THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.
On the 5th of April the Bey received two important communications. The
first was the report of General Younes el Dzeri and Colonel Allela
Jauini as to what had really happened amongst the Khamírs, and the
second was a formal announcement by M. Roustan of the coming
invasion.[37] As might have been expected, the alleged violation of
Algerian territory turned out to be more than problematical, and the
Khamírs were ready and willing to submit unreservedly to their
sovereign’s decision. Two days later M. Roustan called at the palace,
and had a long interview with the Bey. “I am astonished,” said Muhamed
es Sadek, “at the message you bring me. I have already taken energetic
measures to ensure tranquillity on the frontier, and yet you say my
country is to be occupied without even asking me to redress any
grievances you may have to complain of? Your Government can never
contemplate such a step. If I am so treated I shall protest as a vassal
of the Sultan, and you alone will be responsible for whatever may
happen. This responsibility will be greater because you will attack me
without even a notice of the commencement of hostilities.” It is not
surprising that even M. Roustan found some difficulty in answering such
cogent reasoning as this. He professed to be almost convinced, and
promised to telegraph the substance of the Bey’s remarks to Paris. The
next day M. Roustan forwarded to the Palace M. Saint-Hilaire’s reply:—
_April 7th.—M. Roustan to the Bey._
In consequence of the communications I have lately received from your
Highness’s Government respecting the military preparations now going on
in France and Algeria with a view of repressing the attacks of the
frontier tribes, I have forwarded to my Government the observations
addressed to me by your Highness on the subject. I have just received
the reply of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to these communications,
and at once transmit the annexed copy to your Highness.
_April 7th.—M. Saint-Hilaire to M. Roustan._ (Telegram.)
I have received your telegrams respecting the explanations desired by
the Bey. Be good enough to declare to His Highness that we appreciate
the faithful friendship of which he has so often assured us, and of
which we have now to ask for tangible proofs. A serious peril threatens
the integrity of our territory and the safety of the inhabitants living
there under the protection of our laws. That peril springs from the
insubordinate tribes occupying a portion of the Bey’s state, and against
whom an imperative duty of legitimate defence forces us to act with
vigour. We cannot unfortunately reckon on the Bey’s authority to reduce
these tribes, with the requisite energy and promptitude, to a state of
submission rendering them henceforth harmless; but we have a right to
count on the Bey’s military forces to assist us in the work of necessary
repression. Our generals consequently receive orders to come to a
friendly understanding with the officers of the Tunisian troops, and to
give them notice of the moment when the exigencies of strategic
movements will induce them _to borrow for their operations Tunisian
territory either near La Calle or in the Medjerdah Valley_. It is as
allies and auxiliaries of the Bey’s sovereign authority that the French
soldiers will prosecute their march. It is also as allies and
auxiliaries that we hope to meet the Tunisian soldiers with the
reinforcement with which we intend definitively to punish the misdeeds
of the common enemies of the Bey and ourselves.
