THE ACUTE STAGE OF TUNISIAN POLITICS.
Signor Maccio opened his campaign of 1881 with three strategic
movements. He made his peace with Mustapha, and gave the weak but
willing Prime Minister the questionable benefit of his advice and
counsel; he persuaded the Bey to send the son of his predecessor to meet
the King of Italy at Palermo, and he gave considerable encouragement to
the _Mostakel_, an Arabic journal which now began mysteriously to appear
at Cagliari in Sardinia. On the 7th January, Prince Heussein,
accompanied by Signor Maccio and a representative deputation from the
Italian colony, embarked for Sicily on board the Italian despatch boat,
“Stafetta.” Ten days later they returned to Tunis completely satisfied
with the result of their mission. The king had assured Prince Heussein
that Tunis could always reckon on the countenance and support of Italy,
and had invested him with the grand cordon of the order of SS. Maurice
and Lazare. In addition to the flattering tale told by the prince, the
hints dropped by Signor Maccio were eminently calculated to raise hopes
of the most fallacious description.
Although it has never been proved that Signor Maccio actually founded
the _Mostakel_, his connection with it did not very long remain a
secret. Signor Pestalozza, the interpreter of the Italian Consulate-
General at Tunis, had a short time before brought from Syria two Copts
named Zainzain and Bokhos, and these two worthies commenced to print a
patriotic journal, the main feature of which was an Arabic hotchpotch of
everything unkind which had been written about France in Europe during
the few days preceding its appearance. Signor Pestalozza supplied some
of the articles, and was trusting enough to leave his MSS. in the hands
of General Musalli’s compatriots. The _Mostakel_ contained few original
ideas, and certainly nothing to excite the smallest religious
enthusiasm, but it was not pleasant for the French to have a weekly
budget of their failings spread broadcast all over Algeria. They had a
fair enough grievance against both Signor Maccio and his injudicious
subordinate, but they tried to make a mountain out of the mole-hill.
Europe was asked to believe in sober seriousness, that this
insignificant Sardinian leaflet was calculated to excite a religious war
against the Christians from Tangiers to Baghdad. The _Mostakel_ did not
advance the Italian cause a jot, but it served to fan the flame which
the success of Signor Rubattino had kindled, and to confirm the
suspicions which the pilgrimage to Palermo had excited. When M. Roustan
heard his Arab servants laughing over the accounts of his visits to
Madame Musalli and his dinner-parties at Mustapha’s, he knew to whom he
owed the annoyance and acted accordingly. The French troops had not got
to Tunis before M. De Sancy awoke M. Roustan one morning to say that
Zainzain had offered to tell the secrets of the _Mostakel_ for a
consideration, while Bokhos repaired to Paris to make the best bargain
he could for Signor Pestalozza’s MSS. A short time afterwards he sold
his dossier to a patriotic banker, and it was finally published in the
_Paris_ newspaper, but contained nothing beyond the veriest bathos. The
only result of this department of Signor Maccio’s diplomacy was to
irritate the French, to put money into the pockets of two Levantine
adventurers, and to materially increase for three days the sale of a
Parisian evening journal.
M. Roustan was not inactive during his opponent’s absence in Sicily. By
his advice the parties interested in Tunisian commercial development,
liberally subventioned a large section of the French press, and the
_Agence Havas_ began to throw out _ballons d’essai_. As early as the
12th January the following telegram was circulated in Tunis:—
“PARIS, _11th January_.
“A letter from Algiers to the Havas Agency proves that a French
Protectorate over Tunis is indispensable for the security of the
Algerian frontier. France seeks no annexion, but she will never allow a
rival influence to be established there.”
