THE THREE WEEKS’ WAR.
Although by a diplomatic fiction Tunis was supposed to be in a profound
state of peace on the 1st May 1881, an invading force was slowly but
surely closing in around the capital. General Forgemol and his
subordinate columns were already chasing the Khamírs from ridge to ridge
of their native mountains, General Logerot was advancing from Kef along
the Medjerdah valley, while General Bréart was in undisputed possession
of the town of Bizerta. In spite of all this the Bey seemed doggedly
determined to hold out, and the widespread ill feelings amongst the
Arabs induced the British and Italian colonists to present petition
after petition, asking for the presence of ships of war to ensure their
personal safety. During the 1st May the Bey received two communications,
neither of which was calculated to diminish his anxiety. Ali Bey sent
him a very graphic and highly coloured report of the conflict between
the French and the Sheikhia tribesmen at Ben Bachir, and the Governor of
Bizerta wrote that the French flag had already supplanted the Tunisian
standard on the _Kasbah_. The former document ran as follows:—
“The chaouch (sergeant-major) Chaaban and the squadron of cavalry which
had been sent to protect the railway arrived at the camp this evening.
“The _chaouch_ has stated to me that a French column has arrived from
Algeria this morning, and that the General commanding the troops at
Souk-el-Arba sent yesterday an armed force to the Gendouba, Ouled Bou
Salem, and Sheikhia tribes to demand from each a contribution of 300
horses for the _spahis_ and a certain number of mules. The two former
clans pleaded that their poverty prevented their compliance with the
request, but the Sheikhia formally refused to do as they were asked.
“In consequence of this refusal, a strong detachment of French troops
entered the Sheikhia country and attacked them. The Sheikhia defended
themselves; the French burned their _douars_, killing men and women; the
wounded were taken to the General, who ordered them to be beheaded one
after the other. The women were not even spared. . . . The _chaouch_
himself reports that he saw a burned _douar_ containing two women. . . .
Such were the horrors that met his eyes that the _chaouch_ was forced to
take another road to avoid the dreadful sight.”
The sensation produced by the publicity given to this letter at Tunis
can well be imagined. A council was at once called as usual, and a
protest and appeal to the foreign representatives were drawn up. They
were never presented, and in the evening an effort was even made to
suppress Ali Bey’s letter. Mr. Perkins’ inquiries made it very probable
that the _goums_ or Algerian irregulars who led the assault, committed
various excesses according to their wont, but the picture of General
Logerot superintending a systematic decapitation of the wounded is
palpably overdrawn. The treatment of the Sheikhia on the 30th March was,
however, signally avenged by the Arabs exactly six months later at Oued
Zerga.
In fairness to the French I must place on record the version of the
occurrence given me by M. Joel Le Savoureux, the correspondent of the
_République Française_, who was near the spot at the time. “At five
o’clock on the morning of the 30th March,” says M. Le Savoureux, “a
reconnaissance, consisting of two battalions of the 1st Regiment of
Zouaves commanded by Colonel Hervé, was sent in the direction of Ben
Bachir, about four miles to the north of the railway. The evening
before, the tribe of Ouled Bou Salem had asked the General to send them
some troops in order to protect them from their neighbours. The captain
of the _goums_ approached to within thirty yards of a _douar_, and
called out that the French soldiers would do no harm either to life or
property. The answer was a discharge of musketry from behind a cactus
hedge. On this the Zouaves were placed in position, and reinforcements
were sent for, which consisted of two battalions of riflemen, two of
Zouaves, and two squadrons of _chasseurs d’Afrique_ and hussars. The
Ouled Bou Salem were slowly driven back, and entered the valley which
was to become the real battlefield. This valley is almost in a line with
the plain, from which it is only separated by hills of trifling height.