On receipt of these communications a council of state was at once
convened. The Bey sent an urgent message to ask Mr. Reade to come to the
Bardo, which was immediately complied with. “What am I to do?” asked
Muhamed es Sadek. “M. Roustan has, I fear, got me here” (clasping his
throat). Mr. Reade strongly urged on the Bey the necessity of proving
his ability to preserve order by at once sending an army to the frontier
under the command of the heir-apparent, in order to obviate all further
ground of complaint on the part of France. The Bey demurred on the plea
of an empty treasury, but as the council supported the plan proposed,
the Government cashier offered to advance the necessary funds. A week
later Ali Bey started for the frontier with several thousand men. From
this moment the Bey seemed to take the whole direction of affairs into
his own hands, and even Mustapha lost all real influence with him. The
council sat for several hours in the Kasr-es-Said Palace, and the Bey
himself dictated a long telegraphic despatch to the Sultan, and
personally supervised the draft of the following letter to M. Roustan:—
_April 9th.—Muhamed es Sadek to M. Roustan._
We have received your letter of April 7th, 1881, by which you inform us
that the Government of the Republic has resolved on inflicting a
chastisement on some of the Tunisian tribes. We are surprised at such a
decision being taken by a friendly government with which we have always
striven to maintain the best relations and retain its friendship, but
which in turn treats us with measures of this kind, which give us much
pain. In the affair now engaging our attention we have hitherto seen
only petty incidents customary with border tribes, and frequently
belonging to the same state. Immediately on learning the existence of
troubles in the direction of our frontiers, we hastened to send to the
spot a commissioner, accompanied by a troop of horse. From the reports
addressed to us by that delegate we became certain that tranquillity
prevails in that direction, and that those tribes are uneasy rather as
to their own safety, owing to the military movements they notice on
French territory, of which they fancy themselves the object. However
this may be, the troops we have just sent, and who will soon be followed
by others, are more than sufficient to maintain permanent order and
tranquillity. In the event of its being proved that some of our tribes
have committed misdeeds, our delegate has the power of seizing the
culprits and punishing them according to their crimes. Our having taken
these measures should demonstrate to your Government the efforts we are
constantly making in this matter for the purpose of reassuring the
Government of the Republic as to what might disturb the tranquillity of
Algeria. We cherish a hope that the French Government will not carry out
its intentions. If, despite our assurances, it persists in that
decision, we are bound at once to apprise it, that such a determination
would bring us into discredit amongst our own population and Foreign
States, and might raise other complications and dangers not at this
moment to be foreseen. Moreover the entry of French troops on Tunisian
territory would constitute a violation of our sovereign rights and would
prejudice the interests of foreign governments in our country, and which
are placed under our charge. It would, above all, constitute a violation
of the rights of the Sublime Porte. From all the foregoing
considerations, we inform you that we can in no way accept or accord the
execution of the measure contemplated by your Government, and consisting
of the entry of French troops on our territory. In case of that
execution being effected against our will we hold the Government of the
French Republic responsible for all the consequences which might result.
A circular and note were also prepared and transmitted simultaneously to
the different members of the _corps consulaire_.
_April 9th.—Muhamed es Sadek to the Foreign Representatives at Tunis._
The Chargé d’Affaires of France has brought a complaint against the
Khamírs who belong to our tribes. Correspondence having passed between
that officer and our Government, we have thought it right to deliver to
you herein enclosed a copy of these notes. As the entry of troops on our
territory is an infringement of our rights and of that of the Sublime
Porte, we have replied to M. Roustan, and written to the five Great
Powers letters, copies of which are also enclosed. We bring this to your
knowledge for your information and that of your Government, in order
that you may be conversant with the situation.
_The Bey’s Note._
Our attention has recently been called to the conflicts which have taken
place between the Tunisian and the neighbouring Algerian tribes near the
Rekba, in which thefts and other crimes have been committed on both
sides. We at once sent high officials to the spot with the mission of
conferring with the French delegate and arranging these affairs after
the manner of settlement in use between us in such matters. An
understanding was not effected, and finally the Algerian delegate twice
abstained from appearing at the conference on the appointed day, on the
pretext that he was unwell and had no instructions. During this time
other isolated acts of the same kind took place between individual
members of the Tunisian tribe of the Khamírs and some individual members
of the Algerian tribes—acts which are common among neighbouring clans,
even when they belong to the same State.