The _Temps_, commenting on this letter, indicates the services rendered
by France to Tunis, asserts that an uninterrupted protectorate of fifty
years constitutes _ipso facto_ a permanent protectorate, and concludes
with these words,—“He who touches Tunis touches France!” On the 31st
January M. Roustan had a long interview with Muhamed es Sadek. Almost as
soon as they were seated the French _Chargé d’Affaires_ made a most
astounding announcement to the Bey. “Mustapha,” said M. Roustan, “has
been intriguing at Constantinople to succeed you. He has sent £25,000 to
Sheikh Zafar, the Sultan’s _imám_, to get the succession altered, but
the Sultan was so displeased with the proposal that he has decided to
dethrone you in favour of your arch-enemy Kheir-ed-Din. France, your
ancient ally, will protect you; are you prepared to accept her
protection?” The Bey knew the first part of the statement was a
diplomatic falsehood, and so doubted the whole. After a lengthy
conversation he finally declined to alter the _status quo_. “We are all
in the hands of God,” he said, “and if force is to overcome right and
justice, all I can do is to leave my fate and that of Tunis to Him.”
England was not, however, destined to be a mere spectator of the game of
chess between the French and Italian _consuls de combat_. The Enfida
case soon threatened to make her also one of the parties to the dispute.
The story of this fresh phase of the Tunisian question can be told in
few words.
A British subject, Mr. Levy, had possessed, and successfully cultivated
for many years, a large estate on the coast of the regency of Tunis,
called the Suyah. Europeans holding land in this country, as in all
others, are amenable in transactions concerning it to the _lex loci_,
which, in this particular instance, is the Muhammedan code. One of the
best known and most frequently practised principles of that law is
called _shoofâ_, or pre-emption, which may be shortly described as the
right of a partner or neighbour to acquire any property sold in which he
has a share, or which is contiguous to his own estate, on paying down
the purchase money agreed on by the original vendee. This right is as
frequently resorted to through the local courts at Tunis by European
settlers as by Arab proprietors. General Kheir-ed-Din was the owner of a
very important domain bordering on Mr. Levy’s estates, and even
surrounding a portion of his lands, which property is known as the
Enfida. During the autumn of 1880 Mr. Levy entered into negotiations for
its purchase, and obtained promises of support from his friends to raise
the required capital. Suddenly the news reached Tunis that Kheir-ed-Din
had sold his estate to the Société Marseillaise, the French financial
company which had already succeeded M. De Sancy at Sidi Tabet for a
large sum, but on the express condition that the sale was to be effected
according to Muhammedan law. Mr. Levy then determined to invoke his
right of _shoofâ_, and no sooner had the Société Marseillaise completed
the formalities of purchase (which they did in the manner prescribed by
the law and immemorial custom of Tunis) than he made the requisite
declarations, and was, with the sanction of the cadi, placed in
possession of the Enfida. The original purchasers were next obliged by
the requirements of Muhammedan law to sue Mr. Levy before the cadi to
test the validity of his right, and so conscious were they of this, that
they had actually left a zone of land, one mètre in width, all round the
estate still the property of Kheir-ed-Din, in order to place Mr. Levy
out of the category of contiguous neighbours. It, however, transpired
that this fiction must ignominiously fail on account of Mr. Levy
possessing gardens within the Enfida, and a _coup d’état_ was hastily
resolved on by M. Roustan.
Mr. Levy was put in possession on the 12th January. On the following
day, he left his agents in a house on the estate called the Dar-el-Bey,
and furnished them with a written authority to hold it on his behalf. He
then proceeded to plant trees on different parts of the estate, plough
fields, and perform other acts required by law of an exerciser of pre-
emption in possession. During his absence the agent of the French
Company arrived, accompanied by M. Roustan’s chancelier, a M. Robin, and
an armed dragoman. In vain Mr. Levy’s agents protested, and exhibited
their authority, which had been duly executed by Arab notaries; they
were forcibly ejected from the house. Fortunately, however, for Mr.
Levy, the Arab notaries who accompanied the French party refused to
complete the deeds of sale, on account of Mr. Levy having legally
exercised pre-emption, and this appears to have induced M. Robin to
hesitate before extending his system of forcible ejectments to the
workmen occupying for Mr. Levy the other portions of the estate. Mr.