Its other side is formed of steep mountains. The resistance now became
stronger on account of the assistance of the Sheikhia, who rushed down
from their hills. It is believed also that some Khamírs took part in the
engagement, but the total number of combatants did not exceed 1500. As
soon as the reinforcements arrived, the cavalry executed a movement on
both flanks and drove back the Arabs to the end of the valley, where the
Zouaves and riflemen attacked them with the bayonet. The Arabs defended
themselves bravely. As the French troops advanced they found the
_douars_ abandoned and set fire to them. When obliged at last to yield,
the Arabs sought to gain the mountain tops. At this juncture they were
harassed by the projectiles from a battery in the plain. At five P.M.
the enemy was no longer in sight and the retreat was sounded. As no
wounded were found it was supposed that the Arabs had themselves given
them the _coup-de-grace_. Amongst the dead were two women. They had been
shot fighting, and had ammunition upon them and guns in their hands.
Eleven prisoners were brought to the camp. The _goumiers_ collected over
2000 head of cattle.”
It is almost impossible to reconcile these very different versions of
one event. General Logerot emphatically and repeatedly denied the truth
of _chaouch_ Chaban’s report as endorsed by the heir-apparent, but even
according to the most favourable statement of the facts, there can be no
doubt, that the rout at Ben Bachir was unnecessarily destructive of
human life. At any rate, it quite convinced the Arabs of the fallacy of
the Bey’s assurances, and effectually prepared the way for reprisals and
revenge.
The Bey was not the only person at Tunis to receive astounding
intelligence on the 1st May. On the same day M. Roustan wrote to Mr.
Reade that at the battle of Aïn Ismain on the 26th of April a European
had been observed _in the ranks_ of the Khamírs, and that moreover the
person in question had shot dead Lieutenant Fayet, an officer of the 22d
Regiment. “His description,” added M. Roustan, “corresponds exactly to
that of Mr. Perkins.” This story was never seriously persisted in, and
at length formally withdrawn. When details were asked for, the offender
was said to have worn “a black cloak and broad felt hat.” It was of
course proved by many witnesses that Mr. Perkins was always dressed in
an Arab costume and red cap, and “the broad felt hat” turned out to be
quite as apocryphal as the “ranks” of the Khamírs. The accusation of M.
Roustan and the correspondents’ test of General Farre were both prompted
by the same motive—a desire to keep things quiet. They were eminently
unworthy of the great nation in whose name they were made, and the
authors have both since fallen under the lash of that very public
opinion they sought to stifle. The wholesale suppression of telegrams
during the crisis has only been atoned for by the excellent manner in
which the service has been carried on ever since.
The excitement of the 1st May was followed by an anxious pause. The
Sultan sent repeatedly cipher telegrams to the Bey of a reassuring
nature, and transmitted a copy of the circular sent to all the Turkish
ambassadors abroad concerning the Tunisian question.
CONSTANTINOPLE, _May 3d_.
My several circular despatches will have informed you of the present
state of affairs at Tunis and the standpoint we have ever taken up
respecting the question. A mere local accident—namely, a foray of some
barbarous tribes on Algerian territory, which, from the outset, the
Tunisians had expressed their readiness to punish—has, however, to our
great surprise, led to an expedition of French troops to Algeria. It
appears from the latest information received from the Pacha of Tunis,
that French troops are advancing into the interior of the country, after
seizing on several fortified positions. His Highness thinks that so
important a military movement, and so rapid a march through his
province, in spite of the declarations of France to the effect that she
is not actuated by any idea of conquest, seems to denote one of two
objects, either the taking possession and occupation, or a protectorate
of Tunisia. In the presence of such a state of things, the gravity of
which no one can overlook, His Highness and the population imperatively
call upon us to exercise those sovereign rights which, without contest,
belong to the Porte, in order to come to their aid, and protect a
province which forms an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. Relying on
our rights, and entertaining a deep sense of the duties that devolve
upon us regarding a population which is subject to the Sultan, we lately
proposed to the signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin to come to an
understanding with them, or directly with France, to bring about a
settlement calculated to give satisfaction to the grievances of the
French Republic. That appeal has remained unanswered, and we are driven
to inquire whether the Powers, departing from their sense of equity and
justice, mean to retain their passive attitude in that respect. As for
ourselves, we cannot regard with indifference the events taking place in
a portion of our master’s dominions, and we cannot help questioning
whether immutable justice always guides European Cabinets, or whether
they mean to remain passive while might triumphs over right. It would be
painful to us to have to come to such a conclusion. It would lead to a
perturbation of the general peace which the Porte and the Powers desire,
and would henceforth create a commotion which would be most serious in
the present state of the East. We therefore entertain a confident hope
that our appeal will not be disregarded by the signataries of the Berlin
Treaty, which guarantees the vital interests of the Ottoman Empire, and
that they will be good enough to entertain our proposal for a frank and
conciliatory understanding, which might bring about an appeasement of
the Tunisian conflict to the satisfaction of all parties, and in
conformity with the desires of the French Government. You will
communicate this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
Government to which you are accredited.
