Motion, figure, and extension perceivable by sight are different from
those ideas perceived by touch wch goe by the same name.
Diagonal incommensurable wth ye side. Quære how this can be in my
doctrine?
(M335) Qu. how to reconcile Newton’s 2 sorts of motion with my doctrine?
Terminations of surfaces & lines not imaginable _per se_.
Molyneux’s blind man would not know the sphere or cube to be bodies or
extended at first sight(199).
Extension so far from being incompatible wth, yt ’tis impossible it should
exist without thought.
(M336) Extension itself or anything extended cannot think—these being meer
ideas or sensations, whose essence we thoroughly know.
No extension but surface perceivable by sight.
(M337) Wn we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vacuo, ’tis only conceiving a
person affected with these sensations.
(M338) Extension to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing
void of perception—thought seeming to imply action], is a contradiction.
Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?
(M339) In some dreams succession of ideas swifter than at other times.
(M340) If a piece of matter have extension, that must be determined to a
particular bigness & figure, but &c.
Nothing wthout corresponds to our primary ideas but powers. Hence a direct
& brief demonstration of an active powerfull Being, distinct from us, on
whom we depend.
The name of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by the relation
of ye story of the German Count.
Qu. How came visible & tangible qualities by the same name in all
languages?
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Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or (otherwise
thus) whether Being, added to ye faculties, compleat the real essence and
adequate definition of the soul?
(M341) Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be possible
for us to know that any body is absolutely at rest, since that supposing
ideas much slower than at present, bodies now apparently moving wd then be
apparently at rest?
(M342) Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?
Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides his own ideas, that he
should compare them to these, and make these like unto them?
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(M343) The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as yt of a
man(200).
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Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance demonstrated 3
several ways:—
1st. If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a visible inch,
thence it will follow yt unequals are equals, wch is absurd: for at what
distance would the visible inch be placed to make it equal to the tangible
inch?
2d. One made to see that had not yet seen his own limbs, or any thing he
touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it to be a foot length, if
tangible foot & visible foot were the same idea—sed falsum id, ergo et
hoc.
3dly. From Molyneux’s problem, wch otherwise is falsely solv’d by Locke
and him(201).
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(M344) Nothing but ideas perceivable(202).
A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving them each. Ergo,
he cannot say anything wch is not an idea is like or unlike an idea.
Bodies &c. do exist even wn not perceived—they being powers in the active
being(203).
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Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstract, i.e. an
inconceivable idea,] Locke says(204).
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Visible extension is [proportional to tangible extension, also is]
encreated & diminish’d by parts. Hence taken for the same.
If extension be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether tangible or
visible, or both?
Mathematical propositions about extension & motion true in a double sense.
Extension thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany’d wth pleasure &
pain: hence thought to exist in matter; as also for that it was conceiv’d
common to 2 senses, [as also the constant perception of ’em].
Blind at 1st sight could not tell how near what he saw was to him, nor
even whether it be wthout him or in his eye(205). Qu. Would he not think
the later?
Blind at 1st sight could not know yt wt he saw was extended, until he had
seen and touched some one self-same thing—not knowing how _minimum
tangibile_ would look in vision.
(M345) Mem. That homogeneous particles be brought in to answer the
objection of God’s creating sun, plants, &c. before animals.
In every bodie two infinite series of extension—the one of tangible, the
other of visible.
All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.
Ignorance of glasses made men think extension to be in bodies.
(M346) Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contemplate them.
Extension if in matter changes its relation wth _minimum visibile_, wch
seems to be fixt.
Qu. whether m.v. be fix’d?
(M347) Each particle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended, or
have an infinite series of extension.
(M348) If the world be granted to consist of Matter, ’tis the mind gives
it beauty and proportion.
Wt I have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times and in all
men between a visible & tangible inch.
Tangible and visible extension heterogeneous, because they have no common
measure; also because their simplest constituent parts or elements are
specifically different, viz. _punctum visibile & tangibile_. N. B. The
former seems to be no good reason.
(M349) By immateriality is solv’d the cohesion of bodies, or rather the
dispute ceases.