Reade, the British Agent and Consul-General, entered a vigorous protest
against the conduct of M. Roustan, which had excited universal
indignation throughout the whole European colony. This feeling soon
extended itself to the Tunisian Government and its subjects, for M.
Roustan hastened to announce that he regarded the Enfida also as a
French property, and would admit of no interference on the part of the
local courts, or no application of the local law. Mr. Levy appealed for
aid to Lord Granville, and M. Roustan brought two additional French
ships of war to intimidate the Bey in case of need, as well as to
exercise a salutary influence on the cadi if he endeavoured to assert
his legal authority. As soon as the facts became known in England, the
English press warmly and unanimously advocated Mr. Levy’s appeal for
assistance, and Mr. Montague Guest, M.P., in the House of Commons, and
the Earl De la Warr in the House of Lords, called the attention of the
Government to the conduct of M. Roustan, and the necessity of supporting
the protest of Mr. Reade. Communications passed between the two
Governments, and on the 7th February Sir Charles Dilke informed the
House of Commons “that the English and French Governments had agreed
that the question should be dealt with by the local tribunals, under
whose jurisdiction the matter properly comes,” and Lord Granville made a
similar statement in the House of Lords. Both Mr. Guest and Lord De la
Warr had recently visited Tunis; they were both aware of the system of
terrorism pursued by the French representative towards the Bey; and they
had both carefully inquired into the merits of this particular case. On
it being announced that the French ironclads had been sent to Tunis, Mr.
Guest energetically remonstrated, and two British ships were also sent
there. The French vessels were immediately withdrawn, and the
“Thunderer” and “Decoy” returned to Malta. Mr. Levy was for the time
being left in possession of the property, and his final discomfiture
postponed to a more convenient season.
The Enfida dispute attracted great attention in Italy, and it was hoped
that by adopting some common course of action the realisation of M.
Renaud’s vengeance might be averted. The unreasonable conduct of Signor
Maccio very soon placed any such combination out of the question. His
next quarrel with the French was the “straw which broke the camel’s
back,” and, as luck would have it, the Italians were entirely in the
wrong. Ten years before the Bey of Tunis granted to Messrs. Tolmé and
Mancardi the concession for a railway line to Hammám-el-Lif. Mr. Tolmé
was dead, and Mr. Mancardi had quitted Tunis eight years before. The
Rubattino Company, in its first flush of victory, got a transfer of his
rights from Mr. Mancardi, but even he had lost the original grant.
According to the spirit of the cession itself, it had long since ceased
to have effect, and no reasonable man would ever have thought of
reviving it. As soon as Signor Maccio learned that the French railway to
Susa was to pass through Hammám-el-Lif, he conceived the notion of
gaining one more advantage by stopping the works on the plea of an
infringement of the Mancardi grant. To this end the dead and buried
concession was brought forward, and in consequence of a vigorous protest
from Signor Maccio, the Bey was induced to suspend further progress
pending a search for the missing title-deed. Then, and then only, did M.
Roustan determine to furnish the Government with some more tangible
pretext for promptly extinguishing Italy and Signor Maccio, and at the
same time putting the French political and commercial _prépondérance
naturelle_ at Tunis beyond the possibility of further cavil.
The consul for the Bey of Tunis at Bone was one Joseph Allegro. His
father had held the same post before him, and while eating Tunisian
salt, had actually proposed in writing to raise such an insurrection as
would amply justify a French invasion and annexation of the country. The
young Allegro was the offspring of an Arab mother, and his life had been
chiefly spent amongst the half-savage tribes of the Algerian frontier.