(Signed) ASSIM.
Even these messages were powerless to remove the uneasiness produced by
the continued silence of the Powers. After much delay both English and
Italian ships at last arrived at the Goletta. On the 5th May it was
decided at a council held at Mustapha’s house to telegraph by way of
Palermo a second appeal to the five Governments. I was present at this
meeting, but everybody felt that we were now hoping against hope.
Notwithstanding this conviction and the redoubled assiduity of M.
Roustan’s three emissaries, the Bey and his minister still remained
firm. The message despatched on the 5th May was as follows:—
_The Bey of Tunis to Lord Granville, London._
I now confirm my telegraphic despatch to your Excellency in date the
25th of April, in which I informed you of the invasion of this Regency
by the troops of the French Republic, under circumstances which I submit
are contrary to the law of nations, and against which I have most
solemnly protested in my own name and in that of my august sovereign.
The Government of the Republic has assured alike the cabinets of Europe
and myself that its intentions are exclusively to punish the Khamír
tribes for some predatory acts, which, it is alleged, were committed on
the Algerian frontier. In spite of these explicit declarations, my city
of Kef has been occupied; the French troops are now marching on Beja; my
forts at Tabarca have been destroyed and the site occupied; other tribes
besides the Khamírs have been attacked, and a French garrison now holds
my city of Bizerta, over the citadel of which the French flag now
floats. What other measures are contemplated concerning this country I
know not. I call on the foreign representatives at Tunis once more to
bear witness, both to the success of my efforts to give satisfaction to
the Government of the Republic in the matter of the Khamírs, who all
submitted readily to my authority, and to the efficient order I have
maintained till this day throughout my dominions. It is impossible to
foresee what disaster may befall the inhabitants of this country if this
invasion is continued. Under these circumstances, I leave unreservedly
my own fate and the destiny of this state to the decision of the Great
Powers and my suzerain, imploring those ancient allies with whom I have
maintained unbroken faith to adopt such measures of mediation as may
stay the scourge of war which has visited the peaceful inhabitants of my
dominions, and equitable adjudication on any complaints which the
Government of the Republic may entertain against my government or
myself.