As soon as news of the latter acts reached us, we sent an officer with a
party of cavalry to make inquiries about them, to restore order, and
prevent our tribes from committing acts of violence against their
neighbours, even in case the latter had commenced the aggression. Our
delegate has assured us that our tribes have done as we requested, and
that order has not again been disturbed. Not content with that single
measure, we have sent our Minister of War at the head of an
expeditionary column, composed of regular troops and cavalry. We have
also decided on sending our brother, Sidi Ali Bey, with another column,
which is in process of mobilisation, with the object of definitively
securing tranquillity in those parts and of settling the respective
claims. Meanwhile, we receive the letter, a copy of which you will find
enclosed, by which the French Chargé d’Affaires announces to us that the
Government of the Republic has decided on chastising some Tunisian
tribes. In the reply we have sent to him, and of which you will also
find a copy enclosed, we pointed out to the French Chargé d’Affaires
that we had already taken the needful measures with regard to our
tribes. We have at the same time protested against the eventual entry of
French troops on our territory, which is considered by us as a violation
of our rights and of those of the Ottoman Empire, of which Tunis forms
an integral part. We have also made to the Sublime Porte a detailed
report of all that has passed, in order to free ourselves from
responsibility in regard to it. The interests of foreigners, subjects of
the European Powers at Tunis, being bound up with those of the Regency,
we have deemed it right to address ourselves to you, as well as your
colleagues, representatives of the Great Powers, requesting you to
inform your respective Governments on the situation. We appeal to their
well-known sentiments of justice and equity, that they may aid us with a
view to protecting our rights and those of the Ottoman Empire. We beg
them likewise to put an end to acts and menaces which would result in
dangers for which we decline all responsibility.
On the 13th April the Bey received a long cipher telegram from the
Sultan, expressing the entire satisfaction of the Porte at the steps
already taken as regards the Khamírs, and urging the Tunisian Government
to maintain the position it had assumed. Meanwhile the Cairoli Cabinet
fell in consequence of a vote of want of confidence (presumably recorded
by reason of its not sufficiently energetic policy concerning Tunis),
but no other political combination was found capable of replacing it.
The Bey continued to preserve the attitude taken up in his protests, and
the French press divided its attention between Tunisian enormities and
General Farre’s difficulties in getting together the troops necessary to
punish them.
The foreign representatives met on the 12th April in solemn conclave at
the French Consulate, to consider the precautions necessary for the
preservation of order in the capital, and securing the safety of the
European colonists throughout the country. M. Roustan prudently said
nothing, but left it to his warm adherent, M. Theodorovich, the Austrian
Consul, to suggest that they should collectively hold the Bey
responsible for all eventualities. As this measure was not agreed to,
the meeting broke up in confusion.
Next morning crowds of natives and Europeans repaired to the Bardo
Palace to witness the start of the Tunisian army under the command of
Ali Bey. The men were all fairly well equipped and armed, and it was a
matter of general astonishment that so much had been done in the six
days which had intervened since the Bey decided on the expedition. I
shall describe in detail the Tunisian camp when I come to speak of the
Khamír country, but it seemed to me there was hardly one of the
spectators forming part of the enthusiastic crowd which witnessed the
departure of the little force, who did not join in the cries of “May God
give you success and bring you back in safety,” and hope that the Bey’s
promptitude would obviate all necessity for the violation of his
territory. The echoes of the salutes which announced the setting-out of
the heir-apparent for the frontiers had hardly died away when M. Roustan
arrived at the Kasr-es-Said Palace and sought an audience of the Bey.
The French Chargé d’Affaires said that he had come to ask if the Bey
intended to co-operate with the invading force and attack the Khamírs in
the rear? Muhamed es Sadek replied that “he was ready to cut off his arm
to maintain his old friendship with France, but that he could never be a
party to exciting an inevitable insurrection in the country, by joining
the French in a war on his own subjects.” He concluded with these words,
“You yourself, as well as your friends, tell me that you are my only
sincere well-wisher. If this is so, give me a proof of it, and testify
to your Government what you really know about the Khamírs and the
measures I have taken to give you any satisfaction that may be asked
for.” “I will do so immediately,” said M. Roustan, as he took his
departure.
On the following day the Havas telegram stated that a gunboat belonging
to the French fleet had been fired on from the Tabarca forts, and soon
after its receipt the interpreter Sumaripa was sent to inform the Bey
that “France was determined to obtain satisfaction for the insult, and
uphold the honour of her flag.” Messengers were at once despatched to
the spot, and it was ascertained that the affront consisted entirely in
the Governor having refused permission to the crews of some French boats
“to land and march across the mountains into Algeria.”
