AN INTERVIEW WITH THE BEY.
The Bardo Palace, or official abode of the Beys of Tunis, is in reality
a walled town, surrounded by a ditch, about two miles from the gates of
Tunis. It has evidently existed ever since the time of the Spaniards,
for the name is clearly a corruption of the Spanish Pardo—a royal domain
just outside Madrid. The Bardo contains a bazaar, a mosque, and a
Turkish bath, the three outward and visible signs of all Tunisian
cities, both great and small, besides a hall of justice, two audience-
chambers, a quadrangle usually known as the Court of Lions, the public
offices, a series of dungeons for political offenders, and an enormous
_seraglio_, behind the latticed windows of which European gaze has never
penetrated. No Bey of Tunis has ever been known to inhabit the palace of
his predecessor, and each occupant of the throne has generally built a
pleasant place for his residence according to his own devices. Ahmed Bey
lived far away in the Zaghouán plain, while his successor preferred to
enjoy the cool breezes of the Mediterranean amongst the palm groves and
vineyards of the Marsa under the shade of the Carthage hills. For
several years Muhamed es Sadek “avoided the evil eye,” by transferring
his court to the half-ruinous Bardo enclosure, in which some of his
ministers now built convenient dwelling-houses. One of them, Sy Ismael
Sunni, purchased a plot of ground in the smiling Manouba plain just
outside the Bardo _fosse_, and erected a four-storied mansion after the
fashion of an Italian barrack or English workhouse, which he called
inappropriately enough the Kasr-es-Said, or the “abode of felicity.” Sy
Ismail did not live to see the orange gardens blossom round his new
house, for in 1867 he was accused of participation in the romantic
rebellion of the Bey’s brother, Sidi Adel, was dragged from the gilded
apartments of Kasr-es-Said to the executioner’s chamber in the Bardo,
and there strangled with a silken cord. Muhamed es Sadek confiscated the
property of his dead minister, and removed his _penates_ from the gloomy
old _seraglio_ of his ancestors to the more cheerful palace on the other
side of the ditch. Kasr-es-Said has proved almost as unfortunate for the
prince as it did for his servant. The very room in which Sy Ismail Sunni
struggled with his captors, has now witnessed the extinction of even the
remaining shadow of Tunisian independence. It was in Kasr-es-Said that
the last “possesseur du royaume de Tunis” became a vassal of France.
In April 1881, both the Bey and his Prime Minister were living in the
Kasr-es-Said Palace, the only picturesque feature of which is the great
garden of roses, jessamine, and orange-trees, in the midst of which it
stands. The wide expanse of stucco façade is almost blinding in the
sunlight, as one approaches the entrance by an avenue of palm and pepper
trees, and above the roof floats the green, red, and orange-coloured
silk banner, bearing as a device the golden two-bladed sword of the
Hassanite dynasty. It was thus that I saw Kasr-es-Said on the 23d April
1881. Muhamed es Sadek was anxious that people in England should be
acquainted with his troubles, and he asked me to come to the palace
early on the morning in question. The only sign of the impending crisis
was the entire desertion of the _bureaux_ at the Bardo, which were left
in undisputed possession of General Musalli and one or two of his
subordinates. Ministers and employés now crowded the ante-rooms of Kasr-
es-Said, the Council of State held perpetual session in one of the
drawing-rooms, and the corridors were thronged with Tunisian officers
and Arabs from the interior. The department of Foreign Affairs had
temporary quarters in a little chamber on the ground floor, which
possessed several sofas but no table. A solemn silence was maintained
throughout the building, in which the wives of both prince and premier
were sharing, behind the gratings of the harem windows, the common
anxiety. Cigarettes and coffee were almost forgotten. Every new-comer
from the city underwent an ordeal of whispered questioning:—Is there any
news from the frontier? What do the latest newspapers say? Has the
English fleet come? Are the Italian troops already at Palermo? The
Turkish music was playing as usual at the door when I arrived, and M.