Next morning (May 6th), the Bey learned that several tribes were
preparing to set his waning authority at defiance. The Caids of Medjer,
Sharen, Ouled Bou Ghanem, and Ouled Ayar, arrived at the Bardo, and
asked for an audience to tell their tale. They said that on the defeat
of the Sheikhias on the 30th April their surviving chiefs wrote letters
in blood (purporting to be that of their slain women and children),
asking them for help to resist the French, and avenge their wrongs. It
was at first agreed to place their request before the Bey, but unluckily
they captured a messenger who was bringing an official letter from Tunis
to Sy Ali Bey. To their dismay they found that this despatch, far from
holding out any encouragement to resistance, directed him to retreat
before the French forces, and maintain a strict neutrality. As soon as
this was known, the anger of the Arabs was entirely directed against the
Bey, whom they accused of betraying his country to the French. The Caids
took refuge from the general indignation in a neighbouring _zaouia_, but
it was at last agreed that they should be allowed to go to Tunis to see
the Bey in person. Muhamed es Sadek met this deputation of the untutored
lords of the interior in the hall of justice, in which for nearly a
quarter of a century he had almost personified absolute power. The
chiefs bent before him and kissed his hand as usual, but it was evident
to everybody that they were not convinced by his half-hearted
assurances. At last he promised to give them a letter under his sign
manual, which, he said, must satisfy all his faithful subjects. I
subsequently obtained a copy of the Bey’s declaration, which took the
form of a circular. Its text was as follows:—
_To all the Caids and Governors of the Regency of Tunis._
We have previously ordered that our recommendations to preserve order in
your districts be brought to your knowledge. We have learned that you
have done your best to carry out our wishes and we express our
satisfaction.
It has, however, come to our ears that the entrance of the French troops
upon our territory for the affair of the Khamírs, has produced
excitement amongst certain tribes. We have protested against the
violation of our territory, which has been perpetrated without there
being any reason for hostility between us and the Government of the
French Republic or any declaration of war. In any case, this matter will
be arranged _diplomatically and pacifically_. To this end we are now
engaged, in concert with the Imperial Ottoman Government, and with the
aid of other friendly Powers.
In consequence, it is the duty of each individual to preserve order
everywhere, to allow of a favourable solution being arrived at with
moderation and without disturbance. We recommend you not to abandon your
posts, in order to prevent by your presence the people under your rule
from doing any act contrary to our desire. You will enjoin this course
of conduct upon them in the most urgent manner, and you will deter them
from listening to interested people who wish to stir up strife. You will
also explain to them the consequences which disobedience of these
injunctions may entail upon them.
The five Caids rode away with their message of peace, but the tribes
refused to be convinced. One of these very Caids was the first to
proclaim the treason of the Bey, and he is at the present moment an
exile in Tripoli.
Incessant rain now caused a momentary lull in the military movements,
but French newspapers were not allowed to want copy. The European public
were informed that “Mustapha, the Tunisian Prime Minister, being
apprised of the occupation of Bizerta, summoned the principals of the
religious bodies to confer with him, and they (the principals or the
religious bodies?) afterwards proceeded to Kairwán, with the object, it
is stated, of preaching a holy war,” and “that Signor Pestalozza, the
dragoman of the Italian consulate, repaired in disguise to the camp of
Ali Bey on a secret mission, and after his return conferred with General
Bacouch.” Such intelligence as this may well provoke a smile now, but it
was then the old story of the boys who pelted the frogs. Telegrams of
this kind effectually sealed the fate of Tunis, and the long-suffering
Bey acquired the reputation of a crafty and bloodthirsty fanatic.
In the interval strong reinforcements disembarked at Bizerta, and by the
8th May the two brigades of Generals Maurand and Bréart were prepared to
march. On that day I happened to go early to the Kasr-es-Said Palace.