Day after day passed away, and the expected move forward was still
delayed. The activity of M. Roustan’s agents was redoubled. General
Musalli and the Bey’s physician, Mascaro, undertook to convince the
refractory Prince himself, while Sumaripa and the future “master-of-the-
mint” Volterra, took charge of the Prime Minister. As soon as each
successive post brought its burden of newspapers, the most warlike and
menacing extracts were translated into Arabic and judiciously
administered to the inmates of Kasr-es-Said, while every conceivable
argument that ingenuity could suggest was employed to induce them to
abandon the logically unassailable position they had almost
spontaneously assumed. These efforts were seconded by official
correspondence couched in increasingly angry language, but the Bey
showed no signs of yielding and gained an advantage over M. Roustan in
each calm and dignified reply. The letters exchanged on the 15th April
have never yet been published.
_M. Roustan to the Bey._
TUNIS, _April 15th._
HIGHNESS,—The Government of the Republic has learned with infinite pain,
that I have not been fortunate enough to secure your co-operation in the
repression of the Khamírs, and the operations necessary to prevent the
recurrence of disorders on the frontier. Nevertheless, it retains its
conviction that energetic action is necessary.
In the presence of so grave a difference of opinion (of which the
consequences may be still graver), I venture to renew my demands with
that “respectueuse liberté” which your condescension towards me alone
can justify. I cannot believe the decision arrived at is final, in spite
of the declaration made to me by your Highness, and repeated yesterday
by the Prime Minister to my interpreter (Sumaripa).
The departure of the camp yesterday morning affords a new proof in
support of my arguments, and demonstrates conclusively that the present
situation is wholly irrational. Amongst the troops which have set out
under the command of Ali Bey, and the crowd which witnessed their
departure, there was neither a soldier nor a spectator, who believed
that they were marching against the Khamírs and _not_ against the
French. This idea is not confined entirely to the natives; it is shared
in by a great number of Europeans, as can be proved by the current of
general public opinion since yesterday (_sic_).
I am aware that all this is entirely at variance with the wishes of your
Highness, who has ordered the troops to retire on the approach of the
French forces. But will these wise precautions guard against
eventualities, which may arise from the exciting influence of people who
say they are enemies of France, but are in reality enemies of your
Highness? Nobody can say so, and it is this fact which encourages me to
entreat your Highness to consult your true interests and trust entirely
to the honour and friendship of a Power, the protection of which has
never failed either the Hassanite dynasty or the country it rules.
_The Bey to M. Roustan_ (_April 18th_, 1881).
We have received the letter which you have been good enough to address
to us under date 15th April, and we have taken note of its contents.
When we explained to you, both verbally and in writing, the reasons
which prevent us from consenting to the entry of the French troops into
our territory, and the amalgamation of our own army with them in order
to co-operate in their movements, we had hoped that you would have been
struck by the truth of these reasons on looking into them, and that you
would have taken into consideration the serious danger which would
result from such co-operation.
We had thought, too, that the statesmen who govern France with such
wisdom and equity, would also have understood how legitimate these
reasons were, and would have found them just; this belief on our part
was founded on the great faith we put in your kind offices as
intermediary, knowing that you would place the matter before your
Government in its right light, and that you would point out to them the
serious consequences which would result from such a step, and which no
one could prevent.
Unfortunately for us, your above-mentioned letter destroys all illusion
on this matter.
We are therefore compelled, in order to protect the interests which are
intrusted to us, and to avoid the disasters which we foresee must befall
the inhabitants of our country, to bring again to bear the same reasons
which we have already given you both verbally and in writing.
You are aware that we have spared no effort and no diligence in adopting
those measures which the circumstances required, and which we put into
execution thoroughly and loyally.
