BATTLE OF FEROZESHAH (OR FEROZESHUHUR) 21ST DECEMBER, 1845, AND
RESUMED BATTLE OF 22ND DECEMBER—THE ARMY MOVES INTO POSITION
AT SOBRAON.
Early in the morning of the 19th parties were sent out to bring in the
wounded, and our cavalry outposts pushed forward to cover this, as
also to enable our artillery to bring in the captured guns, amounting
to seventeen. The enemy having made a reconnaissance with a large body
of cavalry, which created an alarm in the camp, the troops were turned
out and took up a very faulty position in front of Moodkee. In this
village there is a very tenable little fort, which was of great use to
us. About one o’clock, the enemy making no forward movement, the troops
were turned in to cook. During the afternoon all was quiet.
On the 20th every arrangement was made for the care of the sick,
wounded, stores, etc., at Moodkee, and the troops, well completed in
ammunition, prepared to march on the memorable 21st December. As yet no
direct communication was established with Sir John Littler, in command
of the 7000 men at Ferozepore. These were still isolated and subject
to a weighty attack of the enemy, who could attack with facility and
still hold his position around the village of Ferozeshuhur. This was
strongly fortified and bristling with cannon, and there was plenty
of water for both men and horses. Hence our object was to effect a
combination with the Ferozepore force ere the enemy anticipated us,
unless his correct information of our movements led him to attack
either one or both of our columns moving mutually to a point of
concentration, for Littler’s force was ordered to move out and meet our
advance. (This was by no means a difficult or dangerous movement, the
distance from Moodkee to Ferozepore not exceeding that from the Sikh
army at Ferozeshuhur.)
The troops marched from Moodkee in order of battle (almost crossing
the front of the enemy’s position), and moved in the direction of
Ferozepore, from whence Littler’s column was also moving to effect
the junction, which took place about ten o’clock in the morning. Sir
H. Hardinge, as Governor-General, had interdicted any attack upon
the enemy’s lines until the junction was effected, a most fortunate
interdiction for British India.[134] So soon as the army was collected,
Sir H. Hardinge turned to Sir H. Gough and said, “Now the army is at
your disposal.”
Sir Hugh made immediate arrangements to attack, although much most
valuable time was lost in those arrangements, nor were Generals of
Division made the least aware of how or what or where they were to
attack. The army was one unwieldy battalion under one Commanding
Officer who had not been granted the power of ubiquity. My opinion
may be called one after the result, but I formed it while the troops
were arranging in order of battle. I now record it leisurely and most
deliberately. Had I commanded, I should have moved in contiguous
columns of brigades, my cavalry protecting my advance up to the enemy’s
position till within range of his guns, the troops so moving as to
be able to anticipate any movement of the enemy to the discomfort of
Ferozepore, and to enable me to throw the weight of the attack upon
the right of the enemy, if, as I apprehended from all I had heard, he
was as assailable upon his right as on any other given point. I say I
would have thrown the weight of my attack upon his right, because he
was most formidable in his entrenched position, and if that right was
to be carried as I anticipated, my victorious troops could have acted
on the line of his retreat, which, being comparatively left open, gave
him an opportunity to avail himself of it, and not to fight with that
desperation that even bad troops will show if they are hemmed in. So
soon as my advancing columns had attained to barely within the range of
the enemy’s guns, I would have carefully reconnoitred him, and compared
ocular demonstration with the accounts of the enemy’s interior
arrangements of defence afforded by spies, taking with me each General
of Division as I passed the front of his troops. This reconnaissance
would have enabled officers in command to see their way. The whole
weight of my attack should have been on the enemy’s right and right
centre, which would have given me the advantage which the principles
of war so justly and truly demand, “To be superior to your enemy on
the point of attack.” The enemy’s position was his favoured one,
semicircular, the centre near the village of Ferozeshuhur, where there
were good wells, and also pond water for cattle. By a weighty attack
on a given point, the half of the enemy’s cannon in position would
have been lost to him and innocuous to us. Whereas we attacked in what
may almost be termed lines of circumvallation of the enemy’s crescent,
thus presenting ourselves as targets to every gun the enemy had.
Our artillery was massed about the centre of the army; six-pounders
opposed to the enemy’s guns in embrasures, and of a calibre or weight
beyond the range of our six-pounders; hence the mortality and wrongly
imputed inefficiency of that arm, a noble arm when called forth in its
legitimate field.
The 1st Division, mine, was separated, the 1st Brigade, under Brigadier
Hicks, being to the right of the mass of artillery, the 2nd Brigade to
the left of that arm, which covered from three-quarters to a mile of
ground. The whole Division was regarded as the reserve to the centre of
the army. Sir John Littler’s, the Ferozepore force, was on the left.
