then I’m not the same person I was this day twelvemonth but while I think
of wt I then did. Not in potential; for then all persons may be the same,
for ought we know.
Mem. Story of Mr. Deering’s aunt.
Two sorts of potential consciousness—natural & præternatural. In the last
§ but one, I mean the latter.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to a determined
tangible extension, as inch, foot, &c., this, ’tis plain, cannot be
properly & _per se_ perceived by sight; & as for determin’d visible
inches, feet, &c., there can be no such thing obtain’d by the meer act of
seeing—abstracted from experience, &c.
The greatness _per se_ perceivable by the sight is onely the proportion
any visible appearance bears to the others seen at the same time; or
(which is the same thing) the proportion of any particular part of the
visual orb to the whole. But mark that we perceive not it is an orb, any
more than a plain, but by reasoning.
This is all the greatness the pictures have _per se_.
Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extension of any object, it
not availing to know the object makes such a part of a sphærical surface
except we also know the greatness of the sphærical surface; for a point
may subtend the same angle wth a mile, & so create as great an image in
the retina, i.e. take up as much of the orb.
Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by distinctness and
confusion, with some other circumstances, by great & little angles.
Hence ’tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected with greatness
might have been connected wth smallness, and vice versâ: there being no
necessary reason why great angles, faintness, and distinctness without
straining, should stand for great extension, any more than a great angle,
vigorousness, and confusion(227).
My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general scholastic
way, but in some measure to accommodate them to the sciences, and shew how
they may be useful in optiques, geometry, &c.(228)
Qu. Whether _per se_ proportion of visible magnitudes be perceivable by
sight? This is put on account of distinctness and confusedness, the act of
perception seeming to be as great in viewing any point of the visual orb
distinctly, as in viewing the whole confusedly.
Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically nice as
possible—to avoid giving handle.
If men could without straining alter the convexity of their crystallines,
they might magnify or diminish the apparent diameters of objects, the same
optic angle remaining.
The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not determin’d;
for the nearer a man views them, the images of them (as well as other
objects) will take up the greater room in the fund of his eye.
Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the nature and
manner of demonstrating, &c.
Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being perfectly
and _toto cælo_ different—the one the proportion that any one appearance
has to the sum of appearances perceived at the same time wth it, wch is
proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to segments of sphærical
surfaces;—the other is tangible bigness.
Qu. wt would happen if the sphæræ of the retina were enlarged or
diminish’d?
We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do
not; also that we perceive solids, yet we do not; also the inequality of
things seen under the same angle, yet we do not.
Why may I not add, We think we see extension by meer vision? Yet we do
not.
Extension seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the ear.
As long as the same angle determines the _minimum visibile_ to two
persons, no different conformation of the eye can make a different
appearance of magnitude in the same thing. But, it being possible to try
the angle, we may certainly know whether the same thing appears
differently big to two persons on account of their eyes.
If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him than to another;
hence there is another sort of purely visible magnitude beside the
proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere, viz. its proportion
to the M. V.
Were there but one and the same language in the world, and did children
speak it naturally as soon as born, and were it not in the power of men to
conceal their thoughts or deceive others, but that there were an
inseparable connexion between words & thoughts, so yt _posito uno, ponitur
alterum_ by the laws of nature; Qu. would not men think they heard
thoughts as much as that they see extension(229)?
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
All our ideas are adæquate: our knowledge of the laws of nature is not
perfect & adæquate(230).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M388) Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the
things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as much without the mind as
figure, motion, time, &c.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
We know many things wch we want words to express. Great things
discoverable upon this principle. For want of considering wch divers men
have run into sundry mistakes, endeavouring to set forth their knowledge
by sounds; wch foundering them, they thought the defect was in their
knowledge, while in truth it was in their language.
Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man’s head be liker the
sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from his legs?
Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely
different that makes me judge them the same?
Wt I see is onely variety of colours & light. Wt I feel is hard or soft,
hot or cold, rough or smooth, &c. Wt resemblance have these thoughts with
those?
A picture painted wth great variety of colours affects the touch in one
uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because I see 2, I shall
feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I shall feel angles or
inequalities. How therefore can I—before experience teaches me—know that
the visible leggs are (because 2) connected wth the tangible ones, or the
visible head (because one) connected wth the tangible head(231)?
(M389) All things by us conceivable are—
1st, thoughts;
2ndly, powers to receive thoughts;
3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all wch can possibly exist in
an inert, senseless thing.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
An object wthout a glass may be seen under as great an angle as wth a
glass. A glass therefore does not magnify the appearance by the angle.
(M390) Absurd that men should know the soul by idea—ideas being inert,
thoughtless. Hence Malbranch confuted(232).