How then should we be obliged, by a neighbour (with whom we have been
always careful to live in perfect union, and to protect his rights as an
ally), to accept a position so little becoming to our dignity, and which
would expose the whole population to serious perils, which it would be
impossible for us to avert?
We believe that, up to the present, there exists between us no
difference of opinion as to the programme which we propose to follow.
This plan is to make the Khamírs indemnify the victims of their
depredations, to punish the authors of known outrages, and to take steps
to prevent their recurrence.
Upon these points we are quite agreed, and we will carry them out by the
means usually employed in this sort of affair.
The only secondary matter upon which we might differ, is the manner of
executing this plan, but it is clear that once we are agreed upon the
principle, the way of carrying it out cannot create a difficulty,
especially when there is no question of such a nature as should be hard
to solve, as you remark in your own letter.
You are also aware that the army commanded by our brother Ali Bey left
last Thursday. The instructions given to its chief are to put himself in
communication with the commander of the Algerian forces, in order to beg
him to state the claims which the Algerians make against the Khamír or
other tribes; to submit, also on his part, the demands of our tribes
against the Algerians; to cause those who may be in the right to be
indemnified for their just claims; to punish the guilty; and to take
such steps as shall appear to us to be necessary to ensure the future
tranquillity of the frontier.
Such being our intentions and our determination (as we have already
declared to you, and as we have notified officially to the governors of
our various provinces), we cannot conceal from you that it is with great
sorrow we perceive from your above-mentioned letter, that you do not
appear to have much confidence in the steps we propose to take in this
affair, and that you have based your opinion on rumours, which,
admitting that they were circulated, originated from people who are not
only our enemies but those of your Government.
We have, however, assured you, by our letter of the 12th inst., as well
as in the interview we had with you last Wednesday, that we would never
under any circumstances allow our troops to oppose the French soldiers.
We have especially enjoined the commanders of our army that in the event
(which we still hope will not take place) of the French troops entering
upon Tunisian territory, in opposition to our wish, that they should
cease all operations.
This is all that we can recommend to them.
In case this violation of our territory should cause unforeseen
disorders to arise, we decline all responsibility, and we should find
ourselves compelled to renew the declarations contained in our letter of
the 8th inst.
We would, nevertheless, beg the Government of the Republic (counting
always on its friendship), to leave us our liberty of action and not to
cripple it by carrying out the determinations set forth by you, for the
very probability of such a proceeding would neutralise the effect of the
efforts made by us, and which we have enumerated above.
We hope, therefore, that by means of your valuable and friendly
intervention, your Government, recognising the loyalty of our
intentions, and the sincerity of the friendship which we heartily desire
to maintain with it, will take into consideration the situation, and
will help us to arrive at the object which is, according to your own
showing, the reciprocal wish of us both.—_Written the 19th gomad El
Aoul_ 1298.
Early, on the 20th April, a messenger arrived at Tunis with a letter
from the Governor of Tabarca, informing the Bey that the commander of
the forts had been invited on board the French ships, which had arrived
on the coast, and strongly urged to surrender the fortress. The
instructions sent to Colonel Taib Masmuri contained but four
words:—“Yield only to force.” These were barely despatched, when a
formal demand for the evacuation of Tabarca was made by M. Roustan.
_M. Roustan to the Bey (April 20th)._
HIGHNESS,—The Government of the Republic is justly astonished at the
declarations contained in the letters which your Highness did me the
honour to address to me some days ago, and reiterated in your
communications to the foreign representatives at Tunis, which tend to
repudiate the responsibility for any disorders which may occur in case
the French troops enter on Tunisian territory to chastise the Khamírs.