In this order the army advanced to the attack. There was plenty of
daylight; the imputation of attacking too late in the day is unfounded,
as I will plainly show, although I was not then, nor am I now, an
advocate for so precipitate an attack, made without any knowledge of
the enemy’s position beyond the lies and contradictory stories of
spies. An attack on a rear-guard ought to be precipitated _coûte que
coûte_; an attack on an army delayed until science can be applied with
the greatest decision.
Having posted my right Brigade, I joined the left and correctly posted
it, strictly in obedience to the orders I had received from the
Commander-in-Chief in person. My Division thus posted, I rode forward
with a desire of having a look at the enemy’s position, and came up
to Sir H. Hardinge, who was in doubt what some guns were upon our
left, which had just been brought into action. I galloped forward to
ascertain, and reported they were of Littler’s force, that his attack
appeared to me one of no weight from its formation, and that, if the
enemy behaved as expected, it would fail. Sir H. Hardinge said, “Then
bring up your Division.” I explained I had only one Brigade; I could
bring up that. He ordered it up, and I pretty quickly had it on the
move to the front, to the left of Gilbert’s, or the 2nd Division, and
to the right of Littler’s.
At this moment Gilbert’s left was not only checked in its advance,
but actually falling back, and I had some difficulty in establishing
myself on the front line in consequence of the broken troops falling
back upon me. Scarcely was I firmly established, when Major Broadfoot,
the Political Agent, rode up and said, “Be prepared, General. Four
Battalions of Avitabile’s[135] are close upon you in advance; I have
it from correct information—a man in my pay has just left them.” The
smoke and dirt rendered everything at the moment invisible. I saw,
however, that to resist this attack, which was evidently made to take
advantage of our check, and penetrate our line between Littler’s
right and Gilbert’s left, I must bring up the right of my Brigade.
I endeavoured to do so, and with H.M.’s 50th Regiment I partially
succeeded, under a storm of musketry and cannon which I have rarely,
if ever, seen exceeded. My native troops staggered and some receded,
while the gallant old 50th bore the whole brunt, opening a rapid fire.
At this moment poor Major Arthur Somerset[136] was struck down, a most
accomplished soldier for his experience, and of a promise to emulate
his great ancestor the Duke, had Almighty God been pleased to spare him
to his country. I never saw a more cool, judicious, and gallant officer
than my dear and lamented friend, Arthur Somerset. If the tears of a
veteran could decorate the hero’s tomb, every vein upon it would be
full. Poor youth! “Sic transit gloria mundi!”
The enemy was at this moment in his bearing noble and triumphant. So
fast were officers and men falling, I saw there was nothing for it but
a charge of bayonets to restore the waning fight. I, Colonel Petit, and
Colonel Ryan put ourselves at the head of the 50th, and most gallantly
did they charge into the enemy’s trenches, where such a hand-to-hand
conflict ensued as I had never before witnessed. The enemy was repulsed
at this point, and his works and cannon carried, and he precipitately
retreated. I pushed forward with the 50th in line until we reached the
enemy’s camp. All order was broken by the tents, but my orders and
example were “Forward! Forward! Forward!” I saw a village occupied
by the enemy full in my front, about 400 yards away. By this time I
was joined by many stragglers of regiments from my right or Gilbert’s
Division, but no one from my left or Littler’s. I was therefore
apprehensive of my left flank, nor was I aware (from the obscurity
created by the dust) whether the four Battalions of Avitabile’s were
repulsed, or indeed where they were. I resolved, therefore, to carry
the village, which I soon did in gallant style with H.M.’s 50th and
a detachment of the Honourable Company’s 1st European Light Infantry
under Captain Seaton and Lieutenant ——. The colours of H.M.’s 50th were
gallantly borne forward by Brevet Captain Lovett and Lieutenant de
Montmorency. I was the first officer in the Head-quarters village of
the Sikh army, Ferozeshuhur, and I planted one of the colours of H.M.’s
50th on the mud walls. A scene of awful slaughter here ensued, as the
enemy would not lay down their arms. The village was full of richly
caparisoned and magnificent horses, and there were camels around it
innumerable.