The excitement felt amongst its inmates had, if possible, increased
since my last visit. Soon after my arrival General Bacouch entered the
little saloon, used as an office on the ground-floor, with an open
letter in his hand. A mounted messenger had brought it to the Bey, after
a ride of fifty miles through the torrential rains of the preceding
night. The missive in question was from the Khalifa or sub-governor of
the rich district of Mater. In two sentences the Bey was informed that
one Hmed Ben Yusef, an Algerian envoy, had arrived at Mater from
Bizerta, and had invited the tribes of the province to sign a
declaration “in which they acknowledged the French supremacy, and agreed
to receive the French troops as brothers.” The Khalifa reported that the
Mater tribes were already showing their teeth. At General Bacouch’s
request I proceeded to draft the following protest to M. Roustan,
although the absence of a table presented a formidable difficulty:—
_The Bey of Tunis to M. Roustan (May 8th)._
M. Roustan, Chargé d’Affaires of France, Tunis,—The Caid of Mater has
informed us that an emissary sent by the Commander of the French troops
now at Bizerta has asked him whether the tribe of Bajaoua, the
inhabitants of Mater, as well as the mountain tribes of Mogod and Hozels
and others, were willing to receive the French troops, and has insisted
on obtaining an answer to this demand before midday to-day. This
intelligence has caused us as much pain as surprise. You have assured us
repeatedly that the expedition against which we have protested had no
other scope on the part of the French Republic than the settlement of
the Khamír frontier. To-day it is proposed to occupy the most important
parts of the Regency. Even admitting that we had consented to the entry
of the French troops to punish the Khamírs, and that we had not
protested against this violation of the Tunisian territory, as we have
uniformly done, it is not the less a fact that the proposed occupation
has no relation to the Khamír country, and that we are unable with force
to resist the projected movements. Nevertheless, we have issued
instructions to the Caid of Mater to prevent any resistance to the
French troops in this province. We confirm our former declaration and
once more call your attention to the dangers attending this increasing
invasion. At the same time, we renew our protestation, in our name and
in that of the Sublime Porte, against the occupation of the province of
Mater as contrary to the law of nations.
Before this business was finished, the Prime Minister entered the room.
He seemed much agitated, and spoke with unusual rapidity. He said that
M. Saint-Hilaire had assured Lord Granville the French meant to punish
the Khamírs and nothing more, but the proposed occupation of Mater
showed him that these assurances had deceived alike the British
Government and the Bey. He said:—
“What has the province of Mater to do with the Khamírs? I now see
clearly, in spite of all that has been said to the contrary, the French
are determined to pick a quarrel with us and create a pretext for
further action. Mater is one of our richest provinces, and its mountain
tribes are powerful and some of them warlike. If they resist when they
see their crops destroyed and _douars_ burned, who can tell what
accusation will be brought against us? Where is the French programme to
stop? While M. Saint-Hilaire is giving pacific assurances at London and
Rome, and the Sultan is trying to interest Europe in our fate, we are
being subjected to threats and menaces in which the Khamírs are not even
mentioned.”
He continued:—
“Yesterday, Dr. Mascaro, the Bey’s physician, told his Highness that
great evils would befall him and our country if he did not at once ask
M. Roustan what the French wanted, but the Bey told him to attend to his
physic and leave politics alone. Dr. Mascaro, however, asked me
privately if the Bey was waiting to have his palace surrounded, and I to
have my hands manacled (crossing his wrists) before we accepted M.
Roustan’s terms. I asked him to bring his propositions in writing, but
he refused. What does it all mean? England has been told one story, but
you must let her know what is being asked from us here.”
While Mustapha Ben Ismael was yet speaking it was announced that M.
Roustan’s carriage had arrived at the gates of the garden, and terror
took the place of excitement. “In a few minutes,” said the Minister, “we
shall know our fate. Wait and you shall hear it.” He hastily retired,
and entered the Bey’s private rooms. On the previous day M. Sumaripa,
the French dragoman, had complained of one of the attendants failing to
rise on his approach, but neither he nor M. Roustan could complain of
the homage they received on this occasion. The audience lasted exactly
eighteen minutes, and during this time perfect silence prevailed in the
crowded ante-chambers. No one was present but the Prime Minister, M.
Conti (first interpreter), M. Roustan, and M. Sumaripa. On quitting the
Bey, M. Roustan passed bowing and smiling through a double line of
Tunisian officials to his carriage, and an audible sigh of relief passed
from one end of the palace to the other as soon as his carriage
disappeared on the Tunis road. The Minister re-entered the apartments
near the entrance and said to me—“You want, I suppose, to know M.