Sidi Yusef Ben Ali (M. Allegro has since definitely assumed this name on
openly professing the Moslem faith) had for years dealt almost
professionally in border raids, and was equally clever either at
exciting them or suppressing them. Before the arrival of M. Roustan the
abilities of Yusef Ben Ali were almost hidden under a bushel, although
the figure of his mother, in orthodox veil and _haick_, waiting for the
arrears of her son’s pay at the door of the Bey’s treasurer, was a
familiar feature to every one frequenting the Bardo palace. There was
another kindred spirit still nearer to the border: M. Panariello at La
Galle, knew perhaps even more about the Khamir tribesmen than Yusef Ben
Ali. He was their factor, broker, general agent, and trusted friend on
the coast, and had grown rich in buying their cork, wool, and grain, and
selling them guns, powder, and shot in return. Although an Italian by
birth, a well-distributed cross of the Legion of Honour had induced M.
Panariello to link his fortunes with those of the Republic in general
and the _Société Transatlantique_ in particular. I have seen both these
gentlemen several times since the real nature of the _chasse aux
Khamírs_ has become self-evident, and they both laugh very heartily over
the deception practised. They have, however, no sympathy for each other.
M. Panariello points out triumphantly that Yusef Ben Ali thought it
prudent never to go amongst the Khamírs since he was appointed their
Governor, while Yusef Ben Ali says that M. Panariello never ventures
outside La Galle without an escort. It was to these humble but devoted
friends that M. Roustan addressed himself, when the acute stage of
Tunisian politics at length arrived.
I have in a former chapter spoken of the Khamírs and other tribes which
inhabit the neighbourhood of the Algerian frontier. The boundary itself
is tolerably well defined by a line of hills running southwards from
Tabarca. The Arabs on the eastern slope of the range are subjects of the
Bey of Tunis, those on the western owe allegiance to the French
Republic. “I really cannot say,” said M. Panariello, “when I was at La
Galle in September 1881, which of the two gives the most trouble. The
Algerian Arabs are generally the thieves, and the Tunisian the
receivers; they remain good friends as long as they are robbing third
parties, and only quarrel when it comes to a division of the spoil.
These border squabbles have occurred over and over again any time these
thirty years, and nobody cared about them, _till_,” he added, “_it was
convenient to do so_.” If the Tunisian Arabs have sometimes been the
aggressors, scores of cases are on record in which the Algerians have
wantonly violated Tunisian territory, but the Bey of Tunis never thought
of invading Algeria “for the protection of _his_ frontier,” any more
than France could justify the occupation of Belgium by a case of cattle-
lifting having occasioned loss to some French subjects on the confines
of that kingdom.
While Sidi Yusef and M. Panariello were arranging for an opportune
fracas on the borders, M. Roustan was very active at Tunis. Although his
own _entourage_ never contained a single Frenchman, he set in motion a
purely legendary _côterie_ styling itself the French colony. Before the
outbreak of hostilities, there were not more than a score of French
residents of position and respectability in Tunis, and yet throughout
all the recent events, the utterances of half-a-dozen individuals,
headed by the deputy or representative, have been treated in Europe as
if they expressed the wishes, ideas, and political feelings of some
large and influential body of men, having a peculiar knowledge of the
difficulties of the situation, and the largest, if not the only, stake
in the future of the country. About the 20th March an Address was got up
by “the colony,” and presented with a silver cup to M. Roustan. The
former took the extraordinary shape of a sweeping bill of indictment
against the Bey of Tunis. On its publication in Europe by the good
offices of the _Agence Havas_, Muhamed es Sadek (who still believed in a
Christian sense of justice and the amity of nations) hoped to counteract
its effect by a letter to M. Roustan, of which copies were submitted to
the agents of the “friendly powers.”