Our idea we call extension neither way capable of infinity, i.e. neither
infinitely small or great.
Greatest possible extension seen under an angle wch will be less than 180
degrees, the legs of wch angle proceed from the ends of the extension.
(M350) Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the mind,
’tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them; the mind, even
according to the materialists, perceiving onely the impressions made upon
its brain, or rather the ideas attending these impressions(206).
Unity _in abstracto_ not at all divisible, it being as it were a point, or
with Barrow nothing at all; _in concreto_ not divisible _ad infinitum_,
there being no one idea demonstrable _ad infinitum_.
(M351) Any subject can have of each sort of primary qualities but one
particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.
Qu. whether we have clear ideas of large numbers themselves, or onely of
their relations?
(M352) Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask wt
solidity is, let him put a flint between his hands and he will know.
Extension of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extension of space is
continuity of unsolid, &c.
Why may not I say visible extension is a continuity of visible points,
tangible extension is a continuity of tangible points?
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(M353) Mem. That I take notice that I do not fall in wth sceptics,
Fardella(207), &c., in that I make bodies to exist certainly, wch they
doubt of.
(M354) I am more certain of ye existence & reality of bodies than Mr.
Locke; since he pretends onely to wt he calls sensitive knowledge(208),
whereas I think I have demonstrative knowledge of their existence—by them
meaning combinations of powers in an unknown substratum(209).
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(M355) Our ideas we call figure & extension, not images of the figure and
extension of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely divisible,
those not so.
’Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges of a cube
will appear broad to an acute sense.
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Men die, or are in [a] state of annihilation, oft in a day.
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(M356) Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?
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Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such do intersect
in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is abstract from
extension.
Every position alters the line.
Qu. whether ideas of extension are made up of other ideas, v.g. idea of a
foot made up of general ideas of an inch?
The idea of an inch length not one determin’d idea. Hence enquire the
reason why we are out in judging of extension by the sight; for which
purpose ’tis meet also to consider the frequent & sudden changes of
extension by position.
No stated ideas of length without a minimum.
(M357) Material substance banter’d by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.
(M358) In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease(210).
Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of them at
all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded tangible &
visible extension and figure?
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(M359) Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day does
not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a day?
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But one only colour & its degrees.
Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in assigning the
cause of microscopes magnifying objects.
Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1st give the name of
distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since he would take distance yt
that he had perceived by _touch_ to be something existing without his
mind, but he would certainly think that nothing _seen_ was without his
mind(211)?
(M360) Space without any bodies existing _in rerum natura_ would not be
extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to it wth respect
to body; from whence also the notion of distance is taken. Now without
either parts or distance or mind, how can there be Space, or anything
beside one uniform Nothing?
Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all things he saw
to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one from microscopic eyes,
the other from not perceiving distance, i.e. radius of the visual sphere.
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(M361) The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, whether I
imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and open my eyes
by day, & I shall not avoid seeing them.
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By extension blind [man] would mean either the perception caused in his
touch by something he calls extended, or else the power of raising that
perception; wch power is without, in the thing termed extended. Now he
could not know either of these to be in things visible till he had try’d.
Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extension, figures, &
motion—and not visible(212).
A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho’ the visible idea it
yields be less than wt it was; therefore the bigness or tangible extension
of the body is different from the visible extension.
Extension or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity being three
several ideas.
Depth or solidity _now_ perceived by sight(213).
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Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than a stone or tree;
he having onely the power to be miserable by his unperformed wills, these
having no power at all(214).
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Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by sight—length, breadth, &
depth by touch.
(M362) Wt affects us must be a thinking thing, for wt thinks not cannot
subsist.
Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind, depending
entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as the mind
pleases(215).
Mem. Quære whether extension be equally a sensation with colour? The mob
use not the word extension. ’Tis an abstract term of the Schools.
(M363) Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the body
is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.
Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.
Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than colours
felt by the German Count.
(M364) “Of” and “thing” causes of mistake.
The visible point of he who has microscopical eyes will not be greater or
less than mine.
Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do not divers of
them suppose the existence of lines &c. without the mind?
(M365) Whether motion be the measure of duration? Locke, b. 2. c. 14. s.
19.
Lines & points conceiv’d as terminations different ideas from those
conceiv’d absolutely.
Every position alters a line.
(M366) Blind man at 1st would not take colours to be without his mind; but
colours would seem to be in the same place with the coloured extension:
therefore extension wd not seem to be without the mind.
All visible concentric circles whereof the eye is the centre are
absolutely equal.
Infinite number—why absurd—not rightly solv’d by Locke(216).
Qu. how ’tis possible we should see flats or right lines?
Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon(217)?
Qu. why we see things erect when painted inverted(218)?
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(M367) Question put by Mr. Deering touching the thief and paradise.
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(M368) Matter tho’ allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin’s head.
Motion is proportionable to space described in given time.
Velocity not proportionable to space describ’d in given time.
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(M369) No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists,
affects us not(219).
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Magnitude when barely taken for the _ratio partium extra partes_, or
rather for co-existence & succession, without considering the parts
co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely, or rather indefinitely, or not at
all perhaps, divisible, because it is itself infinite or indefinite. But
definite, determined magnitudes, i.e. lines or surfaces consisting of
points whereby (together wth distance & position) they are determin’d, are
resoluble into those points.
Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is not all
divisible, but is one simple idea.
Simple ideas include no parts nor relations—hardly separated and
considered in themselves—nor yet rightly singled by any author. Instance
in power, red, extension, &c.
(M370) Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not imaginable
without body moving. Not even then necessarily existing (I speak of
infinite space)—for wt the body has past may be conceiv’d annihilated.
(M371) Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside hard,
soft, cold, warm, pleasure, pain?
Qu. Why not taste & smell extension?
Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought heterogeneous
extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible perceptions thought
heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why not as heterogeneous as blue &
red?
Moon wn horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible extension than at
other times; hence difficulties and disputes about things seen under equal
angles &c. cease.
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All _potentiæ_ alike indifferent.
A. B. Wt does he mean by his _potentia_? Is it the will, desire, person,
or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t’other?
No agent can be conceiv’d indifferent as to pain or pleasure.
_We_ do not, properly speaking, in a strict philosophical sense, make
objects more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do that.
(M372) A finite intelligence might have foreseen 4 thousand years agoe the
place and circumstances, even the most minute & trivial, of my present
existence. This true on supposition that uneasiness determines the will.
(M373) Doctrines of liberty, prescience, &c. explained by billiard balls.
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Wt judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost who had always seen
through an inverting glass?
All lines subtending the same optic angle congruent (as is evident by an
easy experiment); therefore they are equal.
We have not pure simple ideas of blue, red, or any other colour (except
perhaps black) because all bodies reflect heterogeneal light.
Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations), there being,
perhaps, rays of air wch will onely exhibit one particular sound, as rays
of light one particular colour.
Colours not definable, not because they are pure unmixt thoughts, but
because we cannot easily distinguish & separate the thoughts they include,
or because we want names for their component ideas.
(M374) By Soul is meant onely a complex idea, made up of existence,
willing, & perception in a large sense. Therefore it is known and it may
be defined.
We cannot possibly conceive any active power but the Will.
(M375) In moral matters men think (’tis true) that they are free; but this
freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; wch freedom is
consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative faculties(220).
Men impute their actions to themselves because they will’d them, and that
not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the consequences of them,
whether good or bad.
This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.
If anything is meant by the _potentia_ of A. B. it must be desire; but I
appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak more to the
purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect of wt he desires
till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself, or the faculty of
desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties are.
Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I will them: therefore I will
will them.
Qu. concerning the procession of Wills _in infinitum_.
Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques and morality.
Their definitions, being of words not yet known to ye learner, are not
disputed; but words in metaphysiques & morality, being mostly known to
all, the definitions of them may chance to be contraverted.
