as any other mind or spirit whatsoever, distinct from ourselves. We may
even assert that the existence of God is far more evidently perceived than
the existence of men; because the effects of Nature are infinitely more
numerous and considerable than those ascribed to human agents. There is
not any one mark that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does
not more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author of
Nature(761). For it is evident that, in affecting other persons, the will
of man hath no other object than barely the motion of the limbs of his
body; but that such a motion should be attended by, or excite any idea in
the mind of another, depends wholly on the will of the Creator. He alone
it is who, “upholding all things by the word of His power,” maintains that
intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the
existence of each other(762). And yet this pure and clear Light which
enlightens everyone is itself invisible [(763)to the greatest part of
mankind].
148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd that they
cannot _see_ God. Could we but see Him, say they, as we see a man, we
should believe that He is, and believing obey His commands. But alas, we
need only open our eyes to see the Sovereign Lord of all things, with a
_more_ full and clear view than we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not
that I imagine we see God (as some will have it) by a direct and immediate
view; or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that which
represents them in the essence of God; which doctrine is, I must confess,
to me incomprehensible(764). But I shall explain my meaning. A human
spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an idea. When
therefore we see the colour, size, figure, and motions of a man, we
perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own minds; and
these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to
mark out unto us the existence of finite and created spirits like
ourselves. Hence it is plain we do not see a man, if by _man_ is meant,
that which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do: but only such a
certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there is a distinct
principle of thought and motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and
represented by it. And after the same manner we see God: all the
difference is that, whereas some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas
denotes a particular human mind, whithersoever we direct our view we do at
all times and in all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity:
everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, being a sign
or effect of the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions
which are produced by men(765).
149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to any one
that is capable of the least reflexion than the existence of God, or a
Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that
variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us, on whom we
have an absolute and entire dependence, in short “in whom we live, and
move, and have our being.” That the discovery of this great truth, which
lies so near and obvious to the mind, should be attained to by the reason
of so very few, is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men,
who, though they are surrounded with such clear manifestations of the
Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were,
blinded with excess of light(766).
150. But you will say—Hath Nature no share in the production of natural
things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation
of God? I answer, If by _Nature_ is meant only the _visible series_ of
effects or sensations imprinted on our minds according to certain fixed
and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense,
cannot produce anything at all(767). But if by _Nature_ is meant some
being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature and things
perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound,
without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this
acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not
just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God. But it is
more unaccountable that it should be received among Christians, professing
belief in the Holy Scriptures, which constantly ascribe those effects to
the immediate hand of God that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to
Nature. “The Lord, He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings
with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of His treasures.” Jerem. x. 13.
“He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and maketh the day dark
with night.” Amos v. 8. “He visiteth the earth, and maketh it soft with
showers: He blesseth the springing thereof, and crowneth the year with His
goodness; so that the pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys
are covered over with corn.” See Psal. lxv. But, notwithstanding that this
is the constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what
aversion from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in our
affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off, and substitute
some blind unthinking deputy in His stead; though (if we may believe Saint
Paul) “He be not far from every one of us.”
151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow, gradual, and
roundabout methods observed in the production of natural things do not
seem to have for their cause the _immediate_ hand of an Almighty Agent:
besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains
falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like,
are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately
actuated and superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness.
But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62;
it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely
necessary in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and
after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and
goodness of God(768). [(769)For, it doth hence follow that the finger of
God is not so conspicuous to the resolved and careless sinner; which gives
him an opportunity to harden in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance.
(Vid. sect. 57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty
machine of Nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on
our senses, the Hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to
men of flesh and blood. “Verily” (saith the prophet) “thou art a God that
hidest thyself.” Isaiah xlv. 15. But, though the Lord conceal Himself from
the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of
thought(770), yet to an unbiassed and attentive mind, nothing can be more
plainly legible than the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who
fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system of Being. It is clear,
from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to
general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of
life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach
and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no
manner of purpose. It were even impossible there should be any such
faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration
abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence
arise(771).
152. We should further consider, that the very blemishes and defects of
nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of
variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in
a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We
would likewise do well to examine, whether our taxing the waste of seeds
and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals before they
come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not
the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and
saving mortals. In _man_ indeed a thrifty management of those things which
he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom.
But we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or
vegetable costs the great Creator any more pains or trouble in its
production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an
Omnipotent Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere _fiat_ or
act of his will. Hence it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural
things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the Agent who
produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of His
power.
153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world,
pursuant to the general laws of Nature, and the actions of finite,
imperfect Spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is
indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too
narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into
our thoughts, and account it _evil_. Whereas, if we enlarge our view, so
as to comprehend the various ends, connexions, and dependencies of things,
on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and
pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are
put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those
particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have
the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of
beings(772).