_“Letter of his Highness the Bey to M. Roustan, Consul-General and
Chargé d’Affaires of France.”_
“It is now some time that the press of Europe occupies itself of Tunis,
and our Government has not deemed it advisable to pay great attention to
the most contradictory news published in different countries. The
Algerian press, more particularly, has not spared the most lively
attacks against Tunisian administration and its functionaries. It has
gone so far as to assert that the frequent quarrels which arise between
the Arabs on the frontier were, if not the work of our Government,
certainly rendered possible by our indifference _vis-à-vis_ of the
culprits. Our Government has been able to face without the slightest
apprehension, these attacks, being persuaded, as it has always been,
that our sentiments of friendship towards France, and the acts by which
we have been constantly enabled to manifest them, would have sufficed to
justify our Government in the eyes of any one desirous of judging the
real situation with impartiality. But now a manifestation of a most
exceptional character has taken place, and our Government, fearing that
a prolonged silence might misguide public opinion on the matter, has
considered that it would be betraying its duty if it did not call the
attention of the Government of the Republic to the real state of affairs
at Tunis. In fact, by an address which has been officially handed to
you, and of which nobody here imagines the contents, a great part of the
French colony deplores that its interests are offended, that its rights
of property are not respected, that personal security is compromised,
and that, finally, the engagements contracted by the Tunisian
administration with French subjects are not observed. It therefore asks
that the Government of the Republic should be informed of the real state
of affairs, and that ready measures, and if need be, energetic ones,
should be taken to put an end to the inconvenience of such a state of
affairs.
“Nothing is easier than to refute one by one all these accusations. No
one, in fact, could contend that French citizens do not possess in
perfect tranquillity in the Regency their landed property just as is the
case with the subjects of every other power. Every one can verify in the
clearest way possible that the complete absence of any criminal attempts
prove how far the personal safety of foreigners in general run no risk.
The countenance which our Government has always given to every
enterprise in which Frenchmen are interested attests its desire
scrupulously to maintain the engagements taken. In its situation with
France and her representatives, our Government believes to have
constantly demonstrated its desire to keep into good account the
friendship of a powerful and respected neighbour, but it has likewise
proved the importance which it attaches to this friendship, forwarding
with marked deference, and often anticipating, its desires.
“The proof lies precisely in the innumerable undertakings accorded to
Frenchmen, and the flourishing conditions of which exclude completely
the assertion that efforts have been made to overcome the assertion of
our Government. It is with pain that we enter into all these details,
which we would have esteemed it useless to enumerate, had it not been
for the act of public accusation which aims at discrediting our
Government in the face of the French Cabinet, and to justify the ill-
feeling of France. A step so unjustifiable on the part of the French
colonists can only, however, offer to our Government the occasion to
declare, as it now does, its sentiments, and to request the French
Government itself to appreciate its conduct and to restore that
tranquillity which, in the interests of all, it considers indispensable.
“Persuaded as it is of having never offended international obligations
with the Government of the Republic, our Government ardently desires
that its good intentions should not be ignored by anybody, and much the
less misstated in a public document. It is in confining ourselves to the
same principles, which have been the constant rule of our conduct, that
we consider in their just value the French interests existing in this
country. And it is in the presence of so undeserved an accusation, which
aims at compromising our Government in the eyes of that of France, that
we submit this to the equitable minds of the enlightened men who direct
the affairs of state of the powerful French nation, our neighbour, and
we cannot doubt that a conscientious and loyal appreciation of the
situation will give us perfect justice. We trust that the Government of
the Republic will not refuse us that mark of sympathy in the interest of
strict justice, giving us on this occasion a fresh proof of the friendly
dispositions which have always been shown us, and for which we feel
truly grateful. We pray you, M. le Chargé d’Affaires, to communicate
with your usual benevolence this letter to your Government.—_Written on
the_ 24 _Rabi Ettani_ 1298, _March_ 24, 1881.
MUHAMED ES SADEK.”
