AT BIZERTA.
The seaport of Bizerta, or Benzerta—the Hippo Dzarytus or Zarytus of the
Romans—is, like Goletta, situated on the shores of the Mediterranean. It
is built on a narrow tongue of land which divides the sea from two vast
sheets of water of great extent and depth, once known as the Hipponitus
Lacus and Sisaræ Palus, and now commonly called the lakes of Bizerta and
Gebel Ishkel. The shallow canal which joins the Mediterranean to these
land-locked seas divides Bizerta into two distinct portions. The one
covers a small island formed by a bifurcation in the channel of the
canal, and joined to the land on either side by bridges of great
antiquity; the other rises on the slope of a hill and is surrounded,
like most Tunisian towns, with a crenellated rampart, and crowned by a
dilapidated _kasbah_ or citadel. A large part of the higher quarter of
Bizerta has shared in the decay of its fortifications, but a series of
marble fountains, surmounted by elegantly carved inscriptions, still
testify to the existence of a past period of Moslem power. The fantastic
windings of the house-bordered canal give to Bizerta the appearance of a
miniature Venice in reduced circumstances. In making the circuit of the
_enceinte_ wall, I remarked an inscription placed upside down in the
bastion. Although much disfigured, the words YPPOS SARITOS were plainly
discernible. The vaulted roofs of the magazines and shops in both parts
of the town are supported almost invariably by Roman columns. The
English janissary Haj Hamda took me to his corn-store to see what he
termed “an inscribed pillar.” I read in bold characters:—
IMP CAES
MAVR IIIIVS
ANTONINVS
PIVS IIII X AVG
PARTHICVS MAX
BRITANNICVS MAX
GIRMANICVS MAX
IRIB POIX VIIII
COS ~IIII~ PP
RIS ~III~ VII
----------
XLIX
----------
There was a time when English statesmen knew the importance of the great
land-locked harbour lying behind the crumbling walls and straggling
streets of Bizerta. The lakes have been surveyed and re-surveyed by
English seamen, but apparently only for the purpose of pointing out the
expediency of acquiring them to our neighbours. A glance at the chart of
the Mediterranean shows better than pages of reasoning what the
possession of Bizerta really means. After assisting in a survey of the
lakes in 1845, Lieutenant Spratt contributed a valuable paper on the
subject to the “Journal of the Geographical Society,” containing a
complete description of the locality.
“The lakes,” writes Lieutenant (now Admiral) Spratt, “have often been
noticed by the Ancient and Middle Age authors under the names of
Hipponitus Lacus and Sisaræ Palus.
“The Hipponitus Lacus was the more northern and larger of the two lakes,
and answers to that of Bizerta, taking its modern name from an important
fortified town situated at its mouth. The Sisaræ Palus is now called the
Lake of Gebel Ishkel, from a high and picturesque mountain rising from
its southern shore, but which must have been formerly an island, as it
is now separated from the plain by an extensive marsh.
“The two lakes run in an east-north-east and west-south-west direction
of each other, and are each about eight geographical miles long. The
Lake of Bizerta is five and a half miles broad, whilst that of Gebel
Ishkel is only three and a half. This latter is a remarkable turbid
shallow lake of fresh water, but the former (Bizerta) is clear, and
nearly as salt as the sea with which it communicates.
“The greatest depth of the water in the Lake of Bizerta is eight
fathoms, with an average of from five to six throughout.
“The channel by which it communicates with the sea is at its north-east
angle, and is about four miles in length and half-a-mile broad, except
near its mouth, where it is contracted into a narrow-winding canal. In
the wide channel there is a depth of from four to seven fathoms, but in
the intricate part between the fishery and the bar at the mouth of the
canal, which in its windings is nearly a mile in length, there is from
two to ten feet only. Across one part of the channel there is a solid
stone bridge of seven narrow arches, and again a little below it the
channel is obstructed by rocks, said to be the foundation of another
bridge.”
On the 1st May 1881 several French ironclads appeared off Bizerta. The
governor of the town was summoned to surrender it to the French, and in
compliance with the Bey’s orders he at once declared that he should
offer no resistance. Before nightfall a French garrison occupied the
town, the French flag was flying on the forts, and the chastisement of
the Khamírs assumed a new phase of its gradual development. Never
perhaps in the history of the world’s warfare, was a more important
conquest effected without the striking of a blow. When the news reached
the Bey at Tunis, he said, “I am sorry to see my flag dishonoured at
Bizerta, but _now_ at any rate England and Italy cannot remain silent.”