Roustan’s _ultimatum_, but I have a surprise for you. He asked for
nothing at all. After the almost hourly messages of Dr. Mascaro and
others we expected to hear of the protectorate, an indemnity, and other
similar conditions, but M. Roustan referred to none of these things. He
told the Bey that the visit was a private one, but that he had come to
assure His Highness of his real affection both for his person and for
Tunis. He said the Bey was not to be deceived by appearances. France was
the true ally of Tunis, and had no quarrel whatever with the Bey. What
does it all mean? Is it possible that France is bound by the promises
which Lord Granville and M. Cairoli announce, and that M. Roustan’s
friends are trying to induce us to seek ourselves conditions which the
Bey regards as opposed alike to his religious and moral duties? We both
want Europe to know what is passing under the cloak of this Khamír
business, so that she may duly weigh M. Saint-Hilaire’s assurances
before we are destroyed.”
The two columns now left Bizerta almost simultaneously. That under
General Maurand took the direction of Mater, following the shore of the
Bizerta lake, while General Bréart marched towards Tunis. The rain fell
incessantly, and the soldiers were often nearly knee-deep in mud. This
circumstance necessarily occasioned great delay. Halts were frequently
called, and Jedeida was not reached till the 10th May. The march was
exceptionally fatiguing, and the Société Marseillaise were considerate
enough to entertain the superior officers at a substantial breakfast, on
the troops passing through the historical domain of Sidi Tabet.
The news of the arrival of the “allies” in the immediate vicinity of the
capital, extinguished the faint hopes of foreign mediation in the hearts
of the Tunisians. I went to Mustapha’s palace in the afternoon. The
blank despair on the faces of its inmates contrasted strangely with the
undisguised glee discernible on the countenances of Musalli, Mascaro,
and Volterra, who now mustered in great force. Signor Pestalozza was
with the Prime Minister when I arrived, and as usual counselled firmness
and “consideration for the interests of the Great Powers.” “Don’t talk
to me any more of the Great Powers,” cried Mustapha, “what in God’s name
have the Great Powers done for us?” When Signor Pestalozza left that
room he knew that the _rôle_ of Italy was played out in Tunis. I found
the Tunisian Premier alone with M. Conti. “I do not blame you,” began
Mustapha, “you have done what you could, but I have been deceived by”——
Here he abruptly stopped. After an awkward pause he continued, “Can you
suggest any remedy even now? Is there anything further to be done? Are
all the Powers leagued with France against us? I answered _faute de
mieux_ that the last move of France had been a sudden one, and that the
European Cabinets might be apprised of what had taken place by telegram.
He looked at his watch. It was already past three o’clock, and the
Italian boat started for Cagliari at six. After reflecting a moment he
said, “Send the messages, they can do no harm;” and turning to me he
added, “This may perhaps be the last kindness you can do us; at any
rate, you will testify that I did my best to save Tunis from France.”
The indefatigable M. Conti at once set to work, and the Italian packet
left an hour late with the messages on board.
_The Bey of Tunis to Lord Granville, London._
The advance of the French troops in this Regency continues. Hitherto we
have succeeded in reassuring our subjects by reiterated declarations
that the French operations would be strictly confined to the punishment
of the Khamírs. We believed that the assurances given to the Powers and
to our suzerain justified our so doing. Notwithstanding these
protestations, the French camp is to-day within seventeen miles of our
capital, and during their march the French forces approached it even
nearer. These undeniable facts tend materially to lessen the effect of
the injunctions we have given our subjects, and have even led to our own
conduct being very seriously animadverted on in our own dominions. We
have redoubled our efforts to persuade our subjects to offer no
resistance to this invasion, but our task becomes more difficult as a
disregard of the assurances given becomes more apparent. Is it possible
for us to tell how long we may be able to maintain order among the
unoffending tribes, who see their dwellings, herds, and crops sacrificed
by the march of the French troops? In these circumstances, and in view
of the extreme urgency of the case, we implore the British Government,
as well as the Governments of the other Great Powers, to take such
measures as may at least induce the Government of the Republic to
declare its intentions in respect to our Regency and make known the
complaints which it may consider itself justified to prefer against us.