(M376) The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do in metaphysiques
& ethiques: for yt about mathematical propositions men have no prejudices,
no anticipated opinions to be encounter’d; they not having yet thought on
such matters. ’Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned sciences. A man must
[there] not onely demonstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against
scruples and established opinions which contradict it. In short, the dry,
strigose(221), rigid way will not suffice. He must be more ample &
copious, else his demonstration, tho’ never so exact, will not go down
with most.
Extension seems to consist in variety of homogeneal thoughts co-existing
without mixture.
Or rather visible extension seems to be the co-existence of colour in the
mind.
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(M377) Enquiring and judging are actions which depend on the operative
faculties, wch depend on the Will, wch is determin’d by some uneasiness;
ergo &c. Suppose an agent wch is finite perfectly indifferent, and as to
desiring not determin’d by any prospect or consideration of good, I say,
this agent cannot do an action morally good. Hence ’tis evident the
suppositions of A. B. are insignificant.
Extension, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but include
succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.
Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions, &c.
The sphere of vision is equal whether I look onely in my hand or on the
open firmament, for 1st, in both cases the retina is full; 2d, the
radius’s of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all to the sight;
3dly, equal numbers of points in one & t’other.
In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.
Why the horizontal moon greater?
Why objects seen erect?
(M378) To what purpose certain figure and texture connected wth other
perceptions?
Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind at 1st could
not know distance; or by pure sight, abstracting from experience of
connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can’t perceive distance.
Therefore by pure sight we cannot perceive or judge of extension.
Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us see at once
more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing the _punctum visibile_
below 30 minutes?
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(M379) Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things, &
their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most part by words
borrow’d from things sensible. Hence manyfold mistakes.
(M380) The grand mistake is that we think we have _ideas_ of the
operations of our minds(222). Certainly this metaphorical dress is an
argument we have not.
Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded, when his essence is
simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c. 23. s. 35(223).
(M381) The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such things
proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much perhaps as from
obscurity & confusion of thought. Hence I may clearly and fully understand
my own soul, extension, &c., and not be able to define them(224).
(M382) The substance _wood_ a collection of simple ideas. See Locke, b. 2.
c. 26. s. 1.
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Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an orbicular
lattice.
Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas wch are now connected with
greater tangible extensions could have been connected with lesser tangible
extensions,—there seeming to be no _necessary_ connexion between those
thoughts?
Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering the optique
angle, but by altering the apparent distance.
Hence Qu. if blind would think things diminish’d by convexes, or enlarg’d
by concaves?
(M383) Motion not one idea. It cannot be perceived at once.
(M384) Mem. To allow existence to colours in the dark, persons not
thinking, &c.—but not an actual existence. ’Tis prudent to correct men’s
mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth glide into
their souls insensibly(225).
(M385) Colours in ye dark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as
soon as light comes, we shall see them, provided we open our eyes; and
that whether we will or no.
How the retina is fill’d by a looking-glass?
Convex speculums have the same effect wth concave glasses.
Qu. Whether concave speculums have the same effect wth convex glasses?
The reason why convex speculums diminish & concave magnify not yet fully
assign’d by any writer I know.
Qu. Why not objects seen confus’d when that they seem inverted through a
convex lens?
Qu. How to make a glass or speculum which shall magnify or diminish by
altering the distance without altering the angle?
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No identity (other than perfect likeness) in any individuals besides
persons(226).
(M386) As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, vice, & all
thoughts move wth local motion as immaterial spirit.
On account of my doctrine, the identity of finite substances must consist
in something else than continued existence, or relation to determined time
& place of beginning to exist—the existence of our thoughts (which being
combined make all substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having
divers beginnings & endings.
(M387) Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will?
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No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles and great or
little extension.
Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived. How then is
extension perceiv’d by sight?
Apparent magnitude of a line is not simply as the optique angle, but
directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the confusion, &c. (i.e.
the other sensations, or want of sensation, that attend near vision).
Hence great mistakes in assigning the magnifying power of glasses. Vid.
Moly[neux], p. 182.
Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without altering the
optique angle, but to no purpose.
Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much diminished by a convex
speculum as another?
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