I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see figure or
distance.
Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro’ a convex glass are not magnify’d?
Tho’ we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant, why should we
therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion betwixt the same angle,
further distant, and greaterness?
(M391) My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.
Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so exist, whether
perfect or no), but in the mind.
Lines thought divisible _ad infinitum_, because they are suppos’d to exist
without. Also because they are thought the same when view’d by the naked
eye, & wn view’d thro’ magnifying glasses.
They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the divisibility
_ad infinitum_.
No idea of circle, &c. in abstract.
Metaphysiques as capable of certainty as ethiques, but not so capable to
be demonstrated in a geometrical way; because men see clearer & have not
so many prejudices in ethiques.
Visible ideas come into the mind very distinct. So do tangible ideas.
Hence extension seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &c. are more blended.
Qu. Why not extension intromitted by the taste in conjunction with the
smell—seeing tastes & smells are very distinct ideas?
Blew and yellow particles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform green, their
extension is not perceiv’d; but as soon as they exhibit distinct
sensations of blew and yellow, then their extension is perceiv’d.
Distinct perception of visible ideas not so perfect as of
tangible—tangible ideas being many at once equally vivid. Hence
heterogeneous extension.
Object. Why a mist increases not the apparent magnitude of an object, in
proportion to the faintness(233)?
Mem. To enquire touching the squaring of the circle, &c.
That wch seems smooth & round to the touch may to sight seem quite
otherwise. Hence no _necessary_ connexion betwixt visible ideas and
tangible ones.
In geometry it is not prov’d that an inch is divisible _ad infinitum_.
Geometry not conversant about our compleat determined ideas of figures,
for these are not divisible _ad infinitum_.
Particular circles may be squar’d, for the circumference being given a
diameter may be found betwixt wch & the true there is not any perceivable
difference. Therefore there is no difference—extension being a perception;
& a perception not perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In vain
to alledge the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, for in yt
case there is (’tis true) a difference perceiv’d, but not between the same
ideas, but others much greater, entirely different therefrom(234).
Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may be squar’d, by the
common way, most accurately; or even perceivable by any other being, see
he never so acute, i.e. never so small an arch of a circle; this being wt
makes the distinction between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men
are perhaps apt to think.
The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore further enquiry of
accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly needless, & time thrown
away.
Mem. To press wt last precedes more homely, & so think on’t again.
A meer line or distance is not made up of points, does not exist, cannot
be imagin’d, or have an idea framed thereof,—no more than meer colour
without extension(235).
Mem. A great difference between _considering_ length wthout breadth, &
having an _idea_ of, or _imagining_, length without breadth(236).
Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c. 6.
’Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is sometimes so) we
may have the greatest pictures from the least objects. Therefore no
necessary connexion betwixt visible & tangible ideas. These ideas, viz.
great relation to _sphæra visualis_, or to the m. v. (wch is all that I
would have meant by having a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly
have stood for or signify’d small tangible extensions. Certainly the
greater relation to s. v. and m. v. does frequently, in that men view
little objects near the eye.
Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether there are 2 men
in the world that see a thing of the same bigness. V. L. 1. c. 6.
Diagonal of particular square commensurable wth its side, they both
containing a certain number of m. v.
I do not think that surfaces consist of lines, i.e. meer distances. Hence
perhaps may be solid that sophism wch would prove the oblique line equal
to the perpendicular between 2 parallels.
Suppose an inch represent a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing, but 1/1000
of ye mile represented is something: therefore 1/1000 an inch, tho’
nothing, is not to be neglected, because it represents something, i.e.
1/1000 of a mile.
Particular determin’d lines are not divisible _ad infinitum_, but lines as
us’d by geometers are so, they not being determin’d to any particular
finite number of points. Yet a geometer (he knows not why) will very
readily say he can demonstrate an inch line is divisible _ad infinitum_.
A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv’d to move by sight merely,
and without experience. There is (’tis true) a successive change of
ideas,—it seems less and less. But, besides this, there is no visible
change of place.
Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the incommensurability of
diagonale & side—whether it does not go on the supposition of units being
divisible _ad infinitum_, i.e. of the extended thing spoken of being
divisible _ad infinitum_ (unit being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect.
Geom.), & so the infinite indivisibility deduced therefrom is a _petitio
principii_?
The diagonal is commensurable with the side.
(M392) From Malbranch, Locke, & my first arguings it can’t be prov’d that
extension is not in matter. From Locke’s arguings it can’t be proved that
colours are not in bodies.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Mem. That I was distrustful at 8 years old; and consequently by nature
disposed for these new doctrines(237).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Qu. How can a line consisting of an unequal number of points be divisible
[_ad infinitum_] in two equals?