Sumaripa, the confidential agent of M. Roustan, had just left the
palace, after delivering a verbal message to Mustapha. When I met the
Prime Minister he was holding a letter in his hand. In order to avoid
mistakes Sumaripa had given him a copy of his instructions. It was a
last attempt on the part of M. Roustan to induce the Bey to commit
political suicide. The memorandum ran as follows:—“The recent
declarations made by the Bey to M. Roustan and the _corps consulaire_
have increased the anxiety already excited by his first communications.
It is true that His Highness asserts his firm intention to maintain
order, but he adds that he can no longer be responsible for it when once
the expedition against the Khamírs commences. In the presence of these
apprehensions in the mind of His Highness, M. Roustan informs him that
he is ready to place at his disposal a company of marines, together with
two cannons belonging to the French frigate in the roadstead, which
force will be amply sufficient to maintain order in and protect the
European quarter. But as we are now, and desire to remain in peace with
the Bey, the disembarkation in question can only take place on the
express demand of His Highness. Ask for an immediate answer, and in case
of refusal say that we take note of it.” Mustapha had already given
orders for a reply to be sent to M. Roustan, and having called M. Conti,
the Bey’s interpreter, we ascended the staircase together and entered a
small _salon_. The room was typical of the whole place. The floor was
covered with Sicilian tiles, and the wooden ceiling painted with wreaths
of red, yellow, and blue flowers. Window curtains, sofa cushions, and
_portières_ alike consisted of faded yellow damask. The table was
missing, but there were two chests of drawers, each supporting a clock
flanked by two artificial bouquets in Parian vases. A side door opened,
and the Bey entered; he took me kindly by the hand, and asked me to sit
down. Mustapha also occupied a place on the divan, but M. Conti remained
standing. The Bey is a fine-looking old man, with grey hair and beard,
and a ruddy complexion. His features are rather Turkish than Arabic, and
I never saw trouble more clearly written on a human face. He was dressed
in a black frock-coat and red trousers, and wore only his Pacha’s sword
and Turkish and Tunisian orders. Muhamed es Sadek at once began the
conversation:—“You have come lately from England, do Englishmen believe
in the Khamírs?” I replied that “I was afraid they knew very little
about them, but that the English press had unanimously deprecated the
expedition.” He said he knew that, and was grateful for the sympathy of
Englishmen, but that he wished to make his case more widely known both
in England and Europe generally. He then, with much animation and
gesture, spoke at considerable length as to his grievances. He commenced
by observing that both he and his predecessors had received, during more
than two centuries, continued marks of sympathy from England, and that
on their part the Beys of Tunis had always followed implicitly every
suggestion made by the English Government. His cousin Ahmed was the
first Mussulman sovereign who had abolished slavery, and he had himself
first granted permission to British subjects to hold land in the
Regency, and had done everything to promote English interests in his
country. He regarded with peculiar pride the high distinction the Queen
had conferred on him in sending him the Grand Cross of the Bath, as well
as many other assurances of her approbation. The Bey expressed his
surprise that his position as a vassal of the Sublime Porte had ever
been questioned in Europe. No Bey of Tunis had ever ascended the throne
without the Sultan’s investiture, and he himself had received three
separate firmans of appointment from Abdul Aziz and his two successors.