After about half an hour the dust cleared away upon my left, and I
saw that Avitabile’s Battalions had been driven back by my charge,
but Littler’s Division had made no impression upon the enemy where
he attacked. The victory appeared complete on my right; crowds of
advancing, straggling officers and soldiers came up, and I resolved
again to push forward. The evening was fast closing, but before
dark I carried the enemy’s camp half a mile beyond the village,
and endeavoured to collect and form the stragglers upon H.M.’s
50th—amounting, I conceive, to near 3000 men. For the first hour,
so excited were the men, I could make no formation, which I little
regarded at the moment, expecting every instant to hear the victorious
army upon my right. Not doing so, on the contrary, hearing the enemy
in force close to my front and right (it was very dark), I saw at once
I had pushed the victory far beyond [the ground held by our army],
and that my position was critical in the extreme. I therefore made a
vigorous and determined exertion to establish a formation, and I got
the 24th Regiment Native Infantry—one of my own Division—in line upon
my right under Major Bird, and about 150 of the 1st European Light
Infantry under Captain Seaton, and proceeded to form the whole in a
semicircle in front of the enemy’s camp, my flank being well refused
towards the village. Scarcely was this first formation effected, when
the enemy made rather a sharp attack upon my right and drove back the
formed troops. The darkness prevented the enemy continuing his success,
and the noise and clamour of my troops in the endeavour to form
indicated that I still held my ground. Thus I was compelled to reoccupy
my right and contract the circle of formation. In this arduous duty I
(and the Service still more so) was deeply indebted to Major Hull of
the 16th Grenadiers, who, after he received a wound of which he died in
a few hours, continued to do his duty, and aid me beyond my expression
under a murderous fire of musketry, grape, round shot, and grisaille.
I at length got all the stragglers, consisting of some of H.M.’s 9th
Regiment under Major Barwell,
The 19th Grenadiers Native Infantry
" 24th Regiment " "
" 28th " " "
" 73rd " " "
and many others, upon the 50th, which was well in hand.
The moon arose, and the night was as bright as day. The enemy soon
discovered the weakness and isolation of my force, and gradually
closed in upon me, keeping up a most destructive fire. My A.A.G.
and Q.M.G. were both wounded, their horses killed—every officer and
soldier dead-tired, so that many were killed fast asleep, both officers
and men. I was fully aware of the importance of my post, in the very
centre of and beyond the enemy’s entrenched position, and although I
could hear nothing of our army or see any bivouac fires, I resolved to
maintain myself to the last. The loss, however, became every moment
more heavy, and officers and soldiers were restless and sensible
of their critically advanced position. The enemy got a gun to bear
directly on my rear; my course was decided for me, and I at once saw
indications of the impossibility of maintaining myself any longer.
It was now three o’clock in the morning. To withdraw without being
compromised was a most perilous operation, for I was surrounded,
while the enemy were shouting and cheering, beating up troops, and
calling out to us in French and English, as well as Hindoostani, that
we were in their power. I therefore feigned to attack, opened a fire
and under the smoke quietly drew off, H.M.’s 50th leading. For the
last arrangement, this was my reason—if I were opposed, the 50th would
charge through such opposition; if pressed on my rear and the native
troops rushed past me, I then had a rear-guard of H.M.’s troops which
I could depend on. The enemy never discovered my retrograde movement
until I was out of his power.
I then marched straight, leaving Ferozeshuhur to my left and continuing
my route (guided by the moon and the dead soldiers on the line by
which I advanced). I soon fell in with a vedette, and, concluding
all was right and seeing a bivouac fire, regarded it as the picquet
of cavalry from which he was posted. Upon reaching the fire, I found
it belonged to the wounded men of H.M.’s 62nd Regiment and others,
under some surgeons, who knew nothing whatever of our army. It was
presumptuously urged upon me by several officers, who ought to have
thought before they spoke, to move on Ferozepore. My answer was decided
enough. “The Commander-in-Chief with his army is not far from us,
meditating an attack as soon as it is daylight, and find him I will if
in h—ll, where I will join him, rather than make one retrograde step
till I have ascertained some fact.” At the moment a large flame mounted
up, as if soldiers were lighting a large fire. I exclaimed, “There’s my
point, friend or foe.”
In about three-quarters of a mile I reached the fire, the village
of Misreewalla, where I found a Brigade of Cavalry, some Irregular
Horse, some Horse Artillery, and two or three thousand stragglers of
every Regiment in the army. I halted my people and got hold of some
spirits, which I issued to my gallant 50th and all the Europeans.
Soon after I reached Misreewalla I met Captain Lumley, A.A.G. of the
Army and at the head of the Department (General Lumley being sick,
and Major Grant desperately wounded at Moodkee). I was delighted to
see him, concluding he came direct from the Commander-in-Chief. He
said, “Sir Harry Smith, you are the very man I am looking for. As
senior officer of the Adjutant-General’s department, I order you to
collect every soldier and march to Ferozepore.” I said, “Do you come
direct from the Commander-in-Chief, with _such an order_? If you do,
I can find him, for, by G——, I’ll take no such order from any man on
earth but from his own mouth. Where is he?” “I don’t know, but these
in my official [position] are the orders.” “D—— the orders, if not the
Commander-in-Chief’s. I’ll give my own orders, and take none of that
retrograde sort from any Staff officer on earth. But why to Ferozepore?