Muhamed es Sadek was, however, as events soon proved, egregiously
mistaken.
The following protest was at once sent to M. Roustan:—
_May 2d_, 1881.
The Governor of Bizerta has informed us yesterday that several French
ships of war appeared before Bizerta, and the occupation of the city and
forts was demanded by the French, under threats of recourse to violence.
As we are at peace with France, the governor was not in a position to
resist; and the French troops have occupied Bizerta and hoisted the
French flag on our forts. This occupation, at a time when we are at
peace with your Government, is a proceeding without precedent, and is
opposed to all the rules and prescriptions of the law of nations. In
consequence, we protest in the most solemn manner against this
occupation. We must express our sorrow at being thus treated by a
Government which we have always endeavoured to conciliate, and with
which it has been our constant endeavour to preserve the most friendly
relations.
The best commentary on this “proceeding without precedent” is contained
in Admiral Spratt’s letter, which appeared in the _Times_ of the 16th
May.
_Admiral Spratt to Mr. Montague Guest, M.P._
I fully confirm the fact of the Lake of Bizerta being easily made
available for the fleets of the world, or for any of them—and at a small
cost—for I would risk my reputation upon its being effected for less
than a quarter of a million. All that is necessary is an excavation of
about a quarter of a mile through the narrow strips of alluvial plain
that separates the lake from the Bay of Bizerta, and some dredging for
about the same length on either side of this narrow strip, so as to
connect the deep water within the lake with the bay outside, and thus
open it to the Mediterranean, by which means the largest ships of any
navy and the fleets of the world could find accommodation and security
within Bizerta Lake; and it would thus become the finest and most
commodious harbour in the Mediterranean. Situated as it is, at the
threshold of the central strait of the Mediterranean, if possessed by
France or by Italy, it would become the most important strategic naval
port within it, and completely command the communications between the
eastern and western divisions. France, which now, in Toulon, is 400
miles distant upon one flank of that line, would thus be only four
hours’ steaming from it on the other flank, where not only could she
have another naval arsenal, but a spacious and perfectly enclosed basin
for the secret practice of torpedo fleets, gunnery exercise, and even
some manœuvring with a few ships, and all in what would become a secret
port. Consequently, all the political as well as the commercial
interests of other nations between the east and west, to say nothing of
Malta, would be at the mercy of France or Italy—whichever becomes
possessed of this most important strategic harbour—as will be evident to
every one possessing a knowledge of the physical conditions, depth of
water, and capacity of the Bizerta Lake, as shown in the _Journal of the
Geographical Society_, to which you have referred in your recent letter
in the _Times_. In the interests of the future peace of Europe, neither
of the great naval Powers should become possessed of it—neither France,
Italy, nor England—all having equal interest in its neutrality, and
neither having a right stronger than the other to wrench it it from the
neutral Power now in possession, and in rightful possession of it. Any
transference of it to either of the three naval Powers would at once
place the balance of naval power in the Mediterranean, in the near
future, in the hands of that Power, and would be an irresistible
incentive to that nation to devote double its energies to the
development of its fleet, and a naval preponderance, involving a
necessity on the part of the others to do the same in the interests of
their commercial and political prestige. Such are my views as a naval
officer founded on long experience with the interests now connected with
the Mediterranean, and with a perfect knowledge of the lake and locality
of Bizerta. As the Italian press has recently very fully entered into, I
may say exposed, these interests, I, as you have requested it, give you
the above facts and details, being no longer under any necessity of
retaining them from the general public.
Mr. Guest shortly afterwards published a pamphlet on the subject of
Bizerta, illustrated with charts and maps of very great value.[40] His
zealous efforts to show that the occupation of this important naval
position was but another step to the fulfilment of the Prince de
Joinville’s dream of converting the Mediterranean into a French lake,
did not find favour in May 1881 with those in high places. Lord
Granville was content with M. Barthélémy Saint-Hilaire’s assurance, that
“France never contemplated incurring the expense of constructing a
harbour at Bizerta,” and limited his action to taking a note of the
declaration. At the time I am writing, I learn that French engineers are
busy with their plans on the site of Hippo Zarytus. The “near-future”
will, however, evidently enable posterity to judge between Lord
Granville and Mr. Guest.