He pointed out that his jewelled sword and the Order of the Osmanlie in
diamonds were the insignia of his rank as Pacha of Tunis. The firman of
1871, about which much has been said, was merely a confirmatory and
declaratory act, which was elicited from the Sultan by the accident of
one of the Powers calling the _status_ of Tunis in question. The Bey
added several details on the subject of the subordinate political
position of Tunis, and declared that he and his predecessors had
scrupulously carried out every demand of their suzerain, both during the
Crimean war, and again in 1878. His principal consolation under the
present trial was the unqualified approval of his conduct twice already
conveyed to him by telegraph from the Sultan. He alluded to the explicit
treaty engagements he had entered into with the Powers, by which he
guaranteed equal privileges to all Europeans in his dominions, and said
that if he had favoured one nation more than another it was undoubtedly
France. Till a very recent period his relations with France had been
most cordial, and he had never refused any request made to him by her
representative which he could grant with any show of justice. France
possessed a railway which crossed his dominions, as well as the sole
means of telegraphic communication with Europe. He alluded in the
strongest terms to the course pursued by the Havas Agency, which had
endeavoured to deceive the world as to the Tunisian question, and to the
attacks made on him by the Algerian press, and particularly the
_Akhbar_; but in spite of all this, he said he would never ignore the
importance of legitimate French interests in the Regency, or abandon the
hope of the restoration of his old cordial relations with the French
Government, which only very recently had acknowledged his efforts to
maintain perfect order on the frontier. He said that M. Roustan had
unceasingly pressed on him for thirteen months the acceptance of a
French protectorate, and he added with energy, that, apart from his
treaties with the great Powers, his political and religious relations
with the Sultan would never allow him to accept it, and that nothing
could ever change his fixed determination on the subject; although his
suzerain alone had spoken, he could never believe that England and Italy
were indifferent to his fate. Not only had they both large and important
colonies, but they could not ignore the consequence of the complete
subversion of the government of his country which M. Roustan asked for.
He left this, however, to their own just appreciation, but they had in
the past ever insisted on an equality of treatment at his hands. He
bitterly complained of the conduct of M. Roustan towards him, and said
that it had made his life a burden to him for some time past. As regards
the Khamírs, a calm investigation would show that the true details of
the dispute were these:—France had assured Europe that she desired to
punish the Khamírs, but in a few days his own troops, under the command
of his brother, had occupied the part of the country in which they
lived, and any satisfaction France desired would be readily given. This
being the case, no shadow of an excuse existed for invading his
territory, and imperilling the peace of his country and the safety of
the European colony. M. Roustan had for some days asked his permission
for the French troops to occupy his territory, but he never could
consent to this step, either in his own name or in that of the Sultan.
He expressed his strong indignation at the attempt which had been made
to shift the responsibilities of the consequence of the invasion upon
him, and especially at the suggestion which M. Roustan had that day made
to him to concur in the disembarkation of French troops with two cannon
at Goletta. He pointed out that such a proceeding must inevitably lead
to very serious consequences. He said that every foreign representative
must testify to the perfect order prevailing in the country in spite of
warlike rumours and continued menaces, and he left it to such Englishmen
as Earl De la Warr and Mr. Guest to let England know, from their own
experience, how he had governed, and whether he was or was not entitled
to the sympathy of England. He felt sure an inquiry would lead a
generous nation like that of France to a different opinion concerning
him. He said he had no quarrel whatever with France; that he would
always further her interests in Tunis; but that, as a vassal of the
Porte, nothing could ever induce him to accept a French protectorate of
his states, or allow his territory to be occupied without protest. An
armed resistance he could not make, but he would be at his post to
maintain order and public security. He felt that he must leave his fate
to the justice of Europe, towards both himself and his suzerain.
After taking leave of the Bey, I went into the temporary office below to
read over the reply to M. Sumaripa’s demand, which had been approved by
the council. The letter was couched in the following terms:—
_The Bey to M. Roustan (April 23d)._
Our Prime Minister has brought to our knowledge the communication which
has been made to him in your name by M. Sumaripa. You state that
additional anxiety has been created amongst the European colonists by
reason of the recent declaration which we have made to you and the
representatives of the friendly Powers, and suggest that this impression
should be removed by the landing of a force of marines with two cannons
from the frigate at Goletta, in order to reassure the European
population of Tunis. You add that this measure can only be adopted with
our consent, because by God’s goodness we are at peace with your
Government, which desires to remain on friendly terms with us.