Seven days after M. Roustan received the Bey’s letter, some sort of
disturbance took place on the frontier, and the hitherto unknown Khamírs
suddenly became famous throughout Europe. What really happened on the
eventful 30th March near the confines of Khamír-land nobody will
probably ever know exactly until we have the pleasure of reading the
autobiography of either Yusef Ben Ali or M. Panariello. Fate
unexpectedly came to M. Roustan’s aid, and while a few Khamír horrors
were being hastily got together, Colonel Flatters perished with his
mission in a real massacre far away in the Sahara. The two events became
hopelessly confused, Colonel Flatters and the Khamírs were at once
bracketed together under the common head of “Horrible Outrages”
(_Observer_, April 3d, 1881), and everybody made up their minds that the
“drapeau menacé de la France” (M. Roustan’s speech to the French
“colony,” March 20th) must be promptly and efficiently avenged. While
the newsboards of London and Paris were covered with the legends,
“French Expedition against Tunis,” “Daring Raids of Tunisian Tribes,”
and “Continued Fighting on the Algerian Frontier,” the Bey of Tunis was
in blissful ignorance of what had taken place. As soon as he knew his
danger through the medium of foreign telegrams, he immediately
despatched one of his most trusted servants at the head of a small force
to investigate into the real or imaginary offences of the Khamírs.
Meanwhile the Havas Agency prosecuted its campaign with almost feverish
activity, and between the 1st and 4th April the Parisian press was
plentifully supplied with a series of fictitious but ferocious combats.
Some of these messages are really inimitable, _e.g._, in a telegram of
the 1st April we read: “A Tunisian Caid has collected about 3000 men of
the Kegla tribe (?) and led them to Sidi Diamessi (?) on the frontier,
for the purpose of surprising, on the pretext of a conference, the
French commandant in the Soukharas district. The latter, however, having
been forewarned of the Caid’s intentions, succeeded in effecting his
retreat.” Here is another specimen: “According to intelligence just
received, numerous Tunisian subjects have left Tunis to join the
Khamírs. A case containing 100 kilogrammes _of ball_ cartridges, sent to
the Khamírs by Tunisian Jews, has been seized by the administration of
the Tunis Railway.” The third is a still greater geographical puzzle
than the others, but even this was swallowed with the rest: “It is
rumoured that on the Tunisian terms being rejected, the Bey has appealed
to Italy. The Khamírs are endeavouring to obstruct the road to Beja, to
prevent French occupation. The Governor of Beja has demanded
reinforcements from Tunis, being in fear that _his_ town would be
occupied by the marauders and shelled by the French!”
Within a week M. Jules Ferry had resolved to avoid _an interpellation on
the part of M. Léon Renaud_, by the Government deciding to chastise the
Khamírs on Tunisian soil. Not only was Tunis to be invaded by a French
army, but M. Saint-Hilaire assured the representatives of foreign powers
at Paris, in the most formal manner, that “the operations about to
commence on the border-land between Algeria and Tunis are meant solely
to put an end to the constant inroads of the frontier clans into
Algerian territory, and that the independence of the Bey and the
integrity of his territory were not in any way threatened.” This
declaration was made with a full knowledge of the fact that M. Roustan
had already endeavoured to coerce the Bey several times into accepting
the “protectorate,” and will ever remain as a lasting blemish on the
diplomatic integrity of M. Saint-Hilaire. The announcement of this
disguised war against Tunis was very differently received in Italy and
in England. Lord Granville believed “in the single-mindedness and
thorough honesty of M. Saint-Hilaire,” and even credited the Khamír
raids. He was good enough to advise the Bey to co-operate against the
Khamírs, or in other words, to assist in the destruction of a portion of
his own subjects by foreign troops on his own soil, and upon the
flimsiest and most preposterous of pretexts. Italy indulged in tall
talk, overturned her ministers, and did nothing at all. We will leave
General Farre at Paris busily engaged in picking up stray battalions for
the coming expedition, struggling feebly with the confusion worse
confounded of the hospital and commissariat services, and driving a
bargain for superseding the ordinary transport ships by the _flotilla_
of the Société Transatlantique, and return to Tunis.