Mem. To discuss copiously how & why we do not see the pictures.
(M393) Allowing extensions to exist in matter, we cannot know even their
proportions—contrary to Malbranch.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M394) I wonder how men cannot see a truth so obvious, as that extension
cannot exist without a thinking substance.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M395) Species of all sensible things made by the mind. This prov’d either
by turning men’s eyes into magnifyers or diminishers.
Yr m. v. is, suppose, less than mine. Let a 3rd person have perfect ideas
of both our m. vs. His idea of my m. v. contains his idea of yours, &
somewhat more. Therefore ’tis made up of parts: therefore his idea of my
m. v. is not perfect or just, which diverts the hypothesis.
Qu. Whether a m. v. or t. be extended?
Mem. The strange errours men run into about the pictures. We think them
small because should a man be suppos’d to see them their pictures would
take up but little room in the fund of his eye.
It seems all lines can’t be bisected in 2 equall parts. Mem. To examine
how the geometers prove the contrary.
’Tis impossible there should be a m. v. less than mine. If there be, mine
may become equal to it (because they are homogeneous) by detraction of
some part or parts. But it consists not of parts, ergo &c.
Suppose inverting perspectives bound to ye eyes of a child, & continu’d to
the years of manhood—when he looks up, or turns up his head, he shall
behold wt we call _under_. Qu. What would he think of _up_ and
_down_(238)?
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M396) I wonder not at my sagacity in discovering the obvious tho’ amazing
truth. I rather wonder at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out
before—’tis no witchcraft to see.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M397) Our simple ideas are so many simple thoughts or perceptions; a
perception cannot exist without a thing to perceive it, or any longer than
it is perceiv’d; a thought cannot be in an unthinking thing; one uniform
simple thought can be like to nothing but another uniform simple thought.
Complex thoughts or ideas are onely an assemblage of simple ideas, and can
be the image of nothing, or like unto nothing, but another assemblage of
simple ideas, &c.
(M398) The Cartesian opinion of light & colours &c. is orthodox enough
even in their eyes who think the Scripture expression may favour the
common opinion. Why may not mine also? But there is nothing in Scripture
that can possibly be wrested to make against me, but, perhaps, many things
for me.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M399) Bodies &c. do exist whether we think of ’em or no, they being taken
in a twofold sense—
1. Collections of thoughts.
2. Collections of powers to cause those thoughts.
These later exist; tho’ perhaps _a parte rei_ it may be one simple perfect
power.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Qu. whether the extension of a plain, look’d at straight and slantingly,
survey’d minutely & distinctly, or in the bulk and confusedly at once, be
the same? N. B. The plain is suppos’d to keep the same distance.
The ideas we have by a successive, curious inspection of ye minute parts
of a plain do not seem to make up the extension of that plain view’d &
consider’d all together.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Ignorance in some sort requisite in ye person that should disown the
Principle.
Thoughts do most properly signify, or are mostly taken for the interior
operations of the mind, wherein the mind is active. Those yt obey not the
acts of volition, and in wch the mind is passive, are more properly call’d
sensations or perceptions. But yt is all a case of words.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Extension being the collection or distinct co-existence of minimums, i.e.
of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch, it cannot be conceiv’d
without a perceiving substance.
(M400) Malbranch does not prove that the figures & extensions exist not
when they are not perceiv’d. Consequently he does not prove, nor can it be
prov’d on his principles, that the sorts are the work of the mind, and
onely in the mind.
(M401) The great argument to prove that extension cannot be in an
unthinking substance is, that it cannot be conceiv’d distinct from or
without all tangible or visible quality.
(M402) Tho’ matter be extended wth an indefinite extension, yet the mind
makes the sorts. They were not before the mind perceiving them, & even now
they are not without the mind. Houses, trees, &c., tho’ indefinitely
extended matter do exist, are not without the mind.
(M403) The great danger of making extension exist without the mind is,
that if it does it must be acknowledg’d infinite, immutable, eternal,
&c.;—wch will be to make either God extended (wch I think dangerous), or
an eternal, immutable, infinite, increate Being beside God.
(M404) Finiteness of our minds no excuse for the geometers.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M405) The Principle easily proved by plenty of arguments _ad absurdum_.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
The twofold signification of Bodies, viz.
1. Combinations of thoughts(239);
2. Combinations of powers to raise thoughts.
These, I say, in conjunction with homogeneous particles, may solve much
better the objections from the creation than the supposition that Matter
does exist. Upon wch supposition I think they cannot be solv’d.