What’s the matter?” “Oh, the army has been beaten, but we can buy the
Sikh soldiers.” “What!” says I, “have we taken no guns?” “Oh yes,” he
says, “fifty or sixty.” “Thank you,” I said; “I see my way, and want
no orders.” Turning round to my A.G., Captain Lugard, I said, “Now get
hold of every officer and make him fall in his men.”
At this moment Captain Christie, in command of an irregular Corps of
Horse, a most excellent officer, came up and said he knew the direction
the Commander-in-Chief was in and could point it out. I was delighted,
and I marched off every man able to move to join Sir Hugh Gough,
sending forward my wounded A.G. to report my whereabouts and what
troops I had with me. The Commander-in-Chief was as delighted to hear
of me and my troops as I was to find His Excellency. His orders were to
move up in support of the attack which I well and truly anticipated he
meditated, when to my astonishment I saw the village of Ferozeshuhur
full in my front two miles distant, the very post I had carried and
occupied the night before, and from which, after having held it until
three o’clock that morning, I was compelled to withdraw, or I should
have remained there nearly by myself.[137]
The attack was made on the part of the enemy’s camp he still held,
namely, his right, which had repulsed Littler’s attack on the afternoon
of the 21st. It was now carried without a check. The 1st Brigade of my
Division, especially H.M.’s 31st Regiment, greatly distinguished itself
and suffered severely.
Scarcely was the victory of the 21st and 22nd December over, when
a fresh body of the enemy (which had been watching Ferozepore
or threatening an attack if the garrison was withdrawn, and had
been deluded through Littler’s very judiciously leaving his camp
standing) came vaunting upon the left of our line and opened a fierce
cannonade upon us, literally within what had been their own camp and
entrenchments. The ammunition for our guns was fully expended, and our
troops were literally exhausted, and we could not attack what would
have been an easy prey under other circumstances. The whole of the
enemy withdrew and recrossed the Sutlej unmolested, for our troops
were in no condition to pursue. Our numerous wounded required to be
collected, our stores to be brought up, our troops to be refreshed.
From the march of the troops from Umbala and Loodiana upon Busseean,
our men had fought three actions, the battles of Moodkee, Ferozeshuhur,
and that of the 22nd December, gained three victories, and endured
great fatigue of marching and privations, especially of what is so
important to the native troops, water.[138] In a day or two the whole
were fresh, and we moved forward on the line the enemy had withdrawn
by. The 1st Division was on the right of the army, and subsequently
Brigadier Cureton’s Brigade of Cavalry (two troops of Horse Artillery,
H.M.’s 16th Lancers, 3rd Light Cavalry, and a corps of Irregular
Horse under a Captain Hill) were posted again to my right and under
my command. My outposts were opposite the enemy. At Sobraon, which
afterwards became so renowned, the enemy threw over a bridge and had
a ford near it; they ably constructed _têtes du pont_, and showed
an intention to cross. To do so was an act of madness which could
not be contemplated by any reasoning faculties, although ultimately
demonstrated.
It appeared to me that our army was not posted where it ought to be,
and I strongly recommended to the Commander-in-Chief to move up the
left bank of the Sutlej, so that his centre should be opposite Sobraon,
and his left be kept in direct communication with Ferozepore by an
intermediate corps under the command of Sir John Grey, which could
also watch the reputed fords and ferries on that part of the river
on his front,—the right of the army, namely, my command, Cureton’s
Cavalry and my own Division, to be posted opposite the ford and ferry
of Hurreekee. The Commander-in-Chief called for the distribution of
the army as I proposed, which I gave in, accompanied by an explanatory
letter to His Excellency. In forty-eight hours it was adopted, and the
army moved into the celebrated position opposite Sobraon. Here the
enemy constructed a bridge of boats and pushed over his whole army,
most strongly fortifying and entrenching himself on the left side of
the river, a movement unparalleled in the history of war from time
immemorial. It may be asked, Why was he permitted? Answer, Because
we could not help ourselves. The right or enemy’s bank was high and
favourable for him in every way, and the bridge was judiciously thrown
over at a bend of the river; hence the natural formation presented a
formidable _tête du pont_, which the enemy entrenched and filled with
cannon of the heaviest calibre. We could not contend with him, our
heavy guns not having arrived, and the left bank of the river being
nearly perfectly flat. Thus he could cross, and did, unmolested, and
duly pushed his outposts forward and ours back, until it was deemed
necessary to counter-fortify our camp in his front, which was done
by bringing some of the heavy guns from Ferozepore. My Division and
command being well to the right, I had a line of outposts from the
confluence of the Beas and the Sutlej to within a mile of the enemy’s
entrenchments at Sobraon.