MUHAMED ES SADEK.
Before this telegram reached London all was over.
The night of the 11th May was spent in anxious watchfulness by the
inmates of Kasr es Said. A council of state sat for hours, the Bey’s
carriages being kept in readiness till its session was ended. It was
first proposed that Muhamed es Sadek should follow the example of many
of his ancestors and find a temporary refuge in Holy Kairwán. The Bey,
however, had neither the moral courage nor the _physique_ necessary for
such a bold step as this, and the project was dismissed. Mustapha Ben
Ismael urged his sovereign to go that very night to the Dar-el-Bey or
city palace in Tunis, and close all the town gates, leaving it to the
French to have recourse to actual violence. The more timid counsellors
opposed the plan as likely to cause a tumult, and it was also abandoned.
It was finally decided that the Bey must remain where he was and trust
to _kismet_ for a solution of his difficulties. On the eventful evening
in question I paid a visit to Hammida Ben Khoja, the _Sheikh-el-Islam_
or supreme ecclesiastical authority in Tunis, who lived in the very
centre of the Arab city. Sy Hammida was at the same time one of the
handsomest and fattest old men I ever saw, indeed he appeared to have
arrived at such a pitch of rotundity that he was unable to stand without
overbalancing himself. In a huge turban consisting of a twisted Cashmere
shawl, seated on a Kairwán carpet, and surrounded by illuminated Korans
on arabesque lecterns and a circle of white-robed _ulema_ or disciples,
Sy Hammida Ben Khoja presented just such a picture as Hodgson would
delight to paint. As might be expected, Sy Hammida was full of the woes
of his country and his faith, and at once proceeded to discuss the
_quæstio vexata_ in classic Arabic. He said that since the troubles
began, his son, brothers, and himself had preached assiduously, both
publicly and privately, patience, forbearance, non-resistance, and
implicit obedience to the Bey in the mosques of Tunis. They had written
letters to the same effect to their subordinates at Kairwán and
throughout the Regency. Nevertheless, he had heard that it had been
announced in Europe that a religious war had been advocated, and that a
revolutionary conspiracy had been discovered in the chief mosque of
Tunis. This was absolutely false. He had told the people that they,
being weak, could not resist the invaders. If they wanted the sympathy
of Europe they must gain it by forbearance. Even if their flocks and
herds, which were the sole wealth of the Tunisians, were destroyed, this
patience would ultimately entitle them to the good offices of the
friendly nations when the injustice of the invasion became known, as it
ultimately must. Europe must now see that the punishment of the Khamírs
really meant at least a French protectorate of Tunis, which was utterly
opposed to the civil and religious duties of the Tunisian people. The
invasion of the Regency was unnecessary, for the Khamírs submitted
before the commencement of it, and it was especially cruel as involving
ingratitude for the continued services rendered by Tunis to France. For
fifty years the European nations had refused the extradition of
political prisoners, but Tunis always surrendered fugitives from
Algeria, maintaining complete neutrality in all troublesome times,
especially during 1870. France ignored this now. He should exert himself
to second the Bey’s efforts to maintain order, but he was certain that
his teachings would be almost powerless, especially among the tribes of
the interior when homes, crops, and herds were destroyed. If no other
European nation had an interest in Tunis, he hoped that justice and
humanity would prompt a friendly intervention. The Tunisians knew how
the English press had been just to them in their sore trial, and should
not easily forget it.
The next chapter will show how much Muhamed es Sadek, Mustapha Ben
Ismael, and Ahmed Ben Khoja were mistaken in their estimate of European
justice and humanity.