Bodies taken for powers do exist wn not perceiv’d; but this existence is
not actual(240). Wn I say a power exists, no more is meant than that if in
the light I open my eyes, and look that way, I shall see it, i.e. the
body, &c.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
Qu. whether blind before sight may not have an idea of light and colours &
visible extension, after the same manner as we perceive them wth eyes
shut, or in the dark—not imagining, but seeing after a sort?
Visible extension cannot be conceiv’d added to tangible extension. Visible
and tangible points can’t make one sum. Therefore these extensions are
heterogeneous.
A probable method propos’d whereby one may judge whether in near vision
there is a greater distance between the crystalline & fund than usual, or
whether the crystalline be onely render’d more convex. If the former, then
the v. s. is enlarg’d, & the m. v. corresponds to less than 30 minutes, or
wtever it us’d to correspond to.
Stated measures, inches, feet, &c., are tangible not visible extensions.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M406) Locke, More, Raphson, &c. seem to make God extended. ’Tis
nevertheless of great use to religion to take extension out of our idea of
God, & put a power in its place. It seems dangerous to suppose extension,
wch is manifestly inert, in God.
(M407) But, say you, The thought or perception I call extension is not
itself in an unthinking thing or Matter—but it is like something wch is in
Matter. Well, say I, Do you apprehend or conceive wt you say extension is
like unto, or do you not? If the later, how know you they are alike? How
can you compare any things besides your own ideas? If the former, it must
be an idea, i.e. perception, thought, or sensation—wch to be in an
unperceiving thing is a contradiction(241).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M408) I abstain from all flourish & powers of words & figures, using a
great plainness & simplicity of simile, having oft found it difficult to
understand those that use the lofty & Platonic, or subtil & scholastique
strain(242).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M409) Whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive; it being that
very having, that passive recognition of ideas, that denominates the mind
perceiving—that being the very essence of perception, or that wherein
perception consists.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
The faintness wch alters the appearance of the horizontal moon, rather
proceeds from the quantity or grossness of the intermediate atmosphere,
than from any change of distance, wch is perhaps not considerable enough
to be a total cause, but may be a partial of the phenomenon. N. B. The
visual angle is less in cause the horizon.
We judge of the distance of bodies, as by other things, so also by the
situation of their pictures in the eye, or (wch is the same thing)
according as they appear higher or lower. Those wch seem higher are
farther off.
Qu. why we see objects greater in ye dark? whether this can be solv’d by
any but my Principles?
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M410) The reverse of ye Principle introduced scepticism.
(M411) N. B. On my Principles there is a reality: there are things: there
is a _rerum natura_.
Mem. The surds, doubling the cube, &c.
We think that if just made to see we should judge of the distance &
magnitude of things as we do now; but this is false. So also wt we think
so positively of the situation of objects.
Hays’s, Keill’s(243), &c. method of proving the infinitesimals of the 3d
order absurd, & perfectly contradictions.
Angles of contact, & verily all angles comprehended by a right line & a
curve, cannot be measur’d, the arches intercepted not being similar.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
The danger of expounding the H. Trinity by extension.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M412) Qu. Why should the magnitude seen at a near distance be deem’d the
true one rather than that seen at a farther distance? Why should the sun
be thought many 1000 miles rather than one foot in diameter—both being
equally apparent diameters? Certainly men judg’d of the sun not in
himself, but wth relation to themselves.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
(M413) 4 Principles whereby to answer objections, viz.
1. Bodies do really exist, tho’ not perceiv’d by us.
2. There is a law or course of nature.
3. Language & knowledge are all about ideas; words stand for
nothing else.
4. Nothing can be a proof against one side of a contradiction that
bears equally hard upon the other(244).
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
What shall I say? Dare I pronounce the admired ἀκρίβεια mathematica, that
darling of the age, a trifle?
Most certainly no finite extension divisible _ad infinitum_.
(M414) Difficulties about concentric circles.
(M415) Mem. To examine & accurately discuss the scholium of the 8th
definition of Mr. Newton’s(245) Principia.
Ridiculous in the mathematicians to despise Sense.
Qu. Is it not impossible there should be abstract general ideas?
All ideas come from without. They are all particular. The mind, ’tis true,
can consider one thing wthout another; but then, considered asunder, they
make not 2 ideas. Both together can make but one, as for instance colour &
visible extension(246).
The end of a mathematical line is nothing. Locke’s argument that the end
of his pen is black or white concludes nothing here.
Mem. Take care how you pretend to define extension, for fear of the
geometers.
Qu. Why difficult to imagine a minimum? Ans. Because we are not used to
take notice of ’em singly; they not being able singly to pleasure or hurt
us, thereby to deserve our regard.
Mem. To prove against Keill yt the infinite divisibility of matter makes
the half have an equal number of equal parts with the whole.
Mem. To examine how far the not comprehending infinites may be admitted as
a plea.