We must first thank both you and your Government for this spontaneous
declaration of its wish to continue at peace with us. We are obliged
also for your solicitude for our good and for the preservation of public
order, of which we consider your proposal itself as an evident proof. We
regret, however, to be obliged to decline your assistance because the
result would be contrary to what you imagine, and its acceptance would
amount to a confession of our inability to maintain order, which is far
from being the case. You are yourself a witness, that, under God’s
providence, nothing whatever has happened to justify the fears
entertained by the colonists, and that order everywhere prevails. The
interpretation you seek to give to our declarations is at variance with
the declarations themselves. We have assured both your honourable
colleagues and yourself that as long as things continue in their normal
course we will answer for the public order and tranquillity, and that in
any case we will do our utmost to prevent the smallest breach of the
peace. We repeat to you, however, once more, that if any portion of the
Regency is invaded by the French troops, we may find ourselves in the
presence of a general rising, which will spread all over the country
notwithstanding our efforts to suppress it. It is this danger we have
endeavoured to point out, and for which we must decline all
responsibility.
We still hope that the Government of the Republic will take all this
into serious consideration, and will reflect on the various perils which
an invasion of our country may engender. We trust, therefore, that we
may be permitted to exclusively treat the matter of the Khamírs,
concerning which we shall arrive at a solution of a satisfactory nature,
and such as will secure the end we both profess to have in view.
M. Roustan was very wroth at this unexpected refusal, and in the course
of the afternoon sent one of his janissaries to make a round of the
Consulates with the following protest in the shape of a circular:—
_M. Roustan to the Corps Consulaire (April 23d)._
The undersigned Chargé d’Affaires of the French Republic has the honour
to bring the following to the knowledge of all the representatives of
foreign nations at Tunis. In view of the renewed declarations of the Bey
in his last communications to the consuls, and of the alarm they have
caused among the population, the undersigned has thought it his duty to
inform His Highness that he was ready to place at his service the
landing party of the “Jeanne d’Arc,” at present in the roads off
Goletta, with two cannons, an amply sufficient force to maintain order
in the European quarter, and protect it against any aggression. The
undersigned only added that the landing could not take place except at
the express request of the Bey, who, this very morning, formally
declined these offers. The undersigned takes note of the refusal, and
loses no time in informing his colleagues of the fact. They will
conclude therefrom, like himself, that the uneasiness the Tunisian
Government feels as to the maintenance of order is less great than that
which it affects to be, or else that it has determined to accept,
whatever occurs, the responsibilities it has hitherto tried to decline.
Before leaving the palace the Prime Minister told me that the Bey had
determined to charter a steamer to carry his telegrams for
Constantinople to Marsala, as it was worse than useless for him to avail
himself of the French line, and offered to allow me to take advantage of
this mode of communication. I was therefore able to telegraph an account
of my conversation with the Bey to England the next day from Trapani in
Sicily. Mustapha was very anxious for me to join Ali Bey’s camp amongst
the Khamírs in order “to see what really took place,” but I told him it
was impossible for me to leave Tunis. He then repeated several times,
“We must have a witness, an _English_ witness,” and I suggested to him
that perhaps Mr. Perkins, a British resident in Tunis, would be able to
meet his wishes. Mr. Edmund Arthur Perkins started for the Khamír
country the same day, and continued to send valuable information to
Tunis until the final retreat of Ali Bey. His journal has especial
interest, as unlicensed writing was strictly forbidden amongst the
invaders. Every correspondent who joined the French columns was forced
to sign the following undertaking, which was very strictly adhered to:—
“I engage on my honour not to transmit any information, either directly
by telegraph or letter, or by third persons, without having the _visa_
of the commander of the column or of the officers he has delegated. I
admit that any breach of that engagement exposes me to all the rigours
of martial law. I moreover admit having been warned that if the journal
in the name of which I am accredited publishes news of a nature to be of
use to the adversaries of France, I may be forthwith escorted back to
the nearest port of embarkation, and that residence in Algeria be
forbidden me.”
It was hardly probable that the intelligence department of the Khamírs
(and, according to M. Roustan’s own showing, they were the only “enemies
of France”) comprised a collection of European journals, but the very
existence of such restrictions has rendered all communications from
independent sources of additional importance, and, as events afterwards
proved, Mustapha was wise in his generation, when he determined at any
cost to have a “witness” with the Tunisian troops amidst the Khamírs.