154. From what hath been said, it will be manifest to any considering
person, that it is merely for want of attention and comprehensiveness of
mind that there are any favourers of Atheism or the Manichean Heresy to be
found. Little and unreflecting souls may indeed burlesque the works of
Providence; the beauty and order whereof they have not capacity, or will
not be at the pains, to comprehend(773). But those who are masters of any
justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to reflect, can never
sufficiently admire the divine traces of Wisdom and Goodness that shine
throughout the economy of Nature. But what truth is there which glares so
strongly on the mind that, by an aversion of thought, a wilful shutting of
the eyes, we may not escape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at,
if the generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure, and
little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not have all that
conviction and evidence of the Being of God which might be expected in
reasonable creatures(774)?
155. We should rather wonder that men can be found so stupid as to
neglect, than that neglecting they should be unconvinced of such an
evident and momentous truth(775). And yet it is to be feared that too many
of parts and leisure, who live in Christian countries, are, merely through
a supine and dreadful negligence, sunk into a sort of Atheism. [(776)They
cannot say there is not a God, but neither are they convinced that there
is. For what else can it be but some lurking infidelity, some secret
misgivings of mind with regard to the existence and attributes of God,
which permits sinners to grow and harden in impiety?] Since it is
downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a thorough
sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that Almighty Spirit
should persist in a remorseless violation of His laws. We ought,
therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on those important points; that
so we may attain conviction without all scruple “that the eyes of the Lord
are in every place, beholding the evil and the good; that He is with us
and keepeth us in all places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and
raiment to put on;” that He is present and conscious to our innermost
thoughts; and, that we have a most absolute and immediate dependence on
Him. A clear view of which great truths cannot choose but fill our hearts
with an awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest
incentive to Virtue, and the best guard against Vice.
156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies is, the
consideration of GOD and our DUTY; which to promote, as it was the main
drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem them altogether useless
and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I cannot inspire my readers with
a pious sense of the Presence of God; and, having shewn the falseness or
vanity of those barren speculations which make the chief employment of
learned men, the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary
truths of the Gospel; which to know and to practise is the highest
perfection of human nature.
THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS THE DESIGN OF WHICH IS PLAINLY
TO DEMONSTRATE THE REALITY AND PERFECTION OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE, THE
INCORPOREAL NATURE OF THE SOUL, AND THE IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OF A DEITY,
IN OPPOSITION TO SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS, ALSO TO OPEN A METHOD FOR
RENDERING THE SCIENCES MORE EASY, USEFUL, AND COMPENDIOUS
_First published in 1713_
Editor’s Preface
This work is the gem of British metaphysical literature. Berkeley’s claim
to be the great modern master of Socratic dialogue rests, perhaps, upon
_Alciphron_, which surpasses the conversations between Hylas and Philonous
in expression of individual character, and in dramatic effect. Here
conversation is adopted as a convenient way of treating objections to the
conception of the reality of Matter which had been unfolded systematically
in the book of _Principles_. But the lucid thought, the colouring of
fancy, the glow of human sympathy, and the earnestness that pervade the
subtle reasonings pursued through these dialogues, are unique in English
metaphysical literature. Except perhaps Hume and Ferrier, none approach
Berkeley in the art of uniting metaphysical thought with easy, graceful,
and transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are increased when we
recollect that this charming production of reason and imagination came
from Ireland, at a time when that country was scarcely known in the world
of letters and philosophy.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
The immediate impression produced by the publication of the _Principles_,
is shewn in Berkeley’s correspondence with Sir John Percival. Berkeley was
eager to hear what people had to say for or against what looked like a
paradox apt to shock the reader; but in those days he was not immediately
informed by professional critics. “If when you receive my book”—he wrote
from Dublin in July, 1710, to Sir John Percival(777), then in London,—“you
can procure me the opinion of some of your acquaintances who are thinking
men, addicted to the study of natural philosophy and mathematics, I shall
be extremely obliged to you.” In the following month he was informed by
Sir John that it was “incredible what prejudice can work in the best
geniuses, even in the lovers of novelty. For I did but name the subject
matter of your book of _Principles_ to some ingenious friends of mine and
they immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time refusing to
read it, which I have not yet got one to do. A physician of my
acquaintance undertook to discover your person, and argued you must needs
be mad, and that you ought to take remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a
desire of starting something new should put you upon such an undertaking.
Another told me that you are not gone so far as a gentleman in town, who
asserts not only that there is no such thing as Matter, but that we
ourselves have no being at all.”
Berkeley’s reply is interesting. “I am not surprised,” he says, “that I
should be ridiculed by those who won’t take the pains to understand me. If
the raillery and scorn of those who criticise what they will not be at the
pains to understand had been sufficient to deter men from making any
attempts towards curing the ignorance and errors of mankind, we should not
have been troubled with some very fair improvements in knowledge. The
common cry’s being against any opinion seems to me, so far from proving
false, that it may with as good reason pass for an argument of its truth.
