkeley refers in one of
his letters to Johnson. See also Green’s _Principles of Natural
Philosophy_ (1712). The immanence of omnipotent goodness in the
material world was unconsciously Berkeley’s presupposition. In God
we have our being.
M278 S.
M279 S.
M280 G.
M281 E. N.
186 Note here Berkeley’s version of the causal principle, which is
really the central presupposition of his whole philosophy—viz. every
event in the material world must be the issue of acting Will.
M282 P.
M283 S.
187 So Locke on an ideally perfect memory. _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. x. § 9.
M284 G.
M285 M.
188 John Sergeant was the author of _Solid Philosophy asserted against
the Fancies of the Ideists_ (London, 1697); also of _the Method to
Science_ (1696). He was a deserter from the Church of England to the
Church of Rome, and wrote several pieces in defence of Roman
theology—some of them in controversy with Tillotson.
M286 S.
M287 E. S.
189 Spirit and Matter are mutually dependent; but Spirit is the
realising factor and real agent in the universe.
M288 M.
M289 P.
M290 G.
190 See Descartes, _Meditations_, III; Spinoza, _Epist._ II, ad
Oldenburgium.
M291 S.
191 Cf. _Principles_, sect. 2.
M292 S.
M293 S.
M294 N. S.
M295 Mo.
M296 Mo.
M297 Mo. N.
192 Is “inclusion” here virtually a synonym for verbal definition?
M298 S.
M299 N.
M300 N.
M301 S.
M302 I.
M303 I.
M304 I.
M305 M.
M306 M.
M307 M. S.
193 See _Principles_, sect. 2. The universe of Berkeley consists of
Active Spirits that perceive and produce motion in impotent ideas or
phenomena, realised in the percipient experience of persons. All
supposed powers in Matter are refunded into Spirit.
M308 P.
M309 P.
M310 I.
M311 S.
M312 S.
M313 S.
M314 S.
194 When self-conscious agents are included among “things.” We can have
no sensuous image, i.e. idea, of _spirit_, although he maintains we
can use the word intelligently.
M315 Mo.
M316 M.
M317 S. G.
M318 P.
M319 M.
M320 S.
M321 M. P.
M322 Mo. N.
195 Berkeley insists that we should individualise our thinking—“ipsis
consuescere rebus,” as Bacon says,—to escape the dangers of
artificial signs. This is the drift of his assault on abstract
ideas, and his repulsion from what is not concrete. He would even
dispense with words in his meditations in case of being
sophisticated by abstractions.
M323 N.
196 Nature or the phenomenal world in short is the revelation of
perfectly reasonable Will.
M324 M. S.
M325 S.
197 Gerard De Vries, the Cartesian.
M326 S.
M327 G. T.
M328 T.
M329 T.
M330 T.
M331 M.
M332 M.
M333 M.
M334 M.
198 Are the things of sense only modes in which percipient persons
exist?
M335 N.
199 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8.
M336 M. S.
M337 M.
M338 M.
M339 T.
M340 M.
M341 N.
M342 M.
M343 T.
200 Time being relative to the capacity of the percipient.
201 See Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8.
M344 M.
202 To perceive what is not an idea (as Berkeley uses idea) is to
perceive what is not realised, and therefore not real.
203 So things have a _potential_ objective existence in the Divine Will.
204 With Berkeley, change is time, and time, abstracted from all
changes, is meaningless.
205 Could he know, by seeing only, even that he _had_ a body?
M345 M.
M346 M.
M347 M.
M348 M.
M349 M. N.
M350 N.
206 “the ideas attending these impressions,” i.e. the ideas that are
correlatives of the (by us unperceived) organic impressions.
M351 M.
M352 M.
M353 M.
207 The Italian physical and metaphysical philosopher Fardella
(1650-1718) maintained, by reasonings akin to those of Malebranche,
that the existence of the material world could not be scientifically
proved, and could only be maintained by faith in authoritative
revelation. See his _Universæ Philosophiæ Systema_ (1690), and
especially his _Logica_ (1696).
M354 M.
208 Locke’s _Essay_, Bk. IV. ch. 11.
209 What does he mean by “unknown substratum”?
M355 M.
M356 S.
M357 M.
M358 M.
210 He gets rid of the infinite in quantity, because it is incapable of
concrete manifestation to the senses. When a phenomenon given in
sense reaches the _minimum sensibile_, it reaches what is for us the
margin of realisable existence: it cannot be infinitely little and
still a phenomenon: insensible phenomena of sense involve a
contradiction. And so too of the infinitely large.
M359 T.
211 In short he would idealise the visible world but not the tangible
world. In the _Principles_, Berkeley idealises both.
M360 S.
M361 M.