The French Government hoped that this unusual language on the part of a
Sovereign was the consequence of your Highness’ pre-occupation for the
public safety. Unfortunately the conversation of the Prime Minister with
different people, and particularly with some members of the Consular
Corps, no longer permits any misconception on the subject; but, on the
contrary, establishes beyond doubt the threatening character of these
declarations. My Government, which could not remain indifferent to this
position of affairs, has consequently charged me to declare to your
Highness that if any evil befalls our subjects or any other foreigners,
it holds your Highness and your Prime Minister exclusively and
personally responsible. I also take upon myself to inform your Highness,
in the meantime, that the French troops must establish themselves at
Tabarca for their operations against the Kroumírs, and to beg your
Highness to be good enough to order the withdrawal of the Tunisian
troops from that locality, in order to avoid any encounter, according to
the promise which your Highness was good enough to make me some days
ago. This precaution is the more necessary, as our flag has been
received at Tabarca with gunshots by some soldiers in the service of
your Highness, as I had the honour to inform you the day before
yesterday.
The members of the Council were at once sent for, and after a long
discussion drafts were approved for an answer to M. Roustan and another
appeal to the foreign representatives.
_The Bey to M. Roustan (April 20th)._
We have received your letter of to-day, and have considered its
contents. We are surprised at your complaint concerning our Prime
Minister in the matter of the public safety, which you allege has
induced your Government to change its opinion as to our declaration in
this respect. Our Prime Minister has done nothing else than repeat our
declarations to you and the other foreign representatives, which we
resume thus:—We are constantly using our greatest efforts to maintain
and ensure by every means in our power, public order and tranquillity.
We repeat to you that under ordinary circumstances we can guarantee the
safety of all the inhabitants, but in the extraordinary event of the
invasion of our territory by French troops, which may produce
complications and a general excitement in all parts of the Regency, it
would be difficult for us, notwithstanding all the efforts that we
continue to put forth, to guarantee the maintenance of order. It seems
to us that it would be equally difficult for the Government of any other
country to do so if it found itself in a position analogous to ours. In
consequence, if public tranquillity is menaced by reason of these
circumstances, it is not reasonable to hold the Sovereign of the country
responsible. We are, therefore, unable to accept any such responsibility
either for our Government or our Prime Minister. You also ask us to
cause our troops to evacuate Tabarca, in order to allow of its
occupation by French soldiers, and you base your request on our promise
to you not to permit our troops to come into collision with the French.
We reiterate this promise, and have instructed our officers accordingly,
but we can never consent to the violation of our territory. It follows,
therefore, that we cannot consent to the occupation of Tabarca demanded
by you; but if the French troops enter by force on our territory our
soldiers have instructions not to oppose them. We feel it our duty to
tell you at the same time, that as the entry of French troops on
Tunisian territory is contrary to our rights and to those of the Ottoman
Empire, of which this Regency forms an integral part, we are compelled
to renew the declaration we have made to you in our former letters, that
we consider the occupation of any part of our territory as a violation
of our rights, against which we solemnly protest, at the same time
declaring that we can accept no responsibility for the consequences
which may ensue from it.
_The Bey to the Corps Consulaire (April 21st)._
On the 20th of April the Chargé d’Affaires addressed us the letter, a
copy of which is now subjoined. This letter relates to a demand we can
never accept, as you will see from our answer to the same. You cannot
ignore the fact that if the French soldiers enter on Tunisian territory,
however large or small may be their number, a danger of very great
gravity has been pointed out to you. We have organised and despatched an
expedition for the settlement of the dispute; order and tranquillity
reign up to this moment throughout the country—a fact which you can
yourselves attest—but, if the French troops enter our territory, it is
impossible for us to guard against the immense dangers which may result
from such an invasion. We are, therefore, compelled to repudiate all
responsibility for the consequences of such an event, and to throw it
entirely on him who is the cause of it. We inform you of this for the
protection of all interests involved, and beg you to acquaint your
Government telegraphically of our declaration, which we trust, in its
wisdom and equity, will lead it to admit the legality of the motives for
the attitude we have assumed, and to bring to the examination of our
difficulty the spirit of impartiality with which we know it to be
endowed.