However, I imagine that whatever doctrine contradicts vulgar and settled
opinion had need be introduced with great caution into the world. For this
reason it was that I omitted all mention of the non-existence of Matter in
the title-page, dedication, preface and introduction to the _Treatise on
the Principles of Human Knowledge_; that so the notion might steal
unawares upon the reader, who probably might never have meddled with the
book if he had known that it contained such paradoxes.”
With characteristic fervour he disclaims “variety and love of paradox” as
motives of the book of _Principles_, and professes faith in the unreality
of abstract unperceived Matter, a faith which he has held for some years,
“the conceit being at first warm in my imagination, but since carefully
examined, both by my own judgment and that of ingenious friends.” What he
especially complained of was “that men who have never considered my book
should confound me with the sceptics, who doubt the existence of sensible
things, and are not positive as to any one truth, no, not so much as their
own being—which I find by your letter is the case of some wild visionist
now in London. But whoever reads my book with attention will see that
there is a direct opposition between the principles that are contained in
it and those of the sceptics, and that I question not the existence of
anything we perceive by our senses. I do not deny the existence of the
sensible things which Moses says were created by God. They existed from
all eternity, in the Divine Intellect; and they became perceptible (i.e.
were created) in the same manner and order as is described in Genesis. For
I take creation to belong to things only as they respect finite spirits;
there being nothing new to God. Hence it follows that the act of creation
consists in God’s willing that those things should become perceptible to
other spirits which before were known only to Himself. Now both reason and
scripture assure us that there _are_ other spirits besides men, who, ’tis
possible, might have perceived this visible world as it was successively
exhibited to their view before man’s creation. Besides, for to agree with
the Mosaic account of the creation, it’s sufficient if we suppose that a
man, in case he was existing at the time of the chaos of sensible things,
might have perceived all things formed out of it, in the very order set
down in scripture; all which is in no way repugnant to my principles.”
Sir John in his next letter, written from London in October, 1716, reports
that the book of _Principles_ had fallen into the hands of the highest
living English authority in metaphysical theology, Samuel Clarke, who had
produced his _Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God_ four years
before. The book had also been read by Whiston, Newton’s successor at
Cambridge. “I can only report at second-hand,” he says, “that they think
you a fair arguer, and a clear writer; but they say your first principles
you lay down are false. They look upon you as an extraordinary genius,
ranking you with Father Malebranche, Norris, and another whose name I
forget, all of whom they think extraordinary men, but of a particular turn
of mind, and their labours of little use to mankind, on account of their
abstruseness. This may arise from these gentlemen not caring to think
after a new manner, which would oblige them to begin their studies anew;
or else it may be the strength of prejudice.”
Berkeley was vexed by this treatment on the part of Clarke and Whiston. He
sent under Sir John’s care a letter to each of them, hoping through him to
discover “their reasons against his notions, as truth is his sole aim.”
“As to what is said of ranking me with Father Malebranche and Mr. Norris,
whose writings are thought to be too fine-spun to be of any great use to
mankind, I have this answer, that I think the notions I embrace are not in
the least agreeing with theirs, but indeed plainly inconsistent with them
in the main points, inasmuch as I know few writers I take myself at bottom
to differ more from than from them. Fine-spun metaphysics are what on all
occasions I declare against, and if any one shall shew anything of that
sort in my Treatise I will willingly correct it.” Sir John delivered the
letters to two friends of Clarke and Whiston, and reported that “Dr.
Clarke told his friend in reply, that he did not care to write you his
thoughts, because he was afraid it might draw him into a dispute upon a
matter which was already clear to him. He thought your first principles
you go on are false; but he was a modest man, his friend said, and
uninclined to shock any one whose opinions on things of this nature
differed from his own.” This was a disappointment to the ardent Berkeley.
“Dr. Clarke’s conduct seems a little surprising,” he replies. “That an
ingenious and candid person (as I take him to be) should refuse to shew me
where my error lies is something unaccountable. I never expected that a
gentleman otherwise so well employed as Dr. Clarke should think it worth
his while to enter into a dispute with me concerning any notions of mine.
But, seeing it was clear to him I went upon false principles, I hoped he
would vouchsafe, in a line or two, to point them out to me, that so I may
more closely review and examine them. If he but once did me this favour,
he need not apprehend I should give him any further trouble. I should be
glad if you have opportunity that you would let his friend know this.
There is nothing that I more desire than to know thoroughly all that can
be said against what I take for truth.” Clarke, however, was not to be
drawn. The incident is thus referred to by Whiston, in his _Memoirs_ of
Clarke. “Mr. Berkeley,” he says, “published in 1710, at Dublin, the
metaphysical notion, that matter was not a real thing(778); nay, that the
common opinion of its reality was groundless, if not ridiculous. He was
pleased to send Mr. Clarke and myself each of us a book. After we had
perused it, I went to Mr. Clarke to discourse with him about it, to this
effect, that I, being not a metaphysician, was not able to answer Mr.
Berkeley’s subtle premises, though I did not believe his absurd
conclusions. I therefore desired that he, who was deep in such subtleties,
but did not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley’s conclusion, would answer him.
_Which task he declined_.”